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A't 


A  TREATISE 


ON   THE 


LAW  OF  CARRIERS 

AS 

ADMINISTERED  IN  THE  COURTS  OF  THE  UNITED 
STATES,  CANADA  AND  ENGLAND 

BY 

ROBERT  HUTCHINSON 


THIRD    EDITION 

BY 

J.  SCOTT  MATTHEWS 

AND 

WILLIAM   F.  DICKINSON 

Members  of  the  Chicago  Bab 


VOIvUIVlK    I 


CHICAGO 

CALLAGHAN  AND  COMPANY 

1906 


Ht?^3 


c 

dOL  ' 


Entered  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1879,  by 

CALLAGHAN  AND  COMPANY, 
In  the  otlice  of  the  Librarian  of  Congress,  at  Washington. 


Entered  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1891,  by 

CALLAGHAN  AND  COMPANY, 
In  the  office  of  the  Librarian  of  Congress,  at  Washington. 


Entered  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1906,  by 

CALLAGHAN  AND  COMPANY, 
In  the  office  of  the  Librarian  of  Congress,  at  Washington 


PUBLISHERS'  NOTE  TO  FIRST  EDITION. 


In  1875  it  came  to  our  knowledge  that  the  author  of  this  vol- 
ume had  been  giving  great  attention  to  the  subject  of  ''Car- 
riers," and  had  prepared  considerable  material  for  a  treatise. 
We  felt  confident  that  the  legal  profession  were  even  then  ready 
to  greet  a  new  work  on  this  subject,  and  that  Mr.  Hutchinson 
was,  by  reason  of  his  large  acquaintance  with  the  subject  and 
his  extended  studies,  well  fitted  to  respond  to  the  evident  want 
of  the  profession.  But  to  our  request  to  complete  his  labors, 
Mr.  Hutchinson  was  unable  to  accede,  owing  to  a  press  of  pro- 
fessional duties  requiring  all  his  attention. 

In  1877,  however,  the  proposition  being  renewed,  he  consented 
to  prepare  the  manuscript,  and  thereafter  labored  unceasingly 
till  the  last  line  of  the  text  was  written.  A  few  days  after  he 
announced  to  us  the  completion  of  the  last  chapter,  and  of  his 
intention  to  forward  it  to  the  printers,  we  received  the  melan- 
choly news  of  his  death  from  yellow  fever,  near  Memphis.  A 
considerable  portion  of  the  work  had  been  stereotyped,  all  of  the 
text  was  written,  but  neither  the  analysis  of  contents,  the  table 
of  cases,  nor  the  index,  was  constructed,  and  it  was  necessary 
that  the  main  body  of  the  text  be  read,  that  the  citations  be  cor- 
rected in  proof,  and  that  the  last  chapter  be  revised. 

This  necessary  workj  the  Hon.  James  0.  Pierce,  Judge  of  the 

iii 


C:Q^^/•oo 


vi  editor's  note  to  second  edition. 

Tlu>  editor  desires  to  make  public  acknowledgment  to  Mr. 
John  W.  Beaumont,  of  the  Detroit  Bar,  who  has  rendered  him 
much  aid,  particularly  in  revising  the  chapters  on  Baggage  and 
Actions  against  Carriers  for  Injuries  to  Goods. 

The  editor  trusts  that  the  work  done  upon  the  second  edition 
may  not  be  found  unworthy  a  place  beside  the  excellent  work 
done  upon  the  first. 

FLOYD  E.  MECHEM. 

Detroit,  July  1,  1891. 


EDITORS'  NOTE  TO  THIRD  EDITION. 


Realizing  that  much  of  the  first  edition  of  this  work  has  be- 
come a  classic  on  the  subject  of  Carriers,  it  has  been  the  endeavor 
of  the  editors  of  this  edition  to  follow  as  closely  as  possible  the 
method  of  treatment  pursued  by  the  original  author.  Since, 
however,  many  new  questions  involving  the  subject  of  Carriers 
have  arisen  and  been  passed  upon  by  the  courts  subsequent  to 
the  publication  of  the  second  edition,  it  has  been  found  neces- 
sary to  add  many  new  sections,  and  to  supplement  or  to  rewrite 
many  of  the  old.  The  treatment  of  the  important  subject  of 
Conflict  of  Laws  has  been  extended  to  twenty-five  sections  of  con- 
crete rules  of  law.  The  Harter  Act,  which  revolutionizes  the 
law  in  reference  to  the  carriage  of  goods  on  the  high  seas  and 
great  lakes,  has  been  extensively  considered.  An  entirely  new 
exposition  of  the  substantive  sections  of  the  new  Interstate  Com- 
merce Act  and  of  the  State  laws  for  the  regulation  of  rates  has 
been  added,  while  the  question  of  the  carrier's  right  to  limit  his 
common-law  liability,  which  has  been  the  subject  of  conflicting 
decisions  by  different  courts,  has  been  given  careful  attention 
and  those  decisions  which  are  authoritative  have  been  pointed 
out.  The  single  section  on  demurrage  in  the  second  edition  has 
been  expanded  into  a  general  treatment  of  the  entire  subject. 
Much  new  matter  has  been  added  through  the  various  chapters, 
under  appropriate  headings,  on  the  subject  of  connecting  car- 
riers. The  chapters  dealing  with  carriers  of  passengers  may  be 
said  to  be  entirely  rewritten. 

The  English,  American  and  Canadian  reports  have  been  care- 

vii 


viii  editors'  note  to  third  edition. 

fully  searched,  and  every  case  of  importance  on  the  subject  of 
Carriers  (excluding  cases  on  Street  Railways)  which  has  been 
decided  since  the  second  edition  of  this  work  has  been  used. 
About  six  thousand  new  cases  have  been  added  to  those  cited  in 
prior  editions,  and  citations  have  been  given  to  the  State  Reports, 
American  State  Reports,  Lawyers  Reports  Annotated  and  Na- 
tional Reporter  System  wherever  possible. 

Owing  to  the  amount  of  new  matter  added,  it  was  found  im- 
possible to  retain  the  old  section  numbers,  and  new  numbers  have 
been  given  throughout.  In  order  to  preserve  the  benefit  of  cita- 
tions of  former  editions  in  judicial  opinions,  the  old  section  num- 
bers have  been  placed  in  parenthesis  immediately  following  the 
new  numbers. 

The  subject  index  has  also  been  greatly  extended.  Each  point 
has  been  indexed  at  least  twice,  once  under  a  general  heading 
and  once  under  a  particular  heading,  but  generally  under  sev- 
eral headings.  In  using  the  index,  time  may  be  saved  by  refer- 
ring first  to  particular  headings. 

The  editors  desire  to  acknowledge  the  valuable  assistance  of 
William  J.  Matthews  in  the  matter  of  proof  reading  and  ar- 
ranging the  table  of  cases. 

J.  SCOTT  MATTHEWS, 
WILLIAM  F.  DICKINSON. 

Chicago,  October  15,  1906. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  I. 

OF  BAILMENTS  AND  CARRIERS  GENERALLY. 

[references  are  to  sections.] 

Bailment   defined    1 

Classification    of    bailments    2 

Application  of  rule  to  carriers   3 

Liability  of  common  carrier  distinguished  from  that  of  other  bailees.     4 

Questions  of  negligence  in  law  of  carriers  5 

Degree  of  diligence  required  depends  on  circumstances   6 

Negligence  in  one  bailee  not  necessarily  so  in  another 7 

Apportionment   of   diligence   according  to   benefit    8 

Law    of    bailment    insufficient    to    determine    liability    of    common 

carriers    9 

Comparative  degrees  of  diligence  and  negligence 10 

Utility   of   this   classification    11 

Common  carrier  not  usually  agent  of  owner  of  goods 12 

But  may  be  agent  in  cases  of  emergency  13 

Bailees  liable  for  malfeasance  and  fraud  14 

CHAPTER  II. 
OF  CARRIERS  WITHOUT  HIRE  AND  PRIVATE  CARRIERS. 

I.     CARRIERS     WITHOUT     HIRE. 

In    general    15 

Who    deemed    to    be    16 

Liability  for  gross  negligence   17 

Undertaking  to  carry  is  a  sufficient  consideration 18 

Carriage  not  gratuitous  where  carrier  has   right  to  demand  com- 
pensation        19 

Presumption  that  carriage  is  gratuitous   20 

Not  gratuitous  where  indirect  compensation  derived    21 

Question  of  gross  negligence  one  of  fact 22 

Not  liable  for  loss  by  robbery  unless  negligent 23 

ix 


X  TABLE   OF    CONTENTS. 

[REFERENCES    ARE   TO    SECTIONS.] 

Degree  of  negligence  which  creates  liability — Instances   24 

Same    subject — Further    illustrations    25 

Same  subject — Further  illustrations    26 

Same  Subject — Other  illustrations   27 

Loss  of  own  goods  at  same  time,  presumptive  but  not  conclusive 

evidence  of  diligence  28 

Same  subject — Reckless  exposure   of  own  goods    29 

Same  subject — Loss  of  bailor's  goods  only   30 

No  presumption  of  negligence   31 

Question  of  gross  negligence,  how  determined   32 

Same  subject — Statements  of  bailee,  when  evidence   33 

Requisites  of  declaration  against  private  carrier  34 

II.   PRIVATE   CARRIERS   FOR   HIRE. 

Who  are  35 

Less  numerous  than  formerly 36 

Degree   of   diligence   required    37 

Same    subject — illustrations    38 

Liability  for  loss  by  theft  or  robbery 39 

Private  carrier  may  contract  for  non-liability   40 

Liability  for  injury  to  goods  subsequently  lost  by  accident 41 

Test  of  private  carrier's  liability   42 

How  compares  with  liability  of  common  carrier 43 

Common  carrier  cannot  become  private  carrier  by  contract 44 

Private  carrier  cannot  become  common  carrier  by  contract 45 

Lien  of  private  carrier  on  goods 46 


CHAPTER  III. 
WHO  IS  A  COMMON  CARRIER. 

Common   carrier   defined    47 

Same  subject — The  essential   characteristics    48 

His  employment  must  be  public  in  its  nature  49 

Same  subject — Exceptional  cases — Gordon  v.  Hutchinson 50 

Same  subject — The  rule  in  England   51 

Same  subject — The  rule  in  Tennessee   52 

Same  subject — Further  of  the  Tennessee  rule   53 

Same    subject — These    exceptional   cases    not   elsewhere    followed — 

Illustrations   54 

Same  subject — Further  illustrations 55 

Same  subject — Other  cases  illustrating  general  rule  56 

Same  subject — The  general  rule  well  settled   57 

Same  subject — How  common  carrier  compares  with  innkeeper ....  58 

Goods  must  be  of  kind  he  professes  to  carry 59 


TABLE   OF    CONTENTS.  XI 

[REFERENCES   ABE   TO   SECTIONS.] 

Must  undertake  to  carry  by  customary  means  and  route 60 

Carriage  must  be  for  hire   61 

Action  must  lie  for  refusal  to  carry   62 

Regular  trips  or  fixed  termini  not  necessary 63 

Kind  of  vehicle  or  vessel  and  distance  immaterial 64 

Hoymen,    bargemen,   lightermen,    canal-boatmen,   etc.,   are   common 

carriers    65 

Ferrymen  are  common  carriers  when   66 

Whether  ferrymen  are  common  carriers  of  goods  retained  in  the 

custody   of  passenger    67 

Proprietors  of  land   vehicles   like   stage-coaches,   omnibuses,   carts, 

wagons,  etc.,  are  common  carriers  when  68 

Vehicles    carrying    passengers    usually    liable   as    common   carriers 

only  as  to  baggage    69 

Proprietors  of  local  land  vehicles  are  common  carriers 70 

Warehousemen,  wharfingers  and  forwarders  of  freight,  when  com- 
mon carriers  71 

Same  subject — When  liability  begins  72 

Water-craft,  railways  and  express  companies  are  chief  carriers  ....   73 

Owners  of  ships  are  usually  common  carriers  74 

Owners  of  steamboats  and  canal-boats  are  common  carriers   75 

Railroad  companies  are  common  carriers  76 

Railroad  receivers,  trustees,  etc.,  are  common  carriers 77 

Street  railways  are  common  carriers    78 

Sleeping  and  parlor-car  companies  not  common  carriers 79 

Express  companies  are  common  carriers  80 

Same  subject — Peculiarities  of  their  business   81 

Same  subject — Attempts  to  secure  exemption   82 

Same  subject — Cannot  escape  liability  by  assuming  name  of  "for- 
warders"        83 

Same  subject — Nor  by  assuming  name  of  "dispatch  company,"  "fast 

freight  line,  etc."   84 

Special  circumstances  under  which  carrier  not  deemed  to  be  com- 
mon carrier  85 

Same  subject — Illustrations    86 

Whether  railroad  transporting  cars  by  contract  is  common  carrier. .   87 
Same  subject — How,  when  railroad  company  does  not  own  cars — 

Circus  train    88 

Owners  of  canal  and  ferryboats  may  show  that  they  are  not  com- 
mon carriers    89 

No  carrier  required  to  carry  every  kind  of  goods 90 

Same  subject — Illustrations 91 

How  when  possession  of  goods  not  taken — Towing  boats 92 

Passenger  carriers  not  common  carriers  of  persons 93 

Postmasters,  mail  contractors  and  carriers  not  common  carriers   .  .   94 
Telegraph  and  telephone  companies  not  common  carriers 95 


Xii  TABLE  OF   CONTENTS. 

[befebences  are  to  sections.] 

Livery  stable  keepers  are  not  common  carriers 96 

Messenger   companies    97 

Log-driving  companies  not  common  carriers   98 

Drovers  and  agisters  not  common  carriers 99 

Owners  and  managers  of  passenger  elevators 100 

Same  subject — Must  allow  passengers  reasonable  time  to  enter  or 

leave    car 101 

Same  subject — When  negligence  will  be  presumed 102 

Bridge,  canal  and  turnpike  companies  103 


CHAPTER  IV. 

OF  THE  DELIVERY  TO  THE  CARRIER,  AND  THE  EVIDENCE 

THEREOF. 

In  general  104 

I.   OF   DELIVERY  TO  THE  GABBIER. 

The  delivery  must  be  complete   105 

Delivery  may  be  made  to  carrier's  agent 106 

Not  suflBcient  when  made  to  agent  not  authorized  to  receive  it  . . .  .107 

Delivery  to  carrier  by  agent  of  shipper  108 

No  delivery  when  owner  retains  custody — Passenger  retaining  cus- 
tody of  baggage   109 

Same  subject   110 

Place  at  which  delivery  must  be  made  Ill 

Must  be  for  immediate  transportation   112 

Same  subject — When  liability  begins   113 

Same  subject — Live  stock  placed  in  yards  provided  by  carrier 114 

Constructive  delivery — Place  fixed  by  agreement  or  usage 115 

Same    subject     116 

Same  subject — Limitations  on  rule   : 117 

Same  subject — Rule  to  be  applied  with  caution   118 

When  the  delivery  becomes  complete   119 

Same  subject — Delivery  to  ships  and  vessels   120 

Same  subject — Delivery  to  railroads  and  express  companies  121 

Carriers  not  required  to  stop  for  goods  except  at  regular  stations.  .122 

Same    subject — Express    companies     123 

When  carrier  deemed  to  have  accepted  goods   124 

Same  subject — How  when  goods  are  loaded  by  owner 125 

Same   subject — Implied   acceptance    126 

Checking,  memorandum  or  entry  on  way-bill  not  necessary  to  com- 
plete   delivery    127 

Delivery  to  ferrymen,  when  complete    128 

Delivery  to  connecting  carriers  to  complete  the  transportation 129 


TABLE  OF   CONTENTS.  Xlll 

[KEFEBENCES   ABE   TO   SECTIOISTS.] 

Duty  of  first  carrier  to  effect  delivery  to  succeeding  carrier 130 

When  liability  of  first  carrier  terminates   131 

Same  subject — Duty  when  succeeding  carrier  neglects  or  refuses  to 

receive  the  goods   132 

How   duty   to  make   delivery  to  a  succeeding  carrier  affected  by 

usage     133 

Agreements  between  carriers  not  binding  on  owner    134 

Same   subject — Illustrations    135 

Same    subject    136 

Same  subject — Cases  holding  delivery  complete   137 

Ov/ner  may  recover  for  goods  constructively  delivered   138 

First  carrier  as  forwarding  agent  for  owner   139 

Same  subject — Duty  of  first  carrier  to  forward  shipping  directions.  ,140 
Carrier  cannot  become  warehouseman  of  the  goods  while  they  are 

in   transit    141 

Same  subject  142 

Of  the  carrier's  duty  to  accept  and  carry  the  goods 143 

Same  subject — Not  obliged  to  accept  goods  of  a  kind  he  does  not 

profess  to  carry   144 

Reasons  which  will  justify  refusal  to  accept  145 

Same  subject — Press  of  business  may  justify  refusal   146 

Same   subject — Other   reasons    147 

Same  subject — Not  obliged  to  accept  from  one  not  authorized  to 

deliver — Liability  where  he  does   148 

Remedy  for  wrongful  refusal    149 

Carrier  may  demand  prepayment  of  the  freight 150 

Actual  acceptance  may  waive  reasons  for  refusal 151 

II.       THE    BILL    OF    LADING. 

No  receipt,  bill  of  lading  or  other  writing  necessary 152 

Liability  of  carrier  usually  limited  by  contract 153 

Contracts   vary   in   form   and   name 154 

Variance    in    duplicates — Shipper's   controls 155 

Variance  between  charter  party  and  bill  of  lading 156 

Bills  of  lading  are  both  receipts  and  contracts  to  carry 157 

Same  subject — As  receipts,  not  conclusive 158 

Authority  of  agent  to  sign  bills  of  lading 159 

Liability  of  carrier  when  goods  not  received,  but  receipt  given 160 

Same  subject — How  in  case  of  bona  fide  holder 161 

Same  subject — The  contrary  view 162 

Recitals  as  to  condition  of  goods,  how  far  conclusive 163 

Effect  of  recitals  as  to  amount  or  quantity  of  goods  received 164 

Same  subject Effect  of  clauses  in  receipt  that  weight,  contents, 

or  value  of  goods  are  unknown 165 

Same  subject 166 

Terms  of  bill  of  lading  cannot  be  varied  by  parol 167 


Xiv  TABLE    OF    CONTENTS. 

[REFERENCES    ARE   TO   SECTIONS.] 

Same  subject— Implied  obligations  cannot  be  varied  by  parol 168 

Same  subject ^^^ 

Same  subject — Effect  of  subsequent  parol  agreement 170 

Effect  of  delivery  of  bill  of  lading  after  oral  contract  of  shipment 

made  but  before  shipment  has  begun 171 

Same  su-bject — How  when  goods   shipped  under  parol  contract  be- 
fore bill  of  lading  delivered 172 

Same  subject— Effect  of  custom— Temporary  receipts 173 

Same  subject— Acceptance  of  bill  of  lading  after  oral  agreement 

made  to  furnish  cars  at  a  certain  time 174 

Bills  of  lading  are  assignable,  but  not  negotiable 175 

Same  subject — Statutes  making  them  negotiable 176 

Goods  must  be   delivered   only   in   accordance   with  bill   of   lading 

and   its   indorsements    177 

Same  subject— If  person  claiming  goods  fails  to  present  proper  bill 
of  lading,  carrier  must  base  refusal  to  deliver  on  that  ground.  .178 

Carrier  must  respect  transfers 179 

Same  subject — Carrier's  duty  to  ascertain  if  bill  of  lading  issued. .  .180 
Same  subject — Where  bill  of  lading  not  presented,  carrier  protected 

if  delivery  is  made  to  proper  party 181 

Same  subject — Effect  of  transfer  of  bill  of  lading  after  delivery  of 

the  goods 182 

Same  subject — Bill  of  lading  to  shipper's  order — Draft  attached 183 

Same  subject — Pledge  of  bill  of  lading  to  shipper's  order  to  secure 

advances — Draft  attached  184 

Same   subject — Pledge   of   bill   of   lading  to   shipper's   order — Time 

draft  attached    185 

Same  subject — Invoice  alone  not  evidence  of  title 186 

Same  subject — Direction  to  notify  certain  person  does  not  dispense 

with  production  of  bill  of  lading 187 

Same   subject — Duplicate   bills   of   lading  to   consignor — Possession 

of   one   duplicate   not  indorsed 188 

Same  subject — Possession  of  indorsed  duplicate  obtained  by  fraud..  189 
Same  subject — Duplicate  receipts — Goods  delivered  only  on  produc- 
tion of  duplicate  190 

Same   subject — Protection   of   third    person   paying   draft   for   con- 
signee's accommodation    191 

Effect  of  custom  on  delivery  w;ithout  surrender  of  bill  of  lading. . .  .192 

When  consignment  may  be  changed  by  shipper 193 

Same   subject — Consignment   cannot  be   changed   by   shipper   when 
goods  become  property  of  consignee  on  delivery  to  carrier. ..  .194 

Same  subject — Illustrations     195 

Same  subject — Effect  of  custom    196 

Who  may  sue  for  breach  of  the  contract 197 

Same  subject — Statutes  controlling    158 

By  what  law  the  effect  of  a  contract  is  to  be  determined 199 


TABLE   OF    CONTENTS.  XV 

[references  are  to  sections.] 

The  rights  arising  out  of  the  contract  must  be  created  by  law 200 

Lex  loci  contractus  will  govern  in  the  great  majority  of  cases 201 

When  performance  wholly  within  one  state,  the  law  of  that  state 
governs     202 

Matters  relating  solely  to  delivery  may  be  determined  by  law  of 
place  of  delivery  205 

In  actions  against  carriers  of  goods,  same  law  governs  whether  the 
form  of  action  is  assumpsit  or  tort 204 

In  actions  for  personal  injuries  against  carriers  of  passengers, 
lex  loci  delicti  governs — Contributory  negligence  governed  by 
same  law — Proof  of  lex  loci  delicti  must  be  made 205 

Rights  created  by  foreign  law  should  be  enforced  elsewhere — Ex- 
ceptional rule  in  federal  and  New  York  courts 206 

Proof  should  be  made  in  court  of  forum  of  what  the  foreign  law  is.  .207 

Matters  relating  to  remedy  are  governed  by  law  of  "forum 208 

A  state  may  require  care  and  diligence  of  carrier  although  contract 
is  one  for  interstate  carriage 209 

Better  rule  is  that  performance  of  contract  of  carriage  is  indivisible  210 

Some  states  hold  performance  of  contract  of  carriage  divisible — 
Rights  of  parties  to  be  construed  by  law  of  place  where  negli- 
gent  breach   occurs 211 

Lex  loci  contractus  generally  governs  validity  of  limitations  of  car- 
rier's  liability    212 

Presumption  exists  that  that  law  applies  which  is  most  favorable 
to  the  validity  of  the  contract 213 

Facts  extrinsic  of  presumptive  evidence  may  be  considered  by  the 
court  to  determine  what  law  governs 214 

Enforcement  of  limitation,  valid  in  one  state,  by  courts  of  another 
state 215 

Enforcement  of  limitation  valid  at  place  of  contract,  valid  at 
destination  and  valid  at  forum 216 

Enforcement  of  limitation  valid  at  place  of  contract,  invalid  at 
destination  and  valid  at  forum 217 

Enforcement  of  limitation  valid  at  place  of  contract,  invalid  at 
destination  and  invalid  at  forum 218 

Enforcement  of  limitation  valid  at  place  of  contract,  valid  at 
destination  and  invalid  at  forum 219 

Enforcement  of  limitation  invalid  at  place  of  contract,  valid  at 
destination  and  valid  at  forum 220 

Enforcement  of  limitation  invalid  at  place  of  contract,  invalid  at 
destination  and  valid  at  forum 221 

Enforcement  of  limitation  invalid  at  place  >  of  contract,  valid  at 
destination  and  invalid  at  forum 222 

Enforcement  of  limitation  invalid  at  place  of  contract,  invalid  at 
destination  and  invalid  at  forum 223 

Proof  must  be  made  of  what  foreign  law  is 224 


Xvi  TABLE   OF    CONTENTS. 

[BEFEBENCES   ABE  TO   SECTIONS.] 

CHAPTER  V. 

OF  CONNECTING  CARRIERS. 

In  general   225 

Carrier  not  bound  to  assume  liability  beyond  terminus  of  his  own 

line    226 

What  circumstances  necessary  to  show  contract  by  carrier  to  as- 
sume liability  beyond  his  own  line 227 

The   rule   of  Muschamp's  Case 228 

This   rule   well   settled   in   England 229 

English  rule  prevails  in  many  states 230 

English  rule  denied  in  majority  of  states 231 

Further  of  this  rule 232 

Liability  beyond  terminus  may  be  excluded  by  contract 233 

Same  subject — Even  when  liability  fixed  by  statute 234 

Same   subject — Other   statutory   provisions — Interstate  Commerce.  .235 
Even  under  contract  for  through  carriage  intermediate  carrier  who 

causes  injury  may  be  held  liable 236 

Carrier  may  contract  for  the  entire  transportation 237 

What  constitutes  such  a  contract 238 

Same  subject 239 

Extent  to  which  carrier  may  limit  his  liability  under  contract  for 

through    carriage    240 

Implied  power  of  agents  to  make  contracts  for  through  carriage. ..  .241 
No  distinction  between  corporations  and  other  carriers  in  respect 

to  power  to  enter  into  contracts  for  through  carriage 242 

No  liability  for  loss  beyond  his  own  line  under  contract  to  carry 

to  end  of  line  and  there  to  deliver  to  next  carrier 243 

Same   subject — Meaning   of  the   term   "to   forward'   or   "to   be   for- 
warded"  244 

Same  subject   245 

Same  subject   246 

Who  is  a  connecting  carrier — Transfer  company 247 

Authority  of  contracting  carrier  to  bind  connecting  carrier  by  con- 
tract     248 

Partnerships  and  associations  between  carriers 249 

Same  subject   , 250 

Same  subject — Actual  partnership  not  necessary 251 

Same  subject— Cases  holding  carriers  jointly  liable 252 

Same  subject   253 

Same  subject    254 

Same  subject    255 

Same  subject— Cases  holding  carriers  not  jointly  liable 256 

Same  subject  257 


TABLE   OF    CONTENTS.  XVll 

[BEFEBENCES   ABE  TO   SECTIONS.] 

Same  subject  258 

Same  subject   259 

Same  subject   260 

Same  subject   261 

Same  subject — Effect  of  establishing  joint  or  through  rates 262 

Same  subject — The  rule  stated 263 

Partnerships  between  corporations  as  carriers 264 


CHAPTER  VI. 

OF  THE  CARRIER'S  LIABILITY  AND  THE  EXCEPTIONS  THERE- 
TO BY  LAW. 

I.      IN  GENEBAL. 

The  liability  of  the  carrier  by  law 265 

Carrier  may  by  contract  assume  more  than  legal  liability 266 

Same  subject — Contract  must  be  express 267 

Purpose  of  this  chapter 268 

II.      CABBIEB   NOT   LIABLE   FOB  LOSSES  ABISING   FBOM   THE  ACT  OF  GOD. 

What  is  meant  by  the  "act  of  God" 269 

Same  subject — Conflict  in  authorities 270 

Same  subject 271 

The  rule  in  Colt  v.  McMechen 272 

Same  subject 273 

Act  of  God  must  be  proximate  cause  of  loss 274 

Same  subject — Human  agency  must  not  have  intervened 275 

Same  subject    276 

Same  subject    277 

Same  subject — Prudence  or  mistaken  judgment  no  excuse 278 

Loss  by  fire,  explosion  or  collision 279 

Same  subject    280 

Same  subject — Same  rule  applies  to  carriers  using  steam 281 

Loss  by  sudden  inundation  282 

Loss  by  earthquake 283 

Loss  by  landslide   284 

Loss  by  snowstorm 285 

Loss  by  wind    286 

Burden  of  proof 287 

But  carrier  not  excused  if  he  negligently  venture  forth  from  place 

of  safety    288 

Same  subject    289 

Same  subject    290 


Xviii  TABLE   OF    CONTENTS. 

[REFERENCES    ABE   TO    SECTIONS.] 

Same  subject    291 

Same  subject— Or  if  he  negligently  exposes  the  goods  to  danger 292 

So  if  his  vessel  be  unseaworthy 293 

Or  if  he  deviate  from  the  usual  course 294 

Same  subject    295 

Same  subject    296 

Where  the  loss  would  not  have  occurred  but  for  the  carrier's  un- 
reasonable delay   297 

Same  subject 298 

Same  subject    299 

Same  subject    300 

Same  subject — The  contrary  view   301 

Same  subject    302 

Same  subject    303 

Same  subject    304 

Same  subject    305 

Same  subject — How  where  loss,  due  to  cause  excepted  by  contract, 
would   not   have   occurred    but   for   the   carrier's    unreasonable 

delay     306 

Effect  of  unreasonable  delay  upon  insurance 307 

Carrier  responsible  as  in  case  of  deviation 308 

The  degree  of  diligence  to  be  exercised  by  the  carrier  when  the 

goods  have  been  overtaken  by  disaster 309 

Same  subject   310 

Same  subject   311 

Burden  of  proof  as  to  carrier's  contributory  negligence 312 

Act  of  God   will   not  excuse  carrier  if  carrier  has  wrongfully   re- 
fused to  deliver  goods 313 


III.    CARRIER    NOT    LIABLE    FOR    LOSSES    ARISING    FROM    ACTS    OF    THE    PUBLIC 

ENEMY, 

Exception  of  losses  arising  from  the  acts  of  the  public  enemy 314 

Reason  for  this  exception 315 

Who    are    public    enemies — Mobs — Rioters — Strikers — Thieves — Pi- 
rates   316 

Same  subject — Rebellion — Revolution 317 

Same  subject — Declaration  of  war  not  necessary  if  actual  hostili- 
ties exist   318 

Carrier  liable  if  loss  by  public  enemy  caused  by  his  negligence  or 

deviation    319 

Same  subject   320 

Same  subject    321 

Effect  of  war  on  contract  of  carriage 322 

Same  subject — Contraband  goods 323 


TABLE  OF   CONTENTS.  XIX 

[references  are  to  sections.] 

iv.     carrier  not  liable  for  losses  from  the  acts  of  the  public  au- 
THORITY. 

Carrier  protected  if  loss  caused  by  public  authority 324 

Same  subject — Destruction  or  injury  under  police  power 325 

Same  subject — Confederate   authority 326 

Same  subject — Seizure  under  legal  process 327 

V.  CARRIER   NOT   LIABLE   FOR  LOSSES    CAUSED   BY    AN   ACT   OF  THE   OWNER  OF 

THE  GOODS. 

Exception  to  liability  on  the  ground  of  the  fraud  of  the  owner  of 

the  goods 328 

Same  subject 329 

Same  subject — Neglect  or  failure  to  disclose  contents  or  value 330 

Same  subject — Extent  of  carrier's  liability 331 

Same  subject — Illustrations       332 

Exception  to   liability  in  case  of  loss  from  the  intermeddling  or 
mistake  of  the  owner  of  the  goods 333 

VI.  CARRIER  NOT  LIABLE  FOR  LOSSES   CAUSED  BY  THE  INHERENT   NATURE  OP 

THE  GOODS. 

Nature   of    the    exception 334 

VII.      EXCEPTION  IN  THE  CASE  OF  LIVE  ANIMALS. 

Live  animals  not  regarded  as  goods 335 

Difference  in  liability  based  on  inherent  nature 336 

Same  subject       337 

Same  subject       338 

Carrier  liable  as  common  carrier  of  animals  except  for  losses  caused 

by  their  peculiar  nature   339 

Same  subject — Cases  holding  contrary  view 340 

Carrier   of   animals   is   common   carrier   and   not   special   agent   of 

owner 341 

Though  injury  caused  by  peculiar  nature  of  the  animals,  carrier 

not  excused  if  he  has  been  negligent 342 

Duty  of  shipper  to  disclose  peculiarities  affecting  risk 343 

VIII.      EXCEPTIONS    MADE   BY   STATUTE. 

Statutes  limiting  carrier's  liability 344 

Policy  of  United  States  courts  towards  carriers  by  water  changed 

by  Harter  Act 345 

Statute  similar  to  Harter  Act  enacted  in  Great  Britain  in  1900 346 


XX  TABLE   OF    CONTENTS. 

[REFERENCES   ARE   TO    SECTIONS.] 

To  what  vessels  and  property  Harter  Act  applies 347 

Harter  Act  only  modifies  relations  between  a  vessel  and  her  cargo.  .348 
Stipulations  in  bills  of  lading  contrary  to  section   one  of  Harter 

Act  are  void  349 

Meaning  of  word  "loading"  in  section  one  of  Harter  Act 350 

"Stowage"  used  in  two  senses  in  section  one  of  Harter  Act     351 

Stowage  with  a  view  to  the  proper  trim  of  the  vessel 352 

Responsibility  for  such  stowage  rests  on  the  carrier  alone 353 

Stowage  with  reference  to  the  natural  characteristics  of  the  cargo 

carrier — Effect  of  custom   354 

Stowage  of  liquid  cargo 355 

Duty  of  ship  to  provide  proper  dunnage 356 

Stowage  of  delicate  and  easily  tainted  goods 357 

Goods  should  be  secured  from  possibility  of  shifting 358 

Proper  stowage  at  commencement  of  voyage  may  be  made  improper 

by  change  of  vessel's  trim  during  voyage 359 

Negligence   in    delivery   of   cargo   within   the   first   section   of   the 

Harter  Act   360 

Vessel  is  liable  for  failure  to  deliver  at  all  through  master's  negli- 
gence in  overlooking  goods 361 

Second  section  of  Harter  Act  is  the  complement  of  section  three 362 

Effect  of  sections  two  and  three  on  the  warranty  of  seaworthiness.  .363 

Same  subject — Latent  defects 364 

Exemption  clauses  in  bills  of  lading  strictly  construed 365 

The  test  of  seaworthiness 366 

Burden  of  proof  on  carrier  to  prove  vessel  was  seaworthy  or  due 

diligence  was  used  to  make  her  seaworthy 367 

How  far  warranty  of  seaworthiness  extends — vessel  must  be  sea- 
worthy at  each  stage  of  voyage 368 

Vessel  liable  for  initial  instability 369 

Presumption  of  unseaworthiness  when  leaks  soon  happen  in  ordi- 
nary weather 370 

Leaking  decks  or  hatches 371 

Defective  rivets  or  bolts 372 

Unfastened  ports  373 

"Water  and  steam  pipes,  etc 374 

Bulkheads    375 

Insufficiency  of  coal 376 

Defective  fog  horns 377 

Deviations  in  compass 378 

Vessel  should  be  cleaned  and  repaired  often  and  well 379 

What  is  due  diligence — Vessel  owner  should  be  responsible  for  the 

acts  of  his  agents 380 

Due  diligence   in  manning  vessel 381 

Faults  or  errors  in  management 382 

Faults   or   errors   in   navigation 383 


TABLE   OF    CONTENTS,  XXI 

[references  are  to  sections.] 

Dangers  of  the  sea 384 

The  inherent  defect,  quality  or  vice  of  the  thing  carried 385 

Effect  of  deviation  •. 386 

EfEect  of  the  Harter  Act  on  damages  recoverable  by  cargo  owner  or 
on  rights  of  a  general  average  contribution 387 


CHAPTER  VII. 

OF  THE  LIMITATION  OF  THE  CARRIER'S  LIABILITY  BY  CON- 
TRACT. 

Goods  usually  shipped  under  contracts  limiting  liability 388 

Rigor  of  common-law  rule  relaxed 389 

Rule  permitting  limitation  of  liability  by  contract  of  early  origin 

in  England   390 

Same  subject — Notice  sufficient  391 

Same  subject — Extent  of  limitation — Anything  except  gross  negli- 
gence or  misfeasance  392 

Considerations  leading  to  English  Land  Carriers'  Act 393 

Summary  of  act 394 

Construction  of  act 395 

Modification  of  Carriers'  Act  by  Railway  and  Canal  Traffic  Act.... 396 

Same  subject — Effect  of  latter  act .' 397 

Same  subject — Language  of  contract  to  relieve  from  negligence  must 

be  explicit  398 

Early  American  cases 399 

Same  subject 400 

Carrier  may  limit  liability  by  special  contract 401 

Same  subject — Contract  must  be  express 402 

Same   subject — Such    limitations    result   from   shipper's    waiver   of 

common  law  liability   403 

Same  subject — But  shipper  must  be  allowed  real  freedom  of  choice 

between  restricted  or  common-law  liability 404 

Same  subject — Limitation  prohibited  in  some  states 405 

Mere  notice  is  not  sufficient — What  constitutes  special  contract 406 

Same  subject 407 

The  acceptance  of  the  carrier's  receipt  creates  a  contract  according 
to  its  terms  between  him  and  the  shipper — Failure  to  read  no 

defense  if  no  fraud  practiced 408 

Same  subject — Shipper  presumed  by  accepting  receipt  to  have  as- 
sented to  its  conditions 409 

Same  subject — Cases  holding  mere  acceptance  insufficient — ^Rule  in 

Illinois 410 

Form   and  nature   of  the   contract — Need   not  be  in  writing — Evi- 
dence to  establish  411 


XXll  TABLE   OF   CONTENTS, 

[references   ABE  TO   SECTIONS.] 

Same  subject — Parol  modifications — Signing  by  one  party — Effect  of 

carrier's  omission  to  sign 412 

Same  subject — Statutory  requirements 413 

Notices  not  intended  to  limit  liability 414 

Terms   of  limitation  must  be  embodied   in  the  contract — Must  be 

plain  and  easily  legible 415 

Receipt  to  be  effectual  in  limiting  liability  must  be  given  to  and 

accepted  by  the  shipper  at  the  time  of  the  receipt  of  the  goods.  .416 
Same  subject — Parol  agreement  acted  upon  cannot  be  limited  by  re- 
ceipt subsequently  delivered  417 

Extent  to  which  carrier  may  limit  his  liability 418 

Carrier    may    stipulate    for    exemption    from    liability    for    certain 

losses  in  carriage  of  live  stock 419 

Carrier  may  stipulate  for  exemption  in  case  of  loss  by  fire 420 

Carrier   may   stipulate   for    exemption   in   case   of   loss   caused   by 

strikes,  mobs,  etc 421 

Carrier  may  stipulate  for  exemption  in  case  of  loss  by  thieves  or 

robbers   422 

Carrier  may  stipulate  for  exemption  where  goods  of  a  dangerous 

character  are  accepted  for  carriage 423 

Carrier  may  stipulate  for  liability  of  warehouseman  while  goods  are 

awaiting  further  conveyance 424 

Contracts  limiting  the  amount  of  damages  recoverable 425 

Same  subject — Contracts  limiting  recovery  to  agreed  value  of  goods.  .426 
Same  subject — Valuation  agreement  must  be  bona  fide — Valuation 

must  be  reasonable   427 

Same  subject — Execution  of  contracts  limiting  recovery  to  agreed 

value  of  goods — Construction  428 

Same  subject — Measure  of  recovery  where  loss  is  only  partial 429 

Same  subject — Contracts  limiting  recovery  to  value  of  goods  at  time 

and  place  of  shipment 430 

Same  subject — Contracts  limiting  liability  to  fixed  amount  without 

regard  to  value  431 

Same  subject — Effect  of  delivery,  after  notice  given  to  stop  goods  in 

transit,   upon  agreement  limiting  recovery  to  stated   value  of 

goods — Conversion  432 

Notice  contained  in  receipt  that  unless  informed  of  value  of  goods 

carrier  will  be  liable  only  to  limited  amount 433 

Same  subject   434 

Same  subject — But  carrier  may  waive  requirement  that,  unless  value 

of  goods  is  stated,  he  will  be  liable  only  to  limited  amount 435 

Same  subject — How  under  English  Land  Carriers'  Act 43G 

Same  subject — When  shipper  bound  to  disclose  value 437 

Same  subject — Illustrations    438 

Same  subject — Notice  under  English  Carriers'  Act 439 

Same  subject — Weight  of  English  cases 440 


TABLE   OF    CONTENTS.  XXlll 

[EEFEBENCES   ABE   TO    SECTIONS.] 

Same  subject — Notice  from  course  of  dealing 441 

Carrier  may  limit  time  within  which  claim  shall  be  made  for  loss.  .442 
Same  subject — Condition  limiting  time  within  which  claim  shall  be 

made  must  be  reasonable 443 

Same  subject — Carrier  may  waive  benefit  of  such  conditions 444 

Same  subject — How  where  damage  has  resulted  from  carrier's  delay 

— Effect  of  failure  to  make  delivery — Conversion 445 

Same  subject — How  where  carrier  is  holding  goods  in  the  character 

of  a  warehouseman   , 446 

Same  subject — Burden  of  proof 44-7 

Carrier  may  limit  time  within  which  suit  shall  be  commenced. ..  .448 
Where  liability  is  limited  by  contract,  burden  of  proof  is  upon  the 

carrier  to  show  himself  within  the  exception 449 

Carrier  cannot  provide  by  contract  against  liability  for  negligence.  .450 

Same  subject — The  contrary  view 451 

Same  subject — The  rule  of  the  United  States  Supreme  Court 452 

Same  subject — This  rule  the  prevailing  one 453 

Same  subject — Contrary  rule  prevails  in  New  York 454 

Same  subject — Rule  in  Illinois 455 

Same  subject — Stipulation  as  to  amount  of  proof  required 456 

Power  of  an  agent  to  bind  the  owner  of  goods  to  limitation 457 

Same  subject  ' 458 

Same    subject — How   where    carrier    has   notice    that   authority   of 

agent  is  restricted   459 

Powers  of  agents  of  carriers  to  bind  them  by  contract 460 

Same  subject — The  English  rule 461 

Same  subject — Implied  authority 462 

What  will  be  construed  as  a  contract  exempting  from  liability  for 

negligence — Language  must  be  clear 463 

Contracts    limiting    liability    must    be    construed    strictly    against 

the  carrier   464 

Same  subject — Particular  exemptions  not  enlarged  by  general  lan- 
guage     465 

Same  subject — Construction  of  specific  terms  not  altered  to  release 

carrier  466 

Same  subject  467 

Same  subject — Ambiguous  words  construed  against  carrier 468 

Same  subject  469 

How  the  benefit  of   such  contracts  can  be  claimed  by  connecting 

carriers 470 

Same  subject  471 

Same   subject — Limitation   inures   to   benefit   of  connecting  carrier 

only  when  contract  for  through  carriage  exists 472 

Same  subject  473 

By  what  law  contract  is  to  be  construed 474 

The  consideration  necessary  to  uphold  such  contracts 475 


Xxiv  TABLE   OF    CONTENTS. 

[RKFEBENCES    ABE   TO    SECTIONS.] 

Contract  must  have  a  fair  construction 476 

Carrier  liable  notwithstanding  exemption  if  the  loss  be  the  result 

of   his   negligence 477 

Carrier  liable,  though  exemption  from  negligence  would  otherwise 

be  sustained,  if  loss  occasioned  by  his  misfeasance 478 

Or,  though  exemption  be  for  losses  resulting  from  delay,  if  delay  is 

occasioned   by  negligence 479 

Or  if  he  deiiarts  from   the  stipulated  method   of  transportation — 

When  departure  will  be  excused 480 

Exceptions  to  liability  in  the  bills  of  lading  of  carriers  by  water... 481 

Same  subject — Perils  of  the  sea — Dangers  of  navigation 482 

Same  subject— Perils  of  the  sea,  etc.,  not  synonymous  with  act  of 

God,  etc 483 

Same  subject — What  included — Illustrations 484 

Same  subject — Jettison,  when   included 485 

Same  subject — Hidden  obstructions  486 

Same  subject — Other  perils 487 

Same  subject  488 

Same  subject — Other  perils — Fire  not  included 489 

Same  subject — How  question  determined 490 

Same   subject — Carrier   liable,   notwithstanding  exception,   for   loss 

from  theft,  embezzlement,  robbery,  etc 491 

Same    subject — Carrier    liable    notwithstanding    exemption    if    loss 

caused  by  negligence 492 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

OF    THE    CARRIER'S   DUTY   AS    TO    THE    TRANSPORTATION    OP 

THE  GOODS. 

In  general   493 

General  nature  of  carrier's  duty 494 

His  duty  to  provide  sufficient  means  of  conveyance 495 

Same  subject — Must  inform  shipper  of  necessary  delay — Burden  of 

proof    496 

Same  subject — Must  provide  safe  and  suitable  vehic'.es .^ 497 

Same  subject — Carrier  not  excused  because  defective  vehicles  used 

by  him  are  owned  by  another 498 

Same  subject — Liability  of  initial  carrier  for  defective  vehicles  pro- 
vided by  him 499 

Same  subject — Liability  of  connecting  carrier  for  defective  vehicles 

received  by  him  from  initial  or  another  connecting  carrier 500 

Vehicles  must  not  only  be  safe  and  suitable,  but  must  bs  inspected 
while  in  transit 591 


TABLE   OF    CONTENTS.  XXV 

[BEFEBENCES    ABE   TO    SECTIONS.] 

Carrier  in  the  selection  of  vehicles  must  guard  against  the  exigencies 

of  such  weather  as  may  reasonably  be  expected 502 

Duty  as  to  providing  appliances  for  preventing  the  escape  of  sparks. 503 

Liability  of  carrier  for  using  exposed  cars 504 

Duty  in  respect  to  providing  refrigerator  or  ventilated  cars 505 

When  carrier  may  use  open  or  closed  cars 506 

Bullion  room  on  vessel  for  carriage  of  precious  metals  must  be  rea- 
sonably safe  507 

How  where  shipper  selects  the  vehicles  himself 508 

Carrier's  duty  in  furnishing  cars  for  live  stock 509 

Same  subject — Stational  facilities — Cattle-yards  510 

Duty  of  carrier  to  accept  goods  for  carriage 511 

He  must  carry  for  all  alike  and  cannot  show  preference 512 

Same  subject — Difference  in  situation  of  shippers  may  justify  a  pref- 
erence   513 

Same  subject — Duty  to  furnish  facilities  to  express  companies  with- 
out discrimination   514 

Same  subject  515 

Same  subject  516 

Same  subject — The  "Express  Cases"  in  the  United  States  Supreme 

Court    517 

Right  of  one  express  company  to  use  the  facilities  of  another  ex- 
press company   518 

Granting  preference  to  one  connecting  carrier  over  another 519 

Giving  preference  to  one  shipper  over  another 520 

Same  subject — Discrimination  in  rates 521 

Same  subject — The  English  rule 522 

Same  subject — Statutory  regulation — The  Interstate  Commerce  Act.  523 

Who  are  subject  to  the  Act 524 

What  shipments  are  subject  to  the  Act 525 

Effect  of  joint  rates  in  bringing  a  railroad  within  the  scope  of  the 
act — Commission  has  power  to  establish  joint  rates  under  cer- 
tain conditions    526 

Principal  objects  of  Act 527 

Act  must  be  construed  broadly 528 

Reasonableness  of  rates — Necessity  of  actual  tender  of  merchandise 

for  shipment  529 

Interests  of  public  predominant  on  questions  of  reasonableness  of 

rates    530 

Value  of  goods  should  be  considered  in  fixing  a  reasonable  rate — 

Weight  and  bulk  of  goods 531 

Mileage  is  not  the  controlling  factor  in  fixing  a  reasonable  rate.... 532 
On  questions  of  reasonableness  of  rates,  a  comparison  of  rates  is  of 

small  importance  533 

What  is  a  reasonable  rate  may  vary  with  the  season  of  the  year. . .  .534 
Second   section   of  Interstate   Commerce   Act  modelled   on   English 
Act 535 


XXvi  TABLE   OF    CONTENTS. 

[BEFEBENCES   ABE   TO    SECTIONS.] 

Purpose  of  second  section 536 

Effect  of  second  section  on  discriminative  interstate  contracts 537 

Discrimination   must   be   unjust — ^Milling   in   transit   agreements — 

Compressing  cotton  en  route 538 

Shippers  must  be  placed  on  absolute  equality 53& 

A  lower  through  rate  not  necessarily  discriminative 540 

Discrimination  may  be  in  passenger  service,  as  well  as  property ...  541 

Reasonableness  of  rate  not  necessarily  involved  in  section  two 542 

A  distinction  exists  between  wholesale  rates  in  freight  and  passenger 

traffic — Party    rates    543 

Car  load  is  usually  taken  as  the  unit  in  fixing  freight  rates 544 

Rebate  equal  to  cartage  charges  is  discriminative 545 

Payment  of  carrier's  prior  debt  by  carriage  as  discrimination 546 

Agreement  for  rebate  does  not  void  contract  of  carriage 547 

Effect  of  section  two  on  limitations  on  the  value  of  the  goods  placed 

in  bills  of  lading 548 

Question  of  relative  rates  is  involved  in  section  two 549 

Failure  to  pay  expenses  no  excuse  for  unjust  discrimination  under 

section  two    550 

Third  section  of  Interstate  Commerce  Act  modelled  on  English  Act — 

Their  difference   551 

Section  three  is  more  comprehensive  than  section  two 552 

Questions  of  undue  or  unreasonable  prejudice  or  preference  are  ques- 
tions of  fact   553 

Origin  of  goods  immaterial  under  section  three 554 

Carriage  of  articles  or  commodities  manufactured,  mined  or  pro- 
duced by  carrier — Section  three  applies  to  carriage  of  timber 
and  manufactured  products  thereof  which  are  excepted  by  sec- 
tion one 555 

Discrimination  in  carriage  of  live  stock  and  affording  proper  facili- 
ties   under   section   three    556 

Discrimination  in  coal  car  distribution  under  section  three 557 

Third  section  applies  as  well  to  passenger  as  to  freight  traffic 558 

Real  and  substantial  competition  justifies  dissimilarity  in  rates 559 

Third  section  does  not  relate  to  acts,  the  result  of  conditions  beyond 

the  control  of  carrier 560 

Competition  may  be  between  railroads 561 

Competition  of  ocean  lines  should  be  taken  into  consideration 562 

Interests  of  shipper,  carrier  and  public  should  be  considered 563 

Rules  as  to  competition  summarized 564 

Condition  that  initial  carrier  shall  have  right  to  route  beyond  its 

own  terminal  is  valid 565 

Joint  rate  is  not  a  basis  for  local  rate 566 

Requiring  prepayment  of  freight  by  connecting  carrier  is  not  unjust 

discrimination     567 

Duty  to  afford  equal  facilities  for  interchange  of  traffic 568 


TABLE   OF    CONTENTS.  XXVii 

[befebenges  are  to  sections.] 

Question  of  similarity  or  dissimilarity  of  circumstances  under  sec- 
tion four  is  one  of  fact 569 

Real  and  substantial  competition  a  factor  under  section  four 570 

"Basing  Point  System"  is  not  illegal  under  section  four 571 

Competition  must  not  be  conjectural 572 

Joint  rates  under  section  four 573 

Discrimination  in  rates — State  Statutes 574 

Power  of  a  state  railroad  commission  to  establish  rates 575 

A  state  has  no  control  over  interstate  rates 576 

The  reasonableness  of  a  state  rate  must  be  determined  without  ref- 
erence to  carrier's  interstate  business 577 

Reasonableness  of  state  rates  should  be  determined  by  a  study  of 

the    rates   themselves    578 

Mileage  as  a  factor  in  determining  the  reasonableness  of  rates 579 

Comparison  of  rates  as  a  criterion  of  reasonableness 580 

A  rate  on  a  single  article  may  be  unreasonable 581 

Carrier  entitled  to  reasonable  profits  on  property  used  by  it 582 

How  val-ue  of  railroad's  property  is  determined 583 

Courts  should  be  fully  advised  of  receipts  and  earnings  of  a  railroad. 584 
Cost  of  local  business  is  greater  than  cost  of  interstate  business. .  .585 
Effect  of  connecting  and  branch  lines  in  determining  the  reasonable- 
ness of  a  rate 586 

A  rate,  though  reasonable,  should  not  tend  to  create  a  monopoly 587 

Discrimination  to  be  actionable  must  be  unjust 588 

A  special  rate  is  not  always  unjustly  discriminative 589 

A  "rebilling"  rate  may  be  discriminative 590 

Free  passes  are  discriminative 591 

An  extra  charge  may  be  made  for  a  shipment  received  off  the  car- 
rier's own  line 592 

Discrimination  in  transfer  of  stock  from  narrow-gauge  to  standard- 
gauge  cars   593 

Right  of  carrier  to  recover  from  shipper  the  difference  between  the 

discriminative  and  regular  rate   594 

Through  rate  may  be  less  than  sum  of  locals 595 

Right  of  state  to  compel  the  issuance  of  mileage  tickets  at  reduced 

rates    596 

Discrimination  between  localities   597 

A  state  may  regulate  domestic  long  and  short  haul  rates 598 

A  shipment  is  an  entirety  in  reference  to  long  and  short  haul  clause. 599 
Special  contracts  with  shippers  not  impossibilities  under  long  and 

short  haul  clause 600 

Competition  not  a  factor  in  construction  of  Kentucky  long  and  short 

haul  clause  601 

General  duty  as  to  stowage  on  vessels 602 

Same  subject — Stowage  under  deck 603 

Same  subject — Stowage  on  deck 604 


XXViii  TABLE   OF    CONTENTS. 

[BErEEEXCES   ARE   TO    SECTIONS.] 

Same  subject — Usage  as  affecting  the  right  to  stow  on  deck  in  par- 
ticular instances    605 

Same  subject — Damage  to  other  goods  stowed  in  hold 606 

Same  subject — Rule  as  to  stowage  in  hold  confined  to  vessels  on 

seas  and  great  lakes 607 

Same  subject — Inland  vessels  subject  to  same  rules  as  carriers  on 

land  608 

Same  subject — Damage  to  goods  in  discharging  cargo 609 

Stowage  upon  freight  cars  of  railroad  companies 610 

The  goods  must  be  carried  in  the  customary  mode  or  according  to 

the  directions  of  the  shipper 611 

Same  subject — When  carrier  not  liable 612 

Carrier's' duty  to  transport  by  usual  route 613 

Same  subject — Choice  of  routes  when  one  dangerous 614 

Same  subject — Option  as  to  routes  to  be  exercised  with  regard  to 

the  shipper's  interest 615 

Tempestuous  weather  may  render  deviation  by  vessel  necessary 616 

The  obligation  to  carry  in  the  manner  provided  by  the  contract. . .  .617 

Same  subject — Carrier  liable  for  loss  if  contract  not  observed 618 

Same  subject  619 

Same  subject  620 

Liability  of  carrier  where,  notwithstanding  an  unauthorized  devia- 
tion, the  goods  arrive  on  time 621 

Construction    of   clauses   in   contracts   of   affreightment   permitting 

deviations — Printed  forms   622 

Construction   of   clauses   reserving   leave   to   tow   and   assist  other 

vessels   623 

Carrier  not  liable  if  loss  occurs  through  misconstruction  of  bill  of 

lading  by  shipper 624 

The  goods  must  be  carried  at  and  within  the  time  agreed  on 625 

Same  subject — Illustrations  626 

Same  subject — Not  excused  by  circumstances  beyond  his  control. .  .627 

Same  subject — Shipper  must  not  be  in  default 628 

Same  subject — Carrier  may  agree  to  hold  the  goods  for  transporta- 
tion until  a  future  date 629 

Same  subject — Implied  authority  of  agent  to  agree  to  furnish  cars 

on  given  day 630 

Care  to  be  taken  of  the  goods  in  case  of  delay  or  accident  in  the 

course  of  the  transportation 631 

Same   subject 632 

Same   subject 633 

Care  to  be  taken  of  live  stock 634 

Space  for  cattle  must  be  sufficiently  ventilated .,, 635 

Care  due  pregnant  or  sick  animals 636 

Rule  in  Michigan  with  reference  to  caring  for  live  stock 637 

Carrier  must  provide  suitable  places  for  feeding  and  watering  live 
stock  ; 638 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS.  XXIX 

[BEFEBENCKS    ABE   TO    SECTIONS.] 

Carrier's  duty  as  to  management  of  vehicles  containing  live  stock.. 639 
Shipper   may  assume   duty   by   contract   to  care  for   live   stock  in 

transit    640 

Same  subject — But  carrier  must  afford  shipper  reasonable  oppor- 
tunity and  facilities  for  performing  his  contract 641 

The  failure  of  the  shipper  to  furnish  a  caretaker  does  not  excuse 

any  subsequent  negligence  on  the  part  of  the  carrier 642 

Carrier  liable  for  his  negligence  in  loading  or  unloading  stock  not- 
withstanding contract  that  shipper  shall  do  so — Effect  of  negli- 
gence by  shipper 643 

Negligent  delay  by  carrier  ordinarily  no  excuse  to  shipper  for  refus- 
ing to  comply  with  his  contract  to  care  for  stock ,  ,.644 

Duty  of  carrier  in  general  to  avert  injury  to  goods  transported ....  645 

Same  subject — The  rule  stated 646 

But  the  carrier  is  not  bound  to  suspend  his  voyage  to  preserve 

the  goods   647 

Same    subject    648 

Preference  may  be  given  to  perishable  goods  already  received 649 

So  preference  may  be  given  to  preservation  of  life 650 

Time  within  which  the  goods  must  be  carried 651 

Same  subject — What  time  reasonable 652 

How  far  carrier  responsible  for  unavoidable  delay 653 

Same  subject — What  will  excuse  delay 654 

Same  subject — Other  illustrations 655 

Same  subject — Circumstances  may  make  delay  a  duty 656 

Same  subject — Delay  from  strikes  or  riots 657 

Carrier  must  complete  carriage  when  cause  of  delay  removed . .      . .  658 

Same  subject 659 

Power  of  the  owner  of  the  goods  to  change  their  destination — Lia- 
bility for  freight 660 

Right  of  owner  to  terminate  carriage  short  of  destination 661 


CHAPTER  IX. 

OP  DELIVERY  BY  THE  CARRIER. 

Last  duty  of  carrier  is  delivery 662 

Same  subject 663 

I.      OF  DELrVEBY  IN  GENEBAL. 

How  made  in  general 664 

Duty  to  make  personal  delivery  except  where  changed  by  usage.... 665 

Same  subject 666 

Same  subject — How  delivery  made — Degree  of  diligence  required. ..  .667 


XXX  TABLE   OF    CONTENTS. 

[eeferences  are  to  sections.] 

Excuses    for   non-delivery — Neither   fraud,   imposition   nor   mistake 

will  excuse  delivery  to  wrong  person 668 

Responsibility  for  delivery  to  the  wrong  person — Negligent  delivery 

to  person  not  the  consignee 669 

Same  subject   670 

Same  subject    671 

Same   subject — Liability    of   carrier   for    innocent   delivery   to   con- 
signee though  a  swindler 672 

Same  subject — The  contrary  view 673 

Same  subject 674 

Same  subject — How  where  consigned  to  agent  of  carrier .675 

Same  subject — How  where  consigned  to  consignee  in  care  of  another 

person    676 

Same  subject — How  where  goods  are  misdirected 677 

Same  subject — Carrier  not  liable  where  wrong  delivery  induced  or 

ratified  by  owner 678 

Same  subject — Doctrine  of  the  cases  stated 679 

When  delivery  at  wrong  place  is  deemed  a  conversion 680 

Delivery  by  carrier  holding  as  warehouseman  subject  to  less  strin- 
gent rules  681 

Same  subject  682 

Same  subject  683 

Same  subject— The  rule  stated 684 

Liability  as  warehouseman  when  goods  refused  or  consignee  can- 
not be  found   685 

Same  subject   686 

n.   DELIVEBY   BY   CABEIEB  BY  WATEB. 

Carriers  by  water  not  required  to  make  personal  delivery 687 

Must  provide  suitable  place  and  land  goods  at  proper  time — Duty  if 

consignee  refuses  to  accept 688 

Must  give  notice  of  arrival  and  allow  reasonable  time  for  removal.. 689 

Notice  must  be  actual 690 

Goods  must  be  put  in  situation  for  removal 691 

Consignee  not  to  be  requested  to  remove  goods  on  Sunday  or  a  legal 

holiday,  on  which  labor  is  forbidden 692 

Same  subject — Fourth  of  July 693 

Consignee  must  remove  goods  within  reasonable  time 694 

Diligence  required  of  carrier  in  giving  notice  to  consignee 695 

Necessity  of  notice  may  be  waived  by  usage 696 

Necessity  of  notice  may  be  dispensed  with  by  contract 697 

At  what  wharf  delivery  shall  be  made 698 

Delivery  at  ship's  tackle 699 

Mode  of  delivery  may  be  established  by  usage — Delivery  to  custom 

house  officials  700 


TABLE   OF    CONTENTS.  XXxi 

[references   are   to    SECTIONS.l 
III.      DELIVERY  BY  RAILROADS  AS  CARRIERS. 

Not  required  to  make  personal  delivery  of  goods — Whether  notice 

of   arrival    necessary 701 

Same  subject — Massachusetts  rule  as  to  delivery  by  railroads 702 

Same  subject 703 

Same  subject — New  Hampshire  rule  as  to  delivery  by  railroads. ..  .704 
Same   subject — Limitations    upon    Massachusetts   and    New    Hamp- 
shire rules 705 

Same  subject  706 

Same  subject  707 

Same  subject — New  York  rule  as  to  delivery  by  railroads 708 

Same  subject — When  question  of  notice  becomes  immaterial 709 

Mode  or  place  of  delivery  may  be  established  by  usage — Effect  of 

usage  on  consignee's  right  to  notice  of  arrival  of  goods 710 

Bulky  freight  in  car  load  lots  must  ordinarily  be  unloaded  by  party 

entitled  to  it — Package  freight 711 

What  is  reasonable  time  for  removal 712 

Situation  or  condition  of  consignee  immaterial 713 

Liability  of  carrier  pending  removal — Liable  as  warehouseman. ..  .714 
Carrier  must  furnish  reasonable  opportunity  and  facilities  for  get- 
ting goods  715 

IV.      DELIVERY   BY   EXPRESS   COMPANIES. 

Express  companies  required  to  make  personal  delivery 716 

Personal  delivery  excused  at  small  stations — Establishment  of  limits 
in  a  city  beyond  which  company  will  not  go  to  make  delivery.  .717 

How  far  usage  may  affect  duty 718 

Same  subject   719 

V.      VARIOUS   INCIDENTS  OF   DELIVERY. 

Whether  carrier  bound  to  make  a  personal  delivery  must  give  notice 

of  a  refusal  of  the  goods  by  the  consignee 720 

Same  subject — Who  to  be  deemed  the  owner 721 

Same  subject — How  when  goods  are  not  to  be  delivered  until  paid 

for   722 

Same  subject — How  when  consignee  absent  or  cannot  be  found ....  723 

Same  subject  724 

Same  subject — Duty  arises  only  when  bound  to  make  personal  de- 
livery or  to  give  notice  of  arrival 725 

The  duty  of  the  carrier  as  to  C.  O.  D.  goods 726 

Same    subject — Must    conform    to    instructions — Wrongful    delivery 

ratified  727 

Same  subject — Duty  to  require  payment  is  based  on  contract 728 

Same  subject — Duty  to  give  consignee  an  opportunity  to  pay 729 


XXXil  TABLE   OF    CONTENTS. 

[REFERENCES   ARE   TO    SECTIONS.] 

Same  subject — Right  to  recover  goods  delivered  without  payment. .  .730 

Same  subject — Liability  of  carrier  for  return  of  money 731 

In  the  absence  of  express  authority  agent  of  carrier  cannot  guaranty 

price  of  goods 732 

The  consignee's  right  to  inspect  the  goods 733 

Same  subject — Consignee's  right  to  return  damaged  goods 734 

The   consignee's   right   to  change  the   place   of  delivery — consignee 

presumed  to  be  the  owner 735 

Same  subject — Consignee  cannot  change  destination  when  known  to 

be   mere   agent    736 

Same   subject — Change  cannot  be  made   after  transportation   com- 
pleted     737 

VI.    EXCUSES    FOR   NON-DELIVERV. 

Carrier  excused  when  goods  taken  from  him  by  legal  process 738 

Same  subject 739 

Same  subject  740 

Same  subject — The  rule  in  Massachusetts 741 

Same  subject — The  process  must  be  regular 742 

Same  subject — Carrier  must  give  notice  of  seizure  to  owner 743 

Same  subject — Carrier  by  water  must  defend  suit  till  owner  notified. 744 
Same  subject — Seizure  must  not  have  been  brought  about  by  laches 

or  connivance  of  carrier 745 

The  effect  of  garnishment  or  trustee  process  upon  the  property  in 

the  custody  of  the  carrier 746 

Same  subject    747 

Same  subject    748 

The  duty  and  liability  of  the  carrier  when  adverse  claim  is  set  up 

to  the  property 749 

Carrier  cannot  of  his  own  motion  set  up  adverse  title 750 

Yet  claim  upon  him  by  adverse  claimant  is  sufficient 751 

Course  to  be  pursued  by  carrier — Interpleader — Indemnity 752 

Same  subject — Entitled  to  reasonable  time  to  investigate  title.... 753 
Carrier  not  liable  for  not  permitting  goods  to  be  seized  on  process 

not  against  owner 754 

The  duty  and  liability  of  the  carrier  when  goods  are  detained  by 

customs  officials 755 

Commendable  motives  of  carrier  no  excuse  for  non-delivery 756 

VII.       STOPPAGE   IN    TRANSITU. 

Carrier  may  show  stoppage  to  excuse  delivery 757 

How  right  exercised 758 

Who  may  exercise  right — Agent — Want  of  privity 759 

To  whom  notice  is  to  be  given 760 

Vendee  must  be  insolvent — What  constitutes  insolvency 761 


TABLE   OP    CONTENTS.  XXxiii 

[references  are  to  sections.] 

Transfer  of  bill  of  lading  to  bona  fide  holder  defeats  rights 762 

Right  not  defeated  by  attachment  or  garnishment  by  creditors  of 

consignee 763 

Effect  of  attachment  of  goods  by  vendor 764 

Effect  of  acceptance  of  drafts  or  negotiation  of  notes 765 

Goods  must  be  in  the  possession  of  some  middleman 766 

How  long  goods  will  be  deemed  in  transit 767 

Actual  or  constructive  delivery  defeats  rights 768 

What  constitutes  a  delivery 769 

When  transit  deemed  to  be  ended 770 

Same  subject 771 

Not  necessary  that  vendor  obtain  actual  possession  of  goods — Notice 

is  sufficient    772 

Duty  and  liability  of  carrier  after  notice 773 

Same  subject — Effect  of  agreed  valuation  in  bill  of  lading  when  de- 
livery made  by  carrier  after  notice 774 

Course  to  be  pursued  by  carrier  for  his  own  protection 775 

VIII.      THE  carrier's  RIGHT  TO  A  RECEIPT  ON  DELIVERY. 

Carrier  may  demand  receipt  on  delivery 776 

But  cannot  require  surrender  of  bill  of  lading 777 


CHAPTER  X. 

OP  THE  RIGHTS  OF  THE  CARRIER. 
In  general  778 

I.       GENERAL    RIGHTS    IN    RESPECT    TO    THE    GOODS. 

The  carrier's  right  to  an  action  to  recover  the  goods  when  taken 

from  him  or  for  an  injury  to  them  while  in  his  custody 779 

Owner's  right  of  action,  how  affected — Extent  of  carrier's  recovery.  .780 

When  carrier  may  be  subrogated  to  owner's  claim 781 

Right  of  carrier  to  recover  possession  of  goods  from  owner 782 

His  right  to  insure  the  goods 783 

Same  subject — Insurance  by  shipper  for  carrier's  benefit 784 

His  authority  to  sell  the  goods 785 

Same  subject — Cannot  sell  to  satisfy  lien 786 

Same  subject — When  sudden  emergency  will  justify  sale 787 

Same  subject — Absolute  necessity  will  justify 788 

Same  subject — The   rule  stated 789 

Same  subject — What  purchaser  must  show 790 

Same  subject — Sale  when  not  necessary  amounts  to  a  conversion. . .  .791 
Same  subject — What  degree  of  necessity  must  be  shown — Necessity 
for  communication  with  owner 792 


Xxxiv  TABLE   OF    CONTENTS, 

[references  are  to  sections.] 
Same  subject — Sale  must  be  made  where  market  and  competition 

exist  '^^^ 

Same  subject— Cannot  give  away  the  goods 794 

His  right  to  know  the  character  of  the  goods  and  the  contents  of 

the   packages    '^^^ 

Same  subject— Shipper  must  make  known  dangerous  character  of 

goods    '^^^ 

His  liability  for  damages  occasioned  by  dangerous  goods 797 

The  liability  of  the  shipper  for  injury  caused  by  dangerous  goods.  .798 

11.      THE  carrier's   right  TO   COMPENSATION. 

The  compensation  of  the  carrier 799 

Carrier  usually  entitled  to  freight  only  on  the  goods  delivered 800 

Carrier  entitled  to  full  freight  if  prevented  by  owner  from  complet- 
ing journey   801 

Entitled  to  freight  though  the  goods  have  become  worthless,  if  they 

are  delivered  802 

Same  subject  803 

The  amount  of  compensation  for  the  carriage 804 

Rights  of  shipper  when  excessive  rates  demanded 805 

Rights  of  carrier  where  low  rate  has  been  secured  by  fraud  or  mis- 
take     806 

Who  liable  for  the  freight — Consignee  prima  facie  liable 807 

Same  subject-«-How  when  consignee  assigns  bill  of  lading  before 

delivery   808 

Same  subject — Presumption  of  consignee's  liability  may  be  rebutted. 809 
Same  subject — Remedy  against  consignee  not  conclusive — Consignee 

deemed  agent  of  shipper 810 

Same  subject — Agency  must  be  known 811 

The  rule  when  the  freight  is  to  be  paid  by  measurement 812 

Must  be  calculated  on  amount  carried  and  delivered 813 

Freight  pro  rata  itineris 814 

Same  subject  ' 815 

Same  subject — How  question  determined 816 

Same  subject — Acceptance  of  proceeds  of  sale  made   without  con- 
sultation with  owner  not  an  acceptance  of  the  goods 817 

Same  subject — How  when  transportation  to  destination  impossible. 818 

Same  subject — How  when  carriage  interrupted  by  war 819 

Same  subject — Rule  for  adjusting  freight  pro  rata 820 

Same  subject — The  application  of  the  rule 821 

Transshipment  of  goods  when  vessel  delayed 822 

Same  subject — Payment  of  freight  in  such  cases 823 

Same  subject — Difference  in  rates,  how  adjusted 824 

Same  subject — Power  of  master  as  agent 825 


TABLE  OF   CONTENTS.  XXXV 

[references   ABE   TO   SECTIONS.] 

No  freight  recoverable  when  ship  captured  by  the  public  enemy 826 

Right  to  freight  where  the  goods  are  carried  contrary  to  the  wishes 

or  directions  of  the  owner 827 

Carrier  cannot  sue  for  freight  until  the  goods  are  delivered 828 

When  delivery  deemed  complete 829 

When  the  shipper  may  recover  freight  paid  in  advance 830 

Parties  may  agree  for  prepayment 831 

Consignee  liable  for  detention  of  the  carrier  by  water — Demurrage. 832 
Same  subject — Effect  of  charterer's  stipulation  to  load   or  unload 

within  a  fixed  time 833 

Same  subject — When  delay  is  caused  by  default  of  the  shipowner.  .834 
Same  subject — When  delay  is  caused  by  observance  of  stipulation 

inserted  for  shipowner's  benefit 835 

Same  subject — Delays  due  to  customs  officers 836 

Same  subject — What  are  counted  as  lay  days — "Days" — "Working 

days" — "Weather  working  days" 837 

Same  subject — Parts  of  days 838 

Same  subject — Agreements  for  "quick  dispatch,"  "customary  quick 

dispatch"  and  "customary  dispatch" 839 

Same  subject — Agreements  to  load  or  discharge  "as  fast  as  steamer 

can  deliver"    840 

Same  subject — Charterer's  liability  may  be  restricted  by  exceptions 

— "Strikes" — "Droughts" — "Political  occurrences,"  etc 841 

Effect  when  contract  is  silent  as  to  time  of  loading  or  discharge.  .842 
Same  subject — Demurrage  not  allowable  for  contemplated  delays.. 843 
Same  subject — When  loading  or  discharge  is  left  to  third  person.. 844 

Same  subject — Charterer  must  have  cargo  ready  for  loading 845 

Same  subject — Charterer's   duty   to  provide  appliances  for  loading 

or  unloading   846 

Same  subject — "In  regular  turn" 847 

Same  subject — Necessity  of  notice  of  vessel's  readiness 848 

Same  subject — Where  ship  must  be  lying 849 

Same  subject — Vessel  to  proceed  to  berth  "as  ordered" 850 

Accident  to  vessel  while  waiting  on  demurrage 851 

Charterer's  liability  for  delays  after  loading  is  completed 852 

Effect  of  consignee's  acceptance  of  goods  as  creating  liability  for 

demurrage 853 

Effect  of  "cesser"  clause 854 

Demurrage  not  allowable  where  delay  is  due  to  shipowner's  or  mas- 
ter's  faults    85S 

Shipowner's  lien  for  demurrage. 856 

Waivers  of  claim  for  demurrage 857 

Liability  of  consignee  for  detention  of  cars  where  duty  to  unload 

the  goods  devolves  on  railroad  company 858 


XXXvi  TABLE   OF    CONTENTS. 

[REFERENCES   ARE   TO    SECTIONS.] 

Same  subject— How  where  duty  to  unload  cars  devolvee  on  con- 
signee   °^^ 

Same  subject — Effect  of  provision  for  demurrage  charge  in  railroad 
company's  receipt — Rules  and  regulations 8G0 

Same  subject — Car  service  associations 8G1 

Same  subject — Lien  of  railroad  company  on  goods  to  secure  payment 
of  charges  in  the  nature  of  demurrage 862 

Carrier's  right  of  indemnity — Freight  for  goods  not  delivered — 
Failure  to  supply  cargo 863 


ni.    THE  carrier's  bight  of  lien. 


The  carrier  has  a  lien  for  his  freight 864 

Lien  usually  a  specific  one 865 

What  charges  the  lien  protects SG6 

Same  subject — Lien  of  last  of  connecting  carriers   for  freight  ad- 
vanced to  preceding  carrier 867 

Lien  on  sub-freight SG8 

Lien  lost  by  unconditional  surrender  of  goods 869 

Lien  not  lost  by  a  delivery  of  part  of  the  goods 870 

Lien  not  lost  by  delivery  obtained  by  trick  or  fraud 871 

Lien  takes  precedence  of  claims  of  consignor  or  creditors 872 

Eights  of  conditional  vendor  who  authorizes  shipment  of  goods.... 873 
Lien  lost  where  carrier  is  liable  for  damages  to  goods  equal  to  or 

exceeding  the  freight  charges 874 

Lien  may  be  waived  by  terms  of  payment 875 

Same  subject — Waiver  by  taking  acceptance  payable  after  delivery. 876 

Same  subject — What  does  not  amount  to  a  waiver 877 

Same  subject — Other  illustrations 878 

Same  subject — Other  illustrations 879 

Carrier  may  store  goods  subject  to  lien  when  consignee  fails  or  re- 
fuses to  pay  freight 880 

Liability  of  carrier  while  so  holding  goods 881 

Whether  the  carrier  has  a  lien  upon  goods  wrongfully  shipped  by 

one  who  is  not  the  owner 882 

Same  subject — How  compares  with  innkeeper 883 

Same  subject — No  lien  where  goods  received  from  tortious  holder.. 884 
Same  subject — Lien  exists  where  goods  received  from  one  clothed 

with  apparent  authority  by  owner 885 

Whether  property  of  government  subject  to  lien 886 

Lien  discharged  by  tender 887 

Lien  not  assignable 888 

Carrier  cannot  sell  the  goods  for  his  charges 889 


I 


TABLE   OP    CONTENTS.  XXXVU 

[references  are  to  sections.] 

CHAPTER  XI. 

OF  CARRIERS  OF  PASSENGERS. 

1.  OF  PASSENGER  CARRIERS  GENERALLY. 

Distinction  between  common  carrier  and  carrier  of  passengers 890 

Not  common  carrier  in  transportation  of  slaves 891 

Carrier  of  passengers  not  insurer  of  their  safety — Liable  only  for 
negligence  892 

1.  Degree  of  care  and  diligence  required. 

Degree  of  care  and  diligence  required  of  passenger  carriers 893 

Same  subject   894 

Same  subject  895 

Same   subject — Bound   to   protect  as  far  as  human  care   and   fore- 
sight will  go 896 

Same  subject — Limitations  to  the  rule 897 

Degree  of  care  required  may  vary  with  the  circumstances — Duty  to 

warn  passenger  of  danger 898 

Same   subject — When  passengers  ai-e  carried   on  freight  or  mixed 

trains     899 

Risks  which  the  passenger  takes  upon  himself — Carrier  not  liable 
for  mere  accidents  or  casualties  which  human  prudence  could 

not  foresee 900 

Same  subject  901 

2.  Duty  as  to  means  of  conveyance. 

Carrier's  responsibility  for  the  safety  of  his  means  of  conveyance.  .902 

Same  subject— Liability  for  latent  defects 903 

Same  subject   904 

Same  subject — The  English  rule 905 

Responsibility  for  defects  in  vehicles  and  machinery  attributable  to 

the  fault  of  the  manufacturer 906 

Same  subject   907 

Same  subject   908 

Same  subject — Carrier  responsible   to  passenger   for  negligence   of 

manufacturer  909 

Same  subject — Same  rule  applies  to  bridges 910 

Responsibility  for  equipping  vehicles  with  unsafe  appliances — Duty 

as  to  management  of  appliances 911 

Responsibility  for  injuries  caused  by  escaping  sparks  or  cinders...  .912 


XXXViii  TABLE   OP    CONTENTS, 

[references  are  to  sections.] 

Liability  of  carrier  wliere  the  immediate  cause  of  the  injury  is  the 

negligent  act  of  a  third  person 913 

Liability  of  carrier  where  injury  is  due  to  an  intervening  cause... 914 
Liability  of  railway  carrier  having  running  powers  over  other  road. 915 
Liability  of  carrier  for  safety  of  intermediate  agencies  employed. .  .916 

Liability  for  injury  caused  by  concurrent  action  of  two  carriers 917 

Liability  of  carrier  for  acts   of  lessees,  etc. — Liability  for  acts  of 

receiver    918 

Liability    of    carrier    for    the    negligence    of    an    independent    con- 
tractor     919 

Liability  for  injury  caused  passenger  by  article  brought  into  vehicle 

by  other  passenger 920 

Same  subject — Dangerous  articles   921 

Duty  of  carrier  to  supply  vehicles  with  necessary  service  and  accom- 
modations   922 

Duty  in  respect  of  management  and  running  of  trains  and  vehicles . .  923 

Same  subject — Duty  to  avoid  sudden  jerks  and  jars 924 

Same  subject — Duty  to  keep  track  free  from  obstructions — Duty  to 

avert  injury  from  obstructions  placed  near  track 925 

Same  subject — Duty  as  to  speed  of  trains  926 

Same  subject — Doors  and  windows — Vestibuled  trains 927 


3.    Duty  as  to  stational  facilities. 

Duty  of  railway  carriers  in  respect  to  platforms,  approaches  and 

station  accommodations   , 928 

Same  subject — Like  accommodations  not  required  at  all  stations. .  .929 
Same  subject — Where  railroad  line  or  stational   facilities  are  still 

in  process  of  construction   930 

Same  subject — Equipment  and  heating  of  waiting  rooms — Retiring 

places  931 

Same  subject — Baggage  rooms    932 

Same  subject — Liability  for  unsafe  platforms 933 

Same  subject — Passengers  must  use  platforms  intended  for  them 984 

Same  subject — Liability  for  obstructions  on  platforms 935 

Same  subject — Liability  for  not  lighting  stations 936 

Same  subject — Duty  in  respect  to  providing  means  for  getting  to  or 

from   stations   and   trains    937 

Same  subject — How  where  stational  facilities  are  not  owned  by  the 

railroad    company — Union    depots    938 

Same  subject — Passenger  not  justified  in  incurring  danger  to  avoid 

inconvenience   939 

Same   subject — Not  liable  for  not  guarding  against  accidents  not 

reasonably  to  be  anticipated  940 

Same  subject— The  degree  of  care  required   941 


TABLE   OP    CONTENTS.  XXXIX 

[references  are  to  sections.] 

Duty  of  carriers  by  water  in  respect  to  wharves,  approaches  and 
stational  facilities  942 

Power  of  carriers  to  adopt  regulations  as  to  admissions  into  their 
stations  and  depots   943 

Same  subject — Right  of  railway  companies  to  exclude  all  but  certain 
favored  hackmen  from  their  grounds — Courts  which  uphold  such 
right    944 

Same  subject — Courts  which  deny  such  right   945 

Power  of  railway  company  to  grant  exclusive  access  to  its  terminal 
wharf  to  favored   steamboat  line    946 

4.    Duty  to  keep  roads,  vehicles,  etc.,  in  repair. 

Duty  as  to  roads  when  provided  by  themselves   947 

Same  subject — Not  liable  for  defect  in  road  caused  by  accident  which 

could  not  have  been  f®reseen — Storms,  floods,  snowslides,  etc. ..948 
Same  subject — Liability  for  unsound  rails,  defective  switches,  etc. ..949 

Same  subject — No  liability  when  injury  caused  by  a  stranger 950 

Same  subject — Liability  for  not  discovering  defect 951 

Responsibility   for   not  adopting   useful   improvements   which   may 

promote  the  safety  of  the  passenger 952 

Same   subject    953 

Same  subject — Duty  of  railroad  company  to  maintain  "whip  lashes" 

near  overhanging  structures  or  bridges   954 

Duty  of  railroad  company  to  maintain  fences  along  its  right  of  way. 955 

Duty  as  to  examination  of  vehicles  and  other  apparatus  956 

Same  subject   957 

5.    Duty  as  to  servants  employed. 

Responsibility  for  the  character  of  servants  employed 958 

Same  subject — Liable  for  their  negligence,  imprudence  or  incom- 
petency     959 

Same  subject — Companies  and  corporations  liable   960 

Same  subject — Liability  for  knowingly  retaining  unfit  servants — 
Ratification    9^1 

6.    Duty  to  accept  passenger. 

Their  duty  to  accept  as  passengers  those  who  offer  themselves  for 

carriage    962 

Same  subject 963 

Same  subject — Right    to  be  carried  on  freight  trains 964 

Same  subject — Right  to  be  carried  on  special  or  emergency  trains.  965 
What  persons  the  carrier  may  refuse  to  accept 966 


Xl  TABl.E   OF    CONTENTS. 

[REFERENCES   ARE   TO   SECTIONS.] 

Same  subject— Right  to  exclude  the  blind 967 

Same  subject— Right  to  exclude  the  insane 968 

Same  subject— Right  to  exclude  intoxicated  persons 969 

Same  subject — Right  to  exclude  persons  who  interfere  with  the  in- 
terests or  business  of  the  carrier 970 

Duty  and  liability  as  to  carrying  prisoners 971 

7.    Separation  of  passengers  for  sex,  color,  etc. 

Passengers  may  be  separated  according  to  sex,  character,  etc. — Color 
discriminations    972 

Same  subject — Contract  of  carriage  made  subject  to  such  regula- 
tions     973 

8.    Ejection  of  passenger  for  misconduct. 

But  when  once  accepted,  a  passenger  cannot  be  ejected  unless  guilty 

of  some  misconduct  974 

Same  subject — Not  to  be  ejected  for  supposed  bad  character  if  prop- 
erly conducting  himself 975 

Same  subject — When  one  passenger  may  be  ejected  for  misconduct 

of  another 976 

When  the  passenger  may  be  ejected  for  improper  conduct 977 

Same  subject — Ejection  of  drunken  passengers 978 

Same  subject — Breach  of  table  manners 979 

9.    Duty  to  protect  passenger. 

Duty  of  the  carrier  to  protect  the  passenger 980 

Same    subject — Carrier    bound    to    protect    against   assaults    which 

might  reasonably  be  expected 981 

Same  subject — Carrier's  duty  to  protect  female  passengers 982 

Same  subject — Carrier  not  liable  for  accidents  arising  from  rude- 
ness or  incivility  of  fellow-passengers 983 

Same  subject — Duty  to  restrain  or  eject  drunken  passengers 984 

Same   subject — Duty   of  carrier  to   guard   against   careless   use   of 

firearms   985 

Same  subject — Carrier's  duty  to   protect  passengers   from   injuries 

by  strikers   986 

Same  subject — Duty  of  carrier  to  protect  passenger  from  arrest. ..  .987 
Same  subject — Duty  of  carrier  to  protect  its  passengers  against  acts 
of    violence    by    passengers    who    have    been    ejected    or    have 

alighted    988 

Same  subject — Duty  of  carrier  to  protect  passenger  while  in  station 
or  depot   989 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS.  xU 

[BEFEEENCES   ABE   TO   SECTIONS.] 

Difference  between  passenger  and  stranger  or  trespasser  as  to  de- 
gree of  care  and  diligence  to  be  used 990 

Same  subject — Duty   to   persons   coming   to  stations  to  assist  pas- 
sengers    991 

Duty  of  carrier  toward  sick,  aged  and  disabled  passengers 992 

Same  subject — Blind  and  deaf  passengers 993 

Duty  toward  intoxicated  passengers 994 

Degree  of  care  required  in  the  carriage  of  children 995 

Duty  to  furnish  assistance  to  passengers  who  have  fallen  from  train. 996 


10.  Who  are  passengers. 

Who  entitled  to  be  considered  a  passenger 997 

Same  subject — Authority  of  carrier's  employes  to  create  relation  of 

passenger  998 

Same  subject — Persons  not  passengers  who  voluntarily  ride  in  places 

not  intended  for  passengers 999 

Same  subject — Riding  on  freight  trains,  engines,  hand-cars,  etc...  1000 

Same  subject — Trespassers,  tramps,  defrauders,  etc 1001 

Same  subject — Passenger  by  mistake  on  wrong  train  is  not  a  tres- 
passer    1002 

Same  subject — Person  riding  on  "drover's  pass" 1003 

Same  subject — Person  riding  on  "employe's  pass" 1004 

Same  subject — May  become  passenger  before  entering  vehicle — Ef- 
fect of  signal  to  stop 1005 

Same  subject — Person  waiting  to  take  train  entitled  to  protection — 

Person  pursuing  departing  train — Spectators 1006 

Same  subject — May  be  passenger  though  received  in  vehicle  before 

ready  to  start 1007 

Same  subject — Prepayment  of  fare  not  necessary 1008 

Same  subject — Injury  while  waiting  but  before  purchase  of  ticket.  1009 
Same    subject — Is   a    passenger   while   coming   to    station   on   car- 
rier's vehicle   1010 

Same  subject — Injury  to  passenger  on  platform  by  objects  thrown 

from  passing  train — Coal — Stick  of  wood — Mail  bags 1011 

Same  subject — Continues  to  be  passenger  though  temporarily  ab- 
sent from  vehicle 1012 

Same  subject — Does  not  cease  to  be  passenger  by  assisting  carrier 

in  emergency  1013 

Same  subject — Does  not  cease   to  be  passenger  by  remaining  on 
train  after  reaching  his  first  destination  with  the  intention  to 

continue  his  journey  to  another  point 1014 

Same  subject — What  elements  must  exist 1015 

Same  subject — How  long  the  relation  of  carrier  and  passenger  con- 
tinues   1016 


xlii  TABLE   OF    CONTENTS. 

[REFERENCES   ABE   TO    SECTIONS.] 

Same  subject — Duty  of  protection  does  not  depend  on  contract 
alone — Mail-carrier — Servant — Excursionist — Sunday  traveler.  .1017 

Same  subject— Duty  to  one  not  passenger  but  lawfully  on  train — 

Express  messenger — Porter — News  agent — Lumberman 1018 

Same  subject — Payment  of  fare  not  necessary  to  constitute  a  pas- 
senger   1019 

Same  subject — Child  or  other  person  carried  free  as  passenger. ..  .1020 

11.  Gratuitous  passenger. 

Care  and  diligence  due  to  a  gratuitous  passenger 1021 

Same  subject — The  rule  stated 1022 


12.  Fare  and  its  payment. 

Amount  of  fare — State  regulation — Discrimination 1023 

Payment  of  fare — How  made — Making  change 1024 

Same  subject — Who  liable  for  fare — Adult  and  child 1025 

Same    subject — Paying    fare    or    buying    ticket    with    counterfeit 

money  1026 

Same  subject — Effect  of  statutory  requirement  that  conductor  wear 

badge  to  show  his  authority  to  collect  fares 1027 

13.    Tickets. 

The  contract  to  carry — Tickets 1028 

Such  tickets  in  universal  use 1029 

Duty  to  sell  tickets  to  those  applying  for  them 1030 

Effect  of  exchange  of  tickets  on  stipulations  therein 1031 

Carrier  may   require   passengers  to  purchase   tickets   and   exhibit 

them  before  entering  trains 1032 

Same  subject — Requiring  higher  fare  when  paid  on  train — Reason- 
able facilities  for  procuring  ticket  must  be  furnished 1033 

Same  subject — Waiver  of  right  to  demand  higher  fare  when  paid 

on  train  1034 

Same  subject — Carrier  may  abandon  custom  to  sell  tickets  at  re- 
duced rates    1035 

Same  subject — Ticket  must  be  produced  when  called  for — Lost,  mis- 
laid or  forgotten  tickets 1036 

Same  subject — Rebate  or  train  tickets  given  on  payment  of  cash 

fare  must  be  produced  when  called  for 1037 

Same  subject — Right  to  require  surrender  of  ticket 1038 

Same  subject 1039 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS.  xliii 

[references  are  to  sections.] 

Same  subject — Torn  or  mutilated  tickets 1040 

In  absence  of  contract,  ticket  presumed  to  be  for  continuous  trip — 

Stop-over    1041 

Same  subject — Through  passenger  cannot  claim  the  advantage  of 
local    excursion    or    competitive    rates    between    intermediate 

points    1042 

Same  subject — Limitations  as  to  time  within  which  ticket  is  good 

for  use  1043 

Same  subject  1044 

Same  subject  IO45 

Same  subject  1046 

Same  subject  IO47 

Rule  different  in  case  of  coupon  tickets 1048 

Coupon   ticket  does   not  usually   import  contract  of  through  car- 
riage    1049 

Same  subject — But  contract  for  through  carriage  may  be  so  made.  1050 
Effect  of  non-designation  of  route  in  ticket  when  there  is  a  longer  ' 

and  shorter  route 1051 

If  ticket  does  not  express  the  entire  contract,  it  may  be  shown  by 

other  proof 1052 

Passenger  is  bound  by  terms  of  ticket  contract 1053 

Same  subject — Round-trip  ticket  requiring  identification 1054 

Same  subject — Provision  that  coupon  shall  not  be  good  if  detached.  1055 

Same  subject — Provision  that  ticket  shall  not  be  transferable 1056 

Same   subject — Passenger   should    truthfully   answer   questions   of 

conductor  concerning  his  identity 1057 

Same  subject — Provision  that  ticket  shall  not  be  good  on  certain 

trains    1058 

Same   subject — Passenger   can   go   only   in  direction   which   ticket 

indicates    1059 

Same  subject — How  when  train  does  not  stop  at  passenger's  des- 
tination    1060 

Same  subject — How  when  by  mistake  he  is  given  obviously  wrong 

ticket    1061 

Same  subject — How  when  ticket  is  apparently  good 10G2 

Same  subject — Where  two  or  more  roads  employ  joint  ticket  agent 

— Which  road  liable  for  his  mistakes 1063 

Same  subject — Where  conductor  on  first  line  tears  off  coupon  of 

second  line   1064 

Same  subject — As  between  passenger  and  conductor  the  ticket  pro- 
duced must  govern 1065 

Same  subject — But  passenger  is  not  without  remedy 1066 

Right  of  passenger  to  rely  on  instructions  given  him 1067 

When  passenger's  ticket  has  been  purchased  for  him  by  third  per- 
son  1068 


Xliv  TABLE   OF    CONTENTS. 

[EEFEBENCES   ABE   TO    SECTIONS.] 

14.    Limitation  of  carrier's  liability. 

Passenger  carrier  cannot  limit  his  liability  by  notice  or  regula- 
tion— Conclusiveness  of  contract 1069 

Same  subject — Good  faith  required  on  part  of  carrier 1070 

Same  subject — When  limitation  inures  to  benefit  of  connecting 
carrier    1071 

Right  of  the  carrier  to  provide  against  liability  for  injuries  to  the 

passenger  from  the  negligence  of  the  carrier  or  his  servants.  .1072 

Same  subject — Actual  payment  of  cash  fare  not  necessary  in  order 

to  render  stipulations  against  liability  for  negligence  void 1073 

Same  subject — No  distinction  made  in  these  cases  as  to  degree  of 
negligence    1074 

Rule  where  free  passes  are  issued  on  condition  of  no  liability. ..  .1075 

Carrier  may  enter  into  contract  of  indemnity  with  insurance  com- 
pany     1076 

15.   Regulations  of  the  carrier. 

The  passenger  must  conform  to  the  reasonable  regulations  of  the 

carrier,  and  may  be  ejected  for  refusal 1077 

Same  subject 1078 

Same  subject 1079 

Regulation  of  carrier  may  be  waived  by  usage — Authority  of  an 

agent  to  waive 1080 

Carrier  liable  if  wrong  person  expelled  for  breach  of  regulations.  .1081 

16.  Ejection  of  passenger  for  breach  of  regulations. 

At  what  place  passenger  may  be  ejected 1082 

Same  subject — Ejection  of  females  and  sick  or  intoxicated  passen- 
gers    1083 

The  right  to  eject  must  be  exercised  in  a  proper  manner 1084 

Effect  of  tender  after  refusal  to  pay  or  show  ticket  and  ejection 

begun   1085 

Duty  of  carrier  to  tender  back  fare  received  before  ejection 1086 

Duty  of  carrier  to  tender  back  fare  received  when  parent  is  ejected 

for  non-payment  of  child's  fare 1087 

Duty  of  carrier  to  return  ticket  claimed  to  be  void  or  worthless 

before  ejecting  passenger 1088 

The   right  to   resist  ejection — May   resist  ejection   from   train   in 

rapid  motion 1089 

Same  subject — Resistance  when  rightfully  on  train — Resistance  not 
necessary  to  preserve  passenger's  rights-:-Damages  for  injuries 
received  while   resisting 1090 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS.  xlv 

[references  are  to  sections.] 

Whether  due  care  has  been  used,  a  question  of  fact 1091 

Relation    of   carrier   and   passenger    does   not   cease    on    wrongful 

ejection    1092 

17.    The  treatment  of  the  passenger. 

The  treatment  due  the  passenger 1093 

Liability  of  carrier  for  ill-treatment  of  passenger — Liable  for  as- 
saults by  brakemen  and  conductors 1094 

Same  subject — Liable  for  assaults  by  porters  or  omnibus  guards..  1095 
Same  subject — Like  rule  governs  as  to  liability  of  carrier  by  water 

for  assault  by  servants 103G 

Same  subject — Exemplary  damages  allowed 1097 

Same  subject — Early  overruled  cases  in  New  York  hold  carrier  not 

liable  for  assault  by  servant  not  acting  in  line  of  his  duty....  1098 
Liability  of  carrier  for  assault  by  servants  in  station  or  before  or 

after  the  existence  of  the  relation  of  carrier  and  passenger...  .1099 
Liability  of  carrier  for  wrongful  arrest  of  passenger  by  carrier's 

servants  1100 

Liability  for  indecent  assaults  on  female  passengers 1101 

Liability   of  carrier  where  ill-treatment  is   provoked  by  the   pas- 
senger  1102 

18.  Duty  as  to  beginning,  continuing  and  ending  the  transportation. 

The  time  at  which  the  carrier  must  commence  and  complete  the 

transportation    1103 

Must  use  diligence  to  conform  to  published  schedules  and  notices.  .1104 

Same  subject 1105 

Same  subject  1106 

Same  subject  1107 

How  when  a  train  is  late — Statements  of  agent  as  to  when  it  will 

arrive  or  depart 1108 

Liability  for  detention  of  the  passenger 1109 

Duty  to  stop  trains  for  passengers  at  regular  or  flag  stations  and 

at  passenger  platforms 1110 

Passenger  must  be  allowed  reasonable  opportunity  to  enter  vehicle 

in  safety  1111 

Helping  passengers  to  enter  train 1112 

Carrier  must  furnish  sufficient  room  and   reasonable  accommoda- 
tions— Right  of  passenger  to  a  seat  before  surrendering  ticket.  1113 
Same  subject — Extraordinary  and  unexpected  demand  will  excuse.  1114 

Same  subject — When  passengers  are  carried  in  baggage  car 1115 

Carrier  must  allow  customary  intervals  for  refreshment  and  give 

notice  of  departure 1116 

Passenger  must  be  put  down  at  usual  place  of  stopping 1117 


xlvi  TABLE  OP   CONTENTS. 

[BEFEBENCES   ABE   TO   SECTIONS.] 

Carrier  must  give  sufficient  time  to  alight 1118 

Same  subject — Not  liable  where  reasonable  time  and  opportunity 

given,  but  passenger  has  delayed 1119 

Same  subject — Not  liable  where  passenger  has  evaded  payment  of 

fare  1120 

Must  give  notice  of  arrival  at  stations 1121 

Must  be  careful   not  to  invite  the  passenger  to  alight  at  an  im- 
proper time  or  place 1122 

Same  subject — Effect  of  calling  name  of  station 1123 

Same  subject — Where  announcement  is  made  by  stranger 1124 

Same  subject — Effect  of  notice  to  passengers  to  take  other  cars...  1125 

Same  subject — Carrying  passengers  past  platforms  or  stations 1126 

Helping  passengers  to  alight 1127 

Awaking  sleeping  passengers 1128 

Furnishing  passengers  necessary  instructions 1129 


IT.     SLEEPING  AND  PABLOB  CABS. 


Sleeping-car  companies  not  common  carriers   or  inn-keepers,   but 

bound  for  reasonable  care 1130 

Same  subject — Negligence  the  test  of  liability 1131 

Same  subject — Limit  of  the  liability 1132 

Same  subject — Liability  while  passenger  is  away  from  berth 1133 

Same  rules  apply  to  parlor-car  companies 1134 

Railroad  company  liable  as  common  carrier  to  passenger  of  sleep- 
ing-car     1135 

Railroad  company  entitled  to  determine  who  shall  occupy  sleeping- 
cars    1136 

Sleeping-car  company  not  responsible  for  train  connections 1137 

Responsibility  of  sleeping-car  company  where  sleeping-car  does  not 
go    over    the    same   line   of    railroad    that    passenger's    ticket 

calls  for  1138 

Duty  of  sleeping-car  company  to  furnish  berth 1139 

Duty  of  sleeping-car  company  to  furnish  means  of  getting  into  or 

out   of    berth 1140 

Passenger  entitled  to  occupy  only  the  berth  he  pays  for 1141 

Duty  to  awaken  passengers  in  time  to  alight 1142 

Duty  to  ventilate  and  heat  cars 1143 

Duty  to  keep  aisles  free  from  obstructions 1144 

Liability  of  sleeping-car  company  for  assaults  by  its  servants  on 

passengers  or  for  wrongful  expulsion 1145 

Liability  of  sleeping-car  company  for  baggage  in  custody  of  porter 

while  lady  passenger  is  leaving  train 1146 


TABLE   OF    CONTENTS.  xlvii 

[BEFEBENCES    ABE   TO    SECTIONS.] 
III.     PASSENGEB   CABBIEBS   BY   WATEB. 

Are  subject  to  general  rules  regulating  other  carriers 1147 

Statutory  regulation  1148 

Penalties  imposed  for  dangerous  practices 1149 

Licensing  officers,  etc 1150 

Statutory  regulations  for  safety 1151 

Government  of  merchant  vessels 1152 

Regulations  to  prevent  collisions 1153 

Purpose  of  these  regulations 1154 

These  regulations  do  not  lessen  liability  of  carrier  for  safe  car- 
riage  of   passengers 1155 

Duty  to  furnish  passengers  with  food  and  other  necessaries 1156 

Same  subject  1157 

Same  subject — Steerage  passengers 1158 

Authority  of  master 1159 

Same  subject  1160 

Duty  of  master  to  provide  for  safety,  health  and  comfort  of  passen- 
gers     1161 

Same  subject — Duty  in  respect  of  women  and  children 1162 

Same  subject — Duty  to  aid  sick  or  disabled  passengers 1163 

Passenger  must  conduct  himself  properly 1164 

Duty  to  furnish  berths 1165 

How  far  carrier  by  water  bound  by  schedule  as  to  leaving 1166 

Same  subject — Carrier  by  water  not  bound   to  deliver  telegrams 

addressed  to  passengers 1167 

Passengers  may  refuse  to  be  carried  in  unseaworthy  ship 1168 

Liability  of  carrier   by   water  continues  until  passenger  and  his 

baggage  are  safely  landed 1169 

CHAPTER  XII. 

THE  LIABILITY  OP  THE  CARRIER  AS  AFFECTED  BY  THE  CON- 
CURRING OR  CONTRIBUTORY  NEGLIGENCE  OF  THE  PAS- 
SENGER. 

Of  contributory  negligence  generally 1170 

Application  of  rule  to  carriers 1171 

Difference  in  this  respect  between  passenger  and  stranger 1172 

Contributory  negligence  of  passenger  no  excuse  to  carrier  where 

injury  could  have  been  averted 1173 

Contributory  negligence  usually  a  question  of  fact 1174 

When  a  question  of  law 1175 

Questions  of  mixed  law  and  fact 1176 

Alighting  from  train  while  in  motion 1177 

Same  subject   1178 


xlviii  TABLE   OF    CONTENTS. 

[references   are   to    oECTIONS.] 

Same  subject— View  that  attempt  by  passenger  to  alight  from  train 

while  in  motion  is  not  necessarily  a  negligent  act  per  se 1179 

Same  subject — How  when  danger  obvious 1180 

Getting  on  train  while  in  motion 1181 

Same  subject — View  that  attempt  by  passenger  to  board  train  while 

in  motion  is  not  necessarily  a  negligent  act  per  se 1182 

Same  subject — Negligence  of  passenger  in  boarding  train  while  in 

motion  no  excuse  for  pushing  him  from  platform 1183 

Leaving  or  entering  train  elsewhere  than  on  platform  where  one 

is  provided   1184 

Same  subject — Effect  of  carrier's  acquiescence  or  directions 1185 

Leaving  or  entering  train  at  place  where  no  platform  is  provided.  .1186 
Alighting  at  an  unusual  place  when  train  has  stopped  short  of  or 

has  overshot  platform 1187 

Using  ways  for  leaving  or  entering  vehicles  not  intended  for  that 

purpose    1188 

Same  subject — Effect  of  carrier's  acquiescence 1189 

Alighting  from  steps  of  vehicle  when  danger  obvious 1190 

Using  ways  for  leaving  depot  not  intended  for  that  purpose 1191 

Passing  from  car  to  car  while  train  is  in  motion 1192 

Same  subject — How  when  cars  provided  with  vestibules 1193 

Occupying  exposed  position  upon  vehicle 1194 

Same  subject — Effect  of  carrier's  acquiescence  or  directions 1195 

Same  subject — Occupying  exposed  position  not  a  bar  to  recovery 

where  it  does  not  contribute  to  injury 1196 

Voluntarily  riding  on  platform  while  train  in  motion 1197 

Same  subject — How  when  car  full 11.98 

Riding  on  platform  to  better  escape  impending  danger — How  when 

car  unfit  for   physical  comfort 1199 

Riding  in  baggage  or  mail-car 1200 

Riding  in  show-car ' 1201 

Stockmen  riding  in  stock-car 1202 

Same  subject — Passing  over  tops  of  cars  while  train  is  in  motion.  .1203 

Same  subject — Stockmen  riding  on  engine 1204 

Riding  on  hand-car 1205 

Interfering  with  management  of  vehicles 1206 

Using  unsafe  platforms   on   depot  premises 1207 

Occupying  exposed  positions  upon  railway  company's  premises. .  .1208 
Exposure    of    person — Passenger    projecting    his    limbs    from    car 

window    1209 

Same  subject — Such  protrusions  held  negligence 1210 

Same  subject — The  contrary'  view 1211 

Same  subject  1212 

Same  subject  1213 

Same  subject — No  defense  where  it  does  not  contribute  to  injury..  1214 
Same  subject — Protruding  head  through  car  window 1215 


TABLE   OF    CONTENTS.  xlis 

[REFERENCES    ARE   TO    SECTIONS.] 

Whether  standing  in  car  is  contributory  negligence 1216 

Same   subject — Care   to    be   exercised    by    passenger   while    riding 

on  freight  trains 1217 

Riding  upon  engine 1218 

Crossing  tracks  to  reach  or  leave  cars 1219 

Crawling  under  trains  to  reach  cars 1220 

How  far  negligence  excused  by  directions  of  carrier  or  his  serv- 
ants   1221 

Same   subject — Directions   by   agent  must  be   given   while   acting 

within  scope  of  his  authority 1222 

Where  the  passenger  is  attempting  to  escape  peril  to  which  the 

carrier  has  exposed  him 1223 

Same  subject — The  test  of  the  carrier's  liability 1224 

Avoiding  an  inconvenience  to  which  the  negligence  of  the  carrier 

has  exposed  him 1225 

Negligence  on  one  kind  of  vehicle  may  not  be  on  another 1226 

Contributory  negligence  as  affected  by  the  infancy  of  the  pas- 
senger   '. . .  1227 

Same  subject — When  negligence  will  be  imputed  to  children 1228 

Imputability   of   the   negligence   of  those   who   have   infants   and 

imbeciles   in   charge 1229 

Contributory  negligence,  as  affected  by  the  intoxication  of  the  pas- 
senger     1230 

Contributory  negligence  as  affected  by  the  blindness  or  deafness 

of  the  passenger 1231 

Traveling  on  Sunday 1232 

Same  subject   1233 

Care  to  be  exercised  by  passenger  after  having  been  wrongfully 
ejected  from  train  or  negligently  carried  beyond  his  destina- 
tion     1234 

Whether  the  negligence  of  the  passenger's  carrier  is  to  be  imputed 
to  him  when  injured  by  the  concurrent  negligence  of  another — 

The  former  English  rule  of  Thorogood  v.  Bryan 1235 

Same  subject — The  English   rule  generally  denied  in  the  United 

States   1236 

Same  subject — English  criticism  of  the  rule 1237 

Same  subject — Final  overthrow  of  the  rule  in  England 1238 

Summary  of  the  rules  upon  the  subject  of  this  chapter 1239 

CHAPTER  XIII. 

PASSENGERS'   BAGGAGE. 

Questions  discussed  in  this  chapter 1240 

Carrier's  liability  for  baggage 1241 

What  is  baggage 1242 


1  TABLE  OF   CONTENTS. 

[befeeences  are  to  sections.] 

Same  subject — Is  whatever  is  usually  carried  as  baggage 1243 

Same  subject — Articles  for  personal  use  during,   or  for   ultimate 

purpose  of  journey 1244 

Same  subject — As  to  value 1245 

Various  articles  held  baggage 1246 

Same  subject — Bedding 1247 

Same  subject — A  broad  rule 1248 

What  is  not  baggage 1249 

Effect  of  knowingly  accepting  articles  not  properly  baggage,  but 

which  are  tendered  as  such  by  the  passenger 1250 

Same  subject — Authority  of  baggage-master  to  check  merchandise 

as  baggage   1251 

Same  subject — Massachusetts  rule  as  to  merchandise 1252 

Baggage  not  limited  to  articles  to  be  used  on  journey 1253 

Articles  appropriate  or  essential  to  purpose  of  journey 1254 

The  question  of  baggage,  how  determined 1255 

Implied  authority  of  baggage-master  concerning  baggage 1256 

Liability  when  passenger  retains  possession  of  baggage 1257 

Same  subject — English  cases — Must  be  clear  that  passenger  as- 
sumes entire  control 1258 

Same  subject — English  cases — Question  of  delivery  to  carrier 1259 

Same  subject — English  cases — Passenger's  contributory  negligence.  1260 

Same  subject — Conclusion  from  last  decision 1261 

Same  subject — English  cases — Dissent  from  earlier  authorities 1262 

Same  subject — English  cases — Bei-gheim  v.  Railway  disapproved. .  .1263 

Same  subject — General  result  of  American  cases 1264 

Same  subject — Carrier  not  liable  for  wearing  apparel  in  present 

use    1265 

Same  subject — Carrier  liable  for  baggage  retained  by  passenger  in 

sleeping-car    1266 

Same  subject — Hand-bag  dropped  out  of  window 1267 

Liability  of  carrier  by  water  for  baggage  taken  by  the  passenger 

into  his  stateroom 1268 

Same  subject — No  liability  for  clothing,  money  or  jewelry  in  cus- 
tody of  passenger 1269 

Same  subject — Nor  for  any  property  in  exclusive  possession  of  pas- 
senger   1270 

Same  subject — New  York  rule  as  to  the  responsibility  of  the  car- 
rier by  water  for  baggage  taken  by  passenger  into  his  state- 
room    1271 

Same  subject — Passenger  negligent,  carrier  not  liable 1272 

Sleeping  and  parlor-car  companies 1273 

Owner  must  be  a  passenger 1274 

What  is  contract  where  baggage  not  accompanied  by  owner 1275 

Where  baggage  is  accompanied  by  a  person  other  than  the  owner.  .1276 


TABLE  OP   CONTENTS.  11 

[references  are  to  sections. J 

Baggage  of  wife  accompanied  by  husband — of  ctiild  accompanied 

by   parent    1277 

When  passenger  need  not  accompany  his  baggage 1278 

Baggage  when  carried  as  freight 1279 

Passenger   lying  over — Baggage   going  on 1280 

Delivery  of  baggage  to  carrier  1281 

Liability   of  carrier   for   delivering  baggage  to  wrong  connecting 

carrier  1282 

Same  subject — Liability  of  connecting  carrier 1283 

Delivery  of  baggage  at  destination 1284 

Passenger  allowed  reasonable  time  to  call  for  baggage 1285 

What  is  reasonable  time 1286 

Same  subject   1287 

Same  subject   1288 

Same  subject   1289 

Same   subject — Dissent   from   prevailing   construction    of   "reason- 
able time"    1290 

Strict  liability  of  carrier  succeeded  by  that  of  warehouseman 1291 

Liability  for  negligence  of  subsidiary  carrier  1292 

Strict   liability   of  carrier  preserved   where    delay    is    caused    by 

carrier     1293 

Delivery   by   carrier   to    transfer   company — Delivery    by    transfer 

company  1294 

Passenger's  right  to  have  baggage  delivered  at  any  regular  station 

at  which  train  stops 1295 

Connecting  carriers — Through  contract 1296 

Contracts  limiting  liability  1297 

Same  subject — Terms  of  limitation  on  baggage  checks 1298 

Same  subject — Terms  of  limitation  on  passenger  tickets 1299 

Liability  for  baggage  when  passenger  is  carried  gratuitously 1300 

Baggage  checks   1301 

What  a  baggage  check  implies 1302 

The  carrier's  lien  upon  baggage  1303 


CHAPTER  XIV. 

OP  ACTIONS  AGAINST  COMMON  CARRIERS. 

I.      THE  PARTIES. 

Who  may  sue  the  carrier  for  loss  of  or  damage  to  the  goods 1304 

One  having  special  property  may  sue  1805 

Owner  may   sue    1306 

Person  making  contract  with  the  carrier  may  sue 1307 

Same  subject— Even  if  plaintiff  have  no  interest  in  goods 1308 


lii  TABLE  OP   CONTENTS. 

[references   ABE   TO   SECTIONS.] 

Same  subject— States  following  this  doctrine 1309 

Same  subject — Doctrine  supported  by  English  cases 1310 

Same  subject — Advantage  of  this  rule 1311 

Conclusions  from  previous  cases 1312 

Contract  need  not  be  in  writing  to  enable  shipper  to  sue 1313 

The  rule  of  these  cases  stated — Only  owner  may  sue  in  tort 1314 

Rule  that  only  owner  can  sue 1315 

Rule  that  mere  agent  without  interest  cannot  sue 1316 

When  consignee  may  sue 1317 

When  consignor  the  proper  party 1318 

Same  subject — Where  sale   is  void,  or  where  contract  of  sale  is 

rescinded,  consignor  should  sue 1319 

Conclusions  on  this  subject 1320 

n.  THE  FORM  OF  ACTION. 

The  form  of  action 1321 

Original  theory  as  to  carrier's  obligation 1322 

First  recognition  of  the  theory  of  the  carrier's  contract  obligation.  .1323 

Action  on  the  case 1324 

Action  in  case  is  several  and  not  joint 1325 

Advantage  of  declaring  in  case  1326 

Action   in   assumpsit    1327 

How  character  of  action  determined 1328 

Same  subject  1329 

Distinction  in  form  of  action  now  generally  unimportant 1330 

When  action  should  be  upon  the  contract  1331 

When  action  should  be  for  breach  of  duty 1332 

III.    THE   PLEADINGS. 

Important  to  determine  if  plaintiff's  declaration  be  in  case  or  as- 
sumpsit    1333 

What  the  declaration  must  allege 1334 

When  action  is  on  the  contract  it  must  be  set  out  correctly 1335 

Same  subject — Example  of  particularity  requisite  in  declaring  on 

contract  1336 

Same  subject — Variance  between  declaration  and  proof  fatal 1337 

Same  subject — Whole  contract  must  be  stated 1338 

Reasons  for  requiring  particularity   in  declaring 1339 

Mere  collateral  stipulations  need  not  be  stated   1340 

Pleadings  in  action  for  statutory  penalty  for  excessive  charge 1341 

How  common-law  action  for  excessive  charge  is  affected  by  stat- 
utory action    1342 

What  is  sufficient  averment  of  an  over-charge  at  common  law....  1343 


TABLE   OF    CONTENTS.  lui 

[references  are  to  sections.] 

statements  as  to  the  carrier's  reward  or  compensation 1344 

The  carrier's  defense  to  the  action 1345 


IV.  THE  evidence. 

What  must  be  proved  by  the  plaintiff 1346 

Plaintiff  must  show  whose  negligence  caused  loss 1347 

Presumption  that  each  of  several  connecting  carriers  received  goods 
in  same  condition  as  when  delivered  to  first  carrier — Burden 

of  proof  to  show  contrarj' 1348 

Same  subject — Rule  in  Michigan  1349 

Contract  with  carrier  may  be  either  express  or  implied 1350 

Express  contract  not  necessary — Delivery  and  acceptance  enough..  1351 
Plaintiff  must  produce  some  evidence  of  loss — What  evidence  will 

be   sufficient    1352 

What  the  carrier  may  show 1353 

Rule  that  burden  of  proof  is  upon  carrier  to  show  no  negligence.  .1354 

Rule  that  burden  of  proof  as  to  negligence  is  upon  the  shipper 1355 

Importance  of  question  1356 

Burden  of  proof  where  property  injured  consists  of  live-stock 1357 

v.    THE   MEASURE   OF    DAMAGES. 

Difference  in  measure  between  actions  of  tort  and  contract 1358 

The  measure  of  damages  for  not  accepting  and  carrying  the  goods.  .1359 

The  measure  of  damages  for  the  loss  of  the  goods 1360 

Same  subject — Exceptions  to  the  rule 1361 

Measure  of  damages  for  injury  to  goods  during  transportation. ..  .1362 
Same  subject — Measure  of  damages  where  goods  not  intended  for 
sale  or  have  no  market  value — Family  portrait — Second-hand 

goods — Building  plans  1363 

Same  subject — How  when  amount  of  loss  limited  by  contract 1364 

Right  of  consignee  to  refuse  to  receive  injured  goods 1365 

Damages  for  delay  in  the  transportation  and  delivery 1366 

Same   subject — Special   damages — Notice   of   special   circumstances 

must  be  given  to  carrier  when  contract  is  made 1367 

Same  subject — Notice  given  after  contract  to  carry  has  been  per- 
formed     1368 

Damages   for   delay   in   transporting  articles  intended   for   use  in 

business     1369 

Damages  when  carrier  refuses  to  perform  his  contract  to  accept 

and  carry  the  goods  1370 

Same  subject 1371 

Delay  not  a  conversion  of  the  goods — Nor  loss  through  mere  non- 
feasance    1372 

Damages  for  delay  where  the  goods  are  not  for  sale  as  merchandise.  1373 


liv  TABLE   OF   CONTENTS. 

[references  are  to  sections.] 
Measure  of  damages  for  conversion   of  the  goods— Mitigation  of 


damages 


.1374 


Damages  for  injury  to,  or  delay  in  the  shipment  of  bodies  of  de- 
ceased persons    1Z75 

CHAPTER  XV. 

OF  ACTIONS  AGAINST  CARRIERS  FOR   INJURIES  TO 
PASSENGERS. 

I.    COMMON-LAW    ACTIONS. 

Actions  for  injuries  at  common  law 1376 

Parent's  right  of  action  1377 

Same  subject — Nature  and  extent  of  recovery  1378 

Husband's  right  of  action  1379 

Relation  of  servitude  necessary  at  common  law  1380 

Effect  of  child's  contributory  negligence  on  parent's  action 1381 

Effect  of  parent's  contributory  negligence  on  his  own  action 1382 

Effect  of  negligence  of  husband  or  wife  on  the  other's  action 1383 

II.    STATUTORY    ACTIONS. 

Statutory  right  of  action  in  case  of  death 1384 

Same  subject — Similar  acts  in  the  United  States 1385 

Whether  statute  gives  a  new  right  of  action 1386 

Extraterritorial  effect  of  these  statutes  1387 

When  right  of  action  created  in  one  state  may  be  prosecuted  in 

other  states  1388 

Who  may  sue  under  these  statutes   1389 

Who  may  sue  when  action  is  brought  in  state  other  than  one  where 

death  is  caused  1390 

Effect  of  deceased's  contributory  negligence  or  his  settlement  of  the 

action     1391 

Effect  of  beneficiaries'  contributory  negligence  or  release 1392 

What  law  governs  as  to  the  effect  of  contributory  negligence  or  of 

a  release  1393 

When  existence  of  kin  must  be  shown  1394 

Who  included   among  beneficiaries — Aliens — Posthumous  and   ille- 
gitimate   children — Grandchildren     1395 

Effect  of  time  limitation   1396 

Measure  of  damages 1397 

No  damages  for  mental  suffering  of  beneficiaries 1398 

Nominal  damages 1399 

Punitive  damages  ordinarily  not  recoverable 1400 

Province  of  jury  in  allowing  damages 1401 

Distribution    of   damages   recovered    1402 


TABLE  OP    CONTENTS.  Iv 

[BEFEBENCES   ABE   TO    SECTIONS.] 
III.    OF   ACTIONS   IN   GENEEAL. 

1.     The  forTTi  of  action. 

Form  of  action  optional  1403 

Form  of  action  when  exemplary  damages  are  claimed 1404 

Form  when  brought  by  personal  representative 1405 

Recovery  must  be  for  cause  of  action  stated 1406 

How  form  of  action  is  determined 1407 

Same  subject 1408 

2.     The  pleadings. 

Special  damages  must  be  pleaded  1409 

Same  subject   1410 

3.     The  evidence. 

Proof  of  the  carrier's  negligence   1411 

Presumptions  as  to  negligence   1412 

When  the  fact  of  the  injury  is  prima  facie  evidence  of  negligence     1413 

Same  subject  1414 

Proof  of  injury  usually  makes  a  prima  facie  case  of  negligence 1415 

Same  subject — How  where  passenger  agrees  to  assume  risk  of  acci- 
dent  1416 

Contributory   negligence   of   passenger — Burden   of    proof    on    de- 
fendant   1417 

Same  subject — Cases  holding  that  burden  of  proof  is  on  plaintiff.  .1418 
To  defeat  recovery  plaintiff's  negligence  must  have  been  a  proxi- 
mate cause  of  injury   1419 

How  question  of  contributory  negligence  determined 1420 

4.     The  measure  of  damages. 

Measure  of  damages  is  generally  compensation  for  injury 1421 

Compensation   for   pain    and   suffering 1422 

Future  damages  may  be  considered 1423 

Inconvenience  may  be  considered 1424 

Suffering  must  be  real    1425 

Measure  of  damages  for  delay  in  transporting  the  passenger 1426 

Damages  for  mental  suffering 1427 

Damages  must  be  proximate  and  natural   consequence  of  the  in- 
jury      1428 

Same  subject — The  more  liberal  rule 1429 

Same  subject — How  question  determined 1430 

Passenger  must  seek  to  make  his  damage  as  light  as  possible. ..  .1431 
Effect  of  previous  sickness  or  disease 1432 


Ivi  TABLE  OF   CONTENTS. 

[BEFEEENCES   ABE   TO   SECTIONS.] 

Damages  in  case  of  maltreatment — Ejection  from  train 1433 

Same  subject — How  when  maltreatment  is  provoked  by  insulting 

language  or  violent  conduct  of  passenger 1434 

Exemplary  or  punitory  damages  against  carriers 1435 

On  what  theory  allowed 1436 

When  allowed  for  carrier's  neglect  of  duty  in  furnishing  safe  vehi- 
cles, tracks,  etc 1437 

When  exemplary  damages  allowed   for  reckless  acts  of  carrier's 

servants    1438 

Same  subject  1439 

Same  subject — The  more  liberal  rule  1440 

When  allowed  for  active  maltreatment  of  passenger 1441 

Same  subject — The  more  liberal  rule  1442 

Same  subject — Effect  of  servant's  good  faith 1443 

Same  subject — Evidence  of  authority  or  ratification 1444 

Same  subject — Carrier  only  liable  where  servant  would  have  been.  .1445 
When  carrier  may  disprove  wrongful  intent 1446 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED. 


In  pursuance  of  the  plan  adopted  in  the  former  editions  of  this  work,  and  now 
followed  by  many  courts,  all  cases  in  which  a  railroad,  railway,  express  or  insurance 
company  was  plaintiff  have  been  arranged  in  this  table  under  the  heading  of  Railroad 
Company,  Railway  Company,  Express  Company,  Insurance  Company,  respectively. 


[REFEBENCES    ABE   TO    SECTIONS.] 


Aaron  v.  Railroad   (2  Daly,  127), 

1422. 
Aaronson  v.  Railroad  Co.    (52  N. 

Y.    Supp.    95,    23    Misc.    666), 

714,  1291. 
Abbe   V.    Eaton    (51    N.    Y.    410), 

158,  807. 
Abbey  v.  Str.  Stephens   (22  How. 

Pr.   78),  92. 
Abbott  V.  Bradstreet  (55  Me.  530), 

1270. 
Abbott    V.    Gatch     (13    Md.    314), 

1367,    1369. 
Abbott  V.  Railroad  Co.   (80  N.  Y. 

27),  918. 
Abbott  V.  Railroad  Co.    (65  N.  J. 

L.  310,  47  Atl.   588),  1191. 
Abbott  V.  Railroad  Co.  ( —  Or.  — , 

80  Pac.  Rep.  1012,  1  L.  R.  A. 

(N.   S.)    851),   936. 
Abel  V.  Traction  Co.  ( —  Penn.  St. 

— ,  61  Atl.  Rep.  915),  1397. 
Aberdeen,  etc.,  Co.  v.  Macken   (2 

I.   R.    (1899),   1),   842. 
Abram  v.  Railway  Co.  (83  Tex.  61, 

IS  S.   W.   321),  1052,   1054. 


Abrams  v.  Railway  Co.    (87  Wis. 

485,  58  N.  W.  780,  41  Am.  St. 

Rep.  55),  431,  641,  1003,  1073. 
Acatos  V.  Burns  (3  Ex.  Div.  282), 

792. 
Achtenhagen    v.     Watertown     (18 

Wis.  331),  1417. 
Ackerson    v.    Railway    (32    N.    J. 

254),  1438. 
Ackley   v.   Kellogg   (8  Cow.  223), 

72. 
Actieselkabet  Barford   v.   Lumber 

Co.  (125  Fed.  137),  833,  841. 
Acton  V.  Castle  Mail  Packets  Co, 

(73  Law  T.  (N.  S.)  158),  408. 
Adams  v.  Haught   (14  Tex.  243), 

801. 
Adams  v.  Railroad  Co.   (67  Vt.  76, 

30  Atl.  Rep.   687,  48  Am.   St. 

Rep.  800),  1388. 
Adams  v.  Railway   (L.  R.  4  C.  P. 

739),   939,   1225. 
Adams  v.   Railway   Co.    (100  Mo. 

555),    1126. 
Adams  v.  Railway  Co.   (Tex.  Civ. 

App.,  79  S.  W.  Rep.  79),  1400- 
Adams   v.    Railway   Co.    (95   Fed. 

938),  1391. 
Adams  v.   Scott   (104  Mass.  164), 

746. 


Ivii 


Iviii 


TABLE   OF    CASES   CITED. 


[references  are 

Adams  v.  Steamboat  Co.   (151  N. 

Y.  163,  45  N.  E.  369,  34  L.  R. 

A.  682,   56  Am.  St.  Rep.   616, 

aff'g  29   N.   Y.  S.   56,   9   Misc. 

25),  1130,   1271. 
Adamson   &   Mail    v.    4300    Tons 

Pyrites   Ore    (137   Fed.   998), 

841. 
Adger  v.  Railway  Co.   (71  S.  Car. 

213,  50  S.  E.  Rep.  783),  1241, 

1278. 
Adler    v.    Weir    (96    N.    Y.    Supp. 

736),    685. 
^tna  Ins.  Co.  v.  Wheeler  (49  N. 

Y.  616),  138,  238. 
Agnew  V.   Jotinson    (22  Penn.  St. 

471),  785. 
Agulino  V.  Railroad  Co.    (21  R.  I. 

263,   43   Atl.   63),   936,   1180. 
Aiery  v.  Merrill  (2  Curtis,  8),  464. 
Aigen  v.  Railroad  Co.   (132  Mass. 

423),  264. 
Aiken  v.   Railroad    (80   Mo.  App. 

8),  1069,  1071. 
Aiken   v.   Railway   Co.    (68   Iowa, 

363),  126. 
Aiken    v.    Railway   Co.    (118    Ga. 

118,  44  S.  E.  Rep.  828,  98  Am. 

St.  Rep.  107),  1028. 
Aiken  v.  Westcott  (123  N.  Y.  363, 

25    N,    E.     503    reversing    14 

Daly,  504,  9  N.  Y.  Supp.  481), 

1294. 
Airey  v.  Palace  Car  Co.    (50   La. 

Ann.  648,  23  So.  512),  1142. 
Ajum  Goolam  Hossen  &  Co.  v.  In- 
surance   Co.     (L.    R.     (1900) 

App.  Cas.  362),  369. 
Alabama    Nat.    Bank    v.    Railway 

Co.   v42  Mo.  App.  284),  175. 
Alair  v.   Railroad   Co.    (53   Minn. 

160,   54   N.  W.  1072,   19  L.  R. 

A.  764,  39  Am.  St.  Rep.  588), 

389,  426,   428. 
Albert  v.  State  (66  Md.  325,  7  Atl. 

Rep.  697),  1389. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Albertson    v.    Railroad    Co.     (48 

Iowa,    292),    1382. 
Albin    V.    Railway    Co.    (103    Mo. 

App.  308,  77  S.  W.  153),  1008. 
Albion  V.   Hetrick   (90  Ind.  545), 

1236. 
Albion   Lumber  Co.  v.   De  Nobra 

72   Fed.  739,  19  C.  C.  A.  168, 

44   U.    S.   App.    347),   1414. 
Albright  v.   Penn    (14   Tex.   290), 

66. 
Alden   v.  Carver    (13   Iowa,  253), 

655,    685,   880,   888. 
Alden  v.  Railroad  (26  N.  Y.  102), 

904,  905,  910. 
Alderman  v.  Railroad   (115  Mass. 

233),  188,  191. 
Aldrich  v.  Cargo   (117  Fed.  757), 

799. 
Aldrich  Car  Seal  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Ex- 
press   Co.    (117    Mich.    32,    75 

N.  W.  94),  719. 
Aldridge  v.  Railway  (15  C.  B.  (N. 

S.)    582),  21,   61,  397,  731. 
Alexander  v.  Greene    (3  Hill,  9), 

40,   92. 
Alexander  v.  Greene  (7  Hill,  533), 

92. 
Alexander  v.  Railway  Co.  (33  Up. 

Can.   474),    1073. 
Alexander  v.  Southey  (5  B.  &  Aid. 

247),  668. 
Alexander's  Cotton  (2  Wall.  404), 

318. 
Alexandria  Bay  Steamboat  Co.  v. 

Railroad  Co.    (45  N.  Y.  Supp. 

1091,  18   App.  Div.  527),  946. 
Alford   V.    Railway   Co.    (86   Wis. 

235,  56  N.  W.  743),  1118. 
Alfson  V.  Bush  Co.  (182  N.  Y.  393, 

75  N.  E.  Rep.   230),  1395. 
Alger    V.    Lowell    (3    Allen,    402), 

1230. 
Allaire  v.  St.  Lukes'  Hospital  (184 

111.  359,  56  N.  B.  638,  48  L.  R. 

A.  225  aff'g  76  111.  App.  441), 

1020. 


TABLE   OF    CASES   CITED. 


lix 


[references  are 

Allam   V,    Railroad   Co.    (183    Pa. 

St.  174,  38  Atl.  709,  39  L.  R. 

A.   535),   710. 
Allan  V.  Steamship  Co.  (132  N.  Y. 

91,  30   N.  E.  482,  28   Am.   St 

Rep.  556,  15  L.  R.  A.  166,  re- 
versing 55  Hun,  611,  8  N.  Y. 

Supp.    803),   1163. 
Allday  v.  Railway  Co.  (5  B.  &  3. 

903),   341. 
Allen  V.  Bates   (1  Hilt.  221),  812. 
Allen   V.   Ferry  Co.    (4-5  N.  J.   L. 

198),  1433. 
Allen  V.  Insurance  Co.   (44  N.  Y. 

437),  801. 
Allen    V.    Mercier    (1    Ash.    103), 

770. 
Allen   V.    Railroad    Co.     (79    Me. 

327),  758,  773. 
Allen  V.  Railroad  Co.  (119  N.  Car. 

710,  25  S.  E.  Rep.  787),  1060. 
Allen  V.   Railway   Co.    (Tex.   Civ. 

App.,  27  S.  W.  Rep.  943),  1229. 
Allen  V.   Railway  Co.    (35  "Wash. 

221,  77  Pac.  204,  66  L.  R.  A. 

804),    1412. 
Allen  V.  R.  &  Nav.  Co.    (98  Fed. 

16:   same  case  106  Fed.  265), 

559,  566. 
Allen  V.  Sackrider  (37  N.  Y.  341), 

56. 
Allen   V.    Sewall    (2   Wend.   327), 

1350. 
Allen  V.  Williams   (12  Pick.  297), 

188. 
Allen,    etc.,    Co.    v.    Railway    Co. 

(—   Wash.   — ,   84    Pac.    Rep. 

620),  230,   233. 
AUender    v.    Railroad    (37    Iowa, 

264),    1008. 
Allender  v.  Railroad  Co.  (43  Iowa, 

276),  1067,  1111. 
Allin  V.  Railway  Co.  (26  Tex.  Civ. 

App.  43,  62  S.  W.  1079),  1406. 
Ailing    V.     Railroad     (126    Mass. 

121),  1252,  1276. 


TO   SECTIONS.] 

Allison    V.    Powers    (179    Pa.    St 

531,  36  Atl.  Rep.  333),  1402. 
AJlyn  V.  Willis   (65  Tex.  65),  764. 
Almand   v.   Railroad   Co.    (95   Ga. 

775,  22   S.   E.  Rep.  674),  702. 
Alsager  v.  Dock  Co.  (14  M.  &  W. 

794),  875. 
Alston  v.  Herring  (11  Exch.  822), 

337,  796. 
Althorf  V.  Wolfe   (22  N.  Y,  355), 

1423. 
Am.    Contract   Co.     v.     Cross     (8 

Bush,  472),  1246. 
American  Grocery  Co.  v.  Railroad 

Co.    (51   N.    Y.    Supp.   307,    23 

Misc.  356),  442. 
American  Hay  Co.  v.  Railroad  Co. 

(85  N.  Y.  Supp.  341),  233. 
American  Nat'l  Bank  v.  Railroad 

Co.   (96  Ga.  665,  23  S.  E.  Rep. 

898,    51    Am.    St    Rep,    155), 

867. 
American   Sugar   Refining   Co.    v. 

Maddock   (93   Fed.  980,   36  C. 

C.    A.    42,    aff'g,    Maddock    v. 

American  Sugar  Refining  Co., 

91  Fed.  166),  160,  161,  165. 
American    Sugar   Refining   Co.   v. 

Rickinson    Sons    &    Co.     (124 

Fed.  188,  59  C.  C.  A.  604,  re- 
versing   120    Fed.    591),    366, 

374. 
American    Sugar  Refining   Co.   v. 

The    Euripides,    63    Fed.    140 

and    52    Fed.    161;    reversed, 

The  Euripides,  71  Fed.  729,  38 

U.  S.  App.  1,  18  C.  C.  A.  226), 

488. 
American   Sugar   Refining   Co.   v. 

The  G.  R.  Booth  (64  Fed  878; 

reversed,  The  G.  R.  Booth,  91 

Fed.  164,  33  C.  C.  A.  430,  s.  c. 

171  U.  S.  450,  19  Sup.  Ct.  R.  9, 

43   L.   Ed.   234),   488. 
Am.  Trans.  Co.  v.  Moore  (5  Mich. 

368),  279,  401. 


Ix 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


[BEFEEENCES   ABE 

American  Zinc,  etc.,  Co.  v.  Markle 

Leadworks  (102  Mo.  App.  li>6, 

76  S.  W.  668),  175. 
Ames   V.   Belden    (17   Barb.   515), 

37,  40. 
Ames  V.  Palmer  (42  Me.  197),  888. 
Ames  V.  Railroad  Co.  (64  Fed.  165, 

affirmed   in    Smyth   v.    Ames, 

169  U.   S.  466,  18  Sup.  Ct.  R. 

418,  decree  modified,  171  U.  S. 

361,   18  Sup.  Ct.  R.  888,  43  L. 

Ed.    197),    574,    577,   581,    583. 
Ames    V.    Southern    Pacific    Com- 
pany   (141    Cal.    728,    75    Pac. 

310,  99  Am.  St.  Rep.  98),  1052, 

1058. 
Ames  Mercantile  Co.  v.  Steamship 

Co,    (125  Fed.  332),  699. 
Amies    v.    Stevens    (1    Str.    128), 

273,  286. 
Ammons  v.  Railway  Co.    (138  N. 

Car.   555,   52   S.   E.   Rep.   731; 

s.  c.  51  S.  E.  Rep.  127),  1033, 

1427,  1442. 
Amory    v.    McGregor    (15    Johns. 

24),  1370. 
Amory  v.  Railroad  Co.  (130  Mich. 

404,  90  N.  W.  22),  1250. 
Amory   Mfg.    Co.   v.   Railway   Co. 

(89  Tex.  419,  37  S.  W.  856,  59 

Am.  St.  Rep.  65),  464,  466. 
Amos   V.   Railroad   Co.    (63   Miss. 

509),   1384,   1389. 
Amos  V.   Temperley    (8   M.  &  W. 

798),  809. 
Anchor    Line    v.    Dater     (68    111. 

369),    236,   410,   1347. 
Anchor  Line  v.   Knowles    (66  111. 

150),   409. 
Anchor  Mill   Co.   v.   Railroad  Co. 

(102  Iowa,  262,  71  N.  W.  255), 

175,  181,  182,  664,  711,  871. 
Anderson  v.   Clark    (2  Bing.   20), 

194. 


TO   SECTIONS.] 

Anderson   v.   Fielding    (92   Minn. 

42,  99  N.  W.  Rep.  357,  104  Am. 

St.  Rep.  665),  1389. 
Anderson  v.  Railroad  Co.  (62  Fed. 

46),  972. 
Anderson  v.  Railroad  Co.  (35  Neb. 

95,  52  N.  W.  Rep.  840),  1397, 

1399. 
Anderson  v.  Railway  Co.  (26  Ind. 

App.  196,  59  N.  E.  396),  442, 

450. 
Anderson  v.  Railway  Co.   ( —  Mo. 

— ,   93   S.   W.   Rep.   394),  997, 

1014. 
Anderson  v.  Railway  Co.   (93  Mo. 

App.  677,  67  S.  W.  707),  1355. 
Anderson  v.  Railway  Co.  (27  Ont. 

R.  441),  1219. 
Anderson    v.    Scholey     (114     Ind. 

553),  1206. 
Andrew   v.   Moorhouse    (5   Taunt. 

435),  828,  831. 
Andrews  v.  Railroad  Co.  (86  Miss. 

129,  38  So.  Rep.  773),  1099. 
Andrews  v.  Railway  Co.  (34  Conn. 

57),   1386. 
Angel  V.  Steamship  Co.   (55  Fed. 

1005),    442. 
Angelina  Corning,  S.   B.    (1   Ben. 

109),  92. 
Angle  V.  Railroad    (9  Iowa,  487), 

231,  674. 
Angle  V.  Railroad  (18  Iowa,  555), 

675. 
Annas   v.   Railroad   Co.    (67   Wis. 

46),   1397,   1401. 
Anniston,    etc..    Railroad   v.    Led- 

better  (92  Ala.  326,  9  S.  Rep. 

73),  1334. 
Anniston  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Railway  Co. 

(—  Ala.  — ,  40  So.  Rep.  965), 

578,   580. 
Anonymous    v.    Jackson    (Peake's 

Addl.  Cas.  185),  391. 
Ansell   V.   Waterhouse    (2   Chitty, 

1),  1325. 


TABLE   OF    CASES   CITED. 


Ixi 


[eefeeences  are 

Ansett  V.  Marshall    (22  L.  J.   Q. 

B.  118),  1431. 
Anthony  v.  ^tna  Ins.  Co.  (1  Abb, 

C.  C.  343),  489. 
Anthony  v.  RaiFroad  Co.   (27  Fed. 

Rep.  724),  904. 
Anthony  v.   Slaid    (11  Met.  290), 

1430. 
Appelby   v.    Railroad    Co.    (60    S. 

Car.  48,  38  S.  E.  237),  1118. 
Apsey  V.  Railroad  Co.    (83  Mich. 

440),  1420. 
Arbuckle  v.  Thompson   (37  Penn. 

St.   170),  1317. 
Archer  v.  Railroad  Co.    (110   Mo. 

App.  349,  85  S.  W.  Rep.  934), 

1006,  1188. 
Archer  v.  Railroad  Co,  (106  N.  Y. 

589,  13  N.  E.  318),  933. 
Arctic  Ins.  Co.  v.  Austin  ( 54  Barb. 

559),  92. 
Arend  v.  Liverpool,  etc.,   Co,    (64 

Barb.  118),  163. 
Arkansas    River    Packet    Co,    v. 

Hobbs  (105  Tenn.  29,  58  S.  W. 

278),  1431. 
Armory  v.  Delamirie  (Smith's  Ld. 

Cases,  481),  749,  751. 
Armour   v.   Railroad     (65    N.    Y. 

Ill),  162. 
Armroyd  v.  Insurance  Co.  (3  Bin. 

437),  815,  817,  818, 
Armstrong    v.    Beadle     (5    Sawy, 

484),  1387,  1389. 
Armstrong    v.    Express    Co.    (159 

Pa.  St.  640,  28  Atl.  448),  419, 

450. 
Armstrong  v.  Railway   (L,  R,  10 

Exch.  47),  1238. 
Armstrong   v.    The    Railway    (45 

Minn,  85,  47  N,  W,  Rep.  459), 

1334. 
Armstrong    v.    Railway    Co.     (53 

Minn.    183,    54    N.    W.    1050), 

446,    457. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Armstrong    v.    Railway    Co,     (62 

Mo,  App.  639,  1  Mo.  App.  Rep. 

552),  867. 
Arnold    v.    Halenbake    (5    Wend, 

33),  75, 
Arnold  v.  Railroad    (83  111,  273), 

455,  964. 
Arnold  v.  Steamboat  Co.  (29  Fed. 

Rep.  184),  698, 
Arrington  v.  Railway  Co.   (6  Tex. 

Ct.   Rep.    69,    70    S,    W.   Rep. 

551),  922, 
Arrowsmith   v.   Railroad   Co,    (57 

Fed.  165),  918. 
Arthur  v.  Pullman  Co.   (88  N.  Y. 

Supp.     981,     44     Misc.     229), 

1131. 
Arthur  v.  Railway  Co.    (139  Fed. 

127,  —  C.  C,  A.  — ),  105,  404, 

475. 
Arthur  v.  Schr.  Cassius  (2  Story, 

81),  787. 
Ash  V.  Putnam  (1  Hill,  302),  871. 
Ash  V.  Railroad  Co.  (72  Md.  144), 

1388,   1390. 
Ashby     V.     White     (Smith's     Ld. 

Cases,  366),  1237. 
Ashe  V.  De  Rossett   (5  Jones   (N. 

C),  299),  1367,  1369, 
Ashmole  v.  Wainwright    (2  Q.  B. 

837),    805. 
Ashmore  v.  Steam  Towing  Co.  (4 

Butcher,    180),    92,    401. 
Aston    V.    Heaven    (2    Esp.    533), 

892,    1412. 
Ashton  v.  Railway  Co.    (2   K.  B. 

(1904)     313,    73    L.    J.    K.    B. 

701),    1041. 
Astrup    v.    Lewy     (19    Fed.    Rep. 

536),    602,    792. 

Atchison  v.  Railroad  Co.   (80  Mo. 

213).  419,  792. 
Atkinson  v.  Railway  Co.   (114  Ga. 

146,  39  S.  E.  888,  55  L.  R.  A. 

223),    1060,    1067. 


Ixii 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED, 


[refebencks  are 

Atkinson  v.  Railway  Co.   (90  Mo. 

App.  489),   897,  1126,  1128. 
Atkinson    v.    Ritchie     (10     East, 

530),  625. 
Atlanta  Nat.  Bank  v.  Railway  Co. 

(106  Fed.  623),  105. 
Atlantic  City  v.  Brown   (71  N.  J. 

Law,   81,   58  Atl.  110),  997. 
Atlantic   City  v.  Dehn    (69   N.   J. 

L.  233,  54  Atl.  220),  68. 
Atlantic  Nat.  Bank  v.  Railway  Co. 

(106   Fed.   623),   187. 
Atrops  V.  Costello    (8  Wash.  149, 

35  Pac.  Rep.  620),  1400. 
Atwater  v.  Railroad  Co.   (48  N.  J. 

L.  55),   1023,  1030,   1036. 
Atwood   V.   Mohler    (108   111.   App. 

416),   1246. 
Atwood   V.    Trans.    Ck).    (9   Watts, 

87),  464. 
Aubry-Le  Revers   v.   Railway   Co. 

(Rep.  Jud.  Que.  12  C.  S.  128), 

1310. 
Audenried    v.    Railroad    Co.     (68 

Penn.  370),  521. 
Auerbach  v.  Railroad  Co.    (89  N. 

Y.  281),  1045,  1049. 
Aufdenberg   v.    Railway   Co.    (132 

Mo.  565,  34  S.  W.  485),  995. 
Ausk  V.  Railway  Co.   (10  N.  Dak. 

215,  86  N.  W.  719),  1334. 
Austin  V.  Railway  (16  Q.  B.  600), 

1338. 
Austin  V.  Railway   (L.  R.  2  Q.  B. 

442),  1020'. 
Austin  V.  Railway  (10  C.  B.  454), 

395,  407. 
Austin  V.  Railway  Co.    (95  N.  Y. 

Supp.  740,  108  App.  Div.  249), 

1389,  1397. 
Australian   S.   N.   Co.   ads.   Morse 

(L.  R.  4  P.  C.  Cas.  222),  792. 
Avery   v.   Railway   Co.    (81   Tex. 

243,  16  S.  W.  1015,  26  Am.  St. 

Rep.   809),   1227. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Aymar    v.    Astor    (6    Cow.    266), 

490. 
Ayres    v.    Railroad     (5    Butcher, 

393),   776. 
Ayres  v.  Railroad  (14  Blatchf.  9), 

415,  131. 
Ayres  v.  Railroad  Co.    (158  N.  Y. 

254,  53  N.  E.  22,  aff'g  40  N.  Y. 

Supp.    11,   4    App.    Div.    511), 

935,   1011. 
Ayres  v.  RailroaJ  Co.     (77    Hun, 

414,  28  N.  Y.  Supp.  789),  1011. 
Ayres    v.   Railroad    Co.    (71    Wis. 

372),  339,  495,  496. 
Ayres   v.    Railroad    Co.    (75    Wis. 

215),   496,   1366. 
Ayres  Weatherwax  &  Reed  Co.  v. 

Dorsey      Produce     Co.      (101 

Iowa,    141,   70    N.   W.   Ill,    63 

Am.  St.  Rep.  376),  175. 


Babcock  v.  Herbert   (3  Ala.  392), 

66. 
Babcock    v.    Railroad    (49    N.    Y. 

491),  471. 
Bachant    v.     Railroad     Co.     (187 

Mass.   392,  73   N.  E.   642,  105 

Am.  St.  Rep.  408),  710. 
Bacharach   v.    Freight   Line    (133 

Penn.  St.  414),  865,  866,  1317. 
Backhaus  v.  Railway  Co.  (92  Wis. 

393,   66  N.  W.  400),   704,   713. 
Backhouse    v.    Sneed    (1    Murph. 

173),   275. 
Bacon  v.  Railroad  Co.  (143  Penn. 

St.  14),   1181. 
Bacon  v.   Steamboat  Co.    (90  Me. 

46,   37  Atl.  328),   942. 
Bader  v.  Railway  Co.  (52  La.  Ann. 

1060,  27  So.  584),  143L 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


Ixiii 


[RKFEBENCES   ABE 

Bags  of  Linseed    (1  Black,   108), 

869. 
Bailey    v.    Damon    (3    Gray,   92), 

865. 
Bailey  v.  Quint  (22  Vt.  474),  869. 
Bailey  v.  Railroad    (49  N.  Y.  70), 

195. 
Bailey   v.   Railway    (14   Ky.   Law- 
Rep.  226,  20  S.  W.  Rep.  198), 

1181. 
Bailey  v.   Richardson    (14  Ky.  L. 

R.  367),  1127. 
Bailey   v.    Shaw    (24   N.   H.    297), 

785. 
Baker  v.   Bolton    (1   Camp.   493), 

1376,  1384. 
Baker  v.   Brinson    (9  Rich.   201), 

1354. 
Baker  v.  Clark    (99   Fed.  911,  40 

C.   C.  A.   174),  935. 
Baker   v.   Hodgson    (3   M.   &   Sel. 

267),   322. 
Baker  v.  Railroad   (10  Lea,  304), 

839 
Baker  v.  Railroad  Co.    (50   N.  Y. 

Supp.  999,  28  App.  Div.  316), 

925. 
Baker  v.  Railway  Co.  (34  Mo.  App. 

98),  234. 
Baker  v.  Railway  Co.    (118  N.  Y. 

533),  1118,  1174. 
Baldwin    v.    Express    Co.    (23    111. 

197).  716,  717. 
Baldwin  v.  Railroad  Co.   (4  Gray, 

333),   1397,    1409. 
Baldwin  v.  Railroad  Co.  (81  Minn. 

247,  83  N.  W.  986,  51  L.  R.  A. 

640),  747. 
Baldwin  v.  Railway  Co.  (64  N.  H. 

596),   1082. 
Baldwin  v.  Railway  Co.  (128  Mich. 

417,  87  N.  W.  380),  1002. 
Baldwin  v.  Railway  Co.    (9  Q.  B. 

Div.  582),  1366. 
Baldwin  v.   Steam   Co.    (74  N.   Y. 

125),   795,  805,  806. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Baldwin    v.    Sullivan    Timber   Co. 

(65  Hun,  625,  20  N.  Y.  Supp. 

496),  832,  837. 
Balfe  V.    West    (22   Bng.   L.   &  E. 

506),    34. 
Ball  V.  Liney   (48  N.  Y.  6),  668. 
Ball  V.  Railroad  Co.  (93  Fed.  513), 

574,   582. 
Ball  V.  Railroad  Co.  (83  Mo.  574), 

419. 
Ball   V.  Railroad   Co.    (93  Va.   44, 

24  S.  E.  Rep.  467,  32  L.  R.  A. 

792),    980. 
Ballard   v.   Railroad   Co.    (15   Ky. 

Law  Rep.  703),  1110. 
Ballentine  v.  Railroad  Co.  (40  Mo. 

491),  285,  309,  339,  654. 
Ballou  V.  Earle    (17  R.  I.  441,  22 

Atl.   1113,  14  L.  R.   A.  433,  33 

Am.    St.   Rep.   881),    153,   401, 

426,   433. 
Ballou  V.  Farnum   (11  Allen,  73), 

1423. 
Baltimore,  etc..  Road  Co.  v.  State 

(71  Md.   573),  1397. 
Bancroft     v.     Transportation     Co. 

(47  Iowa,  262),  84,  471. 
Bancroft-Whitney      Co.      v.      The 

Queen  of  the  Pacific   (78  Fed. 

155,   75   Fed.   74,  and  61  Fed. 

213,  affirmed  in  Pacific  Coast 

S.  S.  Co.  V.  Bancroft  Whitney 

Co.   94   Fed.   180,   36  C.   C.  A. 

135;  reversed  in  The  Queen  of 

the  Pacific,  180  U.  S.  49,  45  L. 

Ed.  419,  21  Sup.  Ct.  R.  278), 

442. 
Bank  v.   Cotton   Oil   Co.    (26   Ky. 

Law  Rep.  518,  82  S.  W.  Rep. 

253),   175. 

Bank  v.  Express  Co.  (45  Penn.  St. 

419),   781. 
Bank    v.    Express   Co.    (4    Blatch- 

ford,   445),   672. 
Bank    v.    Express    Co.    (93    U.    S. 

174),  82,  83,  84,  401,  452. 


Ixiv 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED, 


[references  are 

Bank  v.  Gordon   (5  La.  Ann.  64), 

1246. 
Bank  v.  Lavelle  (52  Mo.  380),  161. 
Bank  v.   Nantucket  S.   B.   Co.    (2 

Story,   16),  61. 
Bank   v.   Pfeiffer    (22   Hun,   327), 

184. 
Bank  v.  Railroad    (44  N.  Y.  136), 

180. 
Bank  v.  Railroad  Co.    (106  N.  Y. 

195),  162. 
Bank   v.   Railroad    (81   Ga.    221), 

184. 
Bank  v.  Railroad    (20  Kan.  519), 

162. 
Bank  v.  Railway   (25  S.  C.  216), 

187. 
Bank    v.    Transportation    Co.    (69 

N.   Y.  374),  188. 
Bank   v.    Transportation    Co.    (23 

Vt.  186),  231,  414,  665  . 
Bank  of  Irwin  v.  Express  Co.   ( — 

Iowa  — ,  102  N.  W.  Rep.  107), 

1317. 
Bank  of  Kentucky  v.   Adams  Ex- 
press Co.    (3  Otto,  180),  44. 
Banker's    Mut.    Casualty    Co.    v. 

Railroad    Co.    (117    Fed.    434, 

54  C.   C.   A.  608,  65  L.  R.  A. 

397;    petition  for  writ  of  cer- 
tiorari denied,  187  J.  S.  648), 

94. 
Banking  Co.  v.  Smith    (128  U.  S. 

174),   574,   1023.      ' 
Banking  Co.  v.   Smitha    (85   Ala. 

47),  233. 
Bannon  v.  Railroad   (24  Md.  108), 

1422,  1436. 
Bansemer    v.    Railroad     (25    Ind. 

434),  702. 
Barbee  v.   Reese    (60   Miss.   906), 

1419. 
Barber  v.  Brace  (3  Conn.  9),  169. 
Barden    v.    RaHroad     (121    Mass. 

426),  1174,  1216. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Bardwell  v.  Express  Co.    (12  Ore. 

49),  445. 
Bardwell  v.  Express  Co.  (35  Minn. 

344),   80,   445. 
Bardwell  v.  Railroad  Co.  (63  Miss. 

574),  1180,  1221. 
Barhydt  v.  Ellis    (45  N.  Y.  107), 

165. 
Barker   v.   Coffin    (31   Barb.   556) 

1043,   1052. 
Barker  v.  Havens  (17  Johns.  234), 

809,   810,   864. 
Barker  v.   Hodgson    (3  M.  &  Sel. 

267),  341. 
Barker  v.  Railroad  Co.    (18  C.  B. 

46),    944. 
Barker  v.  Railroad  Co.    (24  N.  Y. 

599),    1067,    1129. 
Barker    v.    Railroad    Co.    (91   Mo. 

86),   1389,   1394. 
Barker  v.  Railroad  Co.  (51  W.  Va. 

423,  41   S.  E.  148,  90  Am.  St. 

Rep.   808),   933. 
Barkley    v.    Railway   Co.    (37   111. 

App.  293),  990. 
Barkman  v.  Railroad  Co.  (89  Fed. 

453),    915. 
Barnes   v.   Foley    (5   Burr.    2711), 

696. 
Barnes  v.  Inhabitants  of  Rumford 

(96    Me.    315,     52     Atl.     844), 

1236. 
Barnes  v.  Railroad  Co.    (93  N.  Y. 

Supp.  616),  212,  215,  220,  405. 
Barnes  v.  Railroad  Co.    (87  N.  Y. 

Supp.  608,  42  Misc.  622),  935. 
Barnett  v.   Railroad   Co.    (75  Mo. 

App.  446),  1443. 
Barnett    v.    Railway    (5    H.    &   N. 

604),    457. 
Barney     v.     Burnstenbinder     (64 

Barb.  212),  798. 
Barney  v.   Steamboat  Co.    (67   N. 

Y.  301),  963,  977. 
Barret  v.  Railway   (1  Com.  B.  (N. 

S.)   423),  944. 


TABLE  OF   CASES   CITED. 


Ixv 


[BETEBENCES   ABE 

Barrett  v.  Railroad  (45  N.  Y.  628), 

1236. 
Barnum  v.  Railway  Co.  (30  Minn. 

461,  16  N.  W.  Rep.  364),  1394. 
Barque  Quilpue,  Limited,  v.  Brown 

(2  K.  B.    (1904)   264,  73  L.  J. 

K.  B.   596),  843,  847. 
Barrett  v.  Railroad  Co.   (61  N.  Y. 

Supp.  9,  45  App.  Div.  225;  s. 

c.    157    N.    Y.    663,    52    N.    E. 

659,  reversing  36  N.  Y.  Supp. 

1121,  92  Hun,  606),  990. 
Barrett  v.   Railway  Co.    (81   Cal. 

296),    1024. 
Barrett  v.  Rogers   (7  Mass.  299), 

165. 
Barringer  v.  Railway  Co.  ( —  Ark. 

— ,  85  S.  W.  Rep,  94),  1118. 
Barris  v.  Railroad  Co.   (102  Iowa 

375,  71  N.  W.  339),  575. 
Barron   v.    Eldridge     (100     Mass. 

455),  72,  112,   702. 
Barrott  v.  Palace  Car  Co.  (51  Fed. 

796),  1132. 
Barry  v.  Railroad  Co.    (92  N.  Y, 

289),    1228. 
Barry  v.  Railway  Co.    (172  Mass. 

709,  51  N.  E.  518),  1123. 
Barter  v.  Wheeler    (49  N.  H.  9), 

211,  236,  261,  264,  1296. 
Barth  v.  Railway  Co.  (142  Mo.  535, 

44  S.  W.  Rep.  778),  1005,  1397, 

1398. 
Bartholomew  v.  Railroad   (53  111. 

227),  1291. 
Bartlett  v.  A  Cargo  of  Lumber  (41 

Fed.  890),  847. 
Bartlett  v.  Carnley  (6  Duer,  194), 

865. 
Bartlett  v.  Railway  Co.    (94   Ind. 

281),   167,   657. 
Bartlett  v.   Steamboat  Co.   (57  N. 

Y.   Super.  348),  1024. 
Bartlett  v.  S.  B.  Philadelphia   (32 

Mo.  256),  664,  665. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Bartnik  v.  Railroad  Co.   (55  N.  Y. 

Supp.  266,  36  App.  Div.  246), 

942,  1414. 
Barton    v.    Curyea    (40    111.    320), 

175. 
Barton   v.   Railroad   Co.    (52   Mo. 

253),  1209. 
Bartram  v.   Farebrother   (4  Bing. 

579),  766. 
Bartram  v.  McKee   (1  Watts,  39), 

799. 
Bascom  v.  Railroad  Co.   (102  Mo. 

App.  430,  76  S.  W.  697),  1126. 
Bass  V.  Glover   (63  Ga.  746),  184, 

777. 
Bass    V.    Railway    Co.    ( —   Mich. 

— ,  105  N.  W.  Rep.  151),  1016. 
Bass  V.  Railway  (39  Wis.  636;  42 

id.  654),  1441,  1444. 
Bass  V.  Railway  Co,  (42  Wis.  654), 

96L 
Bass   V.   Railway    (36   Wis.   450), 

960,  972. 
Bassett  &  Stone  v.  Mining  Co.  ( — • 

Ky.  — ,   88    S.  W.   Rep.    318), 

47,  92. 
Bastard    v.    Bastard     (2    Shower, 

81),   150. 
Baswight  v.  Railroad  Co.   (Ill  N. 

Car.  592,  16  S.  E.  Rep,  323), 

112,  125. 
Bate  V.  Railway  Co.   (18  S.  C.  R. 

(Can.)    697),  1070. 
Bates  V.  Railroad  Co.   (147  Mass. 

255,  17  N.  E.  Rep.  633),  1018, 

1073. 
Bates    V.    Railway    Co.    (60    Wis. 

298,  19  N.  W.  72),  747,  748. 
Bates  V.  Stanton  (1  Duer,  79),  740, 

749,  751. 
Bates  V.  Todd  (1  Moo.  &  R.  106), 

159. 
Bath  V.  Railway   (Tex.  Civ.  App., 

78  S.  W.  Rep.  993),  163. 
Batson  v.  Donovan  (4  B.  &  A.  21), 

329,  392,  439,  440. 


Ixvi 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


[refebences  are 

Batteshill  v.  Humphreys  (64  Mich. 

494),  1229. 
Battle  V.  Railroad  Co.  (—  S.  Car. 

— ,  49   S.  E.  Reo.  849),  1276. 
Batton    V.   Railroad   Co.    (77   Ala. 

591).  981. 
Bauer   v.   Richter    (103   Wis.    412, 

79  N.  W.  Rep.  404),  1397. 
Baughman    v.    Railroad    Co.     (14 

Ky.  Law  Rep.  268),  431,  1306. 
Baughman   v.   Railroad    Co.     (94 

Ky.   150,   21   S.  W.   757),   450. 
Baumann  v.  Railroad  Co.    (71  N. 

Y.    Supp.   632,   35  Misc.   223), 

651,  1372. 
Baumbach  v.  Railway  Co.  (4  Tex. 

Civ.  App.  650,  23  S.  W.  Rep. 

693),  1372. 
Baxendale  v.  Railway   (4  Com.  B. 

(N.  S.)   63),  522. 
Baxendale  v.  Railway  Co.  (5  C.  B. 

336),  522. 
Baxter  v.  Leland   (1  Blatch.  526), 

602,  606. 
Baxter  v.  Railroad   Co.    (165   111. 

78,   45   N.   E.   1003,   reversing 

64    111.   App.    130),    447,   1338, 

1340. 
Bayles    v.    Railway    Co.    (13    Col. 

181),  521,  589. 
Bayley  v.  Railway  (L.  R.  7  C.  P. 

415),  1084,  1095. 
Bayonne  Knife  Co.  v.  Umbenhauer 

(107  Ala.  496,  18  So.  175,   54 

Am.   St.  Rep.   114),  761. 
Beach  V.  Steamboat  Co.  (30  Barb. 

433,  10  Abb.  Pr.  71),  1387. 
Beal  V.  Railway   (3  H.  &  C.  337), 

397. 
Beale    v.    Thompsen    (3   B.    &   P. 

405),  826. 
Beam  v.  Railway  Co.  (97  111.  App. 

24),   651. 
Beaman  v.  Min.  Co.  (23  Utah  139, 

63  Pac.  Rep.  631),  1397. 


TO   SECTIONS.] 

Bean  v.  Sturtevant  (8  N.  H.  146), 

68. 
Beard    v.    Railroad    Co.    (48    Vt. 

101),  936,  937,  940. 
Beard  v.  Railway   (79  Iowa,  527), 

201,  206,  494,  505. 
Beardslee  v.  Richardson  (11  Wend. 

25),  31,  33,  1355. 
Beardsley  v.  Railroad  Co.  (162  N. 
Y.  230,  56  N.  E.  488,  reversing 
44  N.  Y.  S.  175,  15  App  Div. 
251,  and  40  N.  Y.  Supp.  1077, 
17  Mit.c.  256),  596. 
Bearse  v.  Ropes  (1  Sprague,  331), 

606. 
Beauchamp   v.    Powley    (1    M.    & 

Rob.  38),  32. 
Becher  v.  Railway   Co.    (L.   R.   5 

Q.  B.  241),  1276. 
Beck  V.  Evans  (16  East,  244),  38, 

631. 
Becker   v.  Building  Co.    ( —  Mo. 
App.  — ,  93  S.  W.  Rep.  291), 
101. 
Becker  v.  Building  Co.    (174  Mo. 
246,  73   S.  W.  581),  100,   101, 
1118. 
Becker   v.    Hallgarten    (86   N.    Y. 

167),   762. 
Becker    v.    Railroad     (96    N.    Y. 
Supp.  1,  109  App.   Div.   230), 
708. 
Becker  v.  Railway  Co.    (102  Mo. 

544),  1236. 
Beckman    v.    Shouse     (5    Rawle, 

179),  68. 
Beckwith  v.  Frisbie  (32  Vt.  559), 

65,  89,  651,  654. 
Bedell  v.  Railroad  Co.   (94  Ga.  22, 

20  S.  E.  Rep.  262),  167. 
Bedford  Bowling  Green  Stone  Co. 
v.  Oman  (115  Ky.  369,  24  Ky. 
Law  Kep.  2274,  73  S.  W.  Rep. 
1038;  s.  c.  134  Fed.  441),  122, 
512. 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED, 


Ixvii 


[references  are 

Beebe    v.    Ayres    (28    Barb.    275), 

1036. 
Beebe  v.  Johnson  (19  Wend.  500), 

627. 
Beecher  v.  Railroad  Co.  (161  N.  Y. 

222,   55   N.  E.  899,  aft'g  55  N. 

Y.  Supp.  23,  35  App.  Div.  292), 

1219. 
Beede  v.  Railway   Co.    (90  Minn. 

36,  95  N.  W.  454,  101  Am.  St. 

Rep.  390),  1348. 
Beedy  v.  Pacey   (.Z2  Wash.  94,  60 

Pac.  56),  721. 
Beers  v.  Railroad  Co.    (67   Conn. 

417,   34   Atl.   541,  32   L,  R.   A. 

535,    52    Am.    St.    Rep.    293), 

1274,  1275. 
Begley   v.   Railroad   Co.    (201   Pa. 

St.   84,   50  Atl.   1009),  1184. 
Behlmer  v.  Railroad  Co.   (71  Fed. 

835;   reversed  in  83  Fed.  898, 

28  C.  C.  A.  229,  42  U.  S.  App. 

581;  modified  in  Railroad  Co. 

V.    Behlmer,    175    U.    S.    648), 

526,  564,  570. 
Behr  v.   Railroad   Co.    (74   N.   Y. 

Supp.    1007),    1085. 
Beisiegel    v.   Railroad    (40   N.   Y. 

9),  1423. 
Belden  v.  Pullman  Palace  Car  Co. 

(Tex.    Civ.    App.,    43     S.     W. 

Rep.  22),  1131. 
Belding  v.  Railroad  Co,  (3  S,  Dak, 

369,  53  N,  W.  Rep.  750),  1386, 

1389. 
Belger    v.    Dinsmore    (51    N,    Y. 

166),  409,  451, 
Bell  V,  Clarion   (120  Iowa,  332,  94 

N,  W.  Rep.  907),  1401. 
Bell  V.  Cunningham   (3  Pet.  69), 

1370. 
Bell  V.  Drew  (4  E,  D.  Smith,  59), 

1249. 
Bell   V.   Moss    (5   Wharton,    189), 

758,   759,   760. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Bell  V.  Railroad  Co,  (76  Miss,  71, 

23    So.    268),   1429. 
Bell  V.  Railroad  Co.    (G  Mo.  App. 

363),  702. 
Bell  V.  Reed  (4  Binney,  127),  293, 
Bellous  V.  Railway  Co,   (94  S.  W. 

Rep.    557,    —    Mo.    App.    — ), 

442. 
Bellsdyke  Coal  Co.  v.  Railway  Co. 

(2  N.  &  M.  105),  521. 
Belt  V.  Railway  Co.    (4   Tex.  Civ. 

App.  231,  22  S.  W,  Rep,  1062), 

1388, 
Bemiss   v.    Railroad   Co,    (47    La. 

Ann,  1671,  18  So,  711),  1192. 
Benalleck    v.    People     (31    Mich. 

200),  1341. 
Benedict  v.  Railroad  Co.  (86  Minn. 

224,  90  N.  W.  360,  57  L.  R.  A. 

639,    91    Am.    St.    Rep.    345), 

895,  1197,  1198,  1215,  1228. 
Benedict  v.  The  Railway  (Tex. 

Civ.  App.,  91  S.  W.  Rep. 

811),   1363. 
Benjamin  v.  Benjamin    (15  Conn. 

347),   827. 
Benjamin    v.     Stremple     (13     111. 

466),  782. 
Benner  v.  Insurance  Co.  (6  Allen, 

222),  830. 
Benner  Livery,  etc.,  Co.  v.  Busson 

(58  111.  App.  17),  958,  1223. 
Bennett  v.  Byram   (38  Miss.   17), 

652,  654,  658. 
Bennett  v.  Dutton  (10  N.  H.  481), 

893,  963. 
Bennett   v.   Express   Co.    (83   Me. 

236,   23  Am.   St.  Rep.   774,   13 

L.  R.  A.  33),  325,  741,  742. 
Bennett  v.  Express  Co.    (12  Ore. 

49),  80,  444,  675,  716. 

Bennett  v.   Filyaw    (1   Fla.   403), 

231. 
Bennett  v.  Peninsular  St.  Bt.  Co. 

(6  Com.  B.  775),  238,  962. 


Ixviii 


TABLE   OP   CASES   CITED. 


[references   ABE 

Bennett  v.  Railroad  (36  N.  J.  225), 

1235,  1236. 
Bennett  v.  Railroad  (5  Hun,  599), 

1309. 
Bennett  v.  Railroad  Co.  (57  Conn. 

422),  i^36,  937. 
Bennitt  v.   Railroad  Co.    (46   Mo. 

App.  656),  131. 
Bennitt  v.   The  Guiding  Star    (53 

Fed.     936;     affirmed    in     The 

Guiding  Star,  62  Fed.  407,  10 

C.    C.    A.    454,    22    U.    S.    App. 

344),  162. 
Benoliel   v.   Durocher    (Rap.   Jud. 

Que.   13  C.  S.   260),  1294. 
Benson,  Ex  parte    (18   S.   C.   38), 

521. 
Benson   v.   Gray    (154   Mass.    391, 

28  N.  E.  275,  13  L.  R.  A.  262), 

510. 
Benson   v.   Railroad   Co.    (98   Cal. 

45,  32  Pac.  809),  1234. 
Benson   v.   Railway  Co.    (88   Law 

T.   (N.  S.)   268),  927. 
Benson   v.    Titcomb    (72   Me.   31), 

1418. 
Benton  v.  Fay   (64  111.  417),  1373. 
Benton  v.  Railroad  (42  Iowa,  192), 

1418. 
Beaton   v.   Railroad    Co.    (122    N. 

Car.  1007,  30  S.  E.  Rep.  333), 

1397. 
Berg    V.    Railroad    Co.    (30    Kan. 

561),  231,  232,  233. 
Berg   V.    Steamship   Co.    (5   Daly, 

394),  238. 
Bergheim  v.  Railway  Co.   (3  C.  P. 

Div.  221),  1262. 
Berkley  v.  Watling    (7   Ad.  &  B. 

29),  159. 
Berkowitz  v.  Railway  Co.   (96  N. 

Y.    Supp.    825,    109    App.    Div. 

878),   1348. 
Bernhardt  v.  Railroad    Co.     (159 
Pa.  St.  260.  28  All.  140),  1413, 
1414 


TO   SECTIONS.] 

Bernstein  v.  Railroad  Co.    (88  N. 

Y.  Supp.  971),  192. 
Bernstein  v.  Weir  (83  N.  Y.  Supp. 

48,    40    Misc.    635),    406,    425, 

1298. 
Bernstine  v.  Express  Co.  (40  Ohio 

St.  451),  80,  1318. 
Berry    v.    Cooper     (28    Ga.    543), 

450,  1354. 
Berry   v.   Railroad   Co.    (52    Kan. 

759,  34   Pac.  Rep.   805),   1386. 
Berry  v.  Railroad  Co.  (22  Ky.  Law 

Rep.  1410,  60  S.  W.  699),  99L 
Berry  v.  Railroad  Co.   (44  W.  Va. 

538,  30   S.   E.   143,   67  Am.   St. 

Rep.   781),   704,   712,   713,   714. 
Berry    v.    Railway    Co.    (124    Mo. 

223,  25   S.  W.  229),  997,  1019. 
Berry  v.  Railway  Co.  (122  N.  Car. 

1002,   30   S.   E.   14),   152. 
Berry   v.   Railway   Co.     (73    Wis. 

197),  895. 
Berry,  etc.,  Co.  v.  Railway  Co.  ( — 

Mo.    App.   — ,   92    S.    W.    Rep. 

714),    866,    867. 
Bessling    &    Co.    v.    Railway    Co. 

(Tex.  Civ.  App.,  80  S.  W.  Rep. 

639),  613. 
Best  V.  Town  of  Kinston   (106  N. 

Car.  205,  10  S.  E.  Rep.  997), 

1396. 
Bethea  v.  Railroad  Co.    (26  S.  C. 

91),  1054. 
Bethel  v.  Mellor  &  Rittenhouse  Co. 

(131  Fed.  129),  349,  353. 
Bethell   v.    Clark    (20   Q.   B.   Div. 

615),  767. 
Bethman     v.     Railroad    Co.     (155 

Mass.  352,  29  N.  B.  587),  1122. 
Betts  V.  Railroad  Co,   (191  Pa.  St. 

575,   43   Atl.   362,   45  L.   R.   A. 

261),  1219. 
Betts   V.    Railway   Co.    (92    Iowa, 

343,    60    N.    W.    623.    54    Am. 

St.  Rep.  558,  26  L.  R.  A.  248), 

509. 


TABLE  OF   CASES   CITED. 


Ixix 


[references  are  to  sections.] 


Betts   V.    Transportation    Co.     (21 

Wis.  80),  333,  339,  341,  419. 
Bibb    V.    Railway    Co.    (Tex.    Civ. 

App.,  84  S.  W.  G63),  1348. 
Bibb  Broom  Corn  Co.  v.  The  Rail- 
way Co.   (—  Minn.  — ,  102  N. 

W.  Rep.  709,  69  L.  R.  A.  509), 

301,  305. 
Bicknell  v.  Railroad  Co.    (26  Ont. 

App.  431),  1003. 
Biddle  v.  Bond  (6  Best  &  S.  225), 

749. 
Bigbee  &  Warrior  River's  Packet 

Co.   V.   Railroad  Co.    (60   Fed. 

545),   554. 
Bigelow  V.  Heaton  (4  Denio,  496), 

869,  871. 
Billman  v.  Railroad  Co.    (76  Ind. 

166),  1430. 
Bills    v.    Railroad    Co.    (84    N.    Y. 

5),  634. 
Binns  v.  Pigot    (9  C.   &  P.   208), 

882,  889. 
Bird  V.  Brown  (4  Exch.  786),  759, 

770,  1444. 
Bird  V.  Cromwell  (1  Mo.  58),  631. 
Bird  v.  Railroad  Co.  (72  Ga.  655), 

827,  867. 
Bird    V,    Railway    Co.     (99    Tenn. 

719,  42  S.  W.  451,  63  Am.  St. 

Rep.  856),  132,  233,  472. 

Birge  v.  Gardiner  (19  Conn.  507), 

1418. 
Birkett   v.   Railway    (4    H.    &   N. 

730),  1423. 
Birkett    v.     Telegraph    Co.     (103 

Mich.    361,    61    N.   W.   645,   50 

Am.   St.  Rep.   374),  95. 
Birkett  v.   Knickerbocker  Ice  Co. 

(110  N.  Y.  504,  17  N.  E.  Rep. 

108),  1397. 
Birkett  v.  Willan   (2  Barn.  &  Aid. 

356),   392,   665. 
Birmingham  v.  The  Railroad   (14 

N.  Y.   Supp.   13),   915. 


Bishawaiti  v.  Railroad  Co.   (92  N. 

Y.  Supp.  783),  231,  233. 
Bishell    v.    Huntington    (2    N.    H. 

142),   780. 
Bissell  V.  Railroad  (25  N.  Y.  442; 
29  Barb.   602),    336,    454,   909, 
1073. 
Bissell  V.  Railroad  (22  N,  Y.  258), 

242. 
Bixby   V.   Bennett    (3    Daly,   225), 

863. 
Bixby  V.  Dunlap   (56  N.  H.  456), 

1442. 
Bizzell   V.   Booker    (16   Ark.   308), 

1430. 
Black  V.  Baxendale  (1  Exch.  410), 

651,    1366,    1367. 
Black  V.  Goodrich  Transp.  Co.  (55 

Wis.  319),  425,  428,  464. 
Black    V.   Railroad    Co.    (30    Neb. 

197),  285,  309. 
Black    V.    Railway    Co.     (Ill    111. 

351),    408,   442. 
Blackburn  v.  Navigation  Co.  (1  K. 
B.    (1902)    290,  71  L.  J.  K.  B. 
177,   85   Law   T.    (N.    S.)    783, 
50  Wkly.  Rep.  272),  492. 
Blackett  v.  Exchange  Ass'n  Co.  (2 

Cromp.  &  J.  244),  169. 
Blackman  v.  O'Gorman  Co.   (22  R. 
I.   638,   49   Atl.   Rep.   28),   100, 
101. 
Blackmore    v.    Railway    Co.     (162 
Mo.  455,  62   S.  W.  993),  1291. 
Blackshere  v.  Patterson    (72   Fed. 
204,  18  C.  C.  A.  508,  25  U.  S. 
App.   695),   804. 
Blackstock  v.  Railroad    (20  N.  Y. 

48),  657. 
Blain  v.  Railway  Co.  (5  Ont.  L. 
R.  334,  2  Canadian  Ry.  Cases, 
85;  affirmed  in  Railway  Co. 
v.  Blain,  34  S.  C.  R.  74,  3 
Canadian  Py.  Cases,  143), 
980,  984. 


Ixx 


TABLE  OF   CASES   CITED. 


[EEFEBENCES   ABE 

Blair  v.  Railroad  (66  N.  Y.  313), 

451.  1017,  1018. 
Blair  v.  Railway   Co.    (109   Iowa, 

369,  80  N.  W.  673),  574,  580. 
Blake   v.   Railway   Co.    (78   Iowa, 

57),  1200. 
Blake  v.  Railway  Co.  (89  Iowa,  8, 

56   N.  W.  Rep.  405,  21  L.  R. 

A.  559,  reversing  78  Iowa,  57, 

42  N.  W.  Rep.  580),  1201. 
Blake  v.  Railway    (18  Q.  B.   93), 

1397,  1398. 
Blake  v.  Railway  Co.    (Tex.   Civ. 

App.,  85  S.  W.  Rep.  430),  990, 

1135. 
Blakeley    v.    Le    Due    (19    Minn. 

187),  128. 
Blaker  v.  Railway  Co.   (30  N.  J. 

Eq.   240),  1391. 
Blanchard  v.  Ely  (21  Wend.  342), 

1367. 
Blanchard  v.  Isaacs  (3  Barb.  388), 

68,   111,  121. 
Blanchard  v.  Page   (8  Gray,  281), 

193,  197,  736,  810,  1277,  1308, 

1315. 
Bland  v.   Express  Co.    (1  Duvall, 

232),  317. 
Bland    v.    Railroad    Co.    (55    Cal. 

570),  1033,  1085,  1086. 
Bland   v.   Womack     (2    Murphey, 

373),  30. 
Blank  v.    Railroad   Co.    (182   111. 

332,  55  N.  E.  332,  aff'g  80  111. 

App,  475),  1018,  1073. 
Blauvelt  v.  Railroad  Co.  (206  Pa. 

141,  55  Atl.  Rep.  857),  1397. 
Blevins   v.  Railroad  Co.    (3   Okl. 

512,  41  Pac.  92),  1186. 
Bligh  V.  Railroad  Co.  (94  Me.  499, 

48  Atl.  Rep.  112),  1384. 
Blitch    V.    Railroad    Co.     (76    Ga. 

333),  1197. 
Blitz  V.  Steamboat  Co.   (51  Mich. 

558),  615. 


TO   SECTIONS.] 

Bliven  v.  Railroad  Co.   (35  Barb. 

191),   325,   740,   742,   743. 
Bliven  v.  Railroad  Co.    (36  N.  Y. 

407),  325. 
Block  V.  Bannerman  (10  La.  Ann. 

1),  1159. 
Block  V.  Railroad  Co.   (139  Mass. 

308),   254,   264. 
Bloomingdale  v.   Railroad  Co.    (6 

Lea,  616).  773. 
Blossom  V.  Dodd   (43  N.  Y.  264), 

415. 
Blossom  V.  Griffin  (13  N.  Y.  569), 

113,  131,  416. 
Blossom  V.  Smith  (3  Blatch.  316), 

688. 
Blower  v.  Railway  (L.  R.  7  C.  P. 

655),  337    341. 
Blum   V.   Car   Co.    (1   Flip.    500), 

1130,  1132. 
Blum  V.  Marks  (21  La.  Ann.  268), 

758. 
Blum  V.  Monahan  (73  N.  Y.  Supp. 

162,  36  Misc.  179),  1352. 
Blum    et    al.    v.    The    Caddo     (1 

Woods,  64),  1308,  1315. 
Blumantle   v.   The   Railroad    (127 

Mass.    322),    1252. 
Blumenthal   v.    Brainerd    (38   Vt. 

462),  77,  704. 
Blumenthal   v.   The  Railroad    (79 

Me.  550),  1249. 
Blumenthal    v.   Railroad    Co.    (84 

Fed.  920),  149. 
Blythe  v.  Railway   Co.    (15   Colo. 

333),  277,  280,  286,  31L 
Boast  V.  Firth   (L.  R.  4  C.  P.  1), 

627. 
Boaz  V.  Railroad  Co.   (87  Ga.  463, 

13  S.  E.  Rep.  711),  640. 
Bodley  v.  Reynolds  (8  Q.  B.  779), 

651. 
Boehl   V.  Railway   Co.    (44   Minn. 

191).   336,   1354. 
Boehm  v.  Combe  (2  M.  &  S.  172), 

469. 


T.VBLE   OF    CASES   CITED. 


Ixxi 


[eefeeences  are  to  sections.] 


Boehm  v.  Railway  Co.    (91   Wis. 

592,  65  N.  W.  506),  1082,  1424. 
Boering  v.  Railroad   Co.    (193   U. 

S.  442,  24  Sup.  Ct.  R.  515,  48 

L.  Ed.  742,  aff'g  20  App.  D.  C. 

500),  1075. 
Boggess   V.    Railway    Co.    (37    W. 

Va.    297,    16    S.    E.    Rep.    525, 

23  L.  R.  A.  777),  964,  1177. 
Boggs  V,  Martin  (13  B.  Mon.  239), 

870. 
Bohannan   v.   Hammond    (42   Cal. 

227),   333. 
Bohtlingk  v.  Inglis  (3  East.  381), 

772. 
Boice  V.  Railroad  (61  Barb.  611), 

1043. 
Boland  v.  Railroad    (36  Mo.  484), 

1227,  1229. 
Bolin   V.   Railway   Co.    (108    Wis. 

333,  84  N.  W.  446,  81  Am.  St. 

Rep.  911),  990. 
Boling    V.    Railroad    Co.    ( —    Mo. 

— ,   88   S.  W.   Rep.  35),    1043, 

1052,   1054,   1407. 
Bolinger  v.  Railway  Co.  (36  Minn. 

418,  31  N.  W.  Rep.  856),  1397. 
Bolton  V.  Railway   (1  L.  R.  C.  P. 

431),  769. 
Bomar    v.    Maxwell     (9    Humph. 

621),   69,   1246. 
Bonce  v.   Raiiroad   Co.    (53   Iowa, 

278),  68,  1418. 
Boner  v.  Steamboat  Co.   (1  Jones 

(N.  C).  211),   G52. 
Bonfiglio    V.    Railway     Co.     (125 

Mich.  476,  84  N.  W.  772),  449, 

1352,  1353. 
Bonner  v.  Blum   (Tex.  Civ.  App., 

25  S.  W.  Rep.   60),   1255. 
Bonner  v.  Glenn   (Tex.),  1198. 
Bonner   v.    Marsh    (10    Smedes   & 

M.  376),  194,  1317. 
Bonthrow    v.    Phoenix,    etc.,    Co. 

(—  Ariz.  — ,  71  Pac.  Rep.  941, 

61  L.  K.  A.  563),  1395. 


Book  V.  Railway  Co.  (85  Mo.  App. 

76;    s.    c.    75    Mo.    App.    604), 

1126. 
Books   V.   Danville    (95   Penn.   St. 

158),  1389. 
Boorman  v.  Express  Co.   (21  Wis. 

152),  401,  408,  425. 
Booth  V.  Railway  Co,    (2  Law  R. 

Ct.  of  Exch.  173,  15  L.  T.   (N. 

S.)   624),  397. 
Booth  V.  Terrell   (16  Ga.  20),  780. 
Booth  V.  Wilson  (1  B.  &  Aid.  59), 

29. 
Boothby  v.  Railway  Co.   (66  N.  H. 

342,   34  Atl.  157),  1429. 
Booye  v.  A  Cargo  of  Dry  Boards 

(42  Fed.  335),  833. 
Borden   v.    Railroad    Co.    (113    N. 

Car.   570,   18    S.   E.   Rep.   392, 

37  Am.  St.  Rep.  632),  806. 
Bork  V.  Norton   (2  McLean,  422,) 

322,  815. 
Borries   v.    Hutchinson    (18   C.   B. 

445),  1370. 
Borthwick  v.  Steamship  Co.  (1  K. 

B.    (1904)    319,  73  L.  J.  K.  B. 

240,     affirmed     in      Elderslie 

Steamship   Co.    v.    Borthwick, 

H.    L.    (1905)    App.   Cas.   93), 

357,  365. 
Bosch  V.  Railroad   Co.    (44   Iowa, 

402),  1430. 
Boscowitz  v.  Express  Co.    (93  111. 

523),  80,  505. 
Bosley  v.  Railroad  Co.  (54  W.  X'a. 

563,   46   S.   E.   Rep.   613,   66  L. 

R.  A.  871),  450,  479,  652,  1354. 
Boson  v.  Sandford    (2  Salk.  440), 

74. 
Boson    V.    Sandford     (2    Shower, 

478),   1350. 
Boston    Ins.    Co.    v.    Railway    Co. 

(118  Iowa,  423,  92  N.  W.  88, 

59  L.  R.  A.  796),  94. 
Bostwick  V.  Champion  (11  Wend. 

571),   916. 


Ixxii 


TABLE   OF    CASES   CITED. 


[references   ABE 

Bostwick  V.   Railroad    (45   N.   Y. 

712),  172,  304,  417,  463,  618. 
Bosworth  V.  Railroad  Co.    (25  R. 

I.  202,  55  Atl.  490),  895. 
Bostworth    V.    Swansey    (10    Met. 

363),  1233. 
Bosworth  V.  Walker   (83  Fed.  58, 

27  C.  C.  A.  402),  1180. 
Botany  Worsted  Mills  v.  Knott  (76 

Fed.  582;  affirmed  in  82  Fed. 

471,  27  C.  C.  A.  326,  51  U.  S. 

App.  467  and  Knott  v.  Botany 

Worsted  Mills,   179  U.   S.   69, 

45  L.  Ed.  90),  347,  359. 
Botts    V.    Railroad    Co.     (106    Mo. 

App.  397,  80  S.  W.  Rep.  976), 

419. 
Bottum  V.  Railway  Co.  (—  S.  Car. 

— ,  51  S.  E.  Rep.  985),  330. 
Boucher     v.     Lawson      (Cas.     T. 

Hardw.  194),  159. 
Bouker  v.  Railroad  Co.   (89  Hun, 

132,  35  N.  Y.   Supp.  30),   652, 

804. 
Boulden  v.  Railroad  Co.   (205  Pa. 

St.    264,    54    Atl.    Rep.    906), 

1389. 
Bourland  v.  The  Railway  ( —  Tex. 

— ,  90  S.  W.  Rep.  483,  revers- 
ing s.  c.    (Tex.  Civ.  App.)    87 

S.  W.  Rep.  173),  1388. 
Bourne  v.  Gatliffe  (3  Man.  &  Gran. 

643),   688. 
Bowden  v.  Fargo  (22  N.  Y.  Supp. 

889),  1352. 
Bowdon  V.  Railway  Co.    ( —  Ala. 

— ,  41  So.  Rep.  294),  704. 
Bowen    v.    Lumber    Co.     ( —    Cal. 

App.  — ,   84  Pac.  Rep.    1010), 

1401. 
Bowen  v.  Railroad  Co.   (18  N.  Y. 

408),  903. 
Bowen  v.  Railroad  Co.    (136  Fed. 

306.  69  C.  C.  A.  444),  1389. 
Bowers  v.  Railroad   Co.    (158   Pa. 

St.  302,  27  Atl.  893),  1054. 


TO   SECTIONS.] 

Bowes   V.   City    of    Boston     (155 

Mass.  344,  29  N.  E.  633),  1386. 
Bowler    v.    Lane    (3    Met.    (Ky.) 

311),  1386,  1400,  1436,  1440. 
Bowles  V,  Railroad  Co.   (46  Hun, 

324),  1401. 
Bowman  v.  Hilton  (11  Ohio,  303), 

75,  261,  864. 
Bowman  v   Teall  (23  Wend.  306), 

38,  65,  75,  273,  654,  657. 
Bowring  v.  Thebaud  (42  Fed.  Rep. 

794),  497. 
Bowring  v.  Thebaud  (56  Fed.  520, 

5  C.  C.  A.  640,  11  U.  S.  App. 

648,  aff'g  42  Fed.  795),  368. 
Boyce  v.  Anderson    (2   Pet.   150), 

128,   335,   89L 
Boyce  v.   Bayliffe    (1   Camp.   58), 

1160, 
Boyce  v.  Welch   (5  La.  Ann.  623), 

486. 
Boyd   V.    Dubois    (3    Camp.    133), 

337. 
Boyd  V.  Spencer   (103  Ga.  828,  30 

S.    E.    841,    68    Am.    St.    Rep. 

146),  1028,  1043. 
Boyden   v.    Railroad   Co.    (70   Vt. 

125,  39  Atl.  Rep.  771),  1397. 
Boylan  v.  Railroad  Co.   (132  U.  S. 

146),  1054. 
Boyle  V.   Railway  Co.    (13   Wash. 

383,  43  Pac.  344),  85. 
Boyles  v.  Railway    ( —  Tex.   Civ. 

App.  — ,  86  S.  W.  Rep.   936), 

895. 
Boys  V.  Pink   (8  Car.  &  P.  361), 

436. 
Bracket    v.    McNair     (14    Johns. 

170),  1370. 
Bradburn   v.   Railway    (L.   R.   10 

Exch.  1),  1423. 
Bradford  v.  Downs  (126  Penn.  St. 

622),  1228. 
Bradford    v.    Railroad     (7    Rich. 

201),  230. 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED, 


Ixxiii 


[BEFERENCES   ABE   TO    SECTIONS.] 


Bradhurst    v.    Insurance    Co.     (9 

Johns.  17),  801. 
Bradley  v.  Railroad  (2  Cush.  539), 

1155. 
Bradley  v.  Railway  Co.  (107  Mich. 

243,  65  N.  W.  102),  936. 
Bradley  v.  Railway  Co.    (94  Wis. 

44,  68  N.  W.  410),  1367. 
Bradshaw   v.   Railroad    Co.     (135 

Mass.   407),    1061,    1065,    1066, 

1090. 
Bradstreet  v.   Baldwin    (11  Mass. 

229),  801,  863. 
Bradstreet   v.    Heran    (2   Blatchf. 

116),  163. 
Bradwell    v.    Railroad    Co.     (139 

Penn.  404),  1417. 
Brady  v.  Railroad  Co.   (162  Mass. 

408,   38   N.   E.   710),   992. 
Braithwaite  v.  Power   (1  N.  Dak. 

455),    801,   815. 
Branan  v.  Railroad  Co.    (108  Ga. 

70,  33  S.  E.  Rep.  836,  75  Am. 

St.  Rep.  26),  757,  762. 
Branch  v.  Railroad  Co.   (88  N.  C. 

572),   450,  990. 
Brand  v.  Railroad   (8  Barb.  368), 

895. 
Brand  v.  Steamboat  Co.  (30  N.  Y. 

Supp.  903,  10  Misc.  128),  694. 
Brand   v.   Weir    (57   N.   Y.   Supp. 

731,  27  Misc.  212),  733,  1365. 
Brandt    v.    Bowlby    (2    B.    &    Ad. 

932),  1318,  1360. 
Brashear  v.  Railroad  Co.   (47  La. 

Ann.  735,  17  So.  260,  49  Am. 

St.  Rep.  382),  1195. 
Brasher  v.  Railway  Co.   (12  Colo. 

384),  678. 
Brass    v.    Maitland    (6    El.    &    B. 

470),  337,  796,  797. 
Brassell  v.  Railroad  Co.  (84  N.  Y. 

241),    1219. 


Brauer  v.  Compania  de  Naviga- 
cion  La  Flecha  (66  Fed.  777, 
35  U.  S.  App.  44,  aff'g  The 
Hugo,  57  Fed.  403;  affirmed, 
Compania  de  Navigacion  La 
Flecha  v.  Brauer,  168  U.  S. 
104,  18  Sup.  Ct.  R.  12,  42  L. 
Ed.  398),  215,  452,  464,  485. 

Braun  v.  Railway  Co.  (79  Minn. 
404,  82  N.  W.  675,  49  L.  R.  A. 
319,  79  Am.  St.  Rep.  497;  re- 
hearing denied,  82  N.  W.  984), 
1025,  1086. 

Braun  v.  Webb  (65  N.  Y.  Supp. 
668,  32  Misc.  243;  s.  c.  62  N. 
Y.  Supp.  1037),  1139. 

Braunton  &  Robertson  v.  So.  Pac. 
Co.  (—  Cal.  App.  — ,  83  Pac. 
Rep.  265),  1354. 

Brawley  v.  Watson  (2  Bond,  356), 

92. 
Brazier  v.  Polytechnic  Inst.   (1  F. 

&  F.  507),  909. 
Breen  v.  Railroad  Co.   (109  N.  Y. 

297),  1118. 
Breese  v.  Railroad  Co.    (52  N.  J. 

L.   250),   1406. 
Breese  v.  U.  S.  Tel.  Co.   (48  N.  Y. 

132),  95. 
Bregaro  v.  The  Centurion  (57  Fed. 

412;  reversed,  The  Centurion, 

68  Fe<.  382,  15  C.  C.  A.  480, 

35  U.  S.  App.  332),  355. 

Brehme  v.  Dinsmore  (25  Md.  329), 

426. 
Brehme   v.    Express   Co.    (25   Md. 

328),  425,  426. 
Bremer  v.  Pleiss   (121  Wis.  61,  98 

N.  W.  Rep.  945),  100. 
Bremer  v.  Railway  Co.   ( —  Minn. 

— ,  105  N.  W.  Rep.  494),  1401. 
Bremer  v.   Southern   Express  Co. 

(6   Cold.   356),    720. 
Bremner  v.  Williams   (1  C.  &  P. 

414),   910,   956. 


Ixxiv 


TABLE   OF    CASES   CITED, 


[references   ABE 

Brennan  v.  Mill  Co.  (44  Fed.  Rep. 

795),  1397. 
Brennan    v.    Santa    Fe    Receivers 

(72  Mo.  App.  107),  990. 
Brereton   v.   Chapman     (7     Bing. 

559),  849. 
Bretherton   v.   Wood    (3   B.   &   B. 

54),  962,  1325. 
Brevig  v.  Railway  Co.    (64  Minn. 
168,  66  N.  W.  403),  964,  990, 
1001. 
Brewer  v.  Railroad  Co.  (124  N.  Y. 

59),  1018. 
Brewer  v.   Railway  Co.    (84   Fed. 

258),  570. 
Brewer   Lumber    Co.    v.   Railroad 
Co.    (179  Mass.  228,  60  N.  E. 
548,   54   L.  R.  A.  435,   88   Am. 
St.  Rep.  375),  765,  766. 
Brezewitz  v.  Railway  Co.  ( —  Ark. 

—    70  L.  R.  A.  212),  1221. 
Bricker  v.  Railroad  Co.   (132  Pa. 
St.  1,  18   Atl.   983),  997,  1001. 
Brickman    v.  Railroad   Co.    (8    S. 

Car.  173),  1389. 
Briddon    v.    Railway     (28     L.     J. 
Exch.   51;    32   L.   T.  94),  652, 
654. 
Bridge   v.    Railway    (3   M.    &   W. 

244),  1223. 
Bridger  v.  Railroad  Co.   (25  S.  C. 

24),  1228. 
Bridger  v.  Railroad  Co.   (27  S.  C. 
456,  3  S.  E.  Rep.  860,  13  Am. 
St.  Rep.  653),  205. 
Bridges   v.   Railway    (L.   R.   6  Q. 
B.    377;    L.   R.   7    H.   L.   App. 
213),  1122,  1123,  1231. 
Bridges  v.  Stickney  (38  Me.  361), 

1358. 
Bridgman  v.  Steamboat  Emily  (18 

Iowa,  509),  1370. 
Brien  v.  Bennett  (8  C.  &  P.  724), 
1005. 


TO   SECTIONS.] 

Briggs  V.  Railroad  Co.    (28  Barb. 

515),  1366. 
Briggs  V.  Railroad  (6  Allen,  246), 
72,  132,  139,  457,  786,  867.  885, 
889. 
Briggs    V.   Vanderbilt     (19     Barb. 

222),   258. 
Brigham   v.   So.   Pac.   Co.   —  Cal. 
App.   — ,    84    Pac.    Rep.   306), 
1054. 
Brignold  v.  Waterhouse   (1  M.  & 

S.   259),   439. 
Brind  v.  Dale   (8  Car.  &  P.  207), 

38,  67,  105,  110,  128. 
Brink   v.   Railroad   Co.    (160   Mo. 
87,  60  S.  W.  1058,  83  Am.  St. 
Rep.    459),    1377. 
Brintnall  v.  Railroad  (32  Vt.  665), 

131,  231,  1348. 
Bristol  V.  Wilsmore   (1  B.  &  Co. 

514),   871. 
British   S.  Mill   Co.   v.   Nettleship 

(L.  R.  3  C.  P.  499),  1369. 
Brittan  v.  Barnaby  (21  How.  527), 

415,  828,  870,  880,  1229. 
Britten   v.  Railway  Co.    (1   Q.  B. 
(1899)  243,  68  L.  J.  Q.  B.  75), 
1249. 
Britton  v.  Railroad  Co.   (88  N.  C. 

536),  981. 
Broadwell  v.  Butler  (6  McL.  296), 

627,  652,  665. 
Broadwood  v.  Granara   (10  Exch. 

417),  882. 
Brockett  v.  Railroad  Co.  (73  Conn. 

428,  47  Atl.  763),  1418. 
Brockway  v.  Express  Co.  (171 
Mass.  158,  50  N.  E.  626;  s.  c. 
168  Mass.  257,  47  N.  E.  87), 
212,  213,  214,  215,  220,  415, 
638. 
Bronghel  v.  Tel.  Co.  (72  Conn. 
617,  45  Atl.  Rep.  435,  49  L. 
R.  A.  404),  1401. 


TABLE   OF    CASES   CITED, 


Ixxv 


[refebencks  are 

Bronghel    v.    Tel.    Co.    (73    Conn. 

G14,  48  Atl.  Rep.  751,  84  Am. 

St.  Rep.  176),  1397,  1399. 
Bronson   v.   Oakes    (76   Fed.    734, 

22  C.  C.  A.  520),  927,  1174. 
Bronson  v.   Southbury    (37   Conn. 

199),  1229. 
Brooke  v.   Cunard   S.    S.   Co.    (93 

N.  Y.  Supp.  369),  1363. 
Brooke  v.  Pickwick  (4  Bing.  218), 

69,  392,  1246. 
Brooke  v.  Railroad  (108  Penn.  St. 

529),  162,  208. 
Brooke  v.  Railway  (15  Mich.  332), 

238,  261,  1049. 
Brooke'  Iron  Co.  v.  O'Brien    (135 

Mass.  442),  768. 
Brooks  V.  Railroad  Co.   (88  N.  Y. 

Supp.  961),  652. 
Brooks  V.  Railroad  Co.  (168  Mass. 

164.  46  N.  E.  566),  940. 
Brooks    V.    Schwerin     (54     N.     Y. 

343),  1379. 
Brousseau  v.  Ship  Hudson  (11  La. 

Ann.   427),  606. 
Brower  v.  Peabody  (13  N.  Y,  121), 

175. 
Brown  v.  Barnes  (151  Pa.  St.  562, 

25  Atl.   144),   1180. 
Brown  v.  Clegg  (63  Penn,  St.  51), 

92. 
Brown  v.  Coal  Co.  (L.  R.  10  C.  P, 

562),  159. 
Brown  v.  Collins   (53  N.  H.  442), 

1430, 
Brown  v.  Corn  well    (1  Root,  60), 

605. 
Brown     v.     Dennison     (2     Wend. 

593),    72. 
Brown  v.  Express  Co.   (15  W.  Va. 

812),  406,  449,  1354. 
Brown   v.   Harris    (2   Gray,   359), 

830. 
Brown  v.  Hodgson  (4  Taunt.  189), 

863. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Brown  v.  Hodgson   (2  Camp.  36), 

1315. 
Brown    v.    Johnson    (10   M.   &   W, 

331),  849, 
Brown    v.    Railroad    Co.    (7    Fed. 

Rep.  51),  975,  1090, 
Brown    v.    Railroad    Co.     (36    HI. 

App.  140),  457. 
Brown  v.  Railroad  Co.    (51   Iowa, 

238,  1  N.  W.  487),  1082,  1083. 
Brown   v.  Railroad   Co.    (100   Ky. 

525,  38  S.  W.  862),  442. 
Brown  v.  Railroad  Co.   (38  Kans. 

634),  1033. 
Brown  v.  Railroad   (11  Cush.  97), 

1052,  1070,  1299. 
Brown  v.  Railroad  Co.   (181  Mass, 

365,  63  N.  E.  941),  1177. 
Brown  v.  Railroad  C!o.   (133  Mich. 

371,  94  N.  W.  1050,  10  Detroit 

L.  N.  173),   715. 
Brown  v.  Railroad   Co.    ( —  Miss. 

— ,   41   So.   Rep.   383),   1414. 
Brown    v.    Railroad    Co.    (66    Mo. 

588),   1084,   1433. 
Brown  v.  Railway  (54  N.  H.  535), 

714. 
Brown  v.   Railroad  Co.    (75   Hun, 

355,    27    N.    Y.    Supp.    69;    af- 
firmed   without    opinion,    151 

N.  Y.  674,  46  N.  E.  1145),  944. 
Brown  v.  Railroad    (S3  Penn.   St, 

316),  202,  214,  795. 
Brown  v.  Railroad  Co.  (101  Tenn. 

252,    47    S.    W.    Rep.    415,    70 

Am.  St.  Rep.  666),  1391. 
Brown   v.  Railroad   Co.    (80   Wis, 

162,  49  N.  W.   807),  1177. 
Brown  v.  Railroad  Co.    (102  Wis, 

137,  77  N.  W.  Rep.  748,  44  L, 

R.  A.   o79),   1386. 
Brown  v.  The  Railway    (139  Fed, 

972,    (—  C.   C.   A.  — ),   988. 
Brown    v.   Railway   Co.    (119    Ga. 

88,  46  S.  E.  71),  929,  941. 


Ixxvi 


TABLE   OP    CASES    CITED. 


[REFERENCES    ABE 

Brown  v.  Railway   (58  Me.  384), 

1227,  1228,  1229. 
Brown  v.  Railway  Co.    (49  Mich. 

153),  1418. 
Brown  v.  Railway  Co.  (130  Mich. 

483,   90  N,  W.   290;    s.   c.   134 

Mich.  591,  96  N.  W.  Rep.  925), 

1065. 
Brown  v.  Railway  Co.  (65  S.  Car. 

260,  43  S.  E.  Rep.  794),  1398. 
Brown   v.   Railway   Co.    (54   Wis. 

342),  1365,  1428,  1429. 
Brown  v.  Sax  (7  Cow.  95),  827. 
Brown    v.    Steamship      Co.      (147 

Mass.  58),  429,   1364. 
Brown  v.  Tanner   (L.  R.  3  Chan. 

597),  879. 
Brown   v.   Weir    (88   N.   Y.    Supp. 

479,  95  App.  Div.  78),  1369. 
Brown's  Adm'r  v.  Railroad  Co.  (19 

Ky.  Law  Rep.  1873,  44  S.  W. 

Rep.   648),  994,  1083. 
Brown  &  Haywood  Co.  v.  Railroad 

Co.    (63  Minn.   546,  65  N.  W. 

961),  130,  611. 
Brov-n    Shoe    Co.   v.   Hunt     (103 

Iowa,    586,    64    Am.    St.    Rep. 

198,  72  N.  W.  765),  883. 
Browne   v.  Railroad   Co.    (108   N. 

C.  34),  1110. 
Brownell  v.  Flagler  (5  Hill,  282), 

333. 
Browning   v.    Transportation    Co. 

78    Wis.    391,    47    N.    W.    428, 

23  Am.  St.  Rep.  414,  10  L.  R. 

A.  415),  472,  1352. 
Bruce   v.    Railroad    Co.    (83     Ky. 

174),  1388,  1389,  1390. 
Bruhl  V.  Coleman    (113  Ga.  1102, 

39   S.   E.  481),  668. 
Brulard    v.    Alvin    (45    Fed.    Rep. 

766),  1117. 
Brundred  v.  Rice  (49  Ohio  St.  640, 

32  N.  E.  169,  34  Am.  St.  Rep. 

589),  521. 


TO   SECTIONS.] 

Bruswitz    V.    Navigation    Co.    (64 

Hun,  262,  19  N.  Y.  Supp.  75), 

957. 
Bruty  V.  Railway  (32  Up.  Can.  Q. 

B.  66),  1246. 
Bryan  v.  Railroad  (11  Bush,  597), 

226. 
Bryan  v.  Railway  Co.  (32  Mo.  Ap. 

228),   1075. 
Bryan  v.  Spurgin   (5  Sneed,  681), 

627. 
Bryant  v.  Biddeford  (39  Me.  193), 

1233. 
Bryant  v.  Clifford  (13  Mete.  138), 

780. 
Bryant  v.  Insurance  Co.  (13  Pick. 

543),  790. 
Bryant  v.  Insurance  Co.   (6  Pick. 

131),  801. 
Bryant   v.   Railroad    Co.    (68    Ga. 

805),  638. 
Bryant   v.   Railway   Co.    (53   Fed., 

997,  4  C.  C.  A.  146,  12  U.   S. 

App.  115),  998. 
Bryant  v.  Rich    (106  Mass.  180), 

1096. 
Bryce   v.   Railway   Co.    (129   Fed. 

966),  1414. 
Bryton    v.    Chase    (3    Wis.    456), 

1358. 
Bucher  v.  Railroad  Co.    (98  N.  Y. 

128),  1221. 
Bucher  v.  Railroad  Co.  (131  Mass. 

156),  1233. 
Buck  V.  Biddeford    (82  Me.  433), 

1233. 
Buck  V.  Railroad  Co.   (150  Pa.  St 

170,   24   Atl.   678,   30   Am.   St 

Rep.  800),  450,  1355. 
Buck    V.    Railway    Co.    (15    Daly, 

550),   989. 
Buckland  v.   Adams  Exp.  Co.    (97 

Mass.  124),  82,  148,  246. 
Buckland    v.    Railroad     Co.     (181 

Mass.   3,   62   N.   E.   955),   904, 

1415. 


TABLE  OF   CASES   CITED. 


Ixxvii 


[BEFEBENCES   ABE   TO   SECTIONS.] 


Buckle  V.  Knoop   (2  L.  R.  Exch. 

125,  333),  812. 
Buckler  v.  City  of  Newman   (116 

111.  546),  1236. 
Buckley    v.    Furniss    (15    Wend. 

137),  767. 
Buckley    v.    Railroad     (18     Mich. 

121),  708. 
Buckley     v.     Railroad     Co.     (161 

Mass.  26,  36  N.  E.  583),  937. 
Buckman  v.  Levi    (3  Camp.  414), 

105,  117. 
Budd  V.  Carriage  Co.   (25  Or.  314, 

35  Pac.  660,  27  L.  R.  A.  279), 

68,    895,    898,   959,    1223,    1414, 

1415. 
Budd   V.   Railroad   Co.    (69   Conn. 

272,  37  Atl.  Rep.  683),  1386. 
Buddy  V.  Railroad  Co.  (20  Mo.  Ap. 

206),  702. 
Budgett  V.  Binnington    (25  Q.   B. 

Div.  320),  833. 
Budgett  &  Co.  V.  Binnington  (1  Q. 

B.    (1891)    35,   60   L.   J.   Q.   B. 

1),  833. 
Buel  V.  Railroad    (31  N.  Y.  314), 

959,  1223. 
Buenemann    v.    Railway    Co.    (32 

Minn.  390),  936. 
Buesching    v.    Gas-Light   Co.    (73 

Mo.  220),  1417. 
Buffett  V.  Railroad  (36  Barb.  420), 

1010. 
Buffett  V.  Railroad  (40  N.  Y.  168), 

242,  1006,  1010,  1019. 
Bulkley  v.  Naumkeag  S.  C.  Co.  (24 

How.  386),  120,  281,  489. 
Bullard  v.  Express  Co.  (107  Mich. 

695,   65   N.   W.   551),  123,  716, 

717. 
Bullard  v.  Railroad  Co.   (10  Mont. 

168,  25  Pac.   120,  11  L.  R.  A. 

246),  537. 
Buller  V.  Fisher  (3  Esp.  67),  483, 

490. 


Bullock    V.    Butler   Exchange    Co. 

(22  R.   I.  108,  46    Atl.    273), 

100. 
Bullock  V.  Dispatch  Co.  (187  Mass. 

91,   72   N.   E.   256),  1348. 
Bullock  V.  Railway  Co.  (Tex.  Civ. 

App.,  55  S.  W.  Rep.  184),  1012. 

Bullock    V.     Steamship    Co.     (30 

Wash.    448,    70    Pac.    1106), 

1169. 
Bulman    v,     Dickson     (1     Q.    B. 

(1894)    179),  850. 
Bulman  v.  Fenwick  &  Co.   (1  Q. 

B.    (1894)    179,  63  L.  J.  Q.  B. 

123). 

Bunch  V.  Railway  Co.    (17  Q.  B. 

Div.  215),  1263. 
Bunyca  v.  Railroad  Co.    (19  App. 

D.  C.  76),  1398. 
Burbank  v.  Railroad  Co.   (42  La. 

Ann.  1156,   11  L.  R.  A.  720), 

1006. 
Burgess  v.  Clements   (4  Maule  & 

S.  306),  977. 
Burgess  v.  Gun  (3  Har.  &  J.  225), 

865. 

Burgess   v.   Railway    (6   Com.   B. 

(N.  S.)  923),  937. 
Burgess  v.  Stowe   (134  Mich.  204, 

96  N.  W.  29),  100. 
Burgess  v.  Wickham    (3  B.  &  S. 

669.  693),  905. 
Burgevin  v.  Railroad  Co.  (69  Hun, 

479,  23  N.  Y.  Supp.  415),  1287. 
Burgher     v.     Railroad     Co.     (105 

Iowa,  335,  75  N.  W.  192),  167, 

643. 

Burgin   v.   Railroad  Co.    (115   N. 

Car.   673,  20  S.  B.  Rep.  473), 

1177. 
Burk    v.    Railroad    Co.    (125    Cal. 

364,    57    Pac.    Rep.     1065,     73 

Am.    St.   Rep.    52),   1399. 


Ixxviii 


TABI^   OP   CASES   CITED. 


[befekences  ahe 

Burke  v.  Express  Co.  (87  111.  App, 

505;     s.    c.     Express    Co.    v. 

Burke,   94   111.   App.   29),   336, 

455,  634. 
Burke   v.  Railroad  Co.    (34   How. 

Pr.  239),  1381. 
Burke  v.  Railroad  (49  Barb.  529), 

1227. 
Burke   v.   Railroad    Co,    (108    111. 

App.   565),  994. 
Burke  v.  Railway  Co.  (51  Mo.  App. 

491),   964. 
Burkholder  v.  Trust  Co.    (82  Mo. 

572),  1341. 
Burley  v.   Gladstone    (3   M.  &  S. 

205),  856,  866. 
Burnell    v.    Railroad     (45    N.    Y. 

184),   1290,  1291,  1292. 
Burnett  v.  Lynch  (5  B.  &  C.  589), 

1408. 
Burnett  v.  Railroad  Co,    (176  Pa. 

St.  45,  34  Atl.  972),  211. 
Burnham  v.  Railroad  Co.   (63  Me. 

298),  1052,  1067,  1086. 
Burnham  v  Railway  Co.  (91  Mich. 

523,   52   N.   W.   14),   1126. 
Burnham  v.  Railway  Co.  (81  Miss. 

46,  32  So.  Rep.  912),  654,  658. 
Burns  v.  Burns   (131  Fed.  238,  65 

C.   C.    A.    224,   aff'g   125   Fed. 

432),  172,  832,  853. 
Burns   v.    Oil    Co.    (26    Tex.    Civ. 

App.  223,  63  S.  W.  Rep.  1061), 

1401. 
Burns   v.  Railroad   Co.    (113   Ind. 

169),  1388. 
Burns  v.  Railway  Co.   (63  S.  Car. 

46,  40  S.  E.  1018),  1000. 
Burns  v.  Railway  Co.    (104  Wis. 

646,   80  N.  W.   927),  419,   634, 

638,  641,  1003. 
Burr  V.  Express  Co.   (71  N.  J.  L. 

263,  58  Atl.  609),  708,  712. 
Burr  V.  Railroad  Co.   (64  N.  J.  L. 

30,  44  Atl.  845),  1216. 


TO   SECTIONS.] 

Burrell  v.  Fleming  (109  Fed.  489, 

47   C.   C.   A.    598),   1388. 
Burrill  v.  Grossman  (65  Fed.  104; 

af/irmed  in  91  Fed.  543,  33  C, 

C.  A.  663;   reversed  in  Cross- 
man  V.  Burrill,  179  U.  S.  100, 

45  L.  Ed.  106),  833,  853,  854. 
Burrill    v.    Grossman     (130    Fed. 

763,  65  C.  C.  A.  189,  reversing 

124    Fed.    838    and    111    Fed. 

192),   833. 
Burriss  &  Haynie  v.  Railway  Co. 

(105  Mo.  App.   659,  78   S.  W. 

Rep.  1042),  1317. 
Burroughes  v.  Bayne   (5  H.  &  N. 

296),  750. 
Burroughs  v.  Railroad  (100  Mass. 

26),  130,  231,  241,  261. 
Burrows  v.   Lownsdale    (133   Fed. 

250,  66  G.  G.   A.  650),  942. 
Burrows    v.    Railway    (63    N.    Y. 

556),  1180. 
Burtis  V.  Railroad  (24  N.  Y.  269), 

238,  242. 
Burton    v.   Curyea    (40   111.    320), 

175. 
Burton  v.  English   (12  Q,  B.  Div. 

224),  464. 
Burton   v.    Ferry    Co.    (114    U,    S. 

474),  1113,  1114. 
Burton  v.  Wilkinson  (18  Vt.  186), 

740. 
Burwell  v.  Railroad  Co,  (94  N.  C. 

451),  506, 
Burwell  v.  Railroad  Co.  (94  N.  C, 

455),   1348. 
Bush  V.  Barnett    (96  Gal.  202,  31 

Pac.  2),  1414. 
Bush  V.  Railway  Co.   (3  Mo.  App. 

62),  672,  682. 
Bushel  V.  Wheeler  (15  Q.  B.  442), 

194. 
Bussey  v.  Railroad  Go.    (79  Miss. 

597,  31  So.  Rep.  212),  1389. 
Bussey  v.  Railway  Co.   ( — S.  Car. 

— ,  53  S.  E.  Rep.  165),  1390. 


TABLE  OF   CASES   CITED. 


Ixxix 


[BEFEBENCES    ABE 

Bussey  v.  Trans.  Co.  (24  La.  Ann. 

165),   92. 
Bussman  v.  Transit  Co.   (71  Fed. 

654;  s.  c.  29  N.  Y.  Supp.  1066, 

9  Misc.  410),  1050. 
Buston  V.  Railroad  Co.   (119  Fed. 

808,  56  C.  C.  A.  320,  aff'g  116 

Fed.  235),  132. 
Butcher  v.  Railway   (16  Com.  B. 

13),   1241,   1259. 
Butchers  &  Drovers'  Stock  Yards 

Co.  V.  Railroad  Co.    (67  Fed. 

35,  14  C.  C.  A.  290,  31  U.   S. 

App.   252),   556. 
Butler  V.  Basing  (2  Car.  &  P.  613), 

68. 
Butler  V.  Murray   (30  N.  Y.  88), 

790. 
Butler  V.  Railroad  Co.  (8  Lea,  32), 

708. 
Butler   V.   Railroad   Co.    (18   Ind. 

App.  656,  46  N.  E.  92),  1315. 
Butler  V.  I^ailroad  Co.    (59  Minn. 

135,  60  N.  W.  1090),  1179. 
Butler  V.  Railroad   Co.    (87   Hun, 

10,  33  N.  Y.  Supp.  845),  1077. 
.Butler  V.  The  Railroad   (3  E.  D. 

Smith,  571),  1250. 
Butler  V.  Railway  Co.    (L.  R.   21 

Q.  B.  Div.  207),  1082. 
Butler  V.  Railway  Co.   (143  N.  Y. 

417,  38  N.  B.  454,  26  L.  R.  A. 

46,  reversing  24   N.  Y.  Supp. 

142,  4  Misc.  401),  1377. 
Butler  V.  Wolcott  (2  Bos.  &  P.  N. 

R.  64),  882. 
Butt  V.  Railway  (11  Com.  B.  140), 

392. 
Button  V.  Frink   (51  Conn.  342), 

1418. 
Butts  V.   Railroad  Co.    (110   Fed. 

329,    49    C.    C.    A.    69),    1192, 

1430. 
Buxton   V.  Railway  Co.    (L.  R.  3 

Q.   B.  549),  915. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Byrd  v.  Express  Co.   (139  N.  Car. 

273,  51  S.  E.  Rep.  851),  1397, 

1398. 
Byrne  v.  Boadle   (2  H.  &  C.  722), 

940. 
Byrne  v.  Fargo    (73  N.  Y.   Supp. 

943,  36  Misc.  543),  685,  729. 
Byrne  v.  Railroad  Co.    (83  N.  Y. 

620),    1228. 
Byrne   v.   Weeks    (7   Bosw.   372), 

165. 


Cabeen    v.    Campbell     (6    Casey, 

254),  767. 
Cable  V.  Railway  Co.  (122  N.  Car. 

892,  29  S.  E.  Rep.  377),  1126. 
Cadwallader  v.  Railway   (9  Low. 

Can.  169),  146. 
Caffin  V.  Aldridge   (65  L.  J.  Q.  B. 

85,    (1895)    2  Q.  B.   648,   aff'9 

64  L.  J.  Q.   B.   736,    (1895)    2 

Q.  B.   366),  613. 
Cahill    V.    Railway    (10    Com.    B. 

(N.  S.)  154;  13  id.  818),  1244, 

1249,  1250. 
Callife  V.  Dan  vers  (1  Peake,  N.  P. 

114),  38. 
Cain  V.  Railroad  Co.  ( —  Ky.  Law 

Rep.  — ,  84  S.  W.  Rep.  583), 

143L 
Cain  V.  Railroad  Co.    ( —  S.  Car. 

— ,  54  S.  E.  Rep.  244),  947. 
Cairns  v.  Robins  (8  M.  &  W.  258), 

714. 
Calahan  v.  Babcock   (21  Ohio  St. 

281),   766. 
Calderon   v.    Steamship    Co.    (170 

U.   S.    272,   reversing   69   Fed. 

574,  16  C.  C.  A.  332,  35  U.  S. 

App.   587,    and   64    Fed.    874), 

344,  349,  361,  452. 


Ixxx 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITEL. 


[BEFEBENCES   ABE 

Caldwell  v.   Murphy     (11    N.    Y. 

416),  1409. 
Caldwell  v.  Murphy  (1  Duer,  233), 

895,    1423, 
Caldwell   v.   N.   J.   Steamboat   Co. 

(56  Barb.  425),  281,  1155. 
Caldwell  v.  Railroad  Co.    (89  Ga. 

550,  15  S.  E.  Rep.  678),  1117. 
Caldwell  v.  Railway  Co.    (21  Ky. 

Law  Rep.  397,  51  S.  W.  Rep. 

575),    417. 
Caldwell  v.  Steamboat  Co.   (47  N. 

Y.    282),    895,    906,    909,    952, 

961,  1155,  1441,  1436,  1438. 
Caldwell  v.  Transfer  Co.  (33  N.  Y. 

Supp.  993,  13  Misc.  37),  1352. 
In  re  California  Nav.  &  Imp.  Co. 

(110  Fed.  670),  347,  387. 
California  Powder  Works  v.  Rail- 
road Co.  (113  Cal.  329,  45  Pac. 

691,    36    L.    R.    A.    648),    145, 

423,  457. 
Callahan  v.  Bean   (9  Allen,  401), 

1229. 
Callaway  v.  Mellett  (15  Ind.  App. 

366,  44  N.  E.  198),  1053,  1062, 

1065. 
Callender  v.  Ins.  Co.  (5  Bin.  525), 

815,    817. 
Callison  v.  Brake    (129   Fed.  196, 

63  C.  C.  A.  354),  1397. 
Calumet  Iron,  etc.,  Co.  v.  Martin 

(115  111.  358),  1174. 
Camden    T.    Co.    v.    Belknap    (21 

Wend.    354),   127. 
Cameron    v.    Railway    Co.    (8    N. 

Dak.  618,  80  N.  W.  Rep.  885), 

1391. 
Cameron  v.  Railway  Co.   (70  N.  J. 

L.  633,  57  Atl.  Rep.  417),  1401. 
Cameron    v.    Union    Trunk    Line 

(10  Wash.  507,  39  Pac.  128), 

1423. 
Cammell    v.    Sewell    (3    H.    &    N. 

617;    5  id.  728).  788. 


TO    SICCTIONS.] 

Camp  V.  Steamboat  Co.  (43  Conn. 

333),  401,  450,  1338. 
Campbell  v.  Alford   (57  Tex.  159). 

175. 
Campbell  v.  Car  Co.  (42  Fed.  Rep. 

484),   1101. 
Campbell    v.    Morse     (1    Harpen 

468),    291. 
Campbell  v.  Railway  Co.  (86  Iowa 

587;    overruled  by   Hanley   v. 

Railway   Co.   187   U.   S.   617), 

525. 
Campbell  v.  Railway  Co.  (1  Cana- 
dian   Ry.    Cases,    258;    unre- 
ported elsewhere),  892,  927. 
Campe   v.  Weir    (58   N.   Y.    Supp. 

1082,  28  Misc.  243),  454,  1355. 
Campion  v.  Colvin  (3  Bing.  N.  C. 

17),  877. 
Campion  v.  Railway  Co.  (43  Fed. 

77^,  11  L.  R.  A.  128),  629. 
Canal  Co.  v.  Graham  (63  Penn.  St. 

290),  1422. 
Candee  v.  Railroad  (21  Wis.  582), 

238,    915,    1296. 
Candee  v.  Railroad  Co.   (73  Conn. 

667,  49  Atl.  17),  419,  510. 
Candee  v.  Telegraph  Co.   (34  Wis. 

479),  1358. 
Candiff   v.    Railway    Co.    (42    La. 

Ann.  477,  7  So.  Rep.  601),  964, 
Canfield  v.  Railroad  Co.  (75  N.  Y. 

144),  1352. 
Canfield  v.  Railroad  Co.  (93  N.  Y. 

532),   454,   463. 
Cannan  v.  Meaburn  (1  Bing.  243), 

788,  79L 
Cantling  v.  The  Railroad  (54  Mo. 

385),  91,  1250. 
Cantu  V.  Bennett  (39  Texas,  303), 

201,  206. 
Cantwell  v.  Express  Co.   (58  Ark. 

487,  25  S.  W.  503),  652. 
Capehart  v.  Granite  Mills  (97  Ala. 

353,   12   So.   44),  175. 


TABLE  OF   CASES   CITED. 


Ixxxi 


[REFKRENCES   ABE   TO   SECTIONS.] 


Cappel  V.  Weir   (92  N.  Y,   Supp, 

365,  S.  C.  90  N.  Y.  Supp.  394), 

21li  677. 
Card  V.  Ellsworth    (65  Me.   547), 

1223. 
Carey  v.  Railroad  (1  Gush.  475), 

1376. 
Carey  v.  Railroad  (29  Barb.  35), 

1292. 
Carlisle  v.  Brisbane  (113  Penn.  St 

544),  1236. 
Carlisle  v.  Keokuk,  etc.,  Co.   (82 

Mo.  40),  1334. 
Carlisle  v.  Railway  Co.    (97  Mo. 

App.  571,  71  S.  W.  475),  593. 

Carlisle  v.  Sheldon  (38  Vt.  440), 

1383. 
Carlson  v.  Ocean  Steam  Nav.  Co. 

(109  N.  Y.  362),  344. 

Carlson   v.   Railway   Co.    (21   Or. 

450,  28   Pac.  Rep.  497),  1397, 

1398. 
Carpenter  v.  Railroad  Co.   (97  N. 

Y.  494),  1011. 
Carpenter  v.  Railroad  Co.  (124  N. 

Y.  53),   1130.  1131,   1132. 
Carpenter    v.     Railway     Co.     (67 

Minn.  188,  69  N.  W.  720),  443. 

Carpenter  v.  Railway  Co.  (72  Me. 
388),  211,  1046. 

Carpue  v.  Railway   (5  Ad.  &  Bl. 
(N.   S.)    747),  960,  1223,  1414. 

Carr  v.  Railroad  Co.  (98  Cal.  366, 

33  Pac.  213,  21  L.  R.  A.  354), 

1179. 
Carr  v.  Railroad  (92  N.  Y.  Supp. 

799),  660. 
Carr   v.   Railway    (7   Exch.   707), 

336,  337,  340,  395,  805. 
Carr  v.  Schafer  (15  Colo.  48),  505. 
Carrey  v.  Spencer  (36  N.  Y.  Supp. 

886),  972. 


Carrico    v.    Railroad    Co.    (39   W. 

Va.  86,  19  S.  B.  Rep.  571,  24  L. 

R.  A.  50;  s.  c.  35  W.  Va.  389, 

14    S.    E.   Rep.    12),   919,   925, 

1173,  1196,  1209,  1414,  1417. 
Carrigan  v.  Stillwell  (97  Me.  247, 

54  Atl.  Rep.  389,  61  L.  R.  A. 

163),  1389. 
Cerrillos  Coal  R.  Co.  v.  Deserant 

(9  New  Mex.  49,  49  Pac.  Rep. 

807),    1397. 
Carroll    v.    Burleigh     (15    Wash. 

208,  46  Pac.  232),  1118. 
Carroll  v.  Express  Co.  (37  S.  Car. 

452,  16  S.  E.  Rep.  128),  678. 
Carroll  v.  Railroad  (1  Duer,  571), 

1200. 
Carroll  v.  Railroad  (58  N.  Y.  126), 

895,   898,   904,  906,   909,    1017, 

1151,  1232. 
Carruth   v.   Railway   Co.    (45   La. 

Ann.  1228,  14  So.  736),  1118. 
Carsten  v.  Railroad  Co.  (44  Minn. 

454),   1056. 
Carswell  v.  Railroad  Co.   (118  Ga. 

826,  45  S.  E.  695),  1004,  1073. 
Carter  v.  Graves  (9  Yerger,  446), 

1310. 
Carter   v.    Peck    (4    Sneed,    203), 

230,  249,  261,  496. 
Carter  v.   Railroad   Co.    (Ill   Ga. 

38,  36  S.  B.  Rep.  308,  50  L.  R. 

A.  354),  1309. 
Carter    v.    Railroad    Co.    (139    N. 

Car.   499,   52   S.   E.  Rep.   643; 

138  N.  Car.  750,  52  S.  E.  Rep. 

642),  1397. 

Carter  v.  Railroad  Co.   (19  S.  C. 
20),  1417. 

Carter   v.    Railway   Co.    (42   Fed. 

Rep.  37,  57),  904,  1414. 
Carter  &  Corey  v.  Railway  Co.  ( — 

Tex.   Civ.  App.  — ,  93   S.   W. 

Rep.  681),  1374. 


Ixxxii 


TABLE   OP   CASES   CITED. 


[BEFEBENCES  ARE 

Cartwright    t.    Railroad    Co.    (85  | 

Hun,  517,  33  X.  Y.  Supp.  147), 

652. 
Carty's  Adm'r  v.  Village  of  Win- 

ooski   (—  Vt.  — ,  62  Atl.  Rep. 

45),   1389. 
Caruthers   v.    Sheddon    (6   Taunt. 

14),  783. 
Carvey  v.  Railroad  Co.  (133  Mich. 

659,  95  N.  W.  716,  10  Det.  L. 

N.  350),  1062,  1065. 
Case  V.  Min.  Co.  (103  Mo.  App. 

477,  78  S.  W.  Rep.  62),  1389, 

1396. 
Case  V.  Railroad  Co.  (191  Pa.  St. 

450,  43  Atl.  319),  1126. 

Case  V.  Railway  Co.  (11  Ind.  App. 
517,  39  N.  E.  426),  442. 

Casey  v.  Railway  Co.    (Tex.  Civ. 

App.,  83  S.  W.  Rep.  20),  510. 
Casey  v.  Transit  Co.  ( —  Mo.  App. 

— ,  91  S.  W.  Rep.  419),  1384, 

1389. 
Cash  V.  Railroad   Co.    (67  N.  Y. 

Supp.    823),   923. 
Cash  V.  Railroad  Co.  (81  Mo.  App. 

109),  339. 
Cass   V.    Railroad    Co.    (14   Allen, 

448,  450),  130. 

Cassedy  v.  Stockbridge  (21  Vt. 
391),   1230. 

Cassiano  v.  Railway  Co.  (Tex. 
Civ.  App.,  82  S.  W.  806),  1043. 

Cassidy  v.  Angell  (12  R.  I.  44), 
1417. 

Caswell  V.  Railroad  (98  Mass. 
194),  959,  108,  1223. 

Caton  V.  Rumney  (13  Wend.  387), 
92. 

Cattaraugus  Cutlery  Co.  v.  Rail- 
way Co.  (48  N.  Y.  Supp.  451, 
24  App.  Div.  267),  1276. 


TO   SKCTIONS.] 

Cau  V.  Railroad  Co.  (194  U.  S.  427, 
24  Sup.  Ct.  R.  663,  48  L.  Ed. 
1053,  aff'g.,  113  Fed.  91,  51  C. 
C.  A.  76 J,  401,  408,  409,  452, 
475,  1355. 
Cavallaxo  v.  Railway  Co.  (110 
Cal.  348,  42  Pac.  918,  52  Am. 
St.  Rep.  94),  231,  236,  662, 
668,  708. 
Cavanaugh  v.  Nav.  Co.   (13  N.  Y. 

Supp.  540),  1388,  1396. 
Gavin  v.  Southern  Pacific  Co.  (136 
Fed.  592,  affirmed  in  Southern 
Pacific  Co.  v.  Cavin,  —  C.  C. 
A.   — ,    144     Fed.     348),     895, 
1017. 
Cayo  V.  Pool's  Assignee   (108  Ky. 
124,  55  S.  W.  887,  94  Am.  St. 
Rep.  348,  49  L.  R.  A.  251),  70 
867,  869. 
Gaze  V.  Ins.  Co.   (7  Cranch,  358), 

815,  817. 
Cazneau    v.    Railroad    Co.     (161 
Mass.  355,  37  N.  E.  311),  937. 
Central,  etc.,  Co.  v.  Roach  (70  Ga. 

434),  1389. 
Central    Foundry   Co.    v.    Bennett 
(—  Ala.  — ,  39  So.  Rep.  574), 
1397. 
Central    Stockyards   Co.    v.    Rail- 
road  Co.    (192   U.    S.    568,   24 
Sup.    Ct.    R.    339,    48    L.    Ed. 
565,  aff'g  118  Fed.  113,  55  C. 
C.  A.  63),  556. 
Central  Trust  Co.  v.  Railway  Co. 

(65  Fed.  332),  1054. 
Central  Trust  Co.  v.  Railway  Co. 
(70  Fed.  764),  708,  709,  1324. 
Central  Trust  Go.  v.  Railway  Co. 
(81     Fed.     277,     reversed    in 
Pond-Decker    Lumber    Co.    v. 
Spencer,  86  Fed.  846,  30  C.  C. 
A.   430),   540. 
Central  Trust  Go.  of  New  York  v. 
Railroad    Go.    (69    Fed.    683), 
1367. 


TABLE  OP  CASES  CITED. 


Ixxxiii 


[BEFEEENCES   ABE 

Cerrillos  Coal  R.  Co.  v.  Deserant 

(9  New  Mex.  49,  49  Pac.  Rep. 

807),   1398. 
Certain    Logs    of    Mahogany     (2 

Suran.  589),  828,  878. 
Chadbourne  v.  Railroad  Co.    (104 

111.   App.   333),   936. 
Chaffe  V.  Railroad  (59  Miss.  182), 

194. 
Chaffee  v.  Railroad  Co.   (17  R.  I. 

658,   24   Atl.   141),   1175,   1181, 

1219. 
Chalk  V.  Railroad  Co.    (85  N.  C. 

423),    702,    710. 
Chamberlain      v.      Chandler       (3 

Mason,  242),   1161. 
Chamberlain  v.  Pierson    (87  Fed. 

420,  31  C.  C.  A.  157),  1018. 
Chamberlain    v.    Pullman     Palace 

Car   Co.    (55   Mo.    App.    474), 

1132. 
Chamberlain  v.  Railway  Co.    (122 

Mich.  477,  81  N.  W.  339),  1023. 
Chamberlain     v.     Williamson     (2 

Maule  &  S.  408),  1405. 
Champion  v.  Bostwick  (18  Wend. 

175),    250,   263. 
Chance    v.   Railway   Co.    (10   Mo. 

App.  351),  1067. 
Chandler   v.    Belden     (18     Johns. 

157),  875.  889. 
Chandler  v.   Fulton    (10   Tex.  2), 

759. 
Chaney  v.  Railroad  Co.    (176  Mo. 

598,  75   S.  W.   595),  1194. 
Chapin  v.  Railroad  Co.    (79  Iowa, 

582,  44  N.  W.  Rep.  562),  285. 
Chapman  v.   Railroad    (19  N.   Y. 

341),  1236. 
Chapman  v.  Railway  Co.  (5  Q.  B. 

D.  278),  708. 
Chapman    v.    Railway    (26    Wis. 

295),    1360. 
Chapman  v.  Rothwell  (El.  B.  &  E. 

168),   1015. 
In  re  Charge  to  Grand  Jury    (66 

Fed.  146).  541. 


TO   SECTIONS.] 

Charlotte  Trouser  Co.  v,  RaiW/ay 

Co.    (—  N.  Car.  — ,  51   S.   E. 

Rep.    973),    1250,    1285,    1286, 

1291. 
Charnock  v.  Railway  Co.   (194  U. 

S.    432,    24    Sup.    Ct.    R.    671, 

aff'g  113  Fed.  92,  51  C.  C.  A. 

78),  510. 
Chase  v.  Ins.  Co.   (12  Barb.  595), 

783. 
Chase  v.  Ins.  Co.   (9  Allen,  311), 

830. 
Chase    V.    Railroad    Co.     (77    Me. 

62),   1418. 
Chase  v.  Railroad  (26  N.  Y.  523), 

1033. 
Chase  v.  Railway  Co.     (70    Kan. 

546,  79  Pac.  Rep.  153),  1061, 

1065. 
Chase   v.    Westmore    (5   M.   &   S, 

180),   875. 
Chattanooga  Rapid  Transit  Co.  v. 

Venable  (105  Tenn.  460,  58  S. 

W.  861,  51  L.  R.  A.  886),  97, 

1004,   1022,   1072,   1073. 
Chattock  &  Co.  v.  Bellamy  &  Co. 

(64  L.  J.  Q.  B.  250),  71. 
Cheesman  v.  Exall  (6  Exch.  341), 

749. 
Cheney  v.  Railroad  Co.   (11  Mete. 

121),    1041,    1043,    1065,    1086, 

1117. 
Cherokee  Packet  Co.  v.  Hilson  (95 

Tenn.  1,  31  S.  W.  737),  991. 
Cherry   v.   Railroad   Co.    (52    Mo. 

App.   499;    s.   c.   61   Mo.    App. 

303),   1050,   1433. 
Cherry  v.  Railroad  Co.  ( —  Mo.  — , 

90  S.  W.  Rep.  381),  1077,  1090. 
Chesapeake,  etc.,  Co.  v.  Bank.  ( — 

Md.    — ,    63    Atl.    Rep.     113), 

1306. 
Chesley  v.  St.  Clair  (1  N.  H.  189), 

780. 
Chevallier    v.    Straham     (2    Tex. 

115),   280. 


Ixxxiv 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


[UEFKUENCES    ABE   TO    SECTIONS.] 

Cheviot  V.  Brooks  (1  Johns.  364), 


744. 
Chewning   v.   Railway    Co.    (Ala., 

14  So.  Rep.  2U4),  936. 
Chicago    V.    Major    (18   111.    349), 

1386,  1397. 
Chicago     V.     O'Brennan     (65     111. 

IGO),  1423. 
Chicago    V.    Starr    (42    111.    174), 

1229. 
Chicago  Edison  Co.  v.  Moren  (185 

111.   571,  57   N.   E.   Rep.   773), 

1401. 
Chicago,    etc.,    Co.    v.    La   Montia 

(112  111.  App.  43),  1397. 
Chicago,    etc.,    Co.    v.    Packet   Co. 

(38  Iowa  377),  866. 
Chicago    Exchange    Bldg.    Co.    v. 

Nelson   (197  111.  334,  64  N.  E. 

369,    aff'g    98    111.    App.    189), 

100. 
Chicago    Packing    and    Provision 

Co.   V.  Railway  Co.    (103   Ga. 

140,  29  S.  E.  Rep.  698,  40  L. 

R.  A.  367,  10  Am.  &  Eng.  R. 

Cas.   (N.  S.)  391),  181. 
Chicago  R.   R.   v.   Thompson    (19 

111.  578),  76,  331. 
Chickering    v.    Fowler     (4     Pick. 

371),   687. 
Child  V.  Sands  (Carth.  294),  1325. 
Childs  V.  Bolton  (69  S.  C.  555,  48 

S.  E.  Rep.  618),  1402. 
Childs   V.   Railway   Co.    (77   Hun, 

539,  28  N.  Y.  Supp.  894),  1431. 
Chiles  V.  Drake    (59  Ky.  146,  74 

Am.  Dec.   406),  1400. 
Chilton  V.  Railroad  Co.   (114  Mo. 

88,  21   S.  W.  Rep.  457,  19  L. 

R.  A.  269),  972. 
Chinn   v.   Railway    Co.    (100   Mo. 

App.   576,  75  S.  W.  375),  510, 

652. 
Chippendale  v.   Railway    (7   Eng. 

L.  &  E.  395),  407. 


Chitty  V.  Railway  Co.  (148  Mo.  64, 

49    S.    W.     868),    1223,    1224, 

1406. 
Choate    v.    Railway    Co.    (67    Mo. 

App.     105),     990,    1019,     1197, 

1198. 
Cholette  v.  Railroad  Co.   (26  Neb. 

159),  1118. 
Chouteau  v.  Str.  St.  Anthony   (16 

Mo.  216;   20  id.  519),  86. 
Chouteaux  v.  Leech  (18  Penn.  St. 

224),    486,    63L 
Christenson  v.  American  Exp.  Co. 

(15  Minn.  270),  44,  83,  457. 
Christie  v.  Davis  Coal  &  Coke  Co. 

(95     Fed.     837;     affirmed    on 

opinion  below,  110  Fed.  1006, 

49  C.  C.  A.  170),  800. 
Christie  v.  Griggs   (2  Camp.  79), 

895,  896,   1414. 
Christie   v.   Railway   Co.    (94  Mo. 

453),    52L 
Christie,  The  Craighton   (41  Fed. 

Rep.  62),  490,  1355. 
Christy   v.   Row    (1   Taunt.   300), 

810. 
Chrystal    v.    Flint    (82    Fed.    472, 

reversed  in  Flint  v.  Chrystal; 

83  Fed.  987,  31  C.  C.  A.  593; 

s.  c.     The  Irrawaddy,  171  U. 

S.  187,  18  Sup.  Ct.  R.  831,  43 

L.  Ed.  130),  345,  362,  364,  387. 
Church   v.   Railroad   Co.     (1   Okl. 

44,  29  Pac.  530),  23L 
Church  v.  Railway  Co.   (6  S.  Dak. 

235,  60  N.  W.  854,  26  L.  R.  A. 

616),  1051,  1077. 
Church  V.  Railway  Co.  (14  S.  Dak. 

443,   85  N.  W.  1001),  537. 
Churchill  v.  Railroad  (67  111.  390), 

1041,  1043. 
Cincinnati   Mail   Co.   v.   Coal    (15 

Ind.  345),  86. 
Citizens'      Bank      v.      Nantucket 

Steamboat  Co.    (2  Story,  16), 

57,   61,    75,   86,   91. 


Tx^LE   OP"    CASES    CITED. 


Ixxxv 


[BEFEKENCES   ABE 

City  V.  Kuby  (8  Minn.  154),  1229. 
City  of  Ripon  v.  Bittel    (30  Wis. 

614),  1423. 
Claflin  V.  Railroad  (7  Allen,  341), 

674. 
Claiborne  v.  Railway  Co.  (21  Tex. 

Civ.  App.  648,  57  S.  W.  336), 

990. 
Clairan  v.  Telegraph  Co.    (40  La. 

Ann.    178,    3    So.    Rep.    625), 

1389. 
Clapp    V.    Stanton    (20    La.    Ann. 

495),  92. 
Clare  v.   Steamship  Co.    (20   Fed. 

Rep.   535),   926. 
Clark  V.  Am.  Ex.  Co.  ( —  Iowa,  — , 

106    N.    W.    Rep.    642),    1366, 

1372. 
Clark  V.  Barnwell  (12  How.  279), 

74,  75,  162,  165,  167,  606,  1354, 

1355. 
Clark  V.  Burns   (118  Mass.  275), 

1269. 
Clark  V.  Geer   (86  Fed.  447,  32  C. 

C.  A.  295),  1391. 
Clark  V.   Insurance   Co.    (2   Pick. 

104),  801,  823. 
Clark    V.    Manchester    (62    N.    H. 

577),  1386. 
Clark  V.   Masters    (1   Bosw.  177), 

828. 
Clark  ads.  McDonald    (4  McCord, 

223),  128,   335. 
Clark    V.    Needles    (25   Penn.    St. 

338),   113. 
Clark  V.  Railroad  Co.    (83   N.   Y. 

Supp.  162,  40  Misc.  691),  1156. 
Clark  V.  Railroad   (32  Barb.  657), 

1226. 
Clark  V.  Railroad    (9  Gray,  231), 

884. 
Clark    V.    Railroad   Co.    (127    Mo. 

197.  29  S.  W.  1013),  895,  923, 

1414. 
Clark  V.  Railroad  Co.  (91  N.  C. 

506),  1024,  1085,  1433. 


TO   SECTIONS.] 

Clark   V.   Railway    Co.    (64    Mo. 

440),   419. 
Clark  V.  Russell   (97  Fed.  900,  38 

C.  C.  A.  541),  205. 
Clark  V.  Union  Ferry  Co.   (35  N. 

Y.   485),   66. 
Clark  V.   Zarniko    (106   Fed.   607, 

45  C.  C.  A.  494),  1218,  1413. 
Clark's    Adm'x    v.    Railroad    Co. 

(101   Ky.    34,    39    S.    W.    Rep. 

840,    36    L.   R.   A.    123),    1209, 

1210,  139L 
Clark's  Adm'x  v.  Railroad  Co.  ( — 

Ky.   L.  R.  — ,  49   S.   W.  Rep. 

1120),    92L 
Clarke  v.  Gray  (6  East.  564),  1340. 
Clarke  v.  Railroad  Co.    (14  N.  Y. 

570),  336,   339,  340,   341. 
Clarkson  v.   Edes    (4  Cow.  470), 

864,  877. 
Clarry   v.    Railway   Co.    (29    Ont. 

R.   18),   1431. 
Clay  V.  Railroad  Co.  (84  Ga.  345), 

1389. 
Clay  V.  Willan  (1  H.  Bl.  297),  439. 
Claypool    V.    McAllister     (20    111. 

504),   66. 
Clegg  V.  Railway  Co.  (135  N.  Car. 

148,  47  S.  E.  667,  65  L.  R.  A. 

717),  177,  178,   777,  805. 
Cleghorn    v.    Railroad    (56    N.    Y. 

44),  961,   1439,  1444. 
Clement  v.  Railroad  Co.   (56  Hun, 

643,  9  N.  Y.  Supp.  601),  668. 
Clemson  v.  Davidson  (5  Bin.  392), 

865. 
Clendaniel     v.     Tuckerman      (17 

Barb.  184),  723. 

Clerc  V.  Railroad  Co.  (107  La.  370, 
31  So.  886,  90  Am.  St.  Rep. 
319),  913,  925,  1212. 

Cleveland  v.    Steamboat   Co.    (86 

N.  Y.  306),  901. 

Cleveland  v.    Steamboat   Co.    (89 

N.   Y.  627),   90L 


Ixxxvi 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


[references   ABE   TO    SECTIONS.] 


Cleveland  v.   Steamboat  Co.    (125 

N.  Y.  299),  901. 
Cleveland,   etc.,   Co.   v.   Workman 

(66    Ohio    St.    509,    54    N.    E. 

Rep.    582,    90    Am.     St.    Rep. 

602),  1392. 
Clink  V.  Radford  (1  Q.  B.   (1891) 

625),   854. 
Clinton   v.   Root    (58   Mich.   182), 

1221. 
Clive  V.  Railway  Co.  (42  La.  Ann. 

35,  7  So.  Rep.  66),  1401. 
Clotworthy    v.    Railway    Co.     (80 

Mo.  220),  1118,  1119. 
Cloud    V.    Railway    Co.     (14    Mo. 

App.   136),   1054. 
Ciough  V.  Railroad  Co.    (L.  R.   7 

Exch.   26),   672. 
Clyde  V,  Hubnard    (88  Penn.   St. 

358),  231. 
Coal,  One  hundred  and  Fifty-one 

Tons  of   (4  Blatch.  362),  871. 
Coates    V.    Express    Co.     (45    Mo. 

238),  1296. 
Coates  V.  Railton  (6  B.  &  C.  422), 

767. 
Coates  V.  Railway  Co.   (8  S.  Dak. 

173,  65  N.  W.  1068),  241. 
Coats   V.   Chaplin    (3   Q   B.   483), 

1315. 
Cobb   V.   Abbot    (14     Pick.    289), 

249,  252. 
Cobb  V.  Howard    (3  Blatch.  524), 

1109,  1166. 
Cobb  V.  Railway  Co.  (149  Mo.  609, 

50  S.  W.  894),  948. 
Cobb  V.  Railway  Co.  (L.  R.  (1894) 

App.  Cas.  419,  63  L.  J.  Q.  B. 

629,  aff'g.,  (1893)  1  Q.  B.  459, 

62  L.  J.  Q.  B.  335),  989. 
Coburn  v.  Railroad  Co.    (105  La. 

398,    29    So.    882,    83    Am.    St. 

Rep.  242),  1043. 
Coburn  v.  Railroad  Co.    (198   Pa. 
St.    436,    48    Atl.    265),    1174, 

1190. 


Cochran  v.  Dinsmore    (49    N.    Y. 

249),   1354,   1355. 
Cock    v.    Taylor    (13    East,    399), 

807,   808. 
Cockburn   v.   Alexander    (6   C.   B. 

791),  863. 
Cockle  V.  Railway   (L.  R.  7  C.  P. 

321),   1112. 
Cody   V.   Railroad  Co.    (151  Mass. 

462),    1200. 
Cody    V.    Railroad     Co.     (4     Saw. 

114),  1056. 
Coe  V.  Railroad  Co.   (25  Ky.  Law 

Rep.  1679,  78  S.  W.  439),  1123. 
In   re  Coe's  Estate   ( —  Iowa,  — , 

106  N.  W.  Rep.  742),  1402. 
Coffee  V.   Railroad   Co.    (76  Miss. 

569,    25    So.    157,    71    Am.    St. 

Rep.    535,    45   L.   R.    A.    112), 

1077,  1281. 
Coffin  V.  Railroad  (64  Barb.  379), 

652. 
Coffin  V.  Storer  (5  Mass.  252),  821. 
Coger    V.    Packet    Co.     (37    Iowa, 

145),  972. 
Coggs  V.  Bernard   (1  Sm.  L.  Cas. 

283;    2  Ld.  Raym.  909),  1,   2, 

17,    33,    34,    57,    74,    273,    315, 

344,  415,  1021,  1322. 
Coggill  V,  Railroad  (3  Gray,  545), 

785. 
Cohen    v.    Frost    (2    Duer,    335), 

109,  110,   1270,  1271. 
Cohen  v.  Hume   (1  McCord,  439), 

66,   128. 
Cohen   v.    Railway   Co.     (59    Mo. 

App.   66),   129L 
Cohn  V.   Davidson    (2   Q.   B.   Div. 

455),  497. 
Cohn  V.  Piatt  (95  N.  Y.  Supp.  535, 

48   Misc.  Rep.  378),  333. 
Cohn  V.  Railway  Co.   (181  Mo.  30, 

79  S.  W.  961),  597,  598. 
Coine  v.  Railway  Co.    (123  Iowa, 

458,  99  N.  W.  Rep.  134),  1052, 

1433. 


TABLE   OF    CASES   CITED, 


Ixxxvii 


Cole  V.  Goodwin   (19  Wend.  251), 

68,   69,   75,   233,  392,   399,  411, 

441. 
Cole  V.  Railroad  Co.   (102  Ga.  474, 

31  S.  E.  Rep.  107),  1094. 
Cole  V.  Rowen    (88  Mich.  219,  50 

N.  W.  138,   13   L.  R.   A.   848), 

945. 
Colegrove   v.   Railroad    (20   N.  Y. 

492),    917,    1198,    1236. 
Coleman  v.  Lambert   (5  M.  &  W. 

502),   807. 
Coleman  v.  Railroad  Co.   (84   Ga. 

1,    10    S.    E.    Rep.    498),    991, 

1119. 
Coleman  v.  Railway  Co.    (138   N. 

Car.  351,  50   S.  E,  Rep.  690), 

931,   1104. 
Coleman   v.   Riches    (16   Com.   B. 

104),  159. 
Coles  V.  Bulman  (6  Com.  B.  184), 

863. 
Coles  V.  Railroad  Co.  (41  111.  App. 

607),   410,  443,   1324. 
Colfax  Mt.   Fruit  Co.  v.  Railroad 

Co.  (118  Cal.  648,  46  Pac.  668; 

opinion  on  rehearing,  50  Pac. 

775),  140,   239,  246. 
Colgate  V.   Penn.   Co.    (102   N.   Y. 

120),  179,  192. 
Collard  v.  Railway   (7  Hurl.  &  N. 

79),  1366. 
Collender  v.  Dirsmore   (55  N.  Y. 

166),  167. 
Collett  V.  Railway   (16  Q.  B.  984), 

40,  1017. 
Collier   v.   Arrington's   Exr's,    (61 

N.  Car.  356),  1400. 
Collier  v.  Swinney   (16  Mo.  484). 

268. 
Collins  V.  Burns  (63  N.  Y.  1),  674. 
Collins     V.     Railroad     (10     Cush. 

506),  1249,  1274,  1275. 
Collins  V.  Railroad  Co.   (104  Ala. 

890,  16  So.  140),  708. 


[eefekences  are  to  sections.] 

Collins  V.  Railway  Co.    (80  Mich. 

390,  45  N.  W.  Rep.  178),  937. 
Collins   V.   Railway   Co.    (15   Tex. 

Civ.  App.   169,  39  S.  W.  Rep. 

643),    1017. 
Collins  V.  Railway  (11  Exch.  790), 

229,  480. 
Collins  V.   Trans.   Co.    (10  Watts, 

384),   810. 
Collins    Coal    Co.    v.    Hadley    ( — 

Ind.   App.   — ,   75   N.   E.   Rep. 

832),   1389. 
Collman  v.  Collins  (2  Hall,  569), 

865,  884. 
Colt  V.  McMechen  (6  Johns.  160), 

272. 
Colton  V.  Railroad    (67  Penn.   St. 

211),  450,  1354,  1355. 
Colvin  V.   Fargo    (94  N.  Y.   Supp. 

377),    415. 
Colyar   v.   Taylor    (1    Cold.   372), 

26. 
Comer  v.  Stewart  (97  Ga.  403,  24 

S.  E.  Rep.  845),  641. 
Comerford    v.    Railroad    Co.    (181 

Mass.    528,    63    N.    E.    936), 

1118,  1174. 
Commander-in-Chief,  The  (IWall. 

43),   75. 
Commerce,   Prop.    (1  Black,   574), 

75. 
Commercial  Bank  of  Manitoba  v. 

Railway  Co.   (160  111.  401,  43 

N.  E.   756;    aff'g  58   111.   App. 

438),   185. 
Commonwealth   v.    Chesapeake    & 

O.    Railway    Co.    (24    Ky.    L. 

R.  1887,  72  S.  W.  758),  588. 

Commonwealth    v.    Insurance    Co. 
122  Mass.  136),  783. 

Commonwealth  v.  Louisville  &  N. 

Railroad  Co.    (24  Ky.  L.  Rep. 

509,   68   S.  W.   1103),  588. 
Commonwealth  v.  Power   (7  Met. 

596),  943,  977. 


Ixxxviii 


TABLE   Of    CASES   CITED. 


[BEFEBENCES    ABE 

Commonwealth    v.   Railroad    (108 

Mass.  1),  450,  1020,  1022. 
Commonwealth    v.    Railroad    Co. 

(107  Mass.  236),  1386. 
Compania      de      Navigacion      La 

Flecha  v.   Brauer    (168  U.   S. 

104,   18   Sup.   Ct.  R.   12,  42   L. 

Ed.  398,  aff'g,  Brauer  v.  Com- 
pania     de      Navigacion      La 

Flecha,  66  Fed.  777,  35  U.  S. 

App.    44    and    The    Hugo,    57 

Fed.  403),  215,  452,  464,  485. 
Campania  Naviera  Vascongada  v. 

Churchill  &  Sim   (75  L.  J.  K. 

B.  94),  160. 
Compton   V.   Snaw    (1  Hun,   441), 

880. 
Conant   v.    Griffin    (48     111.     410), 

1397,    1400. 
Condict    V.    Railway     (54    N.    Y. 

500),   153,   231,   232,    240,   279, 

304,    496. 
Condict  V.  Railway   (4  Lans.  106), 

226. 
Condon  v.  Railroad  Co.   (55  Mich. 

218),   131,   135. 
Condran  v.  Railroad  Co.   (67  Fed. 

522,  14  C.  C.  A.   506,  32  U.  S. 

App.    182,    28    L.    R.    A.    749), 

1001. 
Cone  V.  Railroad  Co.    (62  N.  J.  L. 

99,    40   Atl.   780),   1422. 
Congar  v.  Railroad  (17  Wis.  485), 

188,   1315. 
Congar  v.  Railroad   Co.    (24  Wis. 

157),  333,  677. 
Conger  v.  Railroad   (6  Duer,  375), 

339,  654,  1366. 
Conkey  v.  Railway  (31  Wis.  619), 

134. 
Conkling  v.  Brooklyn  Lumber  Co. 

(41  N.  Y.  Supp.  SOI,  10  App. 

Div.   404),    853. 
Conley    v.    Railway    Co.    (95    Me. 

149,   49   Atl.   Rep.   668),   1401. 


TO   SECTIONS.] 

Conley  v.  Railway  Co.  (32  Ont. 
R.  258;  aff'd,  1  Ont.  L.  R. 
345),    678. 

Conn  V.  Railroad  Co.    (21  Ky.  L. 

Rep.  469,  51  S.  W.  617),  574. 
Connell    v.    Putnam     (58    N.    H. 

534),   1378. 

Connell  v.  Railroad  Co.   (Miss.,  7 

S.  W.  Rep.   344),   964. 
Connell's  Exr's  v.  Railway  Co.  (93 

Va.  44,  24  S.  E.  Rep.  467,  32 

L.  R.  A.  792,  57  Am.  St.  Rep. 

786),   980. 
Connelly  v.  Boston  (117  Mass.  64), 

1233. 
Conners  v.  Railroad  Co.  (71  Iowa 

490,    60    Am.    St.    Rep.    814), 

1384. 
Conners  v.  Railway  Co.   (71  Iowa, 

490),   1389. 
Connolly    v.     Railroad    Co.     (158 

Mass.   8,  32  N.  E.  937),  1219. 
Connolly    v.    Warren    (106    Mass. 

146),  1249,  1255, 
Conolly   V.   Railroad   Co.    (41   La. 

Ann.  57,  17  L.  R.  A.  389),  992. 
Connor  v.  Railroad  Co.  (66  N.  H. 

424,  30  Atl.  1121),  935. 
Conover  v.   Express   Co.    (40   Mo. 

App.  31),  426. 
Conrad  Schoop  Fruit  Co.  v.  Rail- 
road Co.    ( —  Mo.  App.  — ,  91 

S.  W.  Rep.  402),  668. 
Conroy   v.   Railway   Co.    (96   Wis. 

243,  70  N.  W.  486,  38  L.  R.  A. 

419),    1208. 
Consolidated  Stone  Co.  v.  Staggs, 

(164  Ind.   331,  73   N.  E.  Rep. 

695),   1397. 

Constable  v.  National  Steamship 
Co.  (154  U.  S.  51,  14  Sup.  Ct. 
R.  1062,  38  L.  Ed.  903),  344, 
420,   697. 


TABLE   OF    CASES -CITED. 


Ixxxix 


[BEFEEENCES   ABE 

Continental    Coal    Co.    v.    Bowne 

(115    Fed.    945,    53    C.    C.    A. 

427),   833. 
Contra  Costa  Railroad  v.  Moss  (23 

Cal.  324),  76. 
Converse  v.  Railroad   Co.    (58   N. 

H.  521),  678. 
Converse  v.  Trans.  Co.    (33  Conn. 

166),   115,   137,   242,   256. 
Converse    Bridge    Co.    v.    Collins 

119    Ala.    534,    24    So.    561), 

867. 
Convoy's   Wheat    (3    Wall.    255), 

132. 
Conway   v.  Railroad  Co.    (51   La. 

Ann.  146,  24  So.  780),  1219. 
Con  well    V.    Voorhees     (13     Ohio, 

523),  94. 
Cook  v.  Gourdin    (2  Nott  &  McC. 

19),  66,  128. 
Cook  v.  Gunpowder  Co.    (70  N.  J. 

L.  65,  56  Atl.  Rep.  114),  1401. 
Cook  v.  Jennings    (7  T.  R.  381), 

815. 
Cook  V.  Navigation  Co.    (76  Tex. 

353),  1020. 
Cook   V.    Railroad    Co.    (65    Hun, 

619,  19  N.  Y.  Supp.  648),  1111. 
Cook   v.    Railroad    Co.     (60     Cal. 

604),  1397,  1401. 
Cook  v.  Railway  Co.   (128  N.  Car. 

333,  38  S.  E.  925),  990. 
Cook    V.    Railway    Co.    (81    Iowa, 

551,   46   N.   W.   Rep.   1080,    25 

Am.  St.  Rep.  512,  9  L.  R.  A. 

764),    521. 
In   re  Cook's  Estate     (126    Iowa, 

158,    101    N.    W.    Rep.     747), 

1397. 
Cooke    v.    Railroad    Co.    (57    Mo. 

App.    471),    113,    114,    510. 
Cooke   V.    Waring    (2    Hurl.   &   C. 

332),  1412. 
Cooley  V.  Railroad  Co.    (81  N.  Y. 

Supp.     692,     40     Misc.     239), 

1426. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Cooley  V.  Railway  Co.    (53  Minn. 

327,  55  N.  W.  141,  39  Am.  St. 

Rep.  609),   748,  872. 
Coolidge  V.  City  of  New  York  (90 

N.  Y.  Supp.  1078,  99  App.  Div. 

175),   1401. 
Coombs  V.  Railway  (3  Hurl.  &  N. 

510),  1319. 
Coombs  V.  The  Queen  (26  S.  C.  R. 

(Can.)    13   aff'g   4   Ex.   C.   R. 

321),  1041. 
Cooney  v.  Pullman  Palace  Car  Co. 

(121  Ala.  368,  25  So.  712,  53 

L.  R.  A  690),  1131,  1132,  1363. 
Cooper  V.  Electric  Co.  (63  N.  J.  L. 

558,  44  Atl.  663),  1399. 
Cooper   V.   Railroad   Co.    (6   Hun, 

276),  1222. 
Cooper  y.  Railroad   Co.    (110   Ga. 

659,  36  S.   E.  Rep.  240),  334, 

336,    339,    392,    401,    450,    451, 

1357. 
Cooper  V.  Railroad  Co.  ( —  N.  Car. 

— ,  52  S.   E.  Rep.   932),   1397. 
Cooper  V.  Railway  Co.    (66  Mich. 

271),  1397. 
Cooper  V.  Railway  Co.  (61  S.  Car. 

345,  39  S.  E.  543),  1412. 
Cooper  V.  Railway   Co.    (L.   R.   4 

Exch.  Div.  88),  1036. 
Cooper  v.  Railway    Co.    (92    Ala. 

329,  25  Am.  St.  Rep.  59),  1352. 
Cooper    V.    Young    (22    Ga.    269), 

1369. 
Cope  V.  Cordova   (1  Rawle,  203), 

687. 
Copeland    v.    Draper    (157    Mass. 

558,  32  N.  E.  Rep.  944,  34  Am. 

St.  Rep.  314,  19  L.  R.  A.  283), 

96. 
Copeland  v.  Seattle  (33  Wash.  415, 

74  Pac.  Rep.  582,  65  L.  R.  A. 

333),  1389. 
Copper  Co.  v.  Copper  Mining  Co. 

(33  Vt.  92),  1367. 


xc 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


[REFEBENCES   ABE 

Copper  Co.   v.   Insurance  Co.    (22 

Pick.   108),  603. 
Coppin  V.   Braithwaite    (8   Jurist, 

875),  975,   1084,  1433. 
Coppock  V.  Railroad  Co.   (89  Hun, 

186,    34    N.    Y.     Supp.     1039). 

1003. 
Copson  V.  Railroad  Co.  (171  Mass. 

233,  50  N.  E.  613),  1397,  1414, 

1418. 
Corbett  v.  Packington   (6  B.  &  C. 

268),  1328. 
Corbett  v.  Railroad  Co.   (25  Utah, 

449,  71  Pac.  Rep.  1065),  1397, 

1398. 
Corcoran    v.    Railroad     Co.     (133 

Mass.  507),  1418. 
Cordell  v.  Railroad  Co.   (75  N.  Y. 

330),  1391. 
Corey    v.    Bath    (35    N.    H.    530), 

1233. 
Cork   Distill.   Co.   v.   Railway   Co. 

(L.  R.  7  H.  L.  Cas.  269),  810. 
Corliss  V.  Railroad  Co.   (63  N.  H. 

404),    1384. 
Cormier    v.    Railroad   Co.    (36    N. 

B.  Canada,  10),  927. 
Cornman  v.  Railway   (4   H.  &  N. 

781),   940. 
Corporation    Commission    v.    Sea- 
board   Air-Line    System    (127 

N.  C.  283,  37   S.  E.  266),  574. 

Corrigan  v.  Iroquois  Furnace  Co. 

(100    Fed.    870,    41    C.    C.    A. 

102),   842. 
Corsar   v.   Spreckles   &   Bros.   Co. 
(141  Fed.  260,  —  C.  C.  A.  — , 

modifying     The     Musselcrag, 

125  Fed.  786),  352,  383. 
Corso   V.   Railroad    Co.     (48    La. 

Ann.  1286,  20  So.  752),  1365. 
Cory   V.    Ironworks  Co.    (L.   R.    3 

Q.  B.  181),  1369,  1370. 
Cosgrove   v.    City   Council   of   Au- 
gusta   (103   Ga.   865,   31   S.   E. 

445,  42  L.  R.  A.  711),  944. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Cosgrove  v,  Ogden  (49  N.  Y.  255), 

1228. 
Costello    V.    Laths    (44    Fed.    Rep. 

105),    869. 
Costello  V.  Railroad  (65  Barb.  92), 

952. 
Costigan     v.     Transportation     Co. 

(33  Mo.  App.   269),  483. 
Costikyan  v.  Railroad  Co.   (12  N. 

Y.  Suppl.  683),  1193. 
Cotaut  V.  Railway  Co.   (125  Iowa, 

46,  99   N.  W.  Rep.  115,  69  L. 

R.  A.  982),  938. 
Cotchett  V.  Railway   Co.    (84  Ga. 

687),  1192. 
Cote  V.   Railroad   Co.    (182   Mass. 

290,  65  N.  E.  400,  94  Am.   St. 

Rep.  656),  1348. 
Cotting    V.     Kansas     City     Stock 

Yards  Co.   (82  Fed.  839),  524. 
Cottrell    V.    Railway    Co.    (—    N. 

Car.  — ,   54    S.   E.   Rep.   288), 

800,  805. 
Cotton   V.   Wood    (8   Com.   B.    (N. 

S.)    568),   1412. 
Coulter  V.  Express  Co.    (56  N.  Y. 

585),    1223. 
Coulthurst  V.   Sweet   (L.   R.   1  C. 

P.    649),    812. 
Countryman  v.  Railroad  Co.   (166 

N.  Y.   201,  59  N.  E.  Rep.  S22, 

82  Am.  St.  Rep.  640),  1397. 
Coup  V.  Railroad    (56  Mich.  Ill), 

60,   88. 
Coupland     v.     Railroad     Co.     (61 

Conn.   531,  23  Atl.  870,  15  L. 

R.  A.  534),  419,  426,  497,  508, 

639. 
Coursey   v.   Railway   Co.   113   Ga. 

297,   38    S.    E.   866),   1179. 
Courteen    v.     Kanawha    Dispatch 

(110  Wis.  610,  86  N.  W.  176, 

55  L.  R.  A.  182),  424,  450. 
Cousins  V.  Railway  Co.  (96  Mich. 

386,  56  N.  W.  14),  1180. 


TABLE  OF   CASES   CITED. 


XCl 


[befebences  aee 

Covell    V.    Hitchcock     (23    Wend. 

611),   194,   754. 
Covin  V.  Hill   (4  Denio,  323),  785. 
Covington   Stock   Yards   v.   Keith 

(139  U.  S.  128),  510,  556,  715. 
Covington  Trans.  Co.  v.  Kelly  (36 

Ohio  St.  86),  1236. 
Cowan  V.  Bond  (39  Fed.  54),  538. 
Coward  v.  Railroad  Co,    (16  Lea, 

225),   450,   1293. 
Cowden  v.  Pacific  Coast  S.  S.  Co. 

(94   Cal.  470,  29  Pac.  873,   18 

L.  R.  A.  221,  28  Am.  St.  Rep. 

142),   521. 
Cowen  v.  Ray    (108  Fed.   320,   47 

C.  C.  A.  352),  1393. 
Cowen  v.   Winters    (96   Fed.   929, 

37  C.  C.  A.  628,  aff'g  Winters 

V.  Cowen,  90  Fed.  99),  1063. 
Cowley    V.    Davidson     (13     Minn. 

92),   1370. 
Cox  V.  Bruce  (L.  R.  18  Q.  B.  Div. 

147),   159,    166. 
Cox  V.   Burns    (1  Iowa,   64),   772. 
Cox    V.    Peterson    (30    Ala.    608), 

280. 
Cox   V.   Railroad   Co.    (170    Mass. 

129,   49    N.    B.    97),    401,    408, 

442,  443,  447,  450,  456. 
Cox  V.  Railway  (91  Ala.  392,  8  So. 

Rep.  824),  1334. 
Cox  V.  Railway  Co.  (109  Cal.  100, 

41  Pac.  794),  1027. 
Cox  V.  Vanderkleed  (21  Ind.  164), 

1422. 
Coxon  V.  Railway    (5  Hurl.  &  N. 

274),   229,  472. 
Coyle  V.  Railway  Co.  (112  Ga.  121 

37  S.  E.  Rep.  163),  1033,  1056. 
Crafter  v.  Railway  (L.  R.  1  C.  P. 

300),   940. 
Cragin  v.   Railroad    (51   N.   Y.   61 

334,  336,  339,  341,  638. 
Craig    V.    Childress    (Peck,    270), 

52. 


TO   SECTIONS.] 

Craig  V.  Continental  Ins.  Co.  (141 

U.   S.   645),  344. 
Craighead    v.    Railroad    Co.     (123 
N.  Y.  391,  25  N.  E.  Rep.  387), 
900. 
Craker  v.  Railway   (36  Wis.  657), 

972,  1101,  1404,  1441,  1444. 
Cramblet  v.  Railway  Co.    (82  111. 

App.  542),  1414. 
Crandall    v.    Railway     ( —  Minn. 
— ,  105  N.  W.  Rep.  185),  927. 
Cranston    v.    Marshall     (5    Exch. 

395),  1166. 
Cranwell  v.   Ship  Fanny  Fosdick 

(15  La.  Ann.  436),  606. 
Crapo  V.  City  of  Syracuse  (N.  Y., 

76   N.  E.  Rep,  465,  reversing 

90   N.   Y.   Supp.   553,  98   App. 

Div.  376),  1396. 
Crary  v.  Railroad  Co.  (203  Pa.  St. 

525,  53  Atl.  363,  59  L.  R.  A. 

815,    93    Am.    St.    Rep.    778), 

1053,   1069,  1415,   1416. 
Crater    v.    Binninger     (4    Vroom, 

513),  1367. 
Cravens  v.  Rodgers  (101  Mo.  247), 

945. 
Crawford  v.    Clark    (15    111.    561), 

689,  696. 
Crawford    v.   Railroad    (51    Miss. 

222),  23L 
Crawford  v.  Railroad  Co.  (26  Ohio 

St.    580),    1036. 
Crawford   v.   Williams    (1    Sneed, 

205),  815,  823. 
Crawleigh  v.  Railway  Co.  (28  Tex. 

Civ.  App.  260,  67  S.  W.  140), 

990. 
Crawshay    v.    Homfray    (4    B.    & 

Aid.  50),  877. 
Cready  v.  Railroad  Co.   (64  N.  Y. 

Supp.  996,  51    App.  Div.  338). 

1423. 
Creamer   v.   Moran   Bros.  Co.    ( — 

Wash.  — ,   84  Pac.  Rep.   592), 

1397,  140L 


xcu 


TABLE  OF    CASES  CITED. 


[BEFEEENCES    ABE 

Creech  v.  Railway  Co.  (66  S.  Car. 

528;   45  S.  E.  Rep.  86),  1005, 

1181,  1182. 
Creed  v.  Railroad   Co.    (86  Penn. 

St.  139),  1200. 
Creery   v.   Holly    (14   Wend.   26), 

169,  604. 
Creighton  v.  Dilks   (49  Fed.  107), 

843. 
Cresson  v.  Railroad  Co.  (11  Phila. 

597),  1036. 
Crine  v.  Railway  Co.   (84  Ga.  651, 

11  S.  E.  Rep.  555),  1217. 
Crissey  v.  Railway   (75  Penn.  St. 

83),    995,    1229. 
Crocker    v.    Railroad     (24    Conn. 

249),  1031,  1033,  1099. 
Croft  V.  Railroad   (1  MacA.  492), 

261. 
Croft  V.  Steamship  Co.  (20  Wash. 

175,  55  Pac.   42),  913,   942. 
Crofts    V.    Waterhouse     (3    Bing. 

319;   11  Moore,  133),  892,  893, 

958. 
Crommelin  v.  Railroad    (4   Keyes 

(N.    Y.),   90),    862. 
Cronk  v.  Railroad  Co.   (123  Iowa, 

349,  98  N.  W.  884),  1414. 
Cronkite  v.  Wells  (32  N.  Y.  247), 

111,  121,  147. 
Crooks    V.    The    -Dunbritton      (61 

Fed.  764;   reversed.  The  Dun- 
britton, 73  Fed.  352,  19  C.  C. 

A.    449,    38    U.    S.    App.    369), 

355,   488. 
Crooks  V.  The  Fanny  Skolfleld  (65 

Fea.   814),  354,   604. 
Croom  V.  Railway  Co.    (52  Minn. 

296,    53    N.   W.    1128,    38    Am. 

St.  Rep.  557,  18  L.  R.  A.  602), 

992. 
Crosby   v.   Fitch    (12   Conn.  410), 

75,  273,  294,  301,  613,  655,  656. 
Crosby   v.    Railroad    Co.    (69   Me. 

418),  1052. 


TO   SECTIONS.] 

Crosby  v.  Railroad  Co.   (9  Det.  L. 

N.  310,   131  Mich.  288,   91  N. 

W.  124),  574. 
Cross  V.  O'Donnell  (44  N.  Y.  661), 

194. 
Cross   V.   Railway   Co.    (69   Mich. 

363,  37  N.  W.  Rep.  361,  13  Am. 

St.  Rep.  399),  937. 
Cross  V.  Railway  Co.  (56  Mo.  App. 

664),   964,   1033. 
Crossan  v.  Railway  Co.  (149  Mass. 

196,   21   N.   E.   367),   867,   885. 
Crossman    v,    Burrill    (179   U.    S. 

100,   45   L.    Ed.    106,    21    Sup. 

Ct.  R.  38,  reversing  Burrill  v. 

Crossman,  91  Fed.   543,  33  C. 

C.   A.   663   and  65   Fed.   104), 

833,  853,  854. 
Crouch  V.  Railroad  Co.   (21  S.  C. 

495),  1417. 
Crouch   V.   Railroad   Co.    (42   Mo. 

App.  248),  230,  462,  1348. 
Crouch  V.  Railway  (7  Exch.  705), 

795. 
Crouch  V.  Railway  (11  Exch.  742), 

1370,  1371. 
Crouch   V.    Railway    (14    Com.    B. 

255),    57,   329,   795. 
Crouch  V.  Railway   (2  Hurl.  &  N. 

491;  3  id.  183),  229. 
Crouch  V.  Railway  (2  Car.  &  Kir. 

789),  406. 
Crow  V.  Falk   (8  Q.  B.  Div.  467), 

497. 
Crow  V.  Railroad  Co.  (57  Mo.  App. 

135),   426,   1357. 
Crowe   V.    The   Railroad    ( — Mich. 

— ,   106  N.  W.  Rep.   395),  911, 

933,  941. 
Crowell  V.  Union  Oil  Co.  (107  Fed. 

302,    46    C.    C.    A.    296),    449, 

1355. 
Crowley    v.    Cohen    (3    B.    &    Ad. 

478),   783. 
Crozier  V.  Steamboat  Co.  (43  How. 

Pr.    466),    1271. 


TABLE  OF    CASES  CITED. 


xcm 


[befebences  are  to  sections.] 


Crumpley  v.  Railway  Co.  (98  Mo. 

36),  1386. 
Crutcher  v.  Railroad  Co.  ( —  Ark. 
— ,  85  S.  W.  Rep.  770),  1369. 
Cuba,    The    (3   Ware,    260),     800, 

802. 
Cuddy   V.    Horn    (46   Mich.    596^ 

917,  1236. 
CufE    V.    Tons    of    Coal    (46    Fed. 

670),  869. 
Culberson  v.  Railway  Co.   (50  Mo. 

App.   556),    1119. 
Cullar    V.    Railway    Co.    (84    Mo. 

App.   340),  1118,   1379. 
Cumberland    Telephone    &     Tele- 
graph Co.  V.  Railroad  Co.  (50 
La.  Ann.  29,  24  So.  803),  512. 
Cuming  v.  Railroad   Co.    (109   N. 

Y.  95),  1378. 
Cunningham  v.  Railroad  Co.    (64 
N.  Y.  Supp.  350,  31  Misc.  471, 
reversing  60  N.  Y.  Supp.  990), 
1118. 
Cunningham  v.   Railroad  Co.    (79 

Mo.  App.  524),  285. 
Curl    V.   Railway    Co.     (63    Iowa, 

417),   1443. 
Curley    v.    Railroad    Ck).    (40    La. 
Ann.    810,    6    So.    Rep.    103), 
1389. 
Curling  v.  Long   (1  B.  &  P.  634), 

865. 
Curtis  V.  Railroad  (18  N.  Y.  534), 

909,  1223,  1412,  1414,  1422. 
Curtis  V.  Railroad  (20  Barb.  282), 

904,  949. 
Curtis  V.  Railroad  (49  Barb.  148), 

1286. 
Curtis  V.  Railway   Co.    (87   Iowa, 

622,  54   N.  W.  339),  1427. 
Curtis  V.  Railway   (74  N.  Y.  116), 
203,     1242,     1243,    1246,    1253, 
1276. 
Cutler  V.  Railroad  Co.    (69   N.  H. 
641,  46  Atl.  1051),  978. 


Cutler  V.   Railway  Co.    (19   Q.  B. 

Div.  64),  1280. 
Cutting  V.  Railway  &  Navigation 

Co.   (46  Fed.  641),  526,  576. 
Cutting    V.    Railway      (13     Allen, 

381),  1362,  1366. 
Cutts   V.    Brainerd    (42   Vt.   566), 

246. 


Da   Costa  v.   Edmonds    (4   Camp. 

141),   604,  605. 
Dagnall  v.  Railway  Co.  (69  S.  Car. 

110,  48  S.  E.  Rep.  97),  1043. 
Dailey  v.  Railway  Co.    (57  N.  Y. 

Supp.  485,  26  Misc.  Rep.  539), 

1396. 
Dakin  v.  Oxley    (15  Com.  B.    (N. 

S.)   646),  799,  803. 
Dale  V.  Hall  (1  Wil.  281),  53,  1323. 
Dale    V.    Railroad    Co.     (57     Kan. 

601,  47   Pac.   521),  1388. 
Daley  v.  Railroad  (26  Conn.  591), 

1227,   1229. 
Daley   v.   Railroad   Co.    (80   Hun, 

174,    29    N.    Y.    Supp.    1011), 

1111. 
Dalston  v.   Janson    (1  Ld.  Raym. 

58),  1344. 
Dalton   V.   Railway   Co.    (4   C.   B. 

296),  1397. 
Dalton's    Adm'r    v.    Railroad    Co. 

(22   Ky.    Law  Rep.   97.   56    S. 

W.  Rep.  657),  990. 
Daly   V.    Railroad   Co.    (49    N.   Y. 

Supp.  901,  26  App.  Div.  200), 

1118. 
Damont  v.  Railroad    (9  La.  Ann. 

441),  1180. 


XCIV 


TABL.E   OF    CASES    CITED. 


[REFERENCES    ARE 

Dangerfield    v.    Railway    Co.    (62 

Kan.    85,   61    Pac.    405),    1054, 

1056. 
Daniel  v.  Giles    (—  Tenn.  — .  66 

S.  W.  Rep.   1128),  1434. 
Daniel    v.    Railroad    Co.    (117    N. 

Car.  592,  23   S.  E.  Rep.  327), 

980,  1099. 
Daniel  v.  The  Railway    (L.   R.   5 

H.  L.  45),  916. 
Baniels  v.  Ballantine  (23  Ohio  St. 

532),  300,  1430. 
Daniels   v.   Clegg    (28   Mich.   32), 

1227. 
Daniels    v.    Railroad     Co.    (62    S. 

Car.  1,  39  S.  E.  762),  1054. 
Dantzler  Lumber  Co,  v.  Churchill 

(136    Fed.    560,    —    C.    C.    A. 

— ),   848. 
Danville  Turnpike  Co.  v.  Stewart 

(2  Mete.    (Ky.)    119),   1236. 
Dargan  v.  Car  Co.   (2  Wils.  607), 

1130. 
Darling    v.    Railroad     (11     Allen, 

295),   231,   233,   261. 
Darlington    v.    Railway    Co.     (99 

Mo.    App.    1,    72    S.    W.    Rep. 

122),  859,  860,   862. 
Dart   V.    Ensign    (47    N.   Y.    619), 

809. 
Daube   &   Knapp   v.    Railway   Co. 

(—  Tex.   Civ.  App.  — ,   86  S. 

W.  Rep.  797),  1369. 
Daubert  v.  Western  Meat  Co.  (139 

Cal.  480,  73  Pac.  244,  96  Am. 

St.  Rep.  154),  1020,  1395. 

Davenport   v.   Railroad    Co.    (173 
Pa.  St.  398,  34  Atl.  59),  505. 

David    V.    Railroad    Co.    (41    Ga. 

233),  1423. 
Davidow  v.  Railroad  Co.   (85  Fed. 

943),  1388. 
Davidson  v.   Graham    (2  Ohio  St. 

131),    44,    401,    410,   450,   1352. 


TO   SECTIONS.] 

Davidson  v.  Hill   (2  K.  B.  (1901) 

606,  70  L.  J.  K.  B.  788),  1389, 

1395. 
Davidson-Benedict  Co.  v.  Severson 

(109  Tenn.  572,  72  S.  W.  Rep. 

967),  1397. 
Davies  v.  Steamboat  Co.    (94  Me. 

379,   47  Atl.   896,   53   L.  R.   A. 

239),  960,   1167. 
Davis    V.    Bradley    (28    Vt.    118). 

175. 
Davis  V.  Button   (78  Cal.  247),  76. 
Davis    V.    Garrett    (6    Bing.    716), 

295,    301,    319,    320,    613,    651, 

656. 
Davis   V.    Graham    (2    Ohio    St.), 

1354. 
Davis   V.    Jacksonville    Southeast- 
ern  Line    (126   Mo.   69,   28   S. 

W.  965),  246,  1344,  1352. 
Davis   v.    James    (5   Burr.    2G80), 

810,   1310,   1315,  1316. 
Davis  &  Jordan  v.  James  (5  Burr. 

2680),  1310. 
Davis  V.  Pattison   (24  N.  Y.  317), 

807. 
Davis   V.    Railroad   Co.    (45    Fed. 

Rep.  543),  997. 
Davis  v.  Railroad  Co.    (1  Disney, 

23),  1366. 
Davis    V.    Railroad    Co.    (107    Ga. 

420,  33  S.  E.  Rep.  437),  1056. 
Davis   V.    Railroad    (22    111.    278), 

1246,  1301. 
Davis  V.  Railroad  Co.   (121  Mass. 

134),  918. 
Davis  V.  Railroad  Co.   (143  Mass. 

301),  1388. 
Davis    V.    Railroad    Co.     (89    Mo. 

340),   271,  287,  1355. 
Davis  V.   Railroad    (53   Mo.   317), 

1113. 
Davis   V.   Railroad    (10   How.   Pr. 

330),  1246,   1253. 
Davis   V.    Railroad    Co.    (64   Hun, 

492,  19  N.  Y.  Supp.  516),  1122. 


TABLE   OF    CASES   CITED. 


XCV 


[references   ABE   TO    SECTIONS.] 


Davis  V.  Railroad  Co.  (136  N.  Car. 

115,  48  S.  E.  Rep.  591),  1389, 

1392. 
Davis    V.    Railroad    Co.    (25    Tex. 

Civ.    App.    8,    59    S.    W.    844), 

1016. 
Davis  V.  Railroad  Co.  (66  Vt.  290, 

29  Atl.  313,  44  Am.   St.  Rep. 

852),  158,  167,  306,  401,  408. 
Davis    V.    Railway    Co.    (53    Ark. 

117,  13  S.  W.  Rep.  801),  1386, 

1389. 
Davis  V.  Railway  Co.  ( —  Ark.  — , 

86  S.  W.  Rep.  995),  1123. 
Davis   V.   Railway   Co.    (83   Iowa, 

744,  49  N.  W.  77),  207. 
Davis  V.  Railway  Co.   ( —  Ky.  L. 

R.    — ,    92    S.   W.    Rep.    339), 

205,   1018. 
Davis  V.   Railway  Co.    (70  Minn. 

37,  72   N.  W.  823),  430,   1362. 
Davis  V.  Railway  Co.  (132  N.  Car. 

291,  43  S.  E.  840),  991. 
Davis  V.  Railway  Co.  (29  Tex.  Civ. 

App.  42,  68  S.  W.  733),  934. 
Davis   V.    Railway    Co.    ( —    Te\. 

Civ.   App.  — ,    93    S.   W.  Rep. 

222),  1414. 
Davis    V.    Railway    Co.    (93    Wis. 

470,  67  N.  W.  16,  1132,  57  Am. 

St.  Rep.  935,  33  L.  R.  A.  654), 

209,   212,    222,   947,    949,   1003, 

1072,    1073,    1430. 
Davis  V.    The   Railway    (18   Wis. 

175),  1180. 
Davis    V.    Somerville    (128    Mass, 

594),  1233. 
Davis  V.  Taft  Vale  R.  Co.   (64  L. 

J.  Q.  B.    (N.   S.)    488),   522. 
Davis  V.  Transportation  Co.    (106 

Mo.  App.  487,   81   S.  W.  Rep. 

226),  131. 
Davison  v.  City  Bank    (57  N.   Y. 

81),  807,  810,  811. 
Dawes  v.  Peck  (8  T.  R.  330),  194, 

810,   1307,   1315. 


Dawley  v.  Wagner  Palace  Car  Co. 

(169     Mass.     315,     47     N.     E. 

1024),  1130,  1133. 
Dawson  v.  Burrus    (73  Ala.   Ill), 

233. 
Dawson  v.  Railroad  Co.  (156  Mass. 

127,  30  N.  E.  466),  1111. 
Dawson  v.   Railroad  Co.    (76   Mo. 

514),  442,  641. 
Dawson  v.  Railway  (7  Hurl.  &  N. 

1037),   1414. 
Day  v.  Owen    (5  Mich.  520),  972. 
Day  V.  Railroad  Co.   (96  Me.  207, 

52  Atl.  771,   90   Am.   St.  Rep. 

335),  1418. 
Dayton  v.   Parke    (142  N.  Y.   391, 

37    N.    E.    642,    reversing    67 

Hun,  137,  22  N.  Y.  Supp.  613), 

853. 
Dealey  v.  Mullen  (149  Mass.  432), 

1228. 
Dean  v.  Driggs  (137  N.  Y.  274,  33 

N.    E.    326,    33    Am.    St.    Rep. 

721,  reversing  18  N.  Y.  Supp. 

67),  162. 
Dean  v.  Furness  (9  Rap.  Jud.  Que. 

B.  R.  81),  408,  799. 
Dean  v.  King   (22  Ohio   St.   118), 

158. 
Dean   v.   Vaccaro    (2    Head,    488), 

688,  1360. 
De  Bary,  etc.  Line  v.  Railway  (40 

Fed.  Rep.  392),  1334. 
Debbins     v.     Railroad     Co.      (154 

Mass.  402,  28  N.  E.  274),  1219. 
Debevoise  v.  Railroad  Co.    (98  N. 

Y.   377),   1387. 
Decan   v.    Shipper    (35    Penn.    St. 

239),  175. 
Decatur  Car  Wheel  Co.  v.  Mahaf- 

fey  (128  Ala.  242,  29  So.  Rep. 

646),  1397. 
Decker   v.    Railroad    Co.    (3    Okl. 

553,  41  Pac.  610),  1077. 
De  Colange  v.  The  Margaux    (37 

Fed.  Rep.  157),  1166. 


XCVl 


TABLE   OP    CASES    CITED. 


[references  are 

Decuir  v.  Benson  (27  La.  Ann.  1), 

972. 
De  Felice  v.  Compagnie  Prancaise 

de  Navigation  (82  N.  Y.  Supp. 

552,  83  App.  Div.  73),  1271. 
De    Forest    v.    Leete    (16    Johns. 

122),  1367. 
Defrier  v.  The  Nicaragua  (81  Fed. 

745),  1156,  1158,  1268. 
De   Garcia  v.   Railway  Co.    (Tex. 

Civ.  App.,  90  S.  W.  Rep.  670; 

S.  C.  11  S.  W.  Rep.  275),  1389. 
Degge  V.  Express  Co.  (64  Mo.  App. 

102),  1352. 
De  Grau  v.  Wilson   (17  Fed.  Rep. 

698),  694. 
De  Harn  v.  Railroad  Co.  (86  Tex. 

68,  23  S.  W.  Rep.  381),  1388. 
De  Kay  v.  Railway  Co.   (41  Minn. 

178,    16    Am.    St.    Rep.    687), 

1219. 
Delahanty  v.  Railway  Co.   (7  Ont. 

L.  R.  690),  1083. 
Delamatyr   v.   Railroad    (24   Wis. 

578),  911. 
Delano  v.  Insurance  Co.  (10  Mass. 

354),  1430. 
Delatour  v.  Mackey  (139  Cal.  621, 

73  Pac.  Rep.  454),  1389. 
De  Laurans  v.  Railroad  (15  Minn. 

49),   1033. 
De  La  Vergne  &  Co.  v.  McLeroth 

(60  111.  App.  529),  997. 
De  Leon  v.  McKernan   (54  N.  Y. 

Supp.     167,     25     Misc.     182), 

1369. 
Delta  Bag  Co.  v.  Kearns  (112  111. 

App.  269),  186,  757,  762. 
De  Lucas  v.  Railroad  Co.   (38  La. 

Ann.   930),  1055. 
Del   Valle   v.    Steamer   Richmond 

(27  La.  Ann.  90),  1246,  1269. 
Demilly  v.  Railroad  Co.    (91  Tex. 

215,  42  S.  W.  Rep.  548),  1043. 


TO    SECTIONS.! 

Demilly  v.  Railway  Co.    (17  Tex. 

Civ.  App.  617,  43  S.  W.  901), 

1056. 
Doming     v.      Merchants'     Cotton 

Press  &  Storage  Co.  (90  Tenn. 

306,  17  S.  W.  89,  13  L.  R.  A. 

518),  404,  464. 
Doming  v.  Railroad  Co.   (48  N.  H. 

455),  462,  625,  630,  1350,  1366, 

1367. 
Deming  v.  Railroad  Co.   (21  Fed. 

Rep.  25),  259. 
Deming  v.   Railway   Co.    (80  Mo. 

App.  152),  1127. 
Demott   V.    Laraway     (14     Wend. 

225),  65,  75. 
Dene    Shipping    Co.    v.    Tweedie 

Trading  Co.    (—  C.  C.  A.  — , 

143    Fed.    354,    affirming    133 

Fed.  589),  366. 
Deni  v.  Railroad  Co.   (181  Pa.  St. 

525,  59   Am.  St.  Rep.  676,  37 

Atl.  558),  1389,  1395. 
Denman  v.  Railroad  Co.   (52  Neb. 

140,  71  N.  W.  967),  651,  1324. 
Dennick  v.  Railroad  Co.    (103  U. 

S.  11),  1388,  1389,  1390. 
Dennis   v.    Clark    (2   Cush.    347), 

1377,  1378. 
Dennis  v.  Railroad  Co.  (70  S.  Car. 

254,    49    S.    E.    Rep.    869,    106 

Am.  St.  Rep.  746),  1396. 
Dennis  v.   Railroad   Co.    (165  Pa. 

St.     624,     31    Atl.     52),     1094, 

1198,   1412. 
Denny  v.  Manhattan  Co.  (2  Denio, 

115),  657. 
Denny  v.  Railroad  Co.    (13  Gray, 

481),   282,   299,   302,   303,   309, 

651. 
Denny    v.    Railroad    Co.    (132    N. 

Car.  340,  43  S.  E.  847),  1197. 
Densmore  Commission  Co.  v.  Rail- 
way Co.    (101  Wis.  563,  77  N. 

W.  904),  450,  508,  1348. 


TABLE  OP   CASES   CITED. 


XCVU 


[befebences  are  to  sections.] 


Dent  V.  Chiles  (5  Stew.  &  P.  383), 

668. 
Denton    v.    Railway    (5    El.    &    B. 

860),   962,   1106. 
Depp  V.  Railroad  Co.    (12  Ky.  L. 

R.   366),   1186. 
Derosia   v.    Railroad     (18     Minn. 

133),  708,  713. 
De  Rotlischild  v.  St.   Pkt.  Co.    (7 

Exch.  734),  467. 
Derry  v.  Railroad  Co.  (163  Pa.  St. 

403,  30  Atl.  162),   1225. 
Derwort    v.    Loomer     (21     Conn. 

245),  895,  904. 
De  Silvale  v.  Kendall  (4  M.  &  S. 

37),  831. 
De    Sola    v.    Pomares    (119    Fed. 

373),   830. 
Despatch    Co.    v.    Cecil    (112    111. 

185),  521. 
Detroit    Daily    Post   v.    McArthur 

(16  Mich.  447),  1445. 
Devato  v.  Plumbago  (20  Fed.  Rep. 

510),  698. 
Devereux  v.  Barclay   (2  B.  &  Aid. 

702),   177,  668,  674. 
Dewell  V.  Moxon   (1  Taunt.  391), 

888. 
Dewire  v.  Railroad  Co.  (148  Mass. 

343),  1196,  1197. 
De    Wolf    V.    Insurance    Co.     (20 

Johns.  214),  1135. 
Dexter  v.  Railroad  (42  N.  Y.  326), 

1246,  1253. 
Deyo   V.   Railroad    (34   N.   Y.    9), 

412,  950. 
Diamant   v.   Railroad    Co.    (62   N. 

Y.   Supp.   519,   30   Misc.    444), 

708. 
Diamond  Jo  Line  v.  Carter  (76  111. 

App.  470),  084. 
Dibble  v.  Brown  (12  Ga.  217),  68, 

1249. 
Dice  V.  Transportation  Co.  (8  Ore. 

60),  1012. 


Dickerman  v.  Union  Depot  Co.  (44 

Minn.  433),  1032. 
Dickins    v.    Railroad     (23    N.    Y. 

158),   1376. 
Dickinson  v.  Railroad  Co.  (2  Hurl 

&   Colt,   735,   9   L.   T.    (N.   S.) 

299),  1395. 
Dickman    v.    Williams     (50    Miss. 

500),  194. 
Dickon  v.  Clifton  (2  Wilson,  319), 

1326. 
Dickson    v.    Merchants'    Elevator 

Co.   (44  Mo.  App.  498),  175. 
Dieckmann    v.    Railway    Co.    ( — 

Iowa  — ,  105  N.  W.  Rep.  526), 

1219. 
Diem  v.  Koblitz    (49  Ohio  St.  41, 

29  N.  E.  1124,  34  Am.  St.  Rep. 

531),  761,  765. 
Dietrich  v.  Railroad  Co.  (71  Penn. 

St.  432),  1117,  1046,  1065. 
Dill    V.    Railroad    (7    Rich.    Law, 

158),   1302. 
Dillard   v.   Railroad   Co.    (2   Lea, 

288),  408. 
Dillier   v.   Railway    Co.    (34    Ind. 

App.   52,  72   N.  E.  Rep.   271), 

1389,  1394. 
Dillingham   v.   Anthony    (Tex.,  11 

S.  W.  Rep.  139),  1102. 
Dillingham  v.  Labath   (Tex.  Civ. 

App.,  30  S.  W.  Rep.  370),  806. 
Dillingham   v.    Pierce    (Tex.    Civ. 

App.,  31  S.  W.  Rep.  203),  99L 
Dillingham    v.    Russell    (73    Tex. 

47),  144. 
Dillon  V.  Railroad  Co.    ( —  N.  H. 

— ,   62  Atl.  Rep.  93),   1397. 
Dillon  V.  Railroad  Co.    (43  N.  Y. 

Supp.  320,  19  Misc.  116),  574. 
Dimmey  v.  Railroad   Co.    (27  W. 

Va.  32),  1223,  1389. 
Dimmitt  v.  Railroad  Co.   (103  Mo. 

440,  15  S.  W.  Rep.  761),  234. 
Dimmitt  v.   Railroad  Co.    (40  Mo. 

App.  654),  950,  959,  1414. 


XCVIU 


TABIJE   OP    CASES    CITED. 


[BEFEBENCES    ABE 

Dininny    v.    Railroad    (49    N.    Y. 

546),  1293. 
Directors,  etc.  v.  Collins  (7  H.  L. 

Cas.  194),  472. 
Distler  v.  Railroad  Co.   (151  N.  Y. 

424.  45  N.  E.  937,  35  L.  R.  A. 

762,  reversing  28  N.  Y.  Supp. 

865,  78  Hun,  252),  1181,  1218, 

1221. 
Dittman  v.  Railway  Co.  (91  Iowa, 

418.  59  N.  W.  257,  51  Am.  St. 

Rep.  352),  1286,  1293. 
Dixie    Cigar    Co.    v.    Express    Co. 

(120  N.  Car.  348,  27  S.  E.  Rep. 

73,  58  Am.  St.  Rep.  795),  443. 
Dixon   V.   Dunham    (14    111.    324), 

696.  698. 
Dixon  V.  Navigation  Co.  (18  S.  C. 

R.  (Can.)  704),  451. 
Dixon  V.  Railroad  (74  N.  C.  538), 

1348. 
Dixon  V.  Railroad  Co.   (179  Mass. 

242,  60  N.  E.  581),  1052,  1065. 
Dixon    V.   Railway    Co.    (110    Ga. 

173,   35    S.    E.   Rep.    369),   72, 

112,  859. 
Dixon  V.  Yates   (5  B.  &  Ad.  340), 

749. 
Doan  V.  Railway  Co.  (38  Mo.  App. 

408),   450. 
Doane   v.   Russell    (3   Gray,   382), 

785. 
Dobbin  v.  Railroad  Co.   (56  Mich. 

522),  678. 
Dobell  &  Co.  V.  Green  &  Co.    (69 

Law  J.  Q.  B.  454,  (1900)   1  Q. 

B.  526,  82  Law  T.  (N.  S.)  314, 

5  Com'l  Cas.  161),  841. 
Dobell  &  Co.  V.  Steamship  Co.    (2 

Q.  B.    (1895)    408,  64  L.  J.  Q. 

B.  777),  373,  380. 
Dobiecki  v.  Sharp  (88  N.  Y.  203), 

933. 
Dob.;on  v.  Ilailroad  Co.    (78  N.  Y. 
Supp.  82,  38  Misc.  582),  1355. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Dodge  V.  Bartol    (5  Greenl.  286), 

603. 
Dodge  V.  Meyer  (61  Cal.  405),  175. 
Dodge  V.  Steamboat  Co.  (148  Mass. 

207),  1012,  1116,  1188. 
Doggett  V.  Railroad  Co.  (78  N.  C. 

305),  1418. 
Doherr  v.  Houston   (128  Fed.  594, 

64  C.  C.  A.  102,  aff'g  123  Fed. 

334),   449,   1353. 
Doherr  v.  The  Etona  (64  Fed.  880; 

affirmed,  The  Etona,   71   Fed. 

895.  18  C.  C.  A.  380,  38  U.  S. 

App.  50),  347. 
Doherty  v.  Peal,  Peacock  &  Kerr 

(54  N.  Y.  Supp.  1054,  25  Misc. 

487),   855. 
D'Olier  v.  Railroad  Co.   (98  N.  Y. 

Supp.  649),  1362. 
Don  V.  Lippmann   (5  CI.  &  F.  1), 

201. 
Donald  v.  Steel  Co.   (  — Mich.  — , 

103  N.  W.  Rep.  829),  140L 
Donaldson  v.  McDowell  (1  Holmes 

290),  856. 
Donaldson  v.  Perry  Co.   (138  Fed. 

643,  C.  C.  A.),  360. 

Donaldson    v.    Railroad    Co.     (18 

Iowa,   280),   1397,    1398,   1423. 
Donk    Bros.    Coal    Co.    v.    Leavitt 

(109  111.  App.  385),  1392. 
Donnell    v.    Amoskeag    Mfg.     Co. 

(118  Fed.  10,  55  C.  C.  A.  178), 

842,  847. 
Donovan  v.  Railroad  Co.  (120  Fed. 

215,  57  C.  C.  A.  362,  61  L.  R. 

A.  140;  rehearing  denied,  124 

Fed.  1016,  60  C.  C.  A.  168; 

affirmed,  199  U.  S.  279,  26  Sup. 

Ct.  R.  91),  944. 
Don  Yan  v.  Ah  You   (4  Ariz.  109, 

77  Pac.  Rep.  618),  1384. 
Doolan  v.  Railway   Co.    (L.  R.  2 

App.    Cas.    792),    341. 


TABLE   OP    CASES    CITED. 


XCIX 


[befebences  are 

Doolittle   V.   Railway   Co.    (G2   S. 

Car.  130,  40  S.  E.  133),  1127, 

1412. 
Doorman  v.   Jenkins    (2  A.   &  E. 

256),  29. 
Doran  v.  Ferry  Co.  (3  Lans.  105), 

1019. 
Doran    v.    Ferry    Co.    (19    N.    Y. 

Supp.  172),  1441. 
Dorr  V.  New  Jersey  St.  Nav,  Co. 

(1  Ker.  485),  401. 
Dorrah  v.  Railroad  Co.    (65  Miss. 

14),  1422. 
Dorsey   v.  Railway   Co.    (104   La. 

478,   29   So.   177,   52   L.   R.   A. 

92),  990. 
Dorsey    v.    Railway    Co.    (83   Mo. 

App.    528),  1019. 
Doss  V.  Railroad  Co.  (59  Mo.  27), 

991. 
Dotson  V.  Railroad  Co.    (68  N.  J. 

L.  679,  54  Atl.  827),  933,  941. 
Dougherty    v.    Railroad    Co.     (84 

Miss.    502,   36    So.   Rep.    699), 

1192. 
Dougherty  v.  Railroad  Co.  (81  Mo. 

330),   895. 
Dougherty  v.  Railroad  Co.   (86  N. 

Y.  Supp.  746),  942. 
Dougherty  v.  Railroad  Co.  (97  Mo. 

647),  1423. 
Dougherty  v.  Railroad  Co.  (91  Mo. 

647),   895,  1422. 
Douglass  V.  Railroad  Co.   (53  Mo. 

App.  473),  652. 
Douglass  Co.  V.  Railway  Co.   (62 

Minn.   288,   64   N.  W.   899,   30 

L.  R.  A.  860),  426. 
Dow  V.  Beidelman  (125  U.  S.  680), 

574,  1023. 
Dow  V.  Packet  Co.  (84  Me.  490,  24 

Atl.  945),  339,  1357. 
Dow   V.    Railway   Co.    (80    N.    Y. 

Supp.  941,   81  App.  Div.  362), 

1073,    1075. 


TO   SECTIONS.] 

Dowd  V.  Railway  Co.  (84  Wis.  105, 

54  N.  W.  24,  36  Am.  St.  Rep. 

917,  20  L.  R.  A.  527),  991. 
Downey   v.   Railroad   Co.    (28   W. 

Va.    732),    1438,    1441. 
Downing  v.  Outerbridge   (79  Fed. 

931,  25  C.  C.  A.  244),  1374. 
Downs  V.   Green    (24  N.   Y.  638), 

408. 
Downs  V.  Perrin    (16  N.  Y.  325), 

408. 
Downs  V.  Railroad  Co.   (36  Conn. 

287),  1036,  1039,  1053,  1065. 
Dows  V.  Bank  (91  U.  S.  618),  186. 
Dows  V.   Greene   (24  N.   Y.   638), 

175,  188. 
Dows   V.   Perrin    (16   N.    Y.   325), 

175. 
Dows  V.  Railway  Co.  (89  Mo.  340), 

767. 
Doyle  V.  Kiser  (6  Ind.  242),  1246. 
Doyle  V.  Railroad  Co.    (72  N.  Y. 

Supp.  936,  66  App.  Div.  398), 

1392. 
Doyle    V.    Railroad   Co.    (82    Fed. 

869,  27  C.  C.  A.  264,  50  U.  S 

App.    249),    892,    1111. 
Doyle  V.   Railroad  Co    (166  Mass 

492,  44  N.  E.  611;  44  Am.  St. 

Rep.  335,  s.  c.  362  Mass.  66,  37 

N.  E.  770,  25  L.  R.  A.  157,  55 

Am.  St.  Rep.  417),  1004,  1072, 

1073. 
Doyle  V.   Railroad   Co.    (126  Fed. 

841),   415,   426,  428,   452. 
Drake  v.  Railroad  Co.   (137  Penn. 

St.    352,    20    Atl.    Rep.     994), 

1184. 
Dresbach  v.  Railroad  Co.  (57  Cal. 

462),  710. 
Dresser  v.  Railway  Co.   (116  Fed. 

281,  53  C.  C.  A.  559),  1049. 
Dressner    v.    Manhattan    Delivery 

Co.    (92    N.    Y.     Supp.    800), 

1315. 


T-U3LE  OF   CASES  CITED, 


[REFERENCES   ABE 

Drew   V.   Bird    (1   M.   &  M.   156), 

SIO. 
Drew    V.    Railroad    Co.    (51    Cal. 

425),  1041. 
Drew  V.  Railroad   (26  N.  Y.  49), 

1098,    1378,   1423. 
Drew  V.  Transit  Co.   (3  Mo.  App. 

495),   1355. 
Drew    Glass    Co.    v.    Railway   Co. 

(44  Mo.   App.  416),  234. 
Drinkwater    v.    Brig    Spartan    (1 

Ware,  145),  877. 
Driver   v.    Railroad   Co.    (103   Va. 

650,  49  S.  E.  Rep.  1000),  1391. 
Drummond    v.    Railroad     Co.     (7 

Utah,  118,  25  Pac.  Rep.  733), 

1056. 
Drury  v.  Railway  Co.  (70  Law  J. 

K.  B.  830,   (1901)  2  K.  B.  322, 

84  Law  T.   (N.  S.)   658).  927. 
Dryden   v.   Railroad   Co.    (60   Me. 

512),  1043. 
Dry    Hides,     Nine    Thousand     (6 

Ben.   199),  812. 
Du  Bose  V.  Railroad  Co.   (121  Ga. 

308,  48   S.  E.  Rep.   913),  965. 
Duhuque   W.    &   C.   Ass'n    v.   Du- 
buque   (30   Iowa,   176),   1430. 
Duck  V.  Railway  Co.   (2  Tex.  Ct. 

Rep.  1042,  63  S.  W.  Rep.  891), 

922. 
Duckworth    v.    Johnson    (4    H.   & 

N.  653),  1397,  1399. 
Duckworth    v.    Railway    Co.     (84 

Law  T.  (N.  S.)  774,  49  Wkly. 

Rep.    541),   1109. 
Dudley  v.  Ferry  Co.   (45  N.  J.  L. 

368),   1418. 
Dudley  v.  Railway  Co.  ( —  W.  Va. 

— ,    52    S.    E.  Rep.    718),   668, 

787,   1365. 
Dudley  v.  Smith   (1  Camp.  167), 

959,   1117. 
Duell   V.    Railway   Co.    (115   Wis. 

516,  92  N.  W.  269),  936,  941. 


TO   SECTIONS.] 

Duff  V.  Budd   (3  B.  &  Bing.  177), 

177,    665,    668,    681,    682,    736, 

1319. 
Duff  V.  Railway  Co.   (L.  R.  (Ire.) 

4  C.  P.  178),  1073. 
Duffy     V.     Thompson     (4     E.     D. 

Smith,    178),    1246. 
Dufour  V.  Railroad  Co.    (67  Cal. 

319),  1174. 
Dufur  V.  Railroad  Co.  (75  Vt.  165, 

53  Atl.  1068),  913. 
Duggan  V.  Railroad  Co.    (159  Pa. 

St.    248,    28   Atl.    186,   39    Am, 

St.  Rep.  672),  980,  1100,  1426. 
Duke  V.  Ferry  Co.  (29  N.  Y.  Supp. 

739,    9    Misc.     268;      affirmed 

without    opinion,    145    N.    Y, 

640,  41  N.  B.  88),  942. 
Du   Laurans  v.   Railroad   Co.    (15 

Minn.    49),    1033,    1443, 
DulLng   V.    Railroad   Co.    (66   Md, 

120),    1060. 
Dumas  v.  Railway  Co.   (Tex.  Civ. 

App.,  43  S,  W,  Rep.  908),  900. 
Dun  V.  Railroad  Co.  (78  Va.  645), 

1209, 
Dunbar  v.  Railroad  Co.  (110  Mass. 

26),  672, 
Dunbar  v.  Railway  Co.  (62  S.  Car. 

414,  40  S.  E.  Rep.  884),  173, 

243. 
Duncan  v.  Railroad  Co.  (113  Fed. 

508),  1075. 
Duncan    v.    St.    Luke's     Hospital 

(98  N.  Y.  Supp.  866),  1384. 
Dunham  v.  Railroad  Co.    (70  Me, 

164),   130,   133,    139,   1366. 
Dunlap  V.  Hunting  (2  Denio,  643), 

753, 
Dunlap  V.  Railroad  Co.   (35  Minn. 

203),  1053. 
Dunlap  V.  Steamboat  Co.  (98  Mass. 

371),    437,    1249,    1276. 
Dunlap  V.   The  Reliance    (2   Fed. 

Rep.  249),  895. 


t 


J 


TABLE  OF    CASES  CITED. 


CI 


[refebences  aue  to  sections.] 


Dunlop    V.    Balfour    (1892)    (1   Q. 

B.   507),   839. 
Dunlop  V.  Lambert   (6  CI.  &  Fin. 

600),  1310,  1317. 
Dunlop    V.     Munroe     (7     Cranch, 

242),  94. 
Dunn  V.  Donald  Currie  &  Co.   (2 

K.  B.    (1902)    614,  71  L.  J.  K. 

B.  963),   653,   1366. 
Dunn  V.  Railroad  Co.  (71  N.  J.  L. 

21,  58  Atl.  164),  915. 
Dunn    V.    Railway    Co.     (58    Me. 

187),  895,  897,  899,  964. 
Dunn  V.  Railway  Co.  (68  Mo.  268), 

638. 
Dunn    V.    Railroad    Co.     (21    Mo. 

App.  84,  205),  1397. 
Dunn  V.  Railway  Co.  (21  Mo.  App. 

188),  1377. 
Dunn  V.  Steamboat  Co.   (58  Hun, 

461,  12  N.  Y.  Supp.  406),  1272. 
Dunne  v.  Railroad  Co.   (91  N.  Y. 

Supp.  145,  99  App.  Div.  571), 

991. 
Dunning  v.  Railroad  Co.   ( —  Ind. 

App.  — ,  77  N.  E.  Rep.  1049), 

1119,  1180. 
Dunseth  v.  Wade    (2  Scam.  285), 

75,  611,   1354. 
Dunson  v.  Railroad  (3  Lans.  265), 

304. 
Duntley  v.  Railroad  Co.  (66  N.  H. 

263,  20  Atl.  Rep.  327),  438. 
Durant  v.  Palmer  (5  Dutch.  544) 

1417. 
Durchmann    v.    Dunn     (106    Fed. 

950,  46  C.  C.  A.  62,  aff'g  101 

Fed.  606),  8"40,  857. 
Durden  v.   Barnett    (7   Ala.   169), 

1378. 
Durfee   v.   Railway   Co.    (9   Utah, 

213,   33  Pac.   944),  1082. 
Durfleld  v.  City  of  New  York   (92 

N.  Y.  Supp.  204,  101  App.  Div. 

581),  1401. 


Durgee     Cement    Co.    v.    O'Brien 

(123  Mass.  12),  763. 
Durgin  v.  Express  Co.    (66  N.  H. 

277,  20  Atl.  Rep.  328,  9  L.  R. 

A.  453),  426,  438. 
Durrell  v.  Johnson   (31  Neb.  796), 

1417. 
Dusar    v.    Murgatroyd    (1    Wash. 

13),   1360. 
Duthie  V.  Hilton  (4  L.  R.  (C.  P.) 

138),   803. 
Dutton  V.  Solomonson   (3  B.  &  P. 

582),   194,   1315,   1317. 
Duval  V.  Hunt  (34  Fla.  85,  15  So. 

Rep.  876),  1397. 
Duval  V.  Pullman  Palace  Car  Co. 

(62  Fed.  265,  10  C.  C.  A.  331, 

23  U.  S.  App.  527,  33  L.  R.  A. 

715;   petition  for  writ  of  cer- 
tiorari denied,  163  U.  S.  684), 

1134. 
Duvenick  v.  Railroad  Co.  (57  Mo. 

App.   550),  475,   640. 
Duvernet  v.  Railroad  Co.    (49  La. 

Ann.    484,    21    So.    644),    937, 

1191. 
Duzan    v.    Myers     (30    Ind.    App. 

227,  65  N.  E.  1046,  96  Am.  St. 

Rep.  341),  1389    1394,  1397. 
Dwight  V.  Brewster   (1  Pick.  50), 

47,   57,   68,   121,   1326. 
Dwinelle  v.  Railroad  Co.    (120  N. 

Y.  117),  1095,  1129. 
Dwyer   v.    Railway   Co.    (69   Tex. 

707),   777. 
Dwyer  v.  Railway   Co.    (84   Iowa, 

479,  51  N.  W.  244,  35  Am.  St. 

Rep.  322),  1398. 
Dyas  V.   So.   Pac.    Co.     (140    Cal. 

296,  73  Pac.  Rep.  972),  1397. 

Dyer   v.    Railway    Co.    (71    N.   Y. 

228),  1236. 
Dyer    v.    Railway    (42    Vt.     441), 

779,  874. 
Dyer   v.   The   Railway    (51   Minn. 

345,  53  N.  W.  Rep.  714),  1317. 


Cll 


T.VBLE   OF    CASES   CITED. 


[BEFEBENCES   ABE 

Dyke  V.  Railroad   (45  N.  Y.  113), 

204,  210,  214. 
Dysart  v.  Railway  Co.    (122  Fed. 

228,  58  C.  C.  A.  592),  964. 


Eagle  V.   White    (6  Whart.  505), 

664,  665. 
Earnest  v.  Express  Co.  (1  Woods, 

573),  233,  426. 
East     India     Co.     v.     Fallen     (2 

Strange,  690),  67,  110. 
Eastman  v.  Railroad  Co.  (70  N.  H. 

135,  46  Atl.  54),  1052,  1056. 
Easton  v.  Dudley  (78  Tex.  236,  14 

S.  W.  Rep.  583),  630. 
Easton,    Ex    parte    (5    Otto,    75), 

688. 
Easton  v.  Waters   ( —  Tex.  — ,  16 

S.   W.   Rep.   540),   1033. 
Eaton  V.  Cook  (32  Vt.  58),  759. 
Eaton   V.   Mclntire    (88    Me.    578, 

34  Atl.   525).   1056. 
Eaton  V.  Railroad  Co.    (11  Allen, 

500),  917,  923,  949,  962. 
Eaton  V.  Railroad  Co.    (67  N.  H. 

442,  40   Atl.  112),  1180. 
Eaton  V.  Railroad  Co.    (57   N.  Y. 

382),   964,  1000. 
Echols   V.   Railroad    Co.    (90    Ala. 

366,  7  So.  Rep.  655),  1360. 
Eckerd  v.  Railway  Co.   (70  Iowa, 

353),    1187. 
Eckert  v.   Railroad   Co.    (211   Pa. 

267,  60  Atl.  781),  442,  499. 
Eckles  V.   Railway   Co.    (112   Mo. 

App.  240,  87  S.  W.  Rep.  99), 

239,  240,  243,  246,  249. 
Economy    Light    Co.    v.    Stephen 

(187    111.    137,   58   N.    E.   Rep. 

359),  1397. 


TO   SECTIONS.] 

Eddy  V.  Harris    (78  Tex.   661,  22 

Am.  St.  Rep.  88),  1109. 
Eddy  V.  Rider   (79  Tex.  53,  15  S. 

W.   Rep.    113),    1033. 
Eddy  V.  Wallace   (49  Fed.  801,  1 

C.  C.  A.  435,  4  U.  S.  App.  264; 

writ   of   error   dismissed,   163 

U.  S.  685),  1177. 
Eden  v.  Railroad  Co.  (14  B.  Mon. 

204),  1376,  1384. 
Edgar  v.   Castello    (14   S.  C.  20), 

1376,  1384. 
Edgerly  v.  Railroad  Co.  (67  N.  H. 

312,    36   Atl.    558),    978,    1174, 

1430. 
Edgerton  v.  Railroad  Co.    (39   N. 

Y.  227J,  899,  1412. 
Edminson  v.  Baxter  (4  Haywood, 

112),  1360. 
Edmunds   v.     Transportation    Co. 

(135  Mass.  283),  672. 
Edmunson  v,  Pullman  Palace  Car 

Co.    (92  Fed.  824,  34  C.  C.  A. 

382),  1143. 
Edsall  V.  Railroad  (50  N.  Y.  661), 

464. 
Edson  V.  Railroad  Co.  (70  111.  App. 

654),   304. 
Edson   V.   Railroad   Co.    (144   Cal. 

182,  77  Pac.  894),  574. 
Edson   V.   Railway  Co.    (133   Cal. 

25,  65  Pac.  15),   575. 
Edson   V.   Weston    (7   Cow.    278), 

740. 
Edwards  v.  Bldg.  Co.  (—  R.  I.  — , 

61  Atl.  Rep.  646),  100,  102. 
Edwards  v.  Burke  (36  Wash.  107, 

78  Pac.  610),  100. 
Edwards     v.     Express     Co.     (121 

Iowa,    744,   96   N.   W.    740,    63 

L.  R.  A.  467),  148. 
Edwards   v.   Lord    (49   Me.    279), 

895,  904. 
Edwards  v.  Railway    (L.  R.  5  C. 

P.  445),  1100. 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


cm 


[eefeeences  are  to  sections.] 


Edwards  v.  Railway  Co.  (81  Mich. 

364,    45    N.    W.    Rep.    827,    21 

Am.  St.  Rep.  527),  1054. 
Edwards    v.     Sherratt     (1     East, 

604),  147,  329. 
Edwards    v.    Todd    (1    Scammon, 

462),  799. 
Edwards  v.  Transit  Co.  (104  Mass. 

159),    741,    742. 
Edwards  &  Co.  v.  Railroad  Co.  ( — 

Tex.   Civ.    App.   — ,   81    S.  W. 

Rep.  800),' 105. 
Eells   V.   Railway    Co.     (52     Fed. 

903),  215,  431. 
Efron  V.  Palace  Car  Co.    (59  Mo. 

App.  641),  1132. 
Egan    V.    Barclay    Fibre    Co.     (61 

Fed.  527),  839. 
Egan  V.  Latlis  (41  bed.  Rep.  830), 

869. 
Egan  V.   Steamboat  Co.    (86  Hun, 

542,  33  N.  Y.  Supp.  791),  1151. 
Ehrgott  V.  Meyer   (96  N.  Y.  246), 

1432. 
Eichorn  v.  New  Orleans,  etc.,  Co., 

(114  La.  712,  38  So.  526;  s.  c. 

112  La.  236,  36  So.  Rep.  335), 

1397. 
Eichhorn  v.  Railway  Co.  (130  Mo. 

575,  32   S.  W.   993),   933. 
Eidson  v.  Railway  Co.    ( —  Miss. 

— ,  23  So.  Rep.  369),  992,  1083. 
Eikrem    v.    Coal    Co.     (125     Fed. 

987),   857. 
Eingartner   v.    111.    Steel    Co.    (94 

Wis.    70,   68   N.   W.   Rep.    664, 

59  Am.  St.  Rep.  859,  34  L.  R. 

A.  503),  1388. 
Elam    V.    Railroad     Co.     ( —    Mo. 

App.  — ,  93  S.  W.  Rep.   851), 

298. 
Elder    Dempster    Shipping    Co.    v. 

Pouppirt   (125  Fed.  732,  60  C. 

C.  A.  500,  reversing  Pouppirt 

V.  Shipping  Co.  122  Fed.  983), 

890. 


Eldridge  v.  Railroad  (1  Sand.  89), 

959,    1223. 
Elkins    V.     Railroad     (3     Foster, 

275),   76,  462. 
Elkins  V.  Railroad  (19  N.  H.  337), 

1306. 
Elkins  V.  Railroad  Co.   (23  N.  H. 

275),    963,    964. 
Elkins  y.  Railroad  Co.  (64  S.  Car. 

553,  43   S.  E.  19),  990. 
Ellinger  v.  Railroad  Co.   (153  Pa. 

St.   213,  25  Atl.   1132,  34  Am. 

Rep.   697),   983. 
Elliot    V.    Railroad    Co.     (21    Ky. 

Law  Rep.  630,  52   S.  W.  Rep. 

833),   990. 
Elliott  V.  Railroad  Co.    (53  Hun, 

78),   1066. 
Elliott    V.    Railway    Co.    (58    Mo. 

App.    80),    134, 
Elliott   V.   Rossell    (10   Johns.   1), 

74. 
Elliott  V.  Southern  Pac.  Co.   (145 

Cal.  441,  79  Pac.  420,  68  L.  R. 

A.  393),  1043,  1046,  1088. 
Ellis  V.  Railway  Co.  (30  Tex.  Civ. 

App.  172,   70   S.  W.   114),  964. 

Ellis    V.    Railway    Co.    (120    Wis. 

645,  98  N.  W.  942),  936,  1122, 

1127. 
Ellis  V.  Turner  (8  T.  R.  531),  651. 
Ellis  V.  Willard  (9  N.  Y.  529),  158, 

167. 
Ellsworth     V.     Railway    Co.     (95 

Iowa,  98,  63  N.  W.  584,  29  L. 

R.    A.    173),   1044,   1062,    1065, 

1090. 
Ellsworth  V.  Tartt   (26  Ala.  733), 

238,  260,  1049. 
Elmore    v.    Railroad     (23     Conn. 

457),  231,  238,  1049. 
Elmore  v.  Sands    (54  N.  Y.  512), 

1043,  1052. 


CIV 


TABLE   OF    CASES   CITED. 


[references  are 

Elmslie  v.  Hagar   (101  Fed.  840; 

affirmed,    Hagar     v.     Elmslie, 

107  Fed.  511,  46  C.  C.  A.  446), 

833,  843, 
Elm  Staves'  Case   (21  Fed.   590), 

158. 
Elwell  V.  Skiddy   (77  N.  Y.  282), 

807. 
Ely  V.  Ehle    (3  Comst.  506),  780. 
Ely   V.    Steamboat  Co.    (53   Barb. 

207),  688,  696. 
Emery  v.  Hersey  (4  Greenl.  407), 

61,  731. 
Emery  v.  Philadelphia  (208  Penn. 

St.    492,    57    Atl.    Rep.    997), 

1397. 
Emery  v.  Railroad  Co.   (67  N.  H. 

434,   36   Atl.   367),   1118,   1397. 
Emigh  V.  Railroad   (4  Biss.  114), 

1407. 
Emilivsen  v.  Railroad  Co.   (51  N. 

Y.    Supp.    606,    30    App.    Div. 

203),  92. 
Emma  Johnson,  Sch'r  (1  Sprague, 

527),  75. 
Empire   State  Cattle  Co.  v.   Rail- 
way Co.    (129  Fed.  480;   s.  c. 

135  Fed.  135),  300,  612,  1353. 
Empire  T.  Co.  v.  Oil  Co,  (63  Penn. 

St.  14),  450,  496,  504. 
Empire     Transportation     Co.     v. 

Coal  &  Iron  Co,  (77  Fed.  919, 

23  C.  C.  A.  564,  40  U,  S.  App. 

157,  35  L.  R.  A.  623,  alf'g  70 

Fed,   268),   833,   842, 
Engberman  v.  Steamship  Co.   (84 

N.   Y.   Supp.   201),   1298, 
Engesether    v.    Railway    Co,     (65 

Minn.  168,  68  N.  W.  4),  442, 

443, 
England     v.    Railroad     Co.     (153 

Mass.  490,  27   N,  E,  Rep,  1), 

1123,    1177, 
England  v.  Railroad  Co.   (32  Tex, 

Civ.   App.    86,    73    S,   W,    24), 

1058. 


TO    SECTIONS,] 

Englehaupt    v.    Railroad   Co.    (58 

Atl.   154,    209   Pa.    182),   1123, 
English  v.  Canal  Company  (66  N. 

Y.   454),  1090, 
Enright  v.  Railroad  Co.   (198  Pa. 

St.  166,  47  Atl.  938,  53  L.  R. 

A.  330,  82  Am.  St.  Rep.  795), 

990. 
E.    O,    Standard    Milling    Co.    v. 

Transit  Co.    (122  Mo.  258,  26 

S.   W.   704),  464,  1355. 
Ephland  v.  Railway  Co.    (71  Mo. 

App.    597;    s.   c.   57   Mo.   App, 

147),  1222. 
Ephland  v.  Railway  Co.   (137  Mo. 

187,   37   S.   W,   820,   38    S,   W. 

926,  59  Am.   St.  Rep.   498,  35 

L.  R.  A.  107),  959,  1222, 
Erickson  v.  Barber  Bros.  (83  Iowa 

367,  49  N.  W.  Rep.  838),  96. 
Erwin    v.    Railway    Co.    (94    Mo. 

App.   289,  68   S.   W.  88),  899, 

1217, 
Escopiniche   v.   Stewart    (2   Conn, 

391),  815,  817. 
Esposito  V.  Bowden   (7  El.  &  Bl. 

762;  4  id,  963),  322. 
Estes    V.   Railroad    Co,    (7    N,    Y. 

Suppl.    863),    1282, 
Estes    V,    Railway    Co.    (110    Mo. 

App.  725,  85  S.  W.  Rep,  627), 

1223,  1414. 
Estey   V.   Truxel     (25    Mo.    App. 

238),  763. 
Estill    V.    Railroad    Co.    (41    Fed. 

Rep.    849),   636, 
Eswin    V,    Railway    Co,     (96    Mo, 

290),   1228, 
E,    T,    R,    R,    V,    Nelson    (1    Cold. 

272),  76,  226,  496,  652,  1215. 
E.    T.    R.    R    V.    Whittle    (27    Ga. 

535),  87. 
Eureka  v.  Merrifield  (53  Kan.  794, 

37  Pac.  Rep.  113),  1384. 
Evans  v.  Blair   (114  Fed.  616,  52 

C.  C.   A.  396),  847. 


TABI-E   OF    CASES    CITED. 


cv 


[befekences  are 

Evans  v.   Hutton    (5   Scott  N.  R. 

670),  658. 
Evans   v.    Marlett    (1   Ld.   Raym. 

271),  1305. 
Evans  v.  Railroad  Co.  ( —  Ky.  — , 

90  S.  W.  Rep.  588),  151,  512. 
Evans  v.  Railroad  Co.   (Ill  Mass. 

142),   336    339,  341. 
Evans  v.  Railway  Co.  (11  Mo.  Ap. 

463),    1045,   1429,   1442. 
Evans  v.  Soule  (2  Maule  &  S,  1), 

441. 
Evans  v.   Spreckels    (4  Fed.  Rep. 

265),  490. 
Evans  &  Hollinger  v.  Railroad  Co, 

(76  Mo.   App.   472),  867. 
Evansich  v.  Railway  Co.   (57  Tex. 

123),  1378. 
Everett   v.   Railroad   Co.     (138   N. 

Car.  68,   50  S.  E.  Rep.  557,  1 

L.    R.    A.    (N.    S.)    985),    425, 

427,   431,   450,  1352. 
Everett  v.  Railway  Co.    (9  Utah, 

340,    34    Pac.    289),    964. 
Everett  v.  Railway  Co.   (69  Iowa, 

15),  1033. 
Everett  v.  Saltus  (15  Wend.  474), 

888,   1317. 
Evers  v.  Ferry  Co.    ( —  Mo.  App, 

— ,  92  S.  W.  Rep.  118),  1195, 

1413. 
Ewau    V.    Tredegar   Co.    (88    Fed. 

703),  834. 
Ewart  V.  Kerr  (1  Rice,  203),  799. 
Ewart  V.    Street    (2   Bailey   Law, 

157),  2-74,  275. 
Ewbank   v.    Nutting    (7    Com.    B. 

797),  791. 
Ewell    V,    Railroad   Co,    (29    Fed. 

Rep.  57),  1389. 
Ewen   V,   Railroad   Co.    (38   Wis. 

614),  1397. 
Ewing   V.   The   Railway   Co.    (147 

Penn.  St.  40,  23  Atl.  Rep.  340, 
4  L.  R.  A.  666),  1427. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Exchange  Ins.  Co.  v.  Canal  Co.  (10 

Bosw.  180),  103. 
Exposition   Cotton   Mills   v.   Rail- 
road  Co.    (83   Ga.   441),   1332. 
Express  Cases   (117  U.  S.  1),  517. 
Express  Co.  v.  Armstead  (50  Ala. 

350),  716. 
Express  Co.  v.  Backman  (28  Ohio 

St.  144),  80,  82,  410,  425,  1354. 
Express  Co.  v.  Bank  (69  Penn.  St. 

394),  450. 
Express    Co.    v.    Bank    of    Tupelo 

(108  Ala.  517,  18  So.  664),  443. 
Express  Co.  v.  Battle  (5  Tex.  Civ, 

App.  532,  24  S,  W.  Rep.  353), 

1369. 
Express  Co,  v.  Blackman  (28  Ohio 

St.    144),    1354. 
Express    Co.    v.     Boullemet     (100 

Ala.  275,  13  So.  941),  241. 
Express   Co.   v.    Bratton    (106   111. 

App.  563),  339,  410.  62,  653, 
Express  Co.  v.  Brunswick   (4  III. 

App.  606),  1374. 
Express  Co.  v.  Burke  (94  111,  App, 

29;  s.  c.  Burke  v.  Express  Co. 

87    111.    App,    505),    336,    455, 

634. 
Express  Co.  v.  Caldwell  (21  Wall. 

264),  442,  452,  1332. 
Express  Co,  v.  Caperton   (44  Ala. 

101),   443. 
Express  Co.  v.  Carnahan   (29  Ind. 

App.  600,   63  N.  E.  245,  64  N. 

E.  647,  94  Am.  St.  Rep.  279), 

408,  426,  433,  457,  463. 
Express   Co.    v.   Carroll    (7   Colo. 

43),    80. 
Express    Co.    v.    Council    (84    111. 

App.   491),   455,   1305. 
Express    Co.    v.    Craft    (49    Miss. 

480),  1309,  1316. 
Express  Co.  v.  Crawley   ( —  Miss. 

— ,  41  So.  Rep.  261),  589. 
Express  Co.   v.  Cressap    (6  Bush, 

572),  27. 


CVl 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


[REFERENCES    ARE 

Express  Co.  v.  Critzer   (Tex.  Civ. 

App.,    42    S.    W.    Rep.    1017), 

672,  682. 
Express    Co.    v.    Crook    (44    Ala. 

46S),  80,  450. 
Express  Co.   v.   Darnell    (62   Tex. 

639),  80,  1369. 
Express   Co.   v.   Darnell    (31   Ind. 

20),  27,  723. 
Express  Co.  v.  Dickson   (94  U.  S. 

549),   736. 
Express  Co.  v.  Emerson   (101  Mo. 

App.  62,  74  S.  W.  132),  634. 
Express    Co.    v.    Everett    (37    Ga. 

688),  329,  331,  719. 
Express  Co.  v.  Fendrick  (38  Ind. 

150),   401. 
Express  Co.   v.   Fletcher   (25  Ind. 

492),  671,  672. 
Express    Co.    v.    Foley    (26    Kan. 

665,  26  Pac.  Rep.  665),  425. 
Express    Co.    v.    Fuller    (13    Tex. 

Civ.   App.    610,   35   S.   W  Rep 

824),  1375. 
Express  Co.  v.  Fuller  (4  Tex.  Civ. 

App.  213,  23  S.  W.  Rep.  412), 

154,  168,  1376. 
Express    Co.    v.    Glenn    (16    Lea, 

472),   80,   442. 
Express  Co.  v.  Grace    (100  Mass. 

505),  401,  409. 
Express  Co.  v.  Graham    (26  Ohio 

St.   595),   145,   410,   450,  1354. 
Express  Co.  v.  Greenhalgh  (80  111. 

68),  749. 
Express  Co.  v.  Guthrie   (9  Bush, 

78),  401. 
Express   Co.   v.    Haines     (67    111. 

137),  230,  410. 
Express  Co.  v.  Hammer   (21  Ind. 

App.  186,  1  N.  E.  953),  676. 
Express    Co.    v.    Harris    (51    Ind. 

127),   442. 
Express   Co.   v.   Harris    (120   Ind. 

73),  450,  472,  869. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Express    Co.    v.    Haynes    (42    111. 

89),   407,   410,   451,   455,    1352. 
Express  Co.  v.  Hertzberg  (17  Tex. 

Civ.  App.   100,  42  S.  W.  Rep. 

795),   672.   682. 
Express  Co.  v.  Hess  (53  Ala.  19), 

236,    1348. 
Express  Co.  v.  Holland   (109  Ala. 

362,  19   So.  66),  717. 
Express    Co.    v.     Hunnicutt     (54 

Miss.    566),    442. 
Express  Co.  v,  Jackson  (92  Tenn. 

326,   21  S.  W.   666).   290,   614. 
Express  Co.  v.  Joyce  ( —  Ind.  — , 

72  N.  E.  865,  reversing   (Ind. 

App.)  69  N.  B.  1015),  426,429, 

432,  433. 
Express     Co.     v.     Kaufman     (12 

Heisk.   161),   677.     ' 
Express   Co.    v.    Keefer    (59   Ind, 

263),   726. 
Express  Co.  v.  Koerner  (65  Minn. 

540,  68  N.  W.  181,  33  L.  R.  A. 

600),   806. 
Express  Co.  v.  Kountze   (8  "Wall. 

342),    294,  319,   401,   487,   611, 

613,  614. 
Express  Co.  v.  Lesem  (39  111.  312), 

726,  728. 
Express    Co.    v.    Loeb    (7    Bush, 

501),   401. 
Express   Co.   v.   Marks,   etc.,   Co., 

(—  Miss.  — ,  40  So.  Rep.  65), 

425,  450. 
Express  Co.  v.  Martin  (26  S.  C.  R. 

(Can.)    135),  442. 
Express    Co.    v.     McConnell     (27 

Kans.    238),    80,    729. 
Express  Co.  v.  McVeigh   (20  Grat. 

264),  83. 
Express  Co.  v.  Milk  (73  111.  224), 

674. 

Express    Co.    v.    Moon    (39    Miss. 
822),  401,  410,  425,  450. 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


evil 


[BEFEBENCES   ABE   TO   SECTIONS.] 


Express  Co.  v.  Needham  ( —  Tex. 

Civ.    App.   — ,   83    S.    W.    22), 

630. 
Express    Co.    v.    Newby    (36    Ga. 

635),  80,   111. 
Express  Co.  v.  Nichols   (33  N.  J. 

434),  1417. 
Express   Co.   v.   Nock    (2   Duvall, 

562),    410. 
Express   Co.   v.    Ogles    (Tex.    Civ. 

App.,    81    S.    W.    Rep.    1023), 

82,  1003. 
Express  Co.  v.  Ohleman  (92  Penn. 

St.  323),  716. 
Express    Co.    v.    Perkins    (42    111. 

458),   333. 
Express  Co.  v.  R.  M.  Rose  Co.  ( — 

Ga.   — ,    53    S.    E.    Rep.    185), 

149. 
Express    Co.    v   Railroad    Co    (57 

Me.  188),  512,  514,  521. 
Express   Co.  v.  Railroad    (111   N. 

Car.  463,  16  S.  E.  Rep.  393,  32 

Am.  St.  Rep.  805,  18  L.  R.  A. 

393),   517. 
Express   Co.   v.   Railway   Co.    (81 

Me.    92),   512,   514. 
Express   Co.    v.   Reagan    (29   Ind. 

21),  442. 
Express  Co.  v.  Robinson  (72  Penn. 

St.  274),  716. 
Express    Co.    v.    Root    (47    Mich. 

231),  82. 
Express    Co.    v.    Rush    (24    Ind. 

403),   243. 
Express   Co.   v.   Sands    (55   Penn, 

St.  140),  1352. 
Express    Co.    v.    Schier     (55    111. 

140),  401,  716,  717. 
Express  Co.  v.  Second  Nat.  Bank, 

(69  Penn.  St.  394),  243. 
Express   Co.    v.   Seibert    (44   Fed. 

310),  524. 
Express   Co.    v.    Seide    (67    Miss. 

609),   450. 


Express  Co.  v.  Shea  (38  Ga.  519), 

226,    230.   236. 
Express   Co.   v.    Shearer    (160   111. 

215,  43  N.  E.  816,  37  L.  R.  A. 

177,  52  Am.  St.  Rep.  324,  aff'g 

43   111   App.   641),    668,   673. 
Express   Co.   v.   Shoop    (85  Penn. 

St.  325).  867. 
Express  Co.  v.  Smith  (33  Ohio  St. 

51),  80,   130,   646,   1430. 
Express  Co.   v.   Spellman    (90  111. 

455),  416,  417. 
Express  Co.  v.  Stack  (29  Ind.  27), 

671. 
Express    Co.    v.    State    (164    Ind. 

196,  73   N.   E.   101),   716. 
Express    Co.    v.    State    (161    Ind. 

328,  67  N.   E.   1033;    s.  c.   161 

Ind.  705,  67  N.  E.  1092),  799. 
Express  Co.  v.  Stettaners   (61  111. 

184),  410,  451,  455,  1352. 
Express  Co.  v.  U.  S.  Express  Co. 

(88    Fed.    659;    aff'd   on    opin- 
ion  of   court   below,   92    Fed. 

1022,    35    C.    C.    A.    172),    151, 

519,  521,  524,  799,  867. 
Express  Co.  v.  Van  Meter  (17  Fla. 

783),  80,  671,  674. 
Express   Co.    v.    Walker    (26    Ky. 

Law  Rep.  1025,  83  S.  W.  Rep. 

106),  208,  218,  448,  1352. 
Express  Co.  v.  Wallace    (60  Ark. 

100,  29  S.  W.  32),  404. 
Express  Co.   v.  Williams    (99  Ga. 

482,  27   S.  E.  Rep.   743),  735. 
Express  Co.  v.  Williams    (6  Tex. 

Ct.   Rep.    345,    71    S.   W.   Rep. 

314),  1363. 
Express    Co.    v.     Wilson     (81     111. 

339),    230. 
Express  Co.  v.  Wolf  (79  111.  430), 

71S,    721. 
Express  Co.  v.  Womack  (1  Heisk. 

256),  80,  304,  319,  496. 
Express  Co.  v.  Wood   (98  Ga.  268, 

25   S.  E.   436),  330. 


CVlll 


TABLE  OP   CASES   CITED. 


[REFERENCES   ABE 

Exton  V.  Railroad  Co.  (62  N.  J.  L. 
7,  42  Atl.  486,  56  L.  R.  A.  508; 
affirmed,  63  N.  J.  L.  356,  46 
Atl.  1099),  989,  1006. 


Fabel    v.    Railway    Co.    (30    Ind. 

App.  268,  65  N.  B.  Rep.  929), 

1390. 
Faber   v.   Railway  Co.    (62   Minn. 

433,  64  N.  W.  918,  36  L.  R.  A. 

789),  1077. 
Faggan  v.  Railway  Co.    (61  Hun, 

623,  16   N.   Y.   Supp.   25),  177. 
Fagg's  Adm'r  v.  Railroad  Co.   (23 

Ky.   Law  Rep.  383,  63   S.   W. 

580),   990. 
Fairbank   &    Co.    v.   Railway   Co. 

(81  Fed.  289,  26  C.  C.  A.  4u2, 

47  U.  S.  App.  744,  38  L.  R.  A. 

271,   reversing   66    Fed.    471), 

464. 
Fairbanks  v.  Kerr    (70  Penn.  St. 

90),  1430. 
Fairchild  v.  Railroad  Co.  (148  Pa. 

St.  527,  24  Atl.  Rep.  79),  201. 
Fairchild    v.    Slocum    (19    Wend. 

329;   7  Hill,  292),  261,  1338. 
Fairchild   v.    Stage    Co.    (13    Cal. 

599),  1422. 
Fairfax    v.    Railroad     (73    N.    Y. 

167),  1246. 
Fairfax  v.  Railroad    (37  N.  Y.  S. 

C.   516;    40  id.   128;    67  N.  Y. 

11),    1274,    1283,    1291. 
Faison  v.  Railway   Co.    (69  Miss. 

569,  13  So.  37,  30  Am.  St.  Rep. 

577),  1348. 


TO   SECTIONS.] 

Faith  V.   East   Ind.    Co.    (4   B.   & 

Aid.  630),  866. 
Falk  V.  Railroad  Co.   (56  N.  J.  L. 

380,  29  Atl.  157),  941. 
Falkenberg    v.    Railroad    Co.    (59 

N.  Y.  Supp.  44,  28  Misc.  165), 

444. 
Falkner  v.  Railway  Co.    (55   Ind. 

369),  1032. 
Fall  V.  Steam  Packet  Co.   (90  Md. 

248,  44  Atl.  1007,  47  L.  R.  A. 

120),    985. 
Fallon   V.    Boston    (3   Allen,   38), 

309. 
Fallon  V.  Railroad  Co.   (64  N.  Y. 

13),   1228. 
Falls  V.  Railroad  Co.  (97  Cal.  114, 

31  Pac.  901),  929,  935,  941. 
Falvey   v.    Railroad    Co.    (76    Ga. 

597),  230,  232. 
Fanning  v.  Railway  Co.   ( —  Tex. 

Civ.  App.   — ,  86   S.   W.   Rep. 

354),  1119. 
Farber  v.  Railway   Co.    (139   Mo. 

272,  40   S.  W.  932),  990. 
Farebrother  v.  Bartram   (4  Bing. 

579),  766. 
Farish  v.  Reigle   (11  Gratt.  697), 

895,  904,  958,   1414. 
Farley  v.  Lavary  (107  Ky.  523,  54 

S.   W.   Rep.   840,   47  L.   R.   A. 

383),  70,  237. 
Farley  v.  Railroad  Co.   (108  Fed. 

14,  47  C.  C.  A.  156),  1001. 
Farley  v.  Traction  Co.  (132  Penn. 

St.  58),  900. 
Farlow  v.  Kelly   (108  U.  S.  288), 

923. 
Farmers'  etc..  Bank  v.  Transporta- 
tion   Co.     (23    Vt.    186),    231, 

414,    665. 
Farmers'   &   M.    Bank   v.   Champ. 

Trans.   Co.    (16  Vt.  52;    18  id 

131;  23  id.  186),  233,  441,  696. 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


CIX 


[eeferences  are 

Farmers'  Loan  &  T.  Co.  v.  Rail- 
road Co.  (120  Fed.  873,  57 
C.  C.  A.  533,  reversing  112 
Fed.  829;  affirmed  in  Railway 
V.  American  Trading  Co.  195 
U.  S.  439),  172,  233. 

Farmers'  Loan  &  Trust  Co.  v.  R. 
&  Nav.  Co.  (73  Fed,  1003), 
714. 

Farmers'  Loan  &  Trust  Co.  v. 
Railway  Co.  (102  Fed.  17), 
1075. 

Farmington  Mercantile  Co.  v. 
Railway  Co.  (166  Mass.  154, 
44  N.  E.  131),  1348. 

Farnham  v.  Railroad  (55  Penn. 
St.  53),  401,  408,  450,   1355. 

Farnon  v.  Railroad  Co.  (180  Mass. 
212,  62  N.   E.  254),  924,  1216. 

Farnsworth  v.  Railroad  Co.  (84 
N.  Y.  Supp.  658,  88  App.  Div. 
320),  £39. 

Farr  &  Bailey  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Naviga- 
tion Co.  (98  Fed.  636,  39  C. 
C.  A.  197;  affirmed  in  Naviga- 
tion Co.  V.  Farr  &  Bailey  Mfg. 
Co.,  181  U.  S.  218,  45  L.  Ed. 
830,  21  Sup.  Ct.  R.  591),  363, 
367,  373,  380. 

Farroll  v.  Railway  Co.  (123  Iowa, 
690,  99  N.  W.  Rep.  578),  1401. 

Farrant  v.  Barnes  (11  Com.  B. 
(N.  S.)   553),  796,  798. 

Farrell  v.  Railroad  Co.  (102  N. 
Car.  390,  11  Am.  St.  Rep. 
760),  761,  763,  872. 

Farwell  v.  Davis  (66  Barb.  73), 
1366. 

Fast  V.  Railroad  Co.  (77  Miss. 
498,  27  So.  525),  1314. 

Fasy  V.  Navigation  Co.  (79  N.  Y. 
Supp.  1103,  77  App.  Div.  469; 
affirmed,  no  opinion,  177  N.  Y. 
591.  70  N.  E.  1098),  158,  1348. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Faucher  v.  Wilson   (68  N.  H.  338, 

38  Atl.  1002,  39  L.  R.  A.  431), 

70,  334. 
Faulkner  v.  Hart  (44  N.  Y.  Super. 

Ct.  *71),  77. 
Faulkner  v.  Hart   (82  N.  Y.  413), 

206,  708. 
Faulkner    v.    Railroad     Co.     (187 

Mass.    254,    72     N.     E.     976), 

1412. 
Faulkner  v.  Railway  Co.    (99  Mo. 

App.  421,   73   S.  W.  927).  241. 
Faulkner   v.    Wright    (Rice,   107), 

270. 
Faust    v.    Railroad    Co.    (8    S.    C. 

118),  741. 
Faust  V.  Railway  Co.    (104   Iowa, 

241,  73  N.  W.  623,  65  Am.  St. 

Rep.  454),  1357. 
Favre  v.  Railroad  Co.   (13  Ky.  L. 

R.  116),  1209. 
Fay    V.    ParKer    (53    N.    H.    342), 

1442. 
Fay    V.    Steamer    New    World    (1 

Cal.   348),  24. 
Fearn   v.   Ferry   Co.    (143   Pa.    St. 

122,  22  Atl.  708),  1412. 
Feiber  v.  Teiegraph  Co.    (21  Abb. 

N.  C.  11),  95. 
Feiber  v.  Telegraph  Co.    (3  N.  Y. 

Suppl.   116),  727. 
Feige   v.   Railroad   Co.    (62   Mich. 

1),   413. 
Feinberg  v.   Railroad   Co.    (52   N. 

J.  L.  451),  285,  309. 
Feise  v.   Wray    (3   East,   93)    759. 
Feital  v.  Railroad  Co.    (109  Mass. 

398),  242,   1233,   1414. 
Feldschneider  v.  Railway  Co.  (122 

Wis.  423,  99  N.  W.  Rep.  1034), 

1003,    1072,    1073,    1414,    1430. 
Feldstein  v.  Steamboat  Co.   (46  N. 

Y.    Supp.    897,    21    Misc.    60), 

677. 
Fell  v.  Knight   (8  M.  &  W.  269), 

977. 


ex 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


[befebences  are 

Fell  V.  Railroad  Co.  (41  Fed.  Rep. 

248),  1084. 
Fell  V.  Railroad  Co.  (42  Fed.  Rep. 

248),   1062,   1441. 
Fellows  V.  Steamer  Powell  (16  La. 

Ann.   316),  158. 
Felton  V.  Holbrook   (21  Ky.  Law 

Rep.  1824,  56  S.  W.  Rep.  506), 

1414. 
Felton  V.   Horner    (97  Tenn.  579, 

37   S.  W.  696),  1217. 
Felton  V.  Live  Stock  Co.   (22  Ky. 

Law  Rep.  1058,  59  S.  W.  744), 

130,  620. 
Felton    V.    Railway    Co.    (86    Mo. 

App.  832),  1293. 
Fenkhausen  v.   Fellows    (20   Nev. 

312),   76L 
Fenner    v.    Railroad     (44    N.    Y* 

505),  685,  708,  709,  720. 
Ferguson  v.  Railroad  Co.  6  App. 

D.  C.  525),  1389. 
Ferguson     v.     Railroad    Co.     (98 

Mich.    533,    57    N.     W.     801), 

1036.  1085. 
Ferguson  v.  Telephone  Co.  (71  N. 

J.  L.  59.  58  Atl.  Rep.  74), 

1397. 
Fernandez    v.    Railroad    Co.     (52 

Cal.  45),  1419. 
Ferry  v.  Railway  Co.    (118  N.  Y. 

497),    1118. 
Fessler    v.    Love    (43     Penn.     St. 

313),   1367. 
Fewings  v.  Mendenhall   (88  Minn. 

336,    93    N.    W.    Rep,    127,    97 

Am.  St.  Rep.  519,  60  L.  R.  A. 

601,  s.  c.  83  Minn  237,  86  N. 

W.  Rep.  96,  55  L.  R.  A.  713), 

980,  986. 
Ficklin   v.  Railroad   Co.    ( —  Mo. 

App.  — ,  93   S.  W.  Rep.  847), 

475. 
Ficklin    &    Sons    v.   Railroad    Co. 

(—   Mo.    App.    — ,    92    S.    W. 

Rep.   347),   475. 


TO   SECTIONS.] 

Fidelity    Land,    etc.,    Co.    v.    Buz- 
zard   (69    Kan.    330,   76    Pac. 

Rep.   832),   1397. 
Field  V.  French  (80  111.  App.  78), 

100. 
Field  V.  Railroad   (32  N.  Y.  339), 

503. 
Field   V.    Railroad    (71   111.    458), 

410- 
Fifield  V.  Insurance  Co.  (47  Penn. 

St.  166).  317. 
Filer  v.   Railroad    (49   N.  Y.  47), 

1174,   1187,   1221,   1379. 
Filer  v.  Railroad    (59   N.  Y.  351; 

68  id.  124),  1177,  1221. 
Files  V.  Railroad   Co.    (149  Mass. 

204),   964,  1000,  1218. 
Fillebrown    v.    Railroad    (55    Me. 

462),  401,  450. 
Finch  V.  Railroad  Co.    (47  Minn. 

36,  49  N.  W.  329),  1033. 
Fink    V.    Garman    (40    Penn.    St. 

95),   1386. 
Finn    v.    The   Railroad    (1   Hous. 

469),  450. 
Finn  v.  Railroad  (112  Mass,  524), 

1308,  1313. 
Finn    v.    Railway    Co.    (86    Mich. 

74),  1118. 
Finnegan     v.     Railway     Co.     (48 

Minn.   378,   51   N.  W.   122,   15 

L.  R.  A.  399),  1002. 
Fire  Association  v.  Loeb   (1  Tex. 

Ct.   Rep.   537,  59   S.   W.   617), 

503. 
First  National  Bank  v.  Dearborn 

(115  Mass.  219),  175. 
First  National  Bank  v.  Mt.  Pleas- 
ant, etc.,   Co.    (103   Iowa,  518, 

72  N.  W.  689),  176. 
First   National   Bank  v.   Railroad 

(20  Ohio  St.  259),  1164. 
First   National   Bank  v.  Railroad 

Co.    (85    Hun,    160,   32    N.    Y. 

Supp.  604),  175,  184. 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


exi 


[beferences  ake 

First   Nat'l   Bank   v.    Schmidt    (6 

Colo.   App.  216,  40  Pac.  479), 

762. 
First  National  Bank  v.  Shaw   (61 

N.   Y.   283),   201,  206. 
Fish  V.  Chapman  (2  Ga.  349),  47, 

49,   62. 
Fish    V.    Clark    (49    N.    Y.    122), 

54,  56,  65,  75,  89. 
Fisher    v.    Clisbee    (12    111.    344), 

66,  67. 
Fisher    v.    Geddes    (15    La.    Ann. 

14),   121. 
Fisher  v.  Faxon   (182  Pa.  St.  457, 

38   Atl.  407),  1126. 
Fisher   v.   Railroad    Co.    (89   Cal. 

399,  26  Pac.  894),  899. 
Fisher   v.    Railroad    Co.    (99   Me. 

338,  59  Atl.  Rep.  532,  105  Am. 

St.  Rep.  283,  68  L.  R.  A.  390), 

130,  496,  656. 
Fisher  v.  Railroad  Co.  (39  W.  Va. 

366,  19  S.  E.  578,  23  L.  R.  A. 

758),  895,  1174,  1197,  1198. 
Fisher  v.  Railroad  Co.  (42  W.  Va. 

183.  24  S.  B.  Rep.   570,  33  L. 

R.  A.  69),  1230. 
Fishman  v.  Piatt  (90  N.  Y.  Supp. 

354),   721. 
Fisk    V.    Newton    (1    Denio,    45), 

665,  685,  720. 
Fitch     V.     Newberry     (1     Doug. 

(Mich.)  1),  148,  740,  884. 
Fitzgerald  v.  Fitzgerald  &  Mallory 

Const.    Co.    (41    Neb.    374,    59 

N.  W.  838),  537. 
Fitzgerald    vL    Railroad    Co.    (50 

Iowa,  79),  1443. 
Fitzgerald  v.  Railroad  Co.  (63  Vt. 

169,   22   Atl.    76,   13   L.  R.   A. 

70),  537. 
Fitzgerald    v.    Railway    Co.     (29 

Minn.  336^,  1229. 


TO   SECTIONS.] 

Fitzgibbon    v.    Railway    Co.    (108 

Iowa,  614,  79  N.  W.  477;  s.  c. 

119  Iowa,'  261,  93  N.  W.  276), 

964,  997,  998,  1406. 
Fitzhenry  v.  Traction  Co.    (63  N. 

J.  Law  142,  42  Atl.  Rep.  416), 

1389. 
Flaherty     v.    Railroad    Co.     (186 

Mass.  567,  72   N.  E.  66),  991. 
Flaherty  v.  Railway  Co.  (39  Minn. 

328,    12    Am.    St.    Rep.    654), 

917,    1236. 
Flanagan     v.     Railroad     Co.     (55 

Hun,  611,  8  N.  Y.  Supp.  744), 

1118. 
Flanagan    v.    Railroad    Co.     (181 

Pa.  St.  237,  37  Atl.  341),  937 

1184. 
Flannery     v.     Railroad     Co.      (4 

Mackey,  111),  981. 
Flautt   V.    Lashley    (36   La.    Ann. 

106),  55. 
Fleming   v.    Hammond     (19     Ga. 

145),   113. 
Fleming  v.  Lobel  ( —  N.  J.  — ,  59 

Atl.  Rep.   27),  1397. 
Fleming  v.  Railroad  Co.    (89  Mo. 

App.  129),  923. 
Fleming  v.  Railway  Co.    (158  Pa. 

St.    130,    27    Atl.    858),    1413, 

1414. 
Fletcher  v.  Railroad  (1  Allen,  9), 

949. 
Fletcher    v.    Railroad    Co,     (187 

Mass.   463,   73   N.   E.   552,  105 

Am.  St.  Rep.  414),  1123.  1197. 
Flinn  v.  Railroad  (1  Hous.  (Del.) 

69),  1073. 
Flint  V.  Chrystal  (83  Fed.  987,  31 

C.  C.  A.  593,  i-eversing  Chrys- 
tal V.  Flint,  82  Fed.  472.     On 

certification  to  U.  S.  Supreme 

Court,    The    Irrawaddy,     171 

U.  S.  187,  18  Sup.  Ct.  R.  831, 

43  L.  Ed.   130),  345,  362,  364, 

387. 


cxu 


TABLE  OF   CASES   CITED. 


[befebences  are 

Flint   V.    Transp.    Co.    (34    Conn. 

554),   981. 
Flint    V.    Trans.    Co.     (6    Blatch. 

158;    34    Conn.    554),    985. 
Flood  V.  Crowell   (92  Fed.  402,  34 

C.  C.  A.  415),   853. 
Flood    V.    Railroad    Co.    (25    Ky. 

Law  Rep.  2135,  80  S.  W.  Rep. 

184),  1060. 
Flori   V.    St.    Louis    (3   Mo.    App. 

231),  1383. 
Florida  v.   Car  Co.    (37  Mo.  App. 

598),  113L 
Flower  v.    Railway  Co.    (2   Q.   B. 

(1894)     65.    63     L.    J.    Q.     B. 

547),  1075. 
Floyd   V.   Bovard    (6  Watts  &   S. 

75),  749. 
Floytrup     v.     Railroad     Co.    (163 

Mass.    152,     39    N.     B.     797), 

1124. 
Fluker    v.    Railroad    Co.    (81    Ga. 

461,  8  S.  E.  Rep.  529,  12  Am. 

St  Rep.  328,  2  L.  R.  A.  843), 

943. 
Flynn  v.  Railway  Co.  (43  Mo.  App. 

424),  1348,  1355. 
Fogassi  V.  Railroad  Co.   (45  N.  Y. 

Supp.    175,    17   App.   Div.   286, 

aff'g    13    Misc.    102,    34    N.    Y. 

Supp.  116),  942. 
Foggan  V.  Railway  Co.    (61  Hun, 

623,  16  N.  Y.  Supp.  25),  177. 
Foley  V.  Railroad   Co.    (98  N.   Y. 

Supp.  182),  163. 
Follman    v.    Mankato     (35    Minn. 

522),  1236. 
Fonesca   v.    Steamship    Co.     (153 

Mass.  553,  27  N.  E.  Rep.  665), 

212,  218,  1028,  1052,  1053,  1069. 
Foot    V.    Railway    Co.     (81    Minn. 

493,  84  N.  W.  342,  83  Am.  St. 

Rep.  395),  1389,  1392,  1397. 
Forbes  v.  Express  &  Transp.   Co. 
(Ill  Fed.  796),  3G9. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Forbes  v.  Railroad  Co.   (133  Mass. 

154),   192,   G68. 
Ford  V.  Mitchell  (21  Ind.  54),  107. 
Ford  V.   Monroe    (20  Wend.  210), 

1378,  1379. 
Ford  V.  Railroad  Co.  (110  La.  414, 

34  So.  Rep.  585),  970,  1024. 
Ford  V.  Railway    (2   Fos.   &  Fin. 

730),  503,  905. 
Ford  V.  Sproule   (2  A.  K.  Marsh. 

528),  758. 
Ford  V.  Williams   (21  How.  287), 

1306. 
Fordyce  v.   Beecher    (2  Tex.   Civ. 

App.  29,  21  S.  W.  Rep.  179), 

1001. 
Fordyce  v.  Dillingham   (Tex.  Cir. 

App.,  23  S.  W.  Rep.  550),  1126. 

Fordyce  v.  Jackson  (56  Ark.  594, 
20   S.   W.  528),  955,  1018. 

Fordyce  v.  Johnson  (56  Ark.  430, 
19  S.  W.  1050),  867,  885. 

Fordyce  v.  Manuel    (82  Tex.  527, 

18  S.  W.  657),  1033. 
Fordyce  v.  McCants  (51  Ark.  509, 

11  S.  W.  Rep.  694,  14  Am.  St. 
Rep.  69,  4  L.  R.  A.  296),  1397, 
1399. 
Fordyce  v.  McFlynn  (56  Ark.  424, 

19  S.  W.  961),  333,  339. 

Fordyce  v.  Merrill   (49  Ark.  277), 

936. 
Fordyce  v.  Withers    (1  Tex.   Civ. 

App.  540,  20  S.  W.  Rep.  766), 

1414,  1423. 
Fore  V.  Railway  Co.  ( —  Miss.  — , 

39  So.  Rep.  493),  1177. 
Foreman  v.  Railroad  Co.  (195  Pa. 

St.  499,  46  Atl.  109),  1017. 
Foreman  v.  Railway  Co.    (4  Tex. 

Civ.    App.    54,   23   S.   W.   Rep, 

422),  1111. 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


CXIU 


Forepaugh   v.   Railroad   Co.    (128 

Pa.    St.    217,    18    Atl.    503,    15 

Am.  St.  Rep.  672,  5  L.  R.  A. 

508),  88,  206. 
Forks  V.  King  (84  Penn.  St.  230), 

1236 
Forsee  v.  Railroad  Co.    (63  Miss. 

66),  1033,  1433,  1440,  1443. 
Forsyth  V.  Railroad  Co.   (103  Mass. 

510),   936,   940. 
Forth  V.  Simpson  (13  Q.  B.  689), 

869. 
Fortier   v.    Pennsylvania  Co.    (18 

111.  App.  260),  201. 
Fort  Wayne  v.  De  Witt  (47  Ind. 

391),  1418. 
Forward  v.  Pittard    (1  T.  R.  27), 

57,  71,  274,  275,  279,  390. 
Foss   V.   Railroad   Co.    (66   N.   H. 

256,    21    Atl.    Rep.    222),    992, 

1187. 
Foster   v.    Colby    (3   Hurlstone   & 

N.  705),  875. 
Foster  v.  Essex  Bank    (17   Mass. 

501),  40. 
Foster   v.    Frampton    (6   B.   &  C. 

107),  736. 
Foster   v.   Railway   Co.    (2   K.   B. 

(1904)     306,    73    L.    J.    K.    B. 

811),  479,  480,  612. 
Fowler  v.  Railroad  Co.  (18  W.  Va, 

579),  1221,  1417. 
Fowler   v.    Railway    Co.    (98   Mo. 

App.  210,  71  S.  W.  1077),  728. 
Fowler  v.    Steam   Co.    (87   N.    Y. 

190),  628. 
Fowler  v.  Telegraph  Co.   (80  Me. 

381),  95. 
Fowles  V.  Railway  (7  Exch.  698), 

395. 
Fox  V.  City  of  Philadelphia   (208 

Pa.  St.  127,  57  Atl.  356,  65  L. 

R.  A.  214),  100. 
Fox    V.    Glastonbury     (29    Conn. 

204),  1418. 


[befebences  are  to  sections.] 

Fox  V.  Mayor,  etc.,  of -City  of  New 

York    (39   N.  Y.  Supp.   309,  5 

App.  Div.  349),  936. 
Fox   V.   McGregor    (11   Barb.   41), 

884,  889. 
Fox  V.  Nott  (6  H.  &  N.  630),  810. 
Fox   V.   Railroad   Co.    (148   Mass. 

220),   625,   651. 
Fox  V.  Railroad  Co.   (118  Cal.  55, 

50   Pac.   Rep.    25,  62   Am.    St. 

Rep.  216),  1401. 
Fox  V.  Railroad  Co.   ( —  Mich.  — , 

101  N.  W.  Rep.  624,  68  L.  R. 

A.  336),  994,  1199. 
Pox  V.  Railway  Co.  (16  Misc.  370, 

38  N.  Y.  Supp.  88),  1348. 
Foy  V.  Railway   (18  C.  B.   (N.  S.) 

225),  933,  937,  1122,  1177,  1187. 
Foy  V.  Railway  Co.  (63  Minn.  255, 

65  N.  W.  Rep.  627),  177. 
FralofE   v.    Railroad    (10    Blatchf. 

16),  1246. 
Francis  v.  Cockrell  (L.  R.  5  Q.  B. 

184),  909. 

Francis  v.  Railroad  (25  Iowa,  60), 

702. 
Francis    v.    Transfer   Co.    (5   Mo. 

App.  7),  1428,  1431. 
Frank  v.  Keith  (2  Bush,  123),  317. 
Frank    v.    Railway    Co.    (57    Mo. 

App.  181),  714. 

Frank  Bird  Transfer  Ck).  v.  Krug 
(30  Ind.  App.  602,  65  N.  E. 
309),  1236. 

Frankfurt  v.  Weir  (83  N.  Y.  Supp. 
112,  4u  Misc.  683),  444,  1317. 

Franklin  v.  Railway  Co.  (3  H.  & 
N.  211),  1397. 

Franklin  v.  Road  Co.  (85  Cal.  63), 
1420. 

Franklin  Printing  &  Pub.  Co.  v., 
Behrens  (80  111.  App.  313;  af- 
firmed, 181  111.  340,  54  N.  E. 
896),  102. 


CXIV 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


[BEFEBENCES   ABE 

Frasier  v.  Railway  Co.  (—  S.  Car. 

— ,   52    S.   B.   Rep.   964),   172, 

201,  715. 
Frazier  v.  Railroad  Co.  (180  Mass. 

427,  G2  N.  E.  731),  938. 
Frazier  v.  Railroad  Co.    (104  Mo. 

App.  355.  78  S.  W.  Rep.  679), 

800. 
Frazier  v.  Railway  Co.   (48  Iowa, 

571),  105. 
Freeh  v.  Railroad   (39  Md.  574), 

1417. 
Frederick    v.    Railroad     (5    Cent. 

Law  Jour.  476),  1039. 
Frederick    v.     Railroad    Co.     (37 

Mich.    342),   1039,   1045,   1061, 

1065,  1066. 
Fredericks   v.   Railroad   Co.    (157 

Pa.  St.  103,  27  Atl.  689,  22  L. 

R.   A.   306),   950,   1412. 
Freedon  v.  Railroad  Co.  (48  N.  Y. 

Supp.  584,  24  App.  Div.  306), 

970. 
Freeman  v.  Birch   (3  Q.  B.  492), 

1305,  1315. 
Freeman  c.  Buckingham  (18  How. 

182),  160,  161. 
Freeman  v.  East  Ind.  Co.   (5  B.  & 

Aid.  617),  7;^8,  791. 
Freeman  v.  Railroad  Co,  (65  Mich. 

577),  1110. 
Freeman    v.    Railroad    Co.     (131 

Mich.    544,   91   N.   W.   1021,   9 

Det.   L.    N.   436,   100    Am.    St. 

Rep.  621),  1217. 
Freeman  v.  Railway  Co.  ( —  Kan. 

— ,  80  Pac.  Rep.  592),  1043. 
Freeman  v.  Railway  Co.   ( —  Mo. 

App.  — ,  93  S.  W.  Rep.   302), 

442,  443,  723. 
Freemont,   etc.,   Railroad    Co.    v. 

New  York,  etc.,  Railroad  Co. 

(66  Neb.  159,  92  N.  W.  131), 

233. 


TO   SECTIONS.] 

Freer  v,  Cameron    (4  Rich.  228), 

1015. 
Frelson   v.    So.    Pac.   Co.    (42   La. 

Ann.  673),  951. 
French  v.  Railroad   (4  Keyes    (N. 

Y.),  108),  451,  463. 
French  v.  Transportation  Co.  (134 

Mass.  288),  740. 
Frick  V.  Railway  Co.  (75  Mo.  542), 

1378. 
Friedenrich   v.    Railroad    Co.    (53 

Md.  201),  1056. 
Friedlander  v.  Railway  (130  U.  S. 

416),  161,  175. 
Friedman    v.    Metropolitan    S.    S. 

Co.    (90   N.   Y.    Supp.    401,   45 

Misc.  383),  690. 
Fiiend  v.   Woods    (6   Gratt.   189), 

270. 
Frink  v.  Coe   (4  G.  Greene,  555), 

68,  904,  958,  959,  961,  1439. 
Frink  v.  Potter   (17  111.  406),  904, 

1412. 
Frink   v.    Schroyer    (18   III.   416), 

1019,   1423. 
Fritz  V.  Railway  Co.   (132  N.  Car. 

829,  44  3.  E.  Rep.  613),  983. 
Frobisher  v.  Transp.  Co.  (81  Hun, 

544,    30    N.    Y.    Supp.    1099), 

952,   1005,   1182. 
Frohlich  Glass  Co.  v.  Railroad  Co. 
(—   Mich.  — ,   101   N.  W.   Rep. 

223),  508. 
Frohriep    v.     Railway    Co.     (131 

Mich.  459,  9  Det.  L.  N.  415,  91 

N.  W.  Rep.  748),  1217. 
Fromont    v.    Coupland     (2    Bing. 

170),  249. 
Frost  V.   Plumb    (40   Conn.    Ill), 

1233. 
Fulks    V.    Railway    Co.    (Ill    Mo. 

335,  19  S.  V/.  818),  1179,  1182. 
Fuller   V.    Bradley    (25    Penn.    St. 

120),  46,  65,  75,  864,  870. 


TABLE  OF   CASES   CITED. 


cxv 


[BEFERENCES   ABE 

Fuller  V.   Brown    (11  Mete.  440), 

627. 
Fuller  V.  Railroad  (21  Conn.  557), 

76,  1118. 
Fuller  V.  Railroad  Co.    (31  Iowa, 

187),  1342.     t^ 
Fullerton  v.   Fordyce   (121  Mo.  1, 

25  S.  W.  587,  42  Am.  St.  Rep. 

516),   918,   933. 
Fulmer  v.  Railway  Co.  (67  S.  Car. 

262,  45  S.  E.  196),  1033. 
Fulton  V.  Railroad  Co.    (11  U.  C. 

Q.  B.  428),  1024. 
Funk  V.  Potter  (17  111.  406),  910. 
Funnel  v.  Pettijohn   (2  Harr.  48), 

339. 
Furlong  v.   Polleys    (30  Me.   491), 

1367.. 
Furman  v.  Railroad  Co.  (57  Iowa, 

42),  740. 
Furman  v.  Railroad  Co.  (62  Iowa, 

395),  740. 
Furman  v.  Railroad  Co.  (68  Iowa, 

219),  740. 
Furman  v.  Railroad  Co.  (81  Iowa, 

540,  46  N.  W.  Rep.  1049),  740. 
Furman    v.    Railroad    (106    N.    Y. 

579),  177,  180,  184,  187. 
Furness  v.  Forwood    (77  Law.   T. 

•      (N.   S.)    95),  841. 
Furnish  v.  Railway  Co.   (102  Mo. 

438),  895,  1414. 
Furstenheim  v.  Railroad  (9  Heisk. 

238),  238. 


Gabler  v.  McChesney    (70   N.   Y. 

Supp.  195,  60  App.  Div.  590), 

833,  849,  853. 
Gabriel  v.  Railroad  Co.   (66  N.  Y. 

Supp.  301,   54   App.   Div.   41), 

933. 


TO   SECTIONS.] 

Gage  V.  Tirrell   (9  Allen,  299),  74, 

267,  627. 
Gahagan    v.    Railroad    (1    Allen, 

187),  1175. 
Gaines   v.    Railway    Co.    (75   Tex. 

572,  12  S.  W.  1001),  525. 
Gaines  v.   Transportation  Co.    (28 

Ohio  St.  418),  410,  416,  1354. 
Gallin  v.  Railway   (L.  R.  10  Q.  B. 

212),   1073. 
Galloway   v.  Railroad  Co.    (95   N. 

Y.    Supp.    17,    107    App.    Div. 

210),  454. 
Galloway  v.  Railway  Co.  (87  Iowa, 

458,  54  N.  W.  447),  1177. 
Galloway  v.  Railway  Co.  (56  Minn. 

346,   57   N.  W.   1058,   23   L.  R. 

A.  442),  991,  1011. 
Gait  V.   Express  Co.    (4  MacArth. 

124),  80,  452. 
Ganguzza  v.  Anchor  Line   (89  N. 

Y.    Supp.    1049,    97    App.    Div. 

352),  1194. 
Ganiard  v.  Railroad  Co.   (50  Hun, 

22),  lllL 
Gann  v.  Railway  Co.  (72  Mo.  App. 

34),  1366. 
Gann   v.   Worman    (69   Ind.   458), 

1389. 
Gannell   v.    Ford     (5     L.    T.   Rep. 

604),  341. 
Gannon  v.  Railroad  Co.  (173  Mass. 

40,  52  N.  E.  1075,  43  L.  R.  A. 

833),  1223. 
Gardner   v.   New   Haven,   etc.   Co. 

(51  Conn.   143),   1001. 
Gardner  v.  Railroad  Co.    ( —  Mo. 

App.  — ,  93   S.  W.  Rep.   917), 

964. 

Gardner  v.  Railroad  Co.  (97  Ga. 
482,  25  S.  E.  Rep.  334,  54  Am. 
St.  Rep.  435;  s.  c.  94  Ga.  538, 
19  S.  E.  Rep.  757),  1019,  1200, 
1414. 


exvi 


TABLE   OF   CASES    CITED. 


[BEFEBENCES    ABE 

Gardner  v.  Railway   Co.    (127   N. 

Car.  293,  37  S.  B.  Rep.  328), 

426,  450,  475. 
Garfield    &   Proctor    Coal     Co.   v. 

Railroad  Co.    (166  Mass.   119, 

44  N.  E.  Rep.  119),  857. 
Garlington  v.   Railway   Co.    (Tex. 

Civ.  App.,  78  S.  W.  Rep.  368), 

1366. 
Garneau  v.  Railroad  Co.   (109  111. 

App.  169),  900,  933. 
In  re  Garnett  (141  U.  S.  12),  344. 
Garnett   v.    Willan    (5   B.    &   Aid. 

53),   392. 
Garoni  v.  Navigation  Co.    (14  N. 

Y.  Suppl.  797),  1147. 
Garrett  V.  Railway  (36  Iowa,  121), 

1411. 
Garrick    v.    Railroad    Co.    (53    S. 

Car.   448,   31   S.  E.  Rep.   334, 

69   Am.    St.    Rep.    874),    1397, 

1400. 
Garrison  v.  Electric  Co.    (97  Md. 

347,  55  Atl.  371),  1085. 
Garrison  v.  Memphis  Ins.  Co.   (19 

How.  312),  281,  483,  489,  490. 
Garside  v.  Trent.  Nav.  Co.    (4  T. 

R.  581),  696. 
Garston  Co.  v.   Hickie    (15  Q.   B. 

Div.  580),  831. 
Garston  Co.   v.   Hickie    (18  Q.  B. 

Div.  17),  483,  831. 
Garton  v.  Railway  Co.   (1  B.  &  S. 

110),  521. 
Gary  v.  Railway  Co.  (17  Tex.  Civ. 

App.  129,  42  S.  W.  Rep.  576), 

895,  1002. 
Gashweiler  v.  Railway  Co.  (83  Mo. 

112).  702. 
Gass    V.    Railroad    Co.    (99    Mass. 

220),  131,  257,  264. 
Gasway   v.  Railroad   Co.    (58   Ga. 

216),  961,  1094. 
Gates    V.    Railroad    Co.    (42   Neb. 

379,  60  N.  W.  583),  181. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Gates  V.  Ryan  (37  Fed.  Rep.  154), 

692,    807. 
Gatliffe,  v.  Bourne    (4  Bing.  314), 

688,  696,  698. 
Gatton  V.  Railway  Co.    (95  Iowa, 

112,  63  N.  W.  589,  28  L.  R.  A. 

556),  525,  537. 
Gatzow  V.  Buening  (106  Wis.  1,  81 

N.  W.  Rep.  1003,  49  L.  R.  A. 

475,  80  Am.  St.  Rep.  1),  447. 
Gaukler  v.  Railway  Co.  (130  Mich. 

666,  90  N.  W.  660),  994,  1083. 
Gavett  V.  Railroad  (16  Gray,  501), 

1175,   1180. 
Gay  V.  Winter  (34  Cal.  153),  1391. 
Gaynor  v.  Railway  Co.  (100  Mass. 

208),  936,  940,  1119. 
Gee  V.   Railway  Co.    (6   H.   &  N. 

211),   1369,   1370. 
Gee   V.   Railway    (L.    R.    8   Q.    B. 

161),  1122,  1216,  1225. 
Gee  V.  Railway    (30   L.  J.  Exch. 

11;  6  H.  &  N.  211),  1367. 
Geismann  v.  Electric  Co.  (173  Mo. 

654,  73  S.  W.  Rep.  654),  1401. 
Geismer  v.   Railway   Co.    (102   N. 

Y.  563),  316,  657. 
Gelinas  v.  Railway  Co.    (11  Rap. 

Jud.  Que.   (C.  S.)   253),  442. 
Gelvin  v.  Railway  Co.  (21  Mo.  Ap. 

273),  630. 
General    Electric   Co.   v.    Railway 

Co.    (—   S.   Car.   — ,   51   S.  E. 

Rep.   695),   187. 
General  Fire  Extinguisher  Co.  v. 

Railway  Co.  (137  N.  Car.  278, 

49  S.  E.  Rep.  208),  306,  1354. 
Geogagn   v.   Railroad   Co.    (42   N. 

Y.    Supp.    205,    10    App.    Div. 

454),  1180. 
Geoghegan  v.   Steamship   Co.    (22 

N.  Y.  Supp.  749,  3  Misc.  224), 

1387. 
George   v.    Railway    Co.    (57    Mo< 

App.  358),  1352,  1355. 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


CXVU 


[references  are 

George    v     Skivington     (5    L.    R. 

Exch.  1),  796. 
Georgia,  etc.  Co.  v.  Smith  (70  Ga. 

694),  574. 
Georgia  R.  &  B.  Co.  v.  Tice   (— 

Ga.   — ,    52    S.    E.   Rep.    916), 

918,  1379. 
Gerhard  v.   Neese    (36  Tex.  635), 

652. 
Gerhart  v.  Railroad  Co.   (110  Mo. 

App.  105,  84  S.  W.  Rep.  100), 

936. 
German,  etc.,  Co.  v.  The  Railway 

(38  Iowa,  127),  475. 
German    State   Bank   v.    Railway- 
Co.  (113  Fed.  414),  94. 
Germania    Fruit   Co.    v.    Railroad 

Co.     (133    Cal.    426,     65     Pac. 

948),  226. 
Geroux  v.  Graves   (62  Vt.  280,  19 

Atl.  Rep.  987),  1394. 
Gerry  v.  Express  Co.   ( —  Me.  — , 

62  Atl.  Rep.  498),  433. 
Gerstle   v.   Railway    Co.    (23   Mo. 

Ap.  361).  1192,  1197,  1198. 
Gibbon  v.  Paynton  (4  Burr.  2298), 

329,  390,   440,  441. 
Gibbons  v.  Farwell  (63  Mich.  344), 

741,  742. 
Gibbons  v.   Pepper    (1  Ld.  Raym. 

38),  1430. 
Gibbons   v.    Williams    (135   Mass. 

335),  1229. 
Gibbs  V.  Hannibal    (82  Mo.  143), 

1389. 
Giblin  v.  National  S.  S.  Co.  (28  N. 

Y.  Supp.  69,  8  Misc.  22),  342. 
Gibson   v.   Brown    (44    Fed.   Rep. 

98),  800,  803. 
Gibson  v.  Culver  (17  Wend.  305), 

133,  665,  688,  696,  710. 
Gibson  v.  International  Trust  Co. 
(186  Mass.  454,  72  N.  E.  70), 

100. 


TO   SECTIONS.] 

Gibson  v.  International  Trust  Co. 

(177  Mass.  100,  58  N.  E.  Rep. 

278,  52  L.  R.  A.  928),  100. 
Gibson   v.   Railroad   Co.    (30   Fed. 

Rep.  904),  1025. 
Gibson  v.  Sturge   (10  Exch.  622), 

800,  812,  828. 
Gilbart  v.  Dale  (5  Ad.  &  El.  543), 

1347. 
Gilbert  v.  Railway  Co.   (54  N.  Y. 

Super.  270),  1111. 
Giles  V.   Fargo    (60   N.   Y.   Super. 

Ct.   117,  17  N.  Y.   Supp.  476), 

451,  505. 
Giles  V,  Fauntleroy  (13  Md.  126), 

1246,  1249. 
Gilleland    &    Dillingham    v.    Rail- 
road Co.    (119   Ga.   789,  47  S. 

E.  336),  509. 
Gillenwater   v.    Railroad    (5    Ind. 

339),  909,  1022. 
Gillespie  v,  McGowan    (100  Penn. 

St.  144),  1228. 
Gillespie   v.   Railway   Co.    (6   Mo. 

Ap.  554),  271,  309. 
Gillespie   v.    Thompson    (6    El.   & 

Bl.  477,  note),  606. 
Gillett  V.  Ellis   (11  111.  579),  485, 

607. 
Gillett  V.  Railway  Co.   (4  Tex.  Ct. 

Rep.   414,  856,  68   S.  W.  Rep. 

61),  612. 
Gilligan  v.  Railroad  Co.   (1  E.  D. 

Smith,  453),  1381,  1397. 
Gilliland  v.  Railroad  Co.  (81  Miss. 

41,   32   So.   916),   592. 
Gillingham  v.  Dempsey   (12  Serg. 

&  R.  183),  1360. 
Gillingham  v.  Railroad  Co.  (35  W. 

Va.  588,  14  S.  E.  Rep.  243,  29 

Am.  St.  Rep.  827,  14  L.  R.  A. 

798),  1093,  1100. 
Gillis   V.   Railroad    Co,    (59    Penn. 

St.  129),  991. 
Gillis    V.    Telegraph    Co.    (61    Vt. 

461),  95. 


CXVlll 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


[BEFEBENCES   ABE 

Gillman    v.    Railroad    Co.    (53    S. 

Car.  210,  31  S.  E.  224),  1440. 

Gillshannon   v.   Railroad   Co.    (10 

Cush.  228),  1004. 
Gillum    V.    Steamship    Co.     (Tex. 
Civ.  App.,  76  S.  W.  Rep.  232), 
1417. 
Oilman  v.  Railroad  Co.  (10  Allen, 

233,  87  Am.  Dec.  635),  1004. 
Gilman  v.  Railroad  Co.  (168  Mass. 

454,  47  N.  E.  193),  957. 
Gilman  v.  Telegraph  Co.  (95  N.  Y. 
Supp.  564,  48  Misc.  Rep.  372), 
97. 
Gilmore  v.  Carman    (1  Sm.  &  M. 

279),  75,  279. 
Gilmore  v.  Railroad  Co.    (154  Pa. 

St.  375,  25  Atl.  774),  937. 
Gilmore  v.  Railway  Co.  (29  Wash. 

150,  69  Pac.  743),  1118. 
Gilpins  V.  Consequa   (1  Peters'  C. 

Ct.  85),  625. 
Gilroy  v.  Price  (App.  Cas.  (1893) 

56),  374. 
Gilson  V.  Gwinn   (107  Mass.  126), 

884. 
Gilson    V.    Railway    Co.    (76    Mo. 

282),   895. 
Ginn      v.       Ogdensburg      Transit 
Co.    (85  Fed.  985,  29  C.  C.  A. 
521),  442. 
Ginna  v.  Railroad  Co.    (67  N.  Y. 

596),  1197,  1198,  1226. 
Ginnon   v.   Railroad    (3  Rob.    (N. 

Y.)    25),   1181. 
Girton  v.  Railroad  Co.  (199  Pa.  St. 

147,  48  Atl.  970),  1186,  1219. 
Gisbourn  v.  Hurst   (1  Salk.  249), 

47. 
Glasscock  v.  Railway  Co.   (86  Mo. 

App.  114),  1366. 
Glasser  v.  Railway  Co.   (57  Penn. 

St.  172),  1392. 
Glassey  v.  Railway  Co.   (57  Penn. 
St.  172),  1229,  1382. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Gleadell   v.   Thomson     (56    N.   Y. 

194),   689,  799. 
Gleason  v.  Duffy    (116  Fed.  301), 

344. 
Gleason  v.  Transportation  Co.  (32 

Wis.   85),   1246,   1272. 
Gleeson   v.   Railroad   Co.    (140   U. 
S.  435,  11  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  859), 
947,  1412. 
Gleeson  v.  Railroad  Co.   (5  Mack- 

ey,  356),  271,  284,  300,  309. 
Gleeson  v.  Railroad  Co.  (140  U.  S. 

435),  271,  284,  300,  309. 
Glenn   v.   Express   Co.    (86   Tenn. 

594),  442. 
Glenn  v.  Railroad  Co.  ( —  Ind.  — , 
75  N.  E.  Rep.  282,  aff'g,  s.  c. 
(Ind.    App.)     73    N.    E,    Rep. 
861),  936,  1016. 
Glover   v.   Railroad    Co.    (95    Mo. 
App.  369,  69  S.  W.  599),  140, 
613,  867. 
Glovinsky    v.    Steamship    Co.    (26 
N.  Y.  Supp.  751,  6  Misc.  388, 
aff'g.,   24    N.    Y.   Supp.    136,    4 
Misc.  266),  1299,  1363. 
Glynn  v.  Margetson  &  Co.    (L.  R. 
(1893)  App.  Cas.  351,  62  L.  J. 
Q.   B.   466,   aff'g.,    (1892)    1   Q. 
B.   337,   61-  L.   J,   Q.   B.    186), 
622. 
Godbout  v.  St.  Paul  Union  Depot 
Co.    (79  Minn.  188,   81   N.  W. 
835,  47  L.  R.  A.  532),  944. 
Goddard  v.  Mallory  (52  Barb.  87), 

462,  617. 
Goddard     v.     Railroad     Co.     (179 
Mass.   52,   60  N.  E.   486),   935. 
Goddard  v.  Railway  (57  Me.  202), 

980,   1094,   1442,   1444. 
Godfrey  v.  Railway  Co.   (116  Ind. 

30),    1059. 
Goetter  v.   Pickett    (61   Ala.    3S7), 
233. 


TABLE  OF   CASES   CITED. 


CXIX 


[BEFEKENCES   ABE   TO   SECTIONS.] 

Goff  V.  Railway  (3  El.  &  El.  672), 

1100,  1441. 
Goffin   V.   The   Railway    (102   Mo. 

540,  15  S.  W.  Rep.  76),  1414. 


Goggin  V.  Railway   Co.    (12   Kan. 

416),  443. 
Goins    V.    Railroad    Co.     (68    Ga, 

190),  1404. 
Gold    Hunter,    The    (1    Bl.   &    H. 

300),  491. 
Goldberg  v.  Railroad  Co.   (133  N. 
Y.  561,  30  N.  E.  597,  reversing 
15  N.  Y.  Supp.  579),  1219. 
Goldberg  v.  Railroad  Co.  (60  Hun, 
586,  15  N.  Y.  Supp.  579),  1219. 
Goldberg  v.  Railway  Co.  (105  Wis. 
1,   80  N.  W.   920,  47   L.  R.  A. 
221,    76    Am.    St.    Rep.    899), 
1281,  1286. 
Goldbovitz  V.  Metropolitan  Express 
Co.  (91  N.  Y.  Supp.  318),  651. 
Goldey  v.  Railroad    (30  Penn.  St. 

242),  450,  1355. 
Goldsmith  v.  Building  Co.  ( —  Mo. 
App.  — ,  83  S.  W.  Rep.  1112), 
100,  894,  895,  896. 
Goller  V.  Railroad  (96  N.  Y.  Supp. 

483),  1212. 
Good  V.   Railway  Co.    (Tex.,  1   S. 

W.  854),  450. 
Good    &   Co.    V.    Isaacs    (2    Q.    B. 
(1892)     555,    61    L.    J.    Q.    B. 
649),  840,  8-46. 
Goodbar  v.  Railway  Co.    (53  Mo. 

App.  434),  112. 
Goodlett  V.  Railroad  Co.    (122  U. 

S.  391),  1175. 
Goodloe  V.  Railroad  Co.  (107  Ala. 
233,   18   So.   166,   29   L.   R.   A. 
729),  1099. 
Goodman  v.   Harvey   (4  Ad.  &  E. 

870),  176. 
Goodman   v.    Navigation    Co.    (22 

Or.  14,  28  Pac.  894),  333. 
Goodman  v.  Railway  Co.   (71  Mo. 
App.   460),   429. 


Goodman    v.    Simonds    (20    How. 

343),  176. 
Goodrich  v.  Railroad  Co.  (29  Hun, 

50),  1197. 
Goodrich  v.  Thompson    (44  N.  Y. 

324),  462,  480,  617. 
Goodsell    V.    Railroad     (33    Conn. 

51),  1384,  1386,  1389. 
Goodsell  V.  Taylor  (41  Minn.  207), 

100. 
Goodwin  v.  Lumber  Co.    (109  La. 

1050,  34  So.  Rep.  74),  1396. 
Goodwin   v.   Nicholson    (17    R.   L 

478,  23  Atl.  Rep.  12),  1389. 
Goodwin    v.    Railroad    (58    Barb. 

195),  664,  691. 
Goodwin  v.  Railroad  Co.   (84  Me. 

203,   24  Atl.  816),  1197. 
Goodwyn  v.   Douglass    (1   Cheves, 

174),   1318. 
Goold  v.   Chapin    (20  N.   Y.  259), 

132,  714. 
Gordon  v.  Bachanan   (5  Yer.  71), 

52,  483,  486. 
Gordon  v.  Hutchinson  (1  Watts  & 

S.   285),   47,   50,  52,  53,  54. 
Gordon   v.    Railroad     (52    N.    H. 

596),  1107,  1117. 
Gordon    v.     Railroad     (40     Barb. 

546),  1009. 
Gore    V.    Transportation     Co.     (2 

Daly,  254),  1271,  1272. 
Gorham  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Fargo  (35  N. 

Y.  Super.  434),  331,  395. 
Gorman  v.  Budlong  (23  R.  I.  169, 
49  Atl.  704,   91   Am.   St.   Rep. 
629),  1389. 
Gorman  v.  Southern  Pac.  Co.   (97 
Cal.    1,   31   Pac.   1112,  33   Am. 
St.   Rep.    157),   1407,    1433. 
Gosling  V.    Birnie    (7  Bing.    339), 

750. 
Gosling  V.  Higgins  (1  Camp.  451), 

674. 
Gott  V.  Dinsmore   (111  Mass.  45), 
471. 


cxx 


TABLE  OF   CASES   CITED. 


[BEFEEENCES   ABE 

Gottlieb  V.  Railroad  Co.  (71  N.  J. 

Law   47,    58    Atl.  Rep.    1088), 

1389,  1394. 
Gottlieb  V.  Railway  Co.   (—  N.  J. 

Law   — ,    63    Atl.    Rep.    339), 

1389. 
Gould   V.   Grafflin    (62   Fed.   605), 

855. 
Gould  V.   Hill    (2   Hill,  623),  400, 

401,  41L 
Gould    V.    Oliver    (4    Bing.    N.    C. 

134),  605. 
Govett  V.  Radnidge   (3  East,  62), 

1326,  1327. 
Grace  v,  Adams   (100  Mass.  505), 

233,   401,   408. 
Gracie  v.  Palmer  (8  Wheat.  605), 

889. 
Gradert  v.  Railway  Co.  (109  Iowa, 

547,  80  N.  W.  559),  1223. 
Gradin  v.  Railway  Co.   (30  Minn. 

217),  964. 
GraefE   v.    Railroad    (161    Pa.    St. 

230,    28    Atl.    1107,    23    L.    R. 

A.  606,  41  Am.  St.  Rep.  885), 

911,  927,  983. 
Graf  V.  Railroad  Co.   ( —  N.  J.  L. 

— ,  62  Atl.  Rep.  333),  927. 
Graffam  v.  Railroad  (67  Me.  234), 

1279. 
Graham  v.  Davis  (4  Ohio  St.  362), 

410,  450,  480,  487,  1354. 
Graham  v.  McNeill  (20  Wash.  466, 

55  Pac.  631,  72  Am.   St.  Rep. 

121,   43   L.   R.   A.   300),    1113, 

1197,  1198. 
Graham  v.  Planters'  Compress  Co. 

(129  Fed.  253),   853. 
Graham  v.  Railroad  Co.    (39  Fed. 

Rep.  596),  1188. 
Graham  v.  Railroad   Co.    (60  Mo. 

536),  1003. 
Graham  v.  Railway  Co.   (39  Minn. 

81),   1414. 
Graham  v.  Railway  Co.    (49  Wis. 

443),  1342. 


TO   SECTIONS.] 

Graham  v.  Railway  Co.  (53  Wis. 
473),  1342. 

Graham  v.  Railway  Co.  ( —  Iowa, 
— ,  107  N.  W.  Rep.  595),  990. 

Graham  v.  Railway  Co.  (149  N. 
Y.  336),  43  N.  E.  917,  revers- 
ing 28  N.  Y.  Supp.  739,  8  Misc. 
305),  1198. 

Graham  v.  Traction  Co.  (64  N.  J. 
L.  10,  44  Atl.  Rep.  964),  1397. 

Graham  &  Co.  v.  Davis  &  Co.  (4 
Ohio   St.  362),  409,  451,  1354. 

Graham  &  Morton  v.  Young  (117 
111.  App.  257),  1301. 

Grand  v.  Livingston  (4  App.  Div. 
589,  38  N.  Y.  Supp.  490;  af- 
firmed without  opinion,  158 
N.  Y.  688,  53  N.  E.  1125),  212, 
213,   214,  215,   220. 

Grand  Tower,  etc.  Co.  v.  UUman 
(89  111.  244),  113. 

Granier  v.  Railroad  Co.  (42  La. 
Ann.  800),  1056. 

Grant  v.  Baker  (12  Oreg.  329), 
1417. 

Grant  v.  Coverdale  (9  A.  C.  470), 
845. 

Grant  v.  Norway    (10  C.  B.  665), 

159,  165,  166. 
Grant  v.  Railroad  Co.   (108  N.  C. 

462),  1017. 
Gratiot,  etc.,   Co.  v.  Railroad   Co. 

(—  111.  — ,  77  N.  E.  Rep.  675), 

714. 
Graven   v.   McLeod    (92   Fed.   846, 

35  C.  C.  A.  47).  1219. 
Graves  v.  Express  Co.   (176  Mass. 

280,   57   N.   E.   462),   426,   428, 

433,  437. 
Graves  v.  Railroad  Co.    (57  N.  Y. 

Supp.  636,  29  App.  Div.  591), 

1287. 
Graves  v.  Railway  Co.   (137  Mass. 

33),  426,  438. 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


CXXl 


[REFEBENCES   ABE   TO    SECTIONS.] 


Graves   v.   Steamship  Co.    (61   N. 

Y.   Supp.    115,    29   Misc.    645), 

322,  324,  462. 
Graves  v.  Ticknor   (6  N.  H.  537), 

31. 
Graville   v.  Railroad  Co.    (105  N. 

Y.  525),  1077. 
Gray  v.  Can-  (L.  R.  6  Q.  B.  522), 

856,  866. 
Gray    v.   Jaclison    (51    N.    H.    9), 

130,    131,    211,    227,    228,    231, 

232,  238,  261. 
Gray  v.  McDonald   (104  Mo.  303), 

1386,  1391.  1400. 
Gray  v.  Missouri  Packet  Co.    (64 

Mo.  47),  19,  1360. 
Gray  v.  Railroad   Co.    (168  Mass. 

20,   46   N.  E.   397),   1099. 
Gray  v.  Railway  Co.   (54  Mo.  App. 

666),  1373. 
Gray   v.   Railway    Co.    (87    Minn. 

280,    91    N.    W.    Rep.    1106), 

1401. 
Gray  v.  Scott   (66  Penn  St.  345), 

1227,  1228. 
Gray  v.  Wain  (2  S.  &  R.  229),  816. 
Grayson    County    Nat'l    Bank     v. 

Railway    Co.     ( —    Tex.    Civ. 

App.  — ,  79  S.  W.  Rep.  1094), 

175,  177,  184,  1360. 
Green  v.  Clark  (13  Barb.  57;  s.  c. 

12   N.  Y.  343),  1215,  1306. 
Green    v.    Dunn    (3    Camp.    215), 

753. 
Green  v.  Mann  (11  111.  613),  1369. 
Green  v.  Pacific  Lumber  Co.   (130 

Cal.    435,    62    Pac.    747),    895, 

898,   899,   1223,   1414. 
Green  v.  Railroad  (41  Iowa,  410), 

116. 
Green  v.  Railroad   (38  Iowa.  100), 

116. 
Green  v.  Railroad  Co.   (128  Mass. 

221),  1363. 
Green  v.  Railroad   (4  Daly,  553), 

1302. 


Green  v.  Railroad   Co.    (28  Barb. 

9;   2  Keyes,  292),  1376. 
Green  v.  Railroad  Co.    (53  N.   Y. 

Supp.  500,  31  App.  Div.  412), 

936. 
Green  v.   Williams    (45   III.   206), 

1373. 
Green   v.    Young  Men's   Christian 

Ass'n    (65  111.  App.  459),  100. 
Green  Wheeler  Shoe  Co.  v.  Rail- 
way Co.   ( —  Iowa  — ,  106  N. 

W.  Rep.  498),  304. 
Greenfield    v.    Railway    Co.     (133 

Mich.  557,   10  Det.  L.  N.  256, 

95  N.  W.  546),  964, 

Greenwood  v.  Cooper  (10  La.  Ann. 

796),  120. 
Gregg  V.  Railroad  Co.  (147  111.  550, 

35  N.  E.  343,  37  Am.  St.  Rep. 

238),   177,   686,   702,   711,    714, 

869,  880. 
Gregory  v.  Railroad  Co.   (10  Neb. 

250),  11)53,  1054. 
Gregory     v.     Railroad     Co.     (126 

Iowa,    230,    101    N.    W.    Rep. 

761),   1397. 
Gregory  v.  Railroad  Co.    (26  Ky, 

L.  R.  76,  80  S.  W.  Rep.  795), 

1384. 
Gregory  v.  Railway  Co.  (2  H.  &  C. 

944),   34L 
Gregory   v.   Railway   Co.    (46  Mo. 

App.    574),   113. 
Gregory  v.  Railway  Co.  (100  Iowa, 

345,  69  N.  W.  532),  1077. 
Gregory   v.    Webb.    ( —   Tex.    Civ. 

App.  — ,  89  S.  W.  Rep.  1109), 

1281. 
Gremes  v.  Penn  Co.  (36  Fed.  Rep. 

72),    1009. 
Gress    v.    Railway    Co.    (109    Mo. 

App.  716,  84  S.  W.  Rep.  122), 

1118,  1179,  1180.         , 
Greve  v.  Dunham  (60  Iowa,  108), 

768. 


CXXll 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


[references  are 

Grey's  Ex'r  v.  Mobile  Co.  (55  Ala. 

387),    1354. 
Grier    v.    Railway    Co.    (108    Mo. 

App.  565,  84  S.  W.  Rep.  158), 

292,  309,  1352. 
Grieve  v.  Railroad  Co.   (104  Iowa, 

659,  74  N.  W.  192),  442,  640, 

1357. 
Grieve  v.  Railroad  Co.   (49  N.  Y. 

Supp.  949),  708. 
Grieve  v.  Railway  Co.  (65  N.  J.  L. 

409,  47  Atl.  Rep.  427),  1401. 
Griffen  v.  Manice  (166  N.  Y.  188, 

59  N.  E.  925,  82  Am.  St.  Rep. 

630,  52  L.  R.  A.  922,  reversing 

62  N.  Y.   Supp.  364,  1138;    47 

App.  Div.  70;   s.  c.  77   N.  Y. 

Supp.  626,  74  App.  Div.  371; 

affirmed,  no  opinion,  174  N.  Y. 

505,  66  N.  E.  1109),  100,  102. 
Griffin  v.   Colver    (16  N.  Y.  489), 

1367,  1369. 
Griffin  v.  Railroad    Co.     ( —    Mo. 

App.  — ,  91  S.  W.  Rep.  1015), 

548,  1355. 
Griffith  v.  Cave   (22  Cal.  535),  66. 

Griffith   V.    Ingledew    (6    S.   &   R. 
429),  1307,  1310,  1315. 

Griffith   V.   Railway    Co.    (98   Mo. 

168),  1122. 
Griffith   V.   Railway   Co.    (—  Mo. 

App.  — ,  90  S.  W.  Rep.  408), 

226,   1298,   1302. 
Griffiths  V.  Lee  (1  Car.  &  P.  110), 

1352. 
Griggs    V.    Austin    (3    Pick.    20), 

830. 
Griggsby    v.    Chappell     (5    Rich. 

443),  103. 
Grill  v.  Screw  Co.   (1  C.  P.  600), 

487. 
Grill  V.  Screw  Co.   (3  C.  P.  476), 

487. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Grimes  v.  Penn.  Co.  (36  Fed.  72), 

1009. 
Grindle   v.    Express    Co.    (67    Me. 

317),  238. 
Grinnell    v.    Telegraph    Co.     (113 

Mass.    299),   95. 
Grinnell    v.   Wells     (7   M.     &    G. 

1041),   1377. 
Griswold    v.    Griswold    (111    Ala. 

572,    20    So.    Rep.    437),    1402. 
Griswold     v.     Insurance     Co.     (1 

Johns.    205),   801. 
Griswold     v.     Insurance     Co.     (3 

Johns.   321),   802,   823. 
Griswold     v.     Railroad     Co.      (53 

Conn.   371),   1018,  1073. 

Griswold  v.  Railroad  Co.  (64  Wis. 

652),    991. 
Griswold      v.      Waddington      (16 

Johns.   438),   322. 
Griswold  v.  Webb    (6  R.  I.  694), 

944. 
Grogan  v.  Express  Co.  (114  Penn. 

St.   523),   80,   426,   450. 
Grogan  v.  Railway  Co.  (39  W.  Va. 

415,  19  S.  E.  Rep.  563),  1043. 
Grossman  v.  Dodd   (63   Hun,  324, 

17  N.  Y.  Supp.  855),  1298. 

Grosso  V.  Railroad  Co.  (50  N.  J. 
L.  317),  1384,  1389. 

Grosvenor  v.  Railroad  (39  N.  Y. 
34),    105. 

Grote  V.  Railway  Co.  (2  Ex.  251), 
909,  910,  1414. 

Grotenkemper  v.  Harris  (25  Ohio 
St.  510),  1397,  1399. 

Grove  v.  Brien  (8  How.  429),  809. 

Grover  &  Baker  S.  M.  Co.  v.  Rail- 
way Co.  (70  Mo.  672),  241, 
462. 

Grubman  v.  The  Ontario  (115  Fed. 
769,  53  C.  C.  A.  199,  aff'g 
The  Ontario,  106  Fed.  324), 
372,  384. 


TABLE   OF    CASES   CITED. 


CXXlll 


[BEFEBENCES   ABE  TO   SECTIONS.] 

Grund    v.    Pendergast    (58    Barb. 

216),  1370. 
Grund  v.  Van  Vleck  (69  111.  478), 

1438. 
Guess  &  Glover  v.  Railway  Co.  ( — 

S.  C.  — .  53   S.  E.  Rep.  421), 

1367. 
Guggenheim   v.   Railway  Co.    (66 

Mich.  150),  1418. 

Guillaume  v.  Hamburgh,  etc.,  P. 
Co.    (42  N.  Y.  212),  463,  674. 

Guillaume  v.  Transportation  Co. 
(100  N.  Y.  491),  172,  177,  417, 
669,  677. 

Gulliver  v.  Adams  Ex.  Co.  (38  111. 
503),  80,  717. 

Gulzoni  V.  Tyler  (64  Cal.  334,  30 
Pac.    981),   918. 

Gunderman  v.  Railway  Co.  (58 
Mo.  App.   379),   928,   934,  941. 

Gunderson    v.    Elevator    Co.     (47 

Minn.  161,  49  N.  W.  Rep.  694), 

1397. 
Gunter  v.  Wicker  (85  N.  C.  310), 

1419. 
Gurley    v.    Armstead    (148    Mass. 

267),    148. 
Gurney  v.  Behrend    (3  El.  &  Bl. 

622,  633,  634),  175. 


Gurney  v.  Railway  Co.  (59  Hun, 
625,  14  N.  Y.  Supp.  321;  s.  c. 
138  N.  Y.  638,  34  N.  E.  Rep. 
512),  1276. 

Gurney  v.  Railway  Co.  (13  N.  Y. 
Supp.   645),   1388,   1390. 

Gwynn  v.  Telephone  Co.  (69  S. 
Car.  434,  48  S.  E.  460),  95. 

Gwyn  Harper  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Rail- 
road Co.  (128  N.  Car.  280,  38 
S.  E.  894,  83  Am.  St.  Rep. 
675),  442,  1348. 


H 


Haas  V.  Railroad  Co.  (81  Ga.  792), 

175,  271,  316,  657. 
Haas   V.   Railroad   Co.    (90    Iowa, 

259,  57  N.  W.  Rep.  894),  1401. 
Haase  v.  Railway  Co.    (19  Oreg. 

354),  1001. 
Hackett    v.    Railroad    (35    N.    H. 

390),  651,  1360,  1372. 
Hackney  v.  Telephone  Co.   (69  N. 

J.   L.   335,  55  Atl.  Rep.  252), 

1397. 
Hadd  V.  Express  Co.  (52  Vt.  335), 

80,  231,  408. 
Haddow  v.  Parry   (3  Taunt.  303), 

165. 
Hadley    v.    Baxendale     (9    Exch., 

341),  1421,  1368,  1369,  1370, 

1358,  1367. 
Hadley  v.   Clarke    (8  T.  R.   259), 

322,  625,   655,  659,  801. 
Haehl   v.   Railroad    Co.    (119   Mo. 

325,  24  S.  W.  Rep.  737),  1397. 
Hagan   v.  Railroad    (3  R.   I.   88), 

1438. 
Hagan    v.    Tucker's    Exec'r.,    (118 

Fed.    731,    55    C.    C.    A.    521, 

aff'g  112  Fed.  546),  843. 
Hagar  v.  Elmslie   (107  Fed.   511, 

46  C.  C.  A.  446,  aff'g  Elmslie 

V.  Hagar,  101  Fed.  840),  833, 

843. 
Hagerman    v.    Norton    (105    Fed. 

996,  46  C.  C.  A.  1),  837. 
Hagerstown  Bank  v.  Express  Co. 

(45  Pa.  St.  419).  781. 
Haggerty    v.     Railroad     Co.     (59 

Mich.   366),   1431. 
Haile  v.  Clayton  &  Hoff  Co.    (61 

N.    J.    L.    197,    38    Atl.    805), 

1111. 


CXXIV 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


[beferences  are 

Haile's    Curator    v.    Railway    Co. 

(60  Fed.  557,  9  C.  C.  A.  134, 

23  U.  S.  App.  80,  23  L.  R.  A. 

774),  1427. 
Haille  v.  Smith   (1  B.  &  P.  563), 

194. 
Hailparn  v.  Joy  S.  S.  Co.   (99  N. 

Y.   Supp.  464),  459. 
Haines  v.  Pearson   (107  Mo.  1pp. 

481,  81  S.  W.  Rep.  645),  1398. 
Haines  v.  Railway  (29*Minn.  160). 

1249,    1250. 
Hale   V.   Bonner    (82    Tex.    33,   17 

S.   W.    605,    27    Am.    St.   Rep. 

850,  14  L.  R.  A.  336),  1375. 
Hale  V.  Navigation  Co.   (15  Conn. 

538),    75,    201,    206,    281,    451, 

489. 
Hales  V.  Railway  Co.    (4  B.  &  S. 

66),  652, 
Halff  V.  Allyn  (60  Tex.  278),  764, 

768. 
Hall   V.   Cheney    (36   N.   H.   26), 

450,  1344. 
Hall    V.    De    Cuir    (9   U.    S.   485), 

972. 
Hall  V.  Dimond    (63  N.  H.   565), 

708. 
Hall  V.  Hollander  (4  B.  &  C.  660), 

1376,  1377,  1380. 
Hall   V.   Insurance   Co.     (9    Pick. 

466),   792. 
Hall  V.  Penn.  Co,    (90  Ind.  459), 

167,   1331. 
Hall  V.  Power  (12  Met.  482),  943. 
Hall  V.  Railroad  Co.  (15  Fed.  Rep. 

57),  1090. 
Hall    V.    Railroad    Co.    (134    Fed. 

309),  1401. 
Hall    V.   Railroad    Co.    (14    Phila. 

414),  316,  489, 
Hall  V.  Railroad  Co.    (44  W.  Va. 
36.  28  S.  E.  Rep.  754,  67  Am. 
St.  Rep.  757,  41  L.  R.  A.  669), 
1342. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Hall  V.  Railroad  Co.    (44  W.  Va. 
36,  28   S.  E.   754,  41  L.  R.  A. 

669,  67  Am.  St.  Rep.  757).  574. 
Hall    V.   Railroad   Companies    (13 

Wall.  367),  784. 
Hall   V,   Railway   Co.    (115    Iowa, 

18,  87  N.  W.  739),  1423. 
Hall    V.    Railway   Co.    (25    S,    C. 

564),  1033. 
Hall    V.    Railway    Co.    (28    S,    C. 

261),  1082,   1083. 
Hall  V.  Railway  Co.    (L.  R.  10  Q. 

B.  437),  1073. 
Hall  V.  Renfro  (3  Met.  (Ky.)  51), 

66. 
Hall  V.  Steamboat  Co,    (13  Conn. 

319),    895.    904. 
Halliday  v.  Railway  Co.    (74  Mo. 

159),    230,    236,   240. 
Halsey  v.  Warden  (25  Kans.  128), 

184. 
Halverson    v.     Electric    Co,     (35 

Wash.  600,  77  Pac.  Rep.  1058), 

1397. 
Ham  V.  Canal  Co.   (142  Penn.  St, 

617),    1002,    1085. 
Ham  V.  Canal  Co.   (155  Penn.  St. 

548,    26    Atl.   Rep.    757),   1234. 
Hamilton  v.  McPherson  (28  N,  Y. 

72),  863,  1367,   1369. 
Hamilton  v.  Morgan's  Co,   (42  La, 

Ann,  — ),  1397,  1440. 
Hamilton  v.  Pandorf  (12  App.  Cas. 

518),  490. 
Hamilton    v.     Railway    Co.     (103 

Iowa,  325,  72  N.  W.  536),  651. 
Hamilton  v.  Railroad  Co.  (39  Kan. 

56,   18   Pac.  Rep.   57),  1388. 
Hamilton  v.  Railroad  Co.  (80  Mo. 

App.  597),  442. 
Hamilton  v.  Railroad  Co.    (96  N. 

C.   398),   174,   1370. 
Hamilton   v.   Railroad    (51   N.   Y. 

100).    1046. 


TABLE  OP   CASES   CITBD. 


cxxv 


[beferences  are 

Hamilton  v.  Railroad    (53   N.  Y. 

25),  1445,  1446. 
Hamilton    v.    Railroad    Co.     (183 

Pa.  St.  638,  38  Atl.  1088),  994. 
Hamlin  v.  Railway   Co.    (1   H.   & 

N.  408),  651,   1109,  1404. 
Hammack  v.  White  (11  C.  B.  588), 

940,  1412. 
Hammond   v.  Railroad  Co.    (6   S. 

C.    130),    1003. 
Hampton   v.   Pullman   Palace  Car 

Co.    (42  Mo.   App.   134),  1131, 

1132. 
Hance    v.   Express    Co.     (66    Mo. 

App.    486;    s.   C   48   Mo.   App. 

179),    1357. 
Hance   v.    Railway   Co.    (56    Mo. 

App.    476;    s.   c.    62   Mo.   App. 

60),  234,  1309. 
Hancock  v.  Railroad  Co.   (27  Ky. 

Law  Rep.  434,  85  S.  W.  Rep. 

210),    1060.' 
Hancock  v.   Railroad   Co.    (91   N. 

Y.    Supp.    601,    100   App.   Div. 

161),   1126. 
Hand  v.  Baynes    (4  Whart.  204), 

480,  613,  652. 
Handley  v.  Railway  Co.   (61  Kan, 

237,   59  Pac.  271),  990. 
Hanks   v.    Railroad    Co.    (60    Mo. 

App.    274),    992,    1127. 
Hanley  v.  Railroad  Co.    (1  Edm. 

Ld,  Cas.  359),  956. 
Hanley  v.  Railway  Co.   (187  U.  S. 

617,  aff'g   106  Fed.  353),   525. 
Hanley  v.  Railway  Co.  ( —  W.  Va. 

— ,  53   S.   E.  Rep.   625),  1389. 
Hanlon     v.     Railroad     Co.      (109 

Iowa,    136,    80     N.     W.     223), 

1043,    1047.    1062. 
Hanna    v.    Railway    Co.    (41    111. 

App.  116),  1388. 
Hannay  v.  Eve    (3   Cranch,   247), 

744. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Hansen  v.  Donaldson  (1  Sess.  Cas. 

(4th)    1066),    834. 
Hansen  v.  Harrold  (1  Q.  B.  (1894) 

612),   854. 
Hansen  v.  Railway  Co.    (73  Wis. 

346),  462. 
Hansen  v.  Railroad  Co.    (73  Wis. 

646),   462. 
Hansford     v.     Payne     (11     Bush, 

384),  1386. 
Hanson  v.  Railway    (62  Me.   84), 

1094,  1102,  1442. 
Hanson  v.  Transportation  Co.  (38 

La.  Ann.  Ill),  964,  1221,  1239. 
Hardenbergh  v.  Railway  Co.    (39 

Minn.  3,  12  Am.  St.  Rep.  610), 

1082,  1113. 
Hardin  v.  Railway  Co.   (Tex.  Civ. 

App.,    77    S.    W.    Rep.    431), 

896,  899. 
Harding    v.    Townshend    (43    Vt. 

536),  1423. 
Hardman    v.    Railroad    Co.      (83 

Fed.    88,    48    U.    S.    App.    570, 

27  C.   C.  A.   407,  39  L.  R.  A. 

300),  714. 

Hardman    v.    Willcock    (9    Bing. 

382),   749. 
Hardwick  v.  Railroad  Co.   (85  Ga. 

507),  1412. 
Hardy  v.  Express  Co.    (182  Mass. 

328,  65  N.  E.  375,  59  L.  R.  A. 

731),   734. 
Hardy  v.  Railroad  Co.    (12  N.  Y. 

Suppl.    55),    1067. 
Haring  v.  Railroad   (13  Barb.  9), 

1175. 
Harker    v.    Dement    (9    Gill,    7), 

749,  779,  1305. 
Harman  v.  Clarke  (4  Camp.  159), 

848. 
Harmony  v.  Bingham  (2  Kern.  99, 

1   Duer,    209),    627,    805. 
Harned   v.   Railway   Co.    (51   Mo. 

App.  482),  431,  442,  444. 


CXXVl 


TABLE   OP   CASES   CITED. 


[BEFEBENCES   ABE 

Harp   V.   Railroad   Co.    (125  Fed. 

445,    61    C.    C.    A.    405,    aff'g 

118  Fed.  169),  147. 
Harp  V.  Railway  Co.  (119  Ga.  927, 

47  S.  E.  206,  100  Am.  St.  Rep. 

212),   1036. 
Harp  V.  The  Grand  Era  (1  Wood's 

Ct.   Ct.  R.  184),   261. 
Harper  v.  Insurance  Co.  (17  N.  Y. 

194),   165. 
Harper  v.  Railroad  Co.   (37  Conn. 

272),  1354. 
Harrell    v.    Railroad    (106    N.    C. 

258),   106. 
Harries  v.  Edmonds    (1   C.   &  K. 

686),   863. 
Harrington    v.    Lyles    (2    Nott    & 

McC.   88),  75. 
Harrington  v.  McShane  (2  Watts, 

443),  19,  61,  75,  731. 
In  re  Harris   (57  Fed.  245),  344. 
Harris  v.  Hart  (6  Duer,  606),  767, 

771. 
Harris  v.  Moody    (30  N.  Y,  266), 

607. 
Harris   v.   Pratt    (17   N.   Y.    249), 

175,  767,  771. 
Harris   v.    Railroad     (20     N.     Y. 

232),  339,  638. 
Harris  v.  Railroad  Co.    (73  N.  Y. 

Sup.   159,   36   Misc.   181),   233. 
Harris   v.    Railway   Co.    (32    Ind. 

App.  600,  70  N.  E.  407),  1179. 
Harris  v.  Railway   (L.  R.  1  Q.  B. 

Div.    515),    1249. 
Harris    v.    Railway   Co.    (89    Mo. 

233),  964,  1217. 
Harris  v.  Railway  Co.    (15  R.   I. 

371),  231,  232,  233. 
Harris   v.   Rand    (4    N.   H.    259), 

273. 
Harris    v.    Stevens    (31    Vt.    79), 

943. 


TO   SECTIONS.] 

Harris  v.  Tenney  (85  Tex.  254,  20 

S.    W.    Rep.    82,    34    Am.    St. 

Rep.    796),    769. 
Harrison  v.    Fink    (42   Fed.   Rep. 

787),    1085. 
Harrison  v.  Railway  Co.    (2  B.  & 

S.  122),  341,  397. 
Harrison  v.  Railway  Co.   (74  Mo. 

364),  625,  630. 
Harrison  v.  Roy    (39   Miss.  396), 

57. 
Harrison  v.  Weir  (75  N.  Y.  Supp. 

909,    71    App.    Div.    248;    s.   c. 

73  N.  Y.  Supp.  1119,  reversing 

69   N.   Y.   Supp.   957,  34  Misc. 

519),   342. 
Harrold  v.  Railroad  Co.  (47  Minn. 

17,  49  N.  W.  389),  1183. 
Harrowing  v.  Dupre  (7  Com'l  Cas. 

157),   843. 
Harshman  v.  Railway  Co.    ( —  N. 

Dak.  — ,  103  N.  W.  Rep.  412), 

1384,  1389. 
Hart  V.  Allen   (2  Watts,  114),  75, 

274. 
Hart  V.  Bridge  Co.   (84  N.  Y.  56), 

1418. 
Hart  V.  Hyde    (5  Vt.  328),  780. 
Hart  V.  North  German  Lloyd  S.  S. 

Co.     (92    N.     Y.    Supp.     338), 

1271. 
Hart   V.    Pearson    (12    Rep.    Jud. 

Que.    (C.   S.)   540),  700. 
Hart   V.    Railroad    (8    N.    Y.    37), 

255,  916,  1296. 
Hart  V.   Railroad   Co.    (112   U.    S. 

331),    339,   425,    426,   433,    437, 

438,   440,   452. 
Hart   V.   Railroad    Co.    (33    S.    C. 

427),    1440. 
Hart  V.  State   (  — Md.  — ,  60  Atl. 

Rep.    457),   972. 
Hart  V.  Steamship  Co.    (95  N.  Y. 

Supp.  733,  108  App.  Div.  279), 

1271. 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


CXXVll 


[befebences  are 

Hartan    v.    Railroad    (114    Mass. 

44).  238,  261,   1049. 
Hartfield     v.    Roper     (21     Wend. 

615),   1229,   1377. 
Hartford  Co.  v.  Hamilton  (60  Md. 

340),    1378. 
Hartford  Deposit  Co.  v.  Pederson 

(67  111.  App.  142;  affirmed,  168 

111.  224,  48  N.  E.  30),  100. 
Hartford    Deposit    Co.    v.    Sollitt 

(172  111.  222,  50  N.  E.  178,  64 

Am.    St.    Rep.     35,     aff'g     70 

111.  App.  166),  100,  102. 
Hartigan    v.    Railroad    Co.     (113 

Mich.  122,  71  N.  W.  452),  990. 
Hartigan  v.   Southern  Pacific  Co. 

(86    Cal.    142,    24    Pac.    851), 

1386. 
Hartley   v.  Hartley    ( —   Kan.   — , 

81  Pac.  Rep.   505),  1402. 
Hartley  v.  Railroad  Co.  (115  Iowa, 

612,    89    N.   W.    88),   231,   233, 

237. 
Hartman  v.  Railroad  Co.   (39  Mo. 

App.   88),   201,   206,   208. 
Hartness  v.   Pharr     (133    N.   Car. 

566,  45  S.  E.  Rep.  901,  98  Am. 

St.  Rep.  725),  1402. 
Hartop  V.  Hoare   (1  Wils.  8),  785. 
Hartwell  v.  Railroad  Co.   (99  Ky. 

436,  36  S.  W.  Rep.  183),  193. 
Hartwell  v.  Railroad  Co.   (15  Ky. 

Law  Rep.   778).   177. 
Hartzig  v.  Railroad  Co.  (154  Penn. 

St.    364,    26    Atl.    Rep.    310), 

1122. 
Harvey    v.    Railroad     (116    Mass. 

269),   1181. 
Harvey  v.  Railroad  Co.  (124  Mass. 

421),   1367,   1369,   1370. 
Harvey   v.   Railroad   Co.    (74   Mo. 

538),  425,  426. 
Harvey  v.  Railway  Co.  ( —  111.  — , 

77  N.  E.  Rep.   569),   1177. 
Harvey   v.    Railway  Co.    (116   111. 

App.  507),  1118. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Hai-vey   v.  Rose    (26   Ark.   3),   66. 
Haskell     v.     Messenger     Co.     ( — 

Mass.  — ,  76  N.  E.  Rep.  215), 

97. 
Haslam  v.  Express  Co.    (6  Bosw. 

235),   664. 
Hasse   v.    Express   Co.    (94   Mich. 

133,  53  N.  W.  918,  34  Am.  St. 

Rep.   328),  685,  729. 
Hastings  v.  Pepper  (11  Pick.  41), 

717,  719. 
Hastings  v.  Railroad  Co.  (53  Fed. 

224),  922. 
Hatch  V.  Pullman  Palace  Car  Co. 

(Tex.  Civ.  App.,  84  S.  W.  Rep. 

246),  1131. 
Hatch  V.  Railway  Co.  ( —  N.  Dak. 

— ,  107  N.  W.  Rep.  1087),  442, 

447. 
Hatch    V.    Railway    Co.    (212    Pa. 

29,  61  Atl.  480),  1111. 
Hathaway    v.    Railway     (46    Ind. 

251),    1229. 
Hatten  v.  Railroad   Co.    (39   Ohio 

St.    375),    1041. 
Haug  V.  Railway  Co.    (8  N.  Dak. 

23,  77   N.  W.   97,  42  L.  R.   A. 

664),    1083,   1397. 
Haughey  v.  Railway  Co.    (210  Pa. 

367,  59  Atl.  Rep.  1112),  1389. 
Hause  v.  Judson  (4  Dana,  7),  758. 
Havens  v.  Railroad  (28  Conn.  69), 

1038. 
Haver  v.   Railroad   Co.    (62  N.   J. 

L.  282,  41  Atl.  916,  43  L.  R.  A. 

84,  72  Am.  St.  Rep.  647),  1093. 
Hawcroft  v.  Railway    (8  Eng.  L. 

&  Eq.   362),   1107.   1114. 
Hawgood  V.  1310  Tons  of  Coal  (21 

Fed.  681),  856. 
Hawkins  v.  Hoffman  (6  Hill,  586), 

69,    177,    651,    668,    674,    1243, 

1246,  1253,  1372. 
Plawkins    v.    Railroad     (17    Mich. 

57),  451,  465. 


CXXVlll 


TABLE  OP   CASES   CITED, 


[befebences  are 

Hawkins  v.  Railway  Co,  (17  Mich. 

62),  497,  505, 
Hawkins  v.  Railway  Co,  (18  Mich. 

427),   497,   505. 
Hayes,  In  re  (2  Curteis,  Ec.  338), 

469. 
Hayes  v.  Campbell   (63  Cal.  143), 

108, 
Hayes  v.   Express   Co.    ( —  N,   J. 

— ,   62   Atl,  Rep,   284),   433. 
Hayes  v.  Wells  (23  Cal.  185),  331, 
Hayes  v,  Williams   (17  Colo,  465, 

30  Pac.  Rep.  352),  1389. 
Hayman  v.  Railway  Co.  (86  N.  Y. 

Supp.  728,  43  Misc.  74),  677, 

678. 
Haymarket  Theater  Co.  v.  Rosen- 
berg   (77   ni.   App.   183),   100. 
Haynes  v.   Railroad   Co.    (54  Mo, 

App,  582),  497. 
Hays  V.   Gallagher    (72   Penn.    St. 

136),  1417. 
Hays   V,   Kennedy    (41   Penn.    St, 

378),   270,   281,   483,  1355, 
Hays  V.  Millar  (77  Penn.  St.  238), 

92, 
Hays  V.  Paul   (51  Penn.  St.  134), 

92. 
Hays  V.  Penn.  Co.    (12  Fed.  Rep. 

309),   521. 
Hays  V.  Railroad  Co.  (51  Mo.  App. 

438),  1110. 
Hays  V.  Riddle  (1  Sand.  248),  871, 

982. 
Hays  V.  Stone  (7  Hill,  128),  1318. 
Hazard  v,   Fiske    (83  N,  Y.  287), 

175, 
Hazard   v.  Railroad  Co.    (1   Biss. 

503),   1118. 
Hazard  v.  Railway    (67  Miss,  32, 

7  So.  Rep.  280),  158,  163. 
Hazel   V.  Railroad   Co.    (82   Iowa, 

477,  48  N.  W.  926),  212,  213, 

218. 
Head  v.  Railway  Co.  (79  Ga.  358, 

11  Am.  St.  Rep.  434),  1054. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Healey   v.   Railroad    (28  Ohio   St 

23),  1084,   1091. 
Hearne  v.  Garton   (2  E.  &  E.  66), 

337, 
Heaton  v.   Railroad   Co,    (65   Mo, 

App,    479),    1182, 
Hebard    v,    Riegel     (67    111.    App. 

584),  70,  1363. 
Hecker  v.  Railway   Co.    (110  Mo. 

App.  162,  84  S.  W.  Rep.  126), 

1180. 
Hedding  v.   Gallagher    (72   N.   H, 

377,  57  Atl,  Rep.  225,  64  L.  R, 

A,    811,    overruling   70    N,    H. 

631,  47  Atl.   Rep.   614  and   69 

N,  H,  650,  45  Atl.  Rep.  96,  76 

Am.    St.   Rep.    204),   519,    944, 
Hedges   v,    Kansas   City    (18   Mo. 

App.  67),  1383. 

Hedges  v.  The  Railroad  (49  N.  Y. 

223),  694,  708,  712,  713. 
Hedrick    v.     Navigation     Co.     (4 

Wash.  400,  30  Pac.  714),  1386. 

Hegeman   v.    Railroad    (16    Barb. 
353),   952, 

Hegeman  v.  Railroad  (13  N.  Y.  9), 

503,    895,    898,    903,    906,    909, 

910,  952. 
Heidecamp  v.  Railway  Co.   (69  N. 

J.  Law  284,  55  Atl.  Rep.  239), 

1395. 
Heil  V.  Railroad  Co.   (16  Mo.  App. 

363),  234,  1355,  1362. 
Heinlein     v.    Railroad    Co.     (147 

Mass.    136),    936,    1006. 
Heirn    v.    McCaugham    (32    Miss. 

17),  1104,  1100,  1408,  1429. 
Heiserman    v.    Railway    Co.     (63 

Iowa,  732),   1342,  1343. 
Heller  v.  Railway  Co.   (109  Mich. 

53,  66  N.  W.  667,  63  Am.  St. 

Rep.  541),   340,  637. 
Hellman   v.    Holladay    (1   Woolw. 

365),  1249, 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


CXXIX 


[references  are  to  sections.] 


Helm    V.    Railroad    Co.    (98    Mo. 

App.  419,  72  S.  W.  Rep.  148), 

167,  174. 
Hemmingway  v.  Railroad  Co.  (72 

Wis.  42),  995,  1129,  1187. 
Hempenstall  v.  Railroad   Co.    (82 

Hun,  285,  31  N.  Y.  Supp.  479), 

1219. 
Hemphill  v.  Chenie  (6  Watts  &  S. 

62),    665. 
Hempstead  v.  Railroad   (28  Barb. 

485),  261. 
Henderson   v.   Iron  Ore    (38   Fed. 

Rep.  36),  165. 
Henderson  v.  Maid  of  Orleans  (12 

La.  Ann.   352),   1362. 
Henderson    v.    Railroad    Co.     (20 

Fed.   Rep.   430),    1267. 
Henderson    v.   Railroad    Co.    (123 

U.  S.  61),  1267. 
Henderson  v.  Railway  Co.  (86  Ky. 

389),  1389. 
Henderson    v.   Railroad    Co.    (116 

La.  — ,  41  So.  Rep.  252),  161. 
Henderson  v.   Railway   Co.    (Tex. 

Civ.     App.,     38     S,     W.     Rep. 

1136),  972. 
Henderson   v.   Railway   Co.    (Tex. 

Civ.    App.,     42     S.     W.     Rep. 

1030),  922. 
Henderson  v.  Stevenson   (L.  R.  2 

H.  L.  Sc.  470),  1052,  1299. 
Hendrick    v.    Navigation    Co.     (4 

Wash.  400,  30  Fac.  Rep.  714), 

1386. 
Hendrick    v.    Railroad    Co.     (170 

Mass.  44,  48  N.  E.  835),  172, 

638. 
Hendrick    v.    Railroad    Co.      (136 

Mo.  548,  38  S.  W.  Rep.  297), 

1016. 
Hendrix  v.  Railroad  Co.   (107  Mo. 

App.  127,  80  S.  W.  Rep.  970), 

247. 


Hendryx  v.  Railroad  Co.  (45  Kan. 

377),    1001. 
Hengstler    v.    Railroad    Co.     (125 

Mich.    530,    84    N.    W.    1067), 

408,   640. 
Henly  v.  Railroad  Co.    (59   N.   Y. 

Supp.  857,  28  Misc.  499,  aff'g 

57  N.  Y.   Supp.  396,  27   Misc. 

811),  1040. 
Hennessey    v.    Brewing    Co.    (145 

Mo.    104,   46    S.    W.  Rep.    966, 

68  Am.  St.  Rep.  554,  51  L.  R. 

A.  385),   1389. 
Henning  v.   Leather  Co.    (11   Ky. 

L.  R.  544),  1389. 
Henry   v.    Railroad    Co.    (76    Mo. 

288),   1430. 
Henry  v.  Railway  Co.    (66   Iowa, 

52),  1174. 
Henry  v.  Railway  Co,    (49   Mich. 

495),  1418. 
Hensler  v.  Stix   (—  Mo.  — ,  88  S. 

W.  Rep.   108),  100. 
Herbst  v.  The  Asiatic  Prince   (97 

Fed.    343    and    103    Fed.    676; 

affirmed,   The   Asiatic   Prince, 

108  Fed.  287,  47  C.  C.  A.  325), 

700. 
Herdman  v.  Railroad  Co.  (62  Hun, 

621,     17    N.    Y.     Supp.    198), 

1198. 
Herf  &  Frerichs  Chemical   Co.  v. 
Railroad    Co.     (100    Mo.    App. 

164,  73   S.  W.  Rep.  346),   203, 

212,   214,   702,   710,   1372. 
Hermann    v.    Goodrich    (21    Wis. 

536),  688. 
Herrick    v.    Gallagher    (60    Barb. 

566),   733. 
Herrick  v.  Railway  Co.   (31  Minn. 
11,  16  N.  W.  Rep.  413,  47  Am. 
Rep.  771),  1388. 
Herring  v.  Railroad  Co.    (101  Va. 

778,   45   S.   B.  Rep.  322),  239, 
285,  298. 


cxxx 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


[REFERENCES   ABE 

Herrman     v.     Railway     Co.      (27 

Wash.   472,   68  Pac.  82,  57  L. 

R.  A.  390),  928,  938,  941. 
Hersfield    v.    Adams     (19     Barb. 

577),  82. 
Hersh  v.  Railroad  Co.    (74   Penu. 

181),  521. 
Herstine  v.  Railroad  Co.   (151  Pa. 

St.    244,    25    Atl.    104),    1413, 

1414. 
Hess  V.  Railway  Co.  (40  Mo.  App. 

202),    444. 
Hesse  v.  Tramway  Co.   (75  Conn. 

571,   54   Atl.   Rep.    299),   1397, 

1401. 
Hett   V.   Railroad   Co.    (69    N.    H. 

189,  44   Atl.   910),  740. 
Heugh  V.  The  Railway  Co.   (L.  R. 

5    Exch.    50),    683. 
Heumphreus    v.    Railroad    Co.    (8 

S.  Dak.   103,   65   N.   W.   466), 

1202. 
Hewes   v.    Railroad    Co.    (217    111. 

500,  75  N.  E.  Rep.  515),  1194. 
Hemes  v.    Railroad    Co.    (119    111. 

App.    393),    1175,    1177. 
Hewes  v  Railroad  Co.  (76  Md.  154, 

24  Atl.  325),  1118. 
Hewett  V.  Railway  Co.    (63  Iowa, 

611),   167,  505,  651. 
Hewett  V.   Swift    (3    Allen,   420), 

1084. 
Hewlett  V.  Burrell    (105  Fed.    80, 

44   C.  C.  A.  362),  698. 
Heye  v.  North  German  Lloyd   (33 

Fed.  70),  344. 
Hey  wood    v.    Railroad    Co.     (169 

Mass.  466,  48  N.  E.  773),  1217. 
Hiatt   V.   Railway   Co.    (96    Iowa, 

169,  64  N.  W.  766),  941. 
Hibbard  v.  Telegraph  Co.  (33  Wis. 

558),  95. 
Hibbard  v.  Railroad  Co.   (15  N.  Y. 

455),    1036,    1078,    1085,    1098. 
Hibler  v.  McCartney  (31  Ala.  502), 

279. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Hick  V.  Railway  Co.  (51  Mo.  App. 

532),  1352. 
Hick    V.    Rodocanachi     (2    Q.    B. 
(1891)   626,  61  L.  J.  Q.  B.  42; 
affirmed,    (1893)     A.     C.     22), 
842,  857. 
Hickey    v.    Railroad     (14     Allen, 

429),  1197,  1221. 
Hickok  V.  Buck   (22  Vt.  149),  782. 
Hickox    V.    Railroad     (31     Conn. 

281),   127. 
Hicks  V.    Railroad    Co.     (64    Mo. 

430),   1228. 
Hicks    V.    Railroad    Co.     (68    Mo. 

329),  899,   1060,   1433. 
Hicks  V.  Railroad  Co.  ( —  Neb.  — , 

107  N.  W.  Rep.  798),  1015. 
Hicks   V.    Railway    (4    Best   &   S. 

403),  1423. 
Hicks    V.    Railway    Co.    (108    Ga. 

304,  32  S.  E.  Rep.  880),  1197. 
Hicks  V.  Shield   (7  El.  &  B.  633), 

831. 
Hieskell    v.    Bank    (89    Penn.    St. 

155),   186. 
Higgins  V.  Railroad   (28  La.  Ann. 

133),  451. 
Higgins     V.     Railroad     Co.     (155 

Mass.  176,  29  N.  E.  Rep.  534, 

31  Am.  St.  Rep.  544),  1388. 
Higgins   V.  Railroad  Co.    (36  Mo. 

418),    1004. 
Higgins  V.  The  Turn.  &  Railroad 

Co.   (46  N.  Y.  23),  1098,  1441. 
High   V.   Railroad   Co.    (Tex.   Civ. 

App.,    55    S.    W.    Rep.    526), 

1180. 
Higley   v.    Gilmer    (3   Mont.   98), 

lOOL 
Hill  V.  Humphreys  (5  Watts  &  S. 

123),   664. 
Hill  V.  Leadbetter    (42  Me.  .572), 

799. 
Hill  V.  New  Haven   (37  Vt.  501), 

1396.   1417. 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


exxxi 


[references  are  to  sections.] 


Hill  V.  The  Railroad  (—  Ga.  — , 
52  S.  E.  Rep.  651),  991. 

Hill  V.  Railroad  Co.  (11  La.  Ann. 
292),   1438. 

Hill  V.  Railroad  Co.  (144  Mass. 
284),    426,    438. 

Hill    V.    Railroad    Co.    (60    Iowa, 

196),  231,  238. 
Hill     V.     Railway     Co.     (46    Mo. 

App.  517),  234. 
Hill    V.    Railroad    Co.    (63    N.    Y. 

101),  1043,   1053,  1082. 
Hill   V.   Railroad   Co.    (178    Penn. 

St.   233,   35  Atl.  Rep.   997,   56 

Am.  St.  Rep.  754,  35  L.  R.  A. 

196),    1391. 
Hill    V.    Railway    Co.    (33    Wash. 

697,   74   Pac.   1054),  426. 
Hill    V.    Sturgeon    (28    Mo.    323), 

489,  1355. 
Hill  Mfg.  Co.  V.  Railroad  Co.  (104 

Mass.  122),  238,  242,  254. 
Hillebrand    v.     Standard    Biscuit 

Co.  (139  Cal.  233,  73  Pac.  Rep. 

163),  1397. 
Hilliard  v.  Godd   (34  N.  H.  230), 

1033. 
Hillis   V.   Railway   Co.    (72    Iowa, 

228),   1132,   1135. 
Hillman    v.    Newington    (57    Cal. 

56),    1236. 
Hills  V.  Mackill     (36    Fed.    Rep. 

702),  490,  602. 
Hilton  V.  Railroad  Co.  ( —  N.  Car. 

— ,   53    S.    E.    Rep.    823,    s.    c. 

136  N.  Car.  479,  48  S.  E.  Rep. 

813),   588,   589,   590. 
Hinckley    v.    Railroad     Co.     (120 

Mass.    257),   1418. 
Hinckley  v.  Railroad   (3  N.  Y.  S. 

C.  281),  408. 
Hinckley   v.   Railroad    (56   N.   Y. 

429),   167,    168,   613. 
Hine   v.    New    York    &   Bermudez 

Co.    (68   Fed.    920),   385. 


Hine  v.   Perkins    (55  Fed.   996,  5 

C.  C.  A.  377,  14  U.  S.  App.  386, 

reversing  The  Nether  Holme, 

50  Fed.  434),  840. 
Hinsdell  v.  Weed   (5  Denio,  172"), 

799,  807. 
Hinkle    v.    Railway    Co.    (126    N. 

Car.    932,   36    S.   E.   Rep.   348, 

78    Am.    St.    Rep.    685),    444, 

1354,    1357. 
Hinshaw  v.  Railroad  Co.    (118  N. 

Car.  1047,  24  S.  E.  Rep.  426), 

1174,  1221. 
Hinton  v.  Dibbin  (2  Ad.  &  El. 

(N.  S.)  646;  2  Q.  B.  646),  11, 

393. 
Hinton  v.  Railway  Co.   (72  Minn. 

339,  75  N.  W.  373),  1354. 
Hipp  V.  Railway  Co.    (50  S.  Car. 

129,  27   S.  E.  Rep.  623),   711. 
Hirsch  v.  Dispatch  &  Delivery  Co. 

(85  N.   Y.    Supp.   198),   433. 
Hirsch  v.  Hudson  River  Line  (57 

N.  Y.  Supp.  272,  26  Misc.  823), 

1352. 
Hirsch  v.  Quaker  City  (2  Disney, 

144),    708. 
Hirsch  v.  Railroad  Co.   (99  N.  Y. 

Supp.   431),   1348. 
Hirsch  v.  Telegraph  Co.  (98  N.  Y. 

Supp.  371),  97. 
Hirshberg  v.  Dinsmore   (12  Daly, 

429),  442. 
Hirschkovitz  v.  Railroad  Co.   (138 

Fed.  438),  1389,  1395,  1401. 
Hively  v.  Webster  Co.   (117  Iowa, 

672,  91  N.  W.  Rep.  1041),  1397, 

1401. 
Hoadley    v.     Transportation    Co. 

(115  Mass.   304,  15  Am.  Rep. 

306),   208,   299,  401,  408. 
Hobbs    v.    Railroad    Co.    (66    Me. 

572),   1401. 
Hobbs   V.    Railway    Co.    (49   Ark. 

357),    962,    1082. 


CXXXll 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


[references  are 

Hobbs  V.  Railway  Co.  (L.  R.  10  Q. 

B.  Ill),  1109,  1428,  1424,  1429. 
Hoboken  Ferry  Co.  v.  Feiszt   (58 

N.    J.    L.    198,    35    Atl.    299), 

942. 
Hobson  V.   Railroad   Co.    (2  Ariz. 

171),  1417. 
Hocum   V.   Wertherick    (22   Minn. 

152),  1417. 
Hodge  V.  Railroad  Co.    (97   N.  Y. 

Supp.   1107),   1072,   1392. 
Hodgson   V.    FuUarton    (4    Taunt. 

787),  39. 
Hodgson  V.  Malcolm   (5  Bos.  &  P. 

336),   490. 
Hodkinson  v.  The  Railway  (14  Q. 

B.    Div.    228),    1291. 
Hoeger  v.   The  Railway    (63  Wis. 

100),    1250,    1284,    1286,    1291. 
Hoehn    v.    Railroad    Co.     (52    111. 

App.    662;     affirmed,    152    111. 

223,   38  N.   E.   549),  964. 
Hoffbauer    v.    Railrgad    Co.     (52 

Iowa,   342),   1032,   1033,   1085, 

1086. 
Hoffman  v.  Express  Co.  (97  N.  Y. 

Supp.   838),   408. 
Hoffman   v.   Noble    (6  Mete.   68), 

785. 
Hoffman  v.  Railroad  Co.   (85  Md. 

391,    37    Atl.    214),    226,    231, 

237,  241,  243. 
Hoffman    v.    Railroad     Co.     (125 

Mich.  201,  84  N.  W.  55),  867. 
Hoffman  v.  Railroad  Co.  (45  Minn. 

53),    1056,    1443. 
Hoffman   v.    Railroad    Co.    (75    N. 

Y.   605),   937. 
Hoffman  v.  Railway  Co.    (8  Kan. 

App.   379,    56   Pac.    331),    233, 

237. 
Hoffman,  etc.,  Co.  v.  Railway  Co. 

(—  Mo.  App.  — ,  94  S.  W.  Rep. 

597),  495. 
Holbrook    v.    Railroad    (16    Barb. 

113),  904. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Holbrook  v.  Railroad  Co.  (12  N.  Y, 

236),    1209. 
Holbrook   v.   Vose    (6   Bosw.    76), 

771. 
Holbrook    v.     Wight     (24     Wend. 

169),   194,   753. 
Holcomb  V.   Danby    (51   Vt.   428), 

1233. 
Holden    v.    Railroad    Co.    (72   Vt. 

156,  47  Atl.  403),  1066,  1324. 
Holden    v.    Railroad    Co.    (73    Vt. 

317,   50  Atl.  Rep.  1096),  1056. 
Holdridge    v.    Railroad    (56    Barb. 

191),   1286. 
HoU  V.  Griffin  (10  Bing.  246),  750. 
Holladay    v.    Kennard     (12    Wall. 

254),  6,  319,  958. 
Holland     v.     Railroad     Co.     (144 

Mass.    425),    1376. 
Holland  v.  Railroad  Co.    (105  Mo. 

App.  117,  79  S.  W.  Rep.  508), 

895,    1217,    1414,    1415. 
Hollister    v.    Nowlen    (19     Wend. 

234),  68,  69,  75,  110,  279,  392, 

399,   411,   892. 
Holly   V.   Gas  Co.    (8  Gray,  123), 

1229. 
Holly   V.    Railroad    Co.     (61    Ga. 

215),  895. 
Holly    V.    Railway    Co.    (119    Ga. 

767,  47  S.  E.  Rep.  188),  1075, 

1299,    1300. 
Holmes   v.    Bailey    (92   Penn.   St. 

57),  184. 
Holmes  v.  Mather   (L,  R.  10  Ex. 

261),    1430. 
Holmes  v.  Railroad  Co.   (94  N.  C. 

318),   1440,   1443. 
Holmes  v.  Railway  Co.    (L.  R.  4 

Exch.   254),  991. 
Holmes   v.   Railway   Co.    (97   Cal. 

161,   31  Pac.   834),  1173,   1208, 
Holmes  v.   Steamship  Co.    ( —  N. 

Y.  — ,  77  N.  E.  Rep.  21,  affg., 

90  N.   Y.   Supp.   834,   100  App. 

Div.   36),  1264,  1271. 


J 


TABLE    OF    CxVSES   CITED. 


cxxxm 


[references  are  to  sections.] 


Holmes    V.    Wakefield    (12    Allen, 

580),  1084. 
Holsapple   v.   Raili'oad    Co.    (3    A. 

&  E.  Ry.  Cas.  487),  341. 
Holsapple  v.  Railroad  Co.    (86  N. 

Y.   275),   454,   463. 
Holt  V.  Railway  Co.   (174  Mo.  524, 

74    S.    W.    631;    s.    c.    87    Mo. 

App.  203),  997,  1082,  1085. 
Holt  V.  Railroad  Co.  (3  Idaho,  703, 

35  Pac.  Rep.  39),  1397. 
Holt   V.    Westcott    (43    Me.    445), 

810. 
Holten    V.   Railroad   Co.    (61   Mo. 

App.    204),    167. 
Holton    V.    Daly     (106    111.    131), 

1386,  1397. 
Holyoke    v.    Railway    (48    N.    H. 

541),   1422.    1423. 
Holzab    V.    Railroad    Co.    (38    La. 

Ann.  185),  917. 
Homans  v.  Railway  Co.  (180  Mass. 

456,  62  N.  B.  737,  57  L.  R.  A. 

291),    1427. 
Home  Ins.  Co.  v.  Railway  Co.   (71 

Minn.  296,  74  N.  W.  140),  783. 
Homiston  v.  Railroad  Co.    (22  N. 

Y.    Supp.    738,    3    Misc.    342), 

1039. 
Honeyman    v.    Railroad    (13    Ore. 

352),    44,    59,   91,    1250. 
Honegsberger  v.   Railroad   Co.    (1 

Keyes,  570),  1227. 
Hood   V.   Railroad    (22    Conn.    1), 

231,  238,  261,  1049. 
Hood  V.  Railroad   (22  Conn.  502), 

231,  242. 
Hooks  V.   Railway  Co.    (73   Miss. 

145,  18  So.  925),  1118,  1123. 
Hoon  V.  Traction  Co.    (204   Penn. 

St.    369,    54    Atl.    Rep.    270), 

1397,  1401. 
Hooper  v.  Railway   (27  Wis.  81), 

1309. 


Hooper  v.  Wells   (27  Cal.  11),  44. 
Hoosier  Stone  Co.  v.  Railway  Co. 

131    Ind.    575,   31    N.  E.   365), 

497. 
Hoover  v.   Railroad  Co.    (156   Pa. 

St.  220,  27  Atl.  282,  22  L.  R.  A. 

263,  36  Am.  St.  Rep.  43),  521. 
Hoover   v.    Railroad    Co.    ( —   Mo. 

App.  — ,  88   S.  W.  Rep.   769  j, 

172. 
Hoover  v.  Railway  Co.  (46  W.  Va. 

268,  33  S.  E.  Rep.  224),   1396. 
Hopkins    v.    Railroad    (36    N.    H. 

9),   1440,   1442. 
Hopkins  v.  Railway  Co.    ( —  Wis. 

— ,  107  N.  W.  Rep.  330),  1118. 
Hopkins    v.    Westcott     (6    Blatch. 

64),  425,  426,   441,  1246,  1254. 
Hopper  V.  Railway  Co.    (91  Iowa, 

639,  60  N.  W.  487),  580. 
Horn    V.    New    Jersey    Steamboat 

Co.    (48    N.    Y.    Supp.    348,    23 

App.   Div.  302),  911. 
Home  v.  Railway  Co.   (L.  R.  8  C. 

P.  131),  1367,  1370. 
Horner  v.   Railroad   Co.    (70   Mo. 

App.   285),    1360. 
Hornthal    v.    Steamboat   Co.    (107 

N.  C.  76,  11  S.  E.  Rep.  1049), 

130. 
Horovitz  V.  Packet  Co.    (18   Misc. 

24,   41  N.   Y.   Supp.   54).   1423. 
Hosea  v.  McCrory   (12  Ala.  349), 

86. 
Hosmer     v.     Railroad     Co.      (156 

Mass.  506,  31  N.  E.  Rep.  652), 

1018,  1073. 
Hostetter  v.  Park   (137  U.  S.  30), 

613. 
Hostetter  v.  Railroad  (11  Atl.  Rep. 

609),  167. 
Hoth    V.    Peters     (55    Wis.    405), 

1417. 
Houck    V.    Railway   Co.    (38   Fed. 

Rep.   226),  972. 


CXXXIV 


TABLE  OF   CASES   CITED. 


[references  are 

Hough  V.  Railroad  Co.  (100  U.  S. 

213),  1417. 
Moulder  v.  Steam  Nav.  Co.   (3  P. 

&  F.  170),  848. 
Houston  Direct  Nav.  Co.  v.  Insur- 
ance Co.  (89  Tex.  1,  32  S.  W. 

889,  30  L.  R.  A.  713,  59  Am. 

St.  Rep.  17,  reversing  31  S.  W. 

685),  576. 
Hover  v.  Railroad  Co.    (25  Ohio, 

667),  1387. 
Howard    v.    Macondray    (7    Gray, 

516),    877. 
Howard  v.  Railroad  Co.   (61  Miss. 

194),  1054. 
Howard  v.   Shepherd    (9  Com.  B. 

297),   197. 
Howard    v.    Wissman     (18    How. 

231),   334. 
Howard  County  v.  Legg   (93  Ind. 

523),  1397. 
Howard  Ex.  Co.  v.  Wile  (64  Penn. 

St.  201),  27. 
Howe    v.    Stewart    (40    Vt.    145), 

758. 
Howell    V.    County    (121    N.    Car. 

362,  28  S.  E.  Rep.  362),  1389. 
Howell  v.  Goodrich   (69  111.  556), 

1423. 
Howell  V.  Railway  Co.    (92  Hun, 

423,  36  N.  Y.  Supp.  544),  755, 

1295. 
Howland  v.  Railroad  Co.  (26  R.  I. 

138,  58  Atl.  683),  937,  1118. 
Howser  v.  Melcher  (40  Mich.  185), 

1341. 
Hoyt    V.    Hudson    (41    Wis.    105), 

1417. 
Hoyt   V.   Railway  Co.    (112   Mich. 

638,   71   N.  W.    172,   9   Am.   & 

Eng.    R.    Cas.    (N.    S.)     818), 

1117. 
Hrebrik    v.    Carr    (29    Fed.    Rep. 

298),  942. 
Hubbard  v.  Express  Co.   (10  R.  I. 

244),   1355. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Hubbard  v.  Railway  Co.  (104  Wis. 
160,  80  N.  W.  454,  76  Am.  St. 
Rep.  855),  1394. 
Hubbard  v.  Railway  Co.  (112  Mo. 
App.  459,  87  S.  W.  Rep.  52), 
226,  1246. 
Hubbell  v.   Insurance  Co.    (74   N. 

Y.  246),  801. 
Hubbersty  v.  Ward  (8  Exch.  330), 

159,   193. 
Hubener  v.  The  Railroad   (23  La. 

Ann.   492),   1181. 
Hubgh  v.  Railroad  Co.  (6  La.  Ann. 

495),   1376,   1384. 
Hudson  V.  Baxendale   (2  Hurl.  & 

N.  575),  132,  685. 
Hudson     V.     Railroad     Co.      (185 
Mass.  510,  71  N.  B.  Rep.  66), 
1391. 
Hudson  V.  Railroad  Co.   (92  Iowa, 
231,  60  N.  W.  6U8,  54  Am.  St. 
Rep.  550),  207,  212,  442,   444, 
450,    1366. 
Hudson   V.   Railway   Co.    (32   Mo. 

App.  667),  1417. 
Hudson  Canal  Co.  v.  Coal  Co.    (8 

Wall.  276),  168. 
Hudson   River   Lighterage   Co.    v. 
Wheeler,    etc.,    Co.    (93    Fed. 
374),   691,   1352. 
Hudston  V.  Railway    (L.  R.   4  Q. 

B.   366),   1244,   1249. 
Huelsencamp  v.  Railway   (34  Mo. 

45),  1197,   1391. 
Huff  V.  Ames  (16  Neb.  139),  1229. 
HufEord  V.  Railroad  Co.   (53  Mich. 

118),  1061,  10u2,  1065,  1090. 
Hufford  V.  Railroad  Co.  (64  Mich. 

631),  1065,  1067. 
Hugg  V.    Insurance   Co.    (7   How. 

595),  818,  823. 
Hugg  V.  The  Mining,  etc.,  Co.   (3b 

Md.  414),  823,  825. 
Hughes    V.    Hoskins    Lumber    Co. 
(136  Fed.  435),  837. 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


CXXXV 


[references  are  to  sections.] 


Hughes  V.  Insurance  Co.   (100  N. 

Y.  58),  801. 
Hughes   V.  Macfie    (2   Hurl.  &  C. 

744),  1227. 
Hughes  V.  Palace  Car  Co.  (74  Fed. 

499),  1130,  1143. 
Hughes   V.   Railroad   Co.    (61   Ga. 

131),  1404. 
Hughes   V.   Railway    (14   Com.  B. 

637),   652,   1335. 
Hughes  V.  Railroad  Co.    (127  Mo. 

447,  30  S.  W.  127),  1011,  1417. 
Hughes  V.  Railroad  Co.    (202   Pa. 

St.   222,  51  Atl.  990,  63  L.  R. 

A.  513,  97  Am.  St.  Rep.  713), 

202,   211,   215,   239,   426. 
Hughes  V.   Steamboat  Co.    (31  N. 

Y.    Supp.   1012,   11  Misc.   65), 

953. 
Hughson    V.    Steamboat   Co.    (181 

Mass.  325,  64  N.  E.  74,  58  L. 

R.   A.   432),   1151. 
Hulbert  v.  R&ilroad  Co.   (40  N.  Y. 

145),   933,   940,   1186. 
Hulbert  v.  Topeka   (34  Fed,  Rep. 

510),  1389. 
Hulett  V.   Swift    (33   N.   Y.  571), 

1272. 
Hull  V.  Railroad  Ck>.  (60  Mo.  App. 

593),   787. 
Hull    V.    Railway    Co.    (41    Minn. 

510),  336,  449,  1354. 
Hulthen  v.  Stewart  &  Co.   (L.  R. 

(1903)  App.  Cas.  389,  72  L.  J. 

K.  B.  917,  aft'g.,    (1902)    2  K. 

B.  199,  71  L.  J.  K.  B.  624.  86 
Law  T.  (N.  S.)  397,  50  Wkly. 
Rep.  538),  840. 

Humboldt,  etc.,  Ass'n  v.  Chris- 
topherson   (73  Fed.  239,  19  C. 

C.  A.  481,  46  L.  R.  A.  264), 
345. 

Humphreys  v.  Perry  (148  U.  S. 
627,  13  Sup.  Ct.  R.  711,  37  L. 
Ed.  587,  reversing  39  Fed. 
417),  1249,  1250. 


Humphreys    v.   Reed     (6    Whart. 

435),  65,  75,  799. 
Hund  V.  Geier   (72  111.  393),  1227. 
Hunn   V.  Railroad   Co.    (78   Mich. 

513),    1397. 
Hunnewell   v.  Taber    (2   Sprague, 

1),  480,  632. 
Hunt    V.    Haskell    (24    Me.    339), 

785,  786,  889. 
Hunt  V.  Nutt  (Tex.  Civ.  App.,  27 

S.  W.  Rep.  1031),  508. 
Hunt    V.    Propeller    Cleveland    (6 

McLean,  76),  1352,  1355. 
Hunt   V.    Railroad    (29    La.    Ann. 

446),   158. 
Hunt  V.  Railway  Co.  (94  Mo.  255), 

1118. 
Hunt  Bros.  v.  Railway  Co.    (Tex. 

Civ.  App.,  74  S.  W.  Rep.  69), 

298. 
Hunter  v.  Fry   (2  B.  &  Aid.  421), 

863. 
Hunter   v.   Potts    (4   Camp.   203), 

337. 
Hunter  v.  Prinsep  (10  East,  378), 

801,  815,   817. 
Hunter    v.    Railroad    Co.     ( —    S. 

Car,  — ,   51   S.   E.   Rep.   860), 

922,   1192. 
Huntting    Elevator    Co.     v.     Bos- 
worth    (179    U.    S.   415,    45   L. 

Ed.   256,    21    Sup.    Ct.   R.   183, 

reversing   Bosworth    v.    Rail- 
road Co.  87  Fed.  72,  30  C.  C. 

A.  541),  131. 
Hunter  v.  Railroad  Co.  (112  N.  Y. 

371),  1181. 
Hunter  v.  Railroad  Co.  (126  N.  Y. 

18),   1177,   1221. 
Hunter   v.  Railway  Co.    (76  Tex. 

195),  231,  232,  233. 
Hunter  v.  Stewart    (47  Me.  419), 

1409. 
Huntingdon  v.  Dinsmore  (4  Hun, 

66),  408. 


CXXXVl 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


[befebences  aue 

Huntoon  v.  Trumbull  (2  McCrary, 

314).  1383. 
Hurley  v.  Milward   (1  Jones  &  C. 

224),   607. 
Huron   Barge  Co.  V.  Turney    (79 

Fed.  109;   s.  c.  71  Fed.  972), 

156,  832,   833. 
Hurst  V.  Railway  Co.    (84  Mich, 

539,  48  N.  W.  44),  1382,  1386. 

1397,  1399. 
Hurst  V.  Railway    (19  C.  B.    (N. 

S.)  310),  1107. 
Hurt  V.  Railroad    (40  Miss.  391), 

1019. 
Hurt  V.  Railway  Co.  (94  Mo.  255), 

1119,  1121. 
Hurtin  v.  Insurance  Co.  (1  Wash. 

530),  815,  818. 
Hurwitz  V.  Packing  Co.  (56  N.  Y. 

Supp.    379),    1249,    1286. 
Hussey    v.    Ryan    (64    Md.    426), 

1378. 
Hussey  v.  The  Sargossa  (3  Woods, 

380),  1357. 
Huston   V.    Peters    (1   Met.    558), 

665. 
Huston  V.   Railroad   Co.    (63   Mo. 

App.  671),  508. 
Hutcheson  v.  Railroad  Co.  (22  Ky. 

L.  Rep.  1871,  63  S.  W.  33;  s.  c. 

57  S.  W.  251),  574. 
Hutchings     v.     Ladd     (16     Mich. 

493),   462. 
Hutchins  v.   Pennsylvania  R.   Co. 

(181  N.  Y.  186,  73  N.  E.  Rep. 

972,    106    Am.    St.    Rep.    537, 

aff'g  86  N.  Y.   Supp.  1138,  92 

App.  Div.  612),  1049,  1052. 
Hutchins  v.  Railway  Co.  (44  Minn. 

5),  1386,  1397. 
Hutchinson    v.    Guion    (5    C.    B. 

149),   337. 
Hutchinrfon    v.    Railway    Co.    (37 

Minn.  524),  333. 


TO   SECTIONS.] 

Hutchison  v.  The  Railway  ( —  N. 
Car.  — ,  52  S.  E.  Rep.  263), 
1126. 

Hutkoff  V.  Railroad  Co.  (61  N.  Y. 
Supp.  254,  29  Misc.  770;  af- 
firmed, 63  N.  Y.  Supp.  198,  30 
Misc.   802),    477,   1352. 

Hutton  V.  Osborne  (1  Sel.  N.  P. 
420),  18,  34. 

Hyatt  V.  Adams  (16  Mich.  180), 
1376,  1379,  1384,  1398.  1400. 

Hyde  v.  Railroad  Co.  (61  Iowa. 
441),  1387. 

Hyde  V.  The  Trent  Nav.  Co.  (5 
T.  R.  389),  75,  280,  665,   687. 

Hyman  v.  Railroad  Co.  (66  Hun, 
202,  21  N.  Y.  Supp.  119),  131. 
1302. 


Ihl  V.  Railroad    (47  N.  Y.   317), 

1397. 
Illinois,  etc.  Co.  v.  Beaird  (24  111. 

Ap.   322),  521. 
Imhoff  V.  Railway  (20  Wis.  344), 

1118,  1119. 
Imhoff  V.  Railroad  (22  Wis.  682), 

1119. 
Independence  Mills  Co.  v.  Railway 

Co.   (72  Iowa,  535),  715.  1118, 

1119    1334. 
Indermaur    v.    Dames     (L.    R.    1 

Com.  P.  247;  L.  R.  2  Com.  P. 

Ill),  1015. 
Ingalls  V.  Bills    (9  Mete.  1),  893, 

895,  903,  910,  956,  959,  1223. 
Ingate  v.  Christie    (3  Car.  &  Kir. 

61),  70. 


TABLE   OP    CASES   CITED. 


cxxxvu 


[eefehences  aee 

Ingersoll  v.  Railroad  Co.  (S  Allen, 

438),  918. 
Ingersoll  v.  Van  Bokkelin  (7  Cow. 

670),  780. 
Ingledew  v.  Railroad  Co.  (7  Gray, 

86),  1362,  1366. 
Ingwersen  v.  Railway  Co.  ( —  Mo. 

App.  — ,  92  S.  W.  Rep.  357), 

444. 
Ingraham    v.     Pullman     Co.     ( — 

Mass.  — ,  76  N.  E.  Rep.  237), 

1423. 
Inhabitants,  etc.  v.   Hall    (61  Me. 

517).  243. 
Inman   v.   Railroad   Co.    (14   Tex. 

Civ.   App.   39,   37   S.   W.   Rep. 

37),  147,  226,  1370. 
Inman  v.  Railway  Co.   (129  U.  S. 

128),   452,   784. 
Inness  v.  Railroad  Co.  (168  Mass. 

433,  47  N.  E.  193),  1008. 
Insurance  Co.   v.  Bonn    (95  U.  S. 

117),  1430. 
Insurance  Co.  v.  Brame  (95  U.  S. 

754),  1384. 
Insurance  Co.  v.  Brig  Sarah  Ann 

(13  Pet.  387),  790. 
Insurance   Co.  v.   Bryan    (1   Hill, 

25),  469. 
Insurance  Co.  v,  Bryan  (26  Wend. 

563),  469. 
Insurance  Co.   v.   Butler    (20  Md. 

41),  801,  815. 
Insurance  Co.  v,  Calebs  (20  N.  Y. 

173),  784. 
Insurance     Co.     v.     Catlett      (12 

Wheat.  383),  815,  817. 
Insurance  Co.  v.  Center  (4  Wend. 

45),  790. 
Insurance  Co.  v.   Chase    (1  E.  D. 

Smith,  115),  246. 
Insurance  Co.  v.  Force  (142  N.  Y. 

90,  36   N.  E.    874,   40  Am.   St. 

Rep.  576,  aff'g,  20  N.  Y.  Supp. 

796),  201,  800. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Insurance  Co.  v.  Groom  (4  Bush, 
289),  489. 

Insurance  Co.  v.  Huth  (16  Ch. 
Div.  474),  792. 

Insurance  Co.  v.  Kountz  Line  (4 
Woods,   268),  259. 

Insurance  Co.  v.  Lenox  (1  Johns. 
Cas.  377;  2  id.  443),  815,  820. 

Insurance  Co.  v.  McNeill  (89  Fed. 
131,  32  C.  C.  A.  173),  420,  705, 
714. 

Insurance  Co.  v.  Morse  (150  U.  S. 
99,  14  Sup.  Ct.  R.  55,  37  L- 
Ed.  1013),  784. 

Insurance  Co.  v.  North  German 
Lloyd  Co.  (106  Fed.  973;  af- 
firmed, Nord-Deutscher  Lloyd 
V.  President,  etc.,  of  Insurance 
Co.,  110  Fed.  420,  49  C.  C.  A. 
1),  120,  350,  364,  380. 

Insurance  Co.  v.  Portland  Flour- 
ing Mills  Co.  (124  Fed.  855; 
afjlrmed,  Portland  Flouring 
Mills  Co.  V.  Insurance  Co.,  130 
Fed.  860,  65  C.  C.  A.  344),  167, 
800,  810. 

Insurance  Co.  v.  Railroad  (8  Baxt. 
268),  130,  13L 

Insurance  Co.  v.  Railroad  Co.  (9 
Ap.  Div.  4,  40  N.  Y.  Supp. 
1113;  affirmed  without  opin- 
ion, 158  N.  Y.  726,  53  N.  E. 
1128),  448. 

Insurance  Co.  v.  Railway  Co.  (3 
McCrary,  233),  506. 

Insurance  Co.  v.  Railroad  Co.  (144 
N.  Y.  200,  39  N.  E.  79,  43  Am. 
St.  Rep.  752,  aff'g,  68  Hun, 
598,  23  N.  Y.  Supp.  231),  113. 

Insurance  Co.  v.  Railroad  Co.  (104 
U,  S.  170),  130,  131,  259,  264. 

Insurance  Co.  v.  Railroad  Co.  (72 
N.  Y.  90),  408. 

Insurance  Co.  v.  Railroad  Co.  (20 
La.  Ann.  302),  1354,  1355. 


cxxxvni 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


[REFERENCES   ARE 

Insurance  Co.  v.  Railroad  Co.  (24 

La.  Ann.  100),  1354. 
Insurance  Co.  v.  Railway  Co.   (63 

Tex.  475),  405,  783. 
Insurance  Co.  v.  Shillito  (15  Ohio 

St.  559),  607. 
Insurance  Co.  v.  Southern  Pacific 

Co.    (72  Fed.  285,  18  C.  C.  A. 

561,   38  U.  S.   App.  243,  aff'g, 

55  Fed.  82),  814,  818. 
Insurance  Co.  v.  Speares  (16  Ind. 

52),  607. 
Insurance  Co.  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  Co. 

(120  U.  S.  166),  486. 
Insurance  Co.  v.  Storrow  (5  Paige, 

285),  469. 
Insurance    Co.    v.    Transportation 

Co.    (97   Fed.  653),  449,   1353. 
Insurance    Co.    v.    Transportation 

Co.    (117  U.  S.  312),  452,  783. 
Insurance    Co.   v.   Transportation 

Co.   (120  U.  S.  166),  27L 
Insurance  Co.  v.  Tweed   (7  "Wall. 

44).  300,  1430. 
Insurance  Co.  v.  Wheeler   (49  N. 

Y.  616),  238,  471. 
Insurance   Co.   of   North   America 

V.    Insurance    Co.    (91    Tenn. 

537,  19  S.  W.  755,  affirmed  in 

Merchants     Cotton     Press     & 

Storage  Co.  v.  Insurance  Co., 

151  U.  S.  368,  14  Sup.  Ct.  R. 

367,  38  L.  Ed.  195),  547. 
Insurance   Co.   of  North  America 

V.  Railroad    (152  Ind.  333,  53 

N.  E.  382),  477,  1355. 
International    Navigation    Co.    v. 

Farr.  &  Bailey  Mfg.  Co.    (181 

U.   S.    218,    45   L.   Ed.   830,   21 

Sup.  Ct.  R.  591,  affirming  Parr 

&  Bailey  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Interna- 
tional Navigation  Co.,  98  Fed. 

636,  39  C.  C.  A.  197),  363,  367, 

373,  380. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Interstate  Commerce  Commission 
V.  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co. 
(50  Fed.  2^5;  appeal  dis- 
missed, 81  Fed.  1005,  29  U.  S. 
App.  746,  26  C.  C.  A.  685). 
570. 

Interstate  Commerce  Commission 
V.  Baird  (194  U.  S.  25,  48  L. 
Ed.  860),  555. 

Interstate  Commerce  Commission 
V.  Brimson  (154  U.  S.  457), 
576. 

Interstate  Commerce  Commission 
V,  Clyde  Steamship  Co.  (181 
U.  S.  29,  45  L.  Ed.  729,  22 
Sup.  Ct.  R.  512,  modifying  93 
Fed.  83,  35  C.  C.  A.  217,  and 
88  Fed.  186),  570. 

Interstate  Commerce  Commission 
V.  Railroad  Co.  (88  Fed.  186 
and  93  Fed.  83,  35  C.  C.  A. 
217;  modified  in  181  U.  S.  29, 
45   L.   Ed.   729),   570. 

Interstate  Commerce  Commission 
V.  Railway  Co.  (52  Fed.  187; 
reversed.  Railway  v.  Inter- 
state Commerce  Commission, 
162  U.  S.  197,  16  Sup.  Ct.  R. 
666),  524,  525,  527,  528,  535, 
562,  563,  566,  570. 

Interstate  Commerce  Commission 
V.  Railroad  Co.  (64  Fed.  723), 
531. 

Interstate  Commerce  CJommission 
V.  Railway  Co.  (64  Fed.  981, 
9  C.  C.  A.  689,  13  U.  S.  App. 
730;  affirmed.  Railway  Co.  v. 
Interstate  Commerce  Commis- 
sion, 162  U.  S.  184,  16  Sup. 
Ct.  R.  700,  40  L.  Ed.  935), 
526. 

Interstate  Commerce  Commission 
V.  Railway  Co.  (168  U.  S.  144, 
18  Sup.  Ct.  R.  45,  42  L.  Ed. 
414,  aff'g,   21  C.  C.   A.  51,  74 


TABLE  OF   CASES   CITED. 


CXXXIX 


[references   ABE   TO   SECTIONS.] 


Fed.   715,   41   U.   S.   App.   453 

and   69    Fed.    227),    536,    553, 

559,  569,  570. 
Interstate  Commerce  Commission 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (73  Fed.  409), 

527,    528,    532,    533,    534,    549, 

552,  553,  559,  563. 
Interstate  Commerce  Commission 

V.  Railroad  Co.   (74  Fed.  784; 

appeals    withdrawn,     82  Fed. 

1002,  39  U.  S.  App.  764,  27  C. 

C.  A.  681),  532. 
Interstate  Commerce  Commission 

V.  Railroad  Co.   (76  Fed.  183; 

affirmed  without  opinion,  104 

Fed.  1005,  43  C.  C.  A.  682,  id., 

167  U.  S.  479,  42  L.  Ed.  243, 

17  Sup.  Ct.  R.  896),  527. 
Interstate  Commerce   Commission 

V.  Railway  Co.  (77  Fed.  942), 

576. 
Interstate  Commerce  Commission 

V.  Railway  Co.   (85  Fed.  107; 

affirmed.  Railway  Co.  v.  Inter- 
state  Commerce   Commission, 

99   Fed.   52,  39  C.  C.  A.   413; 

reversed,  181  U.   S.   1,   45   L. 

Ed.  719,  21  Sup.  Ct.  R.  516), 

559. 
Interstate  Commerce  Commission 

V.  Railway  Co.  (105  Fed.  703), 

570. 
Interstate  Commerce  Commission 

V.    Railroad     Co.     (118     Fed. 

613),  526,  530,  550,   555. 
Interstate  Commerce  Commission 

V.    Railway     Co.     (120     Fed. 

934,    57    C.    C.    A.    224),    533, 

560. 
Interstate  Commerce  Commission 

V.     Railway     Co.     (122     Fed. 

800,  60  C.  C.  A.  540,  aff'g,  117 

Fed.   741),   526,   553,  561,   570. 
Interstate   Commerce  Commission 

V.     Railroad     Co.     (123     Fed. 

597),  565. 


Interstate  Commerce  Commission 

V.     Railroad     Co.     (124    Fed. 

624),  559. 
Interstate   Commerce  Commission 

V.     Railway     (128     Fed.     59; 

modified  and  affirmed  in  New 

Haven  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Interstate 

Commerce  Commission,  200  U. 

S.  3€1),  546,  555. 
Interstate   Commerce  Commission 

V.     Railway     Co.     (141     Fed. 

1003),  527,  531,  541,  552,  553, 

559,  560. 
Interstate  Commerce   Commission 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (145  U.  S.  263, 

12  Sup.  Ct.  R.  844,  36  L.  Ed. 

699,    aff'g    43    Fed.    37),    527, 

543,  552. 
Interstate   Commerce  Commission 

V.  Railway  Co.  (167  U.  S.  479, 

42  L.  Ed.  243,  17  Sup.  Ct.  R. 

896,  id.   104   Fed.   1005,  43   C. 

C.    A.    682,    affirming   76    Fed. 

183),  527. 
Interstate  Commerce  Commission 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (186  U.  S.  320, 

46  L.  Ed.  1182,  aiT'g,  103  Fed. 
249,  43  C.  C.  A.  209,  and  98 
Fed.  173),  556. 

Interstate  Commerce  Commission 
V.  Railroad  Co.  (190  U.  S.  273, 

47  L.  Ed.  1047,  23  Sup.  Ct.  R. 
687,  aff'g,  108  Fed.  988,  46  C. 
C.  A.  685,  reversing  102  Fed. 
709  and  101  Fed.  146),  561, 
570,  571,  572. 

Interstate  Stockyards  Co.  v.  Rail- 
way Co.   (99  Fed.  472),  526. 

Ionia  Transp.  Co.  v.  2098  Tons  of 
Coal   (128  Fed.  514),  842. 

lonnone  v.  Railroad  Co.  (21  R.  I. 
452,  44  Atl.  592,  46  L.  R.  A. 
730),  1004. 

Ireland  v.  Johnson  (1  Bing.  N.  C. 
162),  1334. 


cxl 


TABLE  OF   CASES   CITED. 


[BEFEBENCES   ABE 

Ireland  v.   Railroad   Co.    (20   Ky. 
Law  Rep.  1586,  49  S.  W.  Rep. 
ISS,  453),  239,   240. 
Irelson   v.    Railroad   Co.    (42    La. 

Ann.  673),  951. 
Irish  V.  Railroad  Co.  (4  Wash.  48, 
29  Pac.  845,  31  Am.  St.  Rep. 
899),  1186,  1221. 
Irish  V.  Railway   (19  Minn.  376), 

131,  23L 
Iron  Co.  V.  Brawley  (83  Ala.  375), 

1382. 
Iroquois  Furnace  Co.  v.  Elphicke 
200  111.  411,  65  N.  B.  784,  aff'g 
102  111.  App.  138),  857. 
Irving  V.   Pullman  Co.    (84  N.  Y. 

Supp.  248),  1132. 
Irwin  V.  Railroad   (59  N.  Y.  653), 

462. 
Irzo    V.    Perkins     (10    Fed.    Rep. 

779),  807. 
Isaacs  V.  Railroad  (47  N.  Y.  122), 

1098,  1441. 
Isaacson   v.   Railroad   Co.    (94   N. 
Y.  278),  1256,  1282,  1298,  1302. 
Isaac   V.    Railway   Co.    (12    Daly, 

340),  1389. 
Isabel  V.  Railroad    (60  Mo.  475), 

1229. 
Isham   V.   Erie  R.   Co.    (98  N.   Y. 
Supp.  609),  180,  187,  238,  444, 
451,  1366. 
Izett  V.  Mountain    (4  East,  371), 

439. 
Izlar  V.  Railroad  Co.    (57  S.  Car. 
332,  35  S.  E.  Rep.  583),  991. 


Jackson  v.  Crilly   (16  Colo.  103), 

1197. 
Jackson  v.  Isaacs  (3  H.  &  N.  405), 

83L 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Jackson  v.  Railroad  (23  Cal.  268), 

708. 
Jackson  v.  Railroad  (47  Ind.  454), 

1418. 
Jackson  v.  Railway  Ce.    (144  La. 
982,  38  So.  Rep.  701,  70  L.  R. 
A.  294),  910,  1198. 
Jackson  v.  Railway  Co.   (76  Miss. 

703,  25  So.  Rep.  353),  1083. 
Jackson  v.  Railway  (L.  R.  2  Com. 

P.  Div.  125),  952,  1174. 
Jackson  v.  Railway  Co.    (87  Mo. 

422),   971. 
Jackson    v.    Railroad    (47    N.    Y. 

274),  1098. 
Jackson,  etc.,  Iron  Works  v.  Hurl- 
burt  (158  N.  Y.  34,  52  N.  E. 
665,  70  Am.  St.  Rep.  432,  aff'g 
36  N.  Y.  Supp.  808,  15  Misc. 
93),  70.  1362. 
Jacob  V.  Railroad  Co.    (105  Mich. 

450,  63  N.  W.  502),  1177. 
Jacobs  V.   Railroad   Co.    (208   Pa. 

535,  57  Atl.  982),  1299. 
Jacobs  V.  Tutt  (33  Fed.  Rep.  412), 

1250,  1286,  1293. 
Jacobus  V.  Railway  Co.   (20  Minn. 

125),  450,   1075,   1200. 
James  v.  Brophy  (71  Fed.  310,  18 
C.  C.  A.  49,  33  U.  S.  App.  330), 
833,   837. 
James   v.    Christy    (18   Mo.    162), 

1377. 
James    v.    Railway    Co.    (92    Ala. 

231,  9  So.  Rep.  335),  1401. 
Jameson    v.    Sweeney    (66    N.    Y. 
Supp.  494,  32  Misc.  645;   s.  c. 
61   N.  Y.  Supp.  498,  29  Misc. 
584),  698,  846. 
Jamison  v.  Railroad  Co.   (55  Cal. 

593),  1420. 
Jaminet  v.  Moving  Co.    (109  Mo. 
App.  257,  84  S.  W.  Rep.  128), 
37,  40. 


TABLE   OF    CASES   CITED. 


cxli 


[BEFEEENCES  ABE  TO   SECTIONS.] 


Jammison  v.  Railway  Co.  (92  Va. 

327,  23  S.  E.  Rep.  758,  53  Am. 

St.  Rep.  813),  1197. 
Janny  v.   Railway  Co.    (63  Minn. 

380,  65  N.  W.  450),  1001. 
Jaques  v.  Railroad  (41  Conn.  61), 

1423. 
Jardine   v.   Cornell    (50   N.   J.   L. 

485),  1084,  1433. 
Jarrett   v.   Railway   Co.    (83   Ga. 

347),  1177. 
Jarrett  v.  Railway  Co.   (74  Minn. 

477,  77  N.  W.  304),  701,  1318. 
J.  C.  Hass  &  Co.  V.  Bank  (—  Ala. 

— ,  39  So.  Rep.  129,  1  L.  R.  A. 

(N.  S.)    242),  175. 
Jean,  Garrison  &  Co.  v.  Flagg  (90 

N.  Y.  Supp.  289,  45  Misc.  421), 

163,  1352. 
Jeffrey  v.  Bigelow  (13  Wend.  518), 

798. 
Jeff r is   V.   Railway   Co.    (93   Wis. 

250,  67  N.  W.  424,  57  Am.  St. 

Rep.  919),  761,  769. 
Jellett  V.  Railway  Co.    (30  Minn. 

265),  1374. 
Jencks  v.  Coleman  (2  Sumn.  221), 

75,  963,  970,  977. 
Jenkins  v.  Hankins  (98  Tenn.  545, 

41  S.  W.  Rep.  1028),  1399. 
Jenkins  v.  Motlow  (1  Sneed,  248), 

25. 
Jenkins  v.  Railroad  Co.    (20  Ky. 

Law,  Rep.  865,  47  S.  W.  Rep. 

761),  1414. 
Jenkins  v.  Railway  Co.  ( —  S.  Car. 

— ,  53  S.  E.  Rep.  480),  449. 
Jenkyns  v.   Usborne    (7  M.   &  G. 

678),  759. 
Jennings  v.  Railroad  Co.  (15  Ont. 

App.  477),  1018. 
Jennings    v.    Railway    (52    Hun, 

227),  108. 


Jennings  v.  Railway  Co.    (127  N. 

Y.  438,  28  N.  E.  394,  aff'g,  52 

Hun,  227,  5  N.  Y.  Supp.  140), 

239,  443,  459. 
Jennings  v.  Smith   (106  Fed.  139, 

45  C.  C.  A.  249,  ajf'g,  99  Fed. 

189),  426. 
Jerome   v.   Smith   et  al.    (48  Vt. 

230),  1036. 
Jessel  V.  Bath   (L.  R.  2  Ex.  267), 

159,  165,  197. 
Jesson  V.  Solly  (4  Taunt.  52),  807. 
Jevons  V.  Railroad  Co.    (70  Kan. 

491,  78  Pac.  817),  1056,  1062. 
Jewell  V.  Railroad  Co.    (50  N.  Y. 

Supp.  848,  27  App.  Div.  .500), 

1219. 
Jewell  V.  Railroad   (55  N.  H.  84), 

664. 
Jewell   V.   Railway   Co.    (54   Wis. 

610),  1177. 
Jewett  V.  Keene    (62  N.  H.  701), 

1386. 
Jewett  V.   Olsen    (18   Or.    419,   23 

Pac.    262,     17     Am.    St.    Rep, 

745),  740,  743. 
J.  H.  Cownie  Glove  Co.  v.  Trans- 
portation   Co.    ( —    Iowa,   — , 

106  N.  W.  Rep.  749),  84,  287, 
Jobbitt  V.  Goundry  (29  Barb.  509), 

810. 
John  V.  Bacon  (L.  R.  5  C.  P.  437), 

916. 
John  Hood  Co.  v.  American,  etc. 

Co.    (—   Mass.   — ,   77   N.    E. 

Rep.  638),  426,  428. 
Johns  V.  Railroad  Co.   (39  S.  Car. 

162,  17  S.  E.  698,  39  Am.  St. 

Rep.    709,    20   L.   R.    A.    520), 

941. 
Johnson  v.  Express  Co.   (28  Ont. 

R.  203),  518. 
Johnson  v.  Friar  (4  Yer,  47),  51 

52,  486. 


cxlii 


TABLE  OF   CASES   CITED. 


[BEFEBENCES   ABE 

Johnson  v.  Hill   (3  Starkie,  172), 

882. 
Johnson  v.  Railroad  Co.  (104  Ala. 

241,  16  So.  75,  53  Am.  St.  Rep. 

39),  904. 
Johnson  v.  Railroad  Co.   (108  Ga. 

496,  34  S.  E.  127,  46  L.  R.  A. 

502),  1035. 
Johnson  v.  Railroad  Co.   (16  Fla. 

623),  521,  1023. 
Johnson  v.  Railroad  Co.  (80  Hun, 

306,  30  N.  Y.  Supp.  318),  1397. 
Johnson    v.    Railroad     Co.      (125 

Mass.  77),  1012. 
Johnson  v.  Railroad  Co.   (63  Md. 

106),  1041. 
Johnson   v.   Railroad     (11    Minn. 

296),  895. 
Johnson  v.  Railroad  (70  Penn.  St. 

357),  1174,  1181. 
Johnson    v.    Railroad     (33     N.    Y. 

610),  611,  617. 
Johnson    v.    Railroad    (46    N.    H. 

213),  1043,  1052,  1117. 
Johnson  v.  Railroad  Co.  (91  Iowa, 

248,   59   N.   W.   Rep.   66),  205. 
Johnson  v.  Railroad  Co.    (130  N. 

Car.  488,  41  S.  E.  794),  1177. 
Johnson  v.  Railroad  Co.  (Tex.  Civ. 

App.,     93    S.    W.    Rep.    434), 

nil. 

Johnson  v.  Railway  Co.   (46  Fed. 

347),   1045,   1433. 
Johnson  v.  Railway  Co.    (18  Neb. 

690),  1233. 
Johnson  v.  Railway  Co.    (94  Fed. 

473),  1001. 
Johnson  v.  Railway   Co.    (90   Ga. 

810,  17  S.  E.  Rep.  121),  236. 
Johnson  v.  Railway  Co.   (18  Neb. 

690,  26  N.  W.  Rep.  347),  1399. 
Johnson  v.  Railway  Co.  (116  Iowa, 

639,  88  N.  W.  811),  990. 


TO   SECTIONS.] 

Johnson  v.  Railway  Co.  (133  Mich. 

596,   95   N.   W.   Rep.   724,    103 

Am.  St.  Rep.  464,  10  Det.  L. 

N.  324),  239,  505. 
Johnson  v.  Railway  Co.  (130  Mich. 

453,     90  N.  W.  274.  9  Det.  L. 

N.  123),  1093. 
Johnson  v.  Railway  Co.    (69  Miss. 

191,  11  So.  Rep.  104,  30  Am. 

St.    Rep.    534),    641. 
Johnson    v.    Railway    Co.    (53    S. 

Car.  203,  31  S.  E.  212,  69  Am. 

St.  Rep.  849),  991. 
Johnson  v.  Railway  Co.   (27  Tex. 

Civ.  App.  616,  66  S.  W.  906), 

1406. 
Johnson    v.    Seattle    Electric    Co. 

(39   Wash.   211,   81  Pac.  Rep. 

705),  1389. 
Johnson    v.    Stone     (11    Humph. 

419),  1246. 
Johnson  v.  Davis    (60  Mich.  56), 

698,  864. 
Johnston  v.  Railroad  Co.   ( — Neb. 

— ,  97  N.  W.  Rep.  479),  749. 
Johnston  v.  Railway  Co.  (2  K.  B. 

(1904)    250.    73    L.    J.    K.    B. 

568),    1423. 
Johnstone  v.  Railroad  Co.    (39   S. 

Car.   55.   17.   S.  E.  Rep.  512), 

426,  449,  1353,  1354. 
Joliet    V.    Weston    (123    111.    641), 

1397,    1401. 
Jonasen  v.  Keyser  (112  Fed.  443, 

50  C.  C.  A.  334),  841. 
Jones,    In    re    (3    C.    B.    (N.    S.) 

718),    522. 
Jones    V.    Boyce    (1    Stark.    493), 

959,    1223. 
Jones  V.  Earl    (37  Cal.  630),  758. 
Jones  V.  Pearle  (1  Strange,  556), 

889. 
Jones   V.    Pitcher    (3    Stew.   &   P. 

135),   75. 
Jones   V.    Railroad    Co.    (89    Ala. 

376),  233.  408. 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED, 


cxliii 


[references   ABE  TO   SECTIONS.] 


Jones  V.  Railroad  Co.   (156  N.  Y. 

187,  50  N.  E.  856.  41  L.  R.  A. 

490,  reversing  90  Hun,  605,  35 

N.  Y.  Supp.  1109;   s.  c.  61  N. 

Y.    Supp.    721,    46    App.    Div. 

470),   1186. 
Jones  V.  Railroad  Co.    (91  Minn. 

229,  97  N.  W.  893,  103  Am.  St. 

Rep.  507),  274,  285,  292,  1354. 
Jones  V.  Railroad  Co.   (4  App.  D. 

C.    158;    reversed,    155    U.    S. 

333,  15  Sup.  Ct.  R.  136),  231, 

263. 
Jones  V.  Railroad  Co.   (Mo.  App., 

91  S.  W.  Rep.  158),  497,  499, 

1348. 
Jones   V.   Railroad    Co.    (178   Mo. 

528,  77  S.  W.  890),  1389,1397. 
Jones  V.  Railroad  (29  Barb.  633), 

1366. 
Jones    V.    Railway    Co.    (125   Mo. 

666,  28  S.  W.  883.  46  Am.  St. 

Rep.    514.    26    L.   R.   A.    718). 

1018,    1073.    1135. 
Jones    V.    Railway    Co.    (103    Ga. 

570,  29  S.  E.  Rep.  927).  1180. 
Jones  V.   Railway   Co.    (42   Minn. 

183),    1221. 
Jones  V.  Railway  Co.  (17  Mo.  Ap. 

158),  1032. 
Jones  V.  Railway  Co.  (31  Mo.  Ap. 

614),    1118. 
Jones   V.   Railroad    (27  Vt.   399), 

76, 
Jones   V.   Transportation   Co.    (50 

Barb.   193),   1287. 
Jones  V.  Voorhies  (10  Ohio,  145), 

450,   1246. 
Jordan  v.   Hyatt   (4   Gratt.   151), 

1430. 
Jones,    Limited,    v.   Green    &   Co. 

(2  K.  B.   (1904)   275,  73  L.  J. 

K.   B.    601).    843. 
Jordan  v.  Insurance  Co.  (1  Story, 

342),    801.    818. 
Jordan    v.    James    (5   Ham.    88), 

772. 


Jordan  v.  Railroad  Co.  (165  Mass. 

346,  52  Am.  St.  Rep.  522,  43 

N.   E.   Ill,   32   L.   R.   A.   101), 

931,  1017. 
Jordan  v.  Railroad   (5  Cush.  69), 

1246. 
Jordan   v.    Railway    Co.    (11    Ky. 

L.  R.  833),  1389, 
Joseph   V.   Knox    (3   Camp.    320), 

1310,    1316.    1315. 
Joslyn    V.    Railway    (51    Vt.    92), 

175,  177,  184,  187,  191. 
Joy     V.     Winnissimet     Co.      (114 

Mass.  63),  1412. 
Jucker   v.  Railway   Co.    (52   Wis. 

150),   1432. 
Judd    &    Root    V.    Steamship    Co. 

(128  Fed.  7.  62  C.  C.  A.  515, 

aff'g.,  on   rehearing,   117   Fed. 

206,  54  C.  C.  A.  238;   id.  130 

Fed.  991),  784. 
Judson  V.  Railroad  Co.   (4  Allen, 

520),  261. 
Judson  V.  Railroad  Co.   (6  Allen, 

486),    401. 
Julia.  The   (14  Moore  P.  C.  210), 

92. 
June  V.  Railroad  Co,   (153  Mass. 

79),  1006.  1015. 
Jung  V.    Starin    (33   N.   Y.   Supp. 

650,   12   Misc.   362),  917. 
Junod   V.   Railway   Co.    (47   Fed. 

290),   573. 


Kaase    v.    Railway    Co.     ( — Tex. 

Civ.   App.   — ,   92   S.   W.   Rep. 

444),    1016. 
Kahl    V.    Railroad    Co.     (95    Ala. 

337,    10    So.   Rep.    661),    1384, 

1388. 


exliv 


TABLE   OF   CASES    CITED. 


[references  are 

Kahn    v.    Railroad    Co.     (115    N. 

Car.  638,  20  S.  E.  Rep.  169), 

1291. 
Kahnweiler  v,   Ins.   Co.    (67   Fed. 

483,  14  C.  C.  A.  485),  447. 
Kalamazoo  Hack  Co.  v.   Sootsma 

(84  Mich.  194,  22  Am.  St.  Rep. 

693,  10  L.  R.  A.  819),  945. 
Kallman  v.  Express  Co.    (3  Kan. 

205),    401,    408,    425,    1355. 
Kalina   &    Cizek   v.    Railroad   Co. 

(69    Kan.    172.    76    Pac.    438), 

442,  447,  449.  1353. 
Kaplan  v.  Railroad  Co.   (88  N.  Y. 

Supp.    945),    342. 
Karr    v.     Parks     (40     Cal.    188), 

1227. 
Karr  v.  Parks  (44  Cal.  46),  1378. 
Kaskaskia  Bridge  Co.  v.  Shannon, 

(1    Oilman,    15),    799, 
Kates   V.   Cab   Co.    (107   Ga.    636, 

34  S.  E.  Rep.  372,  46  L.  R.  A. 

431),   944. 
Kates  V.  Pullman  Palace  Car  Co. 

(95    Ga.    810,    23    S.    E.    Rep. 

186),  1131,  1132. 
Katherine    Bate    v.    Railway    Co. 

(Canada  Sup.  Ct.  Cas.   (Cam- 
eron)   10,    reversing   15    Ont. 

App.  R.   388),   1299. 
Katz    V.    Railway    Co.    (91    N.    Y. 

Supp.  720),  1366,  1369. 
Kay  V.  Field   (8  Q.  B.  D.  594,  10 

Q.    B.    D.    241),    845. 
Kay    V.    Railroad    Co.    (65    Penn. 

St.    269),    1174,    1228,    1229. 
Kearney  v.  Railroad  Co.  (9  Cush. 

108),   1376. 
Keating    v.     Railroad     Co.     (104 

Mich.  418,  62  N.  W.  575),  957. 
Keating    v.    Railroad     (49    N.    Y. 

673),    1185. 
Keefe  v.  Railroad  Co.   (142  Mass. 

251),  937. 
Keegan  v.  Railroad  Co.   (76  Minn. 

90,  78  N.  W.  965),  1430. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Keely    v.    Railroad    Co.    (67    Me. 

163),  1059. 
Keene    v.    Lizardi    (5    La.    431), 

1160,   1438. 
Keeney  v.   Railroad   Co.    (125   N. 

Y.   422),   1018. 
Keeney  v.  Railroad  Co.   (47  N.  Y. 

525),    306,    480.    520. 
Kefauver  v.  Railway  Co.  (122  Fed. 

966),  1118,   1413. 
Keith  V.  Amende   (1  Bush,  455), 

163. 

Keith  V.  Pinkham   (43  Me.  501), 

1196. 
Keith  V.  Railway  Co.   (5  Ont.  L. 

Rep.     116,     2     Canadian    Ry. 

Cases,    26,    aff'g.,    3    Ont.    L. 

Rep.     265,     2     Canadian    Ry. 

Cases,   23),   1179. 
Kelham    v.    The    Kensington    (24 

La.  Ann.  100),   1355. 
Kell    V.    Anderson    (10   M.   &  W. 

498),    849. 
Kellar   v.    Railway   Co.    (196   Pa.      jg 

St.  57,  46  Atl.  261),  231,  233.  ■ 

Keller   v.    Railroad    Co.    (174   Pa. 

St.  62,  34  Atl.  455),  233. 
Keller  v.  Railroad  Co.    (27  Minn. 

178),  1118,  1121.  ' 

Kellerman   v.   Railroad   Co.    (136 

Mo.  177,  34  S.  W.  41,  37  S.  W. 

828;    s.  c.  68   Mo.  App.   255), 

167,    475. 
Kellett  V.  Railroad   Co.    (22  Mo. 

App.    356),    1442. 
Kelley  v.  Railroad  Co.  (135  Mass. 

448),   1386. 
Kelley  v.  Railroad  Co.,   (50  Wis. 

381,  7  N.  W.  Rep.  291),  1399. 
Kelley  v.  Railroad  Co.   (— W.  Va. 

— ,   52  S.  E.  Rep.  520),   1397, 

1398. 
Kelley  v.  Railroad  Co.,   (16  Colo. 
455),   1384. 


TABLE   OP    CASES   CITED. 


cxlv 


[references  are  to  sections.] 


Kelley  v.  Steamship  Co.  (120  Fed. 

536;   reversed.  Steamship  Co. 

V.    Kelley,    126    Fed.    610,    61 

C.  C.  A.  532),  158,   160. 
Kellogg  V.   Railroad   Co.    (100  N. 

C.  158),  122. 
Kellogg   V.    Railroad    Co.    (79    N. 

Y.    72),    1397,    1423. 
Kellogg  V.  Smith   (179  Mass.  595, 

61   N.   E.   138),   1125. 
Kellogg   V.    Sowersby    (87    N.    Y. 

Supp.  412,  93  App.  Div.  124)  „ 

521. 
Kellow  V.  Railway  Co.  (68  Iowa, 

470),  923. 
Kelly  V.  Malott   (135  Fed.  74,  67 

C.  C.  A.   548),   1018,   1073. 
Kelly   V.   Railroad   Co.    (39    Hun, 

486),  911. 
Kelly  V.  Railroad  Co.  (112  N.  Y. 

443),    937,    941. 
Kelly    V.    Railroad    Co.    (70    Mo. 

609),  895.   1118. 
Kelly  V.   Railway  Co.    (14   Daly, 

418),   1401. 
Kelly  V.  Railway  Co.  ( — Mo.  App. 

— ,  87  S.  W.  Rep.  583),  1414. 
Kelly    V.    Railway    Co.    (108    La. 

423,    32    So.    388),    1111. 
Kelly   V.   Railway   Co.    (1   Q.    B. 

(1895)     944),    1408. 
Kelly  V.  Railway  Co.    (109  N.  Y. 

44),  911. 
Kelly ville    v.    Petraytis    (195    111. 

215,  63  N.  E.  Rep.  94,  88  Am. 

St.   Rep.    191),    1395. 
Kemp   V.   Clark    (12   Q.   B.   647), 

807. 
Kemp     V.     Coughty     (11     Johns. 

107),  19,  61.  731. 
Kendall    v.    Boston     (118    Mass. 

234),    1412. 
Kendall   v.   Brown    (74   111.   232), 

309. 


Kendall  v.  Railway  Co.   (L.  R.  7 

Ex.  373),  334,  338. 
Kennard  v.   Burton   (25  Me.  39), 

1377,    1381. 
Kennedy    v.    Del.    Cotton    Co.    (4 

Penne.  477,  58  Atl.  Rep.  825), 

1384. 
Kennedy  v.  Railroad  Co.  (74  Ala. 

430),    714. 
Kenney  v.   Railroad   Co.    (125   N. 

Y.    422),    1075. 
Kennon   v.   Railroad   Co.    (51   La. 

Ann.  1599,  26  So.  466),  1118. 
Kenny   Co.   v.   Railroad   Co.    (122 

Ga.  365,   50   S.  E.  Rep.   132), 

711. 
Kent  V.  Railroad   (22  Barb.  278), 

1366. 
Kentucky  Bridge  Co.  v.  Railroad 

Co.    (37   Fed.   Rep.   616),   103, 

526. 
Kentucky,     etc..     Bridge     Co.     v. 

Quinkert    (2    Ind.    App.    244, 

28  N.  E.  338),  895,  1221.  1413. 
Kentucky  Wagon  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Rail- 
way  Co.    (98    Ky.    152,    32    S. 

W.  Rep.  595,  56  Am.  St.  Rep. 

326,    36    L.    R.    A.    850),    859. 

861,   862. 
Keokuk  Packet  Co.  v.  Henry  (50 

111.  460).  1180. 
Keokuk   Packet   Co.   v.   True    (88 

111.   608),   1012. 
Kepperley    v.    Ramsden    (83    111. 

354),  1418. 
Ker    V.    Mountain    (1    Esp.    27), 

1117. 
Kerr  v.  Railway  Co.  (100  111.  App. 

148),    1197. 
Kerrigan  v.  Railroad  Co.  (81  Cal. 

248),    1049. 
Kerwhacker  v.  Railroad    (3  Ohio 

St.  172),  1233. 
Kessler  v.  Railroad   (7  Lans.  62), 

238,   1049. 
Kessler    v.    Railroad    (61    N.    Y. 

53S),   1050. 


cxlvi 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


[BEFEBENCES   ABE 

Ketcheson    v.    Railroad     Co.     (19 
Tex.  Civ.  App.  290,  46  S.  W. 
Rep.    907),   1052. 
Ketchum  v.  Express  Co.   (52  Mo. 

390),  425.  450. 

Keyes-Marshall   Bros.   Livery   Co. 

V.  Railway  Co.  (105  Mo.  App. 

556,   80   S.  W.  Rep.   53),   341. 

Keyes-Marshall   Bros.   Livery   Co. 

V.  Railway  Co.   (—  Mo.  App. 

— ,  87   S.  W.  Rep.  553),  475. 

Keyser   &   Co.   v.   Jurvelins    (122 

Fed.   218,   58   C.   C.   A.   664), 

832. 

Kibby  v.  Railroad   Co.    (—  Mich. 

— ,  105  N.  W.  Rep.  769),  499. 

Kidd   v.   Pearson    (128  U.   S.   1), 

'      325. 

Kidder  v.  Railroad  Co.  (165  Mass. 

398,  43  N.  E.  115),  517. 
Kieran  v.   Sandars   (6  Ad.  &  El. 

515),   750. 
Kiff  V.  Railroad  (117  Mass.  591), 

741,    742. 
KilE    V.    Railroad    Co.     (32    Kan. 

263),  472. 
Kiff  V.  Youmans   (86  N.  Y.  330), 

1434. 
Kiley   v.   Telegraph   Co.    (109   N. 

Y.  231),  95. 

Killian  v.  Railroad   Co.    (97   Ga. 

727,  25  S.  E.  Rep.  384),  1118. 

Killian   v.   Railroad    Co.    (128    N. 

Car.  261,  38  S.  E.  Rep.  873), 

1389. 

Killmer  v.  Railroad  Co.  (100  N.  Y. 

395),   804. 
Kilpatrick   v.   Railroad   Co.    (140 

Penn.  St.  502),  1117. 
Kimball  v.  Palmer   (80  Fed.  240, 

25  C.  C.  A.  394).  1203. 
Kimball  v.  Railroad   (2G  Vt.  249), 
44,    45,    59,    87,    339,   340,    401, 
451. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

In  re  Kimball  S.  S.  Co.  (123  Fed. 
838;  reversed,  Weisshaar  v. 
Kimball  S.  S.  Co..  128  Fed. 
397,  63  C.  C.  A.  139,  65  L. 
R.  A.  84),  344. 
King   V.    Pippett    (1    T.   R.    235), 

1335. 
King  V.  Railroad  Co.  ( —  Miss.  — , 

39  So.  Rep.  810),  1179. 
King    V.    Railway    Co.     (22    Fed. 

Rep.   413),   980. 
King    V.    Railway    Co.    (107    Ga. 
754,  33  S.  E.  Rep.  839),  1012. 
King  V.  Richards  (6  Whart.  418), 

749,  884. 
King  V.  Shepherd  (3  Story,  349), 

74,    274,    311.    491. 
King  V.  Sherwood  (48  N.  Y.  Supp. 
34,   22    App.   Div.    548),   1362. 
King  V.  Steamboat  Co.   (73  N.  Y.         J 
Supp.  999,  36  Misc.  555),  690,        ^ 
694. 
King  V.  Woodbridge  (34  Vt.  565), 

408,    1366. 
Kingman    v.    Denison    (84    Mich. 
608,  48  N.  W.  26.  22  Am.  St. 
Rep.    711),   769. 
Kingston    v.    Railway    Co.     (112 
Mich.    40,    70    N.    W.   315,    40 
L.  R.   A.  131).   1230. 
Kinnavey    v.    Terminal   R.   Ass'n 

(81  Fed.  802),  542. 
Kinner  v.  Railway  Co.    (69  Ohio 
St.   339,   69   N.  E.  614),  1056. 
Kinney  v.  Crocker  (18  Wis.  74), 

1409. 
Kinney  v.   Railroad   Co.    (99   Ky. 

59,  34  S.  W.  1066),  980. 
Kinney    v.    Railroad     (32    N.    J. 

Law,   407),   451,   1075. 
Kinnick  v.  Railway  Co.  (69  Iowa, 

665),    634. 
Kinsley  v.  Railroad  Co.  (125  Mass. 

54),    1135. 
Kinsley  v.  Railroad  Co.   (37  Fed. 
Rep.    181),    521. 


TABLE   OF    CASES   CITED, 


cxlvii 


[BEFEBENCES   ABE 

Kinsman    v.    Insurance    Co.     (5 

Bosw.  460),  831. 
Kipperley    v.    Ramsden     (83    111. 

354),  803. 
Kirby   v.   Adams   Ex.   Co.    (2    St, 

L.  App.  369),  44. 
Kirby    v.    Canal    Co.    (46    N.    Y. 

Supp.  777,  20  App.  Div.  473), 

940. 
Kirby  v.  Railway    (18  L.  T.    (N. 

S.)  658),  397. 
Kirby  v.  Telegraph  Co.  (4  S.  Dak. 

105,    55    N.    W.    759.    46    Am. 

St.  Rep.  765,  30  L.  R.  A.  612), 

95, 

Kird  V.  Railway  Co.  (109  La.  525, 

33    So.    587,    94   Am.   St.  Rep. 

452,    60    L.    R.    A.    727;    s.    c. 

105  La.  226,  29  So.  Rep.  729), 

925,   1211, 
Kirk    V.    Folsom     (23    La.    Ann, 

584),   1355. 
Kirk   V.   Railway   Co.    (59    Minn, 

161,    60   N.   W.    1084.    50   Am. 

St.    Rep.    397),    711. 
Kirk   V.    Railway   Co.    (97   N,    C. 

82),  1174. 
Kirkland  v.  Dinsmore    (62  N.  Y, 

171),  408.  409. 
Kirkland    v.    Leary    (2    Sweeney, 

677),  1366. 
Kirkman  v.   Shawcross    (6  T.  R. 

14),  865. 
Kirkpatrick    v.   Railway    Co.    (86 

Mo.    341),    1317. 
Kirtland  v.  Montgomery  (2  Swan, 

452),  19,  61.  75,  86. 
Kitchen    V.    Vanadar    (1    Blackf. 

356),  785. 
Kitchen    v.    Railway    Co.    (68    S. 

Car.    554.    48    S.    E.    Rep.    4), 

1402. 
Kizer   v.    Railway    Co.    (66    Ark. 

348,  50  S.  W,  871),  539. 


TO   SECTIONS.] 

Klair    v.    Wilmington    Steamboat 

Co.    (4  Pennewill,  51,  54  Atl. 

694),    438,    441,    636. 
Klass  Commission  Co.  v.  Railroad 

Co.    (80   Mo.   App.    164),    464, 

705, 
Klauber  v.  Express  Co.   (21  Wis. 

21),    333. 
Klein    v.    Dunlop    (16    Misc.    Rep. 

34,  37  N.  Y,  Supp.  947),  231, 
Klein    v,    Fischer    (30    Mo.    App. 

568),  768. 
Klein    v.    Packet    Co,     (3    Daly, 

390),  1286, 
Kline  v.  Railroad    (37   Cal.  400), 

1084. 
Klenk  v.  Railroad  Co.    (27  Utah, 

428,   76  Pac.  Rep.  214),  1084. 
Klepsch  V.  Donald   (4  Wash.  436, 

30  Pac.  Rep.  991,  31  Am.   St. 

Rep.    936),    1397. 
Kleven  v.  Railway  Co.   (70  Minn, 

79,  72  N.  W.  828).  1065. 
Klingman  v.  Holmes  (54  Mo.  304), 

1378, 
Klugherz     v.     Railway     Co.     (90 

Minn.  17.  95  N.  W.  Rep.  586, 

101   Am.    St.    Rep.    384),   991. 
Knapp  V.   Express  Co.    (55  N.   H. 

348),   238. 
Knapp  Stout  &   Co.   v.   McCaffery 

(178,    111.    107,    52    N.    E.    898, 

69  Am.  St.  Rep.  290,  aff'g.,  74 

111.  App.   80),  92. 
Knauss  v.  Railroad  Co.    (29   Ind. 

App.  216,  64  N.  E,  95),  1215, 
Knieriem  v.  Railroad  Co.    (96  N, 

Y.    Supp.    602,    109    App.   Div, 

709),    1242.    1264. 
Knight  V.  Bean  (22  Me.  531),  627, 
Knight  V.  Railroad  Co.    (13  R.  I, 

572),    231,    233,    867. 
Knight  V.  Railroad  Co.  (108  Penn, 

St.    250),    1388. 
Knight  V.  Railroad   (56  Me.  234), 

238,    942.    1049. 


cxlviii 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


[BEFEBENCES   ABE   TO   SECTIONS.] 


Knight   V.    Railway    Co.    (23    La. 

Ann.    462),    1181,    1239. 
Knights    V.    Quarles    (2    Brod.    & 

Bing.    102),    1403,    1405. 
Knightstown     v.    Musgrove     (116 

Ind.  121),  1236. 
Knott    V.    Botany    Worsted    Mills 

(179   U.   S.   69.   45   L.   Ed.   90, 

21  Sup.  Ct.  R.  30,  aff'g-.  Bot- 
any  Worsted  Mills  v.  Knott, 

82  Fed.  471,  27  C.  C.  A.  326, 

51  U.  S.  App.  467  ana  76  Fed. 

582),  347.  359. 
Knott  V.    100   Bags   of  Rags    (60 

Fed.   634),   694. 
Knott  V.  Railroad   Co.    (98  N.  C. 

73),  231. 
Knowles  v.  Railroad  Co.   (102  N. 

C.  59),  1036,  1084,  1433,  1440. 
Knowles  v.  Railroad  (38  Me.  55), 

20.    33. 
Knowlton  v.  Railroad  (19  Ohio  St. 

260),  212,   215,   219,   450. 
Knowlton  v.  Railway  Co.  (59  Wis. 

278),    1233. 
Knox  V.  Rivers  (14  Ala.  249),  61. 
Koch  V.   Railroad   Co.    (78   N.   Y. 

Supp.  99,  75  App.  Div.   282), 

980. 
Ex  parte  Koehler   (30  Fed.  869), 

524,  526. 
Koenke  v.  Railroad  Co.  (57  N.  Y. 

Supp.  325,  39  App.  Div.  457), 

1049. 
Kohler  v.  Railroad  Co.  (135  Penn. 

St.    346),    1219. 

Kohn  V.  Packard  (3  La.  225), 
690,    709. 

Kohn  V.  Railroad  Co.  (37  S.  Car. 
1,  16  S.  E.  Rep.  376,  34  Am. 
St.  Rep.  726,  24  L.  R.  A.  100), 
749. 

Korn  V.  Railway  Co.  (125  Fed. 
897,  62  C.  C.  A.  417,  62  L. 
R.  A.   872),   978. 


Krai    V.   Railroad   Co.    (71   Minn. 

422,     74     N.    W.     166),     1126, 

1127,    1432. 
Kramer  v.  Railroad  Co.    (25  Cal. 

434),  1384. 
Kramer     v.     Railway     Co.     (101 

Iowa,  178,  70  N.  W.  119),  445. 
Krantz  v.  Railway  Co.   (12  Utah, 

104,  41  Pac.  714.  30  L.  R.  A. 

297),  990.  1016, 
Kreis    v.    Railway    Co.    (131    Mo. 

533,  33  S.  W.  64),  1173. 
Kremer  v.   Express   Co.    (6   Cold. 

356),   685. 
Krom    V.    Levy    (48    N.   Y.    679), 

1367. 
Krueger  v.  Railway  Co.  (68  Minn. 

445,  71  N.  W.  683,  64  Am.  St. 

Rep.    487),    1065,    1066. 
Krueger  v.  Railway  Co.    (84  Mo. 

App.   358),  990. 
Krulder  v.  Ellison  (47  N.  Y.  37), 

188,   1310,   1315,   1317,  1319. 
Krumm  v.  Railway  Co.    (71  Ark. 

590,    76    S.    W.    Rep.    1075), 

1217. 
Kulman  v.  Railroad  Co.  (65  N.  J. 

L.    241.    47    Atl.    497),    1111, 

1174. 
Kunz   V.   Troy    (104    N.   Y.    344), 

1228. 
Kurfess    v.    Harris    (195    Pa.    St. 

385,  46  Atl.  2).  1190. 
Kyle  v.  Railroad   (10  Rich.  382), 

230. 


La   Blanche   v.  Railway   Co.    (L. 

R.  1  C.   P.  Div.   286),  1371. 
La   Bourgoyne    ( —   C.    C.    A.   — , 

144     Fed.     781),     1069,     1299, 

1361. 
Lachner  Bros.  v.  Express  Co.   (72 

Mo.   App.    13),    1360. 


TABLE    OF    CASES   CITED. 


cxlix 


[BEFEKENCES    ABE   TO    SECTIONS.] 


Lackland  v.  Railway  Co.  (101  Mo. 

App.  420,  74  S.  W.  Rep.  505), 

114,  336.   510. 
Laclouch  V.  Towle    (3  Esp.  114), 

750. 
La  Conner  Trading  &  Transp.  Co. 

V.    Widner     (136    Fed.    177), 

1366,    1373. 
Lafitte    V.    Railroad    Co.    (42    La. 

Ann.  — ).   1100. 
Lafflin  v.  Railroad  Co.  (106  N.  Y. 

136),  936.  941. 
Laffrey   v.   Grummond    (74   Mich. 

186),  1280. 
La    Gascoigne     (135    Fed.     577), 

1068. 
Laing  v.  Colder   (8  Pa.  St.  479), 

895,     959,     1209,     1409,     1410, 

1414,    1415. 
Lake   v.   Milliken    (62   Me.   240), 

1430. 
Lake  Steam  Shipping  Co.  v.  Bacon 

(129    Fed.    819),    348. 
Lake   St.   El.   R.   Co.   v.   Railroad 

Co.    (66   N.   Y.   Supp.   455,   32 

Misc.    669),    783. 
Lakeman    v.    Grinnell    (5    Bosw. 

625),   1360. 
Lakeman  v.  Pollard  (43  Me.  463), 

627. 
Lamb   v.    Parkman     (1    Sprague, 

343),  85.   603. 
Lamb  v.  Railroad  (46  N.  Y.  271), 

130,   238,  463,  477,  1354,   1355, 

1356. 
Lamb  v.   Railway  Co.    (101  Wis. 

138,  76  N.  W.  1123),  450. 
Lambert    v.     Robinson     (1     Esp. 

119),   866. 
Lambeth    v.    Railroad    (66    N.    C. 

494),    1180. 
Lamphear    v.     Buckingham      (33 

Conn.   237),   1394. 
Lampkin    v.    Railroad    Co.     (106 

Ala.  287,  17  So.  448),  1094. 


Lampley  v.  Scott   (24  Miss.  538), 

33. 
Land  v.  Railroad   (104  N.  C.  48), 

122. 
Landa  v.   Hoick  &  Co.    (129   Mo. 

663.  31  S.  W.  900,  50  Am.  St. 

Rep.  459),  747. 
Landon   v.    Railway   Co.    (92    111. 

App.  216),   1236. 
Lane  v.  Atlantic  Works  (111  Mass. 

136),    1430. 
Lane  v.  Cotton  (1  Salk.  143),  48. 
Lane   v.    Cotton     (1     Ld.    Raym. 

646),  57,   94.   147. 
Lane  v.  Penniman   (4  Mass.  91), 

828. 
Lane  v.  Railroad   (14  Gray,  143), 

870. 
Lane  v.  Railroad  Co.  (5  Lea,  124), 

1032. 

Lane   v.   Railway   Co.    (69    Iowa, 

443,  29  N.  W.  Rep.  419),  1391. 
Lane   v.    Railway   Co.    (82    N.    Y. 

Supp.  1057,  85  App.  Div.  85), 

1401. 
Lane  v.  Railway  Co.    (21  Wash. 

119,   57   Pac.  367,   75  Am.   St. 

Rep.    821,    46   L.   R.    A.    153), 

1216. 
Lang  V.  Brady   (73  Conn.  707,  49 

Atl.  199),  47,  1334. 
Lang    V.    Houston,    etc.,    Co.    (27 

N.  Y.   Supp.   90;    affirmed,  144 

N.  Y.  717,  39  N.  E.  Rep.  858), 

1395. 
Lang  V.  Railroad  Co.   (154  Pa.  St. 

342,  26  Atl.  Rep.  370,  20  L.  R. 

A.  360,  35  Am.  St.  Rep.  846), 

316,   631. 

Lange    v.    Schoettler     (115      Cal. 

388,  47  Pac.  Rep.  139),  1400. 
Langdon  v.  Railroad  Co.  (9  N.  Y. 

Supp.  245),  521. 
Langstaff  v.  Stix   (64  Miss.  171), 

768. 


el 


TABLE  OF   CASES  CITED. 


[REFERENCES   ARE 

Lanning  v.  Railroad  Co.   (1  N.  J. 

Law  J.  21),  62. 
La   Pointe   v.   Railroad    Co.    (182 

Mass.  227,  65  N.  E.  44;   s.  c. 

175  Mass.  535,  61  N.  E.  142), 

1180. 
Laponte    v.     Railroad     Co.     (144 

Mass.  18),  1216. 
Laporte  v.  Express  Co.   (48  N.  Y. 

Supp.  292,  23  App.  Div.  267). 

717. 
La  Prelle  v.  Fordyce  (4  Tex.  Civ. 

App.  391,  23  S.  W.  Rep.  453), 

1223. 
Larimore  v.  Railroad  Co.  (65  Mo. 

App.  167),   131. 
Larkin  v.  Railway  Co.  (118  Iowa, 

652,    92    N.     W.     891),     1414, 

1415. 
Larrison  v.  Railway  Co.  (1  Inter- 
state Com.  Rep.  147),  1030. 
Larson  v.  Railroad  Co.  (85  Minn. 

387,    88    N.    W.    994),    1122, 

1177. 
Latham  v.  Rutley   (2  Barn.  &  C. 

20),   1338. 
Laub  V.  Railway  Co.  ( —  Tex.  Civ. 

App.  — ,  94  S.  W.  Rep.  550), 

1012,    1121. 
Laubheim  v.   Steamship  Co.    (107 

N.  Y.   228),   1163. 
Laugher   v.    Pointer    (5    B.   &    C. 

547),   249. 
Laughlin    v.    Railway     (28     Wis. 

204),  1348. 
Laurel   Cotton   Mills   v.   Railroad 

Co.   (—  Miss.  — ,  3'<  So.  134), 

538. 
Laurent  v.  Vaughn    (30  Vt.  90), 

1360,  1366. 
Laurie  v.  Douglass   (15  M.  &  W. 

746),  487. 
Laveroni  v.  Drury   (8  Exch.  166; 

16   Eng.    L.    &    Eq.    510),    74, 

481. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Lavis  V.  Railroad  Co.  (54  111.  App. 

636),  1216. 
Law  V.  Hatcher   (4  Blackf.  364), 

1315. 
Law    V.    Railway    Co.     (91     Fed. 

817),    1388. 
Law  V.  Railroad    (32  Iowa,  534), 

1084. 
Lawrence  v.   Car  Co.    (114  Mass. 

1),  1136,   1139. 
Lawrence  v.  Denbreens   (1  Black, 

170),   334. 
Lawrence  v.  Green  (70  Cal.  417), 

1223,  1414. 
Lawrence   v.    Minturn    (17    How. 

100),    177,    188,    485. 
Lawrence   v.   Railroad    (29   Conn. 

390),    1422. 
Lawrence  v.   Railroad    (36   Conn. 

63),  451. 
Lawson  v.  Railway  Co.    (64  Wis. 

447),    462,   1003,    1202. 
Lawson   v.  Worms    (6   Cal.    365), 

830. 
Layng    v.    Stewart    (1    W.    &    S. 

222),  809. 
Lazard  v.  Transportation  Co.   (78 

Md.  1,  26  Atl.  Rep.  897),  160, 

161,  176. 
Lazarus     v.     Barber     (124     Fed. 

1007),  606. 
Lazelle  v.  Town  of  Newfane   (70 

Vt.    440,    41    Atl.    Rep.     511), 

1389,    1397,   1398,   1399. 
Leach  v.   Railroad   Co.    (89   Hun, 

379,  35  N.  Y.  Supp.  305),  1369. 
Leary  v.  Railroad  Co.   (173  Mass. 

373,   53  N.  E.   817),   1184. 
Leavitt  v.   Railway  Co.    (64  Wis. 

228),    1174. 
Le  Barron  v.  Ferry  Co.  (11  Allen, 

312),   66.   953,   1412. 
Lebeau  v.  Navigation  Co.    (L.  R. 

8  C.  P.  88),  165. 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


cli 


[references  are  to  sections.] 


Le  Blanc  v.  Sweet   (107  La.  355, 

31    So.    766,    90   Am.    St.   Rep. 

— ),  1169. 
Le  Blanche  v.  Railway  Co.    (1  C. 

P.  Div.  286).  1106. 
Leckey  v.  McDermott  (8  S.  &  R. 

500),   785. 
Lechowitzer    v.    Packet    Co.     (28 

N,  Y.  Supp.  577,  8  Misc.  213), 

1070. 
Le  Conteur  v.  Railway    (L.  R.  1 

Q.   B.    54;    6   Best  &   S.   961), 

1258. 
Lee  V.  Burgess  (9  Bush.  652),  86. 
Lee   y.    Gas    Co.    (98    N.   Y.    115), 

1418. 
Lee  V.  Kimball  (45  Me.  172),  737. 
Lee  V.  Knapp  &  Co.   (155  Mo.  610, 

56  S.  W.  Rep.  458),  100,  1389, 

1401. 
Lee  V.  Railroad    (72  N.   C.   236), 

333,  339. 
Lee    V.    Railway    Co.     (53    N.    Y. 

Super.  260),  1111. 
Leech  v.  Baldwin  (5  Watts,  446), 

799. 
Leeds  v.  Insurance  Co.   (81  N.  Y. 

351),  165. 
Leeson    v.    Holt    (1    Stark.    186), 

392. 
Legg  V.   Britton    (64   Vt.   652.   24 

Atl.    1016,    overruling    Weed- 
ham    V.    Railway   Co.    38    Vt. 

294),   1386. 
Leggett     V.     Railroad     Co.     (143 

Penn.  St.  39),  1177. 
Lehigh  Iron  Co.  v.  Rupp  (100  Pa. 

99),   1397. 
Lehigh  Valley  Transportation  Co. 

V.   Pillsbury-Washburn    Flour 

Mills   Co.    (92   111.   App.   628). 

230,  233. 
Leigh  V.  Smith  (1  Carr.  &  P.  638), 

105,  107. 
Leighton    v.    Shapley     (8    N.    H. 

359),   668. 


Leman  v.  Railroad  Co.   (128  Fed. 

191),  1389. 
Lembeck   v.   Jarvis,   etc.,    Storage 

Co.   (—  N.  J.  — ,  63  Atl.  Rep. 

257),   869. 
Lemery  v.  Railway  Co.   (83  Minn. 

47,  85  N.  W.  908),  1012. 
Lemke  v.  Railroad  (39  Wis.  449), 

704,  712,  713. 
Lemon  v.  Chanslor   (68  Mo.  340), 

895. 
Lemon  v.  Pullman  Palace  Car  Co. 

(52  Fed.  262),   1136,  1139. 
Lemon  v.  Railway  Co.   (136  Mich. 

647.  100  N.  W.  Rep.  22),  937. 
Lemon  v.  Walker   (9  Mass.  404), 

744. 
Lemont  v.  Lord  (52  Me.  365),  825. 
Lemont     v.     Railroad      Co.       (1 

Mackey,   180),  992. 
Lemont  v.  Railroad  Co.    (28  Fed. 

Rep.   920),   740. 
Lempriere  v.  Pasley  (2  T.  R.  485), 

888. 
Lennon  v;  The  Railroad  ( —  Iowa, 

— ,  103  N.  W.  Rep.  343),  128L 
Lennon  v.  Railway  Co.   ( —  Iowa, 

— ,  75  N.  W.  Rep.  671),  1174. 
Lenox  v.  Insurance  Co.   (3  Johns. 

Cas.  178),  169. 
Lent  V.   Railroad  Co.    (120  N.  Y. 

467),    1192,    1221. 
Leonard  v.  Hendrickson  (18  Penn. 

St.  40),  92. 
Leonard  v.  Navigation  Co.  (84  N. 

Y.  48),  1387,   1388,   1390. 
Leonard  v.  Railroad  Co.    (54  Mo. 

App.    293;    s.   c.   57   Mo.   App. 

366),    233,    445,    464. 
Leonard     v.     Railroad     Co.     (170 
Mass.  318,  49  N.  E.  621),  990. 
Leonard  v.  Telegraph  Co.   (41  N. 

Y.  544),  95. 
Leonard  v.  Tidd  (3  Mete.  6),  148. 
Leonard    v.    Whitcomb    (95    Wis. 
646,  70  N.  W.  817),  508,  o09. 


clii 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


[BEFERENCES   ABE 

Lesinsky  v.  G.  W.  Despatch   (10 

Mo.  App.  134),  131,  132. 
Leslie  v.  Lewiston   (62  Me.  468), 

1229. 
Leslie    v.    Railroad    Co.    (88    Mo. 

55),  895. 
Lester  v.  Railroad  Co.    (92  Hun, 

342,  36  N.  Y.  Supp.  907),  660, 

668,  678. 
Lester  v.  Railroad  Co.    (73   Hun, 

398,  26  N.  Y.  Supp.  206),  752. 
Leveret  v.  Railway  Co.    (110  La. 

399,  34  So.  Rep.  579),  938. 
Levering   v.     Transportation     Co. 

(42   Mo.   88),   410,   419,   504. 
Levi    V.   Railroad    Co.    (11    Allen, 

300),   68.   78. 
Levien  v.  Webb.   (61  N.  Y.  Supp. 

1113,  30  Misc.  196),  1144. 
Levins  v.  Railroad  Co.  (183  Mass. 

176,  66  N.  B.  803,  97  Am.  St. 

Rep.  434),  1132,  1246,  1249, 

1264. 
Levinson  v.  Railway  Co.  (17  Tex. 

Civ.  App.  617,  43  S.  W.  901), 

1056. 
Levy  V.  Express  Co.    (4  Rich.  S. 

C.    (N.    S.)    234),   425. 
Levy  V.  Steamship  Co.    (123  Fed. 

347),   1433. 
Levy  V.  Weir  (77  N.  Y.  Supp.  917, 

88   Misc.   361),   722. 
Lewark    v.    Parkinson    ( —    Kan. 

— ,  85  Pac.  Rep.  601),  898. 
Lewark   v.   Railroad   Co.    (137   N. 

Car.  383,  49   S.  E.  Rep.  882), 

1369. 
Lewis  V.  Canal  Co.  (145  N.  Y.  508, 

40    N.    E.    248;    reversing    80 

Hun,  192,  30  N.  Y.  Supp.  28), 

1177,   1221. 
Lewis  V.  Ludwick    (G  Cold.  368), 

317. 
Lewis    V.    Railroad    Co.     (13    Ky. 

Law  Rep.  144),  1286,  1291. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Lewis  V.  Railroad  Co.    (70  N.  J. 

L.  132,  56  Atl.  128),  335,  640. 

Lewis  V.  Railway  Co.  (47  W.  Va. 

656,    35    S.    E.    Rep.    908,    81 

Am.  St.  Rep.  816),  14L 

Lewis  V.   Railway  Co.    (54   Mich. 

55),   1428,   1430. 
Lewis  V.  Railroad   (11  Met.  509), 

664. 
Lewis  V.  Railroad    (38  Md.   588), 

1181. 
Lewis  V.  Railway  (5  H.  &  N.  867), 

108,   397,   442. 
Lewis  V.  Railway   (L.  R.  9  Q.  B. 

66),   1122. 
Lewis  V.  Railway  Co.    (Tex,  Civ. 
App.,  81  S.  W.  Rep.  Ill),  970. 
Lewis  V.  Sharvey   (58  Minn.  464, 

59   N.  W.   1096),  766,  768. 
Lewis    V.    Sleeping-car    Co.     (143 
Mass.   267),    1130,    1131,   1132. 
Lewis  V.  Smith   (107  Mass.  334), 

66. 
Lewisohn    v.    Steamship    Co.    (56 

Fed.    602),    215. 
Lexington,    etc.,    Co.    v.    Huffman 
(17   Ky.   L.   R.   775,   32   S.   W. 
Rep.   611),    1394. 
Libby  v.  Ingalls   (124  Mass.  503), 

177,    184,    187. 

Libby    v.    Railroad    Co.     (85    Me. 

34,  26  Atl.  Rep.  943,  20  L.  R. 

A.    812),    895,    897,    910,    947, 

948,   957,   1017. 

License  Cases   (5  How.  504),  325. 

Lickbarrow  v.  Mason   (2  T.  R.  63; 

6  East,  21;   1  Smith  Ld.  Cas. 

896),    175,    188,   762,   785,   864. 

Liddard  v.  Lopes   (10  East,  526), 

815. 
Liefert  v.  Railway  Co.  (Tex.  Civ. 
App.,  57  S.  W.  899),  867,  884, 
889. 
Lienkauf  v.  Lombard,  Ayres  & 
Co.  (42  N.  Y.  Supp.  391,  12 
App.  Div.  302),  462. 


TABLE  OF   CASES   CITED, 


cliii 


[references   ABE 

Lillis    V.    Railway    Co.    (64    Mo. 

464),    1053,    1082. 
Lilly  V.  Railroad  Co.   (32  S.  Car. 

142),    1394. 
Limburger  v.  Westcott   (49  Barb. 

283),  415,  1299. 
Limekiller    v.    Railroad    Co.     (33 

Kan.    83,    5    Pac.    Rep.    401), 

1389. 
Limpus  V.  Omnibus  Co.   (1  H.  & 

C.  526),  1441. 
Lincoln    v.    Railroad    (23    Wend. 

425),  1423. 
Lincoln  v.  Steamship  Co.    (62  N. 

Y.  Supp.  1085,  30  Misc.  752), 

1271. 
Lincoln  v  Walker   (18  Neb.  244), 

1417. 
Lindley  v.  Dempsey  (45  Ind.  246), 

1367. 
Lindley  v.  Railroad  Co.  (88  N.  C. 

547),   261. 
Lindsay  v.  Railway  Co.   (114  Ga. 

896,   41   S.   E.   46),   1180. 
Lindsey  v.  Railway  Co.  (64  Iowa, 

407),    1177,   1180,    1221. 
Lindsey  v.  Steamship  Co.   (88  N. 

Y.   Supp.   371),   1028. 
Lindsley  v.  Railway  Co.  (36  Minn. 

539),  336,  339,  1354,  1357. 
Lindstrom  v.  Navigation  Co.  (117 

Fed.  170),  1401. 
Linklater  v.  Howell  (88  Fed.  526), 

800. 
Liscomb  v.  Railroad  &  Trans.  Co. 

(6  Lans.  75),  993. 
Lister   V.   Railway   Co.    (1   K.   B. 

(1903)     878,    72    L.    J.    K.    B. 

385,  88  Law  T.    (N.   S.)    561, 

52  Wkly.  Rep.  12),  334. 
Litchfield  Coal  Co.  v.  Taylor  (81 

111.    590),   1174. 
Litt  V.  Cowley  (7  Taunton,  169), 

760.    772. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Litt   V.    Railroad    Co.    (64    N.    Y. 

Supp.  108,  50  App.  Div.  550), 

1363. 
Little   V.    Fargo    (43    Hun,   2331), 

657. 
Little    V.    Fossett    (34    Me.    545), 

782,    1305. 
Little  V.  Hackett  (116  U.  S.  366), 

1236. 
Little  V.  Railroad    (66  Me.   239), 

1352. 
Little   V.    Stevenson     (App.     Cas. 

(1896)   108,  65  L.  J.  P.  C.  69), 

845. 
Littlejohn  v.  Jones  (2  McMuUan, 

365),  66. 
Littlejohn   v.    Railroad    Co.    (148 

Mass.  478),  918,  1020,  1022. 
Liver  Alkali  Co.   v.   Johnson    (L. 

R.    7    Ex.    267;    id.    338),    63, 

74. 
Liverpool,   etc.,   Steam   Co.  v.   In- 
surance Co.    (129  U.   S.  397), 

74,  210,  452,  487. 
Liverpool,   etc.,   S.   Co.   v.   Snitter 

(17  Fed.  Rep.  695),  694. 
Livie   v.   Janson    (12   East,   648), 

1430. 
Livingston   v.    Railroad    (5    Hun, 

562),  654. 
Lock  Co.   V.   Railroad    (48   N.  H. 

339),   230,   246,   26L 

Lockhart     v.     Lichtenthaler     (46 

Penn.    St.    151),   1236. 
Lockier   v.    Patterson    (1    Car.   & 

Kir.  271),  1405. 
Lockyer  v.  Sleeping  Car  Co.   (61 

L.   J.    Q.   B.    501),    1137. 
Loeb  V.  Peters  (63  Ala.  243),  175, 

761,    762. 
Loeb  V.  Railway  Co.  ( —  Mo.  App. 

— ,   85   S.  W.  Rep.   118),   445. 

705. 
Loeffler  v.  Packet  Co.  (7  Mo.  App. 

185),  1374. 


cliv 


TABLE  OF   CASES   CITED. 


[REFEBENCES   ABE 

Loeser  v.  Railway  Co.    (94  Wis. 

571,  69  N.  W.  372),  342,  426, 

638. 
Loewenberg   v.   Railway   Co.    (56 

Ark.  439,  19  S.  W.  1051),  867. 

Logan   V.   Railroad   Co.    (77   Mo. 

668),  899,   1060. 
Logan  V.  Railway  (11  Rob.  (La.) 

24),  1280. 
Logwood  V.  Railroad  Co.  (23  Fed. 

Rep.  310),   972. 
London  v.  Railroad    (7   H.  &  N. 

600),    108. 
London   Transport   Co.   v.   Trech- 

mann    (1    K.    B.    (1904)    635, 

73  L.  J.  K.  B.  253),  800. 
Long  V.  Morrison   (14  Ind.  595), 

1397. 
Long  V.  Railroad  Co.  (48  Kan.  28, 

28  Pac.  977,  15  L.  R.  A.  319), 

1099. 
Long  V.   Railroad   Co.    (130   Fed. 

870,    65   C.   C.   A.    354),   1018, 

1073. 
Long   V.    Railroad    Co.    (147    Pa. 

St.  343,  23  Atl.  459,  14  L.  R. 

A.  741,  30  Am.  St.  Rep.  732), 

282,  311,  1355. 
Long  V.  Railroad   (50  N.  Y.  76), 

167,  408.     . 
Longmeid   v.    HoUiday    (6   Exch. 

761),  909. 
Longmore  v.  Railway  (19  Com.  B. 

(N.  S.)    183),  937. 
Lopez  V.  Mining  Co.  (1  Ariz.  464), 

1417. 
Loraine  v.  Railroad  Co.   (205  Pa. 

St.  132,  54  Atl.  580,  61  L.  R. 

A.   502),   512. 
Lord  V.  Steamship  Co.   (102  U.  S. 

543),  344. 
Loring  v.  Mulcahy  (3  Allen,  575), 

148. 


TO   SECTIONS.] 

Losee  v.  Buchanan  (51  N.  Y.  476), 

1430. 
Lough  V.  Outerbridge   (143  N.  Y. 

271,  38  N.  E.  292,  42  Am.  St. 

Rep.    712,    25    L.    R.    A.    674, 

aff'g.,    22    N.    Y.    Supp.    976), 

521. 
Louisiana   Bank   v.   Laveille    (52 

Mo.  380),  158. 
Louisville    Canal    Co.    v.    Murphy 

(9   Bush,  522),  1229. 
Louisville,   etc.,   Co.  v.   Telegraph 

Co.  (24  Am.  L.  Reg.  579),  95. 
Louisville    &    C.    Packet    Co.    v. 

Rogers   (20  Ind.  App.  594,  49 

N.  E.  970),  294,  617. 

Louisville  &  E.  Mail  Co.  v.  Barnes 

Adm'r  (25  Ky.  Law  Rep.  2036 

79  S.  W.  261,  64  L.  R.  A.  574), 

913. 
Louisville  &  J.  Ferry  Co.  v.  Nolan 

135    Ind.    60,    34    N.    E.    710), 

942,  1414. 
Louisville,     etc..    Packet    Co.    v. 

Smith  (22  Ky.  Law  Rep.  1323, 

60  S.  W.  524),  1414. 
Love  joy  v.  Murray   (3  Wall.  1), 

780. 
Loveland    v.    Burke     (120    Mass. 

139),    665,    696. 
Lovell  v.  Iron  Co.    (90  Ala.   13), 

1389. 
Lovett  V.  Hobbs  (2  Shower,  127), 

146. 
Lovett  V.  Railroad  (9  Allen,  557), 

1091. 
Lowe  V.  Moss  (12  111.  477),  658. 
Lowe   V.    Railway   Co.    (89    Iowa, 

420,  56  N.  W.  Rep.  519),  1397. 
Lowe  V.  Railway  Co.   (62  L.  J.  Q. 

B.   524).   977. 
Lowell  Wire  Fence  Co.  v.  Sargent 

(8  Allen,  189),  242,  26L 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


clv 


[eefebences  aee 

Lowenstein  v.  Lombard,  Ayres  & 

Co.    (164  N.  Y.  324,  58  N.  B. 

44,  reversing  45  N.  Y.  Supp. 

286,  17  App.  Div.  408),  783. 
Lowenstein    v.   Railroad    Co.    (63 

Mo.  App.  68),  641. 
Lower  v.  Segal  (60  N.  J.  Law  99, 

36  Atl.  Rep.  777),  1389. 
Lower  v.  Segal  (59  N.  J.  Law  66, 

34  Atl.  Rep.  345),   1390. 
Lowremore    v.    Berry     (19     Ala. 

130),  749. 
Loyd   V.   Railroad    (53   Mo.   509), 

1178. 
Lubbock  V.  Inglis  (1  Stark.  104), 

674. 
Lubrano  v.  Atlantic  Mills   (19  R. 

I.    129,    32     Atl.     205),     1386, 

1389. 
Lucas  V.  Herbert  (148  Ind.  64,  47 

N.  E.   146,   37   L.  R.   A.   376), 

945. 
Lucas  V.  Nockells   (4  Bing.  729), 

875. 
Lucas  V.  Penn.  Co.  (120  Ind.  205), 

933. 
Lucas   V.   Railroad   Co.    (6   Gray, 

64),   922,    1180. 
Lucas  V.  Railroad  Co.  (98  Mich.  1, 

56    N.    W.    1039,    39    Am.    St. 

Rep.    517),    1433. 
Lucas   V.   Railway   Co.    (122   Ala. 

529,  25   So.   219),  1337. 
Lucas   V.   Railway   Co.    (33   Wis. 

53),  964. 
Lucas  V.  Railway  Co.   (112  Iowa, 

594,   84   N.  W.   673),   405. 
Luckel  V.  Century  Bldg.  Co.   (177 

Mo.  608,  76  S.  W.  1035),  100, 
101. 
Lucy  V.  Railway  Co.  (64  Minn.  7, 
65  N.  W.  944,  31  L.  R.  A.  551), 
980,  982,  984. 
Ludlow  V.  Bowne  (1  Johns.  1), 
1318. 


TO   SECTIONS.] 

Luke  V.   Calhoun    (52  Ala.  115), 

1395. 
Luke  V.  Lyde  (2  Burr.  882),  801, 

803,  815,  820. 
Lunansky   v.    Packet   Co.    (99   N. 
.     Y.    Supp.    810),   172. 
Lundquist    v.    Railway    Co.    (121 

Fed.   915),  544. 
Lundy  v.   Railroad  Co.    (66  Cal. 

191),    1045. 

Lustig  V.   Navigation  Co.    (78  N. 

Y.    Supp.   885,   38   Misc.   802), 

120. 
Lustig  V.  Railroad  Co.   (65  Hun, 

547,  20  N.  Y.  Supp.  477),  1185, 

1388. 
Lydon  v.  Robert  Smith  Ale  Brew- 
ing Co.    (132  Fed.  593,  67  C. 

C.  A.  421),  997. 
Lygo  V.  Newbold   (9  Exch.  302), 

1001,  1227. 
Lyle  V.  Barker  (5  Bin.  457),  780. 
Lyle  Shipping  Co.  v.  Cardiff  Cor- 
poration (2  Q.  B.   (1900)   638, 

69    L.   J.   Q.    B.    889,    83    Law 

T.  (N.  S.)  329,  49  Wkly.  Rep. 

85,    5    Com'l    Cas.    397),    846. 
Lynch  v.  Railroad  Co.   (40  N.  Y. 

Supp.  775,  8  App.  Div.  548), 

925. 
Lynch  v.  Smith   (104  Mass.  52), 

1227,    1228,    1229. 
Lynn  v.  Southern  Pacific  Co.  (103 

Cal.  7,  36  Pac.  1018,  24  L.  R. 

A.  710),  926,  1198. 
Lyon,   The    (1  Brown  Adm.  59), 

92. 
Lyon  V.  Mells  (5  East,  428),  497. 
Lyon  V.  Smith  (1  Iowa,  184),  58. 
Lyons  v.  Hoffnung  (15  App.  Cas. 

391),   767. 
Lyons  v.  Hill   (46  N.  H.  49),  773. 
Lyons  v.   Railroad   Co.    (101   Ind. 

419),   1418. 


clvi 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


[REFERENCES   ARE 

Lyons  v.  Rosenthal  (11  Hun,  46), 

1411. 
Lyons  v.  Woodward   (49  Me.  29), 

1376. 


M 


Mace  V.   Reed    (89   Wis.   440,   62 

N.   W.   186),   1441. 
Macfarlane  v.  Adams  Express  Co. 

(137  Fed.  982),  426,  433. 
Mac  Feat  v.  Railroad  Co.  ( —  Del. 

— ,    62    Atl.    Rep.    898),    895, 

1006,  1219. 
Mack    V.    Railway    Co.    (118    Ga. 

629,  45  S.  E.  509),  1197. 
Mackey  v.  Railroad  Co.   (19  App. 

D.  C.  282),  1397. 
Mackay  v.  Railroad  Co.  (34  W.  Va. 

65,  11  S.  E.  Rep.  737,  26  Am. 

St.  Rep.  913,  9  L.  R.  A  132), 

1061,    1065. 
Mackey  v.  Railway  Co.    (18  Fed. 

Rep.   236),  895. 
Maclay    v.    Spillers    &    Baker    (6 

Com'l    Cas.    217),    833. 
Maclin  v.  The  New  Jersey  St.  Bt. 

Co.   (7  Abb.  Pr.   (N.  S.)   229), 

1271. 
Macrow  v.   Railway    (L.   R.   6   Q. 

B.  612),  1241,  1244,  1249,  1253. 
Madan  v.  Sherard  (73  N.  Y.  329), 

415. 
Madden  v.  Railroad  Co.  (90  N.  Y. 

Supp.  261,  98  App.  Div.  406), 

983. 
Madden   v.  Railway   Co.    (50  Mo. 

App.  666),  898. 
Madden  v.  Railway  Co.  (35  S.  Car. 

381,    14    S.    E.    Rep.    713,    28 

Am.  St.  Rep.  855),  1122. 


TO   SECTIONS.] 

Madden  v.  Railway  Co.  (41  S. 
Car.  440,  19  S.  E.  Rep.  951), 
1127. 

Madden  v.  Railway  Co.  (28  W.  Va. 
610),  1394. 

Maddock  v.  American  Sugar  Re- 
fining Co.  (91  Fed.  166; 
aff'd.,  American  Sugar  Refin- 
ing Co,  V.  Maddock,  93  Fed. 
980,  36  C.  C.  A.  42),  160,  161, 
165. 

Magee  v.  Holland  (3  Butcher,  86), 
1378. 

Magee  v.  Navigation  Co.  (46  Fed. 
734),  1403. 

Maghee  v.  Railroad  Co.  (45  N.  Y. 
514),  408,  470,  480,  611,  618. 

Magnin  v.  Dinsmore  (56  N.  Y. 
168),   331,   401,   402,   425,   426, 

433,  451,   454. 

Magnin  v.  Dinsmore  (62  N.  Y.  35), 

434,  438,  441,  463,   1361. 
Magnin    v.    Dinsmore    (70    N.    Y. 

410),    434,    478. 
Magrane  v.  Railway  Co.   (183  Mo. 

119,  81  S.  W.  Rep.  1158),  1198. 
Maguire    v.     Railroad     Co.     (115 

Mass.  239),  1230. 
Mahar   v.    Railroad    Co.    (5    App. 

Div.   22,  39   N.  Y.   Supp.  63), 

1118,  1182. 
Maher  v.  Railroad  (67  N.  Y.  52), 

995,   1174. 
Mahon  v.  Blake   (125  Mass.  477), 

677. 
Mahoney  v.   Cook    (26  Penn.   St. 

342),    1233. 
Mahoney  v.  Railroad  Co.   (63  Me. 

68),  918. 
Maignan  v.  Railroad  (24  La.  Ann. 

333),  704. 
Mairs  v.  Railroad  Co.   (175  N.  Y. 

409,  67  N.  E.  901,  aft'g  76  N. 

Y.    Supp.    838,    73    App.    Div. 

265),   777. 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


elvii 


[EEFEBENCES   ABE 

Major  V.  Railroad  Co.    (21  Utah, 

141,  59   Pac.  522),  1414. 
Major  V.  Railway  Co.   (115  Iowa, 

309,    88    N.     W.     Rep.     815), 

1384,  1389. 
Malcolm  v.  Railroad  Co.   (106  N. 

C.  63),   1116,   1197. 
Mallett  V.   Railway   Co.    (68  Law 

J.   Q.  B.   256,    (1899)    1  Q.   B. 

309,    80    Law    T.    (N.  S.)    53, 

47  Wkly.  Rep.  334),  619. 
Mallory  v.  Railroad  Co.  (39  Barb. 

488),  87. 
Malloy  V.  Railway  Co.   (109  Wis. 

29,   85  N.  W.  Rep.  130),  447. 
Malmster     v.     Railroad     Co.    (49 

Mich.  94),  1236. 
Malone  v.  Express  Co.    (86  N.  Y. 

Supp.    911,    1039),    1298. 
Malone  v.  Railroad  Co.   (12  Gray, 

388),    415,    1299. 
Malone  v.   Railroad  Co.    (152  Pa. 

St.    390,    25    Atl.    638),    1234, 

1426,    1429. 
Malott   V.    Woods    (109    111.    App. 

512),   1043. 
Malott  V.  Shiner   (153  Ind.  35,  54 

N.    E.    Rep.    101,    74    Am.    St. 

Rep.  278),  1386,  1397,  1401. 
Manda  v.  Wells,  Fargo  &  Co.   (47 

N.  Y.  Supp.  182,  21  Misc.  308), 

805. 
Maney  v.   Railroad    (49   111.  App. 

105),  1384. 
Mangam  v.  Railway  Co.  (38  N.  Y. 

455),  1228. 
Mangan    v.     Atterton     (L.    R.     1 

Exch.   239),   1229. 
Manhattan  Oil  Co.  v.  Railroad  (54 

N.  Y.   197),   471. 
Manhattan    Rubber    Shoe    Co.    v. 

Railroad  Co.  (9  App.  Div.  172, 

41  N.  Y.  Supp.  83),  685,  708, 

721. 
Manly  v.  Railroad  Co.    (74  N.  C. 

655),  1228,  1418. 


TO   SECTIONS.] 

Mann   v.   Birchard    (40  Vt.   326), 

45L 
Mann    v.    White   River,    etc.,    Co. 

(46  Mich.   38),  98. 
Mann   Boudoir  Car  Co.  v.   Dupre 

(54  Fed.  646,  4  C.  C.  A.  540, 

13  U.  S.  App.  183,  21  L.  R.  A. 

289),   1139,   1145. 
Mannheim  Ins.  Co.  v.  Transp.  Co. 

(72  Minn.  357,  75  N.  W.  602), 

580. 
Manning  v.  Hollenbeck   (27  Wis. 

202),  884. 
Manning  v.  The  Railway  ( —  Ala. 

— ,  11  So.  Rep.  8,  36  Am.  St. 

Rep.  225),  1085. 
Manning  v.  Railway  &  Power  Co. 

(34  Wash.  406,  75  Pac.  994), 

1389. 
Manser  v.  Railway  Co.    (3  L.   T. 

585),    909,    910. 
Mansfield,  etc.,  Co.  v.  McEnery  (91 

Penn.    St.    185),    1397. 
Manufg.     Co.     v.     Railroad     (104 

Mass.  122),  238,  242,  254. 
Manufg.    Co.,   Washburn    v.   Rail- 
road  (113  Mass.  490),  261. 
Maples     V.     Railroad     (38    Conn. 

557),   1036,   1082. 
Marande  v.   Railway  Co.    (184  U. 

S.  173,  46  L.  Ed.  487,  22  Sup. 

Ct.  R.  340,  reversing  102  Fed. 

246,   42   C.   C.   A.   317),   477. 
Margaret,  The   (94  U.  S.  494),  92. 
Margo  V.  Railroad  Co.    ( —  Penn. 

St.    — ,    62    Atl.    Rep.    1079), 

1185,    1186. 
Marks  v.  Hamilton  (7  Exch.  323), 

783. 
Marmorstein  v.  Railroad   Co.    (34 

N.   Y.   Supp.   97,   13   Misc.   32, 

reversing  32  N.  Y.  Supp.  1146, 

11  Misc.  725),  232,  1302. 
Maroney     v.     Railway     Co.     (106 

Mass.  153),  1052,  1065,  1077. 
Marquette  v.  Railroad    (33   Iowa, 

562),  1193,  1197. 


clviii 


TABLE   OP    CASES    CITED. 


[BEFEBENCES   ABE 

Marquis  v.  Wood  (61  N.  Y.  Supp. 

251,  29  Misc.  590),  1360. 
Marr  v.  Telegraph  Co.   (85  Tenn. 

529),  95. 
Marrus  v.  Steamboat  Co.  (62  N.  Y. 

Supp.   474,    30   Misc.    421,   re- 
versing 60  N.  Y.  Supp.  994), 

445. 
Mars  V.  Canal  Co.  (54  Hun,  625), 

1094. 
Marsh  ads.   Blyth,   1   Nott  &  Mc- 

Cord,   170),   490. 
Marsh  v.  Railway  Co.  (3  McCrary 

236),    867,    884. 
Marshall  v.   Express  Co.    (7  Wis. 

1),   716,   719,   723. 
Marshall    v.    Railroad    (45    Barb. 

502),    649. 
Marshall  v.  Railroad  Co.  (46  Fed. 

269),  1388. 
Marshall  v.  Railroad  Co,    (48   N. 

Y.   660),   649. 
Marshall    v.    Railroad    Co.     (126 

Mich.  45,  85  N.  W.  242,  55  L, 

R.   A.   650),   1274,   1275,   1278, 

1286,  1291. 
Marshall  v.  Railroad  Co.   (78  Mo. 

610),  899,  1060,  1111. 
Marshall    v.    Railway     (11    Com. 

B.    655;    7    Eng.    Law    &    Eq. 

519),    962,    1017,    1241,    1327, 

1351. 
Marshall  v.  Railway  Co.   (74  Mo. 

App.  81),   230,  234. 
Marshall,  etc..  Grain  Co.  v.  Rail- 
road  Co.    (176   Mo.   480,   75   S. 

W.  638,  98  Am.  St.  Rep.  508), 

234. 
Marshall  v.  Welwood  (38  N.  J.  L. 

339),  1430. 
Martin    v.    McLaughlin    (5    Colo. 

387),  1334. 
Martin    v.    McLaughlin    (9    Colo. 

153),  889. 
Martin  v.  Porter  (5  M.  &  W.  351), 

827. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Martin   v.   Railway    (16   Com.   B, 

179),   936. 
Martin  v.  Railway   Co.    (55   Ark. 

510,  19  S.  W.  Rep.  314),  105. 
Martin  v.   Railway   Co.    (58   Kan. 

475,  49  Pac.  605),  1386,  1394. 
Martin   v.   Railway   Co.    (200    Pa. 

603,   50   Atl.   193),   1017. 
Martin    v.    Railway    Co.    (3    Tex. 

Civ.  App.   556,  22  S.  W.  Rep. 

1007),  152. 
Martinsdale    v.    Smith    (1    Q.    B. 

389),   887. 
Marx    V.    Railroad    Co.    (Ill    La. 

1085,  36  So.  Rep.  862),  1046, 

1443. 
Mashiter  v.  Buller  (1  Camp.  84), 

469,   828,   831. 
Maslin  v.  Railroad  Co.  (14  W.  Va. 

180),    1003,    1073. 
Mason    v.    Railway    Co.    (25    Mo. 

App.  473),  497,   510. 
Mason   v.   Railway   Co.    (7   Utah, 

77,    24    Pac.    796),    1386. 
Masonic  Fraternity  Temple  Ass'n 

V.  Collins   (210  111.  482,  71  N. 

E.    396,    aW9;    HO    111.    App. 

504),   100. 
Masser  v.  Railway  Co.   (68  Iowa, 

602),    1228. 
Master  and  Owners  of  S.  S.  "City 

of  Lincoln"  v.   Smith    (L.  R. 

(1904)    App.    Cas.    250),    352. 
Masterson    v.    Railway    Co.    (102 

Wis.  571,  78  N.  W.  757),  1017. 
Masterton  v.   Mayor   of  Brooklyn 

(7  Hill,  61),  1369. 
Mather  v.  Express  Co.  (138  Mass. 

55),  80,  1363. 
Matheson  v.  Railroad  Co.  (61  Kan. 

667,   60  Pac.  Rep.  747),  1388. 
Mathew  v.  Railroad  Co.   (115  Mo. 

App.  468,  78  S.  W.  Rep.  271), 

1432. 
Mathiessen  Co.  v.   Gusi    (29  Fed. 

Rep.   794),   165,   490. 


TABLE  OP   CASES   CITED, 


clix 


[REFERENCES   ARE   TO    SECTIONS.] 


Mathis  V.  Railroad  Co.  (65  S.  Car. 
271,  43  S.  E.  684,  61  L.  R.  A. 

824).   498. 
Matney  v.   Railroad   Co.    (75  Mo. 

App.  233),  1362. 
Matteson  v.  Railroad   Co.    (76  N. 

Y.  381),  1301. 
Matthews  v.  Board  of  Corporation 

Commissioners   (97  Fed.  400; 

s.  c.  106  Fed.  7),  574,  575,  583. 
Matthews  v.   Gibbs    (3   El.   &  El. 

282),  823,  825,  867. 
Matthews    v.    Poythress     (4    Ga. 

287),  176. 
Matthews  v.  Railroad  Co.  (148  Pa. 

St.   491,  24  Atl.   67),   933. 
Matthews  v.  Railway  Co.  (26  Mo. 

App.     75),     1175,     1377,    1378, 

1397. 
Matthews    v.    Warner    (29    Gratt. 

570,  26  Am.  Rep.  396),   1391, 

1397,  1398. 
Matthias    v.     Beeche     (111     Fed. 

940),  846. 
Matthieson    v.    Railway   Co.    (125 

Iowa,  90,  100  N.  W.  Rep.  51), 

935,  1207. 
Mattison   v.    Railroad    (57    N.    Y. 

552),  1291,  1292. 

Mattoon,   etc.,   Co.   v.   Dolan    (105 

111.  App.  1),  1389,   1392. 
Mauldin    v.    Railway    Co.    ( —   S. 

Car.  — ,   52   S.   E.   Rep.   677), 

654. 
Mauran  v.  Insurance  Co.  (6  Wall. 

1),  317. 
Mauritz  v.  The  Railroad  (23  Fed. 

Rep.  765),  1246,  1249,  1250, 

1299. 
Maury   v.    Talmadge    (2   McLean, 

157),  895,  904,  959. 
Maverick   v.   Railroad    (36   N.   Y. 

378),   895. 
Maving    v.    Todd    (1    Stark.    72), 

392. 


Max    V.   Roberts    (12    East,    89), 

1334. 
Maxfield  v.  Railroad  Co.    ( —  Me. 

— ,  60  Atl.  710),  935,  941. 
Maxson  v.  Railroad  Co.   (97  N.  Y. 

Supp.   962),   1043. 
Maxwell  v.  Railroad  Co.    (48  La. 

Ann.  385,  19  So.  287),  450. 
May  V.  Hanson    (5  Cal.  360),  66. 
May    V.    Railroad    Co.    (62    N.    J. 

Law    63,    42    Atl.    Rep.    163). 

1397. 
Mayell  v.  Potter   (2  Johns.  Cases, 

371),    688.    720. 
Mayhew  v.  Boyce   (1  Stark.  423), 

959. 
Mayhew  v.  Eames  (3  B.  &  C.  601), 

392. 
Maynard    v.    Navigation    Co.    ( — 

Or.    — ,    78    Pac.    Rep.    983), 

1427. 
Mayne   v.   Railway    Co.    (12    Okl. 

10,   69   Pac.   933),   937,   941. 
Mayor  v.   Humphries    (1  C.  &  P. 

251),    959,    1406. 
Mayor   of   St.   John  v.   McDonald 

(14   S.  C.  R.    (Can.)    1),  942. 
McAbsher  v.   Railroad    (12   S.   E. 

Rep.   892),   174. 
McAdory  v.  Railroad  Co.  (94  Ala. 

272,    10    So.   Rep.    507),    1401. 
McAdory  v.  Railroad  Co.  (109  Ala. 

636,    19    So.   Rep.    905),    1391. 
McAllister    v.    Railway    Co.    (Ill 

Fed.  938;  affirmed  on  opinion 

below,  113  Fed.  1019),  360. 
McAlister  v.  Railroad  Co.  (74  Mo. 

351),  638,  740,  742. 
McAndrew  v.  Whitlock  (52  N.  Y. 

40),   649,   689. 
McArthur    v.    Sears     (21    Wend. 

190),    75,    278,    483,    484,    490. 
McArthur  Bros.  Co.  v.  622714  Feet 

of    Lumber     (131    Fed.    389), 

840,   847. 


cLx 


TABLE   OF    CASES   CITED. 


[REFERENCES   ARE   TO   SECTIONS.] 


McAunich    v.    Railroad     Co.     (20 

Iowa,  358),   1419. 
McBeath  v.  Railway  Co.   (20  Mo. 

App.  445),  1355. 
McBride     v.     Insurance     Co.     (5 

Johns.  299),  655. 
McBride  v.  Railway  Co.  (72  Minn. 

291,   75   N.  W.   231),   1423. 
McBrier  v.  A  Cargo  of  Hard  Coal 

(69   Fed.   469),   869. 
McCabe  v.  Narragansett,  etc.,  Co. 
(—  R.  I.  — ,  61  Atl.  Rep.  667; 

s.  c.  26  R.  I.  427.  59  Atl.  Rep. 

112),   1397. 
McCafferty   v.   Railroad   Co.    (193 

Pa.    St.    339,    44    Atl.    435,    74 

Am.  St.  Rep.  690),  949,  1386, 

1414,  1430. 
McCaldin  v.  Cargo  of  Scrap  Iron 

(111  Fed.  411),  840. 
McCahan  v.  Hirst  (7  Watts,  175), 

1326. 
McCall  V.   Brock.  (5   Strob.  Law, 

119),   489. 
McCance  v.  Railway  Co.   (7  H.  & 

N.  477),  341,  397. 
McCance  v.  Railway    (3  H.  &  C. 

343),   436. 
McCann  v.  Eddy   (133  Mo.  59,  33 

S.   W.   71,   35   L.  R.   A.   110), 

234. 
McCann  v.  Railroad  (20  Md.  202), 

401. 
McCann  v.  Railway  Co.   (58  N.  J. 

L.  642,  34  Atl.  1052,  33  L.  R. 

A.  127),  992,  1174,  1430. 
McCarn  v.  Railway  Co.    (84  Tex. 

352,  19  S.  W.  547,  31  Am.  St. 

Rep.   51,  16  L.  R.  A.  39,  dis- 
approving Railway  v.  Vaughn 

(Tex.    Civ.    App.)    16    S.    W. 

775),   233. 
McCarthy  v.  Claflin    (99  Me.  290, 

59  Atl.  Rep.  293),  1397,  1401. 
McCarthy    v.    Railroad    Co.    (102 

Ala.   193,   14  So.  370,   48  Am. 

St.  Rep.  29),  333,  1354. 


McCarthy    v.    Railroad    Co.     (18 

Kans.  46),  1388. 
McCarthy  v.  Railroad    (30   Penn. 

St.    247),    702. 
McCarthy  v.  Railway  Co.  (79  Tex. 

33,  15  S.  W.  Rep.  164),  630. 
McCarty   v.   Transit   Co.    ( —  Mo. 
— ,  91  S.  W.  Rep.  132),  1401. 
McCaslin  v.  Railway  Co.  (93  Mich. 

553,  53  N.  W.  724),  1177. 
McCauley  v.  Davidson   (10  Minn. 

418),    34. 
McCawley  v.  Railway  (L.  R.  8  Q. 

B.  57),  1073. 
McChord  v.  Railroad  Co.   (183  U. 
S.  483,  22  Sup.  Ct.  R.  165,  re- 
versing  Railroad  v.  McChord, 
103  Fed.  216),  575. 
McClary  v.  Railroad  Co.    (3  Neb. 

44),    1006,    1430. 
McClelland    v.    Railway    Co.     (94 

Ind.   276),  994,   1083. 
McClure    v.    Hammond     (1    Bay, 

99),   75. 
McClure  v.  Railroad  Co.   (34  Md. 

532),    1041,    1065,    1082. 
McClure     v.     Richardson      (Rice, 

215),   53. 
McCombie  v.  Davies  (6  East,  538), 

785. 
McConnell  v.  Pedigo  (92  Ky.  465, 

18  S.  W.  15),  945. 
McConnell    v.    Railroad    Co.     (86 

Va.   248),   231,   232,   233. 
McCook    V.    Northrup     (65     Ark. 
225,  45  S.  W.  547),  964,  1032. 
McCord   V.   Railroad   Co.    (134   N. 
Car.  53,  45  S.  E.  Rep.  1031), 
925,   1212,   1414. 
McCormack    v.    Railway    Co.     (6 
Ont.   L.  R.   577,   3    Can.    Ry. 
Cases,  185),  339. 
McCormick  v.  Railroad   (4  E.  D. 

Smith,   181),   1246. 
McCormick    v.    Railway    Co.     ( — 
Mich.  — ,  104  N.  W.  Rep.  390), 
941. 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


clxi 


[BEFEBENCES    ABE 

McCoy  V.  Railroad  (44  Iowa,  424), 

339. 
McCrary  v.  Railway  Co.  (109  Mo. 

App.   567,   83   S.  W.  Rep.  82), 

652. 
McCready  v.  Railroad  Co.   (64  N. 

Y.    Supp.    996,    51    App.    Div. 

338),  1414. 
McCullen  v.   Railway  Co.    (74  N. 

Y.    Supp.    209,    68    App.    Div. 

269),  1090. 
McCulloch  V.  McDonald    (91  Ind. 

240),    668. 
McCullough   V.    Hellweg    (66   Md. 

269),  698,  864. 
McCullough   V.    Railway    Co.    (34 

Mo.   App.    23),   114,   172,   450, 

510. 
McCune  v.  Railroad  Co.  (52  Iowa, 

600),   636. 
McCurrie    v.    Railroad    Co.     (122 

Cal.   558,   55   Pac.   324),   1413. 
McDaniel  v.  Railroad  Co.  (90  Ala. 

64),   1192. 
McDaniel  v.  Railway  Co.  (24  Iowa, 

412),    210,    212,    222. 
McDermott    v.    Railway    Co.    (82 

Wis.  246,  52  N.  W.  85),  1122, 

1127,    1190. 
McDonald  v.   Champion,   etc.,   Co. 

(—  Mich.  — ,  103  N.  W.  Rep. 

829),    1397. 
McDonald   v.   Mallory    (77    N.   Y. 

546),   1389. 
McDonald   v.   McDonald    (96   Ky. 

209,  28  S.  W.  Rep.  482,  16  Ky. 

L.  R.  412,  49  Am.  St.  R.  289), 

1402. 
McDonald    v.    Railroad    Co.    (144 

Ind.  459,   43   N.   E.   Rep.   447, 

55  Am.  St.  Kep.  185,  32  L.  R. 

A.  309),  1395. 
McDonald  v.  Railroad  Co.  (47  La. 

Ann.    1440,   17    So.   873),   917. 
McDonald    v.    Railroad     Co.     (88 

Iowa,    345,    55    N.     W.     102), 

1122,  1187. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

McDonald  v.  Railroad  Co.  (87  Me. 

466,  32  Atl.  1010),  1118,  1177. 
McDonald  v.  Railroad  Co.   (72  N. 

J.  280,  62  Atl.  Rep.  405),  1067. 
McDonald  v.  Railroad  Co.  (116  N. 

Y.  546),  1118. 
McDonald  v.   Railroad    (34   N.  Y. 

497),   131,   135,   141,   708. 
McDonald   v.   Railroad    (26   Iowa, 

124),   928,   1225. 
McDonald  v.  Railway  Co.  (31  Ont. 

R.   663),   212. 
McDonald  v.  Railway  Co.    (71   S. 

Car.  352,  51  S.  E.  Rep.  138), 

1395. 
McDonnell  v.  Railroad  (115  Mass. 

564),  1233. 
McDonnell  v.  Railroad  Co.   (54  N. 

Y.    Supp.    747,    35    App.    Div. 

147),  924. 
McDougall    V.    Railroad    Co.     (63 

Cal.   431),  1417. 
McDuffee  v.  Railroad  Co.    (52  N. 

H.    430),   515,   521,   1023. 
McEacheran  v.  Railroad  Co.   (101 

Mich.  264,  59  N.  W.  612),  243. 
McEachran   v.    Railway    Co.    (115 

Mich.  318,  73  N.  W.  231),  799. 
McElroy  v.  Railroad  Co.   (4  Cush. 

400),    916,   923,   947,   949,   962. 
McElveen  v.  Railway  Co.  (109  Ga. 

249,  34  S.  E.  Rep.  281,  77  Am. 

St.  Rep.  371),  167. 
McEntee  v.  Steamboat  Co.   (45  N. 

Y.  34),  177,  668. 
McEwen  v.  Railroad  (33  Ind.  368), 

190. 
McFadden  v.  Blue  Star  Line  (1  K. 

B.   (1905),  697),  363,  368,  374. 
McFadden  v.  Railway  Co.  (87  Cal. 

464),  1383. 
McFadden  v.  Railway  Co.  (92  Mo. 

343),  339,  420,  450,  475,  1334. 
McFall    V.    Railway    Co.     ( — Mo. 

App.  — ,  94  S.  W.  Rep.  570), 

444,  449,  477. 


elxii 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


[BEFERENCES    ABE 

McFarland  v.  Wheeler   (26  Wend. 

4G7),   865. 
McFeat  v.  Railroad  Co.    (Del.,  62 

Atl.  Rep.  898),  1397. 
McFetridge    v.    Piper    (40    Iowa, 

627),  758,  766. 
McGann  v.  Railway  Co.   (85  Tex. 

289,  20  S.  W.  Rep.  80),  1398. 
McGaw    V.    Insurance     (23    Pick. 

104),  801,  816. 
McGaw    V.    Ocean    Co.    (23    Pick. 

405),   801,  802,   815,  818, 
McGee   v.    Railroad    Co.    (92    Mo. 

208),  899,  964. 
McGee    v.    Railway    Co.    (71    Mo. 

App.    310),    859,    860. 
McGeehan    v.    Railroad    Co.    (149 

Pa.  St.  188,  24  Atl.  205),  1184, 

1208. 
McGhee  v.  Cashin   (130  Ala.  561, 

30  So.  Rep.  367),  1092. 
McGhee  v.  Drisdale  (111  Ala.  597, 

20  So.  391),  1043. 
McGhee    v.    McCarley     (103    Fed. 

55,  44  C.  C.  A.  252,  reversing 

on  rehearing,  91  Fed.  462,  33 

C.   C.   A.   629,   63   U.   S.   App. 

422),  1389. 
McGhee  v.  Reynolds  (117  Ala.  413, 

23   So.  68),  1054. 
McGhee  v.   Willis    (134  Ala.   456, 

32  So.  Rep.  301),  1397,  1401. 
McGill  V.  Rowand   (3  Barr,  451), 

69,  1246. 
McGinnis    v.    Foundry    Co.     (178 

Mo.  225,  73  S.  W.  Rep.  586), 

1390. 

McGoffin  V.  Railway  Co.   (102  Mo. 

540),  1017,  1200. 
McGovern  v.  Lewis  (56  Penn.  St. 

231,  1370. 
McGowen  v.  Railroad  Co.  (41  La. 

Ann.  732),  1033. 
McGraw  v.   Railroad   Co.    (18  W. 

Va.  361),  651,  652. 
McGown  V.  Railroad  Co.  (85  Tex. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

289,  20  S.  W.  Rep.  80),  1397, 

1399. 
McGraw  v.  Railway   Co.    (135  N. 

Car.  264,  47  S.  E.  Rep.  758), 

999. 
McGregor    v.     Kilgore     (6    Ohio, 

358),  75,  1360. 
McGregor  v.  Railroad  Co.   (35  N. 

J.  L.  89),  805. 
McGreil  v.  Buffalo  Office  Bldg.  Co. 

(153  N.  Y.  265,  47  N.  E.  305), 

100. 
McGrew  v.  Railway  Co.   (109  Mo. 

582,  19  S.  W.  53),  495. 
McGrew  v.  Railway  Co.   (114  Mo. 

210,  21  S.  W.  463),  574. 
McGrew  v.  Railway  Co.   (177  Mo. 

533,  76  S.  W.  995),  574. 
McGucken  v.  Railroad  C.  (77  Hun, 

69,  28  N.  Y.  Supp.  298),  1000. 
McGuinn  v.  Forbes  (37  Fed.  Rep. 

639),  972. 
McGuire   v.   The  Golden  Gate    (1 

McAllister,  104),  909. 
McHenry    v.    Railroad     (4    Harr. 

448),  58,  70,  708. 
McHugh  V.  Schlosser  (159  Pa.  St. 

480,   28  Atl.   291,   39   Am.   St. 

Rep.  699),  1397. 
Mcintosh  V.  Railway  Co.  (103  Mo. 

131),  1389,  1394. 
Mclntyre   v.    Railroad    (47    Barb. 

515),  1423. 
Mclntyre    v.    Railroad    (37   N.    Y. 

287),   1177,    1192,   1397,   1423. 
Mclntyre   v.    Railroad    (43    Barb. 

532),  1192. 
McKay  v.   Dredging   Co.    (92   Me. 

454,  43  Atl.  Rep.  29),  1397. 
McKay  v.  Railroad  (50  Hun,  563), 

130,  131. 
McKean  v.  Mclvor  (L.  R.  6  Exch. 

36),  672. 
McKee  v.  Garcelon   (60  Me.  167), 

175. 
McKee  v.   Owen    (15  Mich.   115), 

1269. 


TABLE  OF   CASES   CITED. 


clxiii 


[BEFEEENCES    ABE 

McKeen  v.  Mcrse  (49  Fed.  253,  1 

C.  C.  A.  237,  1  U.  S.  App.  7). 

857. 
McKeering  v.  Railroad  Co.  (65  N. 

J.  Law  57,  56  Atl.  Rep.  715), 

1391. 
McKenzie    v.    Railroad    Co.    (137 

Mich    112,    100    N.    W.    Rep. 

260),  340,  637. 
McKeon     v.     Railroad     Co.     (183 

Mass.    271,    67   N.   E.    329,    97 

Am.   St.  Rep.  437),  990. 
McKeon  v.  Railway   (42  Mo.  79), 

1438. 
McKeon  v.  Railway  Co.   (94  Wis. 

477,  69  N.  W.  175,  35  L.  R.  A. 

252),  1142. 
McKeon  v.   See    (4   Rob.   (N.  Y.) 

449),  690,  696. 
McKernan  v.  Railway  Co.    (54  N. 

Y.  Super.  354),  1099. 
McKibbin     v.     Railway     Co.     (78 

Minn.    232,    80    N.    W.    1052), 

1241,    1242,   1250. 
McKimble    v.    Railroad    Co.    (139 

Mass.   542),   1019,   1111,   1174, 

1184. 
McKinley  v.  Railway  Co.  (44  Iowa, 

314),    1094. 
McKinney    v,    Jewett    (90    N.    Y. 

267),  708. 
McKinney    v.     Neil     (1    McLean, 

540),  895,  900,  904,  958. 
McKnight  v.   Ratcliffe    (44  Penn. 

St.  156),  1369. 

McKone  v.  Railroad  Co.  (51  Mich. 
601),   991. 

McLagan  v.  Railway  Co.  (116  la, 

183,  89  N.  W.  233),  241. 
McLamb  v.  Railroad  Co.   (122  N. 

Car.  862,  29  S.  E.  Rep.  894), 

1397. 

McLaren  v.  Railroad  Co.  (85  Ga. 
504),  991. 

McLaren  y.  Railway  Co.  (100  Ala. 
506,   14  So.   405),  1182. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

McLaren  v.  Standard  Oil  Co.  (124 

Fed.   958),   776. 
McLaughlin   v.   Martin    (12   Colo. 

App.  268,  55  Pac.  195),  1315. 
McLean    v.    Burbank     (11    Minn. 

277),  916. 
McLean  v.   Fleming    (L.  R.   2   H. 

L.  Sc.  128),  159. 
McLean  v.  Railway  Co.  (50  Minn. 

485,   52   N.   W.   966),   1433. 
McLean    v.    Rutherford     (8    Mo. 

109),  29. 
McLeod   V.   Railroad   Co.    (58   Vt. 

727,    6    Atl,    Rep.    648),    1387, 

1388. 
McLemore  v.  Sebree,  etc.  Co.   (98 

Ky.  700,  34  S.  W.  Rep.  236), 

1389. 
McMahon    v.    Mayor     (33    N.     Y. 

642),    1228. 
McManus  v.  Railway  (2  H.  &  N. 

702),  340,  341. 
McManus   v.   Railway   Co.    (4   H. 

&  N.  327),  336,  340,  397,  1352. 
McMasters  v.  Railroad    (69  Penn. 

St.  374),  696,  710. 
McMillan    v.    Express    Co.     (123 

Iowa,  236,  98  Iowa,  629),  201, 

206,  412. 
McMillan    v.    Railroad    Co.     (16 

Mich.  79),  231,  401,  403,  408, 

409,    415,    708,    1299. 
McMillan  v.  Spider  Lake,  etc.  Co. 

(115  Wis.  332,  91  N.  W.  979, 

95   Am.    St.   Rep.   947),   1389, 

1395. 
McMorrin  v.  Railway  Co    (1  Ont. 

L.   R.   561,   1   Can.   Ry.   Cases 

217),  712. 
McMurray  v.  Pullman's  Palace  Car 

Co.    (86   111.  App.   619),   1132. 
McMurty  v.  Railway  Co.  (67  Miss. 

601),   1175,  1181. 
McNamara    v.    Railway    Co.     (61 

Minn.  296,  63  N.  W.  726),  964, 

lOOL 


elxiv 


TABLE  OF   CASES   CITED, 


[REFERENCES    ARE   TO    SECTIONS.] 


McNamara    v.    Slavens    (76    Mo. 

329),  1384. 
McNees   v.   Railway   Co.    (22  Mo. 

App.  224),  521. 
McNeill   V.  Railroad  Co.    (132   N. 

C.   510,   44    S.   E.    34,   95   Am. 

St.  Rep.  641),  591,  1075. 
McNeill  V.  Railroad  Co.    (135   N. 

Car.  682.  47  S.  E.  Rep.  765), 

1022. 
McNulta  V.  Ensch  (134  111.  46,  24 

N.    E.    Rep.    C31),    1123. 
McNulty  V.  Railroad  Co.   (182  Pa. 

St.  479,  38  Atl.  524,  38  L.  R. 

A.  376,  61  Am.  St.  Rep.  721), 

1004,   1072,   1073. 
McPadden  v.  Railroad    (44  N.  Y. 

478),  895,   904,   909,   951. 
McPeak  v.  Railway  Co.   (128  Mo. 

617,  30  S.  W.  170),  1222 
McPherson    v.    Railroad    Co.    (97 

Mo.   253),   1397. 
McQuade  v.  Railway   Co.    (53   N. 

Y.    Super.    91),    1111. 
McQuilken    v.    Railroad    Co.    (64. 

Cal.   463),    1174,    1184. 
McRae  v.  Railroad  Co.   (88  N.  C. 

526),  1058. 
McSloop  V.  Railroad  Co.  (59  Fed. 

431),  1118,  1177. 
McSwegan    v.     Railroad     Co.      7 

App.  Div.  301,  40  N.  Y.  Supp. 

51,    reversing    16    Misc.    157, 

37  N.  Y.   Supp.  943),  177. 
McVeety  v.  Railway  Co.  (45  Minn. 

268,    47    N.    W.    Rep.    809,    22 

Am.  St.  Rep.  728,  11  L.  R.  A. 

174),  964,  1001. 
McWethy    v.    Railroad    Co.     (127 

Mich.   333,   86   N.  W.   827,   55 

L.  R.  A.  306),  1431. 
In  re  M.  Burke,   (140  Fed.  971), 

763,   766. 
Meade  v.  Rutledge   (11  Tex.  44), 

1367. 
Meador  v.  Railway  Co.   (62  Kan. 


865,   61   Pac.   442),   895,   1414, 

1415. 
Mearns     v.     The     Railroad     (139 

Fed.    543    (—    C.    C.    A.   — ), 

1123,  1177. 
Mearns   v.   Railroad   Co.    (163   N. 

Y.  108,  57   N.   E.  292,  revers- 
ing 48  N  Y.  Supp.  366,  23  App. 

Div.  298),  1177. 
Mears  v.  Railroad  Co.    (75  Conn. 

171,   52   Atl.   610,   56  L.  R.   A. 

884,  96  Am.  St.  Rep.  192),  44 

157,    163,    401,   472,    776,   1354. 
Medeiros   v.    Hill    (8    Bing.    231), 

626. 
Medler  v.  Railroad  Co.   (12  N.  Y. 

Suppl.  930),  1118. 
Meekin   v.   Railroad   Co.    (164   N. 

Y.   145,   58    N.   E.   50,   79   Am. 

St.  Rep.   635,  0^9-,  64  N.  Y.' 

Supp.    291,    51    App.    Div.    1), 

1389,    1397. 
Meekins  v.  Railroad  Co.    (134  N. 

Car.  217,  46  S.  E.  Rep.  493), 

1432. 
Meeks   v.   Railroad   Co.    (122    Ga. 

266,  50  S.  E.  Rep.  99),  1181. 
Meeks   v.    Railway    Co.    (52    Cal. 

603),   1229. 
Meesel  v.  Railroad  Co.    (8  Allen, 

234),  1226. 
Meier  v.  Railroad  (64  Pa.  St.  225), 

895,  909,  952. 
Meigs  v.    Hagan    (86    Fed.    926), 

1308,  1317. 
Melbourne   v.   Railroad    Co.     (88 

Ala.    443),    18,   660,   737. 
Mellor  V.   Railway   Co.    (105   Mo. 

455,  10  L.  R.  A.  36),  1017. 
Meloche     v.     Railway     Co.     (116 

Mich.  69,  74  N.  W.  301),  113, 

152. 
Memphis  &  C.  Packet  Co.  v.  Buck- 

ner  (22  Ky.  Law  Rep.  401,  57 

S.  W.  Rep.  482),  911,  1003. 
Memphis  &  C,  Packet  Co.  v.  Nagel 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


clxv 


[references  are 

(97  Ky.  9,  29  S.  W.  Rep.  743), 

1440. 
Memphis  &  C.  Packet  Co.  v.  Over- 
man   Carriage    Co.    (93    Fed. 

246),   367. 
Memphis  &  C.  Packet  Co.  v.  Pikey 

(142  Ind.  304,  40  N.  E.  527), 

1093,  1096,  1389,  1395. 
Memphis  News  Publishing  Co.  v. 

Railway  Co.    (110   Tenn.   684, 

75  S.  W.  Rep.  941,  63  L.  R.  A. 

150),  44,  49,  76,  512. 
Menacho  v.  Ward    (27  Fed.  Rep. 

529),   521. 
Menaugh  v.  Railway  Co.  (157  Ind. 

20,  60  N.  E.   694),   1000. 
Mendenhall    v.    Railway    Co.    (66 

Kan  438,  71  Pac.  846,  97  Am. 

St.  Rep.  380,  61  L.  R.  A.  120), 

990,    1001. 
Mendesohn    v.    Anaheim    Lighter 

Co.    (40  Cal.  657),  1438. 
Mensing    v.     Railroad     Co.     (117 

Mich.  606,  76  N.  W.  Rep.  98), 

1126. 
Menzell   v.   Railroad     (1    Dillon, 

531),  465. 
M.  &  T.  Bank  v.  Gordon   (5  La. 

Ann.  64),  1246. 
Merchant's  Bank  v.  Railroad   (69 

N.  Y.   373),   175. 
Merchants,    etc..    Bank   v.   Steam- 
boat Co.    (—  Md.  — ,  63  Atl. 

Rep.    108),    175,    182. 
Merchants  Cotton-Press  &  Storage 

Co.  V.  Insurance  Co.  of  North 

America    (151   U.    S.   368,    14 

Sup.   Ct.  367,   38  L.   Ed.   195, 

affirming  91  Tenn.  537,  19  S. 

W.  755),  547,  784. 
Merchants'  Dispatch  Co.  v.  Bolles 

(80  111.  473),  84,  471,  795. 
Merchants'  Dispatch  v.  Cornforth 

(3  Col.  280),  84,  416,  417,  505. 
Merchants'   Dispatch  Transp.   Co. 

V.   Furthmann    (47   111.   App. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

561;    affirmed,   149   111.   66,  36 

N.   E.    624,    41    Am.    St.    Rep. 

265),  172,  173,  201,  415,  417. 
Merchants'   Dispatch   Co.   v.   Hal- 
lock    (64    111.    284),    702,    725. 
Merchants'   Dispatch  Transp.   Co. 

V.  Hately  (14  S.  C.  R.  (Can.) 

572),   226. 
Merchants'  Dispatch  Co.  v.  Joest- 

ing   (89  111.  152),  84,  410. 
Merchants'  Dispatch  Co.  v.  Kahn 

(76   111.   520),   131,   613. 
Merchants'  Dispatch  Co.  v.  Leysor 

(89   111.   43),  84,   410. 
Merchants'   Dispatch   Co.   v.  Mer- 

riam    (111   Ind.  5),   177. 
Merchants',    etc.,    Ass'n    v.    Wood 

(64    Miss.   661),   1233. 
Merchants'    etc..    Transportation 

Co.   V.   Moore  &  Co.    ( —  Ga. 

—    52    S.   E.  Rep.   802),  432, 

445. 
Mercher    v.    Railroad    Co.     (Tex. 

Civ.  App.,  85  S.  W.  468),  1180, 

1186. 
Meredith  v.  Railway  Co.   (137  N. 

Car.    478,   50   S.   E.   Rep.   1), 

1348. 
Merian  v.  Funck   (4  Denio,  110), 

807. 
Merriam    v.   Railroad    (20   Conn. 

354),  115. 
Merrick    v.    Brainard     (38    Barb. 

574),  92,   779. 
Merrick  v.  Webster  (3  Mich.  260), 

619. 
Merrielees   v.   Railroad    Co.    (163 

Mo.  470,   63    S.  W.  718),   990. 
Merrill  v.  Express  Co.   (62  N.  H. 

514),   408,   444. 
Merrill  v.  Grinnell  (30  N.  Y.  594), 

1246,    1254. 
Merrill  v.  Railroad  Co.  (139  Mass. 

238),   1197. 
Merrill     v.     Railroad     Co.     (139 

Mass.  252,  29  N.  E.  666),  1123. 


clxvi 


TABLE   OF   CASES    CITED. 


[REFERENCES    ABE 

Merrimac,  The    (2   Sawyer,  586), 

92. 
Merriman     v.     Express    Co.     (63 

Minn.    543,    65    N.   W.    1080), 

742. 
Merritt  v.  Earle    (29  N.  Y.   115; 

31  Barb.  38).  275,  1233. 
Merritt  v.  Railroad  (11  Allen,  80), 

124. 
Merritt  v.  Railroad  Co.  (162  Mass. 

326,  38  N.  E.  447),  1177. 
Merritt  &   Chapman,   etc.,   Co.   v. 

Vogeman   (127  Fed.  770,  s.  c. 

143  Fed.  142),  853. 
Mershon    v.    Hobensack    (2    Zab. 

372),  275,   279,  281,   963. 
Mervin  v.  Butler  (17  Conn.  138), 

688. 
Merz  V.  Railway  Co.  (86  Minn.  33, 

90    N.    W.    7),    668,    742,    743, 

749,  753. 
Messenger  v.   Dennie    (137  Mass. 

197),   1229. 
Messenger  v.   Dennie    (141  Mass. 

335),  1228. 
Messenger  v.  Railroad  Co.  (36  N. 

J.  L.  407),  521. 
Messenger  v.  Railroad  (7  Vroom, 

407),   520. 
Mestas  v.  Diamond  Coal  &  Coke 

Co.  (12  Wyo.  414,  76  Pac.  Rep. 

567),   1389, 
Metallic  Compress  Co.  v.  Railroad 

Co.   (109  Mass.  277),  1430. 
Metcalf  V.  McLaughlin  (122  Mass. 

84),  148. 
Metcalfe  v.   Railway   (4   Com.  B. 

(N.   S.)    307),   436,   439. 
Metropolitan  Trust  Co.  v.  Railroad 

Co.    (90   Fed.    683),    574,    582, 

583. 
Metropolitan  Trust  Co.  v.  Railroad 

Co.  (107  Fed.  628),  426,  442. 
Mettlestadt   v.   Railroad    (4   Rob. 

(X.  Y.)    377),  1181. 
Metz  V.  Railroad  Co.  (85  Cal.  329, 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

24  Pac.  610,  20  Am.  St.  Rep. 

228,   9  L.  R.  A.  431),   1249. 
Meuer  v.  Railway  Co.  (5  S.  Dak. 

568,  59  N.  W.  945,  49  Am.  St. 

Rep.  898,  25  L.  R.  A.  81;  s.  c. 

11  S.  Dak.  94,  75  N.  W  Rep. 

823,  74  Am.  St.  Rep.  774),  207, 

210,  212,  1003,  1073. 
Meux   V.    Railway    Co.    (2   Q.    B. 

(1895)    387,    64    L.    J.    Q.    B. 

657),   1246,  1276. 
Meyer  v.  Dresser  (16  Com.  B.  (N. 

S.)   646),  159. 
Meyer  v.  Lemcke   (31  Ind.  208), 

727. 
Meyer  v.  Peck  (28  N.  Y.  590),  158, 

165. 
Meyer  v.  Railroad   (41  La.  Ann. 

639),  115,  122. 
Meyer  v.  Railroad   (40  Mo.  151), 

1230. 
In  re  Meyer   (74  Fed.  881),  344, 

381,  383,  386,  623. 
Meyere  v.  Railway  Co.  (110  Tenn. 

166,  72  S.  W.  Rep.  114),  1197, 

1198. 
Meyerstein  v.  Barber  (L.  R.  2  C. 

P.  42),  175. 
Meyer's  Admx.  v.  Railway  Co.  (54 

Fed.   116,   4   C.  C.   A.  221,   10 

U.  S.  App.  677;  s.  c.  Railway 

V.  Greenthal,  77  Fed.  150,  23 

C.  C.  A.  100),  980. 
Miama    Powder    Co.    v.    Railway 

Co.    (38   S.  Car.  78,  16   S.  E. 

Rep.   339,   21  L.   R.   A.   123), 

799. 
Miama  Powder  Co.  v.  Railway  Co. 

(47  S.  Car.  324,  25  S.  E.  Rep. 

153,    58    Am.    St.   Rep.    880). 

799,  874. 
Michaels  v.  The  Railroad   (30  N. 

Y.    564),   131,    302. 
Michalitschke  v.  Express  Co.  (118 

Cal.    683,    50    Pac.   847),   331, 

426,  428,  433. 


TABLE   OF    CASES   CITED. 


clxvii 


[EEFEEENCES    ABE    TO    SECTIONS.] 


Michigan   Railroad   v.   Shurtz    (7 

Mich,  515),  72,  113. 
Middleton     v.     Fowler     (1     Salk. 

282),   69,   1241. 
Midland   National    Bank   v.   Rail- 
way Co.    (62   Mo.   App.   531), 

175,  176. 
Midland    Nat'l    Bank   v.   Railway 

Co.    (132    Mo.   492,    33    S.    W. 

521,    33    Am.    St.    Rep.    505), 

177,   182,  188. 
Midland  Nav.  Co.  v.  Elevator  Co. 
(6  Ont.  L.  R.   432),  833,   842. 
Midland  Railroad  v.  Bromley  (17 

C.   B.   372;    33   Eng.   L.   &  E. 

235),  67,  1348. 
Mierson  v.  Hope  (2  Sweeney,  561), 

740,   743. 
Milam  v.  Railway  Co.  (58  S.  Car. 

247,   36   S.  E.  Rep.   571),   642. 
Milburn  v.  35000  Boxes   (57  Fed. 

236,  6  C.  C.  A.  317,  14  U.  S. 

App.  562),  839. 
Miles  V.  James  (1  McCord,  157), 

128. 
Millard  v.  Brown  (35  N.  Y.  297), 

1436. 
Miller  v.  King  (166  N.  Y.  394,  59 

N.   E.    1114,    aft'g.,    58    N.    Y. 

Supp.   1145),   1060,   1424. 
Miller    v.    Mansfield     (112    Mass. 

260),  711,  859. 
Miller  v.  Navigation  Co.  (10  N.  Y. 

431),  132. 
Miller     v.     Pendleton     (8     Gray, 

547),  66. 
Miller  v.  Race  (1  Barr,  452),  176. 
Miller  v.  Railroad  (24  Hun,  607), 

165. 
Miller  v.  Railroad  Co.  (88  Ga.  563, 

15  S.  E.  Rep.  316,  30  Am.  St. 

Rep.    170,    18   L.    R.    A.    323), 

714,   859,   860,   861. 
Miller  v.  Railroad  (90  N.  Y.  430), 

160. 
Miller  v.  Railroad  Co.    (85  N.  Y. 


Supp.  883,  89  App.  Div.  457), 
1041. 

Miller  v.  Railroad  Co.  (33  S.  Car. 

359,  9  L.  R.  A.  833),  235. 
Miller   v.   Railroad   Co.    (83   Tex. 

518,  18  S.  W.  954),  867. 
Miller    v.    Railway    Co.    (62    Mo. 

App.    252),    625,   630. 
Miller    Grain    &    Elevator    Co.    v. 

Railway  Co.   (138  Mo.  658,  40 

S.  W.  894).  226. 
Miller  v.  St.  Nav.  Co.    (10  N.  Y. 

431;  13  Barb.  361),  280. 
Miller  v.  Steamboat  Co.  (73  Hun, 

150,  25  N.  Y.  Supp.  924),  942. 
Miller  v.  Steamboat  Co.  (12  N.  Y. 

Supp].  301),  972. 
Miller  v.   Steamship  Co.    (118  N. 

Y.  200),  895,  911. 
Milliman   v.   Railroad    (66   N.   Y. 

642),    969,    974,    1230. 
Mills  V.  Armstrong  (13  App.  Cas. 

1),  1238. 
Mills  V.  Ball   (2  Bos.  &  P.  457), 

758,  772. 
Mills  V.  Railroad   (45  N.  Y.  622), 

131,    134,    457. 
Mills  V.  Railway  Co.  (94  Tex.  244, 

59  S.  W.  874,  55  L.  R.  A.  497, 

reversing   (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  57 

S.  W.  291),  1032,  1033,  1179, 

1182. 

Mills  V.  Weir  (81  N.  Y.  Supp.  801, 
App.  Div.  396),  233,  408. 

Milne  v.  Douglas  (4  McCrary, 
368),  259. 

Milnor  v.  Railroad  (53  N.  Y.  363), 
238,   261,   1050,   1302. 

Milroy  v.  Railway  Co.  (98  Iowa, 
188,  67  N.  W.  276),  611,  1051. 

Miltenberger  v.  Beacom  (9  Penn. 
St.  198),  783. 


clxviii 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED, 


[rkferences  are 

Miltimore    v.    Railroad    (37    Wis. 

190),  333. 
Milward  v.  Hibbert   (3  Ad.  &  El. 

(N.  S.)  120),  605. 
Mina  v.   Steamship  Co.    (23   Fed. 

Rep.   913).  651. 
Minahan  v.  Railway  Co.  (138  Fed. 

37),   1414. 
Miner  v.  Railroad   (32  Conn.  91), 

809,  810. 
Minish   v.    Railway    Co.    (135    N. 

Car.  342,  47  S.  E.  Rep.  432), 

1056. 
Minnehaha,    The    (1   Lush.    335), 

92. 
Minock  v.  Railway  Co.   (97  Mich. 

425,  56  N.  W.  780),  1123. 
Minor  v.  Railroad   Co.    (47  N.  Y. 

Supp.  307,  21  App.  Div.  307), 

1126. 
Minter  v.  The  Railroad    (41  Mo. 

503),   1250. 
Minter   v.   Railroad    Co.    (56    Mo. 

App.  282),  462. 
Minter    v.    Railway    Co.    (82    Mo. 

App.  130),  419. 
Mississippi    Railroad    Commission 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (78  Miss.  750, 

29  So.  789),  574. 
Missouri  Coal  Co.  v.  Railroad  (35 

Mo.  84),  111,  121. 
Missouri    Furnace    Co.    v.    Abend 

(107  III.  44),  1418. 
In  re  Missouri  Steamship  Co.  (42 

Ch.  D.  321,  58  L.  J.  Ch.    (N. 

S.)    721,  61  L.  T.  N.  S.  316), 

212,   214,  220 
Missouri    &    111.    Railroad    Tie    & 

Lumber    Co.    v.    Railway    Co. 

(1  Int.  Com.  Rep.  30),  526. 
Mitchel  V.  Ede  (11  Ad.  &  El.  888), 

193,  736,  1318. 
Mitchell  V.  Clinton   (99  Mo.  153), 

1417. 
Mitchell  V.  Express  Co.  (46  Iowa, 

214),  1355. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Mitchell  V.  Railroad  Co.   (87  Cal. 

62),  1199. 
Mitchell  V.  The  Railroad   (68  Ga. 

644),    419,    1332. 
Mitchell  V.  Railroad   (30  Ga.  22), 

1116. 
Mitchell  V.  Railroad  Co.   (124  N. 

Car.  236,  32   S.  E.  671,  44  L. 

R.    A.    515),    449,    1353,    1354, 

1357. 
Mitchell  V.  Railway   (L.  R.  10  Q. 

B.  256),  708,  714. 
Mitchell  V.  Railway  Co.  (51  Mich. 

236),  1123,  1418. 
Mitchell  V.  Railway  Co.   (77  Miss. 

917,   27    So.    834),    1045,   1065. 
Mitchell    V.     United     States     (21 

Wall    350),    322. 
Mitchell  V.  Weir   (45  N.  Y.  Supp. 

1085,  19  App.  Div.  183,  aff'g., 

43  N.  Y.  Supp.  1123),  1363. 
Moakler  v.  Railway  Co.   (18  Ore. 

189),   1196,   1214. 
Modern  Match  Co.  v.  Railroad  Co. 

(—  Mich.  — ,  104  N.  W.  Rep. 

19),   1348. 
Moeller  v.  Young  (5  El.  &  B.  755), 

807. 
Moffatt   Commission   Co.   v.   Rail- 
road Co.   ( —  Mo.  App.  — ,88 

S.  W.  Rep.  117),  298. 
Moffatt  V.   Tenney    (17   Colo.   189, 

30  Pac.  Rep.  348),  1400. 
Mohney    v.    Cook    (26    Penn.    St. 

342),    1233. 
Mohr  V.  Railway   (40  Iowa,  579), 

702. 
Monaghan    v.    Horn    (7    S.    C.    R. 

(Can.)   409),  1384. 
Monnier  v.  Railroad   Co.    (175   N. 

Y.  281,  67  N.  E.  569,  96  Am. 

St.    Rep.    619,    62    L.    R.    A. 

357,  reversing  75  N.  Y.  Supp. 

521.   70  App.   Div.  405),   1090. 
Montagu    v.    Janverin    (3    Taunt. 

442),  39. 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


clxix 


[references  are 

Montague  v.  The  Henry  B.  Hyde 

(82    Fed.    681;    affirmed,    The 

Henry   B.   Hyde  90   Fed.   115, 

32  C.  C.  A.  534,  61  U.  S.  App. 

147),   210,   449. 
Montgomery  v.  The  Port  Adelaide 

(38    Fed.    753),    698. 
Montgomery  v.  United  States  (15 

Wail.  395),  322. 
Moore  v.  Am.  Trans.  Co.  (24  How. 

1),  345. 
Moore  v.  Hill  (38  Fed.  Rep.  330), 

792. 
Moore  v.  Railroad  Co.   (173  Mass. 

335,   53   N.  E.  816),  1348. 
Moore  v.  Railroad   (4  Gray,  465), 

1033,  1084. 
Moore  v.  Railroad    (3  Mich.   23), 

280. 
Moore  v.  Railway   (L.  R.  8  Q.  B. 

36),  1100. 
Moore   v.   Railway   Co.    (L.   R.   10 

Ir.  Com.  L.  65),  341. 
Moore  v.   Railway   Co.    (69   Iowa, 

491),   895. 
Moore  v.  Railroad  Co.   (41  W.  Va. 

160,  23  S.  E.  Rep.  539),  1056. 
Moore  v.  Railroad  Co.   (115  Mich. 

103,   72   N.   W.   1112),   1217. 
Moore  v.  Railroad  Co.   (119  Mich. 

605,  613,  78  N.  W.  666),  1111. 
Moore   v.   Railroad   Co.    (103   Va. 

189,  48   S.  E.  Rep.  887),  668. 
Moore    v.    Railway    Co.    (67    Ark. 

389,  55  S.  W.  161),  997,  1017. 
Moore   v.    Railway    Co.    (102    Ga. 

302,  29  S.  E.  Rep.  865),  1054. 
Moore   v.    Railway    Co.    (18   Tex. 

Civ.  App.  561,  45  S.  W.  609), 

1049. 
Moore  v.  Shreveport   (3  La.  Ann. 

645),    1418. 
Moore  &  Co.  v.   Cornwall    ( —  C. 

C.  A.  — ,  144  Fed.  22),  366. 
Moore  &  Co.  v.  United  States  (38 

Ct.   CI.   590),   846. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Moore  et  al.  v.  Wilson   (1  Term, 

659),  1310. 
Moorman  v.  Railway  Co.  (105  Mo. 

App.  711,  78  S.  W.  Rep.  1089), 

1118. 
Moorsom  v.  Bell    (2  Camp.  616), 

832. 
Moran  v.  Packet  Co,   (35  Me.  55), 

1277. 
Moran  Bros.   Co.  v.  Railroad   Co. 

(19   Wash.   266,   53   Pac.  Rep. 

49,   1101),   799,   805. 
Mordecai    v.    Lindsey    (79    U.    S. 

417,  18  L.  Ed.  486),  864. 
More  V.  Lott  (13  Nev.  376),  768. 
Morel  V.   Insurance  Co.    (4  Bush, 

536),   1209. 
Moreland    v.    Railroad     Co.      (141 

Mass.  31),  941. 
Morgan  v.  Coal  Co.  (113  Fed.  520), 

842. 
Morgan  v.   Durfee    (69  Mo.   469), 

1397,   1400. 
Morgan  v.  Ide  (8  Cush.  420),  780. 
Morgan  v.  Railroad  Co.  ( —  Penn. 

St.  — ,  16  Atl.  Rep.  353),  1186. 
Morgan  v.  Railroad  Co.   (52  N.  J. 

L.  60,  588),  1024. 
Morgan  v.  Railway  Co.   ( —  Mich. 

— ,  101  N.  W.  Rep.  836,  70  L. 

R.  A.  609),  1198,  1199. 
Morgan  v.  Saks  ( —  Ala.  — ,  38  So. 

Rep.   848),   100. 
Morganton    Mfg.    Co.    v.    Railway 

Co.  (121  N.  Car.  474,  28  S.  E. 

Rep.    474,    61    Am.    St.    Rep. 

679),  1348 
Morhard   v.   Railroad   Co.    (98    N. 

Y.   Supp.   124),   1401. 
Moriarty  v.  Express  Co.   (1  Daly, 

227),   457. 
Morison  v.  Railroad  Co.   (8  N.  Y. 

Suppl.    436),    1111. 
Morley  v.  Hay  (3  M.  &  Ryl.  396), 

872. 
Mormonstein  v.  Railro?d  Co.    (31 


clxx 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


[BEFEBENCES    ABE 

N.  Y.  Supp.  97,  13  Misc.  32), 

1256. 
Morningstar  v.  Railroad  Co.   (135 

Ala.    251,    33    So.    156),    1044, 

1045. 
Morris   v.   Piatt    (32    Conn.    75), 

1430. 
Morris  v.  Railroad  Co.  (11  Ky.  L. 

R.    698,   12   S.   W.   Rep.   940), 

1389. 
Morris  v.  Railroad  Co.  (106  N.  Y. 

678),  920. 
Morris  v.  Railroad  Co.  (116  N.  Y. 

552),  1077. 
Morris  v.  Railway  Co.   (65  Iowa, 

727),   1388. 
Morris  v.  Railway  Co.    (73   Hun, 

560,  26  N.  Y.  Supp.  342),  1019. 
Morris  v.  The  Alvah  (59  Fed.  630; 

reversed.  The  Alvah,  77  Fed. 

315,  23  C.  C.  A.  181),  635. 

Morris  v.  Wier    (46   N.   Y.   Supp. 

'     413,  20  Misc.   586),  451,   1352. 

In    re   Morrison    (147    U.    S.    34), 

344. 
Morrison  v.  Construction  Co.   (44 

Wis.   405),  408,  419. 
Morrison  v.   Davis    (20   Penn.   St. 

171,   201),   267,   282,   298,   302, 

303,  309. 
Morrison    v.    Railway    (56    N.    Y. 

302),   1174,  1180,  1229. 
Morrison  v.  Railroad  Co.    (56   N. 

Y.  367),  1197,  1198. 
Morrow  v.   Pullman  Car  Co.    (98 

Mo.  App.  351,  73  S.  W.  281), 

1131,   1132,   1133. 
Morrow   v.   Railway   Co.    (134   N. 

Car.  92,  46  S.  E.  Rep.  12),  991, 

1180,    1181. 
Morse  v.   Evans    (14  Barb.   524), 

401. 

Morse  v.  Railroad  (10  Barb.  621), 
1422. 

Morse  v.  Railway  Co.  (97  Me.  77, 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

53    Atl.    874),    401,    419,    449, 

1355. 
Morse   v.    Slue    (1    Ventris,    190), 

74,  316,  390. 
Mortland  v.  Railroad  Co.  (81  Hun, 

473,    30    N.    Y.    Supp.    1021), 

1291. 
Morville  v.  Railway    (10  Eng.  L. 

&  E.  366),  407. 
Mosely  v.  Lord  (2  Conn.  389),  61. 
Moses   v.   Norris    (3    N.    H.    304), 

53. 
Moses  v.  Packet  Co.  (88  Fed.  329), 

347,   1072. 
Moses    v.    Railroad    Co.    (73    Ga. 

356),  1054. 
Moses    v.    Railroad    Co.     (39    La. 

Ann.   649),   936. 
Moses  V.  Railroad  (24  N.  H.  71), 

70,  72,  414,  438,  441. 
Moses  V.  Railroad  (32  N.  H.  523), 

704,  713. 
Moses  V.   Railroad   Co.    (5   Wash. 

595,  32  Pac.  488),  867. 
Mosher    v.    Express    Co.    (38    Ga. 

37),   230,   236. 
Mosher  v.  Railroad  Co.  (127  U.  S. 

390),  1053,  1054. 
Moss    V.    Bettis    (4    Heisk.    661), 

52,  54. 
Moszkowitz  V.  Navigation  Co.   (84 

N.  Y.  Supp.  297),  1303. 
Mote  V.  Railroad    (27   Iowa,   22), 

1291. 
Mott  V.   Frost    (47  Fed.   82),   839. 
Moulton  V.  Railway  Co.  (31  Minn. 

85),    336,    339,    341,    419,    425, 

426. 
Mount  V.  Larkins   (8  Bing.  108), 

307. 
Mt.  Vernon  Co.  v.  Railroad  (8  S. 

Rep.  687),  112. 
Mouton  V.  Railroad  Co.   (128  Ala. 

537,    29    So.    Rep.    602),    475, 

1354. 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


clxxi 


[eefeeences 

Mowrey    v.    Railway    (51    N.    Y. 

666),  1227. 
Moynahan  v.  Moore   (9  Mich.  9), 

887. 
Muddle  V.  Stride  (9  C.  &  P.  380), 

1355,   1356. 
Mudgett  V.  Steamboat  Co.  (1  Daly, 

•  151),  1271,  1272, 
Mueller'  v.   Ferry  Co.    (61   N.   Y. 

Supp.  986,  46  App.  Div.  560), 

942. 
Mueller  v.  Railway  Co.  (75  Minn. 

109,    77    N.    W.    566),    1056. 
Mugler  V.  Kansas  (123  U.  S.  623), 

325. 
Muhl  V.  Railway  Co.  (10  Ohio  St. 

276),  1395. 
Mulcahey  v.  Wheel  Co.  (145  Mass. 

.   281),   1386,   1399. 
Mulcairns  v.  Janesville   (67  Wis. 

24),   1397,   1399. 
Mulhado    v.    Railroad    (30    N.   Y. 

370),  1118. 
Mulligan    v.    Curtis     (100    Mass. 

512),  1228. 
Mulligan    v.    Railway    (36    Iowa, 

181),   231,   401,   408. 
Muldoon  V.  Railway  Co.  7  Wash. 

528,   35  Pac.  422,   38  Am.   St. 

Rep.  901,  22  L.  R.  A.  794;  s.  c. 

10    Wash.    311,    38    Pac.    995, 

45  Am.  St.  Rep.  787),  1075. 
Mulhall  V.  Fallon   (176  Mass.  266, 

57  N.  E.  386,  79  Am.  St.  Rep. 

309),   1389,    1395. 
Mullan  V.  Railroad  Co.  (46  Minn. 

474,   49   N.   W.   249),   980. 
Mullen   V.   Railway   Co.    ( —  Tex. 

Civ.  App.  — ,   92   S.  W.  Rep., 

1000),  1217. 
Mulligan  v.  Railway  Co.   (129  N. 

Y.  506,  29  N.  E.  952,  26  Am. 

St.  Rep.  539,  14  L.  R.  A.  791, 

reversing  14  N.  Y.  Supp.  456), 

1099,  1100. 
Mulvana  v.  The  Anchoria  (77  Fed. 


ARE    TO    SECTIONS.] 

994;    affirmed,  The  Anchoria, 

83  Fed.  847),  957. 
Mumford    v.     Insurance    Co.     (5 

John.  262),  826. 
Munal   V.   Brown    (70   Fed.    967), 

1386. 
Munos  V.   So.   Pac.   Co.    (51   Fed. 

188,  2  C.  C.  A.  163),  1396. 
Munn  V.  Baker   (2  Starkie,  255), 

464. 
Munn  V.   Illinois    (94  U.   S.  113), 

574,  1023. 
Munro   v.    Dredging   Co.    (84    Cal. 

515,   24   Pac.   303,    18   Am.   St. 

Rep.   248),   1386,   1398. 
Munro  v.  Pacific  Co.  (84  Cal.  515),, 

1398. 
Munroe     v.     Philadelphia     Ware- 
house Co.   (75  Fed.  545),  176. 
Murch  V.  Railroad  Co.    (29  N.  H. 

9),  916,  940,  963,  964. 
Murdock    v.    Railroad     Co.      (133 

Mass.  15),  1428. 
Murdock    v.    Railroad     Co.      (137 

Mass.    293),   1062,   1065,   1066, 

1067. 
Murphy  v.  Railroad  Co,   (23  Fed, 

Rep.  637),  972. 
Murphy    v.    Railroad     (29    Conn. 

496),  1386. 
Murphy  v.   Railroad   Co.    (89   Ga. 

832,   15   S.  E.  Rep.   774),   927. 
Murphy  v.  Railroad  Co.  (45  Iowa, 

661),  1418. 
Murphy  v.  Railway  Co.  (118  Mass. 

228),    978,    1090,    1091. 
Murphy  v.  Railroad   Co.    (43  Mo. 

App.    342),    1005,    1015,    1181. 
Murphy  v.  Railroad  Co.  (88  N.  Y. 

445),   1397. 
Murphy  v.  Railroad  Co.  (92  N.  Y. 

Supp.   192),   990. 
Murphy  v.  Railroad  Co.   (56  Hun, 

645,  10  N.  Y.  Supp.  354),  1118. 
Murray  v.  Insurance  Co.   (4  Biss. 

417),   801, 


clxxii 


TABLE  OF   CASES   CITED. 


[references  are  to  sections.] 
Murray  v.  Lardner  (2  Wall.  110), 


176. 
Murray  v.  Railroad  Co.  (66  Conn. 

512,  34   Atl.   506,   32  L.   R.  A. 

539),   895,  915,   918,   922. 
Murray  v.  Railroad  Co.  (93  N.  C. 

92),    1228. 
Murray  v.  Railway  Co.    (101  Mo. 

236),  1417. 
Murray   v.  Railroad   Co.    (31   La. 

Ann.  490),  1391. 
Murray  v.  Railway  Co.   (92  Fed. 

868,  35  C.  C.  A.  62,  aff'g.,  62 

Fed.  24),  521. 
Murray    v.    Steamship     Co.     (170 

Mass.   166,  48  N.  E.  1093,   64 

Am.  St.  Rep.  290),  72,  112. 
Murray  v.  Usher  (117  N.  Y.  542), 

1397. 
Murray  v.  Warner  (55  N.  H.  546), 

■      727. 
Murrell   v.  Express  Co.    (54  Ark. 

22),    1366,    1367. 
Muschamp  v.  Railway  (8  M.  &  W. 

421),   228. 
Muser  v.  Express  Co.  (1  Fed.  Rep. 

382),  433. 
Muser    v.     Holland     (17    Blatch. 

412),   426. 
Myers  v.  Baymore   (10  Penn.  St. 

114),  790,  791. 
Myers  v.  Holborn  (58  N.  J.  L.  193, 

33  Atl.  Rep.  389),  1384. 
Myers  v.  Railroad   Co.    (88   Hun, 

619,  34  N.  Y.  Supp.  807;  s.  c. 

82    Hun,    36,    31   N.   Y.    Supp. 

153),   1181,  1182. 
Myers  v.  Railway  Co.  (90  Mo.  98), 

419. 
Myers  v.  Railway  Co.  (64  S.  Car. 

514,  42  S.  E.  Rep.  598),  1045. 
Myerson  v.  Woolverton  (29  N.  Y. 

Supp.  737,  9  Misc.  186),  1348. 
Mykleby  v.  Railway  Co.  (39  Minn. 

54),  1084,  1433. 


Mynard  v.  Railroad  (7  Hun,  309), 

454. 
Mynard  v.  Railroad  Co.  (71  N.  Y. 

180),  402,  454,  463. 
Myres  v.  Diamond   Joe  Line   (58 

Mo.  App.   199),   268. 
Myrick  v.  Railroad  Co.  (107  U.  S. 

102),   187,   231,  232,   233,   237, 

243. 
Mytton  V.  Railway  (4  Hurl.  &  N. 

615),    229,    472,    1296. 


N 


Nagle   V.   Railroad   Co.    (88    CaL 

86),   1187. 
Naglee   v.   Railroad    Co.    (83    Va. 

707),   918. 
Nance  v.  Railroad  Co.    (94  N.  C. 

619),  1118. 
Nanson    v.    Jacob    (12    Mo.    App. 

125),  247. 
Nash    V.    Railway    Co.    (136    Ala. 

177,    33    So.    932,    96   Am.    St. 

Rep.  19),  994,  1083,  1417. 
Nash    V.    Tousley    (28    Minn.    5), 

1389. 
Nathan  v.   Giles    (5  Taunt.   558), 

175. 
Nathan  Bros.  v.  Shivers   (71  Ala. 

117),  889. 
National  Bank  v.  Merchant's  Bank 

(91  U.   S.   92),   185. 
National  Bank  v.  Railroad  Co.  (44 

Minn.  224,  46  N.  W.  Rep.  566), 

161. 
National   Bank  v.  Walbridge    (19 

Ohio  St.  419),  158. 
Nat'l  Bank  of  Bristol  v.  Railroad 

Co.   (99  Md.  661,  59  Atl.  Rep. 

134,    105    Am.    St.   Rep.    321), 

175,  201,  207. 


TABLE  OP   CASES   CITED. 


clxxiii 


[references  are 

National    Bank   of    Commerce   v. 

Railway    Co.    (44    Minn.    224, 

46    N.    W.    Rep.    342,    560,    20 

Am.  St.  Rep.  566,  9  L.  R.  A. 

263),  161. 
National  Bank  of  Phoenixville  v. 

Railroad    (163  Pa.  St.  467,  30 

Atl.  228),  192. 
National     Commercial     Bank     v. 

Transportation  Co.   (69  N.  Y. 

Supp.  396,  59  App.  Div.  270; 

affirmed,   no    opinion,    172    N. 

Y.    596,    64   N,   E.    1123),    182, 

777. 
National  Newark  Banking  Co.  v. 

Railroad  Co.    (70  N.  J.  Law, 

774,  58  Atl.  Rep.  311,  103  Am. 

St.  Rep.  825,  66  L.  R.  A.  595), 

184. 
National  Steamship  Co.  v.  Smart 

(107  Penn.  492),  702,  714. 
Navigation  Co.  v.  Bank   (6  How. 

344),   487,   1355. 
Navigation  Co.  v.  Farr  &  Bailey 

Mfg.  Co.   (81  U.  S.  218,  45  L. 

Ed.   830,   21    Sup.   Ct.   R.  591, 

aff'g.,  Farr  &  Bailey  Mfg.  Co. 

V.  Navigation  Co.  98  Fed.  636, 

39   C.   C.   A.   197  and  94   Fed. 

675),  363,  367,  373,  380. 
In  re  Navigation  &  Imp.  Co.  (110 

Fed.  670),  1414. 
Navigation  Co.  ads.  Morse  (L.  R. 

4  P.  C.  222),  792. 
Navigation    Co.    v.    Marshall    (48 

Ind.  596),  721. 
Navigation   Co.   v.  Wood    (3   Esp. 

127),  75,  275. 
Naylor  v.  Dennie    (8   Pick.   199), 

175. 
Neaffie,  The   (1  Abb.  U.   S.  465), 

92. 
Neal   V.   Gillette    (23   Conn.   436), 

309. 
Neal  V.  Railroad  (8  Jones  (Law), 

482),   685,  702,  720. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Neal    V.    Railway    Co.    (3    Penne. 

467,   53  Atl.  Rep.   338),   1391, 

1397. 
Nealand    v.     Railroad     Co.     (161 

Mass.  67,  36  N.  E.  592),  1286, 

1291. 
Nebenzahl    v.     Fargo     (3    N.    Y. 

Suppl.  929),   668. 
Nebraska    City    v.     Campbell     (2 

Black,  590),  1423. 
Nebraska  Meal  Mills  v.  Railroad 

Co.    (64    Ark.    169,    41    S.   W. 

810,  62  Am.   St.  Rep.   183,  38 

L.  R.  A.  358),  177. 
Nebraska    Tel.    Co.    v.    State    (55 

Neb.    627,    76    N.    W.    171.    45 

L.  R.  A.  113),  95. 
Needham  v.  Railroad  Co.  (37  Cal. 

410),   1420. 
Needham  v.  Railway  Co.   (38  Vt. 

294),  1387. 
Negaubauer    v.    Railway   Co.    (92 

Minn.  184,  99  N.  W.  Rep.  620, 

104  Am.   St.  Rep.  674),   1396. 
Nehrbas  v.  Railroad  Co.   (62  Cal. 

320),  1397,  1417. 
Neil    V.    Express    Co.    (Rap.    Jud. 

Que.  20  C.  S.  253),  233. 
Neilson  v.  Coal,  etc.,  Co.  (122  Fed. 

617,    60    C.    C.    A.    175,    aff'g.. 

The    Nellie    Floyd,    116    Fed. 

80),  366,   371. 
Neilsen   v.   Jesup    (30   Fed.   Rep. 

138),  807. 
Neimeyer  Lumber  Co.  v.  Railroad 

Co.    (54    Neb.    321,    74    N.   W. 

670,  40  L.  R.  A.  534),  759. 
Neish  V.  Graham  (8  El.  &  B.  505), 

877. 
Nellis  V.  Railroad  (30  N.  Y.  505), 

1033. 
Nelson  v.  Dahl    (12  Ch.  D.  583), 

848,  849. 
Nelson  v.  Lighting  Co.   (75  Conn. 

548,   54   Atl.  Rep.   303).   1397, 

1401. 


clxxiv 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


[references  are 

Nelson  v.  Mackintosh  (1  Starkie, 

337),  23,  34. 
Nelson  v.  Railroad  (7  Hun,  140), 

1079,   1082. 
Nelson   v.   Railroad    Co.    (68   Mo. 

593),  1177. 
Nelson  v.  Railroad  (48  N.  Y.  498), 

108,  139,  475. 
Nelson  v.  Railroad  Co.   (50  N.  Y. 

Supp.  63,  25  App.  Div.  535), 

1411. 
Nelson  v.  Railroad  Co.    (78  Tex. 

621),  1389. 
Nelson  v.  Railroad  Co.   (18  Utah, 

244,  55  Pac.  364;  s.  c.  15  Utah, 

325,  49  Pac.  Rep.  644),  1203. 
Nelson   v.   Railroad    Co.    (88    Va. 

971,  14  S.  E.  Rep.  838,  15  L. 

R.  A.  583),  1388. 
Nelson    v.    Railroad    Co    (26    Vt 

717),  915,   918. 
Nelson  v.  Railway  Co.  (104  Mich. 

582.  62  N.  W.  Rep.  993),  1397, 

1401. 
Nelson  v.  Railway  Co.   (28  Mont. 

297,    72    Pac.    642),    292,    429, 

450,  1328. 
Nelson    v.    Woodruff     (1    Black, 

156),  163. 
Nemecek  v.   Filer   &   Stowell   Co. 

(—  Wis.  — ,  105  N.  W.  Rep. 

225),  1389. 
Nenno  v.  Railroad  Co.   (105  Mo. 

App.  540,  80  S.  W.  Rep.  24), 

201,  207. 
Nesbit  V.  Garner  (75  Iowa,  314), 

1236. 
Nesbitt  V.  Lushington    (4  Term, 

783),  317. 
Nesbitt  V.  Railway  Co.  (22  Wash. 

698,  61  Pac.  Rep.  141),  1389. 
Neville  v.  Railway  Co.    (158  Mo. 

293,  59  S.  W.  123),  1217. 
Nevin  v.  Car  Co.    (106   111.   222). 

1139. 


TO    SECTIONS,] 

Nevins  v.  Bay  State  Steamboat  Co. 

(4  Bosw.  225),  1052,  1249. 
Nevius  V.  Railway  Co.    (124  Wis. 

313,    102    N.    W.    Rep.    489), 

450. 
Newcomb  v.  Railroad   (115  Mass. 

230),  191. 
Newcomb    v.    Railroad    Co.     (182 

Mo.  687,  81  S.  W.  1069),  935, 

1129,    1179. 
Newbury  v.  Railroad  Co.   (25  Vt. 

377),  1379. 
Newell    V.    Smith    (49    Vt.    255), 

226,  415,  1366. 
Newhall     v.     Railroad     (51     Cal. 

345),   758,   762. 
Newhall   v.   Vargas    (13   Me.   93), 

759,  771,  772. 
New  Jersey,   etc.,   Co.   v.   Nichols 

33  N.  J.  L.  434),  1417. 
N.  J.  Nav.  Co.  V  Merchants'  Bank 

(6    How.    344),    82,    281,    401, 

457,  477,  489,  504,   608;    1306. 
New  Orleans  Ins.  Co.  v.  Railroad 

(20  La.  Ann.  302),  401. 
Newlin  v.  Railway  Co.  (127  Iowa, 

654,    103    N.    W.     Rep.     999), 

1177. 
New     Philadelphia,     Steamer     (1 

Black,  62),  92. 
Newport  News  &  Miss.  Valley  Co. 

V.   McDonald   Brick  Co.'s  As- 
signee (22  Ky.  L.  Rep.  934,  59 

S.  W.   332),   600. 
Newport  News  &  M.  V.  R.  Co.  v. 

Mercer  (96  Ky.  475,  29  S.  W. 

301),   1366. 
Newport  News,  etc.,  Co.  v.  United 

States  (61  Fed.  488,  9  C.  C.  A. 

579,   22  U.   S.  App.   145),   638. 
Newton  v  Railroad  Co.   (80  Hun, 

491,  30  N.  Y.  Supp.  488),  952, 

1217,   1230. 
New  Union  Mill   Co.   v.   Railway 

Co.    (2   Q.    B.    (1896)    290,    65 

L.  J.  Q.  B.  493),  522. 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


clxxv 


[BEFERENCES    ABE 

New   World   v.    King     (15    How. 

469),  11,  895. 
New   York,   etc.,   Railway  v.   Gal- 

laher    (—  Tex.  — ,   15   S.  W. 

Rep.  694),  1334. 
Niagara,   Propeller  v.  Cordes   (21 

How.  7),  74,  75,  311,  497,  645. 
Niblo  V.  Binsse  (44  Barb.  54),  280. 
Nicholas  v.   Railroad   Co.    (89   N. 

Y.   370),   402,   463. 
Nicholas  v.  Railway  Co.  (78  Minn. 

43,  80  N.  W.  Rep.  776),  1388. 
Nichols  V.  Eddy   (Tex.  Civ.  App. 

24  S.  W.  Rep.  316),   1375. 
Nichols  V.   Railroad    Co.    (23    Or. 

123,   31  Pac.  296,  37  Am.   St. 

Rep.    664,    18    L.    R.    A.    55), 

1049,  1056. 
Nichols  V.  Railroad  Co.  (24  Utah, 

83,    66    Pac,    768,    91   Am.    St. 

Rep.  778),  226,  241,  495,  520. 
Nichols    V.    Railroad    (38     N.     Y. 

131),  1118. 
Nichols  V.  Railway  Co.  (68  Iowa, 

732),  1177. 
Nichols  V.  Railway  Co.  (90  Mich. 

203,  51  N.  W.  364),  1126,  1128. 
Nichols  V.  Railway  Co.    (7  Utah, 

510,  27  Pac.   693),   1082. 
Nichols  V.  Smith  (115  Mass.  332), 

77. 
Nicholson   v.   Railway    (5    C.    B. 

366),  521,  522. 
Nicholson    v.    Railway    Co.     (114 

Fed.  89,  52  C.  C.  A.  37),  1118. 
Nicholson  v.  Railway  (3  H.  &  C. 

534),   936. 
Nicholson  v.  Willan  (5  East,  507), 

391,  439,  441. 
Nickey   v.    Railway   Co.    (35   Mo. 

App.  79),  741. 
Nickles  v.  Railway  Co.  ( —  S.  Car. 

— ,    54   S.   E.   Rep.   255),   949, 

1073. 
Nicholls  V.  Bastard   (2  Cromp.  M. 

&  R.  659),  1306. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Nicollette  Lumber  Co.  v.  Railroad 

Co.    (—  Penn.  St.  — ,  62  Atl. 

Rep.  1060),  862. 
Nieto  V.  Clark  (1  Cliff.  145),  972, 

1161. 
Nightingale  v.  Union  Colliery  Co. 

(9   B.   C.  R.   453,  2   Canadian 

Ry.  Cases,  47),  964,  1000. 
Nill    V.    Sturgeon    (28    Mo.    328), 

483. 
Nine    Thousand    Dry     Hides     (6 

Ben.   199),   812. 
Nines  v.  Railway  Co.  (107  Mo.  475, 

18   S.  W.   26),  234. 
Niver  Coal  Co.  v.   Steamship  Co. 

(—  C.  C.  A.  — ,  142  Fed.  402, 

aff'g    Steamship    Co.    v.    2000 

Tons  of  Coal,   124  Fed.  937), 

833,  841. 
Noble    V.    Railroad    Co.     (4    Okl. 

534,  46  Pac.  483),  1060. 
Noble   V.   Seattle    (19   Wash.   133, 

52  Pac.  Rep.  1013,  40  L.  R.  A. 

822),  1389. 
Noble's  Explosives  Co.  v.  Jenkins 

(2  Q.  B.   (1896)   326,  65  L.  J. 

Q.  B.  638),  323. 
Noden  v.  Johnson  (16  Q.  B.  218), 

1164. 
Nohrden    v.   Railway   Co.    (54    S. 

Car.  492,  32  S.  B.  Rep.  524), 

1400. 
Nolan  v.  Railroad  Co,    (87  N.  Y. 

63),  1197,  1198. 
Nolton  V.  Railroad  (15  N.  Y.  444), 

962,    1017. 
Nord-Deutscher    Lloyd    v.     Presi- 
dent,   etc.,    of    Insurance    Co. 

(110  Fed.  420,  49  C.  C.  A.  1, 

aff'g..  Insurance  Co.  v.  North 

German    Lloyd    Co.    106   Fed. 

973),   120,   350,   364,   380. 
Nordemeyer  v.  Loescher   (1  Hilt. 

499).  867. 
Norman  v.  Binnington    (25  Q.  B. 

Div.    475),    464,    492. 


clxxvi 


TABLE   OP    CASES    CITED, 


[REFERENCES    ABE 

Norman   v.    Railway    Co.    (65    S. 

Car.    517,    44    S.    E.    Rep.    83, 

95   Am.    St.   Rep.    809),    1028, 

1043. 
Normile  v.  R.  &  Nav.  Co.  (41  Or. 

177,    69    Pac.    928),    426,    428, 

449,  643,  708,  1353. 
Normile  v.  Railway  Co.  (36  Wash. 

21,    77   Pac.   Rep.   1087),    664, 

708,  709. 
Norris    v.    Litchfield    (35    N.    H. 

271),   1233. 
Norris    v.   Railway    Co.    (23    Fla. 

182),   271,   282. 
North  V.  Transportation  Co.   (146 

Mass.  316),  130,  140. 
North  American  Trans.  &  Trading 

Co.    V.    Morrison    (178    U.    S. 

262,   44  L.   Ed.   1061,  20   Sup. 

Ct.  R.  869),  1426. 
North     Carolina    Corp.     Commis- 
sion V.  Railroad  Co.    (137  N. 

Car.   1,    49    S.    E.   Rep.    191), 

1104. 
North  German  Lloyd  S.  S.  Co.  v. 

Bullen  (111  111.  App.  426),  72, 

113. 
North  German  Lloyd  v.  Heule  (44 

Fed.  Rep.  100),  807. 
Northern  v.  Williams  (6  La.  Ann. 

578),  688. 
Northern  Commercial  Co.  v.  Nes- 
tor  (138  Fed.  383),  985. 
Northern     Line     Packet     Co.     v. 

Shearer  (61  111.  263),  1310. 
Northey   v.    Field    (2    Esp.    613), 

420. 
Northwestern  Transp.  Co.  v.  Lei- 

ter  (107  Fed.  953,  47  C.  C.  A. 

97),    374. 
Norton   v.   Railway   Co.    (40   Mo. 

App.  642),  1414. 
Norway  Plains  Co.  v.  Railroad  (1 

Gray,  263),  76,  702,  1286. 
Norwich  Co.  v.  Wright  (13  Wall. 

104),  344. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Notara  v.  Henderson   (L.  R.  5  Q. 

B.    346;    L.   R.    7   Q.    B.   225), 

632,   648,   789. 
Nourse    v.    Packard     (138     Mass. 

307),   1386. 
Noyes  v.   Railroad    (27  Vt.   110), 

76,  226,  242. 
Nudd  V.  Wells  (11  Wis.  407),  652. 
Nugent  V.   Railroad   Co.    (80   Me. 

62),  918. 
Nugent  V.  Smith   (L.  R.   1  C.  P. 

Div.  19,  423),  49,  62,  275,  311. 
Nunn    V.    Railroad    Co.     (71     Ga. 

710),  1128. 
Nutter    V.    Railway    Co.     (25    Ky. 

Law  Rep.  1700,  78  S.  W.  Rep. 

470),   1036,  1065. 
Nutting  V.  Railroad  Co.  (1  Gray, 

502),  231,  233. 


Oakes  v.  Railroad  Co.  (95  Me.  103, 

49  Atl.  Rep.  418),  1397,  1398, 

1400. 
Oakes    v.   Railroad    Co.     (20    Or. 

392),  1249. 
Oakes  v.  Richardson   (2  Lowell's 

Dec.  173),  1370. 
Oakey  v.  Russell   (18  Mar.   (La.) 

58),  75. 
Oakley  v.   Packet   Co.    (11   Exch. 

618),  40. 
Gates    V.    Railway    Co.    (104   Mo. 

514),  1390. 
O'Banion  v.  Railway  Co.  (65  Kan. 

352,  69  Pac.  353),  990. 
O'Bannon  v.  Express  Co.  (51  Ala. 

481),   117. 
Ober  V.  Railroad  Co.  (13  Mo.  App. 

81),   1305. 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


clxxvii 


[references  are 

Oberndorfer   v.    Pabst    (100   Wis. 

505,  76  N.  W.  33S),  100. 
O'Breia    v.    Steamship    Co.    (154 

Mass.    272,    28    N.    E.   266,    13 

L.  R.  A.  329),  1163. 
O'Brien  v.  Miller  (168  U.  S.  303), 

344. 
O'Brien  v.   Norris    (16   Md.   122), 

175,  758. 
O'Brien  v.  Railroad  Co.  (15  Gray, 

20),    1001,    1079^   1082. 
O'Brien  v.  Railroad  Co.  (80  N.  Y. 

236),  1085. 
O'Brien    v.    Transit    Co.    ( —   Mo. 

App.  — ,  84  S.  W.  Rep.  939), 

1102. 
Och  V.  Railway  Co.    (130  Mo.  27, 

31  S.  W.  962,  36  L.  R.  A.  442), 

1414. 
O'Callahan  v.  Bode  (84  Cal.  489), 

1401. 
O'Carroll  v.  The  Havre   (45  Fed. 

Rep.  764),  1156. 
O'Clair  v.   Rhode   Island   Co.    (— 

R.    I.   — ,    63    Atl.    Rep.    238), 

1414. 
O'Connor    v.    Foster     (10    Watts, 

418),   1370. 
O'Dea  V.  Railroad  Co.    ( —  Mich. 

— ,  105  N.  W.  Rep.  746),  1118. 
Odell   V.   Railroad   Co.    (45   N.   Y. 

Supp.    464,    18   App.   Div.   12; 

affirmed  tvithout  opinion,  162 

N.    Y.    625,    57    N.    E.    1119), 

1001. 
Oderkirk  v.  Fargo   (61  Hun,  418, 

16   N.  Y.   Supp.  220;    s.  c.  58 

Hun,  347,  11  N.  Y.  Supp.  871), 

681,  684. 
Odom  V.  Railroad  Co.  (45  La.  Ann. 

1201,   14   So.   734,  23  L.  R.  A. 

152),    1118. 
O'Donnell  v.  Railroad  Co.  (19  Ky. 

Law  Rep.  1005,  42  S.  W.  Rep. 

846),  1194. 
O'Donnell    v.    Railroad    Co.     (59 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Penn.     St.     239),     947,     1004, 

1200. 
O'Donnell    v.    Railway    Co.     (106 

III.  App.  287),  1015. 
O'Dougherty      v.      Railroad       (1 

Thomp.  &  C.  477),  177. 
O'Fallon,  etc.,  Co.  v.  Laquest  (198 

111.   125,   64   N.  E.  Rep.   767), 

1397. 
Ogden  V.  Marshall   (8  N.  Y.  340), 

1370. 
Ogle  V.  Lane  (L.  R.  3  Q.  B.  272), 

1369. 
O'Gorman  v.  Railway  Co.   (89  N. 

Y.    Supp.    589,    96    App.    Div. 

594),  1077. 
O'Hanlon  v.  Railway  (6  Best  &  S. 

484),  1360. 
Ohio,  etc.,  Coal  Co.  v.  Smith,   (53 

Ohio   St.    313),    1386. 
Ohio  Coal  Co.  v.  Whitcomb   (123 

Fed.    359,    59    C.    C.    A.    487), 

539. 
Ohrloff  v.  Briscall   (L.  R.  1  P.  C. 

231),  1355. 
Oklahoma  Gas,  etc.,  Co.  v.  Lukert 

(—    Okl.    — ,    84    Pac.    Rep. 

1076),  1389. 
Olanta   Coal   Co.   v.   Railroad   Co. 

(144  Fed.   150),   144. 
O'Laughlin   v.   Railroad  Co.    (164 

Mass.  139,  41  N.  E.  121),  978. 
In  re  Old  Dominion  Steamship  Co. 

(115  Fed.   845),   344. 
Olds  V.  Railroad  Co.    (172   Mass. 

73,    51    N.    E.   450),    1217. 
Olds   V.   Railroad    Co.    (94   N.   Y. 

Supp.  924),  172,  641. 
Olivier   v.    Railroad    Co.    (43   La. 

Ann.    804,    9    So.    431),    1113, 

1197. 
Olivier  v.  Railroad  Co.  (134  Mich. 

367,   96   N.  W.   Rep.   434,   104 

Am.  St.  Rep.  607),  1386,  1397. 
Olmstead   v.    Burke    (25    111.    86), 

1367. 


clxxviii 


TABLE   OP    CASES    CITED, 


[references  are 

Olson  V.  Railroad  Co.    (45  Minn. 

536),  1067. 
Olson   V.   Railway    ( —  Minn.   — , 

102  N.  W.  Rep.  449),  1118. 
Olwell  V.  Express  Co.  (1  C.  L.  J. 

186),   401. 
O'Malley  v.  Railway  Co.  (86  Minn. 

580,  90  N.  W.  974),  401,  426, 

428. 
Omaha  v.  Bowman   (63  Neb.  333, 

88  N.  W.  Rep.  521),  1401. 
Onderdonk   v.    Bank    (119    N.    Y. 

263),  23. 
Onderdonk    v.    Railway    Co.     (74 

Hun,  42,  26  N.  Y.  Supp.  310), 

1118,  1174. 
One  Hundred  and  Fifty  Tons  of 

Coal     (4    Blatchf.    368),    869, 

871. 
O'Neill  V.  Garrett   (6  Iowa,  480), 

772. 
O'Neil  V.  Railroad  (60  N.  Y.  138), 

72,  112,  611,  1319. 
One  Hundred  and  One  Live  Stock 

Co.  V.  Railroad  Co.    (100  Mo. 

App.  674,  75  S.  W.  782),  430, 

442. 
Ontario  Bank  v.  Hanlon  (23  Hun, 

283),  155. 
Ontario    Bank   v.    Steamboat    Co. 

(59   N.  Y.   510),   196. 
Oppenheim  v.  Russell   (3   Bos.   & 

P.  42),  872. 
Oppenheimer  v.  Express  Co.    (69 

111.    62),    425,    426,    431,    434, 

441. 
Orange    Co.    Bank    v.    Brown    (3 

Wend.   158),  1325,   1350. 
Orange   Co.   Bank   v.    Brown     (9 

Wend.  85),  330.  332,  1246. 
Orange    Co.    Bank    v.    Brown    (9 

Wend.  115),  414,  441. 
Orange    County    Fruit    Exchange 

V.    Hubbell    (10    N.    Mex.    47. 

61   Pac.   121),   177. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Orcutt   V.   Railway   Co.    (85   Cal. 

291),  1420. 
O'Regan    v.    Steamship    Co.    (160 

Mass.  356.   35  N.  E.   1070,  39 

Am.    St.   Rep.   484),   212,   215, 

218.    1031. 
O'Reilly  v.  Railroad  Co.  (44  N.  Y. 

Supp.   264,    15   App.   Div.   79; 

s.  c.   4  App.   Div.   139,   38   N. 

Y.   Supp.   779),   937. 
O'Reilly  v.  Railroad  Co.  (16  R.  I. 

388,  17  Atl.  Rep.  171,  5  L.  R. 

A.   364),   1388. 
O'Reilly  v.   Stage    Co.    (87    Hun, 

406,  34  N.  Y.  Supp.  358),  1386. 
Orndorff  v.  Express  Co.   (3  Bush, 

194),   450. 
O'Rourke    v.     Railroad     Co.     (44 

Iowa,  526),  677. 
Orr  V.  Railroad  Co.   (21  Mo.  App. 

336),  234. 
Ortt    V.    Railway    Co.    (36    Minn. 

396),  232,  233. 
Osborn  v.   Gillett   (L.  R.  8  Exch. 

8),   1384. 
Osborn     v.     Railroad     Co.      (123 

Mich.  669,  82  N.  W.  526),  574, 

584. 
Osborn  v.  Railroad  Co.  (126  Mich. 

113,  85  N.  W.  466),  577. 
Osborne  v.  Railway  Co.    (48  Fed. 

49;    reversed.  Railway  Co.  v. 

Osborne,  52  Fed.  912,  3  C.  C. 

A.    347,    10   U.    S.   App.    430), 

573. 
Oskamp  v.  Express  Co.  (56  N.  E. 

13,  61  Ohio  St.  341),  672,  682. 
Osterhoudt  v.  Railway  Co.  (62  N. 

Y.    Supp.    134,    47    App.    Div. 

146),    443. 
Otis  V.  Railway  Co.  (112  Mo.  622, 

20   S.   W.   676),   212,   216,   503, 

1355. 
Ostrander    v.    Brown     (15    Johns. 

39),   688.   696. 
Otis  V.  Thorn  (23  Ala.  469).  1236. 


I 


TABLE   OF    CASES   CITED. 


clxxix 


[references  are 

Ott  V.  Railway  Co.   (18  O.  C.  C. 

395,  10  O.  C.  D.  85),  1387. 
Ouderkirk    v.    Bank    (119    N.    Y. 

263),   23. 
Ouimit  V.  Henshaw   (35  Vt.  605), 

106,  142,  704,  1247,  1284,  1287. 
Ouligan   v.    Butler    ( —  Mass.   — , 

75    N.    E.    Rep.    726),    1394, 

1397. 
Overby  v.  McGee   (15  Ark.   459), 

780. 
Oviatt  V.  Railway  Co.   (43  Minn. 

300),    952. 
Owen    V.    Brockschmidt    (54    Mo. 

285),  1378. 
Owen  V.  Outerbridge  (26  S.  C.  R. 

(Can.)   272),  822. 
Owen  V.  Railroad   (2  Bosw.  374), 

1181. 
Owen  V.  Railway  Co.    (29  Wash. 

207,  69  Pac.  757),  938,  1185. 
Owen    V.    The   Railway    (83    Mo. 

464),   859. 
Owen  V.  Railway  Co.   (11  S.  Dak. 

153,   76   N.   W.   302),   872. 
Owens  V.   Railroad   Co.    (119   Ga. 

230,  46  S.  E.  87,  63  L.  R.  A. 

946),  968. 
Owens    V.   Railroad    Co.    (95   Mo. 

169),    1118. 
Owens  V.  Railway    Co.     (84    Mo. 

App.  143),  1126,  1177,  1179. 
Owens  V.  Railroad  Co.   (88  N.  C. 

502),    1418. 
Owens    V.    Railroad    Co.    (126    N. 

Car.   139,    35    S.   E.   Rep.   259, 

78  Am.   St.  Rep.  642),   987. 
Oxlade  v.  Railway  Co.  (1  N.  &  M. 

72),  521. 
Oxsher  v.   Railway   Co.    (29   Tex. 

Civ.  App.  420,  67  S.  W.  550), 

991. 
Oxlade  v.   Railway    (1   C.  B,    (N. 

S.)   454),  522. 
Oxlade  v.   Railway    (15   Com.   B. 

(N.   S.)    680),  340. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Oxley    V.    Railway    Co.    (65    Mo. 
629),  419,  443.     ■♦ 


Pacific  Coast  S.  S.  Co.  v.  Bancroft- 
Whitney  Co.  (94  Fed.  180,  36 
C.  C.  A.  135;  reversed  in  The 
Queen  of  the  Pacific,  180  U. 
S.  49,  45  L.  Ed.  419,  21  Sup. 
Ct.   R.   278),  442. 

In  re  Pacific  Mail  S.  S.  Co.  (130 
Fed.  76,  64  C.  C.  A.  410,  69 
L.  R.  A.  71,  reversing  126 
Fed.  1020),  344,  381. 

Pacific  Steam  Whaling  Co.  v. 
Grismore  (117  Fed.  68,  54  C. 
C.  A.  454,  aff'g.,  The  Valencia, 
110  Fed.  221),  1152,  1156, 
1169. 

Pacific  Telegraph  Co.  v.  Under- 
wood (37  Neb.  315,  55  N.  W. 
1057,  40  Am.  St.  Rep.  490), 
95. 

Packard  v.  Earle  (113  Mass.  280), 
716,   718. 

Packard  v.  Getman  (6  Cow.  757), 
117. 

Packard  v.  Getman  (4  Wend. 
613),  1372. 

Packard  v.  Railroad  Co.  (181  Mo. 
421,  80  S.  W.  Rep.  951,  103 
Am.  St.  Rep.  607),  1389. 

Packard  v.  Taylor  (35  Ark.  402), 
233,   236,   271,    276. 

Packet  Co.  v.  Henry  (50  111.  460), 
1180. 

Packet  Co.  v.  Mulligan  (25  Ky. 
Law  Rep.  1287,  77  S.  W.  704), 
917,    1236. 

Packet  Co.  v.  Nagel  (15  Ky.  Law 
Rep.  742),  1442, 


clxxx 


TABLE  OF   CASES   CITED. 


[beferences  are 

Packet  Co.   v.    Shearer     (61    111. 

263),  1309,  1310. 
Packet  Co.  v.  Smith  (23  Md.  402, 

87  Am.  Dec.  575),  1277. 
Paddock  v.  Railroad  Co.  (37  Fed. 

Rep.   841),   1135. 
Paddock  v.  Railway  Co.    (60  Mo. 

App.   328),   475,   508. 
Page  V.  Munro   (1  Holmes,  232), 

799. 

Page  V.  Railway  Co.    (7  S.  Dak. 

297,  64  N.  W.  137),  226,  238, 

241. 

Page  V.  Smith  (99  Mass.  395),  77. 

Painter,  Ex  parte  (2  Com.  B.  (N. 

S.)   702),  944. 
Palfrey  v.  Railroad  (4  Allen,  55), 

1376. 
Palm   V.   Railroad    (18   111.    217), 

1369. 
Palmer  v.   Canal  Co.    (120  N.  Y. 

170),  895,  903,  904. 
Palmer    v.    Lorillard    (16    Johns. 

348),  655,  801. 
Palmer  v.  Pennsylvania  Co.   (Ill 

N.  Y.  488),  957. 
Palmer  v.  Railroad  Co,   (101  Cal. 
187,    35    Pac.    630),    130,    201, 
206,   207,  226,  243,  496,   654. 
Palmer   v.   Railroad   Co.    (92  Me. 
399,   42   Atl.   800,   69   Am.   St. 
Rep.   513),   1057,   1442. 
Palmer  v.  Railroad  Co.  (56  Mich. 

1),  1174. 
Palmer   v.   Railroad    (3   Rich.    S. 

C.    (N.  S.)    380),  1038. 
Palmer  v.  G.  J.  Railway  (4  M.  & 
W.    749),    57,    340,     395,     407, 
408. 
Palmeri  v.  Railway  Co.  (133  N.  Y. 
261,  30  N.  E.  1001,  28  Am.  St. 
Rep.    632,    16   L.   R.   A.    136), 
1099. 
Palmeter  v.  Wagner   (11   Alb.   L. 
Jour.   149),   1130,  1132. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Palyo  V.   Railroad   Co.    (30  N.   J. 

Eq.  604),  1419. 
Pantland    Hick    v.     Raymond     & 
Reid  (L.  R.  (1893),  App.  Cas. 
22,  62  L.  J.  Q.  B.  98,  aff'g.,  2 
Q.  B.   (1891)   626),  839,  842. 
Paquin   v.   Railway   Co.    (90   Mo. 

App.  118),  1409,  1423. 
Paradine    v.    Jane     (Aleyn,     26), 

819. 
Pardee  v.  Drew   (25  Wend.  459), 

75,   330,  1249. 
Pardington  v.  So.  Wales  Railway 
(1   H.  &  N.   392;    38  Eng.  L. 
&  E.   432),   336,   340,   397. 
Pares  v.  Railway  Co.    (Tex.  Civ. 
App.,    57    S.    W.    Rep.    301), 
1417. 
Parish  v.  Railroad  Co.  (90  N.  Y. 
Supp.  1000,  99,  App.  Div.  10), 
1065. 
Park  V.  Preston  (108  N.  Y.  434), 

449. 
Parker  v.  Crowell,  etc.,  Co.    (115 
La.  — ,  39  So.  Rep.  455),  1398. 
Parker    v.    Flagg    (26    Me.    181), 

75. 
Parker  v.  James   (4  Camp.  112), 

295,  319. 
Parker   v.   Railroad    Co.    (133   N. 
Car.  335,  45  S.  E.  658,  63  L. 
R.  A.  827),  449,  464,  479,  1353, 
1354. 
Parker  v.  Railway  Co.  (2  C.  P.  D. 

416),  1298,   1299. 
Parker  v.  Railway  (6  Exch.  702; 

6  El.  &  B.  77),  805. 
Parker  v.  Railway    (5   Hun,   57), 

1098. 
Parker  v.  Railway  (7  M.  &  Gran. 

253),  516,  522. 
Parker  v.   Steamship   Co.    (76   N. 
Y.    Supp.    806,    74    App.    Div. 
16),  755. 
Parmalee    v.    Raymond     (43    111. 
App.  609),  1363. 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


clxxxi 


[references  are 

Parmalee  v.  Wilks  (22  Barb.  539). 

301,  626. 
Parmelee  v.  Fischer  (22  111.  212), 

1248. 
Parmelee  v.  Lowitz  (74  111.  116), 

68. 
Parmelee  v.  McNulty  (19  111.  556), 

68. 
Parr  v.  Railroad  Co.    (43  S.  Car. 

197,    20    S.    E.    Rep.    1009,    49 

Am.   St.  Rep.   826),  918. 
Parrill  v.  Railway    Co.    (23    Ind. 

App.  638,  55  N.  E.  Rep.  1026), 

42,    44,   1331. 
Parrott  v.  Wells   (15  Wall.  524), 

1430. 
Parsons  v.  Hardy  (14  Wend.  215), 

65,  75,  273,  652,  654. 
Parsons   v.   Hart    (30     S.     C.    R. 

(Can.)  473),  700. 
Parsons    v.    Monteath    (13    Barb. 

353),   401,   489. 
Parsons  v.  Railroad  Co,  (37  Hun, 

128),    1219. 
Parsons  v.  Railroad  Co.    (94  Mo. 

286),    1389,    1400,    1417. 
Parsons  v.  Railroad  Co.  (85  Hun, 

23,  32  N.  Y.  Supp.  598),  937; 
Parsons  v.  Railroad  Co.    (113  N. 

Y.  355),  1012. 
Parsons  v  Railroad   Co.    (167  U. 

S.  447,  17  Sup.  Ct.  R.  887,  42 

L.  Ed.  231,  aff'g.,  63  Fed.  903, 

11  C.  C.  A,  489,  27  U.  S.  App. 

394),   566. 
Parsons     v.     Transportation     Co. 

(Ill    Fed.    202,    49    C.    C.    A. 

302),    344,    353. 
Partridge   v.    Steamboat   Co.    (66 

N.    J.    L.    290,    49    Atl.    726), 

980. 
Paschall  v.  Owen    (77  Tex.  585), 

1397,  1401. 
Passenger  Tariffs,  In  re  (2  Inter- 
state Com.  Rep.  649),  1030. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Pastoris  v.  Railroad  Co.   (149  Pa. 

St.   432,   24  Atl.   283),   1184. 
Paterson  v.  Railroad  Co.   (85  Ga. 

653),  1177,  1417. 
Paterson     v.     Railway     Co,     ( — 

Minn.  — ,  103  N.  W.  Rep.  621), 

1348. 
Patrick  v.   Railway  Co.    ( —  Ind. 

Terr.  — ,   88   S.  W.  Rep.   330, 

reversed    in    Railway    Co.    v. 

Patrick,   —  C.    C.   A.   — ,   144 

Fed.  632),  154,  408,  411,  412. 
Patry    v.    Railway    Co.    (77    Wis, 

218),  1002,  1444. 
Patscheider    v.    Railway    Co.    L. 

R.  3  Ex.  Div.  153),  1284,  1285. 
Patten  v.  Railroad   (32  Wis.  524; 

36  Wis.   413),   940. 
Patten  v.   Railway  Co.    (29   Fed. 

Rep.  590),  885. 
Patterson  v.  Clyde   (67  Penn.  St, 

500),   1354,   1355. 
Patterson  v.  Railroad  Co.  ( —  Ala. 

— ),  1440. 
Patterson  v.  Railroad  Co.  (25  Ky. 

Law  Rep.  1750,  78  S.  W.  Rep. 

870),    1100. 
Patterson  v.  Railway  Co.   (47  Mo.' 

App.    570;    s.   c.    56   Mo.   App. 

657),    408,    462. 
Patterson    v    Steamship    Co.     ( — 

N.  Car.  — ,  53  S.  E.  Rep.  224), 

1165. 
Pattison    v.    Blanchard    (5   N,   Y. 

186),  250,  263. 
Patton  V.  Magrath  (Dudley,  159), 

281. 
Patton  V.  McGrath  (1  Rice,  162), 

1327. 
Patton   V.    Pickles    (50    La.    Ann. 

857,   24   So.   290),  942. 

Paturzo  V.  Company  (31  Fed.  Rep. 

611),  492. 
Paul  V.  Railroad  Co.   (70  N.  J.  L, 

442,   57  Atl.  139),  450,  640. 


clxxxii 


TABLE  OF   CASES   CITED. 
[REFERENCES    ARE    TO    SECTIONS.] 


Paulitsch  V.  Railroad  Co.  (102  N. 

Y.  280),  1111. 
Pauliuier  v.  Railroad  Co.,   (34  N. 

J.  Law  151).  1402. 
I'aulmier  v.  Railroad    (5  Vroom, 

1.^.1),  1397. 
Pavltt  V.  Railroad  Co.  (153  Pa.  St. 

302.    25   Atl.    1107),    442,    444, 

480. 
Paxton   V.   Boyer     (07    111.    132), 

1430. 
Payne   v.   Halstead    (44   111.   App. 

97).  96,  896. 
Payne  v.  Railroad  Co.   (157   Ind. 

616,    62    N.    E.    472,    vacating 

judgment  of  Ind.  App.  Ct.  in 

60  N.  E.  362),  1075. 
Payne  v.  Railway  Co.  (106  Tenn. 

167,  61  S.  W.  86),  1123. 
Payne  v.  Ralli  (74  Fed.  563),  333, 

866. 
Paynter  v.  James   (L.  R.  2  C.  P. 

348),  870. 
Peabody  v.  Railway  Co.  (21  Oreg. 

121),  1061,  1065. 
Peacock  v.  Rhodes  (2  Doug.  633), 

176. 
Peak's  Admr.,  v.  Railroad  Co,  (23 

Ky.  Law  Rep.  2157,  66  S.  W. 

995),  1180. 
Pearce  v.  Railroad  (21  How.  441), 

264. 
Pearce   v.   Railroad   Co.    (89   Mo. 

App.    437;    reversed   in   Rail- 
road V.  Pearce.  48  L.  Ed.  397, 

192   U.    S.    179),   866. 
Pearse  v.  Steamship  Co.  (24  Fed. 

Rep.  285),   430. 
Pearson  v.  Duane  (4  Wall.  605), 

963,  966,  974. 
Pease  v.  Railroad  Co.   (101  N.  Y. 

367),  1059,  1085. 
Peavy  v.  Railroad    Co.     (81    Ga. 

485),  978,   1102. 
Peck  V.  Neil  (3  McLean,  22),  901. 


Peck  V.   Railroad   Co.    (50    Conn. 

379),  1383. 
Peck   V.  Railroad   Co.    (70   N.   Y. 

587),  972. 
Peck   V.   Weeks    (34    Conn.    145), 

130,  451,  631. 
Peek  V.  Railway    (10   H.  L.   Cas. 

473),  397. 
Peerless  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Railroad  Co. 

(— N.  H.— ,  61  Atl.  511),  450. 
Peers    v.    Nevada,    etc.    Co.,    (119 

Fed.  400),  1389. 
Peet  V.   Railway    (19   Wis.    118), 

226. 
Peet   V.   Railway    (20   Wis.   594), 

146,    649,    1366. 
Peik    V.    Railroad   Co.    (94  U.   S. 

164),   574,   1023. 
Peixotti  V.  McLaughlin    (1  Strob. 

468),  68. 
Pekin  v.  McMahon,    (154  111.  141, 

39  N.  E.  Rep.  484,  45  Am.  St._ 

Rep.    114,    27   L.    R.   A.    206), 

1392. 
Pelly   V.   Royal,   etc.   Ass.   Co.    (1 

Burr.  341),  321. 
Pelton  V.  Railroad  (54  N.  Y,  214), 

708,  709. 
Pence  v.  Railroad  Co.    (116  Iowa, 

279,  90  N.  W.  59),  1181. 
Pence  v.  Railroad  Co.  ( 23  Ky.  Law 

Rep.  1207,  64  S.  W.  905),  1126. 
Pender     v.     Robbins      (6     Jones 

(Law),  207),  27. 
Pendergast   v.    Express    Co.    (101 

Mass.   120),   243. 
Pendleton    v.     Kinsley     (3     Cliff. 

416),   895,   909,   1161. 
Pendleton's    Adm'r.     v.    Railroad 

Co.    (— Va.— ,    52    S.    E.    Rep. 

574),   1219. 
Penfield  v.  Railway  Co.  (50  N.  Y. 

Supp.   79,   26  App.   Div.   413), 

938. 
Peniston  v.  Railway  Co.    (34  La. 

Ann.  777),   936,   1012,   1116. 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


clxxxiii 


[REI'ERENCES    ABE    TO    SECTIONS.] 


Penn  v.  Railroad   Co.    (49   N.   Y. 

204),  336,  339,  341. 
Pennefeather    v.    Baltimore,    etc. 

Co.  (58  Fed.  481),  783. 
Pennewell     v.     Cullan     (5     Harr. 

(Del.)    238),   35,  37,  63. 
Pennington  v.   Railroad    Co.     (69 

111.  App.  628),  1047. 
Pennington    v.    Railroad    Co.    (62 

Md.   95),   1043,   1053,   1085. 
Pennsylvania    Co.    v.    Bray     (125 

Ind.    229),    1055,    1059,    1066, 

1433. 
Pennsylvania    Co.    v.    Butler    (57 

Pa.  335),  1397,  1398. 
Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  City  of  Chi- 
cago   (181    111.   289,    54    N.   E. 

825,  53  L.  R.  A.  223,  aff'g  73 

111.   App.   345),   944,   945. 
Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Clark  (2  Ind. 

App.  146,  27  N.  E.  Rep.  586), 

1334. 
Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Connell,  (112 

111.  295),  1090. 
Pennsylvania   Co.    v.    Coyer    (163 

Ind.  631,  72  N.  E.  Rep.  875), 

1389,  1394. 
Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Dickson   (31 

Ind.  App.  451,  67  N.  B.  538), 

232,  238. 
Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Donovan  (116 

Fed.   907;    modified,  Donovan 

V.  Railroad,   120  Fed.  215,   57 

C.  C.  A.  362,  61  L.  R.  A.  140; 

rehearing    denied,    124     Fed. 

1016,    60    C.    C.    A.    168;    af- 
firmed, 199  N.  S.  279),  944. 
Pennsylvania    Co.    v.    Greso    (102 

111.  App.  252;  s.  c.  79  111.  App. 

127),  918,  1072,  1073. 
Pennsylvania    Co.     v.    Hine     (41 

Ohio  St.  276),  1045. 
Pennsylvania    Co.    v.    Hixon     (10 

Ind.   App.   520,   38   N.  E.  56), 

1180. 


Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Hoagland  (78 

Ind.  203),  1067,  1221,  1428. 
Pennsylvania    Co.    v.    Holderman 

(69  Ind.  18),  1315,  1336. 
Pennsylvania  Co.    v.    Keane    (143 

111.    172,   32   N.   E.   260,   affg., 

41  111.  App.  317),  1397. 
Pennsylvania     Co.     v.     Kenwood 

Bridge    Co.    (170    111.    645,    49 

N.    E.    215,    reversing   69    111. 

App.  145),  610. 
Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Langdon   (92 

Penn.   St.  21),  1200. 
Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Lenhart  (120 

Fed.    61,    56    C.    C.    A.    457), 

1053,   1062,   1065,  1066. 
Pennsylvania    Co.     v.    Lilly     (73 

Ind.  254),  1397. 
Pennsylvania     Co.     v.     Liveright 

(14   Ind.   App.   518,  43   N.   E. 

162;   s.  c.  41  N.  E.  350),  1352. 
Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Marion   (123 

Ind.    415),    933,    1179,    1207. 
Pennsylvania     Co.     v.     McCaffery 

(173    111.    169,    50    N.    E.    713, 

aff'g.,  68  111.  App.  635),  1016, 

1186,  1219. 
Pennsylvania    Co.    v.    Miller    (35 

Ohio  St.  541),  1249,  1250. 
Pennsylvania    Co.    v.    Newmeyer 

(129  Ind.  401,  28  N.  E.  860), 

899,  926. 
Pennsylvania    Co,    v.    Parry     (55 

N.  J.  L.  551,  27  Atl.  Rep.  914, 

39  Am.  St.  Rep.  654,  22  L.  R. 

A.  251),  1041,  1058,  1077. 
Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Paul  (126 

Fed.  157,  62  C.  C.  A.  135), 

1198. 
Pennsylvania    Co.    v.    Poor    (103 

Ind.   553),   1315,   1334. 
Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Railroad  Co. 

(118  U.   S.  290),  918. 
Pennsylvania  Co.   v.  Railway   Co. 

(107   111.  App.   386),   667,   755. 
Pennsylvania    Co.    v.    Reed     (60 


clxxxiv 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


[befeeences  are 

Fed.  694,   9  C.   C.  A.   219.   20 

U.  S.  App.  400),  1183. 
Pennsylvania    Co.    v.    Roy     (102 

U,  S.  451),  895.  1095.  1135. 
Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Scofield   (121 

Fed.    814,    58    C.    C.   A.    176), 

1426,  1433. 
Pennsylvania  Co.   v.   Walker    (29 

Ind.  App.  285,  64  N.  B.  473), 

1331. 
Pennsylvania    Co.    v.    Wentz    (37 

Ohio  St.  333),  1060. 
Pennsylvania   Co.    v.    White     (88 

Penn.  St.  327),  1219. 
Pennsylvania  Canal  Co,  v.  Bent- 
ley    (66   Penn.    St.   30),   1174. 
Pennsylvania    Nav.    Co.   v.    Dand- 

ridge   (S  Gill  &  J.  248),  92. 
Pennsylvania    Steel    Co.    v.    Rail- 
road  Co.    (94   Ga.   636,   21   S. 

E.  Rep.  577),  772,  865,  866. 
Penny  v.  Porter  (2  East,  2),  1337. 
Penny    v.    Railroad    Co.    (133    N. 

Car.  221,  45  S.  E.  563,  63  L. 

R.  A.  497),  989. 
Penoyer    v.    Hallett     (15    Johns. 

332),   817. 
People  V.  Babcock  (16  Hun,  313), 

149. 
People  V.  Haynes  (14  Wend.  546), 

1317. 
People  V.  McKay  (46  Mich.  439), 

943. 
People  V.  Railroad  (22  Hun,  533), 

149. 
Peoria  Bank  v.  Railroad    (58   N. 

H.  203),   117. 
Peoria  Bridge  Ass.  v.  Loomis  (20 

111.  235),  1436. 
Pereira  v.  Railroad  Co.    (66  Cal. 

92),   231,   625,   651. 
Perham    v.    Electric   Co.    (33    Or. 

451,  53  Pac.  Ren.  14,  72  Am. 

St.  Rep.  730,  40  L.  R.  A.  799), 

1386,  1389,  1394. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Perkins  v.  Railroad  (47  Me.  573), 

231,  242,  1360. 
Perkins  v.  Railroad  Co.   (55  Mo. 

201),  961.  \ 

Perkins    v.    Railroad    (24    N.    Y. 

196),   1075. 
Perishable     Freight     Transporta- 
tion  Co.   V.   O'Neill     (41    HI. 

App.  423),   505. 
Perry    v.    Banking    Co.     (85    Ga. 

193),  1397. 
Perry  v.  Carmichael  (95  HI.  519), 

1389. 
Perry   v.   Railroad    Co.     (66    Ga. 

746),  1006. 
Perry    v.    Railway    Co.    (89    Mo. 

App.   49),   1366. 
Perry  v.   Spreckel's   Sugar  Refin- 
ing Co.    (110   Fed.   777),   848. 
Perry    v.    Thompson     (98    Mass. 

249),  401,  415. 
Perth  Committee  v.  Ross    (A.   C. 

(1897)  479,  66  L.  J.  P.  C.  81), 

943. 
Peters   v.  Railroad   Co.    (42   Ohio 

St.  275),   805. 
Peters  v.   Rylands    (20   Penn.   St. 

497),    916,    918. 
Peterson   v.    Case    (21    Fed.   Rep. 

885),   132. 
Peterson  v.   Railw^ay   Co.    (80   la. 

92),   263. 
Petersen  v.  Railway  Co.  (119  Wis. 

197,    96   N.    W.    532,    100    Am. 

St.  Rep.   879),   1018,   1073. 
Petrie  v.   Railroad   Co.    (42  N.  J. 

L.  449),  1041,  1065. 
Pettigrew    v.     Barnum     (11    Md. 

434),   1246,   1249. 
Petty  V.  Railway    (L.  R.  5  C.  P. 

461),   940. 
Pfaetzer  v.  Car  Co.  (4  Wk.  Notes, 

240),   1130,   1132. 
Pfaffenback  v.  Railway  Co.    (142 

Ind.  246,  41  N,  E,  530),  1001, 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


clxxxv 


[BEFEBENCES    ABE 

Pfister   V.   Railroad    Co.    (70    Cal. 

169),   517,  1240,  1249. 
Pharr   v.   Collins     (35    La.    Ann. 

939),   866. 
Phelan  v.  Moss  (67  Penn.  St.  59), 

176. 
Phelps  V.  Railroad    (94   111.   548), 

147. 
Phelps  V.  Railway,    (19   C.  B.  N. 

S.  321),  1244,  1249. 
Phelps   V.   Williamson     (5    Sand. 

578),  830. 
Phelps  V.   Steamboat  Co.   (131  N. 

Car.  12,  42  S.  E.  335),  918. 
Phelps,   James   &   Co.   v.   Hill    (1 

Q.  B.    (1891)    605,  60  L.  J.  Q. 

B.  382),  616. 
Phettiplace  v.   Railroad    Co.     (84 

Wis.    412,    54   N.   W.   1092,   20 

L.  R.   A.   483),   1033,   1082. 
Phifer  v.  Railroad  Co.   (89  N.  C. 

311),   261. 
Phillips  V.  Brigham  (26  Ga.  617), 

613. 
Phillips   V.    Earle    (8    Pick.    182), 

111,  329. 
Phillips    V.    Pruitt    (26    Ky.    Law 

Rep.  831,  82  S.  W.  Rep.  628), 

100. 
Phillips    V.    Railroad     (57    Barb. 

644),   940. 
Phillips   V.   Railroad     (49     N.    Y. 

177),  1181. 
Phillips  V.  Railroad  Co.  (62  Hun, 

233,  16  N.  Y.  Supp.  909),  918, 

1184. 
Phillips  V.  Railroad  Co.  (78  N.  C. 

294),   231,  238,  261. 
Phillips  V.  Railway  Co.    (114  Ga. 

284,  40  S.  E.  268),  1023,  1033. 
Phillips   V.    Railway   Co.    (124   N. 

Car.    123,    32    S.    E.    388,    45 

L.  R.  A.  163),  931,  1008. 
Phillips  V.  Rodie   (15  East,  547), 

856,   866. 
Phillpot  V.   Railway   Co.    (85  Mo. 

164),   1389. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Philpott    V.     Railroad     Co.     (175 

Penn.    St.    570,    34    Atl.    Rep. 

856),   1397. 
Phipps  V.   Railway   Co.    (2   Q.   B. 

(1892)     229,    61    L.    J.    Q.    B. 

379),   522. 
Phenix  Ins.  Co.  Ex  p.  (118  U.  S. 

617),   344. 
Phoenix  Powder  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Rail- 
road  Co.    (—Mo.—,   94   S.  W. 

Rep.   235;   s.  c.   101  Mo.  App. 

442,  74  S.  W.  Rep.  492),  475. 
Pickens  v.  Railroad  Co.    (104   N. 

C.  312),  1085. 
Pickering  v.  Barkley  (Style,  132), 

316,  481,  490. 
Pickering  v.  Busk   (15  East,  38), 

785. 
Pickford  v.  Railway   (8  M.  &  W. 

372),    150,    1344. 
Pickford  v.  Railway  (12  M.  &  W. 

766),   147,   151,   461,   516. 
Pickford  v.  Railway  (10  M.  &  W. 

422),  522. 
Piedmont    Mfg.    Co.    v.    Railroad 

Co.    (19    S.   C.    353),    35,     62, 

227,  232,  238. 
Pier    V.    Finch     (24    Barb.    514), 

1046. 
Pierce  v.   Conners    (20   Colo.   178, 

37  Pac.  721,  46  Am.  St.  Rep. 

297),  1389,  1397,  1398. 
Pierce  v.  Gray  (63  111.  App.  158), 

1118. 
Pierce  v.  Railroad  Co.  (120  Cal. 

156,  47  Pac.  Rep.  874,  40  L. 

R.  A.  350,  52  Pac.  Rep.  302), 

207,  426,  430,  450,  464,  613, 

614. 
Pierce  v.  Railway  (23  Wis.  387), 

21,  61,  731. 
Pierce  v.  Winsor  (2  Sprague,  35), 

798. 
Pike  V.  Polytechnic  Inst.  (1  F.  & 

F.  712),  909. 
Pincus    V.     Railroad    Co.     ( — N. 


clxxxvi 


TABliE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


[BEFEBENCES    ABE 

Car.—.    53    S.    E.    Rep.    297), 

941. 
Pindell    v.   Railway   Co.    (34   Mo. 

App.  675).  702,  710. 
Pindell   v.   Railway   Co.    (41   Mo. 

App.   84;    s.   c.  34    Mo.    App. 

675).    702,   710. 
Pingree  v.  Railroad  Co.  (66  Mich. 

143).   327,   740. 
Pingree     v.     Railroad     Co.     (118 

Mich.   314,   76   N.  W.  635,   53 

L.  R.  A.  274),  574. 
Pinlverton  v.  Railway  Co.,  (—Mo. 

App.—,  93    S.   W.   Rep.   849), 

292. 
Pinney    v.    Railroad     (19     Minn. 

251),  708,  709. 
Pinney  v.  Wells    (10  Conn.  104), 

875,  877. 
Pioneer  Const.  Co.  v.  Sunderland 

(188    111.   345),   1174. 
Pioneer  Fuel  Co.  v.  McBrier   (84 

Fed.  495,  28  C.  C.  A.  466,  55 

¥.  S.  App.  181),  849,  855,  857. 
Piper  Oden  Goodall  Co.  In  re  (86 

Fed.  670),  344,  347. 
Piper  V.  Railroad  Co.   (156  N.  Y. 

224,  50  N.  E.  851,  41  L.  R.  A. 

724.  66  Am.  St.  Rep.  560,  re- 
versing  34   N.   Y.   Supp.   1072, 

89  Hun,  75;  s.  c,  76  Hun,  44, 

27  N.  Y.  Supp.  593),  1192. 
Pisano  v.  Shanley  Co.    (66  N.  J. 

L.  1,  48  Atl.  Rep.  618),  1392. 
Pitcher  v.  Railway  Co.   (61  Hun, 

623,  16  N.  Y.  Supp.  62;  s.  c, 

8  N.  Y.   Supp.  389),  1003. 
Pitcher  v.  Railway  Co.   (8  N.  Y. 

Suppl.    389),   1116. 
Pitloclt  V.  Wells.  Fargo  &  Co.  (109 

Mass.  452),  60,  147. 
Pittman  v.  Express  Co.    (24  Tex. 

Civ.  App.  595.  59  S.  W.  949; 

s.   c.   30   Tex.   Civ.   App.   626, 

71  S.  W.  Rep.  312),  210. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Pittman  v.  Hooper  (3  Sumn.  50), 

830. 
Pittsburgh  v.  Grier  (22  Penn.  St. 

54),   1223. 
Pitzner     v.     Shinnick     (39     Wis. 

129),  1419. 
Place   V.   Union    Ex.   Co.    (2   Hil- 
ton,  19),   82,   49G,  625. 
Plaisted    v.    Navigation    Co.     (27 

Me.  132),  281,  483. 
Plantation,      Inhabitants     of,     v. 

Hall    (61  Me.   517),  231. 
Planters'    Fertilizer    Mfg.    Co.    v. 

Elder    (101    Fed.    1001,   42   C. 

C.  A.  130),  157,  158,  165. 
Plant  Inv.  Co.  v.   Cook    (85  Fed. 

611,  29   C.   C.  A.  377),  942. 
Planz  V.  Railroad  Co.   (157  Mass. 

377,  32  N.  E.  356,  17  L.  R.  A. 

835),    990,    1001. 
Piatt  V.  Hibbard  (7  Cow.  497).  72. 
Platz  V.  Cohoes   (24  Hun,  101;  89 

N.  Y.  219),  1233,  1383. 
Player  v.  Railway  Co.   (62  Iowa, 

723),   1188,   1202. 
Pledger  v.  Railroad   ( — Neb. — ,  95 

N.  W.  Rep.  1057),   990,   1001. 
Plessy    V.    Ferguson     (163    U.    S. 

537,  41  L.  Ed.  256,  16  Sup.  Ct. 

1138,  affirming  ex  parte  Ples- 
sy, 45  La.  Ann.  80,  18  L.  R. 

A.  639,  11  So.  Rep.  948),  972. 
Plott  V.  Railroad    Co.     (63    Wis. 

511),  1060. 
Plumley  v.  Birge  (124  Mass.  57), 

1228. 
Plummer   v.    State    (4   Tex.   App. 

310),  1430. 
Pocahontas   Collieries   Co.  v.  Ru- 

kas'    Adm'r.    ( — Va. — ,    51    S. 

E.  Rep.  449),  1395. 
Poff  V.  New  England,  etc.  Co.  (72 

N.  H.  164,  55  Atl.  Rep.  891), 

1396. 

Pollard  V.  Vinton   (105  U.  S.  7), 
157,   160,   161,   175. 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


clxxxvii 


[bEFEBENCES    ABE 

Pomeroy    v.    Donaldson     (5     Mo. 

36),  66. 
Pomeroy    v.    Railroad    Co.     (172 

Mass.  92,  51  N.  E.  523),  1118. 
Pompily    V.    Manhattan    Delivery 

Co.     (84    N.    Y.    Supp.    230), 

1298. 
Pond-Decker  Lumber  Co.  v.  Spen- 
cer  (86  Fed.  846,  30  C.  C.  A. 

430,    reversing   Central    Trust 

Co.  V.  Railway  81  Fed.  277), 

540. 
Ponder  v.  Railroad  Co.    (117  Ga. 

63,   43   S.  E.  430,  97  Am.   St. 

Rep.    152,    60   L.    R.   A.    713), 

987. 
Pontifex  &  Wood  v.  Hartley   (62 

L.  J.  Q.  B.  196),  71. 
Pool    V.    Railroad   Co.    (23   S.   C. 

286),  758. 
Pool  V.  Railroad  Co.  (7  Utah,  303, 

26  Pac.  Rep.  654),  1397. 
Pool    V.    Railway    Co.     (53    Wis. 

657),  1221. 
Poole  V.  Railroad  Co.  (89  Ga.  320, 

15  S.  E.  Rep.  321),  927,  1111. 
PooTe  V.  Railroad  (8  Jones  (Law), 

1231. 
Poole  V.  Railroad    Co.     (16    Oro. 

261),   1032,  1033. 
Poole  V.   Railway    Co.     (58    Tex. 

134),   760. 
Poole    V.    Railway    Co.    (56    Wis. 

227),  1221. 
Pope  V.  Nickerson   (3  Story,  465), 

211,  788. 
Popham  V.  Barnard  (77  Mo.  App. 

619),  443,  505. 
Porcher    v.    Railroad     (14    Rich. 

(Law)   181),  151,  496. 
Port  Blakely  Mill  Co.  v.  Sharkey 

(102    Fed.    259,    42    C.    C.    A. 

329,  aff'g.,  92  Fed.  425),  1369. 
Porter   v.    Hildebrand    (14    Penn. 

St.  129),   1246,   1253. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Porter  v.  Railroad  (34  Barb.  353), 
1033. 

Porter  v.  Railroad  (20  111.  407), 
702,  705. 

Porter  v.  Railway  Co.  (80  Mich. 
156),  1177. 

Porter  v.  Railroad  Co.  (13  N.  Y. 
Suppl.  591),  1003. 

Porter  v.  St.  Bt.  New  England 
(17  Mo.  290),  1370. 

Porterfield  v.  Humphreys  (8 
Humph.  497),  75. 

Portland  Flouring  Mills  Co.  v. 
Insurance  Co.  (130  Fed.  860, 
65  C.  C.  A.  344,  aff'g..  Insur- 
ance Co.  V.  Portland  Flour- 
ing Mills  Co.,  124  Fed.  855), 
167,   800,   810. 

Portuchek  v.  Railroad  Co.  (101 
Mo.  App.  52,  74  S.  W.  368), 
899,  1412. 

Post  V.  Jones  (19  How.  150), 
788,  793. 

Post  V.   Railroad    Co.     (14    Neb. 

110),  1056. 
Post  V.   Railway   Co.    (103   Tenn. 

184,  52  S.  W.  301,  55  L.  R.  A. 

481,   16   Am.   &  Eng.  R.   Cas. 

(N.    S.)    201),    226,    233,    613, 

617. 

Postlethwaite  v.  Freeland  (5  App. 
Cas.  599),  846. 

Potter  V.  Lansing  (1  Johns.  215), 
1310,  1315. 

Potter  V.  Railway  (21  Wis.  372), 
1398,  1400,  1423. 

Potter  V.  The  Majestic  (56  Fed. 
244;  modified,  60  Fed.  624, 
9  C.  C.  A.  161,  20  U.  S.  App. 
503,  33  L.  R.  A.  746.  Petition 
for  certification  to  supreme 
court  denied,  09  Fed.  844. 
Decree  of  C.  C.  A.  reversed 
and  of  D.  C.  affirmed  in  The 
Majestic,  166  U.  S.  375,  41  L. 


clxxxviii 


TABLE   OP   CASES   CITED. 


[BEFEBENCES    ABE 

Ed.  1039,  17  Sup.  Ct.  R.  597), 

271.    275.    1299. 
Potts  V.  Railroad  Co.    (131  Mass. 

455).  870,  872. 
Potts    V.    Railway    Co.     (17    Mo. 

App.  394),   497. 
Poucher  v.   Railroad     (49    N.    Y. 

263).  454,  1006,  1073. 
Poulln  V.  Railroad  (34  N.  Y.  Sup. 

Ct.  296),  911. 
Poulin    V.    Railway  Co.   (52  Fed. 

197,   3    C.    C.   A.   23,    6  U.    S. 

App.    298,    17    L.    R.    A.    800, 

aff-g.,     47     Fed.     858),     1061, 

1065. 
Poulton  V.  Railway    (L.  R.   2  Q. 

B.  534),  1100,  1441. 
Pounder  v.  Railway  Co.   (I'Q.  B. 

(1892)  385,  61  L.  J.  Q.  B. 
136),  980. 
Pouppirt  V.  Shipping  Co.  (122 
Fed.  983;  reversed,  Elder 
Dempster  Shipping  Co.  v. 
Pouppirt,  125  Fed.  732,  60  C. 

C.  A.  500),  890. 

Powell  V.  Buck  (4  Strob.  (Law), 

427),  785. 
Powell  V.  Mills  (30  Miss.  231),  68. 
Powell   V.   Mills    (37   Miss.    691), 

66,  67,  68. 
Powell  V.  Myers  (26  Wend.  591), 

75,  668,  674,  1291. 
Powell  V.  Railroad  Co.    (25  Ohio 

St.  70),  1053. 
Powers  V.   Davenport    (7   Blackf. 

497),  53,  70,  294,  613. 
Powers  V.  Mitchell   (3  Hill,  545), 

41. 
Powers    V.     Railroad     Co.,     (153 

Mass.  188,  26  N.  E.  Rep,  446), 

964. 
Powers  V.  The  Railway  ( —  Iowa, 

— ,  105  N.  W.  Rep.  345).  1348. 
Powers   Mercantile   Co.   v.   Wells, 

Fargo   &   Co.    (93   Minn.    143, 

100  N.  W.  Rep.  735),  201,206, 

208.    428. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Powley  V.  Swensen  (146  Cal.  471, 

80  Pac.  Rep.  722),  1397. 
Pozzi    V.    Shipton    (8    Ad.    &    El. 

963),  1325   1327,  1329,  1351. 
Prager  v.  Railway  (L.  R.  5  C.  P. 

466),  1122. 
Pratt   V,   Railroad    Co.     (42    Me. 

579),  918. 
Pratt  V.  Railway    (95  U.   S.   43), 

137. 
Pray   v.   Railway    Co.     (44    Neb. 

167.  62  N.  W.  447,  48  Am.  St. 

Rep.   717),  78. 
Predmore  v.  Consumers',  etc.,  Co. 

(91  N.  Y.  Supp.  118,  99  App. 

Div.  551),  1401. 
Pregenzer  v.   Burleigh    (26  N.  Y. 

Supp.  35,  6  Misc.  140),  833. 
Prendergast    v.    Compton    (8    C. 

&  P.   454),   979,   1164. 
Prentice  v.  Decker  (49  Barb.  21), 

415. 
Price  V.  Hartshorn  (44  Barb.  655; 

44  N.  Y.  94),  267,  800. 
Price  V.  Livingstone  (9  Q.  B.  Div. 

679),   831. 
Price  V.  Morse,  etc.,  Co.  (120  Fed. 

445),  842. 
Price    V.    Powell    (3    N.    Y.    322). 

688.  689,  690,  1215. 
Price   V.   Railroad    Co.    (12    Colo. 

402),   885. 
Price  V.   Railroad   Co.    (50   N.  Y. 

213),    669,    672. 
Price  V.  Railroad  Co.   (46  W.  Va. 

538,  33  S.  E.  Rep.  255),  1036. 
Price  V.  Railroad   Co.    (113  U.  S. 

218),  1017,  1200. 
Price   V.   Railway   Co.    ( — Ark. — , 

88  S.  W.  Rep.  575),  994,  1230, 

1412. 
Price  V.  Ship  Uriel   (10  La.  Ann. 

412).   1355,   1860. 
Price  V.  Union  Lighterage  Co.   (1 

K.  B.   (1904)   412,  73  L.  J.  K. 

B.  222,  aff'g.,  1  K.  B.    (1903) 

750,    72    L.    J.   K.    B.    374.    88 


TABLE   OF    CASES   CITED, 


clxxxix 


[references  are 

Law   T.   428,    51   Wkly.   Rep. 
477,  9  Asp.  398,  8  Com'l  Cas. 
155),   463. 
Prickett  v.  Anchor  Line   (13  Mo. 

App.  436),  1289. 
Priestly  v.  Railroad  (26  111.  205), 

1369,   1373. 
Prince  v.   Railway   Co.    (64   Tex. 

146),  1001,  1022. 
Prince  George  County  v.  Burgess 

(61  Md.  29),   1417. 
Princeton,  The  (3  Blatch.  54),  92. 
Pringle  v.  Mollett  (6  M.  &  W.  80), 

852. 
Proctor  V.  Nicholson    (7  C.  &  P. 

67),  882. 
Proctor  V.  Railroad  Co.    (64  Mo. 

112),  1386. 
Procter  v.  Railway  Co.   (130  Cal. 

20,  62  Pac.  Rep.  306),  1433. 
Prokop  V.  Railway  Co.  (Tex.  Civ. 
App.,    79    S.    W.    Rep.    101), 
936,  989. 
Propeller     Commerce     (1     Black, 

574),   75. 
Proud  V.  Railroad   Co.    (64  N.  J. 
L.   702,  46  Atl.  710,   50  L.  R. 
A.  468),  957. 
Propeller  Mohawk   (8  Wall.  153), 
281,    664,    788,    815,    816,    820. 
Propeller   Niagara  v.   Cordes    (21 
How.  7),  74,  75,  311,  497,  645. 
Pruitt    V.    Railroad    Co.    (62    Mo. 
527),   285,   298,   309,   416,   630. 
Pugmire  v.   Coal    Co.     (26    Utah, 
115.   72  Pac.  Rep.  385),  1389. 
Pullman  Palace  Car  Co.  v.  Adams 
(120    Ala.    581,    24     So.     921, 
74  Am.  St.  Rep.  53,  45  L.  R. 
A.   767),   1130,  1131,  1132. 
Pullman  Palace  Car  Co.  v.  Arents 
(28  Tex.   Civ.  App.  71,   66  S. 
W.  329),  1131. 
Pullman  Car  Co.  v.  Bales    (Tex. 
Civ.  App.,  14  S.  W.  Rep.  855), 
114L 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Pullman    Car    Co.    v.    Barker    (4 

Col.  344),  1428. 
Pullman  Palace  Car  Co.  v.  Booth 
(Tex.    Civ.    App.,    28    S.    W. 
Rep.  719),  1139. 
Pullman  Palace  Car  Co.  v.  Field- 
ing   (62   111.   App.    577),    1140. 
Pullman  Palace  Car  Co.  v.  Freud- 
enstein   (3  Colo.  App.  540,  34 
Pac.  578),  1131,  1132. 
Pullman  Car  Co.  v.   Gaylord    (26 

Am.  L.  Reg.  512),  1130. 
Pullman   Car   Co.   v.   Gardner    (3 

Pinney,   78),   1130. 
Pullman  Car  Co.  v.   Gaylord    (23 

Am.  L.  Reg.  788),  1130. 
Pullman  Palace  Car  Co.  v.  Gavin 
(93    Tenn.    53,    23    S.    W.    70, 
42  Am.  St.  Rep.  902,  21  L.  R. 
A.  298),  1131. 
Pullman   Palace   Car   Co.   v.   Hall 
(106   Ga.    765,    32   S.   E.   Rep. 
923,   71   Am-  St.  Rep   293,   44 
L.  R.  A.  790),  1130,  1131. 
Pullman  Palace  Car  Co.  v.  Hatch 
(30    Tex.    Civ.    App.     303,     70 
S.  W.  771),  113L 
Pullman  Palace  Car  Co.  v.  Hocker 
(—Tex.    Civ.    App.—,    93    S. 
W.  Rep.  1009),  1139. 
Pullman  Palace  Car  Co.  v.  Hun- 
ter   (107    Ky.    519,    54    S.    W. 
Rep.   845,    47   L.   R.   A.   286), 
1131. 
Pullman's  Palace  Car  Co.  v.  King 
(99  Fed.  380,  39  C.  C.  A.  573), 
1138. 
Pullman  Co.  v.  Krauss  ( —  Ala.  — , 
40    So.    Rep.    398),    966,    1077, 
1139. 
Pullman   Palace  Car  Co.   v.   Lau- 
rence   (74    Miss.    782,    22    So. 
53),   205,   1130,   1145. 
Pullman    Palace    Car    Co.    v.    Lee 
(49  111.  App.  75),  1090,  1136, 
1139. 


cxc 


TABLE   OF    CASES   CITED, 


[references    ABE 

Pullman  Car  Co.  v.  Lowe  (28  Neb. 

239),   1130. 
Pullman  Palace  Car  Co.  v.  Marsh 

(24    Ind.   App.    129,   53    N.   E. 

782),   1139. 
Pullman  Palace  Car  Co,  v.  Martin 

(92    Ga.    161,   18    S.   E.   Rep. 

364),   1131. 
Pullman   Palace  Car  Co.  v.   Mar- 
tin (95  Ga.  314,  22  S.  E.  Rep. 

700,  29  L.  R.  A.  498),  1131. 
Pullman  Car  Co.  v.  Matthe\ws  (74 

Tex.   654),   1131. 
Pullman  Co.  v.  Norton  (Tex.  Civ. 

App.  91  S.  W.  Rep.  841),  916, 

1131,  1135. 
Pullman   Car   Co.   v.   Pollock    (69 

Tex.  120),  1090,  1130,  1131. 
Pullman  Car  Co.  v.  Reed   (75  111. 

125),  1033,  1039,  1061. 
Pullman    Car    Co.    v.    Smith    (79 

Tex.  468,  23  Am.  St.  Rep.  356, 

13   L.   R.  A.   215),   1142. 
Pullman  Car  Co.  v.  Smith  (73  111. 

360),   1130. 
Purcell   V.   Railroad   Co.    (108   N. 

Car.    414,    12    L.   R.    A.    113), 

1110. 
Purdy  V.  Railroad  Co.  (162  N.  Y. 

42,  56  N.  E.  508,  48  L.  R.  A. 

669,    aff'g.,    54    N.    Y.    Supp. 

1114,   33   App.  Div.   643),   596. 
Purple  V.  Railroad  Co.    (114  Fed. 

123,  51  C.  C.  A.  564,  57  L.  R. 

A.  700),  964,  1001. 
Putnam   v.    Southern   Pacific   Co, 

(21   Ore.  230,   27  Pac.   1033), 

1386. 
Purvis  V.  Coleman  (21  N.  Y.  Ill), 

1271,   1272. 
Putnam  v.  Railroad  Co.  (55  N.  Y. 

108),  969,   974,  978,   1230. 
Pym    V.    Railway    (4    Best    &    S. 

396),  1386,  1397. 
Pym  V.  Railway  (2  F.  &  F.  619), 

909. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 


Quackenbush  v.  Railroad  Co.   (71 

Wis.   472),    1389. 
Quaife   v.   Railway   Co.    (48   Wis, 

513),    936. 
Queensland  &  Nat.  Bank  v.  Steam 

Nav.    Co.    (67    Law    J.    Q.    B. 

402,    (1898)    1   Q.    B.    567,    78 

Law  T.   (N.  S.)   67,  46  Wkly, 

Rep.  324,  8  Asp.  338),  507. 
Querini   v.    Stamphalia    (19    Fed, 

Rep.  123),  800. 
Quigley  v.  Railroad  Co.   (11  Nev, 

350),   1438,  1441. 
Quill    V.    So.    Pac.    Co.    (140    Cal, 

268,  73  Pac.  Rep.   991),   1397, 
Quimby     v.     Railroad     Co.     (150 

Mass.  365),  1075. 
Quimby  v.  Vanderbilt   (17  N.  Y. 

306),     226,    238,    1050,     1052, 

1109. 
Quin   v.   Moore    (15   N,   Y,   432), 

1397. 
Quincy  Coal  Co,  v.  Hood   (77  111, 

68),  1386. 
Quinlan    v.    Pew    (56    Fed.    132), 

344, 
Quinn   v.    Johnson   Forge   Co,    (9 

Houst.   338),   1397. 
Quinn  v.  Railroad  Co.   (56  Conn. 

44,  12  Atl.  Rep.  97),  1391. 
Quinn  v.   Railroad   Co.    (34  Hun, 

331),  1422. 
Quinn    v.    Railroad    Co.    (98    Ky. 

231,  32   S.  W.  742),  972. 
Quinn  v.  Railroad    (51   111.   495), 

1198. 
Quinn  v.   Railway  Co.    (29    S.   C. 

381),    1440. 


TABLE  OF   CASES   CITED. 


CXCl 


[BEF£B£NC£S    are 


Raben  v.  Railway  Co.    (73  Iowa, 

579),   1118,    1121,   1127. 
Raben  v.  Railway  Co.    (74   Iowa, 

732),  1127,  1178. 
Race  V.  Union  Ferry  Co.  (138  N. 

Y.  644,  34  N.  E.  280,  53  N.  Y. 

St.  Rep.  9,  reversing  19  N.  Y. 

Supp.  675),  942. 
Radejky  v.  Sargent  (77  Conn.  110, 

58  Atl.  Rep.  709),  1396. 
Radley    v.    Railway    Co.    (44    Or. 

332,  75  Pac.  212),  1000,  1218. 
Ragan    v.    Aiken    (9    Lea,    609), 

521. 
Ragsdale,     Harper     &    Weathers 

V.  Railway  Co.   (119  Ga.  627, 

46  S.  E.  Rep.  832),  508. 
Rahilly  v.  Railway  Co.   (66  Minn. 

153,  68  N.  W.  853),  1056. 
Railroad  Co.     See  Railway  Co.  v. 

Able  (59  111.  131),  1126,  1178, 

1180. 
Railway   Co.    v.    Abels    (60   Miss. 

1017),   339,   425,    1354. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Ackley   (94  U.  S. 

179),   574,   1023. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Adams    (42    111. 

474),  634,  638. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Adams    (60    111. 

App.  571),  1060,   1433. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Adams  (55  Penn. 

St.   499),  1384. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Adams    (90   Va. 

393,  18  S.  E.  673,  44  Am.  St. 

Rep.    916,    22    L.    R.    A    530), 

859. 
Railroad   Co.  v.  Addison   ( — Tex. 

Civ.   App.  — ,  93   S.  W.  Rep. 

1081),  1429. 
Railroad     Co.     v.     Addizoat     (17 

Bradw.       (111.      App.)       632), 

1285,   1286,   1293. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Railroad   Co.   v.   Akers    (4   Kans. 

453),    1362. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Allen  ( —  Md.  — , 

62  Atl.   Rep.    245.)    895. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Allen    (31    Ind. 

394),  401. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Allen  (— Ky.— ,  89 

S.  W.  Rep.  150),  967,  993. 
Railroad   Co.  v.   Allen    (53   Penn. 

St.  276),   1422. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Allgood   (113  Ala. 

163,  20  So.  986),  151,  1304. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Allison   (59   Tex. 

193),   240,   480. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Anchonda  (5  Tex. 

Ct.   Rep.   289,    68    S.   W.   Rep. 

743),  1111,  1427. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Anderson  (6  A.  & 

Eng.  R.   Cas.  407),   309. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Anderson  (72  Md. 

519),  1123,  1219. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Anderson     (77 

Miss.    28,    25    So.    Rep.    865), 

1200. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Anderson  (82  Tex. 

516,  17  S.  W.  1039,  27  Am.  St. 

Rep.    902),    990. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Anderson  (90  Va. 

1,  17  S.  E.  Rep.  757,  44  Am. 

St.    Rep.    884),    1056. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Andrews  (11  Colo. 

App.    204,    53   Pac.    518),    948. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Andrews  (39  Md. 

329),  1175,  1209. 
Railroad     Co.     v.     Androscoggin 

Mills     (22    Wall.     594),     238. 

408. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Anoka  Nat.  Bank 

(108    Fed.    482,    47    C.    C.    A. 

454),  264. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Anthony  (24  Tex. 

Civ.    App.    9,   57    S.   W.   897), 

911. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Apperson   (49  111. 

480),    949. 


czcii 


TABLE  OP   CASES   CITED. 


[BEFEBENCES   ABE 

Railroad    Co.    v.    Applewhite    (52 

Ind.  540),  1060. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Arms    (15    Neb. 

69),    708. 
Railroad  Co.   v.  Arms    (91   U.   S. 

489),  1441,  1443,  1433. 
Railroad   v.  Arnol    (144   111.   261, 

33  N.  E.  204,  19  L.  R.  A.  313, 

aff'g.,  46  111.  App.  157),  899. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Arnold    (80  Ala. 

COO),   936,   1174,   1430. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Arnold    (8    Ind. 

App.  297,  34  N.  E.  742,)   1062, 

1433. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Arnold    (26   Ind. 

App.  190,  59  N.  E.  394),  980. 
Railroad  Co.  v.   Ashley    (67   Fed. 

209,  14  C.  C.  A.  368,  28  U.  S. 

App.  375),  1072,  1073,  1217. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Ashby    (79    Va. 

130),   1060. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Ashmeade  (58  111. 

487),   122,   147. 
Railroad   Co.  v.   Asmore    (88   Ga. 

529,  15  S.  E.  Rep.   13,   16  L. 

R.  A.  53),  1033,  1079,  1085. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Aspell    (23  Penn. 

St.  147),  959,  1180. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Atchison  T.  &  S. 

F.  R.  Co.  (73  Fed.  438;  appeal 

dismissed,  84  Fed.  214,  51  U. 

S.  App.  599,  28  C.  C.  A.  481), 

565. 
Railroad  v.  Aten   (Tex.  Civ.  App. 

81  S.  W.  Rep.  346),  499. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Athon    (6    Ind. 

App.  295,  33  N.  E.  469,  51  Am. 

St.  Rep.  303),  991. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Ault  (10  Ind.  App. 

661,  38  N.  E.  492),  1066. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Axley     (47    111. 

App.  307),  899,  1020,  1217. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Ayres   (84  Tenn. 

725).   1388. 
Railroad   Co.  v.  Ayres   (29  N.  J. 

L.  393,  80  Am.  Dec.  215),  708. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Railroad    Co.    v.    Baches    (55    111. 

379),  1397. 
Railroad  Co.  v.   Bailey   (40  Miss. 

395),   1440,  1442. 
Railroad    Co.   v.    Baker    (98    Fed. 

694,  39  C.  C.  A.  237,  50  L.  R. 

A.   201),   919. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Baldoni   (115  Ga. 

1013,  42  S.  E.  364),  1043. 
Railroad     Co.     v.     Baldwin     (113 

Tenn.  205,  81  S.  W.  Rep.  599), 

1242,    1246,    1249,   1253. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Ball    (53  N.  J.  L. 

283),  1200. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Ballard    (85   Ky. 

307),  1101,   1433. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Bank  (41  111.  App. 

287),  184. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Bank    (10   Neb. 

556),  162. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Bank   (123  U.  S. 

727),   187,   184,   177. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Bank    (20    Wis. 

130),   232. 
Railroad   Co.  v.   Banks    (132  Ala. 

471,    31    So.    Rep.    573),    1397. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Banton  (54  Penn. 

St.  495),  1397. 
Railroad   Co.   v.    Barger    (80   Md. 

23,   30   Atl.    560,    26   L.   R.   A. 

220,    45    Am.    St.    Rep.    319), 

978,   980,   1094,   1102,   1434. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Barkhouse    (100 

Ala.  543,  13  So.  534),  175,  668. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Barkley    (13  Ky. 

Law  Rep.  331),  1019,  1060. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Barnard   (3  Ben. 

39),    807. 
Railroad    Co.   v.    Barnes    (104   N. 

Car.  25),  730. 
Railroad   Co.  v.   Barron    (5  Wall. 

90),  916,   1397. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Bartram  (11  Ohio 

St.  457),   1117,   1041,   1032. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Bass  (104  Ga.  390, 

30  S.  E.  Rep.  874),  1396. 


TABLE  OF   CASES    CITED. 


CXCUl 


[references  are 

Railroad  Co.  v.  Batchler  (32  Tex. 

Civ.   App.    14,    73    S.   W.    981, 

83    S.    W.    Rep.    902),    1016, 

1099,   1102,   1434. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Bauer    (66    111. 

App.  124),  1033,  1085. 
Railroad     Co.     v.     Bauldauf     (16 

Penn.  St.  67),  401,  450,  1299. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Bayse    (17    Ky. 

Law  Rep.  105,  30  S.  W.  Rep. 

600),   1118. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Beaird    (24    111. 

App.  322),  1334,  1343. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Bean  (9  Ind.  App. 

240,  36  N.  E.  443),  1174,  1179. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Bean    (94   Tenn. 

388,  29  S.  W.  Rep.  370),  1389. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Beatie    (66    Ga. 

438),  419. 
Railroad  Co.   v.   Beaver    (199   111. 

34,  65  N.  E.  Rep.  144),  1397. 
Railroad   Co.  v.  Becker    (32  Fed. 

849),  526. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Bedell    (11  Colo. 

App.  139,  54  Pac.  280),  1225. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Beebe  (174  111.  13, 

50    N.    E.    1019,    43    L.    R.    A. 

210,  66  Am.  St.  Rep  253,  aff'g., 

69    111.    App.    363),    210,    212, 

215,  220,  895,  1003,  1072,  1073, 

1111,  1202. 
Railroad  Co.  v.   Beggs   (Sup.  Ct. 

111.,  5  C.  L.  J.  193),  1001. 
Railroad   v.   Behlmer    (175   U.    S. 

648,  20  Sup.  Ct.  R.  209,  44  L. 

Ed.  309,  reversing  Behlmer  v. 

Railroad,  83   Ked.   898,   28   C. 

C.  A.  229,   42  U.  S.  App.  581, 

modifying  71  Fed.  835),   526, 

564,  570. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Bell  (70  111.  102), 

1230. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Bell  (13  Ky.  Law 

Rep.   393),   445,   464,   657. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Bell  (100  Ky.  203, 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

38  S.  W.  3),  899,  1003,  1072, 

1073. 
Railroad   Co.   v.    Bell    (122   Penn. 

St.  58),  1219. 
Railroad  Co.  v.   Bender    (24  Tex. 

Civ.  App.  133,  57  S.  W.  574), 

990. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Bensley    (69   111. 

630),  705. 
Railroad   Co.   v.    Benson    (86   Ga. 

203,    22    Am.    St.    Rep.    446), 

313. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Benson  (85  Tenn. 

627),   972,   1113. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Bentz  (108  Tenn. 

670,  69  S.  W.  317,  91  Am.  St. 

Rep.  763),  1397. 
Railroad   Co.  v.   Berger    (64   Ark. 

613,  44  S.  W.  Rep.  809),  1102. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Bergman    (Tex. 

Civ.  App.,  3  Tex.  Ct.  Rep.  168, 

64  S.  W.  Rep.  999),  292,  298. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Berg's  Admr.   (17 

Ky.  Law  Rep.  1105,  32  S.  W. 

Rep.    616),   1192. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Berry  (116  Ga.  19, 

42    S.   E.    371),   187,    651,    714. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Berry    (31    Ind. 

App.  556,  68  N.  E.  Rep.  702), 

1334. 
Railroad   Co.   v.    Berry    (53   Kan. 

112,    36    Pac.    53,    42    Am.    St. 

Rep.    278),   895,    964. 
Railroad  Co.  v.   Berry   (68  Penn. 

St.    272),   226. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Berry   (Tex.  Civ. 

App.,  84  S.  W.  258),  964,  1429. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Berry    (31    Tex. 

Civ.   App.   3,    71    S.   W.    326), 

1347. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Best  (169  111.  301, 

48  N.  E.  684,  reversing  68  111. 

App.  532),  899,  964. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Best  (93  Tex.  344, 

55  S.  W.  315),  1041. 


cxciv 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


[REFERENCES    ARE 

Railroad  Co.  v.  Biddle  (Penn.  St., 

IG  Atl.  Rep.  488),   1091. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Bigelow    (68  Ga. 

219),   1045. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Bigger   (66  Miss. 

319),   334,  336. 
Railroad   Co.  v.   Bigham    (4   Tex. 

Ct.  Rep.   658,   67   S.   W.   Rep. 

522),   1362. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Bills    (118    Ind. 

221),    1065. 
Railroad    Co.    v.   Birney    (71    111. 

392),   1110,   1431. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Bitterman    (128 

Fed.  176;  afflrmed,  —  C.  C.  A. 

— ,  144  Fed.   34),  1056. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Blair   (104  Tenn. 

212,  55  S.  W.  154),  1054. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Blocher   (27  Md. 

277),  1442. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Bluraenthal    (160 

111.  40,  43  N.  E.  809,  aff'g.,  57 

111.  App.  538),  911,  1003,  1413. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Blye  (43  111.  App. 

612),   1118. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Board  of  Railroad 

Commissioners    of     State    of 

North  Carolina  (90  Fed.  33), 

578. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Bogard   (78  Miss. 

11,  27  So.  Rep.  879),  430,  444, 

450. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Bogle  (101  Tenn. 

40,  46  S.  W.  760),  1000,  1218. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Bohannon  (6  Tex. 

Ct.  Rep.  281,  71   S.  W.   776), 

1084. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Bonaud    (58  Ga. 

180),  1106. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Books   (57  Penn. 

St.    339),   961. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Booth  (Tex.  Civ. 

App.,  39  S.  W.  Rep.  585),  621. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Berk    (23   R.    I. 

218,    49    Atl.    965),    944. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Railroad    Co.    v.    Bossut    (10    N. 

Mex.   322,   62    Pac.    977),   740, 

872. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Bostwick  (100  Ga. 

96,  27  S.  E.  Rep.  725),  1094. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Bourne  &  Embry 

(15  Ky.  Law  Rep.  445),  233, 

449,  1353. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Bowen    (40   Ind. 

545),  1229. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Bowler  &  Burdick 

Co.  (63  Ohio  St.  274,  58  N.  E. 

813),    1251. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Boyce    (73    111. 

510),    1249. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Boyd  (91  111.  268), 

201,  206,  416,  417. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Boyer  (91  Ga.  115, 

16  S.  E.  Rep.  953),  1348. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Boyer   (97   Penn. 

St.    91),    1236. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Brackman  (78  111. 

App.  141),  990. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Bradford  (86  Ala. 

574),  1389. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Brady    (32    Md. 

333),  451. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Brazzill   (78  Tex. 

317),    1440. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Brelsford   (13  III 

App.  251),  334,  33S. 
Railroad  Co.  v.   Brewing  Co.   (96 

Tenn.    677,    86    S.    W.    392), 

1348. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Brice  (84  Ky.  298, 

1  S.  W.  Rep.  483),  1391. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Bricketts     (72 

Miss.  491),  657. 
Railroad   Co.  v.   Bridger    (94   Ga. 

471,   20   S.   E.  Rep.   349),   472. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Bromley  (17  C.  B. 

372),    67. 

Railroad  Co.  v.  Brookhaven  (71 
Miss.  663,  16  So.  252),  867. 

Railroad  Co.  v.  Brooks  (81  111. 
245),   1001. 


TABLE  OF   CASES   CITED. 


CXCV 


[bkferences  are 

Railroad   Co.   v.   Brooks    (83   Ky. 

129),    1401. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Brooks  (27  Penn. 

St.    339),    997. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Brown    (62   Ark. 

254,  35  S.  W.  Rep.  225),  205. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Brown   (123  Fed. 

946),   574,   582,   583,  586. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Brown    (123   111. 

162,  14  N.  E.  Rep.  197,  5  Am. 

St.  Rep.   510),   1003,   1204. 
Railroad   Co.   v.    Brown    (152    111. 

484,  39  N.  E.  273,  aff'g.,  51  111. 

App.  656),  444,  455. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Brown    ( — Kan. 

— ,  84  Pac.  Rep.  1026),  927. 
Railroad    Co.   v.   Brown    (2   Kan. 

App.  604,  42  Pac.   588),  1084. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Brown   (26  Kan. 

443),    1401. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Brown    ( —   Ky. 

— ,  90  S.  W.  Rep.   567),  1354. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Brown  (177  Mass. 

65,  58  N.  E.  189,  52  L.  R.  A. 

418),   944. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Brown   (77  Miss. 

338,  28  So.  949),  1173. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Brown  (Tex.  Civ. 

App.,  85  S.  W.  Rep.  44),  638. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Brown   (17  Wall. 

450),    918,    972. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Brownlee     (14 

Bush.   590),   408. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Bryan    (86    Ga. 

312),  1094,  1099. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Bryan    (90    111. 

126),   1441. 
Railroad   Co.   v.  Bryant    (73   Ga. 

722),  419. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Bryant  (Tex.  Civ. 

App.,    72    S.    W.    Rep.    8&5), 

1113,  1197,  1230. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Buck  (96  Ind. 

346),  1117,  1123,  1432. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Railroad    Co.    v.   Buckmaster    (74 

111.   App.   575),   920. 
Railroad  Co.   v.   Buckner    (28   111. 

299),    1231. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Bullock  (60  N.  J. 

L.  24,  36  Atl.  773,  37  L.  R.  A. 

417),    1052,    1077,    1080,    1249. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Bundy    (97    111. 

App.  202),  495. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Burke    (6    Cold. 

45),   1376,    1384,    1397. 
Railroad   Co.  v.   Burke    (53  Miss. 

200),   961,   981,   985,   1444.   • 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Burke    (55   Tex. 

323),    331,    403. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Burke   (13  Wend. 

611),   497,   892. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Burns    (60    111. 

284),  496,  520,  649. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Burns   (51   N.  J. 

L.    340),    1004. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Burnsed  (70  Miss. 

437,    12    So.    958,    35   Am.    St. 

Rep.  656),  990. 
Railroad    Co.   v.   Burr    (130    Fed. 

847,  65  C.  C.  A.  331),  784. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Burrows  (62  Kan. 

89,  61  Pac.  439),  1217,  1413. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Burrows  (33  Mich. 

6),    300,    496,    654. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Burt     (92    Ala. 

291,  9  So.  410,  13  L.  R.  A.  95), 

1118. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Burton   (139  Ind. 

357,  37  N.  E.  Rep.  150,  38  N. 

E.   Rep.   594),    1401. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Butler   (103  Ind. 

31),  1418. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Butler   (112  Ind. 

598),   1117. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Button  (24  Conn. 

468),    242. 
Railroad   Co.    v.    Byrne    (205    111. 

9,  68  N.  E.  720,  aff'g.,  105  111. 

App.    96;    s.    c.    78     111.     App. 

204),    1426. 


CXCVl 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED, 


[references  are  to  sections.] 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Byrum    (153   111 


131,  38  N.  E.  578,  aft'Q-,  48  111. 

App.  41),  895,  1118,  1179. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Caffrey   (128  Fed. 

770),  1056. 
Railroad    Co.   v.   Calderwood    (89 

Ala.  247),  1118,  1417,  1419. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Cameron  (66  Fed. 

709,  14  C.  C.  A.  358,  32  U.  S. 

App.  67),   1060. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Camp    (53    Ga. 

596),  702. 
Railroad     Co.     v.     Campbell      (7 

Heisk.   253),   131,    132,   230. 
Railroad  Co,  v.  Campbell    ( —  111. 

— ,  76  N,  B,  Rep.   346),   1362. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Campbell     (128 

Mass.  104),  870. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Campbell  (36  Ohio 

St.   647),   1049,   1299. 
Railroad  Co.  v,  Cantrell  (37  Ark. 

519),  1221. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Carey    (56    Ind. 

396),   1417. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Carloch    (69   111. 

App.  498),  828. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Carmichael    (90 

Ala.  19,  9  L.  R.  A.  338),  1067. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Carothers  (23  Ky. 

Law  Rep.  1673,  65  S.  W,  833), 

1423 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Carper  (112  Ind. 

26),  1067,  1221. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Carr  (47  111.  App. 

3.53),   994. 
Railroad  Co.  v,  Carr  (71  Md.  135), 

963. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Carroll  (6  Heisk. 

347),  916. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Carrow    (73   111. 

348),  1249. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Carter    (165   111. 

570,  46  N.  E.  374,  36  L.  R.  A. 

527,    reversing    62    111.    App. 

618),  230,  685,  696,  702. 


Railroad   Co.   v.   Casazza    (83   111. 

App.  421),  1090. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Case    (9    Bush, 

728),  1236,  1397. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Casey    (52    Tex. 

112),  1082. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Cason    (72    Md. 

377),  1197. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Cates    (14    Ind. 

App.  172,  41  N.  E.  712),  1062. 
Railroad   Co.   v.  Catron    (102  Ky. 

323,  43  S.  W.  Rep.  443),  972. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Cauthen  (115  Ga. 

422,  41  S.  E.  653),  640. 
Railroad    Co.   v.    Chamberlain    (4 

Okl.  542,  46  Pac.  499),  1436. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Chambers  (71  111, 

519),  1126,  1181. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Chambers     ( — 

Ohio  St.—,  76  N.  E.  Rep.  91), 

1388. 
Railroad    Co.   v.    Chancellor    (165 

III.  438,  46  N.  E.  269,  revers- 
ing 60  111.  App.  525),  1008. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Charmon  (161  Ind. 

95,  67  N.  E.  Rep.  923),  1389. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Chastine  (54  Miss. 

503),    1026. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Cheek    (152   Ind. 

663,  53  N.  E.  641),  1112. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Chester   (57  Ind. 

297),   1379,   1384. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Chestnut    Bros. 

(—   Ky.    — ,    89    S.    W.    Rep. 

298),    651.  ,^ 

Railroad  Co.   v.   Chestnut  &  Bro. 

24  Ky.  Law  Rep.  1846,  72  S. 

W.   351),   233,   248. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Chipman     (146 

Mass.    107),    1055. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Christison  (39  111. 

App.  495),  1033. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Church    (58  Fed. 

600,   7   C.   C.   A.   384,   5  U.   S. 

App.  484),  847. 
Railroad   Co.   v,   Clark    (96   Tex. 


I 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


CXCVll 


[refeeences  are  to  sections.] 


349,    72   S.   W.   Rep.    584,   re- 
versing   (Tex.    Civ.   App.)    71 

S.  W.  Rep.  587),  1423. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Clark   (Tex.  Civ. 

App.,    81-    S.    W.    Rep.    821), 

895. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Clarke    (97    Ga. 

706,  25  S.  E.  Rep.  368),  1041, 

1052. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Clarke  (152  U.  S. 

230,  14  Sup.  Ct.  R.  579),  1396. 
Railroad   Co.  v.  Clausen   (173   111. 

100,  50  N.  E.  680,  aff'g.,  70  111. 

App.  550),  1118. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Clayton    (78   111. 

616),   1301. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Cleary    (77    Mo. 

634),   167. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Clemmons     (55 

Tex.   88),   1200. 
Railroad     Co.     v.     Cleveland     (2 

Bush,  468),  704. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Cobb  (48  111.  402), 

747,   748. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Cobb  (64  111.  128), 

147,  496. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Cody  (119  Ga.  371, 

46   S.  E.  429),   1339. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Cohen    (66    111. 

App.  318),  1352. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Cohn     (22    Tex. 

Civ.   App.   11,   53    S.  W.   Rep. 

698),   1119,    1121,   1128. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Cole  (68  Ga.  623), 

130. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Coleman  (28  Mich. 

440),    1181.    1184. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Collier  (104  Tenn. 

189,  54  S.  W.  Rep.  980),  1180. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Collins    (2    Du- 

vall,  114),  960. 
Railroad   Co.    v.    Collins    (56   111. 

212),   1246,   1249. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Collins   (47  Kan. 

11,   27  Pac.  99),  442. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Commercial  Nat'l 


Bank    (123    U.    S.    727,   31   L. 

Ed.   287),   177,   184,   187. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Commonwealth 

(99  Ky.  132,  35  S.  W.  129,  43 

L.  R.  A.  541,  59  Am.  St.  Rep. 

457,  18  Ky.  L.  Rep.  42),  574. 
Railroad    Co.     v.     Commonwealth 

(102   Ky.   300,   43   S.   W.   458, 

53  L.  R.  A.  149),  931. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Commonwealth 

(103   Ky.   605,  45   S.  W.   Rep. 

880,  46  S.  W.  Rep.  697),  929. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Commonwealth 

(104  Ky.   226,  47   S.  W.  Rep. 

598,    707,   20   Ky.   L.   R.    1380, 

43  L.  R.  A.  541),  601. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Commonwealth 

(106   Ky.    633,    51    S.   W.    164, 

90  Am.  St.  Rep.  236,  21  Ky.  L. 

Rep.   232),  571,  601. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Commonwealth 

(20   Ky.   L.  Rep.    1099,   48    S. 

W.  416),  588. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Commonwealth 

(22  Ky.  L.  Rep.  328,  57  S.  W. 

508),    574. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Commonwealth 

(23  Ky.  L.  Rep.  544,  63  S.  W. 

448),    574. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Commonwealth 

(23  Ky.  L.  R.  1159,  64  S.  W. 

975),    598. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Commonwealth 

(24  Ky.  L.  R.  1593,  1609,  1779, 

71  S.  W.  910),   574. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Commonwealth 

(25  Ky.  L.  R.  1442,  78  S.  W. 

Rep.  167),  972. 
Railroad    Co.     v.     Commonwealth 

of  Kentucky    (179   U.   S.   388, 

45  L.  Ed.  244,  aff'g  21  Ky.  L. 

R.    228,   51   S.   W.   Rep.    160), 

972. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Commonwealth 

of  Kentucky    (183  U.   S.   503, 

22  Sup.  Ct.  R.  95),  598. 


cxcvin 


TABLE  OF   CASES  CITED, 


[BEFEEENCES    ABE 

Railroad  Co.  v.  Condon   (10  Ind. 

App.   536,   38   N.   B.   71),   243. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Condor    (75   Ga. 

51),   1442. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Conklin  (32  Kan. 

55,)   1250. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Conley    (6    Ind. 

App.    9,    32    N.   E.   96),    1040, 

1433. 
Railroad  Co.  v.   Connell    (112   111. 

295),  1049,  1061.  1090. 
Railroad   Co.    v.    Conrad    (4   Ind. 

App.  83,  30  N.  E.  406),  1064. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Conroy    (68    111. 

560),    952. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Consolidated  Cat- 
tle Co.   (59  Kan.  Ill,  52  Pac. 

71),   1318. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Constantine    (14 

Ky.  Law  Rep.  432),  1118. 
Railroad     Co.     v.     Conway     (112 

Penn.    St.    511,    4    Atl.    Rep. 

362),  1389. 
Railroad    Co.   v.    Cook    (63   Miss. 

38),    1378. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Cooper  (120  Ind. 

469,    16    Am.    St.    Rep.    334), 

996,  1083,  1230. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Cooper    (19   Ky. 

Law  Rep.  1152,  42  S.  W.  Rep. 

1134),  23L 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Cooper    (21   Ky. 

Law  Rep.  1644,  56  S.  W.  Rep. 

144),   417. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Copeland  (63  Ala. 

219),   230,   232,   233. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Copeland  (24  111. 

332),  226,  230,  238,  1246,  1296, 

1302. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Coppage  (12  Ky. 

Law  Rep.   200),  1389. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Corcoran  (40  Ark. 

375),  135.5. 
Railroad  Co.   v.  Cotton  Mills    (81 

Ga.  522),  236,  247,  472. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Railroad  Co.  v.  Coulburn  (69  Md. 

361,    16  Atl.   Rep.   208),   1179. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Cowherd  (120  Ala. 

51,  23   So.  793),  450,   1354. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Cowles    (32    111. 

116),  236. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Cowser   (57  Tex. 

293),  1417. 
Railroad   Co.  v.   Coyle    (55   Penn. 

St.  396),  1423. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Cozby    (69    111. 

App.  256),  1391. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Cragin    (71    111. 

177),   1411. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Craig  (102  Tenn. 

298,   52   S.  W.   164),   404,  416. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Crawford   (65  111. 

App.   113),  475,   521. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Creighton    (106 

Ky.  42,   50   S.   W.   Rep.   227), 

1397,  1401. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Crenshaw  (65  Ala. 

566),  1417. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Crews    (53    111. 

App.   50),   497. 
Railroad     Co.    v.     Crittenden     (4 

Kan.   App.   512,   44  Pac.  Rep. 

1000),  442. 

Railroad  Co.  v.  Cromwell   (98  Va. 

227,  35   S.  E.   444,   81  Am.   St. 

Rep.    722,    49    L.   R.   A.    462), 

498,   505. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Crow    (54    Neb. 

747,  74  N.  W.  1066,  69  Am.  St. 

Rep.  741),  1003,  1050,  1397, 

1413. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Crown  Coal  Co.      I 

(43  111.  App.  228),  588. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Crozier    (13   Ky. 

Law  Rep.  175),  231. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Crudup  (63  Miss. 

291),  1388,  1390.  1397. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Grumpier    (122 

Fed.  425,  59  C.  C.  A.  51),  947, 

1414. 


TABLE  OF    CASES  CITED. 


CXCIX 


[references    ABE    TO    SECTIONS.] 


Railroad  Co.  v.   Crunk   (119   Ind. 

542,  21  N.  E.  Rep.  31,  12  Am. 

St.  Rep.  443),  991,  992,  1179. 

Railroad  Co.   v.   Cunningham    (67 

111.    316),    1033. 
Railroad  Co.  v.   Cunningham    (88 

111.   App.    289),    449. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Cunningham  (102 

111.  App.  206),  1177. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Curran   (19  Ohio 

St.  1),  450,  1001,  1073. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Curtis    (80    111. 

324),   304. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Curtis    (51   Neb. 

442,  71  S.  W.  Rep.  42,  66  Am. 

St.  Rep.  456),  147. 
Railroad    Co.    v.     Czaja     (59     111. 

App.  21),  1219. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Dalby     (19    111. 

353),  1033. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Dalton    (65    Kan. 

661,  70  Pac.  645),  1427. 
Railroad    Co.   v.    Darting    (6    Ind. 

App.  375,  33   N.  E.  636),  980. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Davenport    (177 

111.    110,   52-  N.  E.   266,   aff'g., 

75  111.  App.  579),  964. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  David    (6  Heisk. 

261),    130,   282,    309. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Davidson  (76  Fed. 

518,  22  C.  C.  A.  306,  46  U.  S. 

App.   300;    s.   c.   64   Fed.   301, 

12  C.  C.  A.  118,  24  U.  S.  App. 

354),    934,   1184,    1423. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Davis  (159  111.  53, 

42  N.  E.  382,  50  Am.  St.  Rep. 

143,   aff'g.,   54   111.   App.   130), 

410,   505,   508. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Davis    (86   Hun, 

86.   34    N.   Y.    Supp.   206;    af- 
firmed   without    opinion,    158 

N.    Y.    674,    52    N.    E.    1125), 

870. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Davis   (104  Tenn. 

442,  58  S.  W.  Rep.  296),  1397. 


Railroad  Co.  v.  Day  (20  111.  375), 

652,  660. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Dean     (98    Tex. 

517,   85    S.   W.    Rep.    1135,   70 

L.  R.  A.  943,  afftrming    (Tex. 

Civ.    App.)     82     S.    W.    Rep. 

524),    1100,    1427. 
Railroad   Co.  v.  Dear   ( — Miss. — , 

39  So.  Rep.  812),  1118. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Decker    (14    Ky. 

Law  Rep.  108),  1177. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Delaney    (82    111. 

198),  1397. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Deloney  (65  Ark. 

177,  45  S.  W.  351,  67  Am.  St. 

Rep.  913),  1065,  1424,  1427. 
Railroad   Co.   v.    Delong    (109   111. 

App.  241),  1414. 
Railroad  Co.  \.  Depp  (17  Ky.  Law 

Rep.  1049,  33  S.  W.  Rep.  417), 

1123. 
Railroad   Co.   v.  Derby    (14   How, 

468),  401,  895,  898,  960,  1021, 

1200. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Dewey    (26    111. 

255),   940. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Dewin    (86    111. 

296),     1025. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  De  Witt  (1  Colo. 

App.  419,  29  Pac.  524),  613. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Dexter   ( — Fla. — , 

39    So.    Rep.    634),    408,    1357. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Diamond  Coal  Co. 

(61    Ohio    St.    242,    55    N.    E. 

616),  589. 
Railroad    Co.   v.    Diamond   Roller 

Mills    (Tex.   Civ.   App.,   82    S. 

W.   Rep.   660),   1348. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Dickerson  (4  Kan. 

App.   345,   45  Pac.   975),   1033. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Dickinson  (89  Ga. 

455,  15  S.  E.  Rep.  534),  1119, 

1180. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Dickson  (143  111. 

368,  32  N.  E.  380,  aif'g.,  42  111. 

App.  363),  1202. 


cc 


TABLE  OF    CASES  CITED. 


[references  are  to  sections.] 


Railroad    Co.   v.    Dies    (91    Tenn. 

177,  18  S.  W.  266,  30  Am.  St. 

Rep.  871),  339.  498,  508. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Diether   (10  Ind. 

App.   206,   37  N.  E.   39,   1069, 

53    Am.    St.    Rep.    385),    130, 

132,    828,    859. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Dill  (48  Kan.  210, 

29  Pac.  148),  404,  408. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Dills    (4    Bush, 

593),  1436. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Dismukes  (94  Ala. 

131,   10   So.   289,   17   L.   R.   A. 

113),   537. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Doan  (195  111.  168, 

62    N.    E.    826,    aff'g.,    93    111. 

App.  247),  918,  1186. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Doan  (153  Ind.  10, 

53  N.  E.  937,  45  L.  R.  A.  427), 

945. 
Railroad   Co.  v.  Dorman    (72   111. 

504),   339. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Dorough  (72  Tex. 

108),  1221. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Dorsey   (30  Tex. 

Civ.  App.  377,  70  S.  W.  575), 

645. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Dougherty    (86 
Ga.  744,  22  Am.  St.  Rep.  499), 

1065. 

Railroad  Co.  v.  Doyle    (142   Fed. 

669),  415. 
Railroad   Co.  v.   Doyle    (60  Miss. 

977),   1388. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Drake    (33    111. 

App.  114),  1111. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Driscoll    (207   111. 

9,  69  N.  E.  Rep.  620),  1397. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Dunbar    (20   111. 

623),   87,  339. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Du  Bose  (120  Ga. 

339,  47  S.  E.  Rep.  917),  965. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Duby    (38    Ind. 

294),   960. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Dufrain    (36    111. 

App.  352),  1177. 


Railroad  Co.  v.  Dumser   (161  III. 

190,  43  N.  E.  698,  aff'g.,  60  111. 

App.  93),   1050,   1198. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Duncan   (28  Ind. 

441),    1180. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Duncan    &    Orr 

(137    Ala.    446,    34    So.    988), 

132. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Dunden  (37  Kan. 

1),  1389,   1397. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Dunham  (68  Tex. 

231),   918. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Dunn    (19    Ohio 

St.  162),   1442. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Dupont  (128  Fed. 

840,  64  C.  C.  A.  478),  242,  261, 

926,  933. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Dwells   (44  Kan. 

394),  1085. 
Railroad    Co.   v.   Eadie    (43   Ohio 

St.  91),  1236. 
Railroad    Co.   v.    Eakin    (6   Cold. 

582),    205,    1387. 

Railroad    Co.    v.    Eakin's    Adm'r 
(103  Ky.   465,  45  S.  W.  Rep. 

529;   s.  c.  46  S.  W.  Rep.  496; 

s.  e.  47  S.  W.  Rep.  872),  1118, 

1179,  1397. 
Railroad    Co.   v.    Earnest   &   Bost 

(Tex.  Civ.  App.,  77  S.  W.  Rep. 

29),  233. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Earwood*(104  Ga. 

127,  29  S.  E.  Rep.  913),  992, 

1127. 
Railroad    Co.   v.    East   Tennessee, 

V.  &  G.  R.  Co.   (47  Fed.  771; 

appeal   dismissed,    159    U.    S. 

b98),    568. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Eaton    (94    Ind. 

474),  1429. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Eblen     (24    Ky. 

Law  Rep.  1609,  71  S.  W.  Rep. 

919),  641. 

Railroad  Co.  v.  Eckford   (71  Tex. 

274),    1123. 


TABLE  OF    CASES  CITED. 


CCl 


[refekences  are 

Railroad  Co.  v.   Edelstein    (Penn. 

St.,   16  Atl.  Rep.  847),   1123. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Edloff    (89    Tex. 

454,  34  S.  W.  414;  s.  c.  35  S. 

W.    144),    1348. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Edmonds  (41  Ala. 

667),   450,  477. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Efron   (Tex.  Civ. 

App.,    38    S.    W.    Rep.    639), 

1354,  1360. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Eininger     (114 

111.    79),    1228. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Elder     (50    111. 

App.    276;    affirmed,    149    111. 

173,  36  N.  E.  565),  955. 
Railroad   Co.   v.    Elder    (57   Kan. 

312,  46  Pac.   310),   1414,  1415. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Elliott    (1    Cold. 

611),   907,   952. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Ellis'  Adm'x.   (97 

Ky.   330,   30   S.  W.  979),  994, 

1083. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Ellison   (117  Ind. 

234),   1206. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Emrich    (24   111. 

App.  245),  230,  1309. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Enches  (127  Penn. 

St.    316),    1177. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Eskew    (86    Ga. 

641,    22    Am.    St.    Rep.    490), 

1126. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Espenschild    (17 

Ind.  App.  558,  47  N.  E.  186), 

991. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Estes    (10    Lea, 

747),   317,  326. 

Railroad  Co.  v.  Estill  (147  U.  S. 
591,  37  L.  Ed.  292,  13  Sup. 
Ct.  444,  modifying  Estill  v. 
Railroad,  41  Fed.  849),  636, 
1362,  1366. 

Railroad  Co.  v.  Eswin  (118  111. 
250),   521. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Railroad   Co.   v.   Eubank    (184  U. 

S.    27,    22    Sup.    Ct.    R.    277), 

598. 
Railroad   Co.   t.   Evans    (30   Tex. 

Civ.  App.  252,  70  S.  W.  351), 

1424. 
Railroad    Co.   v.   Everett    ( — Tex. 

— ,  89  S.  W.  Rep.  761,  revers- 
ing s.  c.   (Tex.  Civ.  App.)   86 

S.  W.  Rep.  17),  248. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Exposition  Cotton 

Mills  (81  Ga.  522,  7  S.  E.  Rep. 

916,  2  L.  R.  A.  102),  212,  218. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Fairclough    (52 

111.  106),   1280,   1291. 
Railroad   Co.   v.    Faler    (58   Miss. 

911),    450. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Farmers'  &  Drov- 
ers',  etc..   Firm    (107   Ky.   53, 

52   S.  W.  972),  136,  496. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Faulkner   (2  Tex. 

Ct.  Rep.  1079,   56   S.  W.  Rep. 

253,  63  S.  W.  Rep.  655),  1025. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Fay  (16  111.  558), 

899,   904,    1418. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Faylor   (126  Ind. 

126),  1414. 
Railroad   Co.  v.   Feehan    (149    111. 

214,    36    N.    E.    Rep.    1036), 

1174. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Feeley  (163  Mass. 

205,  40  N.  E.  20),  1058,  1060. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Felder    (46    Ga. 

433),    702. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Ferguson  (79  Va. 

241),    1217. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Field  (7  Ind.  App. 

172,  34  N.  E.  406,  52  Am.  St. 

Rep.  444),  999,  1080,  1406. 
Railroad     Co.     v.     Fielding     (48. 

Penn.  St.  320),  947. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Fietsam   (123  111. 

518,  15  N.  E.  Rep.  169),  1391. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Finn  (16  Ky.  Law 

Rep.  57),  980,  982. 


ecu 


TABLE   OF    CASES   CITED. 


[BEFEKENCES    ABE 

Railroad  Co.  v.  Finney   (10  Wis. 

388),  1441,  1438. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Fisher    (141    111. 

614,  31  N.  E.  406  aff'g.,  38  111. 

App.  33;  s.  c.  31  111.  App.  36). 

1198. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Fite    (67    Miss. 

373),  1177. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Fitchburg   Rail- 
road   (14  Allen,  462),  783. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Fitzpatrick    (35 

Md.  46),  1200. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Fix  (88  Ind.  381), 

1059,   1065,  1066,  1221. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Flagg    (43    111. 

364),   899,   1033,   1433. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Flannagan    (82 

Ga.  579,  9  S.  E.  Rep.  471,  14 

Am.  St.  Rep.  183),  1397. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Flannagan  (23  111. 

App.   489),   881. 
Raih-oad  Co.  v.  Flaharty   (96  111. 

App.    563    s.   c.    105    111.   App. 

14),  1182. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Fleming  (14  Lea, 

128),    992,    1036,    1065,    1428, 

1431. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Flexman  (103  111. 

546),  1094. 
Railroad    Co.   v.    Flinn    (24   Kan. 

629),  1020. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Flynn    (74   Hun, 

124,  26  N.  Y.  Supp.  859),  944. 
Railroad    Co.   v.    Foley    (53    Fed. 

459,  3  C.  C.  A.  589,  10  U.  S. 

App.   537),   937. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  FoUiard   (66  Tex. 

603),  1126. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Forsyth  (61  Penn. 

St.  81),  231,  238. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Ford    (53    Tex. 

364),   1055. 
Railroad   Co.  v.  Ft.  Wayne  Elec- 
tric Co.    (108   Ky.    113,   55   S. 

W.   918),   672,    682. 
Railroad  Co.  v,  Foster   (134  Ala. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

244,    32    So.    773,    92   Am.    St. 

Rep.  25),  1049,  1061,  1427. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Fotheringham  (17 

Colo.  App.  410,  68  Pac.  978), 

1413. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Foulks    (191   111. 

57,  60  N.  E.  890,  aff'g..  92  111. 
App.  391),  139. 
Railroad     Co.     v.     Fox     (113     111. 

App.   180),  339,  410,  419,  442, 

455. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Fox   (64  Ohio  St. 

133,  59  N.  E.  888,  83  Am.  St. 

Rep.  739),  1388. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Fraloff  (100  U.  S. 

24),    437,    1245,    1246. 
Railroad   Co.   v.    Frame    (6   Colo. 

382),    1305,    1306,    1363. 
Railroad  Co.  v.   Frank    (110  Fed. 

689),   1056. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Frankenberg   (54 

III.    88),    230,    233,    401,    410, 

1296. 
Railroad   Co.   v.    Frazee    (24    Ky. 

Law  Rep.  1273,  71  S.  W.  437), 

431. 
Railroad  Co.   v.   Frazer    (55   Kan. 

582,    40    Pac.    923),    930,    964, 

1119. 
Railroad  Co.  v.   Frazier   (93   Ala. 

45,     30     Am.     St.     Rep.     28), 

1084. 
Railroad   Co.    v.    Freed    (38   Ark. 

614),   759. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Freeman  (97  Ala. 

289,    11    So.   Rep.    800),    1397, 

1400. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  French    (48  Neb. 

638,  67  N.  W.  472),  1413. 
Railroad   Co.   v.  Fries    (87   Penn. 

St.  234),  280,  650. 
Railroad  Co.  v.   Fuqua  &  Horton 

(84    Miss.    490,    36    So.    Rep. 

449),   708. 
Railroad    Co.   v.    Gage    (12   Gray, 

393),  52. 


TABLE  OF    CASES  CITED. 


ccin 


[BEFEBENCES    ABE 

Railroad    Co.    v.   Gaines    (99    Ky. 

411,  36  S.  W.  174,  59  Am.  St. 

Rep.  465),  1043. 
Railroad  Co.   v.   Galliher    (89  Va. 

639,  16  S.  E.  Rep.  935),  1100. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Gann     (68    Ga. 

350),  406.    . 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Garcia  (Tex.  Civ. 

App.,    26    S.    W.    Rep.    780), 

1366. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Gardiner  (51  Neb. 

70,    70    N.   W.    508),    214,    215, 

218. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Garrett    (8   Lea, 

438),  1085. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Garrett    (5   Tex. 

Civ.  App.  540,  24  S.  W.  Rep. 

354),    443. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Gates    (162    111. 

98,  44  N.  E.  1118,  aff'g.,  61  111. 

App.   211),    911,    1050. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Gatewood  (14  Ky. 

L.  R.  108),  990. 
Railroad   Co.   v.    George    (1    Tex. 

Ct.   Rep.   376,   60    S.   W.   Rep. 

313),   895. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  George  &  Co.   (82 

Miss.    710,    35    So.    193),    859, 

861,   862. 
Railroad   Co.  v.   Georgia   Fruit  & 

Vegetable   Exchange    (91   Ga. 

389,   17  S.  E.  Rep.  904),  226, 

657. 
Railroad  v.  Georgia  Home  Insur- 
ance Co.    (85   Miss   7,   37   So. 

Rep.  500),  1242,   1249. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Gerson   (102  Ala. 

409,    14    So.    873),    1351. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Gidley   (119  Ala. 

523,   24   So.   753),   1354. 
Railroad  Co.  v.   Gidlow   (L.  R.  7 

H.  L.  Cas.  517),  805. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Giesen   (Tex.  Civ. 

App.,    69    S.    W.    Rep.    653), 

1427. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Railroad    Co.    v.    Gill     (66    Miss. 

39),    1118. 
Railroad  Co.   v.   Gilmer    (89   Ala. 

534),  710,  1360. 
Railroad   Co.  v.  Gilmer    (18  Tex. 

Civ.  App.  682,  45  S.  W.  1028), 

992. 
Railroad   Co.  v.   Gilmore    (1   Ind. 

App.  468),  1084. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Gilbert  (88  Tenn. 

430,  12  S.  W.  Rep.  1018,  7  L. 

R.  A.  162),  404. 
Railroad  Co.   v.   Gilbert    (64  Tex. 

536),    1067. 
Railroad     Co.     v.     Gladmon     (15 

Wall.   401),   1227,   1228. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Glidewell  (39  Ark. 

487),    76. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Glover    (24   Ky. 

Law  Rep.  1447,  71  S.  W.  630), 

1181. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Goetz     (79    Ky. 

442),   1417. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Goldman   (46  111. 

App.    625),    1348. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Gondola  (50  Neb. 

906,  70  N.  W.  Rep.  491),  205. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Goodin   (62  N.  J. 

L.   394,   42  Atl.   333,   45  L.  R. 

A.  671,  72  Am.  St.  Rep.  652), 

1219. 
Railroad     Co.     v.     Goodman     (52 

Penn.  St.  329),  1423. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Goodyear  (28  Tex. 

Civ.  App.  206,  66  S.  W.  862), 

1121. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Goodykoontz  (119 

Ind.   Ill),  1389. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Gore  (202  111.  188, 

66    N.    E.    1063,    95    Am.    St. 

Rep.   224,  aff'g.,   105  111.  App. 

6;  s.  c.  96  111.  App.  553;  s.  c. 

92  111.  App.  418),  1181. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Grable    (88    111. 

442),  1229. 
Railroad  Co.   v.  Graham    (3   Ind. 


CCIV 


TABLE  OF   CASES  CITED. 


[BEFEBENCES    ABE    TO    SECTIONS.] 


App.  28,  29  N.  E.  170,  50  Am. 

St.   Rep.   256),    1033. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Graham   (98  Ky. 

688,  17  Ky.  L.  R.  1229,  34  S. 

W.  Rep.  229),  1397. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Graham  &  Ward 

(117   Ga.   555),   946. 
Railroad    Co.   v.    Grant    (99    Ala. 

325,  13  So.  599),  450. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Grant    (86  Miss. 

565,    38    So.   Rep.    502),   1072, 

1075. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Grate  Co.  (81  Ga. 

602),  230,  1337,  1366. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Green    (81    111. 

19),   1174. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Green  (25  Md.  72), 

708. 
Railroad  Co.  v.   Green    (52   Miss. 

779),  1436. 
Railroad   Co.  v.  Green    (86  Penn. 

St.    421),    972. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Greene    (106  Ind. 

279,  6.  N.  E.  Rep.  603,  55  Am. 

Rep.  736),  1391. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Greenwood    (99 

Ala.  501,  14  So.  495),  895,  923, 
*      1440. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Gregg    (25    Ky. 

Law  Rep.  2329,  80  S.  W.  Rep. 

512),   638. 
Railroad   Co.  v.   Gregory    (58   111. 

226),   1230. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Gregston  (12  Ky. 

Law  Rep.  604),  1180. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Greso    (102    111. 

App.   252;    s.    c.    79    111.   App. 

127),  1003. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Griffin    (80   Fed. 

278,  25  C.  C.  A.  413),  932. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Griffin    (68    111. 

499),   980,   1039. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Grigsby   (13  Tex. 

Civ.  App.  639.  35  S.  W.  Rep. 

815;   s.  c.  36  S.  W.  Rep.  496), 

990. 


Railroad    Co.    v.    Grimes    (71    111. 

App.  397),  444,  455,  639. 
Railroad  Co.   v.   Grimm    (25  Ind. 

App.  494,  57  N.  E.  640),  923, 

1414. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Groseclose  (88  Va. 

267,  13  S.  E.  Rep.  454,  29  Am. 

St.     Rep.     718),     1008,     1111, 

1229. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Grundy    (12   Ky. 

Law  Rep.    293),   982. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Crush    (67    111. 

262),    933. 
Railroad  Co.  v.   Guinan   (11  Lea, 

98),    1443. 
Railroad    Co.   v.    Gunderson    (174 

111.   495,   57  N.  E.   Rep.   708), 

1399. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Gunning  (33  Colo. 

280.  80  Pac.  Rep.  727),   1397. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Guy  (18  Ky.  Law 

Rep.  750,  37  S.  W.  Rep.  1043), 

1424. 
Railroad  Co.  v.   Hagblad   ( — Neb. 

— ,  101  N.  W.  Rep.  1033;  s.  c. 

106    N.    W.    1041),    898,    941, 

1006. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Hague    (48   Neb. 

97,  66  N.  W.  1000),  895,  1413. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Hailey  (94  Tenn. 

383,  29  S.  W.  367,  27  L.  R.  A. 

549),  964,  lOOL 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Hale    (102    Ky. 

600,  44  S.  W.  Rep.  213),  1111. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Hale    (6    Mich. 

243),  403,  415. 
Railroad    Co.   v.   Hale    (85   Tenn. 

69),  339,  1366. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Hall  (58  111.  409). 

339,  497. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Hall  (69  111.  App. 

497),   828. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Hambel    (2   Neb. 

(Unofficial)     607,     89     N.    W. 

643),  1397,  1413. 


TABLE  OF   CASES  CITED. 


eev 


[references    ABE 

Railroad  Co.  v.  Hamilton  (76  111. 

393),  339,  634. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Hammer   (72  111. 

347),  1439. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Hammond     (33 

Ind.  379),  1246. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Hanberry  (23  Ky. 

Law  Rep.  1867,  66  S.  W.  417), 

1180. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Hand    ( — Md. — , 

61  Atl.  Rep.  285),   1119. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Handy   (63  Miss. 

609),   1134. 
Railroad   Co.    v.   Hanna    (6   Gray, 

539),  72,  113,  261. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Hannibal  (2  Neb. 

(Unofficial)     607,    89    N.    W. 

Rep.  643),  1075. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Harbin   (160  Ind. 

441,  67  N.  E.   109),  924. 
Railroad  Co,  v.  Harbison  (98  Tex. 

490,  85  S.  W.  Rep.  1138),  936. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Harder  (Tex.  Civ. 

App.,    81    S.    W.    356),    1109, 

1430. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Harlan    (12   Ky. 

Law  Rep.  506),  924. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Harman   (91  Va, 

601,    22    S.    E.    Rep.    490,    50 

Am.  St.  Rep.  855,  44  L.  R.  A. 

289),    510. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Harmon   (23  Ky. 

Law  Rep.  871,  64  S.  W.  640), 

1118,  1119. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Harmon   (147  U. 

S.   571),  1118,  1417. 
Railroad  Co.   t.   Harned    (23   Ky. 

Law  Rep.  1651,  66  S.  W.  25), 

340.   1367. 
Railroad  Co.  y.  Harney   (28  Ind. 

28),  1381. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Harper    (69  Ark. 

186,  61  S.  W.  911.  86  Am.  St. 

Rep.    190,    53   L.   R.   A.    220), 

1082. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Harper  (83  Miss. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

560,  35  So.  Rep.  764,  102  Am. 

St.    Rep.    469,    64    L.    R.    A. 

283),    1051,    1062,    1065,    1067, 

1442. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Harrell   (58  Ark. 

454,  25  S.  W.  117),  1236. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Harris    (62   Ark. 

452,  36  S.  W.  186),  574. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Harris    (184   111. 

57,  48  L.  R.  A.  175,  56  N.  E. 

316,  aff'g.,   84   111.   App.   462), 

509. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Harris    (55    111. 

App.  159),  230,  233,  410,  1366. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Harris    (9    Lea, 

180),  1055,  1085. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Harris   (81  Miss. 

208,    32    So.    309,    95   Am.    St. 

Rep.    466,    59   L.   R.   A.    742), 

1045. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Harrison     (119 

Ala.   539,  24   So.  Rep.  552,  43 

L.  R.  A.  385,  72  Am.  St.  Rep. 

936),    537. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Harrison  (100  111. 

App.    211),   937. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Hartwell   (99  Ky. 

436,  36  S.  W.  183),  175,  177. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Harwood   (80  111. 

88),   1397. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Hassell   (62  Tex. 

256),    1060,    1221. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Hasselkus  (91  Ga. 

382,  17  S.  E.  Rep.  838,  44  Am. 

St.    Rep.    37),    168,    442. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Hatch    (52   Ohio 

St.  408,   39   N.   E.   1042),   708. 
Railroad   Co.  v.   Hatton    (5   C.  L. 

J.  389),  1117. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Hawk    (72    Ala. 

112),  1197. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Hawkins  (92  Ala. 

241),   994,   1083. 
Railroad     Co.     v.     Hawkins     (18 

Mich.   427),   451,   496. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Haynes  (64  Miss. 

G04),  1366. 


ecvi 


TABLE  OF   CASES  CITED. 


[refeeences  are 

Railroad  Co.  v.  Haynes  (72  Tex. 

175),  708. 
Railroad    Co.   v.    Hazen    (84    111. 

36),   316,   657. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Hazzard    (26  111. 

373),   899. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Head  (22  Ky.  Law 

Rep.  863,  59   S.  W.  23),  1197. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Head  (— Ky.  Law 

Rep.—,   84   S.  W.  Rep.   751), 

1426. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Headland     (18 

Colo.  477,  33  Pac.  185,  20  L. 

R.  A.  822),  964. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Heard    (—  Miss. 

— ,  39   So.  Rep.   1011),  1353. 
Railroad  Co.  v.   Heaton    (37   Ind. 

448),    401,    450. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Hedge    (44   Neb. 

448,  62  N.  W.  887),  1223. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Hedger   (9  Bush, 

645),    339. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Hefley  (158  U.  S. 

99,   15   Sup.   A.   R.   802),   537. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Heittner  (—  Tex. 

Civ.    App.— ,    94    S.    W.    Rep. 

189),    233. 
Railroad   Co.   v.  Helborg   (99   111. 

App.  563),  1401. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Henderson    (51 

Penn.     St.     315),     450,     1073, 

1397,  1073,  933,  1003. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Henderson   (Tex. 

Civ.    App.,     82     S.    W.    Rep. 

1065),  980,  984,  1427. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Hendricks    (26 

Ind.    232),    895,    1118,    1127, 

1347. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Hendricks     (88 

Tenn.  710),  1401. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Henlein   (52  Ala. 

606),  634,  339,  426,  450. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Henlein   (56  Ala. 

368),  425. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Hennigh  (39  Ind. 
509),  1038. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Railroad  Co.  v.  Henry  (19  Ky. 
Law  Rep.  1783,  44  S.  W.  Rep. 
428),  933. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Henry  (55  Kan. 
715,  41  Pac.  952,  29  L.  R.  A. 
465),  1094,  1100. 
Railroad  Co.  v.   Hepner    (3   Colo. 

App.  313,  33  Pac.  72),  1348. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Herndon   (81  111. 

143),   786. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Herndon   (87  Va. 

193),  936,  1127. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Herold    (75   Md. 
510,   22   Atl.   323,   14  L.  R.   A. 
75),     913,     950,     1077,     1179, 
1223. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Hess    (2    Wash. 

383,    26    Pac.    866),    1417. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Hessions  (150  111. 

566),  1174. 
Railroad   Co.  v.  Hewitt   (67  Tex. 

479),    990. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Hiatt    (17    Ind. 

102),  1418. 
Railroad   Co.  v.   Higdon   (94  Ala. 
286,    10    So.    282,    33   Am.    St. 
Rep.    119,    14    L.   R.   A.   515), 
1250. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Higgins  (85  Tenn. 

620),   1389. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Hill  (90  Ala.  71), 

1440. 

Railroad  Co.  v.  Hill  (93  Ala.  514, 

9    So.    722,    30    Am.    St.    Rep. 

65),   895,   1414,  1415. 

Railroad   Co.   v.   Hill    (110   Tenn. 

396,  75  S.  W.  Rep.  963),  1085. 

Railroad  Co.  v.  Hinds   (53  Penn. 

St.  512),  892,  972,  981. 
Railroad    Co.    v.   Hine    (121    Ala. 

234,   25   So.   857),   1431. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Hines    (19    Ga. 

208),   113. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Hirst   (30  Fla.  1, 
11   So.   Rep.   506,  32  Am.   St. 


TABLE   OP    CASES    CITED. 


ecvii 


[beferences  are 

Rep.    17,    16   L.    R.    A.    631), 

1200. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Hobbs    (118   Ga. 

227,  45  S.  E.  23,  63  L.  R.  A. 

68),  1121,  1127. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Hobbs    (58    111. 

App.    130),  933. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Hobbs    (14    Ky. 

Law  Rep.  766),  652. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Hodapp  (83  Penn. 

St.   22),  333,   677. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Hodgson  (18  Colo. 

117,  31  Pac.  954),  1219. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Hoeflich   (62  Md. 

300),   1025,   1433. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Hoebl    (12  Bush, 

41),  1217,  1227. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Hogeland  (66  Md. 

149),  1236. 
Railroad  Co.  v.   Hogue    (50  Kan. 

40,   31   Pac.   698),   1033,   1433. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Holden   (66  Ark. 

602,  53  S.  W.  45),  1079,  1084. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Holdridge    (118 

Ind.  281),  1055. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Holland  (162  Ind. 

406,  69  N.  E.  138,  63  L.  R.  A. 

948),   475,    508,    1331. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Holland  (68  Miss. 

351),   464. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Holloway  (9  Baxt. 

188),  403. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Hollowell  (65  Ind. 

188),  316,  657. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Holmes   (97  Ala. 

332,   12   So.   286),   1123. 
Railroad    Co.   v.    Holmes    (5    Col. 

197),   1174. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Hoist   (100  U.  S. 

213),  1417. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Homer    (73    Ga. 

251),  1442,  1443. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Hoosey  (99  Penn. 

St.    492),    1113. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Hopkins   (41  Ala. 

486),    450. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Railroad  Co.  v.  Hopkins  (108  Ga. 

324,  33  S.  E.  Rep.  965),  1102. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Hornberger    (77 

111.    457),    122,    147. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Horst    (93   U.   S. 

291),     895,   '897,     1195,     1221, 

1222. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Hottman    (25   O. 

C.  C.  140),  1397. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    House    (101    III. 

App.  397),  651,  1372. 
Railroad    Co.   v.    Houx    (15    Tex. 

Civ.  App.  502,  40  S.  W.  Rep. 

327),   614. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Hubbard  (72  Ohio 

302,  74  N.  E.  Rep.  214),  426, 

442. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Hudgins  (42  Ark. 

485),    1346. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Hudson  ( — Ky.  L. 

R.— ,    92    S.    W.    Rep.    947), 

1054. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Huggins   (89  Ga. 

494,  15  S.  E.  Rep.  848),  899, 

1019. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Hughes  (55  Kan. 

491,  40  Pac.  919),  1118,  1179, 

1180,    1401. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Hughes    (191   U. 

S.  477,  48  L.  Ed.  268,  24  Sup. 

Ct.  R.  132,  aft'g.,  202  Pa.   St. 

222,  51  Atl.  990),  209,  452. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Hull  (24  Ky.  Law 

Rep.    375,    68    S.    W.    433,    57 

L.  R.  A.  771),  1375. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Humphrey     (83 

Miss.   721,   36   So.   Rep.    154), 

1217,  1417. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Hunt    (15    Lea, 

261),   715,   805,   862. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Hunter   (70  Miss. 

471,  12  So.  Rep.  482),  1389. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Hunter   (11  Wis. 

160),  1417. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Huntley  (38  Mich. 

545),    947. 


CCVlll 


TABLE   OF    CASES   CITED. 


[eefebences  ake 

Railroad  Co.  v.  Hurd    (108   Fed. 

116,  47  C.  C.  A.  615,  56  L.  R. 

A.  193),  1388,  1396. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Hurst    (36  Miss. 

660),   962,   1126,   1408,   1440. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Hurst    (67   Ark. 

407,  55  S.  W.  215),  442. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Husen   (95  U.  S. 

465),   325. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Hyatt    (48   Neb. 

161,   67   N.  W.  8),   1179. 
Railroad   Co.  v.   Hyde    (101   Fed. 

401,  41  C.'C.  A.  549),  1077.' 
Railroad    Co.   v.    Illinois    (163   U. 

S.    142),   1110. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Ing  (29  Tex.  Civ. 

App.  398,  68  S.  W.  722),  1056. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Insurance  Co.  (98 

Mass.  420),  783. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Insurance  Co.  (79 

Miss.    114,    30    So.    Rep.    43), 

475. 
Railroad    Co.   v.    Interstate    Com- 
merce Commission  (200  U.  S. 

361,       modifying       Interstate 

Commerce       Commission      v. 

Railway    Co.,    128    Fed.    59), 

546,  555. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Iowa    (94   U.    S. 

155),    574,    1023. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Irwin    (46    Ind. 

180),  175. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Jackson  (24  Conn. 

514,  63  Am.  Dec.  177),  806. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Jackson  (6  Heisk. 

271),   282,   339,  401,   463. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Jackson   (22  Ky. 

Law  Rep.  630,  58  S.  W.  526), 

990. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Jackson   (25  Ky. 

Law  Rep.  2087,  79  S.  W.  Rep. 

1187),    1065,    1433. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Jacobs   ( — Okl. — , 

82  Pac.  Rep.  502),  1367. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Jacoby    (14   Ky. 

Law  Rep.    763),   1209. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Railroad  Co.  v.  Jageman  (115  111. 

407),   201,  230. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   James    (10    Ind. 

App.   550,  35  N.  E.  Rep.  395, 

38  N.  E.  Rep.  192),  145. 
Railroad   Co.   v.  Jarboe    (41   Ala. 

644),   463,   1354. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Jean  (98  Md.  546, 

57   Atl.   540),   122L 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Jefferson   (89  Ga. 

554,  16  S.  E.  Rep.  69,  32  Am. 

St.  Rep.  87,  17  L.  R.  A.  571), 

980,    984. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Jenkins    (15  Ky. 

Law  Rep.  239),  1122. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Jennings  (190  111. 

478,  60  N.  E.  818,  54  L.  R.  A. 

827,    reversing    89    111.    App. 

335),  1006,  1015. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Jennings  (217  111. 

140,  75  N.  E.  Rep.  457),  1202, 

1204. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Johnson  (108  Ala. 

62,  19  So.  51,  31  L.  R.  A.  372, 

s.  c.  104  Ala.  241,  16  So.  Rep. 

75,  53  Am.  St.  Rep.  39;   s.  c. 

92   Ala.   204,   9    So.   Rep.   269, 

25    Am.    St.    Rep.    35),    994, 

1083,  1230. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Johnson  (113  Ga. 

589,  38  S.  E.  954),  1249. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Johnson    (38  Ga. 

409),  1423. 
Railroad   Co.  v.  Johnson    (34  111. 

389),  230. 
Railroad   Co.  v.  Johnson    (44  111. 

App.  56),  1177,  1186. 
Railroad   Co.  v.  Johnson    (67   111. 

312),  1033. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Johnson   (114  111. 

App.   545),  339,   445. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Johnson   (221  111. 

42,  77  N.  E.  Rep.  592),  1227, 

1397. 
Railroad    v.    Johnson    (97    Tenn. 

667,  37  S.  W.  Rep.  558,  34  L. 

R.   A.   442),   1389. 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


CCIX 


[references   ABE 

Railroad  Co.  v.  Johnson  &  Flem- 
ing (— Tenn.— ,  94  S.  W.  Rep. 

600),  1367,  1372. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Johnston  (75  Ala. 

596),   419. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Jolly  (25  Ky.  Law 

Rep.  1735,  78  S.  W.  476),  1216. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Jones    (83    Ala. 

376),  1414. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Jones    (100   Ala. 

263,  14  So.  114),  1348. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Jones    (130   Ala. 

456,  30  So.  Rep.  586),  1397. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Jones    ( — Fla. — , 

34   So.  Rep.   246),   1384,  1389. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Jones    ( — Fla. — , 

39   So.   Rep.   485),   1397. 
Railroad   Co.  v.   Jones    (9   Heisk. 

27),   908. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Jones    (149    111. 

361,  37  N.  E.  247,  24  L.  R.  A. 

141,    41    Am.    St.    Rep.    278), 

574,    575. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Jones   (155  U.  S. 

333,  15  Sup.  Ct.  R.  136),  231, 

263. 
Railroad   Co.   v.    Jones,    Adm'r   of 

Berger  (64  Ark.  613,  44  S.  W. 

Rep.    809,    39    L.    R.    A.    784), 

1102. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Jopes   (142  U.  S. 

18,  12  Sup.  Ct.  R.  109,  35  L. 

Ed.   919),   1102. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Jordan    (23    Ky. 

Law  R.  1730,  66  S.  W.  27),  995. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Jumper   (24  Tex. 

Civ.  App.  671,  60  S.  W.  797), 

912,    1414. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Jurey  (8  111.  App. 

160),    339. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Kane  (69  Md.  11), 

1110,    1111,    1186,    1200,    1221. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Kassen   (49  Ohio 

St.   230,   31   N.  E.   282,   16  L. 

R.  A.  674),  914,  996,  1173. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Katzenbach    (118 

Ind.  174),  1364. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Railroad  Co.  v.  Katzenberger  (16 

Lea,  380),   1135,  1266. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Keedy    (75   Md. 

320,    23    Atl.    643),    292,    310. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Keegan   (210   111. 

150,   71   N.   E.   321,   aff'g.,  112 

111.   App.   28),   937. 
Railroad    Co.   v.    Keener    (93    Ga. 

808,  21  S.  E.  Rep.  287,  44  Am. 

St.  Rep.  197),  425,  431. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Keith  (8  Ind.  App. 

57,  35  N.  E.  296),  115,  151. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Keith    (22    Ky. 

Law  Rep.  593,  58  S.  W.  468), 

1126. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Keller    (20    Ky. 

Law  Rep.  957,  47  S.  W.  Rep. 

1072),  937. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Keller   (67  Penn. 

St.  300),  1397. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Kelley   (31  Penn. 

St.   372),   1229,    1378. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Kellogg  (94  U.  S. 

475),  311,  1430. 
Railroad    Co.    v.   Kelly    (1    Head, 

158),  1315. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Kelly    (92    Ind. 

371),    1192,    1221. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Kelsey    (89   Ala. 

287),  1360. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Kemery's   Admr. 

(23  Ky.  Law  Rep.  1734,  66  S. 

W.    20),    990. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Kendall    (72   111. 

App.    105),    711. 
Railroad     Co.     v.     Kendrick     (40 

Miss.    374),    1121,    1126. 
Railroad     Co.     v.     Kennard     (21 

Penn.   St.   203),   895,   1209. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Kennard  Glass  & 

Paint    Co.     (59    Neb.    435,    81 

N.  W.  372),  214,  215,  218,  405. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Kennedy  (77  Ind. 

507),   964,   1032. 
Railroad     Co.     v.     Kennedy     (41 

Miss.    671),    1246,    1249,    1404. 


ccx 


TABLE   OF    CASES   CITED. 


[BEFEBENCES    ABE 

Railroad  Co.  v.  Kennicott  (68  111. 

App.   90),   1177. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Kerr    (68    Miss. 

14),    238. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Kevekordes    ( — 

Ind.  App.  —    73  N.  E.  1135; 

s.    c.    (Ind.    App.)    69    N.    E. 

1022),  1331. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Kid   (23  111.  App. 

353),  1091. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Kidd     (35    Ala. 

209),   675,   704,   705,   715,   723. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Kilgore  (32  Penn. 

St.  292),  1118,  1178. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Killian    (78    Ga. 

749),    918. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Kilpatrick     (67 

Ark.  47,  54  S.  W.  971),  1032, 

1094,  1196. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    King,    (81    Ala. 

177,  2  So.  Rep.  152),  1397. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    King    (6    Heisk. 

269),   282. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  King  (179  111.  91, 

53  N.  E.  552.  70  Am.  St.  Rep. 

93,    aff'g.,    77    111.    App.    581), 

990. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Kingman  (18  Ky. 

Law  Rep.  82,  35  S.  W.  264), 

1017,    1440. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Klngsley  (177  111. 

558,   52   N.   E.   931,   reversing 

78   111.   App.   236),   990. 
Railroad    Co.   v.    Kirk    (90    Penn. 

St.  15),  1397,  1399,  1423. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Kirkbridge    (79 

Tex.   457),    691,    1084,    1444. 
Railroad    Co.    v.     Kirkwood     (45 

Mich.  51),  139,  1349. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Kitchens   (83  Ga. 

83,   9    S.   E.  Rep.   827),   1391. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Klein     (43     111. 

App.  63),  895,  1415. 
Railroad     Co.     v.     Klyman     (108 

Tenn.   304,   67    S.   W.   472,  91 

Am.  St.  Rep.  755,  56  L.  R.  A. 

769),  1041,  1048. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Railroad  Co.  v.  Knight  (58  N.  J. 

Law   287,    33   Atl.  Rep.   845), 

1241,  1276. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Koontz    (61  Ohio 

St.  551.  56  N.  E.  471,  76  Am. 

St.  Rep.  435),  766,  767. 
Railroad   Co.  v.   Kuehn    (70   Tex. 

582),  1389. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Kuhn   (107  Tenn. 

106,   64   S.   W.   202),   274,   292, 

895,  910,  947,  1414,  1415. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Kyte  (6  Ind.  App. 

52,  32  N.  E.  1134),  1429. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Lacy     (49    Ga. 

106),  1396. 
Railroad   Co.    v.    Laloge    (24    Ky. 

Law  Rep.  693,   696,  69   S.  W. 

795,   62   L.   R.   A.    405),    931, 

989,   1006,   1008. 
Railroad     Co.     v.     Lamoreux     (5 

Kan.  App.  813,  49  Pac.  152), 

1433. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Lampley  (76  Ala. 

357),   44,   59,   61,   91,   94. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Landauer,  39  Neb. 

803,    58    N.   W.   434;    s.   c.   36 

Neb.  642,  54  N.  W.  976),  1118, 

1179,   1413. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Lander    (20   Ky. 

L.  R.  913,  47  S.  W.  Rep.  344), 

972. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Landers  (135  Ala. 

504,    33    So.    Rep.    482),    442, 

443,    450. 
Railroad     Co.     v.     Langdon     (92 

Penn.    St.    27),    1200. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Langlois  (9  Mont. 

419),    945. 
Railroad     Co.     v.     Langton     (32 

Mich.    251),    1349. 
Railroad   Co.   v.  Lannum    (71   111. 

App.  84),  172,  714. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  La  Porte  (33  Ind. 

App.  691,  71  N.  E.  Rep.  166), 

1394. 
Railroad    Co.    v.   Larkin    (47   Md. 

155),   1433,   1084. 


I 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


CCXl 


[references  are  to  sections.] 


Railroad  Co.   v.   Larned    (103   111. 

293),  162,  668. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Latimer   (128  111. 

163),   1082,   10S3. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Lawler    (40   Neb. 

356,  58  N.  W.  968),  449,  450, 

1354,   1360. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Lawrence  (96  111. 

App.  635),  1230. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Lazarus    (13  Ky. 

Law  Rep.  461),  444,  652. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Ledbetter  (92  Ala. 

326),    1334. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Lee  (97  Ala.  325, 

12  So.  48),  1180. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Le    Gierse    (51 

Tex.  187),  1389. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Lehman    (56  Md. 

209),  651,  653. 
Railroad   Co.  .  v.    Leigh    (45   Ark. 

368),    1113. 
Railroad   Co.    v.   Leiner    (202   111. 

624,  67  N.  E.  398,  95  Am.  St. 

Rep.  266,  aff'g.,  103  111.  App. 

438),   926,   990. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Letcher   (69  Ala. 

106),   991,   1177. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Levy    (127    Ind. 

168,  26  N.  E.  773),  170. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Lewis   (89  Tenn. 

235,  14  S.  W.  Rep.  603),  205. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Lewis   (Tex.  Civ. 

App.,  23  S.  W.  Rep.  323),  658. 
Railroad    Co.   v.   Liddell    (85   Ga. 

482,    21    Am.    St.    Rep.    169), 

918,    1126,    1440. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Light    (39    111. 

App.  530),  639. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Lillie   (112  Tenn. 

331,  78   S.  W.  Rep.  1055,   105 

Am.  St.  Rep.  947),  1130,  1241, 

1261,  1266. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Lilly  (8  So.  Rep. 

644),   122. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Lindley  (42  Kan. 

714),  1195,  1203. 


Railroad  Co.  t.  Lister  (6  Tex.  Ct. 

Rep.  58,  72  S.  W.  107),  1033. 
Railroad   Co.  v.  Littell    (128  Fed. 

546,    63    C.    C.    A.    44),    1062, 

1065. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Little    (71    Ala. 

611),   425,   449,   1354. 
Railroad   Co.    v.    Little    (66   Kan. 

378,   71   Pac,   820,  97  Am.   St. 

Rep.    376,    61   L.   R.   A.    122), 

1060,    1062,    1067,    1433,    1442. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Lockhart  (79  Ala. 

315),  1126,  1430,  1424. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Lockhart   (71  111. 

627),   496,   1367. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Lockridge     (93 

Ind.  191),  1418. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Lockwood     (28 

Ohio  St.  358),  477. 
Railroad    Co.    v.     Lockwood     (17 

Wall.  357),  44,  233,  392,   401, 

431,  441,  452,  1003,  1073,  1074. 

Railroad    Co.   v.   Loftis    (72   Ohio 

St.    288,    74    N.    E.    Rep.    179, 

106  Am.   St.  Rep.   597),  1049. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Logan    (88    Ky. 

232,    10    S.    W.    Rep.    655,    21 

Am.  St.  Rep.  332),  994,  1083. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Lohe    (68    Ohio 

St.    101,    67    N.    E.    Rep.    161, 

67   L.   R.   A.   637),   1197. 
Railroad    v.    Lone    Star    Salt   Co, 

(19   Tex.   Civ.   App.   684,   685, 

48   S.   W.   619),   574. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Long    (5    Kan. 

App.  644,  47  Pac.  993),  1442. 
Railroad   Co.    v.    Long    (75   Penn. 

St.    257),    1229. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Louthan    (80    111. 

App.  579),  1032,  1090. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Lowe    (101    Ga. 

320,  28  S.  E.  Rep.  867),   175, 

187. 
Railroad  Co,  v.  Lowell   (90  Tenn. 

17,  15  S.  W.  Rep.  837),  426. 


CCXll 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


[REFERKNCES    ABE 

Railroad  Co.  v.  Lyon   (89  Ga.  16, 

15  S.  B.  Rep.  24,  24  Am.  St. 

Rep.    72,    15    L.    R.    A.    857), 

1060. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Lyons  (129  Penn. 

St.  114).  1118. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Lucas    (18    Ind. 

App.  239,  47  N.  E.  842),  1060. 
Railroad    Co.   v.   MacCartney    (68 

N.    J.    L.    165,    52    Atl.    575), 

807,   810. 
Railroad    Co.   v.    Macchi    (74   Vt. 

403,  52  Atl.  960),  810. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Mackinney    (124 

Penn.  St.  462),  1412. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Mahan    (8  Bush, 

184),    1287. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Mahara    (47   111. 

App.  208),  933. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Mahula    (1   Tex. 

Civ.  App.  182,  20  S.  W.  Rep. 

1002),   233. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Maloy    (77    Ga. 

237),  1389. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Manchester  Mills 

(88  Tenn.  653,  14  S.  W.  Rep. 

314),  404,  420,  449,  784,  1355. 
Railroad    Co.   v.    Marcus    (38    111. 

219),  1249. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Maris    (6    Kan. 

333),    704,    713. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Marlett  (75  Miss. 

956,  23  So.  583),  1043. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Marshall   (90  Va. 

836,  20  S.  E.  Rep.  823),  948. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Marshall  ( —  Kan. 

— ,  81  Pac.  Rep.  169),  936. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Martelle  (65  Neb. 

540,    91    N.    W.    364),     1117, 

1180. 
Railroad   Co.   v.  Martin    (111   111. 

219),  916,  1007. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Martin   (41  Mich. 

667),   991. 
Railroad    Co   v.    Mask    (64   Miss. 

738),  1121. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Railroad    Co.    v.   Mason    (4    Kan. 

App.   391,   46   Pac.  31),   404. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Massengill    (15 

Lea,   328),   1177. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Masterson     (16 

Ind.  App.  323,  44  N.  E.  1004), 

205,  1217. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Matthews,     ( — 

Ala.    — ,    39    So.     Rep.     207), 

1179. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Matthews  (24  Ky. 

Law   Rep.   1766,   114   Ky.   973, 

72    S.   W.   Rep.   302,    102   Am. 

St.  Rep.  316,  60  L.  R.  A.  846), 

1242,  1249,  1250. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Matthews  (13  Ind. 

App.  355,  41  N.  E.  842),  990. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Maugans   (61  Md. 

61),    1200. 
Railroad   Co.  v.  Maxwell    (59   111. 

App.  673),  1110. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Maybin   (66  Miss. 

83),  976,  1036. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Mayes    (49    Ga. 

355),  918. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Mayo  (4  Ind.  App. 

413,    30    N.    E.    1106),    1033, 

1086. 
Railroad    Co.    v.     McArthur     (43 

Miss.  180),  1126,  1429. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    McCandliss    (33 

Kan.  366),  1192. 
Railway    Co.     v.    McChord     (103 

Fed.    216;    reversed     in     Mc- 
Chord V.  Railroad,  183  U.  S. 

483),   575. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  McClellan  (54  111. 

58),   122,   147. 
Railroad     Co.     v.     McClosky     (23 

Penn.  St.  526),  1396. 
Railroad     Co.     v.     McClurg     (56 

Penn.   St.   294),   1175,   1209. 
Railroad   Co.  v.  McCool    (26   Ind. 

140),  702. 
Railroad    Co.   v.   McCormick    (124 

Penn.   St.  427),   1122,   1126. 


TABLE   OF    CASES   CITED. 


ccxni 


[references    ABE    TO    SECTIONS.] 


Railroad  Co.  v.  McCurdy   (45  Ga. 

288),  1126. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    McDonald     (68 

Ind.   316),   978. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    McDonnell    (91 

111.   App.   488),   917. 
Railroad    Co.    v.   McDonough    (21 

Mich.    165),     336,     340,     341, 

1351. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  McElwain  (98  Ky. 

700,  34  S.  W.  236),  1386,  1389. 
Railroad      Co.      v.     McElwee      (6 

Heisk.    208),    230,    243. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  McEwan   (17  Ky. 

Law  Rep.  406,  31  S.  W.  Rep. 

465),   980. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  McEwan   (21  Ky. 

Law  Rep.  487,  51  S.  W.  Rep. 

619),  980,  984,  985. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  McGahey  (63  Ark. 

344,  38  S.  W.  659,  58  Am.  St. 

Rep.    Ill,    36   L.   R.   A.    781), 

1242,    1250,    1285,    1286,    1288. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  McGugan  ( —  Md. 

— ,  62  Atl.  Rep.  752),  1174. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  McGuire  (79  Ala. 

395),   704. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   McKean    (40    111. 

218),   1231. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    McKenzie    (Tex. 

Civ.  App.,  41  S.  W.  Rep.  831), 

1427. 
Railroad    Co.    v.     McKinney     (34 

Ind.  App.  402,  73  N.  E.  148), 

426,  1331. 
Railroad    Co.    v.   McLaughlin    (73 

Fed.  519,  19  C.  C.  A.  551,  43 

U.  S.  App.  181),  1003. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    McLendon     (63 

Ala.    266),    1440. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  McManus'  Admx. 

(24   Ky.   L.   R.    81,    67   S.   W. 

Rep.  1000),  990. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    McMullen     (117 

Ind.   439,   20   N.  E.  Rep.   287, 

10  Am.  St.  Rep.  67),  1388. 


Railroad  Co.  v.  McNeal  (Tex.  Civ. 

App.,    76    S.    W.     Rep.     206), 

1427,  1433. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Meador    (65   Ga. 

705),    768. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Means   (136  Fed. 

83,  68  C.  C.  A.  65),  923,  1019. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Means    (48    111. 

App.  396),  1123. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Mehlsack  (131  111. 

61,  19  Am.  St.  Rep.  17),  990, 

1001. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Mercantile  Trust 

&    Deposit   Co.    (82    Md.    535, 

34  Atl.   778,   38  L.  R.  A.   97), 

1076. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Merrill    (48    111. 

425),   728. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Merriwether  (Ky. 

L.    R.,    12    S.    W.    Rep.    935), 

1389. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Messino  (1  Sneed, 

220),  949,  952,  963. 
Railroad  Co.   v.  Metcalf   (50  Neb. 

452,  69  N.  W.  961),  1315. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Meyer    (78    Ala. 

597),  230,  233,  408,  416,  417. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Meyers   (62  Fed. 

367,  10  C.  C.  A.  485,  18  U.   S. 

App.   569),   264,   1197. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Michie    (83    111. 

427),   964,    1001,    1218. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Middlesex    &    S. 

Traction    Co.     (70    N.    J.    L. 

732,   58   Atl.   332),   574,   575. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Midvale  Steel  Co. 

(201  Pa.  St.  624,  51  Atl.  313, 

88    Am.    St.    Rep.    836),    859, 

860. 
Railroad    Co.    v.   Miles     (88     Ala. 

256),    1197. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Miles    (55    Penn. 

St.   209),  972. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Miles     (18     Ky. 

Law  Rep.  580,  37  S.  W.  Rep. 

486),  1060. 


CCXIV 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


[BEFEBENCES    ABE 

Railroad    Co.    v.    Miller    (79    111. 

App.   473),  426,  455. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Miller    (25  Mich. 

274),  1418. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Miller    (16   Neb. 

661),   804,   805. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Miller   (87  Penn. 

St.   395),    1355. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Miller  (132  U.  S. 

75),    574. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Mills     (—    Ind. 

App.  _,  77  N.  E.  Rep.  608), 

1003,  1202,  1414. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Mills    (57    Kan. 

687,  47  Pac.  Rep.   834),   1389. 
Railroad  Co  v.  Millsaps  (76  Miss. 

855,    25    So.    672,    71    Am.    St. 

Rep.  543),  298. 
Railroad  Co.   v.  Milmine    (57  111. 

App.  291),  162. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Mineral   Springs 

Mfg.  Co.   (16  Wall.  318,  21  L. 

Ed.    297),    131.    142,   231,    410, 

415. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Minogue   (90  Ky. 

369,    29    Am.    St.    Rep.    378), 

1423. 
Railroad   Co.  v.   Minor    (69   Miss. 

710,   11   So.   101,   16  L.  R.   A. 

627),   980. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Mississippi    (133 

U.   S.   587,   33   L.   Ed.   784,   10 

Sup.    Ct.     384,     affirming     66 

Miss.   662,   6   So.  Rep.   203,   5 

L.  R.   A.   132),   972. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Mitchell   (32  Fla. 

77,    13    So.   673,   21   L.   R.    A. 

487),  1001,  1277. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Montgomery    (39 

111.  335),  113. 
Railroad    Co.   v.   Moore    (51   Ala. 

394),   233,   260,    1352. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Moore    (101   Ga. 

684,  28  S.  E.  Rep.  1000),  1094. 
Railroad   Co.   v.  Moore    (40  Miss. 

39).   1404. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Railroad    Co.   v.   Moore    (59   Tex. 

64),   1228. 

Railroad    Co.    v.    Morain    (36    111. 

App.    632,    634;    affirmed,    140 

111.   117,   29   N.  E.   869),   1418. 

Railroad   Co.   v.   Morris    (17    Ind. 

App.   189,   46   N.   B.  Rep.   554, 

60   Am.    St.   Rep.    166),    1002. 

Railroad  Co.  v.  Morris   (31  Gratt. 

200),  1177. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Morris    (26    111. 

400),  1386. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Morris    (67   Tex. 

692),  918. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Morris    (68    Tex. 

49),   1334,   1344. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Morrison    (19  111. 

136),  401,  411. 
Railroad     Co.     v.     Morrison     (34 
Kan.    502),    1246,    1255,    1293. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Morton    (61   Ind. 

539),  60. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Moss     (23     Cal. 

324),  76. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Moss  (13  Ky.  Law 

Rep.  684),  964,  990. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Moss    (60    Miss. 

1003),   450,   1354. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Mossbarger    ( — 
Ky.  — ,  91  S.  W.  Rep.  1121), 
1367. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Mower    Co.    (76 

Me.   251),   1305. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Mowery  (36  Ohio 

St.  418),  1223. 
Railroad    Co.    v.   Mt.   Vernon    Co. 

(84  Ala.  174),  131,  175,  233. 
Railroad   Co.   v.  Muhling    (30   111. 

9),  899,  1004,  1019,  1082. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Mulfinger's 
Admx.  (26  Ky.  L.  R.  3,  80 
S.  W.  Rep.  499),  1397,  1401. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Mulford  (162  111. 
522,  44  N.  E.  861,  35  L.  R. 
A.  599,  reversing  59  111.  App. 
479),  263,  1049. 


TABLE   OF    CASES   CITED. 


ccxv 


[KEFKBENCES    ABE 

Railroad   Co.   v.   Mullen    (217   111. 

203,  75  N.  E.  Rep.  474),  1177. 
Railroad    Co.   v.   Mundy    (21   Ind. 

48),    1075. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Murden    (86   Ga. 

434),    1067. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Murphy    (198   111. 

462,   64   N.   B.   1011,  aft'g-,  99 

111.  App.  126),  925. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Murphy   (46  Tex. 

356),   1181,   1174. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Murray   (55  Ark. 

248,  18   S.  W.  50,  16  L.  R.  A. 

787,    29    Am.     St.    Rep.    32), 

1223. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Murray    (85   Ga. 

343),    881,   867. 
Railroad    Co.   v.   Murray    (71    111. 

001),    1227. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Mushrush     (11 

Ind.  App.  192,  37  N.  B.  954), 

991. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Myrtle    (51   Ind. 

566),   1033. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Naive   (112  Tenn. 

239,  79  S.  W.  Rep.  124,  64  L. 

R.  A.  443),  207,  696,  708,  710, 

1348. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Nash    (43    Ind. 

423),    702. 
Railroad    Co.    v.     National    Live 

Stock  Bank    (178   111.  506,   53 

N.    B.    326,    reversing    59    111. 

App.  451),  160. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  National  S.  S.  Co. 

(137   N.   Y.   23,   32   N.  B.   993, 

aff'g.,   62   Hun,   621,   17  N.   Y. 

Supp.  28;  s.  c.  14  N.  Y.  Supp. 

253),    867. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Neely    (91    Va. 

539,  22  S.  B.  Rep.  367),  1446. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Neimann   (84  111. 

App.   272),   677,   800. 
Railroad   Co.   v.    Nelson    (1    Cold. 

272),    70,   226,   496,   652,   1215. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Railroad    Co.    v.    Nelson    (59    111. 

110),  1032,  1033. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Nelson    (51    Ind. 

150),   909. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Newell    (212    111. 

332,   72   N.   E.   416,   aff'g.,   113 

111.  App.  263),  918,  1198. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  N.  Y.,  etc..  Rail- 
road  Co.    (66  Neb.   159,   92   N. 

W.  Rep.  131,  59  L.  R.  A.  939), 

233,   240,   241. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Ney    (Tex.    Civ. 

App.,  58  S.  W.  Rep.  43),  1348, 

1363. 
Railroad   Co.  v.   Nichols    (8   Kan, 

505),    962. 
Railroad  Co.   v.   Nichols    (9   Kan. 

235),    339. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Nichols   (85  Fed. 

945,    29    C.    C.    A.    500),    464, 

1003. 
Railroad  Co.   v.   Nichols    ( — Miss. 

— ,  38  So.  Rep.  371),  1414. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Nickless  (71  Ind. 

271),  1003. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Nix  (68  Ga.  572), 

1085,  1388. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Noell    (32   Gratt. 

394),   1397,   1398. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Norris    (17   Ind. 

App.  189,  46  N.  E.  554,  60  Am.. 

St.  Rep.  166),  990,  1085,  1102. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Oberhoefer    (76 

111.  App.  672),  937. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  O'Connell  (160  111. 

636,  43  N.  B.  704,  aff'g.,  59  111. 

App.  463),  911. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Oden  (80  Ala.  38), 

425,    430.   450,   475,    704,    1354. 
Railroad    Co.   v.    Odill    (96    Tenn. 

61,  33  S.  W.  611,  54  Am.  St. 

Rep.  820),  132,  617. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    O'Donnell    (114 

111.    App.    346;    s.    c.    213    111. 

545,    72    N.    E.    1133),    1384, 

1389. 


CCXVl 


TABLE  OF    CASES  CITED. 


[references  are 

Railroad    Co.    v.    O'Donnell     (49 

Ohio  St.  489,  32  N.  E.  476,  21 

L.  R.  A.  117,  34  Am.  St.  Rep. 

579).   651,   658,    743,   745,   756, 

800.  1374. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Oehm     (56    111. 

293),    1249. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Ogier   (35  Penn. 

St.    60),    1417. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Ohio  Valley  Bank- 
ing &  Trust  Co.  (107  Ga.  512, 

33   S.  E.  Rep.   821),  187,  745. 
Railroad    Co.    v.   Oil   Works    (126 

Penn.  St.  485),  865,  872. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  O'Keefe   (168  111. 

115,    48   N.    E.    294,    39   L.   R. 

A.    148,   61   Am.   St.   Rep.   68, 

reversing  63  111.  App.  102;   s. 

c.  154  111.  508,  39  N.  E.  606), 

927. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  O'Laughlin   (Tex. 

Civ.  App.,  72  S.  W.  Rep.  610), 

508. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Olds  (77  Ga.  673), 

1061,   1065,   1066,  1442. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  O'Loughlin   (Tex 

Civ.  App.,  84  S.  W.  1104),  499,' 

500,  509. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Olsen  (7  Ind.  App. 

698,  34  N.  E.  531),  1092. 
Railroad     Co.     v.     Ordway     (140 

Mass.   510),   1347. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Ormsby  (27  Gratt. 

455),  1229. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Orndorff  (55  Ohio 

St.  589,  45  N.  E.  447,  38  L.  R. 

A.  140,  60  Am.  St.  Rep.  716), 

10S7. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Orr   (Ala.,  8   So. 

Rep.  363).  1397. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Ostrander     (66 

Ark.   567.  52  S.  W.  435).  537. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Owens    (93    Ky. 

201,   19   S.  W.  .590),  426. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Page    (22    Barb. 

130),  1038,  1052. 


1 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Railroad  Co.  v.  Painter   (15  Neb. 

394),  763. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Palmer   (38  Neb. 

463,  56  N.  W.  957,  22  L.  R.  A. 

335),   405. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Parish    (18   Tex. 

Civ.  App.  130,  43  S.  W.  1066), 

430. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Parks    (18    III. 

460),  1083. 

Railroad  Co.  v.  Parmalee  (51  Ind. 

42),    1118. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Parry    (55   N.  J. 

L.  551,  27  Atl.  914,  39  Am.  St. 

Rep.    654,    22    L.   R.   A.    251), 

1041,  1058,  1077. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Patten    (3    Kan. 

App.  338,  45  Pac.  108),  1287, 

1291. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Patterson  (63  111. 

304),  1033. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Patterson  Tobacco 

Co.  (92  Va.  670,  24  S.  E.  Rep. 

261,  41  U  R.  A.  511;  affirmed, 

169  U.   S.   311,  42  L.  Ed.   759, 

18  Sup.  Ct.  R.  335),  209,  235. 

Railroad  Co.  v.  Pattison   (41  Ind. 

312),    805. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Patton   (31  Miss. 

156),  1440. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Paulk    (24    Ga. 

356),    1223. 
Railroad  Co.  v.   Pauson   (70  Fed. 

585.  30  L.  R.  A.  730,  44  U.  S. 

App.    178.    17    C.    C.   A.   287), 

1053. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Payne    (86    Va. 

481,  6  L.  R.  A.  849),  426,  450. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Pearce  (192  U.  S. 

179,   48  L.  Ed.  397,  reversing 

Pearce    v.    Railroad,    89    Mo. 

App.  437).   233.   866. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Peed's  Adm'r  (102 

Va.   662,   47   S.   E.  Rep.  850), 

1397,  1398. 


TABLE  OF    CASES  CITED. 


CCXVll 


[references  are 

Railroad   Co.   v.   Pendergrass    (69 

Miss.   425,    12    So.   Rep.   945), 

1389. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    People    (56    111. 

365),    230,    520. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  People  (67  111.  1), 

520,    574. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    People    (67    111. 

11),  521. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   People    (121   111. 

304),  521,  574. 
Railroad     Co.     v.     People     (Ohio, 

1877),  6  C.  L.  J.  436),  1403. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Perkins  (25  Mich. 

329),    340,    341. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Perry    (58    Ga. 

461),  1006,  1008. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Peters  (116  Penn. 

St.  206),   1118. 
Railroad    Co.   v.    Pevey    (30   Tex. 

Civ.  App.  460,  70  S.  W.  778), 

931.  ♦ 

Railroad    Co.    v.    Phillibert     (25 

Kan.  583),  1417. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Phillips    (93   Ga. 

801,  20  S.  E.  Rep.  646),  1293. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Phillips    (60   111. 

198),    175. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Phillips  (64  Miss^ 

693),  1389. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Phillips    (49   111. 

234),    909. 
Railroad  Co.   v.   Phillipson    (Tex. 

Civ.  App.,  39  S.  W.  958),  430. 

450. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Pickard    (8   Col. 

163),  1181. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Pickleseimer   (85 

Va.  798),  1175,  1181. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Picklesimer    (89 

Va.   389,   16   S.   E.  Rep.   245), 

1181. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Pilgrim    (9   Colo. 

App.  86,  47  Pac.  657),  948. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Pillow   (76  Penn. 

St.  510),  981,  984. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Railroad  Co.  v.  Pillsbury  (123  111. 
9),   986. 

Railroad   Co.    v.    Piper    (13    Kan. 

505),   226,   246. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Pittman    (73  Ga. 

325),  1401. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Ponder   (117   Ga. 

63,  43  S.  E.  Rep.  430,  97  Am. 

St.  Rep.  152,  60  L.  R.  A.  713), 

987. 

Railroad  Co.  v.  Pondrom   (51  111. 

333),  1211. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Pontius   (19  Ohio 

St.    221),    232,    240,    410,    450, 

1296. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Potter    (36    111. 

App.  590),  130. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Powell    (13   Tex. 

Civ.  App.  212,  35  S.  W.  Rep. 

841),    1045. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Powers  ( — Neb. — , 

103  N.  W.  Rep.  678),  114. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Powers  (149  U.  S. 

43,   13   Sup.   Ct.  R.   748,   37  L. 

Ed.    642),    1174,    1219. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Pratt    (22   Wall, 

123),    231,    242,    452,   497,   499, 

505,   508. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Prewitt   (46  Ala. 

63),    675,    704. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Price    (96   Penn. 

St.  286),  997,  1017,  1200. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Prickett   (210  111. 

140,  71  N.  E.  Rep.  435),  1397. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Prince   (2  Heisk. 

580),  1404. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Proctor   (1  Allen, 

267),   1043,  1117. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Proctor   ( — Ky. — , 

89    S.    W.    Rep.    714),    1219. 

1230. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Pumphrey    (59 

Md.     390),     668,     1360,     1362, 

1367,    1369,    1374. 


CCXVlll 


TABLE  OF    CASES  CITED. 


[BEFEBENCES    ABE 

Railroad   Co.  v.  Putnam    (118   U 

S.  554,  7  Sup.  Ct.  R.  1,  30  L. 

Ed.   257),   1397. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Quarles   &   Cou- 

turie    (—Ala.—,    40    So.   Rep. 

120),  304. 
Railroad  Co,  v.  Queen  City  Coal 

Co.    (13  Ky.  Law  Rep.   832), 

76,  146. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Quigley  (21  How. 

202),  1438. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Quinn    ( — Ala. — , 

39  So.  Rep.  616),  1379. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Quisenberry    (48 

111.  App.  338),  1033. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Radford    (23  Ky. 

Law  Rep.  886,  64  S.  W.  511), 

426,  442. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Rae  (18  111.  488), 

496,    867. 
Railroad     Co.     v.     Ragsdale     (46 

Miss.  458),  651,  652,   654,  658, 

1366,    1369,    1367. 
Railroad  Co.   v.  Railroad    (14  Al- 
len,  462),   783. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Raiordon     (119 

Penn.     St.     577),     419,     1357, 

1415. 
Railroad  Co.  v.   Rambo    (59   Fed. 

75,  8  C.  C.  A.  6,  16  U.  S.  App. 

277),  1050. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Randall    (79   Ga. 

304),  1118,   1414. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Randolph  (53  111. 

510),  1060. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Randolph  (65  111. 

App.   208),   1099. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Ransom  (56  Kan, 

559,  44  Pac.  Rep.  6),  917. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Rathbone   (1  W. 

Va.  87),  463. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Ray  ( — Ind.  App. 

— ,  73  N.  E.  Rep.  942),  1391. 
Railroad   Co.   v.  Ray    (101   Tenn. 

1,   46   S.  W.   554),   1093,   1135. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Railroad  Co.  v.  Rayburn  (153  111. 

290,    38   N.   E.    558,    reversing 

52   111.  App.   277),   1013. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Read  (37  111.  484), 

451,   455,   1075. 
Railroad   Co.    v.   Reagan    (52    111. 

App.  488),  990. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Redding  (140  Ind. 

101,  39  N.  E.  921,  34  L.  R.  A. 

767),   990. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Redding  (17  Tex. 

Civ.  App.  440,  43  S.  W.  1061), 

562. 
Railroad    Co.    v.   Reeves    (25   Ky. 

Law  Rep.  2236,  80  S.  W.  Rep. 

471),  1111,  1423. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Reeves   (85  N.  Y. 

Supp.  28,  41  Misc.  490),  1056. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Reeves   (10  Wall. 

176),  282,  300,  309,  477,  1355. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Reid     (91    Ga. 

377,   17    S.   E.   934),   419,   475, 

640. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Reisner  (18  Kan. 

458),  1222. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Remmy   (13  Ind. 

518),   167,   133L 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Renz     (55    Ga. 

126),   1226,   1233. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Revalee   (17  Ind. 

App.  657,  46  N.  E.  352),  1118. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Rexwood  (59  Ark. 

180,  26   S.  W.   1037),   1229. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Reynolds  (24  Ky. 

Law  Rep.  1402,  71  S.  W.  516), 

941,  1011,  1414. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Reynolds  (8  Kan. 

623),  339. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Reynolds  (17  Kan. 

251),  450. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Reynolds  (55  Ohio 

St.  370,  45  N.  E.  712,  60  Am. 

St.  Rep.  706),  1060,  1062. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Rhodes  (25  Fla. 

40),  1061,  1075,  1082. 


TABLE  OF    CASES  CITED. 


CCXIX 


[BEFEBENCES    ABE   TO    SECTIONS.] 


Railroad    Co.    v.    Rice    (38    Kan. 

398),    1433. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Rice    (64  Md.  63, 
21  Atl.   97),   1003,  1065,   1066, 
1067. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Richardson    (53 

Kan.  157,  35  Pac.  1114),  233. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Richardson    (19 

Ky.  Law  Rep.  1495,  43  S.  W. 

Rep.   465),   167. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Richardson    (23 

Ky.  Law  Rep.  2234,  66  S.  W. 

1035),  416. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Rlcherson     (14 

Ky.  L.  R.  925),   1177. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Richmond  (98  Ga. 

495,  25  S.  E.  Rep.  565),  1099. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Richmond     (23 

Ky.  Law  Rep.  2394,  67  S.  W. 

25),   923. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Ricketts   (96  Ky. 

44,  27  S.  W.  Rep.  860),  1184. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Ricketts   (18  Ky. 

Law  Rep.  687,  37  S.  W.  Rep. 

952),  936,  1118. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Riegel   (73  Penn. 

St.  72),  728. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Riley    (39    Ind. 

568),  1011,  1012,  1116. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Riley    (47    111. 

514),  1230. 
Railroad   Co.   v.  Rinard    (46   Ind. 

293),  963,   1033. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Ritter    (85    Ky. 

368),  1414. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Roach    (35  Kan. 

740),  1049. 
Railroad   Co.   v.  Roberts    (91   Ga. 

513,  18  S.  E.  Rep.  315),  1067. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Roberts    (40   111. 

503),  1033. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Robinson     (141 

Ala.    325,    37    So.    Rep.    431), 

1396. 
Railroad     Co.     v.     Robinson     (44 

Penn.  St.  175),  1417. 


Railroad    Co.    v.    Rodebaugh    (38 

Kan.  45),  1299.  * 

Railroad  Co.  v.  Roeser  ( — Neb. — , 

95  N.  W.  Rep.  68),  1209,  1215, 

1397. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Rogers  (6  Heisk. 

143),    246,    230. 
Railroad   Co.   v.  Rogers    (28   Ind. 

1),    1033. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Roller   (100  Fed. 

738,  41  C.  C.  A.  22,  49  L.  R. 

A.  77),  918,  1223,  1409,  1423, 

1427. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Root  (49  Neb.  900, 

69  N.  W.  397),  1200. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Rose    (11    Neb. 

177),   964. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Ross  (105  111.  App. 

54),   442,   455. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Ross    (Tex.   Civ. 

App.,    89    S.    W.    Rep.    1105), 

1118. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Rothschild  &  Co. 

(119    Ga.   604,    46   S.   E.   Rep. 

830),   674. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Rouse    (78    111. 

App.  286),  1388. 

Railroad  Co.  v.  Rowan   (66  Penn. 
St.  393),  1417. 

Railroad  Co.  v.  Rumbold   (40  IlL 

143),   915. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Ruby    (38    Ind. 

294),   960. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Rudolph  (113  Ga. 

143,  38  S.  E.  328),  1413. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Rutherford    (29 

Ind.    82),    1209. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Ryan  (165  111.  88, 

46    N.    E.    208.    aff'g.,    62    111." 

App.   264),   1219. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Sage    (35    Hun, 

95),    869. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Sammon     (Tex. 

Civ.  App.,  79  S.  W.  Rep.  854), 

1427. 


ccxz 


TABLE  OF    CASES  CITED. 


[BEFEBENCES    ABE 

Railroad  Co.  v.  Sanders   (98  Ala. 

293,  13  So.  57),  923. 
Railroad  Co.  v.   Sanders   (86  Ky. 

259.  5  S.  W.  Rep.  563),  1396. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Sandusky  (14  Ky. 

Law  Rep.  767),  949,  1216. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Sanger  (15  Gratt. 

230),    947,    990. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Sargeant  (19  Ohio 

St.  438),  664,  678. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Satterwhite   (112 

Tenn.  185,  79  S.  W.  Rep.  106), 

1401. 
Railroad    Co.   v.    Satterwhite    (19 

Tex.  Civ.  App.  170,  47  S.  W. 

Rep.   41),   991. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Sayers  (26  Gratt. 

328),   401,   450. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Sayles    (87   Fed. 

444,    32    C.    C.    A.    485,    aff'g., 

Sayles    v.   Railroad,    81    Fed. 

326),   415. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Scharzenberger 

(45  Penn.   St.   208),   1049. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Schaufler  (75  Ala. 

136),  1180,  1221. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Schaun    (97   Md. 

563,  55  Atl.  701),  1061. 
Railroad   Co.  v.   Schiebe    (44   111. 

460),  1180. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Schmelling    (197 

111.    619,    64   N.   E.   714,   affg., 

99  111.  App.  577),  1186. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Schuldt  (66  Neb. 

43,   92   N.  W.   162),   419,   634, 

640. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Schumaker    (29 

Md.   168),  231. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Schwartz   (13  111. 

App.   490),  1309,   1311. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Scott  (42  111.  132), 

702. 
Railroad  Co.  v.   Scott   (Tex.   Civ. 

App.,    79    S.    W.    Rep.    642). 

1036,  1382,   1431. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Railroad    Co.    v.    Scott    (111    111. 

App.  234),  895,  1019,  1228. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Scott    (88    Va. 

958,  14  S.  E.  763,  16  L.  R.  A. 

91),  1209. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Scott's  Adm'r  (22 

Ky.    Law    Rep.    30,    108    Ky. 

392,  56  S.  W.  Rep.  674,  50  L. 

R.  A.  381),  1004,  1019,  1072, 

1073,  1401. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Scovill  (71  Conn. 

136,  41  Atl.  246,  42  L.  R.  A. 

157,  71  Am.  St.  Rep.  159), 

944. 
Railroad  Co,  v.  Searles  (83  Miss. 

721,  37  S.  W.  Rep.  939,  68  L. 

R.  A.  715),  859,  860,  861,  862. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Seitz  (214  111.  350, 

73  N.  E.  585,  105  Am.  St.  Rep. 

108,   aff'9;   105   111.  App.   89), 

178,   594,   806. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Selby    (47    Ind. 

471),   450,   1003,   1072. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Sellers    (93   Ala. 

9,  30  Am.  St.  Rep.  17),  1126. 
Railroad   Co.   v.    Shackleford    ( — 

Miss.—,    40     So.     Rep.     427), 

1250. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Shacklet  (105  111. 

364),  1236,  1389. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Shanly  (107  Mass. 

568),    796. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Sharpe    ( — Neb. 

— ,  107  N.  W.  Rep.  758),  214, 

215,    218,   304. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Shea  (66  111.  471), 

331. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Shean    (18   Colo. 

368,  33  Pac.   108,   20  L.  R.  A. 

729),    1012,     1219. 
Railroad   Co.  v.   Sheehan    (29   111. 

App.  90),  1094. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Sheeks   (155  Ind. 

74,   56  N.  E.   434),   1414. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Sheeley  (27  N.  Y. 

Supp.  185),  944. 


TABLE  OF   CASES  CITED. 


CCXXl 


[befebences  are  to  sections.] 


Railroad  Co.  v.  Sheppard  (56  Ohio 
St.  68,  46  N.  E.  61,  60  Am. 
St   Rep.    732),   211,   212,   450, 

904,    1362. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Sherrod   (84  Ala. 

178),   233,   426. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Sherwood    (132 

Ind.  129,  31  N.  E.  781,  17  L. 

R.    A.    339,    32    Am.    St.    Rep. 

239),  419,  449,  1355. 
Railroad   Co.  v.   Shipley    (31  Md. 

368),   1175. 
Railroad   Co.  v.   Shivell's  Adm'x., 

(13   Ky.  L.  R.   902,   18   S.  W. 

Rep.  944),  1388. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Shivers  ( — Md. — , 

61  Atl.  Rep.   618),   895,   1413. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Shomo    (90    Ga. 

496,   16   S.   E.   220),   167,   233. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Shott   (92  Va.  34, 

22  S.  E.  Rep.  811),  1017. 
Railroad   Co.  v.   Shurtz    (7  Mich. 

515),    72,    113. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Sickings  (5  Bush, 

1),  1209. 
Railroad   Co.   v.    Siddons    (53    111. 

App.    607),    1110,    1409,    1427. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Simmons   (49  111. 

App.   443),   651. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Simms    (18    111. 

App.   68),   442. 
Railroad   Co.   v.    Simon    (160    111. 

648,  43  N.  B.  596,  aff'g.,  57  111. 

App.  502),  157,  230,  410. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Simpson  (30  Kan. 

645),   339.   425. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Sims  (27  Ind.  59), 

1114. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Singleton  (66  Ga. 

252),   964. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Singleton  (67  Ga. 

306),  1221. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Siniard   (123  Ala. 

557,  26  So.  Rep.  689),  1111. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Skells   (3  W.  Va. 

556),   401. 


Railroad    Co.    v.    Skillie    (86    Ga. 

686),  1366. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Skillman  (39  Ohio 

St.   444),  1033,   1085. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Slatton    (54    111. 

133),  1181. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Slusser   (19  Ohio 

St.   157),   1442. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Smith    (92    Ala. 

237),   1123,   1420. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Smith   (2  Duvall, 

556),  1436. 
Railroad   Co.  v.    Smith    (Tex.,   14 

S.   W.  Rep.   642),   1123. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Smith   (Tex.  Civ. 
App.,    90    S.    W.    Rep.    709), 
1067. 
Railroad   Co.   v.    Smith    (86   Fed. 
292,  30  C.  C.  A.  58,  40  L.  R. 
A.  746),  1006. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Smith    (74    111. 

197),   201,    206. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Smith    (59    111. 
App.    242;    affirmed,    162    111. 
185,  44  N.  E.  390),  935. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Smith    (81    111. 

App.  364),  233. 
Railroad    Co.   v.    Smith    (162    111. 
583,  44  N.  E.  Rep.  856),  1398. 
Railroad    Co,    v.    Smith    (13    Ky. 

Law  Rep.   974),    1122. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Smith    (14    Ky. 
Law  Rep.  814),  445,  464,  652, 
1366. 
Railroad   Co.  v.    Smith    (85  Miss. 
349,  37  So.  Rep.  643,  70  L.  R. 
A.   642),   966,   967. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Smith  (110  Tenn. 
197,    75    S.    W.    711,    100    Am. 
St.  Rep.   799),   1001,   1120. 
Railroad   Co.  v.   Smith    (31   S.   C. 
R.  367,  1  Can.  R'y.  Cases,  255, 
reversing    Smith    v.    Railway, 
34  N.  S.  R.  22,  1  Canadian  Ry. 
Cases,  231),  926. 


cexxii 


TABLE  OF   CASES  CITED. 


[references  are 

Railroad    Co.    v.    Smith    (95    Va. 

187,  28  S.  E.  Rep.  173),  1197. 
Railroad  Co.  v.   Smitha   (85  Ala. 

47),   339. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Smitha    ( — Ala. 

— ,  40  So.  Rep.  117),  339,  640, 

642,    1354. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Smuck    (49   Ind. 

302),  464. 
Railroad   Co.  v.   Smyser    (38   111. 

354),  125. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Snider    (118  Ga. 

146,  44  S.  E.  Rep.  1005),  1197. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Snyder   (117  Ind. 

435),  1414. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Snyder   (18  Ohio 

St.  399),  1227,  1229. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Snyder   (24  Ohio 

St.  670),  1229. 
Railroad    Co.   v.    Soper    (59    Fed. 

879,  8  C.  C.  A.  341,  21  U.  S. 

App.  24),  442,  443,  448. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Senders   (178  111. 

585,   53  N.  E.   408,  reversing, 

79   111.  App.  41),   1180. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    South    (43    111. 

176),  1033,  1111. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Southern    Bank 

(41  111.  App.  287),  187. 
Railroad     Co.     v.     Southern    Ry. 

News  Co.  (151  Mo.  373,  52  S. 

W.  Rep.  205,  45  L.  R.  A.  380), 

1076. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Southern  Seating 

&  Cabinet  Co.  (104  Tenn.  568, 

58  S.  W.  308,  78  Am.  St.  Rep. 

933,    50    L.    R.    A.    729),    140, 

1366,  1367. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Sowell   (90  Tenn. 

17,   15   S.  W.  Rep.   837),   426. 
Railroad     Co.     v.     Spearen      (47 

Penn.  St.  300),  1229. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Spears    (66   Ga. 

485),  419. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Railroad  Co.  v.  Spence  (93  Tenn. 

173,    23    S.    W.    Rep.    211,    42 

Am.  St.  Rep.  907),  1401. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Spencer  (27  Colo. 

313,  61  Pac.  606,  51  L.  R.  A. 
*   151),  935,  991,  1174,  1397, 

1398,  1401. 
Railroad     Co.     v.     Spicker     (105 

Penn.   St.   142),   1043,   1052. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Spickler  (61  Tex. 

427),   1417. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Spratt  (2  Duvall, 

4),  253. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Sprayberry     (9 

Heisk.    852),    205,    238,    1049, 

1387,  1388. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   St.   Louis,   I.   M. 

&   S.  Ry.   Co.    (41   Fed.   559), 

526. 
Railroad   Co.   v.    St.  Louis   S.   W. 

Ry.  Co.  (63  Fed.  775,  11  C.  C. 

A.  417,   27  U.   S.  App.  380,  26 

L.   R.   A.    192,    aff'g.,   59   Fed. 

400),    567,    568,    799; 
Railroad  Co,  v.   Stanley    (61  Md. 

266),  922,   1225. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Starnes  (9  Heisk. 

52),    1444. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Startz   (Tex.  Civ. 

App.,    33    S.    W.    Rep.    575), 

1370. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    State    (65    Ark. 

363,  46  S.  W.  421,  67  Am.  St. 

Rep.  933),  1241,  1242,  1249. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    State     (29    Md. 

252),  952. 

Railroad    Co.    v.    State    (33    Md. 

542),  1423. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    State    (54    Md. 

655),  1200. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    State     (60    Md. 

449),    1219,   1389. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    State    (63    Md. 

135),  1219. 


TABLE  OF    CASES  CITED. 


ecxxiii 


[befebences  are 

Railroad    Co.    v.    State    (72    Md. 

36,    17   Atl.   Rep.    1107),    1200. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  State  (81  Md.  371, 

32  Atl.  201),  1008,  1122,  1219, 

1230,    1397. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  State  (95  Md.  637, 

53  Atl.  969),  1003,  1397,  1412. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  State  of  Minneso- 
ta   (186   U.   S.   257,  46   L.   Ed. 

1151,  22  Sup.  Ct.  R.  900,  aff'g., 

80  Minn.   191,   83   N.  W.   60), 

574,  575,  576,  577,  579,  581. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Statham  (42  Miss. 

607),  992,  1436. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Steear    (53   Neb. 

95,  73  N.  W.  466),  1301. 
Railroad   Co.   v.    Steenberger    (24 

Ky.  Law  Rep.   761,   69   S.   W. 

1094),    1413. 
Railroad    Co.   v.    Steinbruner    (47 

N.  J.  Law  161),  1236. 
Railroad  Co.  v.   Steiner   (61  Ala. 

559),    589. 
Railroad  Co.  v.   Stephen    (13  Ky. 

Law  Rep.  687),  1045,  1433. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Stern   (119  Penn. 

St.  24),   117,   184,   186. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Stewart   (14  Tex. 

Civ.  App.  703,  37  S.  W.  770), 

1182. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Stewart   (55  Kan. 

667,  41  Pac.  961),  1118. 
Railroad   Co.  v.   Stewart    (2   Tex. 

Ct.   Rep.   498,   62    S.   W.   Rep. 

1085),  1018,  1217. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  St.  John  (13  Tex. 

Civ.  App.  257,  35  S.  W.  Rep. 

501),  1054. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Stocksdale     (83 

Md.    245,    34    Atl.    880),    1053, 

1054,   1065. 
Railroad    Co.   v.    Stokes    (12    Ky. 

Law  Rep.  192),  1126. 
Railroad   Co.    v.    Stonecipher    (90 

111.  App.  511),  1110. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Railroad    Co.    v.    Stoner    (49    Fed. 

209,    1   C.    C.   A.   231,    4   U.    S. 

App.    109;    s.   c.    51   Fed.   649, 

2  C.  C.  A.  437,  10  U.  S.  App. 

209),   1414. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Storment    (190 

111.  42,  60  N.  E.  104,  aft'g.,  90 

111.  App.  505),  1118. 
Railroad   Co.   v.    Storms    (15   Ky. 

Law  Rep.   333),    1403. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Stout    (53    Ind. 

143),  1223. 
Railroad   Co.   v.    Stout    (17   Wall. 

657),    1228. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Stratton   (111  111. 

App.  142),  1061. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Strickland     (90 

Ga.  562,   16  S.  E.  352),   1033, 

1084,  1424. 
Railroad  Co.   v.   Stringfellow    (44 

Ark.   322),   1179. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Strong    (56    111. 

App.  604),  1366. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Strong    (52    Ga. 

461),  1384. 
Railroad  Co.  v.   Suffern    (129   111. 

274),    520. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Sullivan   (59  Ala. 

372),   1389. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Sullivan  (120  Fed. 

799,  57  C.  C.  A.  167,  61  L.  R. 

A.    410),    1389. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Sullivan   (81  Ky. 

624),  994,  1083. 
Railroad     Co.    v.     Sullivan     (177 

Mass.  230,  58  N.  E.  689),  944. 

Railroad  Co.  v.  Sullivan's  Adm'x. 

(25   Ky.   L.  R.  854,   76  S.  W. 

Rep.  525),  1397. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Sutherland    (89 

Va.   703,   17   S.  E.   Rep.   127), 

643. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Sutton    (53    111. 

397),   899,   992. 
Railroad   Co.   v.    Sutton    (L.   R.   4 

H.  L.  Cas.  226),  805. 


CCXXIV 


TABLE  OF    CASES  CITED. 


[refebences  are 

Railroad   Co.   v.    Swann    (81   Md. 

400,   32  Atl.   175,  31  L.  R.  A. 

313),  895,  1115,  1200. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Swanson  (102  Ga. 

754,  28  S.  E.  601,  39  L.  R.  A. 

275),  541. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Swift    (12   Wall. 

262),  87.  151,  963,  1246,   1250. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Swint    (73    Ga. 

651),  1388. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Taber    (98    Ky. 

503,  32  S.  W.  Rep.  168,  36  S. 

W.  Rep.  18,  34  L.  R.  A.  685), 

209,   222,   426,   442. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Taffey   (38  N.  J. 

Law  527),  1417. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Tapp  (6  Ind.  App. 

304,  33  N.  E.  462),  274,  1278. 
Railroad    Co.   v.    Tarter    (19    Ky. 

Law  Rep.  229,  39  S.  W.  Rep. 

698),   233. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Taylor    (69    111. 

461),  949. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Taylor    (102   111. 

App.  445),  1219. 

Railroad    Co.    v.    Taylor    (24"Ky. 

Law  Rep.  1169,  70  S.  W.  825), 

1118. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Taylor    (25   Ind. 

App.   679,  58  N.  B.  852),  928, 

1118,  1127. 
Railroad   Co.  v.   Taylor    (Ind.,   25 

N.  E.  Rep.  869),  1414. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Tegnor  (125  Ala. 

593,    28    So.   Rep.    570),   1397. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Temple   (47  Kan. 

7.    27    Pac.    98,    13    L.    R.    A. 

362),   442,    443,    444. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Terry  (8  Ohio  St. 

570),  993.        . 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Terry    (27   Tex. 

Civ.  -App.  341,  65  S.  W.  697), 

993,    1121. 

Railroad  Co.  v.  Thomas   (42  Ala. 
672),  904. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Railroad  Co.  v.  Thomas   (83  Ala. 

343),   233. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Thomas   (89  Ala. 

294),  61L 
Railroad  Co.  v,  Thomas   (60  Fed. 

379,   9   C.   C.   A.   29,   23   U.   S. 

App.   37),   1203. 
Railroad  Co.   v.   Thomas    (79   Ky. 

160),  1200,   1417. 
Railroad    v.    Thomas    ( — Miss. — , 

40   So.   Rep.    257),    1395. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Thompson  (76  Ga. 

770),  1186. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Thompson  (19  111. 

578),    76,    33L 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Thompson  (56  111. 

138),  895,  897,  947. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Thompson  (71  111. 

434),  339,  634. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Thompson     ( — 

Neb.—,  106  N.  W.  Rep.  598), 

442. 
Railroad   Co.  v.   Thompson    (Tex. 

Civ.  App.,  77  S.  W.  Rep.  439), 

896,   955,   1414. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Thornton  (22  Ky. 

Law  Rep.  778,  58  S.  W.  796), 

1000. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Thrapp    (5    111. 

App.  502),  625. 
Railroad  Co.  v.   Tindall    (13  Ind. 

366,   74  Am.  Dec.   259),   1376, 

1397,    1398. 
Railroad   v.    Tisdale    (74    Tex.   8, 

11  S.  W.  Rep.  900),  236,  238, 

657. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Tison    (116    111. 

App.    48),    630. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Towboat  Co.    (23 

How.  209),  1233. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Tracey    (109   111. 

App.  563),  1016,  1099. 
Railroad     Co.     v.     Trafton      (151 

Mass.   229),   1046. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Trail    (Miss.,   25 

So.  Rep.  863),  1180. 


TABLE  OF   CASES  CITED. 


eexxv 


[befebences  are 

Railroad  Co.  v.  Trautwein  (52  N. 

J.  Law  169),  937. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Treat    (179    111. 

576,    54    N.    E.    290,    aff'g.,   75 

111.   App.    327),   933. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Tripp   (147  Mass. 

35),   944. 
Railroad   Co.  v.   Trippe    (42   Ark. 

465),   264. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Tronstine     (64 

Miss.  834),  1274. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Trotter  (60  Miss. 

442),   900. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Trousdale  &  Son 

(99    Ala.    389,    13    So.    23,    42 

Am.  St.  Rep.  69),  1357. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Troyer  ( — Neb. — , 

103  N.  W.  Rep.  680;   s.  c.  97 

N.  W.  Rep.  308),  1003. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Tucker    (23   Ky. 

L.    R.    1929,    65    S.    W.    Rep. 

453),  1397. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Turner    (72   Ga. 

292),  1094. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Turner  (100  Tenn. 

214,  47  S.  W.  223,  43  L.  R.  A. 

140),  1028,  1041,  1043,  1052, 

1077. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Turpelo,  etc.,  Co. 

(67  Miss.  35,  19  Am.  St.  Rep. 

262),  1348. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  United  States  (93 

U.  S.  444),  103. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Usry  (82  Ga.  54), 

1187,  1431. 
Railroad   Co.  v.   Vanatta    (21   111. 

188),  1082. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Vancleave  (23  Ky. 

L.    Rep.    479,    63    S.    W.    22), 

574. 
Railroad     Co.    v.    Vandever     (36 

Penn.  St.  298),  1400. 
Railroad     Co.     v.     Vandiver     (42 

Penn.  St.  365),  1084. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Van   Dresar    (22 

Wis.  511),  341. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Railroad  Co.  v.  Van  Horn  (38  N. 

J.  Law,   133),   1123. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Van  Patten    (64 

111.  510),  1174. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Van    Steinburg 

(17  Mich.  99),  1418. 
Railroad   Co.   v.  Vaughn    (4   Tex. 

Civ.  App.  281,  16  S.  W.  Rep. 

775),   240. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Venable    (65   Ga. 

55),  1389. 
Railroad   Co.  v.  Venable    (67   Ga. 

697),  1397. 
Railroad     Co.     v.     Vibbard     (114 

Mass.   447),   870. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Vinson    (25    Ky. 

Law  Rep.   38,   74   S.  W.   671; 

rehearing  denied,  25  K.  L.  R. 

652,  76  S.  W.  167),  1217. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Voils     (98    Ga. 

446,  26  S.  E.  Rep.  483,  35  L. 
R.   A.   655),   1005,   1008,   1112. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Waggoner  (90  111. 
App.  556),  1004,  1011,  1073. 

Railroad  Co.  v.  Wainwright   (Ky., 

13  S.  W.  Rep.  438),  1389. 
Railroad  Co.   v.  Walker    (217   111. 

605,  75  N.  E.  Rep.  520),  928, 

1006. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Walker  (23  Ky.  L. 

Rep.  453,  63  S.  W.  20),  599. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Wallace   (202  111. 

129,  66  N.  E.  1096,  aft'g.,  104 

111.   App.    55),    1118. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Wallace  (24  U.  S. 

App.   589,   66   Fed.   506,   14  C. 

C.  A.  257,  30  L.  R.  A  161),  44, 

59,  60,  85,  88,  1018,  1073. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Walrath  (38  Ohio 

St.  461),   1135. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Walsh   (45   Kan. 

653,  26  Pac.  Rep.  45),  1414. 
Railroad  Co.  v.   Walsh    (47  N.  J. 

Law,  548),  1433. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Ward    (135    111. 
511),   933. 


cexxvi 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


[references  are 

Railroad   Co.  v.  Ward    (47   N.  J. 

Law,    560),    1174. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Ware   (Tex.  Civ. 

App.,  60  S.  W.  Rep.  343),  212. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Warren  (64  N.  Y. 

Supp.  781,  31  Misc.  571),  944. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Washburn  (5  Neb. 

117),   450. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Washington    ( — 

Ark.—,  85  S.  W.  Rep.  406,  69 

L.  R.  A.  65),  227,  230,  233. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Washington  (Tex. 

Civ.  App.,  30  S.  W  Rep  719), 

1094. 
Railroad    Co.   v.   Waters    (41    111. 

73),  496. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Waters   (50  Neb. 

592,  70  N.  W.  225),  243,  630. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Wathen    (23  Ky. 

Law  Rep.  2128,  66  S.  W.  714), 

340. 
Railroad  Co.  v.   Watly    (69  Miss. 

145,  13  So.  Rep.  825),  1397. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Weakly   (50  Ark. 

397),  426. 
Railroad   Co.  v.  Weber    (33  Kan. 

543),  994,  1083,  1230,  1397. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Weber   (76  Penn. 

St.  157),  1417. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Webster   (25  Fla. 

394),  1202. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Weigland  ( 79  Fed. 

991,  39  U.  S.  App.  761,  25  C. 

C.  A  681),  1299 
Railroad    Co.   v.    Weikle    (6    Ind. 

App.  340,  33  N.  E.  639),  1418. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Weiller    (Penn. 

St.,  19  Atl.  Rep.  702),  450. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Weiner  (49  Miss. 

725),   401,  450. 
Railroad   Co.    v.   Welch    (86   Tex. 

203,  24  S.  W.  Rep.  390,  40  Am. 

St.  Rep.  829),  895,  896. 
Railroad    Co.    v.   Weldon    (52    111. 
290),  1397,  1423. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Railroad  Co.  v.  Wells   (85  Tenn. 

613),   972. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Welsh  (62  N.  J.  L. 

655,   42   Atl.   736,   72  Am.   St. 

Rep.  659),  990. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  West   (22  Ky.  L. 

R.   387,   60   S.   W.  Rep.   290), 

990. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Wetmore  (19  Ohio 

St.  110),  489,  1099. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Wheeler  (35  Kan. 

185),    899. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Whitacre  (35  Ohio 

St.  627),  1417. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Whitcher   (1  Al- 
len, 497),   809. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    White    (88    Ga. 

805,   15   S.  E.  Rep.  802),  709. 
Railroad   Co.  v.  White   (82  Miss. 

120,    33    So.   Rep.    970),    1440. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  White   (—Tex.—, 

89  S.  W.  Rep.  746,  reversing 

s.   c.    (Tex.   Civ.  App.)    86   S. 

W^  Rep.  71),  1067,  1129. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  White   (Tex.  Civ. 

App.,    34    S.    W.    Rep.    1042), 

964. 
Railroad     Co.     v.     Whitfield     (44 

Miss.  466),  1126,  1127. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Whitlow  (105  Ky. 

1,   43    S.   W.   Rep.    711,    41   L. 

R.    A.    614),    205,    1388,    1393. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Whitman  (79  Ala. 

328),  1441. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Whittaker     (22 

Ky.  Law  Rep.   395,   57   S.  W. 

Rep.   465),    1179. 
Railroad   Co.    v.   Whittemore    (43 

111.   420),  1082. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Whittle    (27   Ga. 

535),    87. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Wightman     (29 

Gratt.   431),   1394,   1397,   1402. 
Railroad   Co.    v.    Wilcox    (48   Ga. 
432),    740,    742. 


i 

I 


1 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


cexxvii 


[eeferences  are 

Railroad   Co.    v.   Wilcox    (99    Va. 

394,  39   S.  E.  Rep.  144),  537. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Wilkens    (44  Md. 

11),   158,  160,   175,   261. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Wilkerson   Bros. 

(Tex.    Civ.    App.,    82    S.    W. 

Rep.  1069),  499. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Wilkes   (68  Tex. 

617),  1036. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Wilkinson     (15 

Ky.  Law  Rep.  92),  1433. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Willard    (31   111. 

App.  435),  1036. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Williams     (113 

Ala.    402,    21    So.    Rep.    938), 

1387. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Williams   (55  111. 

185),   972,   980. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Williams  (61  Neb. 

608,  85  N.  W.  832,  55  L.  R.  A. 

289),   339,   642. 
Railroad   Co.  v.  Wilson    (123   Ga. 

62,  51  S.  E.  Rep.  24),  1375. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Wilson   (119  Ind. 

352),    804. 
Railroad   Co.   v.  Wilson    (20   Ind. 

App.  5,  50  N.  E.  90),  1060. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Wilson   (132  Ind. 

517,  32  N.  E.  311,  18  L.  R.  A. 

105;  s.  c.  119  Ind.  353,  21  N. 

E.   341),   521,   804,   805. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Wimberly  75  Ga. 

316),  1291,  1283. 
Railroad  Co,  v.  Winans  (17  How. 

30),    918. 
Railroad   Co.  v.  Winfrey   ( — Neb. 

— ,  93  N.  W.  Rep.  526),  1179. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Wingate  (143  Ind. 

125,  37  N.  E.  274),  933,  1180. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Winslow   (27  Ky. 

Law  Rep.  329,  84  S.  W.  Rep. 

1175),  1094. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Winters   (175  111. 

293,  51  N.  E.  901,  aff'g.,  65  111. 

App.  435),   899.   1186. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Railroad   Co.   v.   Winter's   Adm'r. 

(143  U.  S.  60,  12  Sup.  Ct.  R. 

356,  36  L.  Ed.  71),  1053,  1062, 

1065,  1067,  1090. 
Railroad     Co.     v.     Wireman     (88 

Penn.  St.  264),  194. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Wolcott  (141  Ind. 

267,  39  N.  E.  451,  50  Am.  St. 

Rep.  320),  594,  805. 
Railroad    Co.   v.    Wolfe    (80    Ky. 

82),  1419. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Wolfe    (61    Neb. 

502,  86  N.  W.  441),  895. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Wood    (66    Ala. 

167),   710. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Wood    (72    Ala. 

451),  1215,  1366. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Woolridge  (32  111. 

App.  237),  935. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Worland  (50  Ind. 

339),  1331. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Worman  (72  Ind. 

App.  494,  40  N.  E.  751),  1126. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Wortham  (73  Tex. 

27),    1127. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Worthington    (30 

Ind.   App.   633,   65   N.   E.   557, 

96  Am.  St.  Rep.  355;   rehear- 
ing   denied,    66    N.    E.    478), 

1123. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Worthington   (21 

Md.  275),  949. 
Railroad    Co.   v.   Weight    (76   Ga. 

532),  490. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Wright   (68   Ind. 

586),  1082,  1085. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Wrightsville  &  T. 

R.  Co.   (74  Fed.  522),  526. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Wyatt  (104  Tenn. 

432,  58  S.  W.  308,  78  Am.  St. 

Rep.  926),  933. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Wymore  (40  Neb. 

645,    58    N.    W.    Rep.    1120), 

1391. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Wynn   (88  Tenn. 

320),   339,   425,   426,   1357. 


ccxxvni 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


[BEFEBENCES   ABE 

Railroad  Co.  v.  Wyrick  (99  Tenn. 

500,  42  S.  W.  Rep.  424),  1398. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Wysor    (82    Va. 

250),  1055,  1404. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Yarwood   (15  111. 

46S),   963. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Yohe    (51    Ind. 

181),  740,  743. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    York    (128    Ala. 

305,    30   So.   Rep.    676),    1397. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Young    (81    Ga. 

397),  1228. 
Railroad   Co.    v.   Young    (118    111. 

App.  226),  1006. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Young    (28   Ind. 

516),  339,  401. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Young  (6  Tex.  Ct. 

Rep.   508,   72   S.  W.  68),   651. 
Railroad   Co.    v.    Zebe    (33    Penn. 

St.  318),  940,  1180,  1184,  1397. 
Railroad    Co.   v.   Zebe    (37    Penn. 

St.    420),    1184. 
Railroad    Co.    v.    Zilly    (20    Ind. 

App.  569,  51  N.  E.  141),  1287, 

1291. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   Zwirtz    (13   Okl. 

411,  73  Fac.  941),  1249. 
Railroad  Commission  v.  Houston 

&    T.    C.    Railroad    (90    Tex. 

340,  38  S.  W.  750),  574. 
Railroad  Commission  of  Texas  v. 

Weld    (95  Tex.  278,  66  S.  W. 

1095,  reversing  66  S.  W.  122), 

574. 
Railroad   Commission  v.  Weld   & 

Neville    (96    Tex.    394,    73    S. 

W.    529,    reversing    68    S.    W. 

1117),  574,  575,  581,   587,  588. 
Railway  Co.    See  Railroad  Co. 
Railway  Co.  v.  A.   B.  Frank  Co. 

(Tex.    Civ.    App.,    48    S.    W. 

210),  145,  664,  686. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Acres    (108   Ind. 

548),   963. 
Railway  Co.   v.   Adams    (115   Ga. 

705.  42  S.  E.  35),  442. 


TO   SECTIONS.] 

Railway    Co.    v.   Adams    (4   Kan. 

App.    305,   45    Pac.    920),  162. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Adams    (11    Ky. 

Law  Rep.   833),   1389. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Adams    (14   Tex. 

— ),    1348. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Adams    (6    Tex. 

Civ.  App.  102,  24  S.  W.  Rep. 

839),  1018. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Adams    (32   Tex. 

Civ.  App.   112,  72   S.  W.   81), 

899,  1217. 
Railway    Co.   v.   Adams    (49    Tex. 

748),   668,   671. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Adams    (78   Tex. 

372,  14  S.  W.  Rep.  666,  22  Am. 

St.  Rep.   56),   233,   442. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Adams  192  U.   S. 

440,  24  Sup.  Ct.  R.  408,  48  L. 

Ed.    513,    reversing    116    Fed. 

324,    54    C.    C.   A.    196),    1075, 

1386,  1389,  1392. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Adcox    (52   Ark. 

406,  12  S.  W.  Rep.  874),  1060. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Aldridge   (27  Ind. 

App.  498,  61  N.  E.   741),  957. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Alexander  ( — Ala. 

— ,  40  So.  Rep.  424),  1397. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Alexander    (Tex. 

Civ.    App.,    30     S.    W.    Rep. 

1113),  1128. 
Railway  Co.  v.   Allender    (59   111. 

App.    620;    s.    c.    47    111.   App. 

484),  927,  957,  998,  1108. 
Railway  Co.  v.  American  Trading 

Co.  (195  U.  S.  439,  aff'g.,  Far- 
mers' Loan  &  T.  Co.  v.  Rail- 
road,  120   Fed.   873,   57   C.  C. 

A.    533,    reversing    112    Fed. 

829),   172,   233. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Anderson  (67  Ark. 

123,  53   S.  W.  673),   1017. 
Railway  Co.  v.   Anderson    (28  S. 

C.    R.    (Can.)    541,    org.,    24 

Ont.  A.  R.  672),  1012. 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


CCXXIX 


[EEFEBENCES   ABE 

Railway  Co.  v.  Anderson   ( — Neb. 

— ,  101  N.  W.  1019),  598. 
Railway  Co.  v.   Anderson    (61   N. 

J.  L.  248,  39  Atl.  905,  68  Am. 

St.  Rep.  703),  1024. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Anderson  (26  Tex. 

Civ.  App.  518,  63  S.  W.  1023), 

172. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Anniston  Foundry, 

etc.,  Co.  (135  Ala.  315,  33  So. 

274),   574. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Antrobus  (33  Ind. 

App.  663,  71  N.  E.  Rep.  97l), 

1392. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Applewhite    (52 

Ind.  540),  1117. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Arey     (18    Tex. 

Civ.  App.  457,  44  S.  W.  Rep. 

894),  1054. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Armes    (32    Tex. 

Civ.   App.   32,   74   S.  W.  Rep. 

77),   1118. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Arms    (91   U.    S. 

489),  1436. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Armstrong  (4  Tex. 

Civ.  App.  146,  23  S.  W.  Rep. 

236),  1003. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Arnett   (111  Fed. 

849,  50  C.  C.  A.  17),  634. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Arnett   (126  Fed. 

75,    61    C.    C.    A.    131),    638, 

1362. 
Railway   Co.  v.   Arnold    (16  Tex. 

Civ.   App.  74,   40    S.   W.   Rep. 

829),  644,   1357. 

Railway  Co.  v.  Atchison  (47  Ark. 
74),    1060. 

Railway   Co.   v.   Atkins    (46   Ark. 

423),  1179. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Avis    ( — Tex. — , 

93   S.  W.  Rep.  424),  1203. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Ayres    (63    Ark. 

331.  38   S.  W.  515),  442,  443, 

447. 


TO   SECTIONS.] 

Railway  Co.   v.   Babcock    (154  U. 

S.    190,    14    Sup.    Ct.    R.    978, 

38   L.    Ed.    958),    1396. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Baddeley   (54   111. 

19),  1423. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Baddeley  (150  III. 

328,  36  N.  E.  Rep.  965),  1397. 
Railway  Co.   v.   Bagge    (15   Q.   B. 

Div.    626),    810. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Baier    (37    Neb. 

235,  55  N.  W.  913),  1397,  1413, 

1423. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Baird    (75    Tex. 

256),   263. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Baker    (67    Ark. 

531,  55  S.  W.  941),  1174. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Ball   (25  Tex.  Civ. 

App.  500,  61  S.  W.  327),  972. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Ball   (28  Tex.  Civ. 

App.  287,  66  S.  W.  879),  1198. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Ball  (80  Tex.  602), 

1364. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Bandy    (120    Ga. 

463,    47    S.    E.    Rep.    923,    102 

Am.  St.  Rep.  112),  1117,  1177. 
Railway   Co.   v.  Bangs    (47   Mich. 

470),  1177. 
Railway  Co.   v.   Bank    (123  U.   S. 

727),   184. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Bank     (92    Va. 

495,  23  S.  E.  Rep.  935,  44  L. 

R.  A.  449),  638,  641. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Bank    (112    Fed. 

861,  50  C.  C.  A.  558,  56  L.  R. 

A    546),  112. 
Railway  Co.  v.   Barber    (44   Kar 

612,  24  Pac.  Rep.  969),   1394. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Barber  (Tex.  Civ. 

App.,  30  S.  W.  Rep.  500),  443, 

1362. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Barker   (33   Ark. 

350),  1401. 
Railway  Co.  v.   Barker    (39  Ark. 

491),  1401. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Barnes  (Ind.  App., 

74  N.  E.  Rep.  583),  1221. 


ccxxx 


TABLE   OF   CASES    CITED. 


Railway  Co.  v.  Barnett  (65  Ark. 

255,  45  S.  W.  Rep.  550),  928, 

941. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Barnhart  (5  Tex. 

Civ.  App.  601,  23  S.  W.  Rep. 

801),  918,   1348. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Barrett  (Tex.  Civ. 

App.,    80    S.    W.    Rep.    660), 

935. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Barrow    (—Tex. 

Civ.    App.—,    94    S.    W.    Rep. 

176),   495. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Barry    (Tex.  Civ. 

App.,  45  S.  W.  814),  526,  576. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Bartlett   (7  H.  & 

N.  400),  735,  736,  770. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Bates  Machine  Co. 

(200    111.    636,    66    N.    E.    326, 

93  Am.  St.  Rep.  218,  aff'g.,  98 

111.  App.  311),  230. 
Railway  Co.  v.   Batte   (Tex.   Civ. 

App.,  94  S.  W.  Rep.  345),  171, 

1366. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Battle    (69    Ark. 

369,  63  S.  W.  Rep.  805),  936. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Baugh   (Tex.  Civ. 

App.,  42  S.  W.  245),  168. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Bayfield  (37  Mich. 

205),  1397. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Bayles    (19   Colo. 

348,  35  Pac.  744;   s.  c.  Bayles 

v.  Railway,   13   Colo,   181,   22 

Pac.  341),   521,  589. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Beall  (91  Tex.  310, 

42    S.   W.   Rep.    1054,   66  Am. 

St.  Rep.  892,  41  L.  R.  A.  807), 

1384. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Beard   (Tex.  Civ. 

App.,  78  S.  W.  Rep.  253),  72, 

152. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Beasley  Couch  & 

Co.    (— Va.— ,    52    S.   E.    Rep. 

566),  425,  1285,  1286. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Beattie    ( — Tex. 

Civ.    App.—,    88    S.    W.    Rep. 

367),  651,  1366. 


[REFEBENCES   ABE   TO   SECTIONS.] 

Railway  Co.  v.  Beaver    (41   Ind. 


493),  899. 
Railway   Co.   v.  Beckett    (11   Ind. 

App.  547,  39  N.  E.  429),  1033. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Beckwith  (129  U. 

S.  26,  36),  1436. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Beecher   (65  Ark. 

64,  44  S.  W.  715),   1016. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Beeson    (30  Kan. 

298),  417. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Beggs  (85  111.  80), 

909,  1001.    • 
Railway  Co.  v.  Belcher   (89  Tex. 

428,  35  S.  W.  6),  1367,  1369. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Bell  (93  Tex.  632, 

57  S.  W.  939),  1216. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Bell  (24  Tex.  Civ. 

App.  579,  58  S.  W.  614),  923. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Bell  ( —  Tex.  Civ. 

App.—,   87    S.   W.   Rep.   730), 

1060. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Bell  (25  Ky.  Law 

Rep.  10,  74  S.  W.  700),  1122, 

1127. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Bennett   (50  Fed. 

496,   1   C.  C.   A.   544,   6  U.   S. 

App.    95),    1053,    1058,    1065, 

1433. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Bennett   (89  Ind. 

457),  316,  657,  1331. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Bennett   5   Kan. 

App.   231),   1402. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Berry    (60    Ark. 

433,  30  S.  W.  764,  46  Am.  St. 

Rep.    212,   28   L.   R.    A.    501), 

1246,  1250. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Berryman  (11  Ind. 

App.  640,  36  N.  E.  728),  1063, 

1066. 
Railway    Co.   v.    Biddle    (17    Ky. 

Law  Rep.  1363,  34  S.  W.  Rep. 

904),  1427. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Bingham   (2  Tex. 

Civ.  App.  278,  21  S.  W.  Rep. 

569),  1177. 


TABLE   OP    CASES   CITED. 


CCXXXl 


[BEFEBENCES    ABE 

Railway  Co.  v.  Birdwell  (72  Ark. 

667,  82  S.  W.  Rep.  835),  1348. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Birney    (71    111. 

391),  1428. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Black    (23    Tex. 

Civ.  App.  119,  57  S.  W.  330), 

990. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Blain  (34  S.  C.  R. 

74,    3    Canadian    Ry.    Cases, 

143,   aff'g.,   Blain   v.   Railway 

Co,  5  Ont.   L.  R.  334,  2  Can- 
adian   Ry.    Cases,    85    and    2 

Canadian  Ry.  Cases,  69),  980. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Blake  (7  H.  &  N. 

987),   915. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Block    (87    Tex. 

160,  27  S.  W.  Rep.  118),  964. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Blum'  ( — Ky. — , 

89   S.  W.  Rep.  186),  917. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Board  of  Railroad 

Commissioners       (106       Fed. 

353),   525,   582. 
Railway   Co.    v.    Bohn    (27   Mich. 

503),   995. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Bohnow   (108  111. 

App.  346),  1401. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Bolton    (2    Ind. 

Terr.     463,     51     S.     W.     Rep. 

1085),   1173,   1208. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Bolton    (43   Ohio 

St.    224),    1013. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Bond     (62    Tex. 

442),  1085. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Booton   (Tex.  Civ. 

App.,  15  S.  W.  Rep.  909),  405, 

1365,    1372. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Born     (20    Tex. 

Civ.  App.  351,  50  S.  W.  613), 

1118. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Botts    (5  Tex.  Ct. 

Rep.  810,  70  S.  W.  Rep.  113), 

1366. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Botts    (22    Tex. 

Civ.  App.  609,  55  S.  W.  Rep. 

514),    172. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Boudron  (92  Penn. 

St.   475),  1196,   1197. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Railway  Co.  v.  Bourdett   ( — Kan. 

— ,  85  Pac.  Rep.  820),  866. 
Railway   Co.   v.    Bowen    (36   Tex. 

Civ.  App.  165,  81  S.  W.  Rep. 

80),   1398. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Bowler  &  Burdick 

Co.    (57    Ohio    St.    38,    47    N. 

E.  1039,  63  Am.  St.  Rep.  702), 

1250. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Bowles    (1    Ind. 

Terr.  Rep.  250,  40  S.  W.  899), 

525,    537. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Bowlin  (Tex.  Civ. 

App.,    32    S.    W.    Rep.    918), 

1099. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Boyd  (6  Tex.  Civ. 

App.  205,  24  S.  W.  Rep.  1086;, 

918,    1218. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Boyle    (115    Ga. 

836,  42  S.  E.  242,  59  L.  R.  A. 

104),    980,    985. 
Railway   Co.   v.    Boyles    (11    Tex. 

Civ.  App.  522,  33  S.  W.  Rep. 

247),  1121. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Bozarth    (91    111. 

App.   68),   442. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Bradley   (— Ga.— , 

54   S.  E.  Rep.  69),  991. 
Railway   Co.    v.    Braid    (1    Moore 

P.  C.    (N.  S.)    101),  948. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Brantley  (26  Tex. 

Civ.   App.   11,   62   S.  W.   Rep. 

94),  1391. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Bratcher     (Tex. 

Civ.  App.,  78  S.  W.  Rep.  531), 

1424. 

Railway    Co.    v.    Brauss    (70    Ga. 

368),  1442. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Bravard     (Ind. 

App.,    76    N.    E.    Rep.    899), 

1414. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Breeding    (4  Tex. 

Civ.  App.  219),  1348. 
Railway   Co   v.    Brisbane    (24    111. 

App.  563),  1033. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Bromberg    (141 


CCXXXll 


TABLE  OF   CASES   CITED. 


[BEFEBENCES   ABE 

Ala.    259,   37    So.   Rep.    395), 

1389. 
Railway  Co,  v.  Bromley  (17  Com. 

B.  372),  1347. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Broom     (6    Ex. 

326),  1444. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Brooks    (81    111. 

245),  964,  1001. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Brown    (113   Ga. 

414,  38  S.  E.  989),  960. 
Railway   Cc.   v.   Brown    (120   Ga. 

380,   47   S.   E.  Rep.   942),   941. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Brown    (46    111. 

App.    137;    s.    c.    49    111.   App. 

40),  1110,  1111. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Brown    (50  L.  T. 

Rep.    281),    341. 
Railway   Co.    v.   Brown    (16   Tex. 

Civ.  App.  93,  40  S.  W.  608), 

895,   1432. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Brown    (78   Tex. 

397),  936. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Bruce  (55  Ark.  65, 

17  S.  W.  363),  580. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Bruyere  (114  Fed. 

540,  51  C.  C.  A.  574),  991. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Bryan   (Tex.  Civ. 

App.,  28  S.  W.  Rep.  98),  651. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Bryant    ( — Ind. 

App.—,    75    N.    B.    Rep.    829), 

173,   231,  238,  241. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Bryant  (Tex.  Civ. 

App.,    26    S.    W.    Rep.    167), 

1118. 
Railway    Co.    v.     Buchanan     (31 

Tex.  Civ.  App.  209,  72  S.  W. 

96),    1127. 
Railway    Co.   v.    Bunch    (13    App. 

Cas.  H.  of  L.  31),  1263. 
Railway  Co.   v.   Bundick    (94   Ga. 

775,   21  S.  E.  Rep.  995),  537. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Bunnell   (138  Ala. 

247,    36    So.   Rep.   380),    1407. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Burgess  (116  Ala. 

509,  22  So.  Rep.  913),  1398. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Burgess  Co.   (Tex. 


TO   SECTIONS,] 

Civ.  App.,  90  S.  W.  Rep.  189), 

537,    634. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Burns   (Tex,  Civ, 

App.,    80    S,    W,    Rep.    104), 

1360, 
Railway    Co.    v.    Bush    (101    Ind. 

582),  1423. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Butcher   (83  Tex. 

309,  18  S.  W.  583),  941. 
Railway   Co,    v.   Butler    (26   Tex. 

Civ.  App,  494,  63  S.  W.  650), 

1362. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Byers   (5  Tex.  Ct. 

Rep.  688,  69  S.  W.  Rep.  1009), 

1118. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Byers   (6  Tex.  Ct. 

Rep.  36,  70  S.  W.  Rep.  558), 

895,  1423. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Byers    Bros.    (7 

Tex.    Ct.   Rep.   244,   73    S.   W. 

Rep.  427),  233,  641. 

Railway    Co.   v.   Byers    Bros.    ( — 

Tex.    Civ.    App.—,    90    S.    W. 

Rep.    720),    1348. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Byrd  ( — Tex.  Civ. 

App.—,    89    S.   W,   Rep.    991), 

922,  1432. 
Railway  Co.   v.   Byrne    (100  Fed. 

359,  40  C.  C,  A.  402),  114. 
Railway   Co.    v.    Cain    (Tex.   Civ. 

App.  84  S.  W.  682),  913. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Callender  (183  U. 

S.    632,    22    Sup.    Ct.    R.    257, 

aff'g.,  98  Fed.  538,  39  C,  C.  A. 

154),   130,   465. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Calumet    Stock 

Farm    (194    111.    9,    61    N.    E. 

1095,  88  Am.  St.  Rep.  68,  aff'g. 

96    111.    App.    337),    410,    639, 

1362. 

Railway    Co.    v.    Calvert    ( — Tex. 

Civ.    App.—,    91    S.    W.    Rep. 

825),    1367. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Campbell  (61  Kan. 

439,  59  Pac,  1051,  48  L,  R,  A. 


TABLE  OF   CASES   CITED. 


CCXXXlll 


[BEFEBENCES   ABE 

251,    reversing     (Kan    App.) 

56  Pac.  509),  1023. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Campbell  (30  Tex. 

Civ.  App.  35,   69   S.  W.  451), 

922. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Campbell    (Tex. 

Civ.    App.,    85    S.    W.    1158), 

233. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Campbell  (76  Tex. 

174),  964,  1001. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Cannon    (106  Ga. 

828,  32  S.  E.  Rep.  874),  1054. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Cannon  (Tex.  Civ. 

App.,  81  S.  W.  778),  1111. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Cantrell    (37  Ark. 

526),  1179. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Capper   (Tex.  Civ. 

App.,  84  S.  W.  694),  1348. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Caraway    ( — Ark. 

— ,  91  S.  W.  Rep.  749),  1401. 
Railway    Co.    v.     Carl     (28    Kan. 

622),  918. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Carlisle  (Tex.  Civ. 

App.,  78  S.  W.  Rep.  553),  500, 

638. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Carlton    (60  Tex. 

397),  1391. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Carpenter  (56  Fed. 

451,   5  C.   C.   A.   551,   12   U.   S. 

App.  392),  954,  1203. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Carter  (9  Tex.  Civ. 

App.  677,  29  S.  W.  Rep.  565), 

475. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Case    (122    Ind. 

310),  651. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Cassell    ( — Ky. — , 

92    S.    W.    Rep.    281),    1054, 

1433. 
Railway   Co.   v.    Castello    (9    Ind. 

App.  462,  36  N.  E.  299),  1118. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Cau  (120  Fed.  15, 

645,   57   C.   C.   A.   35),   784. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Cavenesse     (48 

Ark.  106,  2  S.  W.  Rep.  503), 

1391. 


TO   SECTIONS.] 

Railway  Co.  v.  Chalifoux    (22  S. 

C.  R.  (Can.)  721),  948. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Cheatwood's  Admr. 

(103   Va.    356,    49    S.   E.   Rep. 

489),  1397. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Chicago   Portrait 

Co.  122  Ga.  11,  49  S.  E.  Rep. 

727,    106    Am.    St.    Rep.    87), 

432,  1328. 
Railway  Co.  v.  China  Mfg.  Co.  (79 

Tex.  28),  405,  1354. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Chisholm    (79  111. 

584),  1433. 
Railway  Co.   v.   Choate    (22   Tex. 

Civ.  App.   618,  56  S.  W.  Rep. 

214),    1192. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Chollette  (41  Neb, 

578,  59  N.  W.  921),  1413. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Clariday  ( — Ga. — , 

53  S.  E.  Rep.  461),  1179. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Clark    (48    Kan. 

321,    329,    29    Pac.   Rep.    312), 

339,    416,    417. 
Railway   Co.    v.    Clark    (52    Kan. 

398,     34     Pac.     1054),     1274, 

1276. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Clark   (72   Penn. 

St.  231),  1041. 
Railway  Co.   v.   Clark    (Tex.   Civ. 

App.,    79    S.    W.    Rep.    827), 

641. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Clarke    (5    Tex. 

Civ.  App.  547,  24  S.  W.  Rep. 

355),    448. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Clayton  (Tex.  Civ. 

App.,  84  S.  W.  1069),  1348. 
Railway  Co.   v.    Clayton    (173   U. 

S.  348,  43  L.  Ed.  725,  19  Sup. 

Ct.  421,  aft'g.,  84  Fed.  305,  28 

C.    C.    A.    142,    51    U.    S.   App. 

676),  130. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Cleere   ( — Ark. — , 

88  S.  W.  Rep.  995),  1397. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Clements    (Tex. 

Civ.  App.,  49  S.  W.  Rep.  913). 

537. 


CO  XXX IV 


TABLE  OF    CASES  CITED. 


[REFERENCES    ARE 

Railway  Co.  v.  Cleveland  (2  Tex. 

Ct.   Rep.   253,   61   S.   W.   Rep. 

951),  1180. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Clifton  (Tex.  Civ. 

App.,    80    S.    W.    Rep.    386), 

1373. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Cloes  (5  Ind.  App. 

444,  32  N.  E.  588),  1033.  1429. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Closser   (126  Ind. 

348),  521. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Clowes    (93    Va. 

189,  24  S.  E.  Rep.  833),  1192. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Coggin    (—Tex. 

Civ.    App.—,    90    S.    W.    Rep. 

523),    1366. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Coggins   (88  Fed. 

455,  32  C.  C.  A.),  1012. 
Railway    Co.   v.    Cole    (Tex.    Civ. 

App.,    16    S.    W.    Rep.    176), 

1367. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Cole   (8  Tex.  Civ. 

App.  635,  28  S.  W.  Rep.  391), 

241,    1003. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Cole     (G6    Tex. 

562),  1126. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Cole   (29  Ohio  St. 

126),  1102. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Coll  (—  Ind.  App. 

— ,  76  N.  E.  Rep.  816),  1054. 
Railway  Co.   v.   Collins    (7   H.  S. 

Cas.  194),  241. 
Railway   Co.  v.   Colorado   Fuel  & 

Iron  Co.   (101  Fed.  779,  42  C. 

C.  A.  12),  529,  569. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Combes  &  Rector 

(Tex.    Civ.    App.,    80    S.    W. 

Rep.  1045),  174. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Commercial  Guano 

Co.    (103    Ga.    590,    30    S.    B. 

555),  292,  1319. 
Railway    Co.     v.     Commonwealth 

25  Ky.  L.  R.   1078,   77  S.  W. 

207),  595. 
Railway   Co.   v.    Conder    (23   Tex. 

Civ.  App.   488,  58   S.  W.  58), 

1100. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Railway  Co.  v.  Contreras  (31  Tex. 

Civ.  App.  489,  72  S.  W.  1051), 

1395. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Cook  (8  Tex.  Civ. 

App.  376,  27  S.  W.  Rep.  769), 

1202. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Cook  (12  Tex.  Civ. 

App.  203,  33  S.  W.  Rep.  669), 

1202. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Cook  (12  Ind.  App. 

109,  38  N.   E.   1104),  1129. 
Railway  Co.  v.   Coolidge    ( — Ark. 

— ,  83   S.  W.  Rep.  333,  67  L. 

R.    A.    555),    652,    1348,    1360, 

1366. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Coons    (25    Ky. 

Law  Rep.  509,  76  S.  W.  45), 

1178. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Cooper    (2    Tex. 

Civ.   App.   42,   20    S.   W.   Rep. 

990),   1423. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Cooper    (6    Ind. 

App.  202,  33  N.  B.  219),  1032, 

1099. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Cope  (36  111.  App. 

97),   1040. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Cornelius  (10  Tex. 

Civ.  App.  125,  30  S.  W.  720), 

931. 
Railway   Co.   v.    Cotton     (41    111. 

App.  311,  316),  1409. 
Railway  Co.  v.   Coulson    (8   Kan. 

App.  4,  54  Pac.  2),  1012. 
Railway  Co.   v.   Cowser    (57  Tex. 

293),  1397. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Cox  (60  Ark.  106, 

29  S.  W.  Rep.  38),  1188. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Cox   (66  Ohio  St. 

276.  64  N.  E.  119,  90  Am.  St. 

Rep.   583),   964. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Cox  (145  U,  S.  593, 

12  Sup.  Ct.  R.  905),  1388. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Cravens   (57  Ark. 

112,  20  S.  W.  803.  38  Am.  St. 

Rep.    230,   18    L.   R.   A.    527), 

404. 


TABLE  OF    CASES  CITED. 


CCXXXV 


[references  are 

Railway  Co.  v.  Craycraft  (12  Ind. 

App.  203,  39  N.  B.  523),   170, 

1362. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Crenshaw  (65  Ala. 

566),   1228. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Crisp  (14  Com.  B. 

527),    408,    1338. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Crispi    (73    Tex. 

236),    1126. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Crockett  (27  Tex. 

Civ.  App.  463,  66  S.  W.  114), 

1179. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Crouch  (3  H.  &  N. 

183),  729,   750. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Crow  (47  Neb.  84, 

66  N.  W.  21),  1003,  1174,  1217. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Crowder  (130  Ala. 

256,   30   So.   592),   1217. 
Railway  v.  Crowder  (135  Ala.  417, 

33  So.  Rep.  335),  1217. 
Railway   Co.    v.    Crowell   Lumber 

&  Grain  Co.   (51  Neb.  293,  70 

N.  W.  964),  537. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Culberson  (68  Tex. 

664),    1389. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Cullen  ( —  111.  — , 

77    N.    E.     Rep.     470),     1003, 

1204. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Culver    (75    Ala. 

587),    233,    1348. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Cunningham   (123 

Ga.    90,    50    S.    E.    Rep.    979), 

892,  895,  899,  1217,  1431. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Currie   (Tex.  Civ. 

App.,    91    S.    W.    Rep.    1100), 

1397. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Cushney  (95  Tex. 

309,   67   S.  W.   77),   1348. 
Railway    Co.   v.    Cutter    (19    Kan. 

83),  1397,  1398. 
Railway  CJo.  v.  Daggett    (87  Tex. 

322,   28   S.   W.    525,   reversing 
(Tex.    Civ.    App.)     27    S.    W. 

186),   641,   644,    1366. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Railway  Co.  v.  Daniels   (49  Ark. 

352),   420. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Daniels    (90    111. 

App.    154),    1036,    1065,    1090. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Daniels  (Tex.  Civ. 

App.,    29    S.    W.     Rep.     426), 

1053. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Danshank  (6  Tex. 

Civ.  App.  385,  25  S.  W.  Rep. 

295),    1212. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Darby    (119   Ala. 

531,   24   So.   713),   152. 
Railway    Co.    v.   Darby    (28    Tex. 

Civ.  App.  229,  67  S.  W.  129), 

298,    1372. 
Railway  Co.  v.  D'Arcais  (27  Tex. 

Civ.  App.   57,  64   S.  W.  813), 

430. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Davidson   (3  Tex. 

Civ.  App.  542,  21  S.  W.  Rep. 

68),  895. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Davidson  (68  Tex. 

370),   1181. 
Railway    Co.  v.    Davis    (55    Ark. 

462,  18  S.  W.  Rep.  628),  1397, 

1401. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Davis  (56  Ark.  51, 

19  S.  W.  107),  1442. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Davis    (17    Tex. 

Civ.  App.  340,  43  S.  W.  540), 

922,    1017. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Dawson   (68  Ark. 

1,   56    S.    W.    Rep.    46),    1386, 

1392,    1401. 
Railway     Co.     v.     Dawson     (Tex. 

Civ.  App.,  24  S.  W.  Rep.  566), 

806. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Dawson  (Tex.  Civ. 

App.,    29    S.    W.    Rep.    1106), 

1060. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Dawson    (98   Va. 

577,   36   S.   E.  Rep.   996),   899, 

1414. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Dean    (43    Ark. 

529),    1045,    1049. 


ccxxxvi 


TABLE  OF   CASES  CITED. 


[references   ABE   TO   SECTIONS.] 


Railway  Co.  v.  DeBoard   (91  Va. 

700,  22  S.  E.  Rep.  514,  29  L. 

R.   A.  825),  1401. 
Railway   Co.   v.    Dennis    (4   Tex. 

Civ.   App.   90,   23   S.  W.  Rep. 

400),  1046. 
Railway   Co.    v.  Denver   &  O.   R. 

Co.  (110  U.  S.  680,  4  Sup.  Ct. 

R.  185),   519. 
Railway   Co.   v.   De   Pascale    (70 

Ohio  St.  179,  71  N.  E.  633), 

1434. 
Railway  Co.  v.  De  Saussure   (116 

Ga.  53,  42  S.  E.  479),  1052. 
Railway  Co.  v.  De  Shong  (63  Ark. 

443,  39  S.  W.  260),  1362. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Dey    (82    Iowa, 

312,  48  N.  W.  98,  12  L.  R.  A. 

436,    31    Am.    St.    Rep.    477), 

574,  575. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Dick  (26  Tex.  Civ. 

App.  256,  63  S.  W.  895),  989. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Dickerson  (59  Md. 

317),    899. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Dickinson  (74  111. 

249),   1352. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Dishman    (Tex. 

Civ.    App.,     85     S.    W.     319), 

1354. 
Railway    Co.   v.    Ditts    (158    Ind. 

669,   64  N.  E.   222),  964. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Divinney  (66  Kan. 

776,  71  Pac.  855;  s.  c.  69  Pac. 

351),  1093. 
Railway   Co.  v.   Doane    (115   Ind. 

435),  1126. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Dolan   (Tex.  Civ. 

App.,  85  S.  W.  302),  450,  643. 
Railway     Co.     v.     Donahue     (70 

Penn.    St.    119),    1423. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Doremeyer    (20 

Ind.  App.   605,   50  N.  E.   497, 

67  Am.  St.  Rep.  264),  740. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Dorough   (72  Tex. 

108),    1174,    1181. 


Railway   Co.   v.   Dotson    (15  Tex. 

Civ.   App.   73,   38   S.   W.  Rep. 

642),  1118,  1123. 
Railway     Co.     v.     Doughtry     (88 

Tenn.  721),  1400. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Doughty  ( —  Ark. 

— ,  91  S.  W.  Rep.  768),  1400. 
Railway    Co.    v.     Douglas     (Tex. 

Civ.  App.,  30  S.  W.  Rep.  487), 

1373. 
Railway   Co.    v.    Druien    (26   Ky. 
.  Law  Rep.  103,  80  S.  W.  778, 

66  L.  R.  A.  275),  211,  215. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Drumm    (32   Ind. 

App.  547,  70  N.  E.  286),  1397. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Drummond    (73 

Miss.   813,   20   So.   7),   1065. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Duck   (6  Tex.  Ct. 

Rep.  903,  72  S.  W.  Rep.  445; 

s.  c.  2  Tex.  Ct.  Rep.  1042,  63 

S.  W.  Rep.  891),  922. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Dunlap   ( —  Kan. 

— ,  80  Pac.  Rep.  34),  294,  301, 

1355. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Dunman    (Tex. 

Civ.  App.,  81  S.  W.  789),  510. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Dunn  (19  Ohio  St. 

162),  1440. 
Railway  Co.  v.   Dunn    (Tex.   Civ. 

App.,    78    S.    W.    Rep.    1080), 

641. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Dupee    (23    Ky. 

L.  R.  349,  67  S.  W.  Rep.  15), 

1401. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Dwyer    (75   Tex. 

572,    12    S.  W.   Rep.    1001,    16 

Am.  St.  Rep.  926),  574. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Dykes   (Tex.  Civ, 

App.,  45  S.  W.  758),  1179. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Dylinski    (67   111. 

App.   114),  1396. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Eaton   (183  U.   S. 

589,  aff'g.,  59  Neb.  698,  82  N. 

W.   1119),  1413. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Edins    (Tex.  Civ. 

App.,  83  S.  W.  253),  333,  640. 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


CCXXXVll 


[REFEBENCES   ABE 

Railway   Co.    v.     Edmond     (Tex. 

Civ.     App.,    29     S.    W.     Rep. 

51S),   918. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Edwards  (78  Fed. 

745,    24    C.    C.    A.    300),    496, 

1366. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Edwards  (78  Tex. 

307,  14  S.  W.  Rep.  607),  1334. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Elgin   Condensed 

Milk  Co.    (175  111.  557,  51  N. 

E.   911,  67  Am.  St.  Rep.  238, 

aff'g.,  74   111.   App.   619),   172, 

230. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Elliott    (7    Tex. 

Civ.  App.   216,   26  S.  W.  Rep 

455),    1395. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Elliott    (76    111. 

67),  521. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Elliott    (22   Tex. 

Civ.   App.   31,  54    S.   W.   Rep. 

410),   1060. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Elliott    (26   Tex. 

Civ.  App.  106,  61  S.  W.  726), 

1122. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Embrey   ( —  Ark. 

— ,    90    S.   W.   Rep.    15),    263, 

1348. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Evans  (23  Ky.  L. 

R.   568,   63   S.   W.   Rep.   445), 

1397. 
Railway   Co.   v.    Evans    (52    Neb. 

50,  71  N.  W.  1062),  937,  1430. 
Railway   Co.   v.  Evans    (71   Tex. 

361),    994,    1083. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Evans,   etc.,   Co. 

(—  Tex.  Civ.  App.  — ,  93   S. 

W.   Rep.    1024),   443. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Evans    (16   Tex. 

Civ.   App.    68,   41   S.  W.  Rep. 

80),   1392. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Everett  (Tex.  Civ. 

App.,    83    S.    W.    257),    1365, 

1372. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Evershed    (L.  R. 

3  App.  Cas.  1029),  804. 


TO   SECTIONS.] 

Railway  Co.  v.  Fagan   (Tex.  Civ. 

App.,  27  S.  W.  Rep.  887),  636. 
Railway   Co.  v.   Fairbanks  &  Co. 

(90  Fed.  467,  33  C.  C.  A.  611), 

231,    497,    498,    508. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Fales    (Tex.  Civ. 

App.,    77    S.    W.    Rep.    234), 

1245,    1246,    1255,    1363,    1414. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Fambrough   (Tex. 

Civ.  App.,  55  S.  W.  Rep.  188), 

510. 
Railway  v.  Farmer  (100  Va.  379, 

41  S.  E.  Rep.  721),  1075. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Farr  (70  Ark.  264, 

68   S.  W,   243),   1124. 
Railway  Co.   v.   Farrell    (31   Ind. 

408),   1123,  1187. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Faulkner    (Tex. 

Civ.    App.,     56    S.    W.    Rep. 

253),  1025. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Felker    ( —  Tex. 

Civ.   App.  — ,   90   S.   W.  Rep. 

530),  510,  651. 
Railway    Co.   v.    Felton    (125    111. 

458),  1224. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Fennell   (79  Tex. 

488),   163. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Fenwick    (Tex. 

Civ.    App.,    78     S.    W.    548), 

1018,   1073. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Ferguson  (26  Tex. 

Civ.  App.  460,  64  S.  W.  797), 

1432. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Fifth  Nat.   Bank 

(26   Ind.   App.   600,   59   N.   E. 

43),  442,  445,  478,  668. 
Railway  Co.   v.    Findley    (76   Ga. 

311),   895,   1118,   1414. 
Railway   Co.   v.    Finley    (79   Tex. 

85),   992,   1118,    1127. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Fitzgerald    (5   S. 

C.  R.   (Can.)   204),  506. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Flake   (114  Tenn. 

671,  88  S.  W.  Rep.  326),  980, 

984,  985. 


ecxxxvui 


TABLE  OF   CASES   CITED, 


[befebences  are 

Railway    Co.    v.    Flanagan    (113 

Ind.  488),  122. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Fleetwood  (90  Ga. 

23.  15  S.  E.  Rep.  778),  1094, 

1442. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Flood   (5  Tex.  Ct. 

Rep.  922,  70  S.  W.  Rep.  331), 

1004,   1072,  1073. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Flood   (Tex.  Civ. 

App.,    79    S.    W.    Rep.    1106), 

912,  1075,  1194,  1423. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Flournoy  (75  Ga. 

745),   1366. 
Railway  Co.  v.  FoUiard   (66  Tex. 

603),  1246. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Foreman   (73  Tex. 

311,    15    Am.    St.    Rep.    758), 

1116. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Forsythe    (4   Ind. 

App.  326,  29  N.  E.  1138),  420, 

449,  1331,  1355. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Fort  Grain  Co.  (7 

Tex.   Ct.   Rep.   207,    72   S.   W. 

419   and  73   S.  W.   845),   526, 

576. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Foster    (104   Ind. 

293),  1256,  1301. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Foster    (14    Ky. 

Law  Rep.  637),  231. 
Railway   Co.   v.    Foster    (97    Tex. 

618,  619,  80  S.  W.  Rep.  1197, 

reversing     (Tex.    Civ.    App.) 

78  S.  W.  Rep.  1134),  922. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Foxworth  (41  Fla. 

1,  25  So.  Rep.  338,  79  Am.  St. 

Rep.  149),  1397,  1398. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Foxworth  ( —  Fla. 

— ,    34    So.    Rep.    270),    1397, 

1401. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Franchere     (35 

Can.  S.  C.  R.  68),  1075. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Frankel  Bros.  (33 

S.  C.  R.  115,  2  Can.  Ry.  Cases, 

155),    653,    735. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Frawley  (110  Ind. 

18),  1233. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Railway  Co.  v.  French   (56  Kan. 

584,   44   Pac.    Rep.    12),    1401. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Freeman  (36  Ark. 

41),  1392. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Freeman     (Tex. 

Civ.  App.,  16  S.  W.  Rep.  109), 

608. 
Railway  Co',  v.  Frey  (25  Tex.  Civ. 

App.  386,  61  S.  W.  442),  933. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Friel  (19  Ky.  Law 

Rep.  152,  39  S.  W.  Rep.  704), 

1122. 
Railway   Co.  v.   Frier    (Tex.   Civ. 

App.,  22  S.  W.  Rep.  6),  1118. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Fulgham    (8   So. 

Rep.    803),    167. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Funk    ( —    Tex. 

Civ.   App.  — ,   92    S.  W.   Rep. 

1032),  171. 
Railway  Co.  v.  F.  W.  Stock  &  Son 

—  Va.  — ,  51  S.  E.  Rep.  161), 

249.  1328,  1360. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Gaines  (Tex.  Civ. 

App.,    79    S.    W.    Rep.    1104), 

1094. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Gallagher    (Tex. 

Civ.  App.,  64  S.  W.  809),  231. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Gallaher   (79  Tex. 

685),    1334. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Gann  (8  Tex.  Civ. 

App.  620,  28  S.  W.  Rep.  349), 

641. 

Railway   Co.  v.   Garner    ( —  Ark. 

— ,  89  S.  W.  Rep.  550),  1389. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Gardner  (114  Fed. 

186,    52    C.    C.   A.    142),    1111. 
Railway  Co.   v.   Garner    ( —  Ark. 

— ,  89  S.  W.  Rep.  550),  1397. 
Railway   Co.   v.    Qastka    (128    111. 

613),    1094. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Gatewood  (79  Tex. 

89,  14  S.  W.  Rep.  913,  10  L.  R. 

A.   419),   421,   448. 
Railway   Co.   v.    Gelger    (79   Tex. 

13,  15  S.  W.  Rep.  214),  1397. 


TABLE   OP    CASES    CITED. 


CCXXXIX 


[references 

Railway  Co.  v.  Geis  (31  Md.  357), 

1417. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Germany    (Tex. 

Civ.  App.,  56  S.  W.  Rep.  586), 

1111. 
Railway   Co.   v.    Gerreis    (14   Ky. 

Law  Rep.  397),  917. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Gilbert   (88  Tenn. 

430,  12  S.  W.  1018,  7  L.  R.  A. 

162),   475. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Gill  (54  Ark.  101, 

15  S.  W.  Rep.  18,  11  L.  R.  A. 

452),  1023. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Gill    (156    U.    S. 

649,  15  Sup.  Ct.  R.  484,  39  L. 

Ed.    567,    affg.,    54    Ark.    101, 

15  S.  W.  18),  586. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Gillam    (27    111. 

App.  386),  1401. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Gist  (31  Tex.  Civ. 

App.  662,  73  S.  W.  857),  1033, 

1111,  1417. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Glascock  &  War- 
field    (117    Ga.   938,   43    S.   E. 

Rep.  981),  37. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Glenk  (9  Tex.  Civ. 

App.  599,  30  S.  W.  278),  938. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Glidewell  (39  Ark. 

487),   668. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Glover   (Tex.  Civ. 

App.,    88    S.    W.    Rep.    515), 

1397. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Glover  (92  Ga. 

132,  18  S.  E.  406),  1389,  1395, 

1397. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Glynn  (1  El.  &  El. 

652),    783. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Goben    (15    Ind. 

App.    123,    43    N.    E.    890;    re- 
hearing   denied,     42     N.     E. 

1116),  1037. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Godair    Commis- 
sion   ( —   Tex.    Civ.    App.    — , 

87  S.  W.  Rep.  871),  448. 


ARE   TO    SECTIONS.] 

Railway  Co.  v.   Godkin    (104   Ga. 

655,   30  S.  E.  378,  69  Am.  St. 

Rep.   187),  990. 
Railway  Co.   v.   Godola    (50   Neb. 

906,   70   N.   W.   491),   78. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Goldman    (Tex. 

Civ.  App.,  51  S.  W.  Rep.  275), 

1118. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Goldstein    Bros. 

(—  Ala.  — ,  41  So.  Rep.  173), 

130. 
Railway     Co.     v.     Goodman     (12 

Com.  B.  313),  1241. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Goodman    (Tex. 

Civ.    App.,    43    S.    W.    580), 

1062. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Goodridge  (149  U. 

S.  680,  13  Sup.  Ct.  R.  970,  37 

L.  Ed.  896),  539,   546. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Gortatowsky   (123 

Ga.   366,   51   S.  E.  Rep.   469), 

806. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Grant  (6  Tex.  Civ. 

App.  674,  26  S.  W.  Rep.  286), 

172,  1362. 
Railway  v.  Graves    (21   Ky.  Law 

Rep.  684,  52  S.  W.  Rep.  961), 

426. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Graves  (Tex.  Civ. 

App.,  16  S.  W.  Rep.  102),  630. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Gray  (6  Tex.  Civ. 

App.  332,  71  S.  W.  Rep.  316), 

1012,  1111. 
Railway    Co.    v.   Gray     (28    Ind. 

App.  588,   64  N.  E.  Rep.   39), 

1177,  1179. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Grayson  Co.  Bank 

(—   Tex.   — ,   93    S.   W.   Rep. 

431,  reversing  Tex.  Civ.  App., 

91  S.  W.  Rep.  1106),  177,  181. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Greathouse    (82 

Tex.  104,  17  S.  W.  834),  430, 

442,   443,   447. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Green   (Tex.  Civ. 

App.,    91    S.    W.     Rep.     380), 

1414. 


ccxl 


TABLE   OF   OASES   CITED. 


[BEFEBENCES    ABE 

Railway  Co.  v.  Greenthal  (77  Fed. 

150,    23    C.    C.    A.    100;    s.    c. 

Meyer's   Adni'x.    v.    Railway 

Co.    54   Fed.    116,    4   C.   C.   A. 

221,   10  U.   S.  App.   677),  980. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Greenwood     (79 

Penn.    St.    373).    1032. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Griffith    (63  Ark. 

491,  39   S.  W.  560),  1414. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Griffith  (Tex.  Civ. 

App.,  24  S.  W.  Rep.  362),  238. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Griffith    (12   Tex. 

Civ.  App.  631,  35  S.  W.  Rep. 

741),  1101. 
Railway   Co.   v.    Groesbeck    (Tex. 

Civ.  App.,  24  S.  W.  Rep.  702), 

1431. 
Railway   Co.  v.    Grubbs    (28   Tex. 

Civ.  App.,  367,  67  S.  W.  519), 

934. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Guilford   (119  Ga. 

523,  46  S.  E.  655),  952. 
Railway   Co.  v.   Gunter    (—  Tex. 

Civ.   App.   — ,   86   S.  W.  Rep. 

938),  1366. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Haas  (—  Tex.  — , 

17  S.  W.  Rep.  600),  597. 
Railway   Co.    v.    Haist    (71    Ark. 

258,   72    S.   W.    893,    100    Am. 

St.  Rep.  65,  893),  1388,  1397. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Hale  (90  Ala.  8), 

1414. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Hale  (83  111.  360), 

1367,  1369. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Hall  (66  Fed.  868, 

14  C.  C.  A.  153,  32  U.  S.  App. 

60),  638,  1366,  1367. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Hall    (100    Fed. 

700,  41  C.  C.  A.  50),  933,  1409, 

1423. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Hall  ( —  Ga.  — ,  52 

S.  E.  Rep.  679),  408,  426,  427, 

430,    450. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Hall      (100     111. 

371),  926. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Railway    Co.    v.    Hall    (64    Tex. 

615),  119,  122. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Halsell  (Tex.  Civ. 

App.,  81  S.  W.  1241),   1366. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Hamler    (215   111. 

525,    74    N.    E.    Rep.    705,    106 

Am.  St.  Rep.  187),  1018,  1073. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Hamlin    (42    111. 

App.  441),  459. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Haney   (Tex.  Civ. 

App.,  94  S.  W.  Rep.  386),  922. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Hanmer    (23   Ky. 

Law  Rep.  1864,  55  S.  W.  375), 

1407. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Hanna   (Tex.  Civ, 

App.,    58     S.    W.    Rep.     548), 

1000. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Hansman  (21  Ky. 

Law  Rep.  1264,  54  S.  W.  Rep. 

841),  1414. 
Railway     Co.     v.     Hardway     (17 

Brad.    (111.)    321),   1249,  1291. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Hardy    (55   Ark. 

134,  17  S.  W.  711),  1077. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Hare     ( —    Ind. 

App.  — ,  75  N.  E.  Rep.  867), 

475. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Harkey    ( —  Tex. 

Civ.  App.  — ,   88   S.   W.   Rep. 

506),  1414,  1415. 
Railway   Co.   v.    Harmon    (12    111. 

App.  54),  336. 
Railway   Co.  v.  Harper    (44  Ark. 

208),  1355. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Harris    (26    Fla. 

148,    23    Am.    St.    Rep.    551), 

231,  1348. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Harris    (121   Ga. 

707,  49  S.  E.  Rep.  703),  1369. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Harris  (158  U.  S. 

326,  15  Sup.  Ct.  R.  843,  39  L. 

Ed.  1003,  aff'g.,  63  Fed.  800), 

923. 
Railway   Co.   v.    Harris    ( —   Ind. 

App.  — ,  77  N.  E.  Rep.  1051), 

941. 


TABLE  OP    CASES  CITED. 


ccxli 


[BEFEEENCES    ABE 

Railway   Co.   v.    Harris    (67   Tex. 

166),    339. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Harris    ( —  Tenn. 

— ,  91  S.  W.  Rep.  211),  1062. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Harris  (122  U.  S. 

597),  1432. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Harris    (103   Va. 

635,   49   S.   E.  Rep.   997),   937, 

1185,  1187. 
Railway     Co.     v.     Harrison     (10 

Exch.  376),  1001. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Harrison  (32  Tex. 

Civ.  App.  368,   73   S.  W.  38), 

1118. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Harrison  (97  Tex. 

611,  80  S.  W.  1139,  reversing 

(Tex.    Civ.    App.)     77    S.    W. 

Rep.    1036),    922,    1052. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Hartnett     (Tex. 

Civ.    App.,     34     S.     W.     Rep. 

1057),  1424. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Harwell    (91  Ala. 

340),    408,    430,    508,    1354. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Hassard  (75  Penn. 

St.  367),  995. 
Railway  Co.  v.   Hassell    (23   Tex. 

Civ.   App.   681,   58   S.  W.   54), 

133,  1373. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Hatton    (60   Ind. 

12),  1067. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Hawkins    (Tex. 

Civ.    App.,     30     S.     W.     Rep. 

1113),  448. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Hawkins   ( —  Ky. 

— ,  89  S.  W.  Rep.  258),  1065. 
Railway   Co.   v.    Haynes    (3    Tex. 

Civ.   App.   20,   21    S.   W.   Rep. 

622).  654. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Head    (Tex.   Civ. 

App.,    15    S.    W.    Rep.    504), 

1126,  1431. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Heard   (Tex.  Civ. 

App.,    91    S.    W.    Rep.    1100), 

1397. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Railway    Co.    v.    Heath    (22    Ind. 

App.   47,    53    N.   E.    198),   419, 

444,   502,  911,   1366. 
Railway   Co.    v.    Hecht    (115    Ind. 

443),  1432. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Heggie    (86    Ga. 

210,  12  S.  E.  Rep.  363),  641. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Heidenheimer  (82 

Tex.    195,    17    S.    W.    608,    27 

Am.   St.  Rep.  861),   762. 
Railway  Co.   v.   Heilprin    (95   111. 

App.  402),  729,  1366,  1372. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Henderson     (57 

Ark.  402,  21  S.  W.  Rep.  878), 

236. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Hendricks    (128 

Ind.  462,  28  N.  E.  58),  955. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Henlein    (52  Ala. 

606),   1354. 
Railway   Co.    v.   Henry    (84    Tex. 

678,  19  S.  W.  870,  16  L.  R.  A. 

318),    1041. 
Railway    Co.    v,    Henry    (75    Tex. 

220),    1389,    1397,   1401. 
Railway     Co.     v.     Henry      (Tex. 

Civ.  App.,  81  S.  W.  334),  1362. 
Railway  Co.  v.   Hensen    (121  Ga. 

462,  49  S.  E.  Rep.  278),  1397. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Herrick  (49  Ohio 

St.   25,   29   N.   E.  Rep.   1052), 

1008. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Herring    (57   111. 

59),   1033,   1036. 
Railway    Co.     v.     Herring     (Tex. 

Civ.  App.,  24  S.  W.  Rep.  939), 

634. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Hess    (2    Wash. 

388),   1417. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Heymann  (118  Ga. 

616,  45  S.  E.  491),  325. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Higgs  ( —  Ind.  — , 

76  N.  E.  Rep.  299),  1072. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Highnote  ( —  Tex. 

— ,  86  S.  W.  Rep.  923,  revers- 
ing   (Tex.    Civ.    App.)    84    S. 

W.   Rep.    365),   1180. 


ccxlii 


TABLE   OF    CASES   CITED. 


[REFERENCES   ARE 

Railway  Co.  v.  Hill   (13  Col.  35), 

885. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Hinchcliffe   (2  K. 

B.    (1903)    32,   72   L.   J.   K.   B. 

530,   88  Law  T.    (N.   S.)    800, 

51  Wkly.  Rep.  556,  19  Times 

L.  R.  430),  1042. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Hine  (25  Ohio  St. 

629),    1396. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Hinsdale  (38  Kan. 

507),   1033. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Hitt  (—  Ark.  — , 

88  S.  W.  Rep.  908),  1397. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Hochstim   (67  111. 

App.   514),  1250,   1306. 

Railway  Co.  v.  Hodge  (Tex.  Civ. 
App.,  39   S.  W.  986),  1367. 

Railway   Co.   v.    Hodge    (10   Tex. 

Civ.  App.  543,  30  S.  W.  829), 

630. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Hodges  (Tex.  Civ. 

App.,    24    S.    W.    Rep.    563), 

936. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Hoerr    (120    111. 

App.   65),  1090,  1433. 

Railway  Co.  v.  Holcomb  (44  Kan. 

332),  899. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Holden    (73    111. 

App.   582),   859. 
Railway   Co.  v.   Holder    (10   Tex. 

Civ.  App.  223,  30  S.  W.  383), 

163. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Holloway  ( —  Kan. 

— ,    80    Pac.    Rep.    31),    923, 

1182. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Holloway    (Tex. 

Civ.  App.,  54  S.  W.  Rep.  419), 

1111. 

Railway  Co.  v.  Holmes  (75  Miss. 
371,   23   So.   187),   1065. 

Railway  Co.  v.  Holsapple  (12  Ind. 
App.  301,  38  N.  B.  1107), 
1122. 


TO   SECTIONS.] 

Railway    Co.    v.    Hook    (60    Tex. 

403),  1389. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Horn    (132    Ala. 

407,  31  So.  Rep.  481),  1111. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Hosea    (152   Ind. 

412,  53  N.  E.  Rep.  419),  1386, 

1391. 

Railway  Co.  v.  Houghton  (4  Tex. 

Ct.   Rep.   688,    68    S.   W.   Rep. 

718),  1362. 
Railway  Co.  v.  House  &  Watkins 

(—  Tex.   Civ.  App.  — ,  88   S. 

W.  Rep.  1110),  174,  495. 
Railway    v.    Houston    (Tex.    Civ. 

App.,  40  E.  W.  842),  233. 

Railway  Co.  v.  Howard   (111  Ga. 

842,  36  S.  E.  Rep.  213),  1043, 

1117. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Howard  (178  U.  S. 

153,   44   L.   Ed.   1015,   20   Sup. 

Ct.  R.   880,  aff'g.,  14  App.   D. 

C.  262),  242,  915. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Howerton     (127 

Ind.   236),   1038. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Hoyt  (37  111.  App. 

64),  664. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Hubbard   (106  111. 

App.   462),   895,   1418. 

Railway  Co.  Hubbard    (Tex.  Civ. 

App.,    76    S.    W.    Rep.    764), 

1118. 
Railway  Co.  v,  Hubbell   (54  Kan. 

232,    38    Pac.    266),    537. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Hudman   (8  Tex. 

Civ.  App.  309,  28  S.  W.  Rep. 

388),   1110. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Hudson    (25   Ky. 

Law  Rep.  2154,  80  S.  W.  Rep. 

454),    1054. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Huff  (98  Tex.  110, 

81   S.  W.   Rep.   525,  reversing 

(Tex.    Civ.    App.)     78    S.    W. 

Rep.  249),  964,  1001. 


TABLE  OF    CASES  CITED. 


ccxliii 


[references    ABE 

Railway  Co.  v.  Hughart   (90  Ala. 

36),  426,  1364. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Hull  (76  111.  App. 

408),    172. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Humble    (181   U. 

S.   57,   aff'g.,   97   Fed.   837,   38 

C.  C.  A.  502),  931,  1379,  1423. 
Railway   Co.    v.    Hume    (87    Tex. 

211,  27  S.  W.  Rep.   110),  448. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Hume  (6  Tex.  Civ. 

App.  653,  24  S.  W.  Rep.  915), 

630. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Humes   (115  U.  S. 

512),  1436. 
Railway   Co.   v.    Humphries    (108 

Ga.   591,   34   S.   E.   283),   1126. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Humphreys    (25 

Tex.   Civ.  App.  401,  62  S.  W. 

791),  1111. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Hunt    (Tex.   Civ. 

App.,  81  S.  W.  322),  640,  652. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Hunt    (Tex.   Civ. 

App.,  32  S.  W.  Rep.  549),  859, 

860. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Hunter    (42  Ark. 

200),  105,  1274. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Hutchins  (121  Ga. 

304,   48   S.  E.  Rep.  939),   991. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Hyatt    (12    Tex. 

Civ.  App.  435,  34  S.  W.  Rep. 

677),   922. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Implement  Co.  ( — 

Kan.   — ,    85    Pac.   Rep.    408), 

799,  1305,  1315. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Insurance  Co.   (84 

Tex.   149,   19   S.  W.  459),  405. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Insurance  Co.  (139 

U.   S.   223),   105,   300. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Interstate    Com- 
merce Commission   (162  U.  S. 

184,  16  Sup.  Ct.  R.  700,  40  L. 

Ed..    935,      aff'g.,      Interstate 

Commerce      Commission      v. 

Railway,  64  Fed.  981),  526. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Railway  Co.  v.  Interstate  Com- 
merce Commission  (162  U.  S. 
197,  16  Sup.  Ct.  R.  666,  40  L. 
Ed.  940,  reversing  20  U.  S. 
App.  6,  6  C.  C.  A.  653.  57 
Fed.  948  and  Interstate  Com- 
merce Commission  v.  Rail- 
way, 52  Fed.  187),  524,  525, 
527,  528,  535,  562,  563,  566. 
570. 

Railway  Co.  v.  Interstate  Com- 
merce Commission  (181  U.  S. 
1,  45  L.  Ed.  719,  22  Sup.  Ct. 
R.  516,  reversing  99  Fed.  52, 
39  C.  C.  A.  413,  and  Inter- 
state Commerce  Commission 
v.  Railway,  85  Fed.  107),  559, 
560,  563,  570. 

Railway  Co.  v.  Irvine  (64  Tex. 
529),   899. 

Railway  Co.  v.  Irvine  &  Woods 
(7  Tex.  Ct.  Rep.  374,  73  S. 
W.  Rep.  540),  630. 

Railway  Co.  v.  Ivey  (Tex.  Civ. 
App.,  23  S.  W.  Rep.  321), 
641. 

Railway  Co.  v.  Ivy  (71  Tex.  409, 
9  S.  W.  Rep.  346,  10  Am.  St. 
Rep.    758),   103. 

Railway  Co.  v.  Ivy  (79  Tex.  444, 
15  S.  W.  Rep.  692),  163. 

Railway  Co.  v.  Jackson  (3  Tex. 
Ct.  Rep.  479,  61  S.  W.  Rep. 
440),    964. 

Railway  Co.  v.  Jackson  (4  Tex. 
Civ.  App.   74),   1365,   1372. 

Railway  Co.  v.  Jackson  (62  Tex. 
209),  1366. 

Railway  Co.  v.  Jackson  &  Ed- 
wards (—  Tex.  — ,  89  S.  W. 
Rep.  968,  reversing  s.  c.  (Tex. 
Civ.  App.)  86  S.  W.  Rep.  47), 
231,   241,   460. 

Railway  Co.  v.  Jacobs  (70  Ark. 
401,  68   S.  W.   248),  444. 


ccxliv 


TABLE  OF    CASES  CITED, 


[BEFEBENCES    ABE 

Railway   Co.   v.   Jaggerman    (115 

111.  407),  230. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Jahn    (18    Tex. 

Civ.  App.  74,   43   S.  W.  575), 

1003. 
Railway   Co.   v.    James    (117    Ga. 

832,   45   S.   E.   223),   508,   640. 
Railroad   Co.   v.   James    (82   Tex. 

306.  18  S.  W.  589,  15  L.  R.  A. 

347),    1084,    1085,    1128,    1429, 

1433. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Jarrard    (65  Tex. 

560),  1423. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Jenkins    (103  111. 

588),   858. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Johnson   (59  Ark. 

122,  26  S.  W.  593),  1123,  1219. 
Railway    Co.     v.     Johnson     (Tex. 

Civ.  App.,  15  S.  W.  Rep.  121), 

657. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Johnson   (23  Tex. 

Civ.  App.  160,  55  S.  W.  Rep. 

772),  1402. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Johnson   (29  Tex. 

Civ.  App.  184,  68  S.  W.  58), 

1093,  1102. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Johnson  (75  Tex. 

158),   1437,   1443. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Johnson   (92  Tex. 

591,  50  S.  W.  Rep.  563),  503. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Johnson   King  & 

Co.    (121    Ga.    231,    48    S.    E. 

Rep.  807),  431,  432,  1354. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Johnston  (45  Neb. 

57,  63  N.  W.  144,  50  Am.  St. 

Rep.  540),  175,  177,  182,  668. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Johnston  (78  Tex. 

536,  15  S.  W.  Rep.  104).  926, 

1397,    1401. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Jones    (121   Ala. 

113,   25    So.    Rep.   814),   1399. 
Railway      Co.      v.      Jones      (132 

Ala.    437,    31    So.    Rep.    501), 

426.  427.  430,  450. 
Railway  Co.   v.  Jones    (Tex.   Civ. 

App.,  85   S.  W.   37),  1054. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Railway  Co.  v.   Jones    (Tex.  Civ. 

App.,  39  S.  W.  Rep.  124),  989. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Jones    (35    Tex. 

Civ.  App.  584,  80  S.  W.  Rep. 

852),  1401. 
Railway   Co.    v.   Jones    (108    Ind. 

551),  926. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Jones     (1    Ind. 

Terr.  354,  37  S.  W.  Rep.  208), 

1348. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Joplin    (21    Ky. 

Law.  Rep.  1380,  55  S.  W.  Rep. 

206),  1034,  1036. 
Railway    Co.    v.   Jordan    (25    Ky. 

Law  Rep.  574,  76  S.  W.  Rep. 

145),   899,   1200. 
Railway     Co.     v.     Jordan     Stock 

Food  Co.  (67  Kan.  86,  72  Pac. 

533),   749. 
Railway   Co.  v.  Joseph   (125  Ala. 

313,  28  So.  Rep.  35),  1251. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Josey   (6  Tex.  Ct. 

Rep.  472,  71  S.  W.  Rep.  606), 

651. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Jurey   (111  U.  S. 

584),  1313,  1360. 
Railway  Co.  v.  J.  W.  Burgess  Co. 

(—  Tex.   Civ.  App.  — ,  90   S. 

W.  Rep.  189),  537,  634. 
Railway   Co.    v.    Kaiser    (82    Tex. 

144,  18  S.  W.  305),  1427. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Kalidas  Mukerjee 

(A.  C.   (1901)   396,  70  Law  J. 

P.  C.   63,  84  Law  T.    (N.   S.) 

210),   92L 
Railway   Co.   v.   Kapp    (Tex.   Civ. 

App.,  83  S.  W.  233),  652. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Kavanaugh    (92 

Fed.    56.    34    C.    C.    A.    203), 

201,    206. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Keefer    (146   Ind. 

21,  44  N.  E.   796,  38  L.  R.   A. 

93,  58  Am.  St.  Rep.  348),  517, 

1018,  1073. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Keenan  (190  111. 

217,  60  N.  E.  Rep.  107),  1397. 


TABLE   OF    CASES   CITED. 


ccxlv 


[BEFEBENCES    ABE 

Railway   Co.   v.   Kelly    (91   Tenn. 

699,  20  S.  W.  312,  30  Am.  St. 

Rep.  902,  17  L.  R.  A.  691;  s.  c. 

91   Tenn.  708,  20   S.  W.  Rep. 

314),   708,   709,    1360. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Kelsey    (180    111. 

530,  54  N.  E.  608,  aff'g.,  76  111. 

App.   613),    1198. 
Railway    Co.     v.     Kempton     (138 

Fed.   792,  — C.   C.   A.— ),   215, 

300,    611. 
Railway   Co.   v.    Kendall    (72   111. 

App.   105),  702. 
Railway    Co.    v,    Kendrick    (Tex. 

Civ.  App.,  32  S.  W.  Rep.  42), 

1128. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Kennedy   (78  Ga. 

646),  1357. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Kennedy  (12  Tex. 

Civ.  App.  654,  35  S.  W.  Rep. 

335),    1118. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Ketcham     (133 

Ind.  346,  33  N.  E.  116,  19  L. 

R.    A.    339,    36   Am.    St.    Rep. 

550),  1017. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Keyes    (91    Fed. 

47),  577,  585. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Keys   (9  H.  L.  C. 

556),    1244. 
Railway  Co.  v.   Killebrew   (Tex.) 

(20   S.  W.  Rep.  182;   s.  c.  20 

S.  W.  Rep.  1005),  911. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Kinchen   (103  Ga. 

186,  29  S.  E.  Rep.  816),  183. 
Railway  Co.  v.  King  (99  Fed.  251, 

40   C.   C.   A.   432,   49   L.  R.   A. 

102),  1219. 
Railway  Co.  v.  King  (88  Ga.  443, 

14  S.  E.  Rep.  708),  1038. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Kingsbury    (Tex. 

Civ.  App.,  25  S.  W.  Rep.  322), 

497,    643. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Kinnare    (203   111. 

388,  67  N.  E.  Rep.  826),  1397. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Kinnebrew  (7  Tex. 

Civ.  App.  549,  27  S.  W.  Rep 

631),   1052. 


TO   SECTIONS.] 

Railway  Co.  v.  Kinsley  (27  Ind 
App.  135,  60  N.  E.  169,  87 
Am.  St.  Rep.  245),  1043,  1045, 
1433. 

Railway  Co.  v.  Kirkham  (63  Kan. 

255,   65  Pac.  261),  442,  444. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Klepper    (5   Tex. 

Ct.   Rep.   533,   24    S.   W.   Rep. 

567),  333,  448. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Klitch    (11   Ind. 

App.  290,  37  N.  E.  560),  1429. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Knight  (122  U.  S. 

79),  112,  160,  161,  163,  166. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Koch    (47    Kan. 

753,  28  Pac.   1013),  443. 
Railway  Co.  Koehler  (47  111.  App. 

147),   1181. 

Railway  Co.  v.  Koll  (73  Ala.  396), 

115. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Kolp  ( —  Tex.  Civ. 

App.  — ,  88  S.  W.  Rep.  417), 

496. 

Railway    Co.    v.    Kuenhle     (Tex. 

Civ.  App.,  16  S.  W.  Rep.  177), 

1084. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Kuhn     (86    Ky. 

578),    917. 
Railway   Co.    v.    Kutac    (72    Tex. 

643),  1236. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Lagerkrans    (65 

Neb.  566,  91  N.  W.  358;   s.  c. 

95  N.  W.  2),  1110,  1219,  1397. 

Railway  Co.  v.  Laird  (164  U.  S. 
393,  17  Sup.  Ct.  R.  120,  aff'g., 
58  Fed.  760,  7  C.  C.  A.  489), 
1408. 

Railway  Co.  v.  Lamm  (73  111. 
App.    592),   859. 

Railway  Co.  v.  Langlois  (9  Mont. 
419,  24  Pac.  Rep.  209,  18  Am. 
St.  Rep.  745,  disapproving 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Tripp,  147 
Mass.  35,  17  N.  E.  Rep.  89), 
945. 


ccxlvi 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


[BEFEBENCES   ABE 

Ra'lway    Co.    v.    Lang's     Adm'r., 

100    Ky.    221,    38    S.   W.   Rep. 

503;  s.  c.  40  S.  W.  Rep.  451; 

s.  c.  41  S.  W.  Rep.  271),  1198. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Langsdale    (Tex. 

Civ.  App.,  30  S.  W.  681),  588, 

589. 
Railway  Co.  v.  La  Prelle  (27  Tex. 

Civ.  App.  496,  65  S.  W.  488), 

1102. 
Railway    Co.    v.     Lauricella     (87 

Tex.  277,  28  S.  W.  277,  47  Am. 

St.  Rep.  103;  s.  c.  (Tex.  Civ. 

App.)     26    S.    W.    Rep.    301), 

899,  923,  1414. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Law  (68  Ark.  218, 

57  S.  W.  258),  333. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Law  (57  Neb.  559, 

78  N.  W.  291),  177. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Lawton    (55  Ark. 

428,  18  S.  W.  543,  29  Am.  St. 

Rep.  48,  15  L.  R.  A.  434),  991. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Leatherwood    (29 

Tex.  Civ.  App.  507,  69  S.  W. 

119),  226,  537,  1366. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Lee  (92  Fed.  318, 

34  C.  C.  A.  365;  s.  c.  76  Fed. 

212,  22  C.  C.  A.  132,  40  U.  S. 

App.  298),  1019,  1075,  1202. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Lee  (21  Tex.  Civ. 

App.  175,  51  S.  W.  351;  s.  c. 

57  S.  W.  Rep.  573),  1118. 
Railway    Co.     v.     Leftwich     (117 

Fed.  127,  54  C.  C.  A.  1),  1192. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Lehman     (Tex. 

Civ.  App.,  72  S.  W.  Rep.  619), 

1402. 
Railway    Co.    v.     Lehmberg     (75 

Tex.  61),  1401. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Leibold  (Tex.  Civ. 

App.,  55  S.  W.  Rep.  368),  617, 

641. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Leslie    (57    Tex. 

83),   1432,   1177. 
Railway   Co.    v.    Lesser    (46    Ark. 
236),   419. 


TO   SECTIONS.] 

Railway   Co.   v.   Lester    (24   Tex, 

Civ.  App.  467,  59  S.  W.  946), 

990. 
Railway    Co.   v.    Lester    (75    Tex. 

56),  1401,   1397. 
Railway    Co.    v.     Levi     (76    Tex. 

337),   657. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Levy   ( —  Ala.  — , 

39  So.  Rep.  95),  230,  1354. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Lewis    (69    Ark. 

81,  61  S.  W.  Rep.  163),  1082. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Lewis  (89  111.  App. 

30),  1314. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Lewis  (145  111.  67, 

33    N.    E.    960,    aff'g.,    48    111. 

App.  274),  895,  897,  926,  949. 
Railway    Co.   v.   Lewis    (24    Neb. 

848,  40  N.  W.  Rep.  401),  1388, 

1390. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Liderman  (187  111. 

469),  1174. 
Railway  Co,  v.  Lightcap    (7   Ind. 

App.  249,  34  N.  E.  243),  1060. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Lilly    (90    Term. 

563,  18  S.  W.  Rep.  243),  1394. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Lippman  (110  Ga. 

665,  36  S.  E.  Rep.  202,   50  L. 

R.  A,  673),  47,  892,  899,  1072, 
Railway  Co.  v.  Liveright  (7  Kan. 

App.   772,   53   Pac.   763),   1276. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Lockwood    Mfg. 

Co.    (—  Ala.  — ,   37   So.  Rep. 

667,    68    L.    R.    A.    227),    859, 

862. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Long  (81  Tex.  253, 

16    S.    W.    1016.    26    Am.    St. 

Rep.   811),   1189. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Long  (87  Tex.  148, 

21    S.    W.    Rep.    113,    47    Am. 

St.  Rep.  87,  24  L.  R.  A.  637), 

1397. 
Railway   Co.    v.   Long    (Tex.   Civ. 

App.,  26  S.  W.  Rep.  114).  895. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Long     (13     Tex. 

Civ.  App.  664,  36  S.  W.  Rep. 

485),  921,  985. 


TABLE  OF    CASES  CITED. 


ccxlvii 


Railway  Co.   v.   Looney    (85  Tex. 

158,    19    S.   W.    1039,    34    Am. 

St.  Rep.  787,  16  L.  R.  A.  471), 

1049. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Love  (91  Ala.  432, 

8    So.    714,    24    Am.    St.    Rep. 

927),  1414. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Lowell  (151  U.  S. 

209,  14  Sup.  Ct.  281,  38  L.  Ed. 

131),  1219. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Lucas    (119   Ind. 

583),   1122,   917. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Ludlam    (52  Fed. 

94,    2    C.    C.    A.    633,    2    U.    S. 

App.  342),  1424. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Ludlam   (57  Fed. 

481,   6   C.   C.  A.   454,   13  U.   S. 

App.  540),  1060. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Luther    ( —  Tex. 

Civ.   App.   — ,   90   S.   W.   Rep. 

44),    1093. 
Railway   Co.   v.    Lynch     (12    111. 

App.   365),    1367. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Lynch   (Tex.  Civ. 

App.,  40  S.  W.  631),  964. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Lynch   (Tex.  Civ. 

App.,  55  S.  W.  Rep.  517),  918. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Lyon   (123  Penn. 

St.   140),   1295. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Lyons    (20    Ky. 

Law  Rep.  516,  46  S.  W.  Rep. 

209),    1052,    1065. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Mackie    (71  Tex. 

491),  1066. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Maddox   (75  Tex. 

300),   450,   457. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Maddry   (57  Ark. 

306,  21  S.  W.  472),  1223,  1397. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Magg    (132    Ind. 

168,  31  N.  E.  Rep.  564),  1397. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Mahony  (148  Ind. 

196.    46    N.     E.     917),     1018, 

1073. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Mallette   (92  Ala. 

209),  1414. 


[befebences  are  to  sections.] 

Railway  Co.  v.  Manning  (23  Neb. 


552),   1354. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Mfg.  Co.   (79  Tex. 

26),  449. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Marchman    (121 

Ga.   235,   48   S.   E.  Rep.   961), 

115,   630,  1309. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Marshall  ( —  Ark. 

— ,   86  S.   W.   Rep.   802),   499, 

508. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Marston   (30  Neb. 

241).  417. 
Railway    Co.   v.   Martin    (26   Tex. 

Civ.  App.  231,  63  S.  W.  1089), 

1417. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Martin    (59   Kan. 

437,   53   Pac.   461),   915,   1003, 

1072,  1073. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Martino    (2   Tex. 

Civ.  App.  643,  18  S.  W.  Rep. 

1066;  s.  c.  21  S.  W.  Rep.  781), 

1054. 
RailAyay  Co  v.  Marville    (7  Rail. 

Cas.   830),   395. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Massay  (Tex.  Civ. 

App.,    76    S.    W.    Rep.    585), 

1179. 
Railway   Co.    v.    Mathes    (7    Tex. 

Ct.   Rep.   172,    73   S.   W.  Rep. 

411),   1012,   1119. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Mathews  (116  Ga. 

424,  42  S.  E.  Rep.  771),  1401. 
Railway  Co.   v.   Mathis    ( —  Ark. 

— ,  91  S.  W.  Rep.  763),  1397, 

1401. 
Railway   Co.   v.    Matula    (79    Tex. 

581),  1397. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Maxwell    (59    III. 

App.  673),  1174. 
Railway     Co.     v.     Maxwell     (113 

Tenn.    464,    82     S.     W.     Rep. 

1137),  1394. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Mayes    (58    Ark. 

397,    24    S.     W.     Rep.     1076). 

1179. 


ccxlviii 


TABLE  OF    CASES  CITED. 


[BEFEBENCES    ABE 

Railway  Co.  v.  Mayes  (4  Tex.  Civ. 

App.   225),   1429. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Mayfield  (23  Tex. 

Civ.  App.  417,  56  S.  W.  942), 

1111. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Mazzie    (29   Tex. 

Civ.  App.  295,  68  S.  W.  56), 

1348. 
Railway  Co.   v.   McCann    (174  U. 

S.  580,  19  Sup.  Ct.  R.  775,  43 

L.  Ed.  1093),  234. 
Railway  Co.  v.  McCarthy  (29  Tex. 

Civ.  App.  616.  69  S.  W.  229), 

226. 
Railway  Co.  v.  McCarty   (82  Tex. 

608,  18  S.  W.  716),  1366. 
Railway  Co.  v,  McCarty   (—  Tex. 

Civ.  App.  — ,  89   S.  W.  Rep. 

805),    938,    941,    1207,    1423. 
Railway    Co.    v.    McCarty     (Tex. 

Civ.  App.,  94  S.  W.  Rep.  178), 

1278,  1363. 
Railway  Co.  v.  McClain  (148  Ind. 

188,  44  N.  E.  306),  1221. 
Railway   Co.   v.   McClanahan    (66 

Tex.  530),  1033. 
Railway    Co.    v.    McConnell     (82 

Fed.   65),   1056. 
Railway    Co.    v.    McCormick    (71 

Tex.    660,   9    S.   W.   Rep.    540, 

1  L.  R.  A.  804),  1388. 
Railway  Co.  v.  McCullough  (Tex. 

Civ.  App.,  33  S.  W.  Rep.  285), 

1121. 
Railway    Co.    v.    McCullough    (18 

Tex.  Civ.  App.  534,  45  S.  W. 

324),  1121. 
Railway    Co.    v.    McCullough    (22 

Tex.  Civ.  App.  208,  55  S.  W. 

Rep.   392),  1017. 
Railway  Co.  v.  McCutcheon   (Tex. 

Civ.  App.,  77  S.  W.  Rep.  232), 

931. 
Railway  Co.  v.  McDonald  ( 75  Tex. 

46),  961,  1400. 


TO   SECTIONS.] 

Railway    Co.    v.    McDonnell    (43 

Md.  534),  1229. 
Railway    Co.    v.    McDonough    (53 

Ind.  289),  1433. 
Railway  Co.  v.  McElree   (16  Tex. 

Civ.  App.  182,  41  S.  W.  843), 

1118. 
Railway   Co.   v.   McFadden    (Tex. 

Civ.  App.,  25  S.  W.  Rep.  451), 

1438,  1444. 
Railway   Co.   v.   McFadden    (Tex. 

Civ.  App.,  32  S.  W.  Rep.  18), 

304,  477. 
Railway   Co.   v.   McFadden    (Tex. 

Civ.    App.,     40    S.     W.     216), 

1354. 
Railway    Co.    v.    McFadden    (154 

U.  S.  155,  14  Sup.  Ct.  R.  990, 

38  L.  Ed.  944),  105,  158. 
Railway  Co.  v.  McGown   (65  Tex. 

640),    1075. 
Railway  Co.  v.  McGrath   (3  Kan. 

App.  220,  44  Pac.  39),  1366. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Mclntyre    (Tex. 

Civ.  App.,  82  S.  W.  Rep.  346), 

215,    410,   427,   475. 
Railway    Co.    v.    McKenzie     (102 

Ga.   313,   29   S.   E.  Rep.   869), 

1054. 
Railway     Co.     v.     McKenzie     (43 

Mich.  609),  231,  233,  243. 
Railway  Co.  v.  McKenzie  (30  Tex. 

Civ.  App.  293,  70  S.  W.  237), 

1119,  1431. 
Railway    Co.    v.    McKinney    (118 

Ga.  535,  45  S.   E.  430),  1179, 

1182. 
Railway  Co.  v.  McLane  (Tex.  Civ. 

App.,    32    S.    W.    Rep.    776), 

1122. 
Railway    Co.    v.    McLaughlin    ( — 

Kan.   — ,    84    Pac.   Rep.    989), 

1397,  1401. 
Railway   Co.   v.   McMillan    (16   S. 

C.    R.    (Can.)    543,    reversing 

15  Ont.  App.  R.  14),  226. 


TABLE  OF    CASES  CITED. 


ccxlix 


[BEFEEENCES   ABE 

Railway   Co.   v.   McRae    (82   Tex. 

614,  18  S.  W.  672,  27  Am.  St. 

Rep.  926),   638. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Meek   (7  Tex,  Ct. 

Rep.  86,  75  S.  W.  Rep.  317), 

1242,    1253,   1255. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Merriman  (52  111. 

123),  1296. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Meyers  (Tex.  Civ. 

App..    35    S.    W.    Rep.    421), 

1179. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Miami  Steamship 

Co.    (86  Fed.  407,  30  C.  C.  A. 

142),  565,  567,  799. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Miles    (40    Ark. 

298),  1003,  1222. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Miles  (13  Ky.  Law 

Rep.  539),  1348. 
Railway   Co.    v.    Miles    (162    Ind. 

646,  70  N.  B.  Rep.  985),  1397. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Miller    (2    Colo. 

442),   1394,   1400. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Miller    (33    Ind. 

App.    128,    70    N.     E.     1006), 

1177. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Miller    (8    Tex. 

Civ.  App.  241,  27  S.  W.  Rep. 

905),   991. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Miller  (9  Tex.  Civ. 

App.  104,  28  S.  W.  Rep.  233), 

1084. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Miller    (15    Tex. 

Civ.  App.  428,  39  S.  W.  583), 

991. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Miller    (79    Tex. 

78,  23  Am.  St.  Rep.  308,  11  L. 

R.   A.    395),    1118,    1127. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Miller    (141    Ind. 

533,  37  N.  E.  343),  1414,  1418. 
Railway   Co.  v.  Miller    (19   Mich. 

305),   205,   1082,   1441,   1445. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Miller    (25  Mich. 

274),  1236. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Mills  (105  111.  63), 

1118. 


TO   SECTIONS.] 

Railway  Co.   v.   Minnesota      (134 

U.   S.   418),   574,   1023. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Mitchell   (57  Ark. 

418,  21  S.  W.  883),  949,  1414. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Mitchell   (56  Kan. 

324,  43  Pac.  244),  990. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Mitchell  (98  Tenn. 

27,   40   S.  W.   72),   1118,   1180. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Mitchell     (Tex. 

Civ.  App.,  26  S.  W.  Rep.  154), 

1119. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Mitchell     (Tex. 

Civ.  App.,  79  S.  W.  Rep.  94), 

912. 
Railway    Co.    v.     Mitchell     (Tex. 

Civ.  App..  85  S.  W.  286),  634. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Moffatt   (60  Kan. 

113,   55  Pac.  837,   72  Am.   St. 

Rep.  343),  1397. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Molina  Plow   Co. 

(13   Ind.   App.   225,   41   N.   E. 

480),  157,  158,  167,  177,  749. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Moneyhun    (146 

Ind.    147,    44    N.    E.    1106,    34 

L.  R.   A.   141),   1198. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Moody   (Tex.  Civ. 

App.,    30    S.    W.    Rep.    574). 

1077. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Moore    (83    Ga. 

453),   995,   1020. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Moore    (108    Ga. 

84,  33  S.  E.  Rep.  889),  1111. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Moore    (34    Ind. 

App.   154,  71  N.  B.  516,  72  N. 

E.  Rep.  479;  s.  c.  29  Ind.  App. 

52,   63   N.  E.  Rep.  863),  1397. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Moore   (Tex.  Civ. 

App.,  80  S.  W.  426),  558. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Moore    (49    Tex. 

31),   1389. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Moore    (59    Tex. 

64),   1229. 
Railway   Co.    v.    Moore    (98   Tex. 

302,    83    S.   W.    362),    1060. 
Railway   v.   Moorman    (Tex.   Civ. 

App.,  46  S.  W.  662),  1060. 


ccl 


TABLE  OF   CASES  CITED. 


[BEFEBENCES    ABE 

Railway  Co.  v.  Morgan   (26  Tex. 

Civ.  App.  378,  64  S.  W.  688), 

1219. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Morris    (65   Kan. 

532,   70  Pac.  651),  442. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Morris    (94   Tex. 

505,  61  S.  W.  709),  1198. 
Railway  Co.   v.   Morrison's  Faust 

Co.    (20    Tex.    Civ.    App.    146, 

48   S.  W.   1103),   1246. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Motes    (117    Ga. 

923,  43   S.  E.  990,  97  Am.  St. 

Rep.    223,    62   L.    R.   A.    507), 

943,   1077,   1102. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Mozeley    (79   Ga. 

463),   1118. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Mudford  (44  Ark. 

439),  1372. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Mudford  (48  Ark. 

50),   1367. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Mugg  &  Dryden 

(_  u.  S.  — ,  26   Sup.  Ct.  R. 

628),   537. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Mullen    (138  Ala. 

614,  35  So.  701),  1102. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Mundy    (21   Ind. 

48),  1075. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Murphy   (60  Ark. 

333,  30  S.  W.  419,  46  Am.  St. 

Rep.  202),  105,  112,  113,  119, 

125. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Murphey  (113  Ga. 

514,  38   S.  E.  Rep.   970,   53  L. 

R.  A.   720),  426,   431. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Murphy   (46  Tex. 

356),    1181. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Murray    (113   Ga. 

1021,  39  S.  E.  427),  1187. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Murray   (55  Ark. 

248,  18  S.  W.  50,  29  Am.  St. 

Rep.    32,    16    L.    R.    A.    787), 

895,   1223,   1224. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Murtishaw    (Tex. 
Civ.  App.,  78  S.  W.  Rep.  953), 
1362. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

1 

Railway  Co.  v.  Musick  (Tex.  Civ. 

App.,  80  S.  W.  Rep.  673),  641. 
Railway    Co.   v.    Myers    (80    Fed. 

361,  25  C.  C.  A.  486),  1208. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Myers    (87    Fed. 

149,  32  C.  C.  A.  19),  1413. 
Railway  Co.   v.  Naylor    ( —  Ohio 

St.   — ,    76    N.    E.   Rep.    505), 

1395. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Neal  (66  Ark.  543, 

51  S.  W.  Rep.   1060),  1110. 
Railway    v.    Needham     (52    Fed. 

Rep.    371,    3    C.    C.    A.    129), 

1389. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Neel  (56  Ark.  279, 

19    S.   W.   963),   163. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Neiswanger    (41 

Kan.  621),  936. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Nelson   (Tex.  Civ. 

App.,  44  S.  W.  179),  1003. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Nevill    (60   Ark. 

375,  30  S.  W.  425,  46  Am.  St. 

Rep.    208,    28    L.    R.    A.    80), 

316,  704,  707,  712,  713. 
Railway   Co.    v.   Nevin    (31   Kan. 

385).  1334,   1369. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Newberger  &  Bro. 

(67    Kan.    846,    73    Pac.    57), 

704. 
Railway   Co.  v.  Newhoff    (12   Ky. 

Law  Rep.  467),  1291. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Newlin    (74    111. 

App.   638),   442. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Newman   (98  Md. 

507,   56   Atl.   973),  1443,   1446. 
Railway  Co.  v.  New  York  &  N.  E. 

R.   Co.    (50   Fed.   867),   568. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Nicholai    (4    Ind. 

App.    119,    30    N.    E.    424,    51 

Am.    St.  Rep.   206),   408,   411, 

464,   477,   1052,   1069,   1352. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Nichols    (8   Kan. 

505),    1001,    1017. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Nichols    (9   Kan. 

252),  71. 


TABLE  OF   CASES  CITED. 


ccli 


[references  are 

Railway    Co.     v.     Nicholson     (61 

Tex.  491),  152,  1313. 
Railway    Co.     v.    Nicholson     (61 

Tex.  550),  1363. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Nunn    (98    Fed. 

963,  39  C.  C.  A.  364),  1118. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Nuzum    (50   Ind. 

141),   1060,   1117. 
Railway  Co.  v.  O'Brein   (132  Fed. 

593,  67  C.  C.  A.  421,  reversing 

116  Fed.  502),  1018,  1073. 
Railway  Co.  v.  O'Bryan    (112  Ga. 

127,   37  S.  E.  Rep.  161;    s.  c. 

115    Ga.    659,    42    S.    E.    Rep. 

42),  980,  1121. 
Railway    Co.    O'Connor    (119    111. 

586,  9  N.  E.  263,  aff'g.,  19  111. 

App.  591),  1386. 
Railway  Co.  v.  O'Connor   (76  Md. 

207,   24   Atl.   449,   16  L.   R.   A. 

449,    35    Am.    St.    Rep.    422), 

1032,  1424,  1433. 
Railway    Co.    v.    O'Connor    (Tex. 

Civ.  App.,  78  S.  W.  Rep.  374), 

1397. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Odom    (63    Ark. 

326,   38   S.  W.  339),  233. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Ohio    (173   U.   S. 

285),   1110. 
Railway    v.    Old    Dominion    Bag- 
gage Co.  (99  Va.  Ill,  37  S.  E. 

Rep.    784,    50   L.    R.    A.    722). 

944. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Oppenheimer    (64 

Ark.  271,  43  S.  W.  150,  44  L. 

R.  A.  353),  521,  597. 
Railway    Co.    v.    O'Quin    ( —    Ga. 

— ,    52    S.   E.   Rep.    427),    977, 

1442. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Ormond    (64  Tex. 

485),  1174. 

Railway  Co.  v.  Orr  (46  Ark.  182), 

937. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Orton    (67    Kan. 

848,  73  Pac.  63),  912,  927. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Railway  Co.  v.   Osborn    (67  Ark. 

399,  55  S.  W.  142),  1081. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Osborne   (52  Fed. 

912,  3   C.   C.  A.   347,   10  U.   S. 

App.    430,    reversing    Osborne 

V,  Railway,  48  Fed.  49),  573. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Osgood    ( —  Ind. 

App.   — ,    73    N.    E.   Rep.    285, 

s.  c.  70  N.  E.  Rep.  839),  1394. 
Railway  Co.   v.   Otis'   Adm'r.    (25 

Ky.  Law  Rep.  1686,  78  S.  W. 

480),   1397,   1400. 
Railway  Co.  v.   Overall    (82  Tex. 

247,  18  S.  W.  142),  1173. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Overfield  (19  Tex. 

Civ.  App.  440,  47  S.  W.  Rep. 

684),  1012. 
Railway   Co.   v.    Owens    (123    Ga. 

393,  51   S.  E.  Rep.  404),  991. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Pace  (69  Ark.  256, 

63  S.  W.  62),  444,  447. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Packet    Co.    (70 

111.  217),  236,  1347. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Paine  (1  Tex.  Civ. 

App.  621,  21  S.  W.  Rep.  78), 

443,  447. 
Railway  Co.  v.   Palmer    (1  Q.  B. 

(1895)     862,    64    L.    J.    Q.    B. 

316),   1042. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Park    (66    Kan. 

248,  71  Pac.  586),  442. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Parks    ( —   Tex. 

Civ.   App.  — ,   90   S.  W.  Rep. 

343),  895,  912. 
Railway   Co.    v.    Parks    (97    Tex. 

131,     76     S.     W.     Rep.     740, 

reversing     (Tex.    Civ.    App.) 

69  S.  W.  Rep.  125),  912,  1414. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Parks  (7  Tex.  Ct. 

Rep.  178;  s.  c.  8  Tex.  Ct.  Rep. 

452,  73  S.  W.  Rep.  439),  912. 
Railway    Co.   v.   Parry    (67    Kan. 

515,   73  Pac.  105),  992. 
Railway   Co.    v.    Parsley    (6   Tex. 

Civ.  App.  150,  25  S.  W.  Rep. 

64),  1017,  1200. 


cclii 


TABLE  OF   CASES  CITED. 


[BEFEBENCES    ABE 

Railway  Co.  v.  Patrick  (—  C.  C. 

A.  — ,  144  Fed.  632,  reversing 

Patrick    V.    Railway    Co.,    — 

Ind.  Terr.  — ,  88  S.  W.  330), 

408,  411,  412,  426. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Patterson   (69  111. 

App.   438),   173,   419. 
Railway     Co.     v.     Patterson     (69 

Miss  421,  13  So.  697,  22  L.  R. 

A.  259),    1113. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Patton    (203   111. 

376,   67   N.   E.   804,  aff'g.,  104 

111.    App.    550),   1362. 
Railway   Co.   v.    Pavey    (48   Kan. 

452,  29  Pac.   593),   1118,  1122. 
Railway   Co.   v.    Payne    (98    Tex. 

211,  87  S.  W.  Rep.  330,  70  L. 

R.  A.  946),  1054. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Peacock   (69  Md. 

257),  1099. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Peale,  Peacock  & 

Kerr   (135  Fed.   606),  654. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Pearson  (72  Penn. 

St.   169),  1229. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Pelletier   (134  111. 

120),  978. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Pendergast    (75 

111.  App.  133),  1056. 
Railway    Co.    v.    People    (56    111. 

365),  521. 
Railway    v.    Pepperell    Mfg.    Co. 

(Tex.    Civ.    App.,    37    S.    W. 

965),   466. 
Railway    Co.  v.    Perishow  &  Neu- 

man    (61  111.   App.  179),   150. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Perry    (Tex.   Civ. 

App.,  85  S.  W.  Rep.  62),  1397. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Person    (49   Ark. 

996),  1179. 
Railway   Co.    v.   Phelps    (46   Ark. 

485),   1366. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Phillio    (96   Tex. 

18,  69  S.  W.  994,  97  Am.   St. 

Rep.    868,    59    L.    R.    A.    392, 

reversing     (Tex.    (^iv.    App.) 

67  S.  W.  915),  989,  991. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Railway  Co.  v.  Phillips   (29  Tex. 

Civ.  App.  336,  69  S.  W.  107), 

927. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Phillips    (32  Tex. 

Civ.  App.  238,  74  S.  W.  793), 

1215. 
Railway  Co.  v.   Pierce    (47  Mich. 

277),    1045,    1060,    1067. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Pitts    (Tex.    Civ. 

App.,    83    S.    W.    Rep.    727), 

1348,    1365. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Pitzer    (109   Ind. 

179),  1432. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Pointer    (9   Kan. 

620),   1423. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Pointer   (14  Kan. 

38),   1417. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Porter   (Tex.  Civ. 

App.,  41  S.  W.  Rep.  88),  1122. 
Railway   Co.   v.    Porter    (25    Tex. 

Civ.  App.  491,  61  S.  W.  343), 

651. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Porter    (38    Neb. 

226,  56  N.  W.  Rep.  808),  1413. 
Railway   Co.  v.   Posten    (59   Kan. 

449,  53  Pac.  465),  1003,  1072, 

1073,  1423. 
Railway   Co.    v.    Potts   &   Co.    (33 

Ind.  App.  564,  71  N.  E.  685), 

173,   445,   680. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Pound  (111  Ga.  6, 

36  S.  E.  Rep.  312),   702,  710. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Pratt  (15  111.  App. 

177),   641. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Prentice    (147  U. 

S.  101,  13  Sup.  Ct.  R.  261,  37 

L.   Ed.   97),   1438,   1441. 
Railway  v.  Prewitt   (46  Ala.  63), 

675. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Price    (106    Ga. 

176,  32  S.  E.  Rep.  77,  71  Am. 

St.  Rep.  246,  43  L.  R.  A.  402), 

1126. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Prince    (77   Tex. 

560,  14  S.  W.  Rep.  171),  1205, 

1414. 


TABLE  OF   CASES  CITED. 


ccliii 


[BEFEBENCES    ABE 

Railway  Co.  v.  Pritchard  (77  Ga. 

412),  1369. 
Railway   Co.    v.    Propst    (83    Ala. 

525),   1389. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Propst    Lumber 

Co.    (114   111.   App.   659),  859, 

862. 
Railway   Co.    v.    Pruitt    (97    Tex. 

487;    s.    c.    (Tex,    Civ.    App.) 

79   S.  W.  Rep.  598),  1002. 
Railway  Co.   v.  Quillen    (22   Ind. 

App.     496,     53    N.    E.    1024), 

1424. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Quo  (103  Ga.  125, 

29  S.  E.  Rep.  607,  68  Am.  St. 

Rep.    85,    40    L.    R.    A.    483), 

1101. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Racer  (5  Ind.  App. 

209,  31  N.  E.  853),  496. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Racer    (10    Ind. 

App.  503,  37  N.  E.  280),  174, 

462,  630. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Radbourne     (52 

111.  App.  203),  236,  1352. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Ragsdale  (14  Ind. 

App.  406,  42  N.  E.  1106),  419, 

442,  450,  1331. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Railroad  Co.    (36 

Fed.   879),   1181. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Railroad  Co.    (51 

Fed.  465,  473),  568. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Railroad  Co.   (61 

Fed    158,   9   C.   C.  A.   409,   15 

U.  S.  App.  479,  aff'g.,  51  Fed. 

465),  551,  567,  799. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Railroad  Commis- 
sion of  Mississippi    (86  Miss. 

667,  38   So.  356),   590. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Railway  (34 

Fed.   92),   1181. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Railway   (34  Fed. 

481),    149. 
Railway  Co.   v.   Railway  Co.    (63 

Wis.   93),    467. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Rainey   (19  Colo. 

225,  34  Pac.  986),  339,  509. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Railway  Co.  v.  Rainey   (122  Ga. 

307,  50  S.  E.  Rep.  88,  106  Am. 

St.  Rep.   134),   1121,   1128. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Ratley    (—  Tex. 

Civ.  App.  — ,   87   S.  W.   Rep. 

407),  1179. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Rea    (7  Tex.   Ct 

Rep.  888,  74  S.  W.  Rep.  939; 

s.  c.  27  Tex.  Civ.  App.  549,  65 

S  W.  Rep.  1115),  1113. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Record    ( —  Ark. 

— ,  85   S.  W.  Rep.  421),   230, 

1052,  1255. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Redmayne  (L.  R. 

1  C.  P.  329),  1367,  1369,  1370. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Reed    (80    Tex. 

362,  15  S.  W.  Rep  1105),  1438, 

1444. 

Railway  Co.  v.  Reeder  (170  U.  S. 
530,  18  Sup.  Ct.  R.  530,  aft'g., 
76  Fed.  550,  22  C.  C.  A.  314), 

1202. 

Railway   Co.   v.  Reese  (93  111.  App. 

657),   935. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Reeves    (116   Ga. 

743,  42  S.  E.  1015),  941,  1118, 

1127. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Reeves  (97Va.  284, 

33  S.  E.  Rep.  606,  16  Am.  & 

Eng.  R.  Cas.  (N.  S)  166),  444, 

1357. 

Railway  Co.  v.  Reid    (7  Tex.  Ct. 

Rep.   607,   74   S.  W.  Rep  99), 

1186. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Reiss    (183  U.  S. 

621,  22  Sup.  Ct.  R.  253,  aff'g., 

99  Fed.  1006,  39  C.  C.  A.  679 

and  98  Fed   533,  39  C.  C.  A. 

149),   131,   226,   464,   706. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Remmy   (13   Ind. 

518),    167. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Renicker  (8  Ind, 

App.    404,    35    N.    E.    1047), 

1406. 


ecliv 


TABLE  OF    CASES  CITED, 


[BEFEBENCES    ABE 

Railway  Co.  v.  Reyman   ( —  Ind. 

— .  76  N.  E.  Rep.  970  s.  c.  73 

N.  E.  587),  505,  702,  711. 
Railway  Co  v.  Reynolds   (8  Kan. 

623),  1355. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Reynolds  (17  Kan. 

251),   475. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Rhoades     (Tex. 

Civ.  App.,  51  S.  W.  Rep.  517), 

1177. 
Railway  Co.   v.  Rhodes    (86  Fed. 

422,    30    C.    C.   A.    157),    1011. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Rhodes  (Tex.  Civ. 

App.  80  S.  W.  869),  919. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Rice    (38    Kan. 

398),  1065,  1066,  1090. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Richards  (68  Tex. 

375,  4  S.  W.  Rep.  627),  1388. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Richardson    (14 

Ky.     Law    Rep.     367),     1118, 

1126,  1442. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Richmond     (94 

Tex.    571,    63    S.    W.    619,    re- 
versing   (Tex.   Civ.   App.)    61 

S.  W.    410),    405,    1354. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Ricketts   (96  Tex. 

68,    70    S.   W.    315,    reversing 

(Tex.    Civ.    App.),    54    S.    W. 

1090),   1429. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Ricks    (109    Ga. 

339,  34  S.  E.  Rep.  570),  1043. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Rielly    (40    111. 

App.    416),    1077,    1218,    1418. 

Railway   Co.   v.  Riggs    (10    Kan. 

App.  578,  62  Pac.  712),  112. 

Railway   Co.   v.  Riley    (68   Miss. 

765),  1065. 

Railway   Co.   v.   Rinard    (46   Ind. 

293),  1033. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Rines    (Tex.   Civ. 

App.,  84  S.  W.  1092),  1374. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Riney    (Tex.   Civ. 

App.,  92  S.  W.  Rep.  54),  1085.    | 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Railway  Co  v.  Rinicker   (17  Ind. 

App.  619,  47  N.  E.  239;   s.  c. 

8    Ind.    App.    404,    35    N.    E. 

1047),   1424. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Roach  ( — Ind.  App. 

— ,    77   N.    E.   Rep.    606,   s.   c. 

78     S.     E.    Rep.     201),     1003, 

1406. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Robbins   (57  Ark. 

377,  21  S.  W.  Rep.  886),  1400. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Roberts    (71    111. 

540),  1370. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Roberts  (Tex.  Civ. 

App.,    85    S.    W.    Rep.    479), 

1352,    1360. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Robertson     (82 

Tex.    657,    17    S.    W.    1041,   27 

Am.  St.  Rep.  929),  1395,  1397, 

1401. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Robinson  (132  Cal. 

408,  64  Pac.  572),  1041. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Robinson  (68  Miss. 

643,  10  So.  60),   1005. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Robinson  (79  Tex. 

608),  900. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Roebuck  (132  Ala. 

412,    31    So.   Rep.    611),    1197. 
Railway  Co.   v.   Rogers    (111   Ga. 

865,  36  S.  E.  Rep.  946),  640. 

Railway   Co.  v.   Rogers    (16  Tex. 

Civ.   App.   19,   40   S.   W.   Rep. 

201),  1107,  1109,  1424. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Rogers  (21  Tex. 

Civ.  App.  605,  53  S.  W.  Rep. 

366),   1072,   1075. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Rogers    (24   Tex. 

Civ.   App.   382,   60  S.  W.  61), 

899. 
Railway  Co.  v,  Rolfe  ( —  Ark.  — , 

88  S.  W.  Rep.  870),  630,  1367. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Root  (106  111.  App. 

164),   1397. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Rosenberry    (45 

Ark.  256),  1179. 


TABLE  OF    CASES  CITED, 


cclv 


[references  are 

Railway    Co.    v.    Rosenthal    (Tex. 

Civ.  App.,  29  S.  W.  Rep.  196), 

1250. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Rosenzweig    (113 

Penn.  St.  519),  1058,  1441. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Roundtree    (Tex. 

Civ.  App.,  25  S.  W.  Rep.  989), 

1111. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Rowell    (74    111. 

App.   191;    s.   c.    92    111.   App. 

103),   936. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Rubenstein     (5 

Colo.   App.  121,   38   Pac.  76), 

1414. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Russ  (57  Fed.  822, 

6  C.  C.  A.  597,  18  U.  S.  App. 

279;   s.  C.  67  Fed.   662,  14  C. 

C.  A.  612,  34  U.  S.  App.  14), 

1090,   1403,  1441. 
Railway   Co.    v.   Russell    (8    Tex. 

Civ.  App.  578,  28  S.  W.  Rep. 

1042),    1118. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Russell  (Tex.  Civ. 

App.,  74  S.  W.  569),  991. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Rutherford     (94 

Tex.  518,  62  S.  W.  1056,  aff'g., 

(Tex.    Civ.    App.)    62    S.    W. 

1069),   990. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Ryan    (62    Kan. 

682,  64  Pac.  Rep.   603),  1401. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Safford  (Tex.  Civ. 

App.,  48  S.  W.  1105),  1110. 
Railway   Co.   v.    Sain    (Tex.   Civ. 

App.,    24    S.    W.    Rep.    958), 

1123. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Sales  (26  S.  C.  R. 

(Can.)    663),   472. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Salinger  (46  Ark. 

528),   1002,   1432. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Salzman  (52  Ohio 

St.  558,  40  N.  E.  891,  31  L.  R. 

A.  261,  49  Am.  St.  Rep.  745), 

992,    1013. 
Railway  Co.  v.   Sanders    (98   Ala. 

293,  13  So.  Rep.  57),  1400. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Railway  Co.  v.  Sanders  &  Russell 

(25  Ky.  Law  Rep.  2333,  80  S. 

W.  Rep.  488),  340,  642. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Sanford   (45  Kan. 

372,   25   Pac.  Rep.   891,   11  L. 

R.  A.  432),  990,  1084. 
Railway   Co.   v.    Sattler    (64    Neb. 

636,  90  N.  W.  649,  57  L.  R.  A. 

890,    97    Am.    St.    Rep.    666), 

1012,  1219. 
Railway    Co>    v.    Saulsberry    (112 

Ky.  915,  66  S.  W.  Rep.  1051, 

56    L.    R.    A.    580),    978,    996, 

1082. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Sayers   (26  Gratt. 

328),  1197. 
Railway     Co.     v.     Schuster     (113 

Penn.  St.  412),  1229. 
Railway   Co.  v.   Sciacca    (80  Tex. 

350,  16  S.  W.  Rep.  31),  1402. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Scoggin  &  Brown 

(—  Tex.  Civ.  App.  — ,   90  S. 

W.  Rep.  521),  247,  1357. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Scott  (4  Tex.  Civ. 

App.  76,  26  S.  W.  Rep.  239), 

1318. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Scott  (86  Va.  902), 

1122. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Searles   (71  Miss. 

744,  16  So.  255),  497,  499. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Shacklett   (19  111. 

App.  145),  917. 
Railway  v.  Shacklet  (119  111.  232, 

10  N.  E.  Rep.   896),   1389. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Shanley  (Tex.  Civ. 

App.,  81  S.  W.  1014),  1348. 
Railway   Co.   v.    Sharp    (64    Ark. 

115,  40  S.  W.  781),  226,  470. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Shaw    (86    Fed. 

865,  31  C.  C.  A.  70),  990. 
Railway  Co.  v.   Shelton   (30  Tex. 

Civ.   App.   72,    69    S.  W.   653; 

s.  c.  70  S.  W.  Rep.  359),  1177, 

1423. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Shepherd  (8  Exch. 

30),   1244,   1249,   1250,   1259. 


cclvi 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


[BEFEBENCES   ABE 

Railway    Co.    v.    Sherbert    (Tex. 

Civ.  App.,  42  S.  W.  Rep.  639), 

980,    982,    984. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Sherlock  (59  Kan. 

23,  51  Pac.  899),  405. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Sherrill   (32  Tex. 

Civ.  App.  116,  72  S.  W.  429), 

1122. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Sherrod   (—  Tex. 

Civ.  App.  — ,   87   S.  W.  Rep. 

363),  1362. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Sherwood  (84  Tex. 

125,  19  S.  W.  455,  17  L.  R.  A. 

643),  405. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Shields    (9    Tex. 

Civ.  App.  652,  28  S.  W.  Rep. 

709;  s.  c.  29  S.  W.  Rep.  652), 

921. 
Railway  Co.  v.   Short   (Tex.  Civ. 

App.,  25  S.  W.  Rep.  142),  233. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Shuford   (72  Tex. 

165),  1440. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Silegman    (Tex. 

Civ.  App.,  23  S.  W.  Rep.  298), 

167,    448,    1362. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Simonson  (64  Kan. 

802,  68  Pac.   653,  91  Am.   St. 

Rep.    248,   57   L.   R.   A.    765), 

158. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Simpson  (60  Tex. 

103),  1228. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Sims     (28    Ind. 

App.  544,  63  N.  E.  485),  1209. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Slanker    (77    111. 

App.    567;    affirmed,    180    111. 

357,  54  N.  E.  309),  1118. 
Railway   Co.   v.    Slattery    ( — Neb. 

— ,  107  N.  W.  Rep.  1045),  339, 

638,    642. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Slatton    (54    111. 

133),  1118. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Sloat  (93  Ga.  803, 

20  S.  E.  Rep.  219),  432. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Smissen   (31  Tex. 

Civ.  App.   549,   73"  S.   W.   42), 

342. 


TO   SECTIONS.] 

Railway  Co.  v.  Smith   (173  U.  S. 

684,    43   L.    Ed.    858,    19    Sup. 

Ct.    565,    reversing    Smith    v. 

Railway  Co.  114  Mich.  460,  72 

N.   W.   328),   575,   596. 
Railway  Co.   v.   Smith   (110   Fed. 

473),  582. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Smith  (90  Ala.  60, 

8    So.    86,    24    Am.    St.    Rep. 

761),  1118. 
Railway    Co.   v.    Smith    (70    Ark. 

179,  67  S.  W.  865),  923,  1197, 

1199. 
Railway   Co.    v.    Smith    (119    Ga. 

667,  46  S.  E.  Rep.  853),  1388. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Smith  (5  Ind.  App. 

560,   32   N.  E.  809,   1118. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Smith    ( —    Ind. 

Terr.  — ,  89  S.  W.  Rep.  668), 

1085. 
Railway   Co.   v.    Smith    (28   Kan 

542),  1229. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Smith    (74    Md. 

212),    1111. 
Railway  Co.  v.   Smith    (46  Mich. 

504),    1228,    1418. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Smith    (65    Tex. 

167),    1401. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Smith    (63    Tex. 

322),   512,   1370. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Smith   (Tex.  Civ. 

App.,    24    S.    W.    Rep.    668), 

1291. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Smith    (10   Tex. 

Civ.  App.  338,  30  S.  W.  361), 

957. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Smith    (11    Tex. 

Civ.  App.  550,  32  S.  W.  Rep. 

828),   1362. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Smith    &   White 

(Tex.    Civ.    App.,    79    S.    W. 

Rep.  614),  1370. 
Railway  v.  Smith  (Tex.  Civ.  App., 

84  S.  W.  852),  1024,  1036. 
Railway   Co.   v.    Smith    (103   Va. 

326,  49  S.  E.  Rep.  487),  937. 


TABLE  OF   CASES  CITED. 


cclvii 


[REFERENCES    ARE 

ilailway  Co.  v.  Snyder  (117  Ind. 

435,    10    Am.    St.    Rep.    60), 

1432. 
Railway  Co.  v.   Snyder   (24  Ohio 

St.   670),  1382,   1392. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Snyder   (117  Ind. 

434),  910,  1432. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Solan   (169  U.  S. 

133),   452. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Sparger  (Tex.  Civ. 

App.,  39  S.  W.  1001),  1033. 
Railway   Co.   v.  Sparks    (55   Kan. 

288,  39   Pac.   1032),  1203. 
Railway  Co.   v.   Spencer's  Adm'x, 

—  Va.  — ,  52  S.  E.  Rep.  310), 

1397. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Spicker   (61  Tex. 

427),  1389. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Sproles   &   Vines 

(—  Tex.  Civ.  App.  — ,  92   S. 

W.  Rep.  40),  1367. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Stacey   (64  Miss. 

463),   929. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Stanbro    (87   111. 

195),  1366. 
Railway  Co.  v.   Stanley   (89  Tex. 

42,  33  S.  W.  109),  1362. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Stansberry    (132 

Ind.  533,  33  N.  E.  218),  933. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Stark    (38   Mich. 

714),  1111. 
Railway  Co.  v.  State  ( —  Ark.  — , 

84   S.  W.  Rep.   502),  513. 
Railway    Co.    v.    State    (66    Miss. 

662),    972. 
Railway    Co.    v.    State    (97    Tex. 

274,    78    S.    W.    495,   affg.,   32 

Tex.    Civ.    App.    1.    73    S.   W. 

429),  576. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Steele  (6  Ind.  App. 

183,  33  N.   E.   236),   443. 
Railway  Co.  v.   Steiner    (61   Ala. 

559),   805. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Railway  Co.  v.  Stell  (28  Tex.  Civ. 

App.  280,  67  S.  W.  537),  964. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Stephens    (Tex. 

Civ.  App.,  86  S.  W.  Rep.  933), 

1362. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Stevens   (95  U.  S. 

655),   452,   1073. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Stewart   (91  Ala. 

421),  1221. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Stewart   (68  Ark. 

606,  61  S.  W.  169,  82  Am.  St. 

Rep.  311),  926. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Stewart    (77    111. 

App.  66),  941,   1015. 
Railway  Co.  v.   Stewart   (24   Ind. 

App.  374,  56  N.  E.  917),  1427. 
Railway   Co.   v.    Stone   &   Haslett 

(112  Tenn.  348,  79  S.  W.  Rep. 

1031,  105  Am.  St.  Rep.  955), 

233,    401,    404,    408,    427,    653, 

1355. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Stoner  (5  Tex.  Civ. 

App.  50,  23  S.  W.  Rep.  1020), 

867. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Story  (63  111.  App. 

239;    s.  c.   104   111.  App.   132), 

1427. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Story    (29    Tex. 

Civ.  App.  483,  68  S.  W.  534), 

913. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Strain    (81    111. 

504),   499. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Stratton    (78   111. 

88),   1181. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Street    (26    Ind. 

App.  224,  59  N.  E.  404),  1053, 

1054,   1062,  1066,   1067. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Stribling    (Tex. 

Civ.  App.,  94  S.  W.  Rep.  436), 

1366. 
Railway   Co.   v.    Stringfellow    (44 

Ark.  322),  1123. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Stutler   (54  Penn. 

St.   375),  1118. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Sue  (25  Neb.  772), 

933,  1188. 


cclviii 


TABLE  OF    CASES  CITED. 


[REFERENCES    ARE 

Railway    Co.    v.    Suggs    (62    Tex. 

323),   910. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Sullivan  (120  Fed. 
799,  57  C.  C.  A.  167,  61  L.  R. 
A.  410),  1397. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Swaffield  (L.  R.  9 

Ex.    132),   130. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Swarthout     (67 

Ind.  567),  1060. 
Railway    Co.   v.    Sweet    (57    Ark. 

287,  21  S.  W.  587),  897. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Sweet    (60    Ark. 
550,  31  S.  W.  Rep.  571),  1397, 
1401. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Swenson     (Tex. 
Civ.  App.,  25  S.  W.  Rep.  47), 
237. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Taggart    (149   U. 
S.  698,  13  Sup.  Ct.  R.  977,  37 
L.  Ed.  905),  539,  546. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Talbot    (39   Ark. 

523),   449,   464. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Tankersley    (63 

Tex.  57),  1360. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Tankersley    (54 

Ark.  25),  1177. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Tarin    (108   Fed. 
734,  47  C.  C.  A.  648,  54  L.  R. 
A.   240),   898. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Tarkington    (27 
Tex.  Civ.  App.  353,  66  S.  W. 
137),   1094. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Tarwater   (3  Tex. 
Ct.   Rep.   159,   75   S.  W.   Rep. 
937),  1427. 
Railway    Co.   v.    Taylor    (27    Ky. 
Law  Rep.  351,  85  S.  W.  Rep. 
168),  980. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Teeters    ( —  Ind. 
— ,  77  N.  E.  Rep.  599,  aWo-, 
—    Ind.    App.    — ,    74    N.    E. 
Rep.    1014),    205,    1003,    1072, 
1073.  1202. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Terrell  (6  Tex.  Ct. 
Rep.  893,  72  S.  W.  430),  1286, 
1291. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Railway    Co.   v.    Terry    (62    Tex. 

380),  1126. 
Railway   Co.   v.  Terry  &  McAfee 

(—  Tex.   Civ.  App.  — ,  89   S. 
W.  Rep.  792),  917,  1362. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Texas  &  P.  Rail- 
way Co.  (41  Fed.  913),  638. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Thompson  (56  111. 

138),  1423. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Thompson  (71  111. 

434),   638. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Thompson    (Tex. 

Civ.  App.,  21  S.  W.  Rep.  186), 

233. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Tietken   (49  Neb. 

130,  68  N.  W.  336,  59  Am.  St. 

Rep.    526),   1003. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Todd  ( —  Neb.  — , 

105  N.  W.  Rep.  83),  1366. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Tolbert   (123   Ga. 

401,  51  S.  E.  Rep.  401),  884. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Tomlinson     (69 

Ark.  489,  64  S.  W.  Rep.  347), 

991,    1219. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Tompkins  (176  U. 

S.  167,  20  Sup.  Ct.  R.  336,  44 

L.  Ed.  417,  reversing  90  Fed. 

363),  585. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Topping   (25  Ky. 

Law  Rep.  1390,  78  S.  W.  135), 

1126,  1216. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Townsend     ( — 

Kan.   — ,   81   Pac.   Rep.   205), 

1389,  1397,  1400. 
Railway    Co.     v.     Trammell     (28 

Tex.  Civ.  App.  312,  68  S.  W. 

716),  510,   664. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Trawick  (68  Tex. 

314),  442. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Trawick  (15  S.  W. 

Rep.   568,  80   Tex.   270),   114, 

444. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Treadway     (142 

Ind.   475,   40  N.   E.   807,  s.   c. 

143  Ind.  689),  936,  938. 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


cclix 


Railway  Co.   v.   Tribbey    (6  Kan. 
App.    467,   50   Pac.    458),   405, 
415. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Trimble   (54  Ark. 

314),  1102. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Truesdell  (21  Tex. 
Civ.  App.  125,  51  S.  W.  Rep. 
272),  1366. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Truskett  (104  Fed. 
728,  44  C.  C.  A.  179;  affd., 
186  U.  S.  480,  46  L.  Ed.  1259), 

653,    1362. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Tuckett  (Tex.  Civ. 

App.,    25    S.    W.    Rep.    670), 

1362. 
Railway   Co,  v.   Turner    (85   Fed. 

369,  29  C.  C.  A.  196),  936. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Turner  (Tex.  Civ. 

App.,  77  S.  W.  255),  1119. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Turner  (Tex.  Civ. 

App.,  23  S.  W.  Rep.  83),  1085, 

1431. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Turney  (Tex.  Civ. 

App.,    78    S.    W.    Rep.    256), 

1174,  1186. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Twiname  (111  Ind. 

587),  78. 
Railway   Co.    v.    Twiss    (35    Neb. 

267,^3  N.  W.  76,  37  Am.  St. 

Rep.  437),  236. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Tyler  (9  Ind.  App. 

689,  35  N.  E.  523),  1301. 
Railway  v.  Tyler  Coffin  Co.  (Tex. 

Civ.  App.,  81  S.  W.  826),  651, 

1372. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Underwood    (90 

Ala.  49,  24  Am.  St.  Rep.  756), 

1209. 
Railway  Co.  v.  United   States    (2 

Wyo.   170),  886. 
Railway  Co.  v.  United  States  (117 

U.  S.  356),  521. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Valirius   (56  Ind. 

511),  899. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Valleley   (32  Ohio 

St.  345),  994,  1083. 


[references  are  to  sections.] 

Railway  Co.  v.  Vandeventer    (26 

Neb.  222),  405. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Vaughn  (Tex.  Civ. 

App.,    41    S.    W.    Rep.    415), 


1357. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Viers  (24  Ky.  Law 

Rep.  356,  68   S.  W.  469),  232, 

233,    236,    472. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Vining    (27    Ind. 

513),  1227,  1392. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Vivion    (19    Ky. 

Law  Rep.  687,  41  S.  W.  Rep. 

580),   895. 
Railway  v.  Voigt   (176  U.  S.  498, 

20  Sup.  Ct.  R.  385,  44  L,  Ed. 

560,  reversing  Voigt  v.  Rail- 
way,   79    Fed.    561;    see   also 

102  Fed.  1000),  1018,  1073. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Wade    (18    Ind. 

App.  346,  48  N.  E.  12),  1184. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Wagley   (91  Fed. 

860,    34    C.    C.    A.    114),    1009, 

1230. 

Railway  Co.  v.  Walden  (Tex.  Civ. 

App.,  46  S.  W.  87),  1060,  1067. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Walker  (154  U.  S. 

653,  14  Sup.  Ct.  R.  1189),  923. 

Railway  Co.  v.  Wallen   (65  Tex. 

568),  1224. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Wangelin  (152  111. 

138,  38  N.  E.  Rep.  760),  1397. 

Railway   Co.    v.   Ware   &   Walker 

(Tex.    Civ.    App.,    78     S.    W. 

Rep.  961),  1362. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Watson    (110  Ga. 

681,  36  S.  E.  Rep.  209),  1045, 

1077. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Watson   (72  Tex. 

631),    1010,    1111,    1186,    1431. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Watson's   Adm'r. 

(93  Ky.  645,  21  S.  W.  244,  40 

Am.  St.  Rep.  211,  19  L.  R.  A. 

310),   947,  949,  1217. 


eelx 


TABLE  OP   CASES   CITED. 


[BEFEBENCES   ABE 

Railway    Co.    v.    Watts    (82    Ga. 

229),    1177. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Weakly   (50  Ark. 

397,  8   S.  W.  Rep.   134),   426, 

475. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Weaver   (35  Kan. 

412),  1417. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Webb  (—  Ala.  — , 

39  So.  Rep.  262),  668. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Webb    (116    Ga. 

152,  42  S.  E.  395,  59  L.  R.  A. 

109),    914. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Webb    (103    Ky. 

705,  46  S.  W.  Rep.  11),  151. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Webb    (20    Tex. 

Civ.  App.  438,  49   S.  W.  526), 

1359,  1366. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Webster    (21   Ky. 

Law   Rep.   3,    50    S.    W.    Rep. 

843),    1111. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Weeks    (99    111. 

App.    518;    aff'd..    Weeks    v. 

Railway,  198  111.  551,  64  N.  E. 

1039),  1006,  1015. 
Railway   Co.    v.    Weir    (37   Mich. 

Ill),  1300,  1332. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Welch   (Tex.  Civ. 

App.,    94    S.    W.    Rep.    333), 

1427. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Welch    (—   Tex. 

Civ.  App.  — ,  91   S.  W,  Rep. 

621),   1433. 

Railway  Co.  v.  Wellman   (143  U. 

S.  339,  12  Sup.  Ct.  R.  400,  36 

L.    Ed.    176,    aft'g.,    83    Mich. 

592,  47  N.  W.  489),  575,  584. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Wells  (61  Ohio  St. 

268,   55   N.  E.  827),  574. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Wentworth     (8 

Tex.    Civ.    App.    5,    27    S.    W. 

Rep.  680),  656. 
Railway   Co.    v.    Western   Hay   & 

Grain  Co.   (2  Neb.  {unofflciaT) 

784,   90   N.   W.   205),    240. 


TO   SECTIONS.] 

Railway    Co.    v.   White    (67    Fed. 

481,  14  C.  G.  A.  483,  32  U.  S. 

App.   192),   1196,,  1197. 
Railway    Co.    v.    White    (108    Ga, 

201,  33  S.  E.  Rep.  952),  233. 
Railway  Co.  v.  White   (Tex.  Civ. 

App.,  80  S.  W.  Rep.  641),  643, 

1362. 
Railway   Co.   v.  White    (101   Fed. 

928,   42   C.   C.   A.   86  and   108 

Fed.  990),  1003,  1431. 
Railway     v.     Wichita     Wholesale 

Grocery  Co.    (55  Kan.  525,  40 

Pac.   899),   247,   449,   704,   711, 

1353. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Widman   (10  Ind. 

App.   92,  37  N.   E.  554),   1340. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Wilbanks   (7  Tex. 

Civ.  App.  489,  27  S.  W.  Rep. 

302),   240. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Wilcox    (84    111. 

239),    677. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Williams    (Tex. 

Civ.  App.,  31  S.  W.  Rep.  556), 

450,   1362. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Williams     (Tex. 

Civ.  App.,  78   S.  W.  Rep.   5), 

1432. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Williams    (Tex. 

Civ.  App.,  57  S.  W.  Rep.  883), 

462. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Williams  (21  Tex. 

Civ.  App.  469,  51  S.  W.  653), 

991. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Williams  (91  Tex. 

255,    42    S.   W.   855,   reversing 

(Tex.    Civ.    App.)     40    S.    W. 

350),   999,   1000. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Williams    (4  Tex. 

Civ.  App.  294,  23  S.  W.  Rep. 

626),  1357. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Williams  (70  Tex. 

159),    263. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Williams  (77  Tex. 

121),  638,  1334. 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


cclxi 


[BEFEBENCES   ABE 

Railway  Co.   v.   Wilson    (70   Ark. 

136,  66  S.  W.  661,  91  Am.  St. 

Rep.  74),  931,  989. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Wilson   (161  Ind. 

153,   66    N.   E.    950,    67    N.   E. 

993,    100    Am.    St.    Rep.    261), 

1062. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Wilson    (79   Tex. 

371,    15    S.    W.    Rep.    280,    23 

Am.  St.  Rep.  345,  11  L.  R.  A. 

486),  1117,  1118,  1200,  1414. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Winder  (2  Q.  B. 

(1892)  595,  61  L.  J.  Q.  B. 

608),  1042. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Witherspoon  (Tex. 

Civ.  App.,  38  S.  W.  Rep.  833), 

1370. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Witty    (32    Neb. 

275,  49  N.  W.  183,  29  Am.  St. 

Rep.  436),  431,  450. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Wolf  (—  Tex.  Civ. 

App.  — ,   89   S.  W.  Rep.   778), 

895,   913,   1118. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Wolfe    (128    Ind. 

347),  1017. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Wood    (114    Ga. 

140,  39  S.  E.  894,  55  L.  R.  A. 

536),  1054. 
Railway    Co.   v.    Wood    (104    Fed. 

663,    44    C.    C.    A.    118),    936, 

1016. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Wood    (113    Ind. 

544),   1094,   1432. 
Railway  Co.   v.  Wood    (Tex.  Civ. 

App.,  30  S.  W.  Rep.  715),  172. 
Railway   Co.   v.  Wood    (Tex.    Civ. 

App.,  77  S.  W  964),  980. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Woodward    (164 

Ind.  360,  72  N.  E.   558;   peti- 
tion    for     rehearing     denied, 

164   Ind.   360,   73  N.   E.   810), 

226,   243,   336.   1357,   1362. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Wortham  (73  Tex. 

25),   933. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Worthy    (87   Tex. 

459,  29  S.  W.  Rep.  376),  1397. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Railway  Co.   v.   Wright    (68   Ind. 

586),  1032. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Wright    (2    Tex. 

Civ.  App.   463,   21   S.  W.  Rep. 

399),  1046,  1065. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Wright    (10   Tex. 

Civ.  App.  179,  30  S.  W.  294), 

1046. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Wright    (20   Tex. 

Civ.  App.  137,  49  S.  W.  147), 

172. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Wright   (Tex.  Civ. 

App.,  84   S.  W.  270),   1427. 
Railway  v.  Wright   (18  Ind.  App. 

125,  47  N.  E.  491),  1033,  1053. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Wright    (25    Ind.- 

App.   525,  58  N.  B.  559),   668, 

740. 
Railway   Co.   v.   Yocum    (34   Ark. 

493),   1389. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Young    (90    Fed. 

709,    33    C.    C.    A.    251),    912, 

1012. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Young    (58    Neb. 

678,     79     N.    W.     556),     1389, 

1397,  1413,  1414. 
Railway   Co.    v.    Young    (67    Neb. 

569,  93  N.  W.  Rep.  922),  1401. 
Railway    Co.    v.    Zantzinger     (93 

Tex.   64,   53    S.  W.   379,   44   L. 

R.   A.    553),    1431. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Zernecke   (183  U. 

S.  582,  aft'g.,  59  Neb.  689,  82 

N.   W.   26,   55   L.   R.  A.   610), 

1413. 
Railway    &    Nav.    Co.    v.    Oregon 

Short  Line   &  U.   N.   Ry.   Co. 

(57  Fed.  673,  6  C.  C.  A.  495, 

15   U.   S.  App.  173),   568,   946. 
Raisor  v.   Railroad   Co.    (215   111. 

47,   74   N.    E.   Rep.    69),    1388. 
Rajnowski    v.    Railroad    Co.     (74 

Mich.    20),    1389. 
Ramm  v.  Railroad  (94  Iowa,  296, 

62  N.  W.  751),  1008. 


cclxii 


TABLE   OP    CASES    CITED. 


[BEFEBENCES   ABE 

Ramsdell    v.    Railroad    Co.    (151 

Mass.  245),  1389. 
Ramsden  v.  Railroad    (104  Mass. 

117),  980,  1094,  1303. 
Ranchau  Co.  v.  Railroad  Co.    (71 

Vt.  142,  43  Atl.  11,  76  Am.  St. 

Rep.    761),    1299. 
Rand   v.   Transportation   Co.    (59 

N.  H.  363),  420. 
Randall  v.  Railroad  (45  La,  Ann. 

778,  IS  So.  166),  1019. 
Randall   v.   Railroad   Co.    (108   N. 

C.    612,    13    S.    E.    Rep.    137), 

799. 
Randall    v.    Railway    (113    Mich. 

115,  71  N.  W.  450,  38  L.  R.  A. 

666),   990. 
Randall  v.  Railway  (102  Mo.  App. 

342,  76  S.  W.  493),  1084,  1085, 

1090. 
Randall  v.  Sprague   (74  Fed.  247, 

21  C.  C.  A.  334,  33  U.  S.  App. 

464,   reversing   67   Fed.   604), 

842,  845,  847,  852. 
Randall  v.  Transportation  Co.  (54 

Wis.    147),    1417. 
Randolph  v.  Railroad  Co.  (18  Mo. 

App.  609).  1433. 
Randolph    v.    Railway     (106    Mo. 

App.  646,  79  S.  W.  Rep.  1170), 

933. 
Rankin  v.   Packet   Co.    (9   Heisk. 

564),  785,  7SG,  787,  889. 
Rankin   v.   Railroad   Co.    (55   Mo. 

168),  702. 
Ranney  v.   Railroad    (67  Vt.  594, 

32  Atl.  810),  1223,  1224. 
Ransberry  v.   Transp.   &  Trading 

Co.    (22    Wash.    476,    61    Pac. 

154),  1428. 
Ransom   v.   Railroad   Co.    (15   N. 

Y.  415),  1422. 
Ransome  v.  Railway  Co.  (1  C.  B. 

437),    522. 
Ransome,    In    re    (1    C.    B.   437), 

522. 


TO   SECTIONS.] 

Raphael  v.   Pickford    (5  M.   &  G. 

551),    652. 
Rathbone  v.  Railroad   (140  N.  Y. 

48,    35    N.    E.    418,    reversing 

69   Hun,  617,   23  N.  Y.  Supp. 

1148),  435. 

Rathbone  v.  Railroad  (40  Or.  225, 
66  Pac.  909),  1000,  1205. 

Rathbone  Bros.  &  Co.  v.  Mclver 
Sons  &  Co.  (2  K.  B.  (1903) 
378,  72  L.  J.  K.  B.  703,  19 
Times  L.  R.  590,  reversing 
(1902)  8  Com'l  Cas.  1),  365. 

Rathbun  v.  Steamboat  Co.  (76  N. 
Y.  376),  727. 

Rathgebe  v.  Railroad  (179  Pa.  St. 
31,  36  Atl.  160),  933,  1174. 

Rattersee  v.  Railway  (Tex.  Civ. 
App.,  81  S.  W.  Rep.  566), 
1016,  1188. 

Ratzer  v.  Railway  (64  Minn.  245, 
66  N.  W.  988,  58  Am.  St.  Rep. 
530),  175,  177,  182. 

Ranch  v.  Lloyd  (31  Penn.  St. 
358),    1220,    1227. 

Raughley  v.  Railroad  (202  Penn. 
St.  43,  51  Atl.  597),  1118. 

Rawitzky  v.  Railroad  Co.  (40  La. 
Ann.  47),  1043. 

Rawlings  V.  Railroad  (97  Mo. 
App.  511,  71  S.  W.  534),  997, 
1019,  1020,  1427,  1428. 

Rawsdell  v.  Grady  (97  Me.  319, 
54  Atl.  Rep.  763),  140L 

Rawson  v.  Holland  (59  N.  Y. 
611),   130,   133,   139,   458. 

Rawson  v.  Johnson  (1  East,  203), 
1344. 

Rawson    v.    Railroad    (48    N.    Y. 

212),  1052,  1299. 
Ray  V.  Railroad  Co.   ( —  N.  Car. 

— ,  53   S.  E.  Rep.  622),  1174, 

1219. 


TABLE   OP    CASES    CITED. 


celxiii 


[references  are  to  sections.] 


Raymond     v.     Railway     Co.     (65 

Iowa,   152),   895. 
Raymond  v.  Tyson  (17  How.  53), 

875. 
Read  v.  Railroad  Co,   (140  Mass. 

199),  1233. 
Read    v.    Railroad    Co.     (60    Mo. 

199),   287,   298,   401,  450,   657, 

1354,  1353. 
Read  v.  Railway  Co.  (L.  R.  3  Q. 

B.   555),    1391. 
Read  v.  Spalding  (30  N.  Y.  630), 

282,    303. 
Read  v.  Spalding  (5  Bosw.  395), 

83,  84. 
Readhead  v.  Railway  (L.  R.  2  Q. 

B.   412;    L.   R.  4   Q.   B.   379), 

892,  905,  909. 
Reary    v.    Railway    Co.    (40    La. 

Ann.  32),  964,  1001, 
Reber  v.  Bond  (38  Fed.  Rep.  822), 

1217. 
Reddington  v.  Traction  Co.    (132 

Penn.  St.  154),  1174,  1181. 
Redfleld  v.  Railroad  Co.  (110  Cal. 

277,  42  Pac.  Rep.  822),  1397, 

1401. 
Redhing  v.  Railroad  Co.  (68  N.  J. 

L.  641,  54  Atl.  431>,  1219. 
Redmon  v.  Railroad  (90  Mo.  App. 

68),  1372. 
Redmond    v.    Steamboat    Co,    (56 

Barb.  320),  688. 
Redmond    v.    Steamboat    Co.    (46 

N.   Y.   578),    688,    689= 
Redner  v.  Railway   (73  H\in,  562, 

26   N.   Y.   Supp.   1050),    937. 
Redpatb    v.    Vaughan    (52    Barb. 

489),   267,   486. 
Reed  v.  Bridge  Co.   (16  Ky.  Law 

Rep.  379,  28  S.  W.  Rep.  149), 

1188. 
Reed   v.    Express    Co.    (48    N.   Y, 

462),    245. 
Reed  v.  Railroad   (56  Barb.  493), 

949. 


Reed   v.   Railroad    (104   Ky.   603, 

47  S.  W.  Rep.   591,  44  L.  R. 

A,  823;   rehearing  denied,  48 

S.  W.  Rep.  416),  996. 
Reed   v.   Railroad   Co.    (4   Penne. 

413,    57   Atl.   Rep.  529),    1397. 
Reed  v.  Railroad  (Tex.  Civ.  App., 

50  S.  W.  Rep.  432),  1054. 
Reed    v.    Railroad    Co,     (84    Va. 

231),  936. 
Reed  v.  Railway   (100  Mich.  507, 

59  N.  W.  144),  1117. 
Reed   v.   Railway    (76   Minn.   163, 

78  N.  W.  974),  964. 
Reed  v.   Steamboat  Co.    (1  Marv. 

193,  40  Atl.  955),  75,  264. 
Reed  v.  Weld   (6  Fed.  Rep.  304), 

807. 
Reese   v.    Pennsylvania    Co.    (131 

Penn.  St.  422),  1032,  1033. 
Reeves  v.  Railway  (68  S.  Car.  89, 

46  S.  E.  Rep.  543),  1440 
Regan  v.  Railway  (61  N.  H.  579), 

130,   131,   132. 
Regner  v.  Railroad  (74  Hun,  202, 

26  N.  Y.  Supp.  625),  969,  1091. 
Reid  v.  Hoskins  (5  E.  &  B.  729), 

322, 
Reid  V.  Hoskins  (6  E.  &  B.  953), 

322. 
Reid   V.   Railroad    (10    Ind.   App. 

385,  35  N.  E.  703,  53  Am.  St. 

Rep.   391),   306,  420,   1355. 
Reilly    v.    Railroad    (94    Mo.   600, 

7  S.  W.  Rep.  407),  1392. 
Reimer    v.    Railroad     (178    Mass. 

54,  59  N.  E.  671),  930. 
Reineman    v.    Railroad    Co.    (51 

Iowa,  338),  869. 
Reiter,   etc.,   Mfg.   Co.   v.   Hamlin 

(—  Ala.  — ,  40  So.  Rep.  281), 

1397,    1401. 
R.  E.  Lee,  The  (2  Abbott  (U.  S.), 

49),    1268. 
Relf  V.  Rapp    (3  Wats  &  S.  21), 

329,    437. 


eelxiv 


TABI^   OP    CASES   CITED. 


[REFERENCES    ABE 

Renlund  v.  Mining  Co.   (89  Minn. 

4i;  93  N.  W.  1057,  99  Am.  St. 

Rep.  534),  1389,  1395. 
Reynolds    v.    Narragansett,    etc., 

Co.   (—  R.  I.  — ,  59  Atl.  Rep. 

393),  1397. 
Reynolds  v.  Railroad  Co.  (85  Mo. 

90),   1309,  1341. 
Reynolds  v.  Railroad    (43   N.   H. 

580),   758,   759,    770. 
Reynolds  v.  Railroad    (121  Mass. 

291),   131. 
Reynolds  v.  Railroad  Co.  (3  N.  Y. 

Suppl.  331),  668,  678. 
Reynolds    v.     Railway     Co.     ( — 

Wash.  — ,  82  Pac.  Rep.  161), 

638,   715. 
Rhodes    v.    Beard    (16    Ohio    St. 

581),    1358. 
Rhodes  v.  Newhall  (126  N.  Y.  74, 

27  N.  B.  947,  22  Am.  St.  Rep. 

859,    aff'g.,    12    N.    Y.    Supp. 

669),   164. 
Rice    V.    Hart    (118    Mass.    201), 

702. 
Rice  V.  Railroad  Co.  (22  111.  App. 

643),  1300. 
Rice  V.  Railroad  Co.   (3  Mo.  App. 

27),  331. 
Rice    V.    Railroad    Co.     (63    Mo. 

314),    401,   442,   443. 
Rice  V.   Shute   (Smith's  Ld.   Cas. 

645),  1324. 
Rice  V.  Steamboat  Co.    (56  Barb. 

384),  1360. 
Richards  v.  Doe  (100  Mass.  523), 

163. 
Richards  v.  Railroad   (1  111.  404), 

702. 
Richards  v.  Railway   (7  Man.  G. 

&.    S.     (Com.    B.)     839),    67, 

1259. 
Richards  v.  Riverside  Iron  Works 
(56  W.  Va.  510,  49  S.  E.  Rep. 
437),    1389. 


TO   SECTIONS.] 

Richards    v.    Westcott    (2    Bosw. 

589),   70,   1249. 
Richardson  v.  Canadian,  etc.,  Ry. 

Co.    (19   Ont.  R.   369,  45  Am. 

&  Eng.  R.  Cas.  413),  708. 
Richardson     v.     Chynoweth     (26 

Wis.    656),    1367. 
Richardson    v.    Dunn     (2    Q,    B. 

218),    1317. 
Richardson  v.  Goddard   (23  How. 

28),  664,  688,  692,  694. 
Richardson  v.  Kier   (34  Cal.  63), 

1420. 
Richardson  v.  Railroad  Co.  ( —  S. 

Car.  — ,   51    S.   E.  Rep.   261), 

1442. 
Richardson  v.  Railway  Co.  (L.  R. 

10  C.  P.  486,  1  C.  P.  Div.  342), 

910. 
Richardson  v.  Railway  Co.  (L.  R. 

10  C.  P.  486),  910. 
Richardson   v.    Railroad    Co.    (98 

Mass.  85),  1388,  1390. 
Richardson    v.    Railway    Co.    (62 

Mo.  App.  1),  443,  467. 
Richardson   v.   Railway  Co.    (149 

Mo.  311,  50  S.  W.  782,  13  Am. 

&  Eng.  R.  Cas.   (N.  S.)    170), 

445,    475. 
Richardson    v.    Railway    Co.    (61 

Wis.  596),  341,   1334. 
Richardson    v.    Young    (38    Penn. 

St.  169),  815,  818. 
Richardson      Spence     &     Co.     v. 

Rowntree   (L.  R.   (1894)  App. 

Cas.  217,  63  L.  J.  Q.  B.  283), 

1299. 
In  re  Richardsons   (66  Law  J.  Q. 

B.  868,  (1898)  1  Q.  B.  261,  77 

Law.   T.    (N.   S.)    479,  8   Asp. 

330),  841. 
Richer  v.  Fargo   (78  N.  Y.  Supp. 

1007,  77  App.  Div.  550),  130. 
Richmond   v.    Steamboat   Co.    (87 

N.  Y.  240),  688,  698. 


TABLE   OF    CASES   CITED. 


cclxv 


[references   ABE 

Richmond    v.    Southern    Pac.    Co. 

(41    Or.    54,    67    Pac.    947,    93 

Am.  St.  Rep.  694,  57  L.  R.  A. 

616),  1072. 
Richmond    v.    Railroad    Co.     (87 

Mich.  374,  49  N.  W.  Rep.  621), 

1397,    1402. 
Ricker    v.    Freeman    (50    N.    H. 

420),  1430. 
Rickerson,    etc.,    Co.    v.    Railroad 

Co.    (67  Mich.   110),  231,  243. 
Ricketts     v.     Railroad     (4     Lans. 

446),   261. 
Ricketts  v.   Railroad   Co.    (33  W. 

Va.  433,  25  Am.  St.  Rep.  901), 

1094. 
Ricketts   v.   Railway   Co.    (33   W. 

Va.   433),   1438. 
Ricks    V.    Railway    (118    Ga.    259, 

45   S.  E.  268),  1181. 
Riddle  v.  Railroad   Co.    (1   Inter. 

St.  Com.  Rep.  604),  46. 
Ridenhour    v.    Railway    Co.    (102 

Mo.  270),  995,   1118. 
Rieser    v.    Metropolitan    Express 

Co.    (91   N.   Y.    Supp.   170,    45 

Misc.   632),  451,   1352. 
Rietveld     v.     Railroad     Co.     ( — 

Iowa,  — ,  105  N.  W.  Rep.  515), 

1395. 
Riley    v.    Home     (5    Bing.    217), 

57,  146,  392,  795. 
Riley  v.  Railroad  Co.    (135  Mass. 

292),  1418. 
Rincicoth  v.   Contracting  Co.    ( — 

Conn.   — ,   60   Atl.   Rep.   115), 

1397. 
Ringgold  V.  Haven    (1  Cal.   108), 

1360. 
Ringwalt    v.    Railroad     (45    Neb. 

760,  64  N.  W.  219),  1241. 
Ripley  v.  Railroad  (31  N.  J.  Law, 

388),   1036. 
Rivers  v.  Railroad   (86  Miss.  571, 
38   So.  Rep.   508),   1033. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Rixford  v.  Smith  (52  N.  H.  355), 

211,    333,    339. 
Roach  v.  Imperial  Mining  Co.   (7 

Fed.  698),  1389. 
Robel   v.   Railway  Co.    (35  Minn. 

84,  27  N.  W.  Rep.  305),  1397. 
Roberts    v.     Kennedy     (2     Dana, 

430),  70. 
Roberts  v.  Koehler  (30  Fed.  Rep. 

94),   1303. 
Roberts  v.  Railroad   (78  111.  App. 

526),    1414. 
Roberts    v.    Railroad    (175    Mass. 

296,  56  N.  E.  559),  1219. 
Roberts    v.    Riley     (15    La.    Ann. 

103),    401,    411. 
Roberts  v.  Smith  (5  Arizona,  368, 

52  Pac.  1120),  964. 
Roberts    v.     Turner     (12     Johns. 

232),  72. 
Roberts  v.  Van  Buskirk  (31  N.  Y. 

661),   226. 
Robertson   v.   National   S.   S.   Co. 

(1    App.    Div.    61,    37    N.    Y. 

Supp.  69),  212,  216. 
Robertson   v.    National   S.   S.   Co. 

(139  N.  Y.  416,  34  N.  E.  1053, 

reversing  60  N.  Y.  Super.  Ct. 

132,  17  N.  Y.  Supp.  459),  480. 
Robertson  v.  Railroad   (156  Mass. 

525,  31  N.  E.  650,  32  Am.  St. 

Rep.  482),  88. 
Robertson    v.    Railroad    (152    Mo. 

382,  53  S.  W.  1082),  941. 
Robertson    v.    Railroad    ( —    Ala. 

— ,  37   So.  Rep.  831),  1067. 
Robertson     v.     Railway     Co.     (22 

Barb.   91),   1001,   1218. 
Robertson   v.    Railway    (122   Wis. 

66,  99  N.  W.  Rep.  433),  1386, 

1389,    1395. 
Robinson  v.  Austin  (2  Gray,  564), 

1372. 
Robinson  v.  Baker  (5  Cush.  137), 

884. 


cclxvi 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


[REFERENCKS    ABE 

Robinson   v.   Cone    (22   Vt.    213), 

1227,   1228,   1229. 
Robinson  v.  Dunmore    (2   Bos.   & 

P.  416),  38,  40,  45,  110. 
Robinson   v.   Franklin   Sugar  Re- 
fining Co.   (70  Fed.  792),  356. 
Robinson  v.  Hoist   (96  Ga.  19,  23 

S.  E.  Rep.  76),  613. 
Robinson     v.     Insurance     Co.     (2 

Johns.  89).  815,  820. 
Robinson  v.  Knights    (L.  R.  8  C. 

P.  465),  800. 
Robinson  v.  Merch.  Desp.  Co.  (45 

Iowa,  470),  84,  238,  408,  457. 
Robinson  v.   Min.   Co.    (26  Wash. 

484,  67  Pac.  Rep.  274),  1396. 
Robinson  v.  Railroad  Co.  (48  Cal. 

421),  1420. 
Robinson    v.    Railroad    Co.     (105 

Cal.  526,  541,  38  Pac.  94,  108, 

722,  28  L.  R.  A.  773),  1077. 
Robinson  v.  Railroad  Co.    (9  Fed. 

Rep.  129),  743. 
Robinson  v.  Railroad  Co.   (9  Fed. 

Rep.   877),   910. 
Robinson  v.  Railroad  Co.  (16  Fed. 

Rep.  57),  743,  745. 
Robinson    v.    Railroad    (65    Barb. 

146),  1236. 
Robinson    v.    Railroad    Co.     (135 

Mich.  254,  10  Det.  L.  N.  727, 

97  N.  W.  689),  957,  1135. 
Robinson    v.    Railroad    Co.     (129 

Fed.    753,    64    C.    C.    A.    281), 

147. 
Robinson    v.    Railroad     Co.     (26 

Wash.  484,  67  Pac.  Rep.  274), 

1389. 
Robinson  v.  Railroad  Co.  (117  Ga. 
168,  43   S.  E.  452,  97  Am.  St. 

Rep.    156),    1389,    1395. 
Robinson  v.  Railway   (35  L.  J.  C. 

P.  123),  341,  522. 
Robinson  v.  Steamship  Co.  (71  N. 
Y.    Supp.    424,    63    App.    Div. 
211;    affirmed    without    opin- 


TO   SECTIONS.] 

ion,   177  N.  Y.  565,   69   N.  E. 

1130),  472. 
Robinson  v.  Stewart  (68  Me.  61), 

175. 
Robinson    v.    Transportation    Co. 

(45  Iowa,  490),  480,  1360. 
Robinson    v.    Transportation    Co. 

(45   Iowa,   470),    1361. 
Robinson  v.  U.  S.  Ben.  Ass'n.  (132 

Mich.  695,  94  N.  W.  Rep.  211, 

102    Am.    St.   Rep.    436),   927. 
Robison  v.  Rupert   (23  Penn.   St. 

523),  1434. 
Robostelli     v.     Railroad    Co.     (33 

Fed.  Rep.  796),  1056,  1219. 
Robson  V.  Railway    (L.  R.   10  Q. 

B.    271),   911,    1122,    1174. 
Robson    V.    Railway    (L.    R.    2    Q. 

B.  Div.  85),  1187. 
Rocky    Mount    Mills    v.    Railroad 

(119    N.    Car.    693,    25    S.    B. 

Rep.    854,    56    Am.    St.    Rep. 

682),    249. 
Roderick   v.   Railroad   Co.    (7   W. 

Va.  54),  333. 
Rodgers  v.  Railroad  Co.   ( —  Ark. 

— ,  89  S.  W.  Rep.  468,  1  L.  R. 

A.     (N.    S.)     1145),    898,    922, 

964,    1173. 
Rodman  v.  Railway  Co.   (65  Kan. 

645,  70  Pac.  Rep.  642,  59  L.  R. 

A.    704),    1396. 
Roe    V.    Railway     (7    Exch.    36), 

1100. 
Rogan    V.    Railway    Co.    (51    Mo. 

App.  665),  430. 
Rogers  v.   Head    (Cro.   Jac.   262), 

38,   53. 
Rogers  v.  Railroad  (2  Lans.  269), 

106. 
Rogers  v.   Railroad    (57   N.   J.   L. 
703.    34    Atl.    11),    1036,    1038, 
1053. 
Rogers  v.  Schneider  (13  Ind.  App. 
23,  41  N.  E.  71),  765,  769. 


TABLE  OF    CASES  CITED, 


cclxvii 


[references  are 

Rogers   v.    Smith    (17    Ind.   323), 

1377. 
Rogers  v.  Steamboat  Co.   (86  Me. 

261,  29  Atl.  1069,  25  L.  R.  A. 

491),    1005,    1022,    1069,    1075. 
Rogers  v.   Weir    (34   N.   Y.   463), 

668,   749,   753. 
Rogers  v.  Wheeler   (2  Lans.  486; 

43  N.  Y.  598),  77. 
Rogers  v.  Wheeler  (52  N.  Y.  262), 

72,  113,  611. 
Rogers   Loco.   Works   v.   Railroad 

(5  C.  E.  Green  (N.  J.),  379), 

76. 
Rohl  V.  Parr  (1  Esp.  444),  337. 
Rolette  V.  Railway   (91  Minn.  16, 

97  N.  W.  431),  1198. 
Rolfe    V.   Railway    Co.    ( —   Mich. 

— ,  107  N.  W.  Rep.  899),  1349. 
Rolfs    V.    Railway    (66    Kan.    272. 

71  Pac.  526),  1052,  1053,  1065. 
Rolling  Mill   Co.  v.  Corrigan    (46 

Ohio  St.  283),  1228. 
Romano  v.  Capital,  etc.,  Co.   (125 

Iowa,    591,    101    N.    W.    Rep. 

437,  106  Am.  St.  Rep.  323,  68 

L.   R.   A.    132),   1395. 
Romero   v.   McKernan    (88   N.   Y. 

Supp.   365),   261. 
Romero  v.  Railway  Co.    (11  New 

Mex.    679,    72    Pac.    Rep.    37), 

1389. 
Romine  v.  Railroad  (24  Ind.  App. 

230,  56  N.  E.  245).  898.  1216. 
Roos    V.    Railroad     (199    Pa.    St. 

378,  49  Atl.  344),  784. 
Root  V.  Chandler  (10  Wend.  110), 

780. 
Root   V.   Railroad    (83    Hun,    111, 

31  N.  Y.   Supp.  357;    s.   c.   76 

Hun,  23.  27  N.  Y.  Supp.  611), 

457,    509. 
Root  V,  Railroad    (45  N.  Y.  524), 

76,  181.  226,  231,   238,  242. 
Root  V.  Railroad   Co.    (114  N.   Y. 

300),   521. 


TO   SECTIONS.] 

Root  V.  Sleeping  Car  Co.  (28  Mo. 

App.  199),  1132. 
Rooth  V.  Railway  Co.  (L.  R.  2  Ex. 

173),   341. 
Rose  V.  King  (78  N.  Y.  Supp.  419, 

76   App.   Div.   308),   1421. 
Rose  V.  Railroad  Co.    (106  N.  C. 

168),    1433,    1440,    1442. 
Rose  V.  Railroad   (39  Iowa,  246), 

450,    1075. 
Rose  V.  Railway    (L.  R.  2   Exch. 

Div.  248),  1174,   1187. 
Roseman  v.  Railroad  (112  N.  Car. 

709,  16  S.  E.  766.  34  Am.   St. 

Rep.    524,    19    L.    R.    A.    327), 

1083. 
Rosen    v.    City    of    Boston     (187 

Mass.  245,  72  N.  E.  992,  68  L. 

R.   A.   153),   957. 
Rosenbaum    v.    Railroad    Co.    (38 

Minn.  173.  36  S.  W.  Rep.  447. 

8  Am.  St.  Rep.  653),  1004. 
Rosenbloom     v.     Railway      (Rap. 

Jud.  Que.,  16  C.  S.  360),  1310, 

1360. 
Rosencranz     v.     Swofford     Bros., 

etc.,   Co.    (175  Mo.   518,   75   S. 

W.  445,  97  Am.  St.  Rep.  609), 

888. 
Rosenfield     v.     Express     Co.      (1 

Woods.  131).   749. 
Rosenfield    v.    Railroad    Co.    (103 

Ind.  121),  475. 
Rosenstein   v.   Vogemann    (92    N. 

Y.    Supp.    86.    102    App.    Div. 

39),    689. 
Rosenthal  v.  Weir  (170  N.  Y.  148, 

63  N.  E.  65,  57  L.  R.  A.   527. 

aff'g.,  66  N.  Y.  Supp.  841,  54 

App.  Div.  275).  432.  760,  772, 

774. 
Ross  V.  Innis   (26  111.  259),  1229. 
Ross    V.    Railroad    (49    Vt.    364), 

333. 
Ross    V.    Railroad     (4    Mo.    App. 

582),    1250,    1286. 


cclxviii 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


[befebences  are 

Ross  V.  Railway  Co.  (44  Fed.  Rep. 

44),    1401. 
Rossier   v.   Railroad   Co.    ( —  Mo. 

App.  —   91  S.  W.  Rep.  1018), 

1249,  1285. 
Rossiter  v.  Chester  ( 1  Doug.  154 ) , 

815. 
Rosted  V.  Railway  (76  Minn.  123, 

78  N.  W.  971),  1222,  1429. 
Roth    V.    Packet    Co.    (59    N.    Y. 

Super.  Ct.  49,  12  N,  Y.  Supp. 

460),   163. 
Roth  V.  Railroad   (34  N.  Y.  548), 

712,   723,  1286. 
Roth   Clothing   Co.   v.    Steamship 

Co.    (88    N.   Y.    Supp.    987,   44 

Misc.  237;  s.  c.  86  N.  Y.  Supp. 

25),   690,   1366. 
Rothschild  v.  Railroad  (163  Penn. 

St.   49,  29  Atl.   702),   1412. 
Rothschild    v.    Railroad     (69    111. 

164),    702. 
Rothstein    v.    The    Railroad    (171 

Penn.    St.    620,    33    Atl.    Rep. 

379),   1180. 
Rouse  V.  Railway  Co.   (128  Mich. 

149,  87  N.  W.  Rep.  68),  1397, 

1399. 
Roussel    V.    Aumais     (Rap.    Jud. 

Que.  18  C.  S.  474),  49. 
Rowan  v.  Express  Co.    (80  N.  Y. 

Supp.   226,   80  App.   Div.  31), 

425,    1355. 
Rowan  v.  155,453  Feet  of  Lumber 

(131  Fed.  345),  850. 
Rowdin    v.   Railroad    (208    Penn. 

St.    623,    57    Atl.    1125),    1003, 

1072,  1073,  1414. 

Rowe  V.  Tel.  Co.  (66  N.  J.  L.  19, 
48  Atl.  Rep.  523),  1401. 

Rowell  V.  Railroad  (68  N.  H.  358, 
44   Atl.  488),   990. 

Rowland  v.  Miln  (2  Hilt.  150), 
688. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Rowland     v.     Railroad     Co.     (61 

Conn.  103,  23  Atl.  755,  29  Am. 

St.   Rep.    175),    806. 
Rowley  v.  Bigelow  (12  Pick.  3.07), 

772. 
Rowley  v.  Railway  (L.  R.  8  Exch. 

221),  1423. 
Rowson  V.  Atlantic  Transport  Co. 

(2  K.  B.   (1903)   666,  72  L.  J. 

K.    B.    811,    aff'g.,    1    K.    B. 

(1903)    114),  349,  366,  382. 
Roy   &  Roy   v.   Railway   Co.    ( — 

Wash.  — ,   85   Pac.  Rep.   53), 

161. 
Royal  Costume  Co.  v.  Weir  (95  N. 

Y.    Supp.    575,    48    Misc.   Rep. 

376),   433. 
Royston  v.  Railroad  Co.  (67  Miss. 

376,  7  So.  Rep.  320),  985. 
Rubens  v.  Ludgate  Hill  S.  S.  Co. 

(65  Hun,  625,  20  N.  Y.  Supp. 

481),   416,   475. 
Rubin  V.  Wells  Fargo  Express  Co. 

(85  N.  Y.  Supp.  1108),  651. 
Ruck  V.  Hatfield   (5  Barn.  &  Aid. 

632),   193. 
Rucker     v.     Donovan     (13     Kan. 

251),  758,  872. 
Rudell  V.  Transit  Co.   (117  Mich. 

568,  76  N.  W.  380,  44  L.  R.  A. 

415),   172,   460,  462,   625. 
Rudiger  v.  Railroad  Co.  (101  Wis. 

292,  77  N.  W.  Rep.  169),  1397. 
Rudy  V.  Railway  (8  Utah,  165,  30 

Pac.  366),  1082,  1083. 
Ruffin  V.  Ruggerio  (31  N.  Y.  Supp. 

826,  10  Misc.  739),  674. 

Ruggles  V.  Illinois  (108  U.  S. 
526),    758,    872. 

Runyan  v.  Railroad  (61  N.  J.  L. 
537,  41  Atl.  367,  43  L.  R.  A. 
284,  68  Am.  St.  Rep.  711;  re- 
affirmed in  64  N.  J.  L.  67,  44 
Atl.  985,  48  L.  R.  A.  744,  and 
47  Atl.  422,  65  N.  J.  L.  228), 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED. 


eclxix 


[refebences  are 

963,  966,  1077,  1080,  1241, 

1242,  1249,  1250. 
Ruppel  V.  Railway  (167  Pa.  St. 

166,  31  Atl.  478,  46  Am.  St. 

Rep.  666),  426,  430,  501. 
Ruppell    V.    United    Railroads    (1 

Cal.    App.    666,    82    Pac.    Rep. 

1073),   1389,   1397. 
Rushfortli    V.    Hadfield    (7    East, 

224),  865. 
Russ  V.  The  War  Eagle  (14  Iowa, 

363),  1019,  1423. 
Russell    V.   Livingston    (19   Barb. 

346),   8». 
Russell   V.    Neiman    (17   Com.   B. 

(N.  S.)    163),  314. 
Russell  V.  Railroad  (70  N.  J.  Law, 

808,  59  Atl.  Rep.  150,  67  L.  R. 

A.  433),  450,  459. 
Russell    V.    Railroad    (42    N.    Y. 

Supp.  678,  12  App.  Div.  160), 

1102. 
Russell  V.  Railway  Co.    (157  Ind. 

305,  61  N,  E.  678,  55  L.  R.  A. 

253,    87    Am.    St.    Rep.    214), 

426,  1018,  1073. 
Russell  Grain  Co.  v.  Railroad  Co. 

(—   Mo.   App.   — ,    89    S.   W. 

Rep.    908),   496,   705. 
Russell  Manufg.  Co.  v.  Steamboat 

Co.   (50  N.  Y.  121),  689,  693, 
'    696. 
Russo    V.    Morris,    etc.,    Improve- 
ment Assn.    (104  La.  426,   29 

So.  Rep.  46),  100,  101. 
Rutherford    v.    Foster    (125    Fed. 

187,  60  C.  C.  A.  129),  1389. 
Rutherford  v.  McGowen    (1  Nott 

&  McC.  17),  66. 
Rutherford  v.   Railway    (28   Tex. 

Civ.  App.  625,  67  S.  W.  161), 

1045. 
Rutledge    v.   Railroad    (129    Fed. 

94,  63  C.  C.  A.  596),  1118. 
Rutter    V.    Railway    Co.    (81    Mo. 

169),   1389. 


TO   SECTIONS.] 

Ryan  v.   Dayton    (25  Conn.  188), 

627. 
Ryan   v.   Railroad   Co.    (23   Penn. 

St.  384),  1004. 
Ryan  v.  Railway  (90  Minn.  12,  95 

N.  W.   758),   175,   177,   660. 
Ryan  v.  Railway  Co.  (65  Tex.  13), 

212,   213,    215,   218,   449,    1354. 
Ryder  v.  Railroad  Co.    (51  Iowa, 

460),    668. 
Ryland  &  Rankin  v.  Railway  (55 

W.    Va.    181,    46    S.    E.    Rep. 

923),   651,  1372. 


Sage   V.   Railroad    Co.    (134   Ind. 

100,  33  N.  E.  771),  1033. 
Sager    v.    Railroad    Co.    (31    Me. 

228),   339,   392,   450,   496,   505, 

611,   1355. 
Saleeby    v.    Railroad     (90    N.    Y. 

Supp.  1042,  99  App.  Div.  163, 

aff'g.,   81    N.    Y.    Supp.    903), 

1250,   1251,   1352. 
Salem  Bk.  v.  Gloucester  Bk.   (17 

Mass.  1),  34. 
Sales  V.  Western  Storage  Co.    (4 

Iowa,  547),  68. 
Salmon  Falls  Mfg.  Co.  v.  The  Tan- 
gier   (1   Cliff,   396),   689,   698. 
Saltonstall   v.    Stockton    (Taney's 

Dec.    11),    963. 
Saltsman     v.     Railroad     Co.     (65 

Hun,  448,  20  N.  Y.  Supp.  361), 

226. 
Saltus  v.  Everett  (20  Wend.  269), 

785,  790. 
Saltus  V.  Insurance  Co.  (12  Johns. 

107),  801. 
Sambuck    v.    Railroad    Co.    (Cal., 

71    Pac.    174),    1414. 
Samms  v.  Stewart  (20  Ohio,  73), 

37,  54. 


eelxx 


TABLE  OF   CASES   CITED, 


[REFERENCES   ABE 

Samuel    v.    Cheney     (135    Mass. 

278),  672. 
Samuels   v.   Railroad   Co.    (35    S. 

Car.  493,    14    S.   E.   Rep.   943, 

28   Am.   St.   Rep.   883),   1126. 
Sanbo  v.  Coal  Co.  (130  Fed.  52), 

1390. 
Sanders    v.    Jenkins     (1    Q.    B. 

(1897)   93,  66  L.  J.  Q.  B.  40), 

849. 
Sanders  v.  Railroad  Co.    (90  111. 

App.  582),  990. 
Sanders  v.  Railway  Co.   (107  Ga. 

132,  32  S.  B.  Rep.  840),  1180. 
Sanders    v.    Vanzeller    (4    Q.    B. 

260),  807. 
Sanders  v.  Young  (1  Head,  219), 

66. 
Sanderson  v.  Frazier  (8  Col.  79), 

1417. 
Sanderson  v.  Lamberton  (6  Binn. 

129),   1306. 
Sanderson  v.  Panther  Lumber  Co. 

(50  W.  Va.  42,  40  S.  E.  Rep. 

368,  55  L.  R.  A.  908),  1018. 
Sanderson  v.  Railway  Co.  (64  Mo. 

App.  655),  1079. 
Sandifer's  Adm'r.  v.  Railroad  Co. 

(—    Ky.    — ,    89    S.    W.    Rep. 

528),  929. 
Sandiman  v.  Breach    (7  B.  &  C. 

96),   1233. 
Sands  v.  Railway  Co.   (108  Tenn. 

1,  64   S.  W.  Rep.  478),   1001. 
Saner  v.  Railway  Co.   (108  Mich. 

31,  65  N.  W.  Rep.  624),  1391. 
Sanford  v.  Railroad  Co.  (24  Penn. 

378),   516,   521. 
Sanford    v.    Railroad     (11    Cush. 

155),  1315. 
Sanford    v.    Railroad     (23    N.    Y. 

343),    1089. 
Sanson  v.  Railway  Co.   (Ill  Fed. 

887,  50  C.  C.  A.  53),  927. 


TO   SECTIONS.] 

Sargent   v.    Gile    (8    N.    H.   325), 

668. 
Sargent  v.  Morris  (3  Barn.  &  Aid. 

277),  1305,  1315. 
Sargent     v.     Railroad     Co.     (115 

Mass.  416),  517. 
Sargent  v.  Railway  Co.   (114  Mo. 

348,  21  S.  W.  823.  19  L.  R.  A. 

460),  935,  936,  1011. 
Satterlee  v.  Groat  (1  Wend.  272), 

57,  1001. 
Sattler   v.   Railway    ( —  Neb.   — , 

98  N.  W.  Rep.  663),  1219. 
Saunders  v.  Railway  Co.   (10  Okl. 

325,  61  Pac.  1075),  1194. 
Saunders    v.    Railway    Co.    (6    S. 

Dak.  40,  60  N.  W.  148),  1412. 
Saunders    v.    Railway    Co.     (128 

Fed.  15,  62  C.  C.  A.  523),  401, 

402,  417,  452,  1241,  1242,  1249, 

1250. 
Saunders  v.  Southern  Pac.  Co. 

(13  Utah,  275,  44  Pac.  932), 

954,  1003,  1072,  1073,  1203. 
Sauter  v.  Railroad  Co.   (66  N.  Y. 

50,   23  Am.  Rep.  18),   1397. 
Savage   v.   Corn   Ex.   Ins.   Co.    (4 

Bosw.   1;    36  N.  Y.  635),  783. 
Savannah  Electric  Co.  v.  Bell  ( — 

Ga.   — ,    53    S.    E.    Rep.    109), 

1397. 
Savery  v.  Railroad    (2   Interstate 

Com.  Rep.  338),  1030. 
Savitz   V.   Railway    (150    111.   208, 

37    N.    E.    235,    aff'g.,    49    111. 

App.  315),   588. 
Sawyer    v,    Cleveland    Iron    Min. 

Co.   (69  Fed.  211,  16  C.  C.  A. 

191,   35  U.   S.  App.  427),   164. 
Sawyer  v.  Railroad  (37  Mo.  240), 

904. 
Sawyer  v.   Sauer    (10  Kan.   519), 

1378. 
Saxton   V.    Railway   Co.    (98    Mo. 

App.  494,  72  S.  W.  717),  991, 

1430. 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


cclxxi 


[BEFEBENCES    ABE 

Sayles  v.  Railroad   (81  Fed.  326; 

affirmed,    Railroad    v.    Sayles 

87  Fed.  444,  32  C.  C.  A.  485). 

415. 
Scaife  v.  Tarrant,  L.  R.  (10  Exch. 

358),  40. 
Scaife  v.  Tobin   (3  B.  &  A.  523), 

807. 
Scaling  v.  Car  Co.    (24  Mo.  App. 

29),  1130,  1131. 
Scammon  v.  Railroad  Co.  (41  Mo. 

App.   194),   576. 
Scammon   v.   Wells,  Fargo   &  Co. 

(84  Cal.  311),  1364. 
Scanlan  v.  Tenney  (72  Fed.  225), 

942. 
Schaacht     v.     Railroad     Co.     (94 

Tenn.    658,    30    S.   W.   742,   28 

L.  R.  A.   176),  330,   332. 
Schaefer  v.  Railway  Co.  (128  Mo. 

64,   30  S.  W.  331),   1182. 
Schaefer   v.   Railway   Co.    (51   N. 

Y.    Supp.    431,    29    App.    Div. 

261),  1198. 
Schaeffer  v.  Railroad  Co.  (168  Pa. 

St.  209,  31  Atl.  1088,  47  Am. 

St.  Rep.  884),  449,  1353,  1355. 
Schaller  v.  Railway  Co.   (97  Wis. 

31,  71   N.  W.   1042),   408,  409, 

450,   475,   1355. 
Scharff   v.    Meyer    (133    Mo.    428, 

34  S.  W.  858,  54  Am.  St.  Rep. 

672),    175. 
Scheffler  v.  Railroad  Co.    (105  U. 

S.   249),   1430. 
Scheffler  v.  Railway  Co.  (32  Minn. 

125),  1389. 
Scheffler  v.  Railway  Co.  (32  Minn. 

518),  1397. 
Scheiber  v.  Railway  Co.  (61  Minn. 

499,  63  N.  W.  1034),  1197. 
Scheu    V.    Benedict     (116    N.    Y. 

510),   688,  693. 
Schieffelln    v.    Insurance    Co.    (9 

Johns.  21),  801. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Schierhold    v.    Railroad    Co.    (40 

Cal.  447),  1230,  1420. 
Schiffler  v.  Railway  Co.   (96  Wis. 

141,  71  N.  W.  97,  65  Am.  St. 

Rep.  35),  1117,  1177. 
Schilling     v.     Railroad     Co.     (66 

Minn.    252,    68    N.    W.    1083), 

1217. 
Schimpf    V.     Harris     (185    Penn. 

St.   46,   39  Atl.   820),   960. 
Schleiger  v.  Terminal  Co.  (43  Or. 

4,  72  Pac.  Rep.  324),  1384. 
Schlesinger    v.    Railroad    Co.    (88 

111.  App.  273),  177,  676. 
Schlesinger    &,   Sons    v.    Railroad 

Co.   (85  N.  Y.  Supp.  372),  674. 
Schlessinger  v.   Railway   Co.    (98 

N.  Y.  Supp.  840),  937. 
Schlichting  v.   Railway   Co.    (121 

Iowa,    502,    96    N.    W.    959), 

177. 
Schloss  V.   Wood    (11   Colo.   287), 

47,  71. 
Schloterer  v.  Ferry  Co.   (78  N.  Y. 

Supp.  202,  75  App.  Div.  330), 

895,  1053. 
Schmidt  v.  Deegan   (69  Wis.  300, 

34  N.  W.  Rep.  83),  1392. 
Schmidt  v.  Keyser    (88  Fed.  799, 

32   C.  C.  A.  121),  854. 
Schmidt  v.  Railways  Co.  (116  La. 

— ,  40  So.  Rep.  714),  1100. 
Schmidt  v.  Railway  Co.   (25  Ky. 

Law  Rep.  11,  74  S.  W.  674), 

1065. 
Schmidt    v.     Railway     (23     Wis. 

186),  1227. 
Schmidt  v.  Railway  Co.   (90  Wis. 

504,   63   N.  W.  1057),   72,   112. 
Schneider     v.     Evans     (25     Wis. 

241),  867. 
School    District    v.    Dauchy     (25 

Conn.  350),  627. 
School   District   v.   Railroad    (102 

Mass.  552),  450. 


cclxxii 


TABLE  OF   CASES   CITED. 


[befebences  ari: 

Schooner      Emma      Johnson      (1 

Sprague,   527),   75. 
Schooner  Freeman  v.  Buckingham 

(18  How.  182),  IGO,  161. 
Schooner  Reeside   (2  Sumn.  567), 

75. 
Schooner     Volunteer     (1     Sumn- 

551),   75. 
Schoop  Fruit  Co.  v.  Railroad  Co 

(—    Mo.    App.    — ,    91    S.    W. 

Rep.  402),  668. 
Schopman   v.   Railroad    (9    Cush. 

24),    915,    916. 
Schotsmans  v.  Railway    (L.  R.   1 

Eq.    349;    L.    R.    2    Ch.    App 

332),   758,   771. 
Schreiner  v.  Railroad  Co.    (42  N. 

Y.    Supp.    163,    12    App.    Div. 

551),  1228. 
Schrier  v.  Railway  Co.    (65  Wis. 

457),  1397,  1401. 
Schriver     v.     Railroad     Co.      (24 

Minn.  506),  336,  1348. 

Schroeder    v.    Railroad    (5    Duer, 

55),  242,  246,  665,  667. 
Schroyer     v.     Lynch     (8     Watts, 

453),   94. 
Schubach  v.   McDonald    (179   Mo. 

163,  78   S.  W.   1020,   101  Am. 

St.  Rep.  452,  65  L.  R.  A.  136), 

1043,  1056. 
Schultze  V.  Railway  Co.    (32  Mo. 

App.   438),    1197. 
Schulze  V.  Railway  Co.   (19  Q.  B. 

Div.    30),    1366. 

Schulze- Berge  v.  The  Guildhall 
(58  Fed.  796;  afirvied.  The 
Guildhall,  64  Fed.  867,  12  C. 
C.  A.  445,  26  U.  S.  App.  414), 
381,    467. 

Schumaker  v.  Railroad  Co.  (46 
Minn.  39,  45  N.  W.  Rep.  559), 
1358. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Schumacher  v.  Railway  Co.   (207 

111.   199,    69    N.   E.  825,   aff'g., 

108    111.   App.    520),    702,    711, 

714,    858,    859,    862. 
Schureman  v.  Withers   (Anthon's 

N.  P.  166),  827. 
Schuster  v.  Carson  (28  Neb,  612), 

761,  768. 
Schwarz  v.   Judd    (2  Minn.  371), 

1389. 
Schwarzschild    v.    Steamship    Co. 

74  Fed.  257),  431,  623. 
Schwarzschild    &    Sulzberger    Co. 

V.  Railway  Co.    (76  Mo.  App. 

623),  678. 
Schwinger  v.  Raymond   (83  N.  Y. 

192),    603. 
Scofield  V.  Railroad  Co.  (112  Fed. 

855,  50  C.  C.  A.  553,  56  L.  R. 

A.   224),   1062,   1065. 
Scofield  V.  Railway  Co.    (43  Ohio 

St.  571),  521,  589. 
Scothorn  v.  Railway  Co.  (8  Exch. 

341),  229,   241,  660. 
Scott  V.  London  Dock  Co.  (3  H.  & 

C.   596),   940,   1412. 
Scott   V.    Railroad    Co.    (144    Ind. 

125,  43  N.  E.  133,  32  L.  R.  A. 

154),    1060,    1063. 
Scott    V.    Railroad    Co.     (77    Ga. 

450),  1380,  1389. 
Scott    V    Railroad    Co.    (53    Hun, 

414),   1102. 
Scott  V.  Shepherd  (2  W.  Bl.  892), 

1430. 
Scott  V.   Steamship   Co.    (19   Fed. 

Rep.    56),    489. 
Scott  V.  Steamship  Co.  (106  Mass. 

468),  1367,  1370. 
Scovill  V.  Griffith   (12  N.  Y.  509), 

651,   652,   1372. 
Scow    No.    190    and    450   Bales   of 

Cotton    (88   Fed.   320),   818. 
Scully   V.   Railroad   Co.    (80   Hun, 

197,  30  N.  Y.  Supp.  61),  1177. 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


cclxxiii 


[references  are 

Seagar  v.  Steamship  Co.  (55  Fed. 

324;    afflrmed,   55   Fed.   880,   5 

C.    C.   A.    290,    14   U.    S.    App. 

352),  839. 
Seaman   v.    Adler    (37   Fed.   Rep. 

268),  803. 
Searle  v.  Railway  Co.  (32  W.  Va. 

370),  895,  1397. 
Searle   v.    Scovell    (4   Johns.    Ch. 

218),  822,  823,  825. 
Searles  v.  Car  Co.   (45  Fed.  Rep. 

330),  1139. 
Searles  v.  Railway  Co.    (69  Miss. 

186,  13  So.  Rep.  815),  499. 
Sears  v,  Dennis   (105  Mass.  310), 

1223. 
Sears  v.  Railroad  (14  Allen,  433), 

1105. 
Sears    v.    Wills    (4    Allen,    212), 

869. 
Sears  v.  Wingate   (3  Allen,  103), 

158,   165. 
Seasongood   v.    Railroad    Co.    (14 

Ky.  Law  Rep.  430),  1291. 
Seasongood  v.  Transportation  Co. 

21  Ky.  Law  Rep.   1142,  54  S. 

W.  Rep.  193,  49  L.  R.  A.  270), 

147,    226. 
Seaver  v.  Bradley  (179  Mass.  329, 

60  N.  E.  795,  88  Am.  St.  Rep. 

384),    100. 
Seaver  v.  Railroad  Co.   (14  Gray, 

466),  1004. 
Seavey  Co.  v.  Union  Transit  Co. 

(106  Wis.  394,  82  N.  W.  285), 

294,  301,  611. 
Seawell   v.   Railroad   Co.    (132    N. 

Car.   856,   44   S.  E.  Rep.   610; 

rehearing    denied,    45    S.    E. 

Rep.   850),   989. 
Seawell  v.  Railroad  Co.   (119  Mo. 

222,  24  S.  W.  1002;   overruled 

by  Hanley  v.  Railway,  187  U. 

S.    617),    525. 
Secomb  v.  Nutt  (14  B.  Mon.  324), 

770. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Security  Trust  Co.  v.  Express  Co. 

80   N.   Y.   Supp.   830,   81  App. 

Div.     426;     affirmed    without 

opinion,  178  N.  Y.  620,  70  N. 

E.  1109),  451,  668. 
Seddon   v.    Bickley    (153    Pa.    St. 

271,  25  Atl.  1104),  942. 
Segal   V.   Railway  Co.    (Tex.   Civ. 

App.,  80  S.  W.  Rep.  233),  972, 

982. 
Segura  v.  Reed  (3  La.  Ann.  695), 

688,  690. 
Seigel    v.    Eisen     (41    Cal.    109), 

1226. 
Sejalon  v.  Woolverton    (64  N.  Y. 

Supp.  48,  31  Misc.  752),  1355. 
Selby    V.    Railroad    Co.     (113    N. 

Car.  588,  18  S.  E.  Rep.  88,  37 

Am.   St.   Rep.    635),   442,   509. 
Self  V.  Dunn   (42  Ga.  528),  66. 
Seligman   v.   Armijo    (1   N.   Mex. 

459),  316. 
Sellers  v.  Railway    (123   Ga.  386, 

51  S.  E.  Rep.   398),  177,  668, 

777. 
Sellick  v.  City  of  Janesville  (100 

Wis.  157,  75  N.  W.  975,  41  L. 

R.  A.  563),  1431. 
Selway  v.  Holloway  (1  Ld.  Raym. 

46),  105. 
Seney  v.  Railway  Co.    (125  Iowa, 

309,  88  N.  W.  Rep.  815),  1384, 

1386. 

Serenson  v.  Railroad  Co.  (45  Fed. 

Rep.    407),   1401. 
Serwe  v.  Railroad  Co.    (48  Minn. 

78,    50    N.     W.     1021),     1407, 

1429. 
Sessions  v.  Railroad  Co.  (78  Hun, 

541,     29     N.     Y.     Supp.     628), 

1132. 
Sevier  v.  Railroad  Co.    (61  Miss. 

8),   992,   1128. 
Sewall   V.   Allen    (6   Wend.   355), 

1233. 


ccLxxiv 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


[EEFEBENCES   ABE 

Sewall  V.  Wood   (135  Fed.  12,  67 

C.   C.  A.  580),  855. 
Sewell  V.  Webster  (59  N.  H.  586), 

1233. 
Seybolt   v.    Railroad    Co.    (95   N. 

Y.  562),  1017. 
Seymour   v.   Greenwood    (7   H.   & 

N.  355),  1084,  1095,  1441. 
Shaacht  v.  Railroad  Co.  (94  Tenn. 

658,   30   S.  W.   742,   28   L.   R. 

A.  176),  330,  332. 
Shaber  v.  Railway  Co.   (28  Minn. 

103),   1397. 
Shackleford  v.  Wilcox  (9  La.  33), 

169. 
Shaefer  v.   Railway   Co.    (98   Mo. 

App.  445,  72  S.  W.  154),  1094. 
Shamblin    v.    Railroad    (114    La. 

467,    38    So.   Rep.    421),    1217. 
Shand  v.  Grant   (15  Com.  B.    (N. 

S.)   324),  812. 
Shannon's  Adm'r.  v.  Railway  Co. 

(—    Va.    — ,    52    S.    E.    Rep. 

376),  1018. 
Sharer   v.    Paxon    (171    Penn.    St. 

26.    33    Atl.    Rep.    120),    1094, 

1183. 
Sharp  V.  Clark   (13  Utah,  510,  45 

Pac.  566),  613,  660,  661. 
Sharp  V.  Grey  (9  Bing.  457),  497, 

904,   905,   956. 
Shaw   V.   City   of   Charleston    ( — 

W.  Va.  — ,  50  S.  B.  Rep.  527), 

1384. 
Shaw  V.  Railroad  (101  U.  S.  557), 

175,  176,  189. 
Shaw  V.  Railroad    (5  Rich.  462), 

1360. 
Shaw  V.  Railway  (13  Q.  B.  347), 

1338. 
Shaw  V.  Railway  Co.    (123  Mich. 

629,  82  N.  W.  618,  49  L.  R.  A. 

308,    81    Am.    St.    Rep.    230), 
lOlL 
Shaw   V.  Railway   Co.    (40   Minn. 
144),  1278. 


TO   SECTIONS.] 

Shea    V.    Railroad    Co.     (44    Cal. 

414),  1423. 
Shea   V.   Railway   Co.    (63   Minn. 

228,  65  N.  W.  458),  430,  1354. 
Shea   V.   Railway   Co.    (66   Minn. 

102,  68  N.  W.  608),  130,  500. 
Shealey    v.    Railway    Co.    (67    S. 

Car.  61,  45   S.  E.   119),  1118. 
Shedd    V.    Moran     (10    111.    App. 

618),  1388. 
Shedd    V.    Railroad    (40   Vt.    88), 

1043. 
Sheets  v.  Wilgus   (56  Barb.  662), 

811. 
Sheffer  v.  Railroad  Co.  (105  U.  S. 

249,  26  L.  Ed.  1070),  300. 
Shefeer  v.    Railway   Co.    (22    Ky. 

Law  Rep.  1305,  60  S.  W.  403), 

1111. 
Shelby    v.    Railway   Co.    (77   Mo. 

App.    205),    625,    1366. 
Sheldon    v.    Robinson    (7    N.    H. 

157),  68,  795. 
Shellaberger  v.  Fisher    ( —  C.  C. 

A.  — ,  143  Fed.  937),  10»,  102. 
Shellenberg   v.   Railroad   Co.    (45 

Neb.    487,    63    N.    W.    859,    50 

Am.    St.   Rep.   561),   749,   751, 

753. 
Shelton    v.    Mer.    D.    T.    Co.    (59 

N.  Y.  258),  173,  457,  611. 
Shelton  v.  Railway  Co.    (29  Ohio 

St.   214),   1039,   1045,   1065. 
Shelton  v.  Transportation  Co.  (36 

N.  Y.  S.  C.  527;  59  N.  Y.  258), 

113,    416. 
Shelton's  Adm'r.  v.   Railroad   Co. 

(19    Ky.    Law    Rep.    215,    39 

S.  W.  Rep.  842),  1215. 
Shenk  v.  Propeller  Co.   (60  Penn. 

St.  109),  688,  702. 
Shepard  v.  De  Bernales  (13  East, 

565),   810. 
Shepherd     v.     Naylor     (5     Gray, 

591).  165. 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 
[references  are  to  sections.] 


cclxxv 


Sheridan  v.  New  Quay  Co.   (4  C. 

B.  618),   749,  751,  753. 
Sheridan   v.   Penn.   Collieries   Co. 

(128   Fed.   204),  855. 
Sheridan  v.  Railroad  Co.    (36  N. 

Y.  39),  992,  1163,  1430. 
Sherley  v.  Billings  (8  Bush,  147), 

1096,    1441. 
Sherlock  v.  Ailing   (44  Ind.  184), 

895. 
Sherlock  v.  Railway  Co.   (85  Mo. 

App.  46),  1250. 
Sherman  v.  Johnson    (58  Vt.  40, 

2  Atl.  Rep.   707),  1384. 
Sherman   v.   Railroad    (64   N.   Y. 

255),  139,  695. 
Sherman     v.     Railway     Co.     (40 

Iowa,  45),  1053. 

Sherman  v.  Rugee  (55  Wis.  346), 

763. 
Sherman  v.   Stage  Co.    (24   Iowa, 

515),   1386,   1417. 
Sherman  v.  Wells  (28  Barb.  403), 

1360. 
Sherwood     v.    Railway    Co.     (82 

Mich.   374),   1187. 
Sherwood    v.    Railway    Co.     (86 

Hun,    556,    33    N.    Y.    Supp. 

771),  1355. 

Shiells   V.   Blackburne    (1   H.   BI. 

158),  7. 
Shillibeer   v.    Glyn    (3    M.    &   W. 

143),  34. 
Ship    Nath'l    Hooper     (3     Sumn. 

542),  818. 
Shipper  v.  Railroad  Co.  (47  Penn. 

St.  338),  521. 
Shipping  Co.  v.  Armitage   (L.  R. 

9  Q.   B.   99),   800,  803. 
Shipton  V.  Thornton    (9  A.  &  E. 

314),  660,  824. 
Shoemaker     v.     Kingsbury       (12 

Wall.  369),  896,   963. 
Short  V.  Simpson   (L.  R.  1  C.  P. 

248),   197. 


Shriver  v.  Railroad  Co.  (24  Minn. 

507),  450,  1354. 
Shutt  V.  Railroad  Co.  (149  Pa.  St. 

'266,   24   Atl.   305),    1219. 
Sickles  V.   Railway  Co.    (13   Tex. 
Civ.  App.  434,  35  S.  W.  Rep. 
493),   1192. 
Sieber  v.  Railway  Co.    (76  Minn. 
269,  79  N.  W.  Rep.  95),  1397. 
Siebrecht  v.   Railroad    (48   N.   Y. 
Supp.    3,   21   Misc.   615,   aff'g., 
46  N.  Y.  Supp.  1100,  20  Misc. 
730),  477. 
Siegrist    v.    Arnot    (86    Mo.    200, 

56  Am,  Rep.  424),  96. 
Silsbury  v.  McCoon    (6  Hill,  425; 

4  Denio,  332),  827. 
Silsbury  v.  M<;Coon  (3  N.  Y.  379), 

827. 
Silver  v.  Frazier   (3  Allen,  382), 

1430. 
Silver   v.   Hale    (2   St,   Louis   Ct. 

App.   557),   654. 
Silverman  v.  Railway  Co.  (51  La. 
Ann.  1785,  26  So.  447),  1362, 
1365. 
Simis  V.  Railroad  Co.    (20  N.  Y. 
Supp.      639,     1     Misc.     179), 
1052. 
Simkins    v.    Steamboat    Co.     (11 

Cush.  102),  168,  613. 
Simmons  v.  Railroad  Co.  (41  Or. 
151,  69  Pac.  440;  rehearing 
denied,  69  Pac,  1022),  899, 
964,  997,  1004,  1019,  1022, 
1073,    1110. 

Simmons  v.  Railway  Co.  (120  Ga. 

225,  47  S.  E.  Rep.  570),  1179, 

1180. 
Simmons  v.  St.  Bt.  Co.   (97  Mass. 

361),  1155. 
Simon  v.  Miller  (7  La.  Ann.  360), 

1246. 
Simon  v.  The  Fung  Shuey  (21  La. 

Ann.    363),    401. 


celxxvi 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


[REFERENCES    ARE 

Simons   v.    Railway    (2    Com.    B. 

(N.  S.)   620),  1338. 
Simons  v.   Railway    (18   Com.  B. 

805),  397. 
Simpson     v.     Dufour     (126     Ind. 

322),   754. 
Simpson  v.  Railroad  Co.  (16  Misc. 

613,    38    N.    Y.     Supp.     341), 

1249,  1363. 
Simpson  v.  Railway   (L,  R.  1  Q. 

B.  Div.  274),  1367. 
Sims  V.  Bond    (5  B.  &  Ad.  389), 

1306. 
Siner  v.  Railway   (L.  R.  3  Exch. 

150),  1177,  1187. 
Siner  v.  Railway   (L.  R.  4  Exch. 

117),  937,   1122. 
Singleton   v.     Felton     (101     Fed. 

526,  42  C.  C.  A.  57),  990. 
Singleton    v.    Hilliard    (1    Strob, 

203),   489. 
Singleton  v.  Railway  (7  C.  B.  (N. 

S.)    287),  1229. 
Singleton  v.  Railroad  Co.  (70  Ga. 

464),  918. 
Sinnott     v.     Railroad     Co.     (104 

Tenn.    233,    56    S.    W.    836), 

1054. 
Sinsheimer    v.   Railroad    Co.    (46 

N.  Y.  Supp.  887,  21  Misc.  45), 

668. 
Siordet  v.  Hall  (4  Bing.  607),  274. 
Sira  V.  Railway  Co.  (115  Mo.  127, 

21  S.  W.  905,  37  Am.  St.  Rep. 

386),  1060,  1083. 

Sisson     V.     Railroad     (14     Mich. 

489),  1366. 
1600  Tons  of  Nitrate   of  Soda  v. 

McLeod    (61    Fed.   849,    10   C. 

C.  A.  115,  15  U.  S.  App.  369), 
841. 

Skilling  V.  Ballman  (73  Mo.  663), 

175. 
Skinner  v.  Hall  (60  Me.  477),  231, 

261. 


TO   SECTIONS.] 

Skinner  v.  Railroad  Co.   (39  Fed. 

Rep.   188),   900. 
Skinner  v.  Railroad  Co.   (1  Cush. 

475),  1384. 
Skinner    v.    Railroad    (12     Iowa, 

191),  776. 
Skinner  v.  Railroad   Co.    (128   N. 

Car.    435,    39    S.   E.   Rep.  65), 

927. 
Skinner     v.     Railway     (5     Exch. 

787),  1017,  1414. 
Skinner  v.  Upshaw  (2  Ld.  Raym. 

752),  864. 
Skoglund     V.     Railway     Co.     (45 

Minn.  330),  1379. 
Skottowe  V.  Railway  Co.   (22  Or. 

430,  30  Pac.  222,  16  L.  R.  A. 

593),   937,   1397. 
Slater  v.  Railroad  Co.   (194  U.  S. 

120,    24    Sup.    Ct.    R.    581,    48 

L.  Ed.  900),  1388. 
Slater  v.   Railway   Co.    (29   S.   C. 

96),  271,  283,  287,  1354. 
Ex.  p.  Slay  ton    (105  U.  S.   453), 

344. 
Sleade    v.    Payne    (14    La.    Ann. 

453),  696. 
Sleat  V.  Fagg   (5  B.  &  Aid.  342), 

392,  480,  611,  619. 
Sleeper  v.  Railroad  Co.  (100  Penn. 

St.  259),  1056. 
Sleeper    v.    Sandown    (52    N.    H. 

244),  1231. 
Slim    V.    Railway     (14     Com.    B. 

647),  1335. 
Sloan  V.  Railroad    (1  Hun,  540), 

1379. 
Sloan    V.    Railway     Co.     (58    Mo. 

220),   497. 
Sloan  V.  Railway  Co.  (126  N.  Car. 

487,  36  S.  E.  Rep.  21),  733. 
Sloane  v.  Railway  Co.    (Ill  Cal. 

668,  44   Pac.  320,  32  L.  R.  A. 

193),   1039,  1432,   1433. 
Sloman   v.   The   Railroad    (67   N. 

Y.  208),  1250. 


TABLE   OF    CASES   CITED. 


cclxxvii 


[BEFEBENCES   ABE  TO   SECTIONS.] 


Sloop    V.    Railroad    Co.    (93    Mo. 

App.  605,  67  S.  W.  956),  1366. 

Sloop   V.    Railroad    ( —   Mo.    App. 

— ,  84   S.  W.  Rep.   Ill),  475, 

652. 

Sloss  V.  Sheffield,  etc.  Co.  (—  Ala. 

— ,  40  So.  Rep.  211),  1397. 
Slosson  V.  Railroad  Co.  (51  Iowa, 

294),  1418. 
Smalley   v.   Railway   Co.    (9   Det. 
L.   N.   443,   131  Mich.   560,  91 
N.   W.   1027),    1118. 
Smedley  v.  Railway  Co.   (184  Pa. 
St.  620,  39  Atl.  544),  895,  948, 
1423. 
Smiley  v.   Railway  Co.    (160  Mo. 

629,  61  S.  W.  667),  1423. 
Smith  V.  Bedouin  Steam  Nav.  Co. 
(App.   Cas.    (1896)    70,   65   L. 
J.  P.  C.  8),  159. 
Smith  V.  Booth  (122  Fed.  626,  58 
C.  C.  A.   479,  aff'g.,  110  Fed. 
680),  344,  464. 
Smith    V.    Dearlove    (6    Com.    B. 

132),  882. 
Smith  V.  Dinsmore  (9  Daly,  188), 

442. 
Smith   V.   Cable   Co.     (174    Mass. 
576,  55  N.  E.  Rep.  380,  75  Am. 
St.  Rep.  374,  47  L.  R.  A.  323), 
1427. 
Smith  V.  Chamberlain  (38  S.  Car. 
529,  17  S.  E.  Rep.  371,  19  L. 
R.  A.  710),  943. 
Smith   V.    Cissel    (22   App.   D.    C. 

318),  1397,  1398. 

Smith  V.  Day    (100  Fed.   244,   40 

C.  C.  A.  366,  49  L.  R.  A.  108, 

reversing   86   Fed.   62),   1208. 

Smith  V.  Electric  Co.    (188  Mass. 

371,  74  N.  E.  Rep.  664),  1389. 

Smith   V.    Empire,    etc.    Co.    (127 

Fed.  462),  1388. 
Smith   V.   Express   Co.    (104   Ala. 
387,  16  So.  62),  728. 


Smith  V.  Express  Co.   (108  Mich. 

572,   66  N.  W.  479),  231,  401, 

408,  433. 
Smith  V.  Findley   (34  Kan.  316), 

804. 
Smith  V.   Harrison    (67  Fed.  354, 

14  C.  C.  A.  656,  28  U.  S.  App. 

383,  aft'g.,   50  Fed.  565),  839. 
Smith  V.  Holcomb  (99  Mass.  552), 

1422. 
Smith  V.  Home    (8  Taunt,   144), 

390,  392. 
Smith  V.  Lee   (66  Fed.  344,  13  C. 

C.  A.  506,  21  U.  S.  App.  650), 

698,  848. 
Smith  V.  Martin  (6  Binney,  262), 

791. 
Smith  V.  Middleton  (112  Ky.  588, 

66    S.    W.    388,    100    Am.    St. 

Rep.  308),  1397. 
Smith  V.  North  German  Lloyd  S. 

S.  Co.   (142  Fed.  1032),  1069. 
Smith    V.    Overby    (30    Ga.    241), 

1422. 
Smith   V.    Packet   Co.    (86    N.   Y. 

408),   1163,   1428. 
Smith  V.  Pekin   (Gilp.  203),  .469. 
Smith  V.  Pierce  (1  La.  350),  92. 
Smith    V.    Pullman's    Palace    Car 

Co.     (5    Rev.    de    Jur.    423), 

1130. 
Smith  V.  R.  &  Banking  Co.    (113 

Ga.  9,  38  S.  E.  330),  964. 
Smith  V.  Railroad   (75  Ala.  449), 

1386. 
Smith  V.  Railroad  Co.   (12  Allen, 

531),  336,  339,  341,  1362. 
Smith  V.  Railroad  (43  Barb.  225), 

1348. 
Smith   V.    Railroad    Co.    ( —   Ind. 

App.  — ,  73  N.  E.  Rep.  928), 

1397. 
Smith  V.  Railroad   Co.    (124   Ind. 

395,   24   N.  E.   753),   964. 
Smith  V.  Railroad  Co.    (55   Iowa, 

33),   1220. 


cclxxviii 


TABLE  OP   CASES   CITED. 


[BEFEBENCES   ABE 

Smith  V.  Railroad  Co.    (1  Inter- 
state   Com.    Rep.    208),    1030. 
Smith  V.  Railroad  Co.  (95  Ky.  11, 

23  S.  W.  Rep.  652,  22  L.  R.  A. 

72),  990. 
Smith  V.  Railroad  Co.   (64  N.  C. 

235),   450,   1354. 
Smith  V.  Railroad  Co.    (99  N.  C. 

241),  1217. 
Smith  V.  Railroad  Co.   (35  N.  H. 

366),   1417. 
Smith  V.  Railroad  (44  N.  H.  325), 

1249. 
Smith  V.  Railroad  Co.   (46  N,  J. 

L.  1),  1233. 
Smith  V.  Railroad  Co.    (34  N.   S. 

R.  22,  1  Can.  Ry.  Cases,  231; 

reversed,   Railroad   v.    Smith, 

31   S.   C.   R.   367,   1  Can.  Ry. 

Cases,  255),  926. 
Smith  V.  Railroad  (19  N.  Y.  127; 

6  Duer,  225),  952. 
Smith  V.  Railroad  (24  N.  Y.  222), 

454. 
Smith  V.  Railroad  Co.  (87  Md.  48, 

38  Atl.  1072),  1443,  1446. 
Smith  V.  Railroad   (37  Mo.  287), 

1417. 
Smith  V.  Railroad  Co.  (100  Mich. 

148,  58  N.  W.  651,  43  Am.  St. 

Rep.   440),   641. 
Smith   V.    Railroad   Co.    (149   Pa. 

St.  249,  24  Atl.  304),  945. 
Smith  V.  Railroad  Co.  (6  S.  Dak. 

583,  62  N.  W.  Rep.  967,  28  L. 

R.  A.  573),  1400. 
Smith    V.    Railway    Co.    (88    Ala. 

538,    16    Am.    St.    Rep.    63,    7 

So.  119,  7  L.  R.  A.  323),  1123. 
Smith   V.    Railway    Co.    (91   Ala. 

455,  8  So.  754,  24  Am.  St.  Rep. 

929,    11    L.   R.    A.    619),    282, 

311. 
Smith    V.    Roberts    (67    Fed.    361, 

14  C.  C.  A.  417,  28  U.  S.  App. 

389),  839. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Smith  V.  Railway  (L.  R.  2  C.  P. 
4),  940. 

Smith  V.  Railway  Co.  (114  Mich. 
460,  72  N.  W.  328;  reversed 
in  Railway  Co.  v.  Smith,  173 
U.  S.  684,  43  L.  Ed.  858,  19 
Sup.  Ct.  565),  574,  575,  596. 

Smith  V.  Railway  Co.    (32  Minn. 

I,  18   N.   W.   827),   1413. 
Smith  V.  Railway  Co.    (92  Minn. 

II,  99   N.  W.  Rep.  47),   1334. 
Smith    V.    Railway    Co.    (74    Mo. 

App.  48),  161. 
Smith  V.  Railway   (112  Mo.  App. 

610,  87  S.  W.  Rep.  9),  450. 
Smith  V.  Railway  Co.  ( —  N.  Dak. 

— ,  107  N.  W.  Rep.  56),  537. 
Smith   V.    Railway    (23    Ohio    St. 

10),  1422,  1433. 
Smith  V.  Railway  Co.   (92  Penn. 

St.   450),   1229. 
Smith  V.  Railway  Co.   (6  S.  Dak. 

583,  62  N.  W.  Rep.  967,  28  L. 

R.  A.  573),  1397. 
Smith   V.   Railway   Co.    (49   Wis. 

443),  1342. 
Smith  V.  Railway  Co.   (48  W.  Va. 

69,  35  S.  E.  Rep.  834),  1094. 
Smith  V.  Robinson  Bros.  Lumber 

Co.   (34  N.  Y.  Supp.  518),  457. 
Smith  V.  Rosario  Nitrate  Co.    (1 

Q.    B.    (1894)    174,    (1893)    2 

Q.  B.  323),  841. 
Smith    V.    Seward    (3    Penn.    St. 

342),  66,  1327,  1328. 
Smith    V.    Smith    (2    Pick.    621), 

333. 
Smith  V.  State  (100  Tenn.  494,  46 

S.   W.   566,  41  L.  R.  A.   432), 

972. 
Smith  V.  Steamship  Co.  (123  Fed. 

176),  689,  G99. 
Smith  V.  Steamship  Co.  (142  Fed. 

1032),  1299. 


TABLE   OF    CASES   CITED. 


cclxxix 


[befehences  are 

Smith  V.   Transportation  Co.    (20 

Wash.  580,  56  Pac.  372,  44  L. 

R.  A.  557),  1169. 
Smith  V.  Whitman   (13  Mo.  352), 

613. 
Smith    V.    Wilson    (31    How.    Pr. 

272),  1162. 
Smitha  v.  Railroad  Co.  (86  Tenn. 

198),  339. 
Smitson  v.   Railway  Co.    (37   Or. 

74,   60   Pac.   907),   1118,   1122, 

1427. 
Smotherman  v.   Railway  Co.    (29 

Mo.  App.   265),   1197. 
Smurthwaite  v.  Wilkins  (11  Com. 

B.    (N.   S.)    842),   197. 
Smyrl  v.  Nolan  (2  Bail.  421),  270, 

486. 
Smyth   V.    Ames    (169   U.   S.   466, 

18    Sup.     Ct.   R.     418,     aff'g., 

Ames    V.    Railway,    64    Fed. 

165;   modified,  171  U.  S.  361, 

18    Sup.    Ct.    888,    43    L.    Ed. 

197),  574,  577,   581,  583. 
Smyth  V.  Wright   (15  Barb.   51), 

816,  820. 
Snead  v.  Watkins  (1  Com.  B.  (N. 

S.)    267),  882. 
Snell  V.  Smith  (78  Ga.  355),  1389. 
Snellbaker    v.    Railroad    Co.     (94 

Ky.  597,  23  S.  W.  Rep.  509), 

1033. 
Snelling  v.   Ferry  Co.    (13   N.  Y. 

Suppl.  398),  923. 
Snelling  v.  Yetter  (49  N.  Y.  Supp. 

917,  25  App.  Div.  590),  72. 
Snider    v.    Express    Co.    (63    Mo. 

376),   401,   408,   425,   450. 
Snow    V.     Carruth     (1     Sprague, 

324),  120,  799. 
Snow  V.  Railroad  Co.   (136  Mass. 

552),  1011. 
Snow  V.  Railroad  Co.    (185  Mass. 

321,  70  N.  E.  205),  1430. 
Snow   V.   Railway   Co.    (109    Ind. 

422),  130,  167,  168. 


TO   SECTIONS.] 

Snowden    v.    Railroad    Co.    (151 
Mass.   220),   1192. 

Snowdon  v.  Davis  (1  Taunt.  359), 

805. 
Snyder  v.  Depot  Co.   (19  O.  C.  C. 

368),  944. 
Snyder   v.   Railroad   Co.    (85   Mo. 

App.  495),  1427. 
Soblomsten,   The    (L.   R.   1   Adm. 

293),  824. 
Solan   V.   Railway   Co.    (95   Iowa, 

260,  63  N.  W.  692,  58  Am.  St. 

Rep.    430,   28   L.   R.   A.    718), 

1003,   1072,   1073. 
Solomon  v.  Railway  Co.    (103   N. 

Y.  437),  1174,  1177. 
Solomon    v.     Steamboat    Co.     (2 

Daly,  104),  690. 
Solomons  v.  Dawes   (1  Esp.   83), 

753. 
Sonia  Cotton  Oil  Co.  v.  The  Red 

River  (106  La.  42,  30  So.  303, 

87    Am.    St.    Rep.    293),    167, 

177,  194. 
Sonier  v.  Railroad  Co.  (141  Mass. 

10),  1174. 
Sonn   V.    Smith    (68    N.   Y.    Supp. 

217,  57  App.  Div.  372),  674. 
Soper  V.  Railroad  Co.   (113  Mich. 

443,   71  N.  W.  853),  443,  444. 
Sorensen    v.    Balaban    (42    N.    Y. 

Supp.  654,  11  App.  Div.  164), 

1384. 
Sorensen  v.  Keyser  (52  Fed.  163, 

2   C.   C.  A.   650,   2   U.   S.  App. 

297,    reversing    48    Fed.    117; 

s.   c.   51   Fed.   30,    2   C.   C.   A. 

92),  837,  841. 
Sorrell   v.    Railroad    Co.    (75    Ga. 

509),  1341. 

Soule  V.  Railroad  (24  Conn.  575), 

1376. 
Southard    v.    Railway    (60    Minn. 

382,   62  N.  W.   442,  619),   141, 

475,  1354. 


cclxxx 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


[BEFEBENCES   ABE 

Southcote  V.  Stanley   (1  Hurl.  & 

N.  247),  1015. 
Southcote's    Case     (4    Coke,    84), 

40,    390. 
Southerland-Innes  Co.   v.   Thynas 

128  Fed.  42,  64  C.  C.  A.  116), 

488. 
Southern  Bell  Tel.  Co.  v.  Cassin 

111  Ga.  575,  36  S.  E.  Rep.  881, 

50  L.  R.  A.  694),  1391. 
Southern    Ex.    Co.   v.    Crook    (44 

Ala.  468),  80,  450. 
Southern  Ex.  Co.  v.  Hess  (53  Ala. 

19),  236. 
Southern  Ex.  Co.  v.  McVeigh   (20 

Gratt.   264),  83. 
Southern    Ex.    Co.    v.    Moon    (39 

Miss.    822),   401,   450. 
Southern   Ex.    Co.    v.    Newby    (36 

Ga.  635),  80,  111. 
Southern  Ex.  Co.  v.  Shea  (38  Ga. 

519),    226,    230,    236.    ■ 
Southern  Ex.  Co.  v.  Womack   (1 

Heisk.  256),  80,  304,  317,  319. 
Southern  Pac.  Co.  v.  Bailey  (Tex. 

Civ.  App.,  91  S.  W.  Rep.  820), 

1433. 
Southern  Pacific  Co.  v.  Board  of 

Railroad    Commissioners    (78 

Fed.  236;    s.   c.  95  Fed.   572), 

574,  578,  582,  583. 
Southern  Pacific  Co.  v.  Cavin  ( — 

C.    C.    A.    — ,    144    Fed.    348, 

affirming    Cavin    v.    Southern 

Pacific    Co.,    136     Fed.     592), 

1412. 
Southern  Pac.  Co.  v.  Duncan   (16 

Ky.  Law  Rep.  119),  462. 
Southern  Pacific  Co.  v.  Hamilton 

(54  Fed.   468,  4   C.  C.  A.  441, 

7  U.  S.  App.  626),  1100. 
Southern    Pac.    Co.    v.    Interstate 

Commerce    Commission     (200 

U.  S.  536,  reversing  132  Fed. 

829   and   137   Fed.   606),   565. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Southern   Pacific   Co.   v.   Maloney 

136   Fed.   171),   1422. 
Southern  Pacific  Co.  v.  Patterson 

(7   Tex.   Civ.  App.   451,   27   S. 

W.  Rep.   194),   1023,   1085. 
Southern  Pacific  Co.  v.   Schuyler 

135    Fed.    1015,    68    C.    C.    A. 

409),  1017. 
Southern  Queen  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Mor- 
ris  (105  Tenn.  654,  58  S.  W. 

Rep.  651),  1401. 
Soviero  v.  Express  Co.    (94  N.  Y. 

Supp.   375),   231. 
Soyer  v.  Great  Falls,  etc.  Co.   (15 

Mont.    1,    37    Pac.   Rep.    838), 

1397. 
Spade  V.  Railroad  Co.  (168  Mass. 

285,  47  N.  E.  Rep.  88,  60  Am. 

St.  Rep.  393,  38  L.  R.  A.  512), 

1427. 
Spade  V.  Railroad  Co.   (172  Mass. 

488,  52  N.  E.  747,  43  L.  R.  A. 

832),   1432. 
Spafford    v.     Railroad     Co.      (128 

Mass.   326),   1030. 
Spalding  v.  Railroad  Co.  (101  Mo. 

App.  225,  73  S.  W.  Rep.  274), 

642,   1372. 
Spangler  v.  Railway  Co.  (68  Kan. 

46,   74   Pac.   607,   63   L.  R.  A. 

634,   104,  Am.    St.   Rep.   391), 

980,  988. 
Spann  v.  Transportation  Co.    (33 

N.    Y.    Supp.     566,     11     Misc. 

680),   65,   273,    654,   658,   1366. 
Spannagle  v.  Railroad  Co.   (31  111. 

App.  460),  1006. 
Sparks  v.   Citizens  Coach  Co.    (6 

N.  J.  Law  J.  365),  1195. 
Sparks   v.   Railroad   Co.    (31  Mo. 

App.  Ill),  1394. 
Spaulding    v.    Railroad    Co.     (98 

Iowa,  205,  67  N.  W.  Rep.  227), 

1397. 
Spears  v.  Railroad  Co.    (11  S.  C. 

158).   702. 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


cclxxxi 


[references  are 

Spees  V.  Boggs   (198  Pa.  St.  112, 

47  Atl.  875,  82  Am.   St.  Rep. 

792),  102. 
Spellman  v.  Transit  Co.  (36  Neb. 

890,  55  N.  W.  270,  38  Am.  St. 

Rep.    753,    20   L.   R.   A.   316), 

78,  1414. 
Spence   v.    Chadwick    (10    Q.     B. 

517),   625. 
Spence  v.  Mitchell    (9  Ala.  744), 

780. 
Spence   v.   Railroad    Co.    (92   Va. 

102,  22  S.  E.  Rep.   815,  29  L. 

R.  A.  578).  1309,  1324. 
Spencer  v.  Daggett  (2  Vt.  92),  75. 
Spencer  v.  Lovejoy    (96  Ga.   657, 

23  S.  E.  Rep.  836,  51  Am.  St. 

Rep.  152),  1049. 
Spencer  v.  Railroad  Co.  (17  Wis. 

487),  1174,  1211. 
Spencer  v.  Railway  Co.  (105  Wis. 

311,  81  N.  W.  407),  1412. 
Spencer     v.     White      (1     Iredell 

(Law),  236),  809. 
Spero  V.  Railroad  Co.   (47  N.  Y. 

Supp.    1093,    21     Misc.     683), 

942. 
Spicer  v.  Railroad  Co.  (149  Mass. 

207),   1126. 
Spiegel  V.   Steamship   Co.    (56   N. 

Y.    Supp.   171,   26  Misc.  414), 

743. 
Spiess  V.  Railroad  Co.    (71  N.  J. 

L.  90,  58  Atl.  116),  1052. 
Spindler  v.  Hilliard  (2  Rich.  286), 

281. 
Spinetti    v.    Steamship     Co,     (14 

Hun,    100),    469. 
Spinetti  v.  Steamship  Co.   (80  N. 

Y.  71),  469. 
Spink   V.    Railroad    Co.    (21    Ky. 

Law  Rep.  778,  52  S.  W.  Rep. 

1067),  1061,   1065. 
Spofford     V.    Railroad     Co.     (128 

Mass.  326),  521,  1023. 


TO   SECTIONS.] 

Spohn    V.    Railway    Co.    (87    Mo. 

77),  981. 
Spohn   V.   Railway   Co.    (101   Mo. 

417),  981. 
Sprague    v.    Railroad    (52    N.    Y. 

637),   708. 
Sprague  v.  Railway  Co.   (92  Fed. 

59,  34  C.  C.  A.  207),  899,  1174. 

1217. 
Sprague  v.  Railway  Co.   (34  Kan. 

347),   442. 
Sprague   v.    Smith    (29    Vt.   421), 

77,   238,   916,   1049. 
Sprague     v.     West     (Abb.     Adm. 

548),  807. 
Sprigg's   Adm'r.   v.   Railroad    ( — 

Vt.    — ,    60    Atl.    143),    1003, 

1072,  1073. 
Spring  V.  Haskell  (4  Allen,  112), 

1360,  1370. 
Springer  v.  Byram   (137  Ind.  15, 

36  N.  E.  361,  23  L.  R.  A.  244, 

45  Am.  St.  Rep.   159),   100. 
Springer    v.    Ford    (189    111.    430, 

59  N.  E.  953,  52  L.  R.  A.  930, 

82    Am.    St.    Rep.    464,    aff'g., 

88  111.  App.  529),  100,   102. 
Springer  v.  Schultz  (205  111.  144, 

58   N.   E.   753,    aft'g.,    105    111. 

App.   544),    100,    102. 
Springer  v.  Westcott    (166  N.  Y. 

117,    59    N.    E.    693,    aff'g.,    46 

N.  Y.  Supp.  589,  19  App.  Div. 

366;  s.  c.  37  N.  Y.  Supp.  909, 

2  App.  Div.  295;  s.  c.  33  N.  Y. 

Supp.  805,  87  Hun,  190;  s.  c. 

29   N.  Y.   Supp.   149,  78  Hun, 

365),  1294,  1298. 
Springer    Transp.    Co.    v.    Smith 

(16  Lea,  498),  1096. 

Springs    v.    Railroad    Co.    (46    S. 

C.    104,    24    S.   E.    Rep.    166), 

203. 
Sproat  V.   Donnell    (26  Me.   185), 

169,  603. 


cclxxxii 


TABLE   OP   CASES   CITED. 


[befeeences  are 

Sproul  V.  Hemmingway  (14  Pick. 

1),  92. 
Sproule  V.  Railway  Co.  (Tex.  Civ. 

App.,    91    S.    W.    Rep.    657), 

1017. 
Sprowl  V.   Kellar    (4   Stew.   &   P. 

382),  75. 
Spry  V.  Railway  Co.  (73  Mo.  App. 

203),   1431. 
Squire  v.  Railroad  (98  Mass.  240), 

108,    139,    339,    408,    426,    430, 

438,  457. 
St.  Louis  Drayage  Co.  v.  Railroad 

Co.    (65   Fed.   39),   519. 
St.  Mary's  Creamery  Co.  v.  Rail- 
way (8  Out.  L.  R.  1,  3  Cana- 
dian Ry.  Cases,  447,  aff'g.,  5 

Ont.    L.   R.    742,    2    Canadian 

Ry.  Cases,  122),  784. 
Staal  V.  Railroad   Co.    (57  Mich. 

239),  1401. 
Stadhecker    v.    Combs     (9    Rich. 

Law  (1st  ser.)   193),  80. 
Stager  v.  Railway  Co.   (119  Penn. 

St.  70),  1414. 
Stahl  V.  Railroad   Co.    (71   N.   H. 

57,   51   Atl.    176),   1372. 
Stahler  v.  Railroad  Co.    (199  Pa. 

St.   383,    49    Atl.    273,   85   Am. 

St.  Rep.  791),   1397,  1423. 
Staines  v.  Railroad  Co.  ( —  N.  J. 

— ,    61    Atl.    Rep.    385),    1177, 

1221,   1432. 

Stalcup  V.  Railway  Co.    (16  Ind. 

App.  584,   45  N.  E.  802),  964. 
Standard   Milling   Co.   v.   Transit 

Co.    (122    Mo.    258,    26    S.   W. 

Rep.  704),  651,  702. 
Standish  v.  S.  S.  Co.   (Ill  Mass. 

512),  1036,   1303. 
Stanley  v.  Steele   (77  Conn.  688, 

60  Atl.  Rep.  640,  69  L.  R.  A. 

561),   96. 
Stannard   v.    Prince     (64    N.    Y. 

300),   72. 


TO   SECTIONS.] 

Stanton  v.  Austin  (L.  R.  7  C.  P. 

651),   848. 
Stanton  v.  Eager  (16  Pick.  467), 

194. 
Stanton    v.    Railroad     (14    Allen, 

485),  1263. 
Stapleton    v.    Railway    Co.     (133 

Mich.  187,  10  Det.  L.  N.  133, 

94  N.  W.  Rep.  739),  119,  685, 

713. 
Starnes  v.  Railroad  Co.  (91  Tenn. 

516,   19   S.  W.   675),   426,  429. 
Starper  Bros.  v.  Railroad  Co.   (37 

Conn.   272),   1354. 
Starr   v.   Railway   Co.    (67   Minn. 

18,  69  N.  W.  632),  1018,  1073. 
State    V.    Bangor    (30    Me.    341), 

1389. 
State   V.    Campbell    (32    N.   J.   L. 

307),   1085. 
State    V.     Campbell     (3    Vroom, 

309),    1079. 
State    V.    Chovin    (7    Iowa,    204), 

1033. 
State  ex  rel  v.  Cumberland  Tele- 
phone   &    Telegraph    Co.    (52 

La.    Ann.    1850,    28    So.    284), 

512. 
State   V.    Express   Co.    (81   Minn. 

87,  83  N.  W.  465),  577. 
State  V.  Goold  (53  Me.  279),  1033. 
State    ex    rel    v.    Hicks    (44    La. 

Ann.    770,    11    So.    Rep.    74). 

972. 
State  V.  Hungerford  (39  Minn.  6), 

1033. 
State   V.   Johnson    (61   Kan.   803, 

60  Pac.  1068,  49  L.  R.  A.  662), 

574. 
State  V.  Kinney   (34  Minn.   311), 

1084,  1433. 
State    V.    Liquors    (83    Me.    158), 

779. 
State    V.    Missouri    Pac.    Ry.    Co. 

(71  Mo.  App.  385),  1249. 


TABLE   OF    CASES   CITED. 


cclxxxiii 


[BEFEBENCES   ABE 

State  V.  Overton   (24  N.  J.  435), 

972,  1041. 
State  V.  Probate  Court  (51  Minn. 

241,    53    N.     W.     Rep.     463), 

1397. 
State  V.  Railroad  Co.  ( —  Pla.  — , 

40  So.  Rep.  875),  575. 
State    V.    Railroad    Co.    (27    Fla. 

403,  9  So.  Rep.  89),  574. 
State    V.    Railroad    Co.     (60    Me. 

490),  1386. 
State  V.  Railroad  Co.  (81  Me.  84), 

1192. 
State  V.   Railroad   Co.    (76  Minn. 

469,  79  N.  W.  510),  929. 
State   V.   Railroad   Co.    (80  Minn. 

191,  83  N.  W.  60),  574,  583. 
State    V.    Railroad    Co.     (76    Me. 

357),   1391,   1418. 
State    V.    Railroad    (24    Md.    84), 

1397,  1398. 
State  V.  Railroad  Co.  (45  Md.  41), 

1387. 
State    V.    Railroad    Co.     (58    Md. 

482),  1417. 
State    V.    Railroad    Co.    (63    Md. 

433),  1004. 
State  V.  Railroad  Co.  (75  Md.  152, 

23   Atl.  Rep.   310,   32  Am.  St. 

Rep.  372),  1391. 
State   V.    Railroad    Co.    (22    Neb. 

313),   574. 
State  V.  Railroad   (—  Neb.  — ,  99 

N.  W.  Rep.  309),  495,  496. 
State  V.  Railroad  (—  Neb.  — ,  101 

N.  W.  Rep.  23),  495,  512. 
State    V.    Railroad    Co.    (31    Tex. 

Civ.  App.  219,  71  S.  W.  Rep. 

994),   525. 
State  V.  Railway  Co.  (84  Md.  163, 

34   Atl.   1130),   1077. 
State    V.    Railway    Co.     (58     Me. 

176),  1012,  1116. 
State    V.    Railway    Co.     (61    Me. 

114),  1386. 


TO   SECTIONS.] 

State  V.  Railway  Co.  (47  Ohio  St. 

130),  521. 
State  V.  Reed    (76   Miss.   211,   24 

So.  308,  43  L.  R.  A.  134),  945. 
State   V.   Ross    (2   Butcher,   224), 

1084. 
State  V.   Seaboard  Air-Line  Rail- 
way (—  Fla.  — ,  37  So.  314), 

577,  583. 
State  V.  Southern  Kan.  Ry.  Co.  of 

Texas    (Tex.   Civ.  App.   49   S. 

W.  252),  576. 
State    V.    Southern    Railway    Co. 

122  N.  C.   1063,   30   S.  E.  133, 

41  L.  R.  A.  246),  591. 
State  V.   Telephone  Co.    (17   Neb. 

126),    95. 
State  V.  Telephone  Co.  (114  Tenn. 

194,  86  S.  W.  390),  95. 
State    V.    Thompson     (20     I^.     H. 

250),  1038,  1079. 
State  V.  Union  Depot  Co.  (71  Ohio 

St.  379,  73  N.  E.  633,  68  L.  R. 

A.    792),   944. 
State   Nat.   Bank  v.   Railway   Co. 

72   Mo.   App.   82),   234. 
Staub  V.  Kendrick  (121  Ind.  226), 

1246. 
St.  Clair  v.  Railroad  Co.   (77  Mis. 

789,  28  So.  957),  1049. 
Steamboat    Angelina    Corning    (1 

Ben.  109),  92. 
Steamboat     Co.     v.     Atkins     (22 

Penn.  St.  522),  779. 
Steamboat  Co.  v.  Bason    (1  Har- 
per,  262),  289,  482. 
Steamboat    Co.    v.    Brockett    (121 

U.   S.   637),   1084,   1433. 
Steamboat     Co.     v.     Brown     (54 

Penn.  St.  77),  226,  242. 
Steamboat     Co.     v.     East     Coast 

Transp.    Co.     (28    Fla.    387), 

946. 
Steamboat  Co.   v.   Knapp    (73  111. 

506),  687,  695. 


cclxxxiv 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


[BEFEBENCES   ABE 

Steamboat  Co.  v.  Merchants',  etc. 

Bank  (—  Md.  — ,  63  Atl.  Rep. 

113),   182. 
Steamboat  Co.  v.  People's  Steam- 
boat Co.   (141  Fed.  454),  946. 
Steamboat    Co.    v.    Railroad    (24 

Conn.   40),   1441. 
Steamboat    Co.    v.    Walker     (120 

Fed.  97.  56  C.  C.  A.  49),  1414. 
Steamboat  Crystal  Palace  v.  Van- 

derpool     (16    B.    Mon.    302), 

1269. 
Steamboat  Farmer  v.  McCraw  (26 

Ala.   189),   780,   1306. 
Steamboat  Lynx  v.  King  (12  Mo. 

272),    647. 
Steamboat    New    World    v.    King 

(16   How.  469),   11,  895. 
Steamboat    Sultana    v.    Chapman 

(5  Wis.  454),  698. 
Steamboat  Virginia  v.   Kraft   (25 

Mo.   76),   866,   867. 
Steamer     New     Philadelphia     (1 

Black,  62),  92. 
Steamer    Webb    (14    Wall.    406), 

92. 
Steamship     America     (8     Bened. 

491),   1357. 
Steamship      Co.      v.      Borthwick 

(App.    Cas.    (1905)     93,    aff'g 

Borthwick   v.    Steamship    Co. 

(1904)   1  K.  B.  319),  357. 
Steamship  Co.  v.  Bryan  (83  Penn. 

St.    446),    1268. 
Steamship  Co.  v.  Bullen   (111  111. 

App.  426),  113. 
Steamship    v.    Burrows    (36    Fla. 

121,    18    So.    Rep.    349),    449, 

483,   1353. 
Steamship     Co.     v.     Castle     Mail 

Packets     Co.,     Ltd.     (L.     R. 

1898)  App.  Cas.  486,  67  L.  J. 

Q.  B.  795,  aft'g  66  L.  J.  Q.  B. 

819,   (1897)   2  Q.  B.  485),  835. 
Steamship  Co.  v.  Colombian  Land 

Co.  (102  Fed.  358,  42  C.  C.  A. 

398),  810,  865,  866. 


TO   SECTIONS.] 

Steamship  Co.  v.  Dempsey  (1  Q. 

B.    (1892)    854,  61  L.  J.  Q.  B. 

620,  reversing  1  Q.  B.   (1892) 

54,   61   L.  J.  Q.  B.  263),  839, 

844. 
Steamship    Co.    v.    Drysdale    (32 

S.  C.  R.  379),  442. 
Steamship     Co.     v.     Guggenheim 

(123   Fed.   330),   840. 
Steamship   Co.   v.    Hill   Mfg.   Co. 

(109   U.   S.   587),   344. 
Steamship    Co.    v.    Insurance    Co. 

(129  U.   S.  397),  452. 
Steamship  Co.   v.   Kane    (88  Fed. 

197,   31   C.   C.   A.   452),  919. 
Steamship  Co.  v.  Kelley  (115  Fed. 

678,  53  C.  C.  A.  310),  158,  160. 
Steamship  Co.  v.  Kelley  (126  Fed. 

610,  61  C.  C.  A.  532,  reversing 

Kelley  v.   Steamship  Co.,  120 

Fed.  536),  158. 
Steamship  Co.  v.  Keyser  (84  Fed. 

693;  aff'd,  on  opinion  of  court 

below,  87  Fed.  1005,  31  C.  C. 

A.    347,    59    U.    S.   App.    211), 

841. 
Steamship  Co.  v.  Lamport  &  Holt 

(1  Q.  B.   (1897)   570,  66  L.  J. 

Q.  B.  382),  838. 
Steamship  Co.  v.  Leask  (18  Sess. 

Cas.    (4th)    280),   842. 
Steamship  Co.  v.  Mackay  (1  K.  B. 

(1903)     297,    72    L.    J.    K.    B. 

147),  164. 
Steamship  Co.  v.  119,254  Bushels 

of   Flaxseed    (117   Fed.   283), 

384,  880. 
Steamship  Co.  v.  Paige   (108  Ga. 

296,   33   S.   E.   Rep.   969),   286, 

509. 
Steamship  Co.   v.   Pilkington    (28 

S.    C.    R.    (Can.)     146),    451, 

464,  602. 
Steamship  Co.  v.  Seago  (101  Fed. 

999,    42    C.    C.    A.    128),    163, 

449,  1353. 


TABLE  OP   CASES   CITED. 


cclxxxv 


[BEFEBENCES   ABE   TO   SECTIONS.] 


Steamship   Co.    v.    Sharpe   &   Co. 

(24   Q.   B.   Div.    (1890)    158), 

853. 
Steamship  Co.  v.  Smart   (107  Pa. 

St.  492),  702,  714. 
Steamship    Co.    v.    2000    Tons    of 

Coal    (124   Fed.   937;    affirvted 

in  Niver  Coal  Co.  v.   Steam- 
ship Co.,  —  C.  C.  A.  — ,  142 

Fed.  402),  833,   841. 
Steamship    Co.    v.    Way    (90    Ga. 

751),  344. 
Steamship  Line  v.   Steiger  &  Co. 

(136  Fed.  772;  s.  c.  132  Fed. 

160),   488. 
Steamshipping  Cp.  v.  Hagar  (124 

Fed.  460),  837,  857. 
Stearns  v.   Railroad   Co.    (46   Me. 

95),  918. 
Stedman    v.    Transportation     Co. 

(48  Barb.  97),  401. 
Steel  V.  Kurtz  (28  Ohio  St.  191), 

1397,    1398. 
Steel   V.    Steamship    Co.    (3    App. 

Cas.  72),  373. 
Steele  v.   McTyer    (31   Ala.   667), 

55. 
Steele  v.  Railway  Co.   (55  S.  Car. 

389,    33    S.    E.    Rep.    509,    74 

Am.  St.  Rep.  756),  899,  1217. 
Steele  v.  Townsend  (37  Ala.  247), 

233,   408,  449,  450,  1354. 
Steelman  v.  Taylor  (3  Ware,  52), 

800,  802. 
Steenerson    v.    Railway    Co.     (60 

Minn.    461,    62    N.    W.    826), 

575. 

Steenerson    v.    Railway    Co.     (69 

Minn.  353,  72  N.  W.  713),  575, 

577,  583,  586. 
Steers  v.  Steamship  Co.  (57  N. 

Y.  1),  408,  451,  1028,  1297, 

1354,  1355. 
Steffen  v.   Railway   Co.    (156  Mo. 

322,  56  S.  W.  1125),  1370. 


SteidI  V.  Railroad    ( —  Minn.  — , 

102  N.  W.  Rep.  701),  170,  660. 
Steinman   v.   Angier   Line    (1   Q. 

B.    (1891)    619,  60  L.  J.  Q.  B. 

425),   468. 
Steinman  v.  Wilkins   (7  Watts  & 

S.  466),  51. 
Steinweg   v.    Railway    (43    N.   Y. 

123),  463,  477,  503,  505,  952. 
Steinwender      v.      The      Mexican 

Prince  (82  Fed.  484;  affirmed 

on   opinion   of    court    below, 

The  Mexican   Prince  91  Fed. 

1003,   34    C.    C.   A.    168),   374, 

382. 
Stembridge    v.    Railway    Co,    (65 

S.    Car.    440,    43    S.    E.    968), 

1414. 

Stephan  v.  Railway  Co.   (106  111. 

App.   13),    1396. 
Stephen    v.    Smith    (29   Vt.    160), 

1033,  1036. 

Stephenson  v.  Hart  (4  Bing.  476), 

681,    1319. 
Stephenson    v.    Railroad    Co.     (2 

Duer,  341),  1222. 
Stern  v.  La  Compagnie  Generale 

Transatlantique      (110      Fed. 

996),  1396. 

Stern  v.   Railroad   Co.    (76  Mich. 

591),  1412. 
Sternfels  v.  Railroad  Co.   (174  N. 

Y.   512,   66  N.  E.  Rep.   1117), 

1397,  1401. 
Sternfels  v.  Railroad   Co.    (77  N. 

Y.    Supp.    309,    73    App.    Div. 

494),    1398. 
Stevenot     v.     Railway     Co.      (61 

Minn.   104,   63   N.  W.   256,   28 

L.   R.   A.   600),   747. 
Stevens    v.    Navigation    Co.     (39 

Fed.  Rep.  562),  492. 
Stevens  v.  Railroad  (8  Gray,  262), 


cclxxxvi 


TABLE   OF    CASES   CITED. 


[BEFEBENCES   ABE 

Stevenson  v.  Pullman  Palace  Car 

Co.  (Tex.  Civ.  App.,  26  S.  W. 

Rep.  112;  s.  c.  32  S.  W.  Rep. 

335),  1131. 
Stevenson   v.   West   Seattle   Land 

&  Imp.  Co.   (22  Wash.  84,  60 

Pac.   51),    1427. 
Stewart   v.   Comer    (100   Ga.   754, 

28  S.  E.  Rep.  461,  62  Am.  St. 

Rep.   353),   615. 
Stewart  v.  Despatch  Co.  (47  Iowa, 

229),   84,   450. 
Stewart  v.  Machias  Port  (48  Me. 

477),  1230. 
Stewart  v.  Railroad  Co.    (83  Ala. 

493),   1389. 
Stewart  v.  Railroad  Co.  (103  Ind. 

14),   1384,   1394. 
Stewart     v.     Railroad     Co.     (146 

Mass.  605),  1192. 
Stewart   v.    Railroad    Co,    (1   Mc- 

Crary,  312),  233. 
Stewart  v.  Railroad  Co.   (38  N.  J. 

L.   505),   521. 
Stewart  v.  Railroad  Co.  (90  N.  Y. 

288),    1098. 
Stewart  v.  Railroad  Co.  (168  U.  S. 

445,  18  Sup.  Ct.  R.  105,  42  L. 

Ed.  537).   1390. 
Stewart  v.  Railroad  Co.   (53  Tex. 

289),   936. 
Stewart  v.   Railway    (3   H.   &   C. 

135),  408,  1241. 
Stewart  v.  Railway  Co.    (21   Ind. 

App.   218,   52   N.   E.   89),   173, 

408,   475,   1331. 
Stewart  v.  Transportation  Co.  (47 

Iowa,   229),   620. 
Stickney  v.  Allen  (10  Gray,  352), 

1363. 

Stiles   V.    Davis    (1    Black,    101), 
739,  740. 

Stiles   V.    Railroad    Co.     (65     Ga. 
370),    991. 


TO   SECTIONS.] 

Sfillson  V.  Railway  Co.    (67  Mo. 

674),    1229. 
Stilwell  V.  Staples  (19  N.  Y.  401), 

783. 
Stimson    v.    Jackson    (58    N.    H. 

138),   677,   719. 
Stimson    v.    Railroad     (98    Mass. 

83),    238,    1249,    1276,    1302. 
Stimson  v.  Railway  Co.   (75  Wis. 

381,  44  N,  W.  Rep.  748),  920. 
St.  John  V.  Railway  Co.  (Tex.  Civ. 

App.,    80    S.    W.    Rep.    235), 

895,   1111,   1417. 
Stock  V.  Wood    (136   Mass.   353), 

1418. 
Stockton    V.    Prey    (4    Gill,    406), 

895,  904,  1423. 
Stockwell    V.    Railroad    Co.     (131 

Fed.  153),  1388. 
Stoddard    v.    Railroad    Co.      (181 

Mass.  422,  63  N.  E.  927),  916. 
Stoddard    v.    Railroad     (5    Sand. 

180),  401. 
Stoeckman   v.    Railroad    Co.     (15 

Mo.  App.  503),  1388,  1390. 
Stokes    v.    Railroad    Co.    (107    N. 

Car.  178),  933. 
Stokes  V.  Railway  Co.   (2  F.  &  F. 

691),   910. 
Stokes     V.     Saltonstall     (13     Pet. 

181),   892,   894,   895,   958,   959, 

1223,   1414. 
Stollenwerck     v.     Thatcher     (115 

Mass.   224),  175,  186. 
Stone    V.    Hays    (3    Denio,     575), 

1318. 
Stone  V.  Knowlton  (3  Wend.  374), 

1335. 
Stone    V.     Railroad     (Iowa),     (5 

Cent.  Law  Jour.  477;  10  C.  L. 

N.  78),  1079. 
Stone   V.   Railroad   Co.    (62   Miss. 

607),  574. 
Stone  V.  Railroad  Co.   (115  N.  Y. 

104),  1228. 


TABLE   OF    CASES   CITED. 


celxxxvii 


[BEFEBENCES    ABE 

Stone   V.   Railway   Co.    (47   Iowa, 

82),  1041,  10S5. 
Stone   V.   Railway   Co.    (66   Mich. 

77),   1187. 
Stone    V.    Railway    Co.    (88    Wis. 

98,  59  N.  W.  457),  990. 
Stone  V.  Railway  Co.    (8   S.  Dak. 

1,  65  N.  W.  29),  177. 
Stone  V.  Rice  (58  Ala.  95),  696. 
Stone  V.  Swift  (4  Pick.  389),  175. 
Stone  V.  Trust  Co.  (116  U.  S.  307), 

574,   1023. 
Stoneman    v.   Railway    (52    N.   Y. 

429),  1249,  1250. 
Stoner  v.  Railway  Co.   (109  Iowa, 

551,   80   N.  W.  569),   172,   625, 

630. 
Stoody  V.  Railway  Co.   (124  Mich. 

420,  83  N.  W.  Rep.   26),  899, 

1414. 
Storer  v.  Gowen  (18  Me.  174),  32. 
Storr    V.    Crowley    (McClel.    &    Y. 

129),  665,  729. 
Storrie  v.  Elevator  Co.  (134  Mich. 

297,  96  N.  W.  Rep.  569),  1386. 
Story  V.  Railroad  Co.  (133  N.  Car. 

59,   45   S.  E.   349),  963,  969. 
Stowe     V.     Railroad     (113     Mass. 

521),  702. 
St.  Paul  Trust  Co.  v.  Sargent  (44 

Minn.  449,  47  N.  W.  Rep.  51), 

1396. 
Straiton    v.    Railroad     (2    E.    D. 

Smith,  184),  261. 
Strand  v.  Railway  Co.   (64  Mich. 

216),  1223. 
Strand  v.  Railway  Co.    (67  Mich. 

380),   994,   1230. 
Strange   v.  Railway   Co.    (61   Mo. 

App.   586),   1126,   1427. 
Stranger,    The    (1    Brown    Adm. 

281),  92. 
Straus   V.    Railroad    Co.    (75   Mo. 

185),  1118. 
Straus    V.    The    Martha    (35    Fed. 

Rep.  313),  661. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Strauss  v.  Railroad  Co.  (87  N.  Y. 
Supp.  67,  91  App.  Div.  583), 
1388. 

Streeter  v.  Horlock  (1  Bing.  34), 
611. 

Streets  v.  Railroad  Co.   (78  N.  Y. 

Supp.  729,  76  App.  Div.  480; 

affirmed  without  opinion,  178 

N.    Y.    553,    70    N.    E.    1109), 

1000. 
Strieker    v.    Leathers     (68    Miss. 

803,    9    So.    821,    13    L.    R.    A. 

600),  698. 
Strieker  v.  Railroad  Co.   (60  N.  J. 

L.    230,    37    Atl.     776),    1065, 

1107. 
Strickland    v.    Barrett    (20    Pick. 

415),  148. 
Stringer  v.  Railway  Co.    (96  Mo. 

299),  1000,   1218. 
Strohn  v.  Railroad  (23  Wis.  126), 

267,  462. 
Strong    V.    Adams    (30    Vt.    221), 

780. 
Strong  V.  Hart    (6  B.  &  C.  160), 

810. 
Strong  V.  Railroad  Co.   (86  N.  Y. 

Supp.  911,  91  App.  Div.  442), 

1298,   1348. 
Strother  v.  Railroad  Co.    (123   N. 

Car.  197,  31  S.  E.  386),  1101. 
Strough  V.  Railroad  Co.  (87  N.  Y. 

Supp.   30,  92  App.  Div.   584), 

495,  521,  804. 
Strouss  V.   Railway  Co.    (17   Fed. 

Rep.   209),  271,  1249,  1250. 
Strutt  V.  Railroad  Co.    (45   N.   Y. 

Supp.  728,  18  App.  Div.  134), 

942. 
Stubbs    V.    Lund    (7    Mass.    453), 

771. 
Stuebing   v.    Marshall    (10    Daly, 

406),    1392. 
Stump   V.    Hutchinson    (11   Penn. 

St.  533),  1338. 


cclxxxviii 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITEL. 


[references  are 

Sturdlvant  v.   Railway  Co.    (Tex. 

Civ.  App.,  27  S.  W.  Rep.  170), 

911.  1216. 
Sturgeon  v.  Railway  Co.   (65  Mo. 

569),  419. 
Sturgess  v.  Bissell  (46  N.  Y.  462), 

1360. 
Sturgis    V.    Frost    (56    Ga.    188), 

1423. 
Sturgis  V.  Railway  Co.   (72  Mich. 

619),  937. 
Stutmuller  v.  Cloughly   (58  Iowa, 

738),  1397. 
Suber  v.  Railway  Co.   (96  Ga.  42 

23    S.    E.    Rep.    387),    1179. 
Sullivan  v.  Canal  Co.  (72  Vt.  353, 

47  Atl.  1048),  937,  1174,  1191. 
Sullivan    v.    Railroad    Co.     (148 

Mass.  119),  978. 
Sullivan  v.  Railroad  Co.   (82  Me. 

196),  1233. 
Sullivan  v.  Railroad  Co.   (12  Ore. 

392),    1441. 
Sullivan    v.    Railroad    (30    Penn. 

St.  234),  895. 
Sullivan  v.   Thompson    (99  Mass. 

259),  716,  718. 
Summers  v.  Railroad  Co.  ( —  Mo. 

App.  — ,   79   S.  W.  Rep.  481), 

444,  475. 
Sumner  v.  Caswell   (20  Fed.  Rep. 

249),  55,  497. 
Sunbolf   V.    Alford    (3    M.   &    W. 

248),   882. 
Susong  v.  Railroad  Co.    (115  Ga. 

361,  41  S.  E.  566),  1348. 
Sutherland  v.  Bank  (78  Ky,  250), 

193,  748. 
Sutherland  v.  Railway  Co.    (Tex. 

Civ.  App.,  40  S.  W.  Rep.  193), 

999. 
Sutherland  v.  Sutherland   (69  111. 

481),  1444. 
Sutro  V.  Fargo   (41  N.  Y.  Super. 

231),  1355. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Sutton  v.  Railroad  Co.    (45  Fed. 

507),   850. 
Sutton  v.  Railway  Co.  (14  S.  Dak. 

Ill,   84   N.   W.   396),   241. 
Sutton    V.    Wauwatosa     (29    Wis. 

21),    1233. 
Swain   v.    Shepherd    (1   Moody   & 

R.  223),  1318. 
Swan  V.  Railroad  Co.    (132  Mass. 

116),  1085,  1111,  1032,  1033. 
Swan  V.  Railroad  Co.   (106  Tenn. 

229,  61  S.  W.  57),  859,  860. 
Swanson  v.  Oakes  (93  Minn.  404, 

101    N.    W.    Rep.    949),    1395, 

1397,  1401. 
Swarthout   v.    Steamboat   Co.    (48 

N.    Y.    209;     46    Barb.    222), 

1422. 
Swedish,    etc..    Bank    v.    Railway 

(—  Minn.  — ,  105  N.  W.  Rep. 

69),  161. 
Sweeney    v.    Railroad    (10    Allen, 

368),  1015. 
Sweeney  v.  Waterhouse  &  Co.  (39 

Wash.     507,     81     Pac.     Rep. 

1005),  1315. 
Sweet  V.  Barney   (23  N.  Y.  335), 

177,  664,  724,  1215. 
Sweetland    v.    Railroad    Co.    (117 

Mich.  329,  75  N.  W.   1066,  43 

L.   R.   A.   568),   1386. 
Swetland    v.    Railroad    Co.     (102 

Mass.  276),  309,  334. 
Swift  v.  Mosely  (10  Vt.  208),  785. 
Swift    V.    Railroad    Co.    (58    Fed. 

858),    527. 
Swift  V.  Steamship  Co.  (106  N.  Y. 

206),    172,   242,   258,   264,   417. 
Swift  &  Co.  V.  Furness,  Withy  & 

Co.    (87  Fed.   345),  613,  1362. 
Swift  &  Co.  V.  Johnson   (—  C.  C 

A.    — ,    138    Fed.    867),    1384, 

1389,   1397. 
Swift  River   Co.   v.   Railroad   Co. 

(169  Mass.  326,  47  N.  E.  1015, 

61   Am.    St.    Rep.    288),    1369. 


TABLE  OF   CASES   CITED. 


cclxxxix 


[eefekences  aee 

Swigert  v.  Railroad  Co.    (75  Mo. 

475),   1174,  1181. 
Swindler  v.  Hilliard   (2  Rich.   (S. 

C.)     286),    75,    401,    408,    450, 

489,   1354. 
Sword  V.  Young   (89  Tenn.   126), 

669. 
Sykes   v.    Lawlor    (49    Cal.    236), 

1378. 
Sykora  v.  Case,  etc.,  Co.  (59  Minn. 

130,    60    N.    W.    Rep.    1008), 

1397. 
Symonds  v.  Pain  (6  H.  &  N.  709), 

92. 
Symonds     v.     Railway     Co.     (87 

Minn.    408,    92    N.     W.     409), 

1217. 
Szymanski     v.      Blumenthal      (3 

Penne.  558,  52  Atl.  Rep.  374), 

1395. 


Taber  v.  Railroad  Co.    (71  N.  Y. 

492),    1187. 
Taffe  V.  Railroad  Co.   (41  Or.  64, 

67    Pac.    1015,    58    L.    R,    A. 

187).  231. 
Tagart,  Beaton  &  Co.  v.  Fisher  & 

Sons   (1  K.  B.   (1903)    391,  72 

L.   J.   K.  B.  202),  868. 
Taillon  v.   Mears    (29   Mont.   161, 

74    Pac.    421),    892,    895,    960, 

1418. 
Talbot   V.   Merchants'   Trans.    Co. 

(41  Iowa,  247),  212,  213,  218. 
Talbot   V.    Railway    Co.    (72    Mo. 

App.   291),   1187. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Talcott    V.    Railroad    (159    N.    Y. 

461,   54   N.  E.  1,  reversing  in 

part,  affirming  in  part  35   N. 

Y.    Supp.    574,    89    Hun,    492; 

s.   c.    66    Hun,    456,    21    N.    Y. 

Supp.   318),   1049,   1050,   1250, 

1251,  1276. 
Talcott  V.  Railroad  Co.   (80  N.  Y. 

Supp.     149,     39     Misc.     443), 

1050. 
Tallahassee     Falls     Mfg.     Co.     v. 

Railway    Co.    (117    Ala.    520, 

23    So.   139,   67   Am.    St.   Rep. 

179),  167,  1328. 
Tallahassee     Falls     Mfg.     Co.     v. 

Railway    Co.     (128    Ala.    167, 

29   So.  Rep.  203),   704,  712. 
Talley  v.  Railway   (L.  R.  6  C.  P. 

44),   1244,   1260. 
Tamvaco  v.  Simpson  (19  Com.  B. 

(N.    S.)    453;    L.   R.    1    C.   P. 

363),  875,  879. 
Tanas  v.  Gas  Co.   (84  N.  Y.  Supp. 

1053),    1395. 
Tangier,  The   (32  Fed.  Rep.  230), 

800. 
Tapley  v.  Martens   (8  T.  R.  451), 

810. 
Tarbell  v.  Railroad  (34  Cal.  616), 

963,  1019. 
Tarbell    v.    Railroad    Co.    (73    Vt. 

347,    51    Atl.    Rep.   6,    87    Am. 

St.   Rep.    734),    1392. 
Tarbell   v.    Shipping   Co.    (110   N. 

Y.   170),   714. 
Tate    V.    Hyslop    (15    Q.    B.    Div. 

368),  433. 
Tate  V.  Meek  (8  Taunt.  280),  879. 
Tate  V.  Railroad  Co.  (26  Ky.  Law 

Rep.  309,  81  S.  W.  Rep.  256), 

989,  1099. 
Tate    V.    Railroad    Co.    (78    Miss. 

842,    29    So.    392,    84   Am.    St. 

Rep.    649),   125. 
Tattan    v.    Railway    (2   El.   &   El. 

844),  1325. 


ccxe 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


[BEFEBENCES    ABE 

Tattersall  v.  Steam  Co.   (12  Q.  B.    | 

Div.  297),  492. 
Taylor  v.  Coal  Co.  (94  N.  C.  525), 

13S9. 
Taylor  v.  Day  (16  Vt.  566),  949. 
Taylor    v.    Ironworks    (124    Fed. 

826),   807. 
Taylor  v.  Monroe   (43  Conn.  42), 

1397. 
Taylor    v.    Pennsylvania    Co.    (50 

Fed.  755),  929. 
Taylor  v.  Penn.  Co.  (78  Ky.  348), 

1390. 
Taylor  v.  Railroad  Co.    (39  Ark. 

148),   472. 
Taylor  v.  Railroad  Co.   (99  N.  C. 

185),  1054. 
Taylor  v.  The  Railroad    (8  N.  J. 

Law  149),  401. 
Taylor  v.  Railroad  (—  Mo.  — ,  38 

S.  W.  Rep.  304),  922. 
Taylor  v.  Railroad  Co.   (71  N.  Y. 

Supp.  884,  63  App.  Div.  586), 

1179. 
Taylor   v.    Railroad    Co.    (87    Me. 

299,    32    Atl.    905)-,    139,    231, 

237. 
Taylor  v.  Railway  (48  N.  H.  304), 

952. 
Taylor  v.  Railway  Co.   (4  Ont.  L. 

R.  357,  2  Canadian  Ry.  Cases 

99),   1054. 

Taylor  v.  Railway   (L.  R.  1  C.  P. 

385),    653,    654. 
Taylor   v.   Railway   Co.    (1   Q.   B. 

(1901)     774,    70    L.    J.    Q.    B. 

499),  769. 
Taylor  v.  Steam  Co.    (L.  R.  9  Q. 

B.  546),  464,  468. 
Taylor   v.    Wells    (3    Watts,    65), 

731. 
Taylor   v.    Wells    (2    Saund.    74), 

73. 
Teal  v.  Sears  (9  Barb.  317),  1344. 
Teasdale     v.     Insurance     Co.     (2 

Brev.  190),  815. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Tebbs    V.    Railway    Co.    (20    Ind. 

App.  192,  50  N,  E.  486),  735. 
Tecumseh   Mills   v.    Railroad    Co. 

(104  Ky.   572,   57   S.  W.  Rep. 

9,  22  Ky.  L.  R.  264,  49  L.  R. 

A.    557).    214,    219. 
Telephone  Co.   v.   Bradbury    (106 

Ind.  1),  95. 
Telephone    Co.    v.    Telegraph    Co. 

(66  Md.  399),  95. 
Telegraph  Co.  v.  Carew  (15  Mich. 

525),    95. 
Telegraph    Co.    v.    Griswold     (37 

Ohio  St.  301),  95. 
Telegraph    Co.    v.    Mumford     (87 

Tenn.    190,    10    Am.    St.    Rep. 

630),   95. 
Telegraph    Co.    v.    Reynolds     (77 

Va.  173),  95. 
Telegraph  Co.  v.  Texas  (105  U.  S. 

460),    95. 
Telfer  v.  Railroad   Co.    (30  N.  J. 

L.  188),  1230,  1378,  1397,  1398. 
In    re    10,082    Oak   Ties    (87    Fed. 

935),   839,   855. 
Terry  v.   Jewett    (78   N.   Y.   338), 

1219. 
Tewes  v.  Steamship  Co.  (85  N.  Y. 

Supp.  994,  89  App.  Div.  148), 

306,   1275. 
Texas,  etc.,  Lime  Co.  v.  Lee  (Tex. 

Civ.  App.,  82  S.  W.  Rep.  306; 

s.    c.    82    S.    W.    Rep.    1025), 

1397. 
Tharsis  Sulphur  &  Copper  Co.  v. 

Morel    Bros.   &    Co.    (2   Q.   B. 

(1891)  647,  61  L.  J.  Q.  B.  11), 

850. 
Thayer  v.  Railroad    (22  Ind.  26), 

895. 
The  Abazzia   (127  Fed.  495),  376, 

379,   380. 
The    Aberfoyle    (1    Blatch.    360), 

1157,  1424. 
The  Adella  S.  Hills  (47  Fed.  76), 

177. 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


CCXCl 


[befebences  are 

The  Aggi   (107  Fed.  300,  46  C.  C. 

A.    276,    aff'g.,    93    Fed.    484), 

363,    365,    372,    464. 
The  Ainwick  (135  Fed.  884),  688. 
The  Albany    (44   Fed.   Rep.   431), 

794. 
The  Alvah   (77  Fed.  315,  23  C.  C. 

A.    181,    reversing    Morris    v. 

The  Alvah,  59  Fed.  630),  635. 
The  Alvena    (79    Fed.   974,    25    C. 

C.  A.  261,  aff'g.,  74  Fed.  252), 

380,   385. 
The    Amiable    Nancy    (3    Wheat. 

546),  1438. 
The  Anchoria  (83  Fed.  847,  27  C. 

C.  A.   650,  51  U.  S.  App.  608, 

aff'g.,    Mulvana    v.    The    An- 
choria, 77  Fed.  994),  957. 
The    Angelina     Cornig     (1     Ben. 

109),   93. 
The  Anna  (47  Fed.  526),  344. 
The   Annie   Faxon    (75   Fed.   312, 

21  C.  C.  A.  366,  44  U.  S.  App. 

591),   344. 
The  Arctic  Bird    (109   Fed.  167), 

172,   366,    370,    442,    483,    1360. 
The  Asiatic  Prince  (108  Fed.  287, 

47  C.  C.  A.  325,  aff'g.,  Herbst 

V.    The    Asiatic    Prince,    103 

Fed.    676    and   97   Fed.    343), 

700. 
The  Aspasia  (79  Fed.  91;  affirmed 

on  opinion  of  court  below,  80 

Fed.  1003),  356. 
The  Asphodel   (53  Fed.  835),  161, 

165. 
The  Assyria    (98  Fed.  316,  39  C. 

C.  A.  97),  855. 
The    Australian    S.    N.    Co.    ads. 

Morse    (L.    R.    4    P.    C.    Cas. 

222),   792. 
The   Bark   Cheshire    (2    Sprague, 

28),   606. 
The      Bark      Col.      Ledyard      (1 

Sprague,    530),    606. 
The    Bark    Edwin     (1     Sprague, 

477),    281. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

The  Barnstable   (181  U.   S.   468), 

344. 
The    Barracouta     (39    Fed.    Rep. 

288),   489. 
The   Beaconsfleld    (158  U.   S.  303, 

15  Sup.  Ct.  R.  860,  39  L.  Ed. 

993),  779. 
The  Beche  Dene   (55  Fed.  525,  5 

C.    C.    A.    207,    2    U.    S.    App. 

582),   449.   1353. 
The    Bella     (91    Fed.    540),    864, 

1005. 
The    Ben    Adams    (2    Ben.    445), 

674,  691. 
The  Benefactor    (103  U.   S.   243), 

344. 
The    Bergenseren    (36    Fed.    Rep. 

700),  485,  492. 
The    Berkshire     (59    Fed.    1007), 

387. 
The  Bermuda  (27  Fed.  Rep.  476), 

425. 
The  Bermuda   (29  Fed.  399),  344. 
The  Bernina    (12   Prob.  Div.  58), 

1238. 
The    Bird    of    Paradise    (5    Wall. 

545),  830,  876,  877. 
The  Bitterne   (35  Fed.  Rep.  927), 

489. 
The    Black    Warrior     (1    McAU. 

181),  1355. 
The   Blue  Jacket    (10   Ben.   248), 

490. 
The  Boskenna  Bay  (22  Fed.  Rep. 

667),    697. 
The  Boskenna  Bay  (40  Fed.  Rep. 

91),    697. 
The  Boston  (1  Low.  464),  698. 
The    Brewster     (95    Fed.    1000), 

788. 
The    Brig    Collenberg    (1    Black, 

170),  800. 
The  Brilliant  (138  Fed.  743),  374. 
The  Britannia  (34  Fed.  Rep.  906), 

489. 
The  Britannia  (87  Fed.  495),  154, 

624. 


CCXCll 


TABLE  OP   CASES   CITED. 


[BEFEBENCES    ABE 

The  British  King  (89  Fed.  872; 
affirmed  on  opinion  below,  92 
Fed.  1018,  35  C.  C.  A.  159), 
375. 

The  Caledonia  (43  Fed.  Rep.  681), 
167. 

The  Caledonia  (157  U.  S.  124,  15 
Sup.  Ct.  537,  39  L.  Ed.  644, 
afTg.,  43  Fed.  681  and  50  Fed. 
567),  362,  364,  464,  497. 

The  Calvin  S.  Edwards  (50  Fed. 
477,  1  C.  C.  A.  533,  1  U.  S. 
App.  173,  aff-g.,  46  Fed.  815), 
488. 

The  Captain  John  (33  Fed.  Rep. 
927),   688. 

The  Cargo  of  the  Joseph  W. 
Brooks    (122    Fed.    881),    839. 

The  Carib  Prince  (170  U.  S.  655, 
18  Sup.  Ct.  753,  42  L.  Ed. 
1181,  reversing  68  Fed.  254, 
15  C.  C.  A.  385  and  Wupper- 
man  v.  The  Carib  Prince,  63 
Fed.  266),  363,  364,  365,  372, 
375,   464. 

The  Carlos  F.  Roses  (177  U.  S. 
655,   44  L.  Ed.   929),  175. 

The  Cassius  (2  Story,  81),  1370. 

The  Catania   (107  Fed.  152),  374. 

The  Catskill    (95   Fed.   702),   344. 

The  Centennial  (131  Fed.  816), 
1158. 

The  Centurion  (68  Fed.  382,  15 
C.  C.  A.  480,  35  U.  S.  App.  332, 
reversing  Bregaro  v.  The  Cen- 
turion,  57   Fed.   412),   355. 

The  Chasca  (23  Fed.  Rep.  156), 
490. 

The  Chattahoochee  (173  U.  S, 
540,  19  Sup.  Ct.  R.  491,  43  L. 
Ed.  801,  aft'g.,  74  Fed.  899,  21 
C.   C.   A.   162),   344,   347. 

The  Chinese  Prince  (61  Fed.  697), 
386. 

The  Cito  (7  P.  Div.  5),  800. 

The  City  of  Clarksville  (94  Fed. 
201),    344,    405. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

The   City   of   Hartford    (97  U.   S. 

323),  344. 
The    City    of   Kingston    (77    Fed. 

655),   911. 
The  City  of  Norwich    (118   U.   S. 

503),  344. 
The  City  of  Para    (44  Fed.  691), 

344. 
The  City  of  Portsmouth  (125  Fed. 

264),   942,   1423. 
The  C.  J.  Willard    (38  Fed.  Rep. 

759),    490. 
The    Colima    (82    Fed.    665),    354, 

364,    367,    369,    380. 
The  Colon    (9   Ben.   354),   492. 
The  Columbia  (73  Fed.  226,  19  C. 

C.  A.  436),  344. 
The    Columbo     (3    Blatchf.    521), 

165. 
The  Commander-in-Chief  (1  Wall. 

43),    75. 
The    Commerce     (1    Black,    574), 

75. 
The    Connemara    (57    Fed.    314), 

634. 
The  Cressington   (L.  R.  (1891)  P. 

152,   60  L.   J.  P.  25),  382. 
The  Cuba  (3  Ware,  260),  800,  802. 
The  Curlew    (55   Fed.    1003,    5   C. 

C.   A.    386,   8   U.    S.   App.   405, 

aff'g.,  51  Fed.  246),  464. 
The    C.    W.    Elphicke     (122    Fed. 

439,    58    C.    C.    A.    421,    aff'g., 

117  Fed.  279),  366,  371. 
The  Cygnet    (126  Fed.  742,  61  C. 

C.  A.  348),   344,  381. 
The  Dan    (40  Fed.  691),  55. 
The    Dauntless     (121    Fed.    420), 

1397. 
The  David  (5  Blatch.  266),  151. 
The  Davis   (10  Wall.  15),  886. 
The  D.  C.  Murray   (89  Fed.  508), 

1156. 
The    Delaware     (14    Wall.     579), 

74,    158,    167,    169,    296,    412, 

485,  603,  604. 


I 


J 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


ccxem 


[references  are 

The  Delaware   (161  U.  S.  459,  16 

Sup.  Ct.  516,  40  L.  Ed.  771), 

348. 
The  Denmark  (27  Fed.  Rep.  141), 

433. 
The    D.    Harvey    (139    Fed.    755), 

1352. 
The  Dixie   (46  Fed.  403),  839. 
The  Drew  (15  Fed.  Rep.  826),  672. 
The    D.    R.    Martin     (11    Blatch. 

233),  977. 
The    Dunbeth    (L.    R.     (1897)    P. 

133,  66  Q.  J.  P.  66),  294. 
The  Dunbritton    (73  Fed.  352,  19 

C.    C.    A.    449,   38    U.    S.    App. 

369,  reversing  Crooks  v.   The 

Dunbritton,  61  Fed.  764),  355, 

488. 
The  Earnwood  (83  Fed.  315),  602. 
The    E.    A.    Shores    Jr.    (73    Fed. 

342),   347,  378,   383. 
The  Eddy  (5  Wall.  481),  880,  688, 

691,    721,    828,    869,    875. 
The  Edwin  (1  Sprague,  477),  120. 
The   Edwin    I.    Morrison    (153    U. 

S.    199,   14    Sup.   Ct.    R.    823), 

362,    364. 
The    Egypt    (25    Fed.    Rep.    320), 

489. 
The    E.    H.    Pray    (27    Fed.    Rep. 

474),  773. 
The    Elvira    Harbeck    (2    Blatch. 

336),  1274. 
The    Emily    v.    Carney    (5    Kan. 

645),  1355. 
The  Emma  Johnson    (1  Sprague, 

527),  75. 
The  Energia    (66  Fed.  604,  13  C. 

C,    A.    653,    35   U.    S.   App.    6, 

aff'g.,    Insurance    Co.    v.    The 

Energia,     61     Fed.     222     and 

Phillips    v.    The    Energia,    56 

Fed.  124),  345. 
The  Ethel   (5  Ben.  154),  490. 
The  Ethel  (59  Fed.  473),  776. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

The  Etona  (71  Fed.  895,  18  C. 

C.  A.  380,  38  U.  S.  App.  50, 

aft'g.,    Doherr  v.  The  Etona, 

64  Fed.  880),  347. 
The  Eugene  (87  Fed.  1001,  31  C. 

C.  A.  345,  aff'g.,   83  Fed.  222), 

1005. 
The  Eugene  Vesta   (28  Fed.  Rep. 

762),    497. 
The  Eureka    (108  Fed.   672),   344. 
The    Euripides    (71    Fed.    729,    18 

C.  C.  A.  226,  38  U.  S.  App.  1, 

reversing      American      Sugar 

Refining  Co.  v.  The  Euripides, 

63  Fed.  140  and  52  Fed.  161), 

488. 
The  European    (120   Fed.   776,   57 

C.   C.  A.   140),   1156. 
The  Excellent  (16  Fed.  Rep.  148), 

602. 
The  Exe   (57  Fed.  399,  6  C.  C.  A. 

410,  14  U.  S.  App.  626,  revers- 
ing   52    Fed.    155),    488. 
The    Farwell     (8    Diss.    64,    Fed. 

Cas.  No.  8426),  160. 
The  Favorite    (2   Biss.   502),   486. 
The    Ferro    (L.    R.  '(1893)    Prob. 

38,  62  L.  J.   P.  48),  382. 
The  Fittler   (1  Low.  114),  698. 
The  Flamborough    (69   Fed.  470), 

379,    380. 
The  Flintshire  (69  Fed.  471),  449, 

1355. 
The  Florida  (64  Fed.  159),  609. 
The  Folmina  (143  Fed.  636),  488. 
The  Fred  H.  Rice    (40  Fed.  Rep. 

690),  492. 
The  Frey   (106  Fed.  319,  45  C.  C. 

A.  309,  reversing  92  Fed.  667), 

347,    353,    358,    488. 
The  Fri    (140  Fed.  123),  381. 
The  Friesland  (104  Fed.  99),  367, 

379. 
The  Furnessia  (35  Fed.  Rep.  798), 

1147. 


CCXCIV 


TABLE   OF    CASES   CITED. 


[BEFEBENCES    ABE 

The  Garden  City    (26  Fed.   769), 

344. 
The  Gazelle   (128  U.  S.  474),  801. 
The  G.  B.  Boren   (132  Fed.  887), 

352. 
The   Geiser    (19   Fed.   Rep.   877), 

602. 
The    Generous    (2    Dodson,    324), 

311. 
The  Gen.  McCullom   (9  Ben.  31), 

779. 
The  Germanic   (196  U.  S.  589.  25 

Sup.   Ct.  Rep.  317,  49  L.  Ed. 

610,  aff'g.,  124  Fed.  1,  59  C.  C. 

A.  521  and  107  Fed.  294),  347, 

360. 
The   George   W.   Roby    (111   Fed. 

601,  49  C.  C.  A.  481,  modify- 
ing 103  Fed.  328),  344. 
The   Giglio    (31   Fed.   Rep.    432), 

492. 
The  Giles  Loring    (48  Fed.  463), 

344,  353,  367,  488,  497. 
The     Glamorganshire      (50     Fed. 

840),   606. 
The    Glendarroch    (L.    R.    (1894) 

Prob.  226,  63  L.  J.  P.  89),  449, 

1355. 
The  Glenfinlas  (48  Fed.  758,  1  C. 

C.  A.    85,   modifying   42   Fed. 

232),   839,   840. 
The    Glenfruin    (10    Prob.    Div. 

103),  497. 
The    Glenmavis     (69    Fed.    472), 

215,   374. 
The   Glenochil    (Prob.    D.    (1896) 

10,  65  L.  J.  P.  1),  382. 
The  Glide   (78  Fed.  152,  24  C.  C. 

A.   46),   488. 
The  Gloaming  (46  Fed.  671),  606. 
The    Gold    Hunter    (1    Bl.    &    H. 

300),  491. 
The  Gordon   Campbell    (141   Fed. 

435),   367. 
The  Grafton  (Olcott,  42),  688. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

The  Gran  Canaria  (16  Fed.  Rep. 
868),    604. 

The  Gratitudine  (3  Rob.  Adm. 
240),   469,   788,   789. 

The  G.  R.  Booth  (171  U.  S.  450, 
19  Sup.  Ct.  R.  9,  43  L.  Ed. 
234,  reversing  American  Su- 
gar Refining  Co.  v.  The  G.  R. 
Booth,  64  Fed.  878;  s.  c.  91 
Fed.  164,  33  C.  C.  A.  430), 
465,   488. 

The  Guadeloupe  (92  Fed.  670), 
379,    382. 

The  Guardian  (89  Fed.  998),  1168. 

The  Guiding  Star  (62  Fed.  407, 
10  C.  C.  A.  454.  22  U.  S.  App. 
344,  aff'g.,  Bennitt  v.  The 
Guiding  Star,  53  Fed.  936), 
162. 

The  Guildhall  (64  Fed.-  867,  12  C. 
C.  A.  445,  26  U.  S.  App.  414, 
aff'g.,  Schulze-Berge  v.  The 
Guildhall,  58  Fed.  796),  381, 
467. 

The  Guy  C.  Goss  (53  Fed.  826), 
449,    1353. 

The  Hadji  (18  Fed.  Rep.  459), 
430,    433. 

The  Hardy   (1  Dill.  460),  731. 

The  Hammonia  (10  Bene.  512), 
1160. 

The  Harrisburg  (119  U.  S.  199), 
208,  1396. 

The  Harry  Hudson  Smith  (C.  C. 
A.,  142  Fed.  724),  344. 

The  Hattie  Palmer  (68  Fed.  380, 
15  C.  C.  A.  479,  35  U.  S.  App 
369,  aff'g.,  Hawkins  v.  The 
Hattie  Palmer,  63  Fed.  1015), 
1372. 

The  Henry  B.  Hyde  (90  Fed.  115, 
32  C.  C.  A.  534,  61  U.  S.  App. 
147,  ffl/f'gr.,  Montague  v.  The 
Henry  B.  Hyde,  82  Fed.  681), 
210,   449,   1355. 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


ccxcv 


[references  are 

The  H.  F.  Dimock  (77  Fed.  238), 

344. 
The  H.  G.  Johnson  (48  Fed.  696), 

606. 
The  Hindoustan   (67  Fed.  794,  14 

C.   C.    A.    650,    35    U.    S.    App. 

173),   1355. 
The  Homeric  (106  Fed.  960),  384. 
The  Hudson  (122  Fed.  96),  357. 
The    Hugo    (57   Fed.    403    and    61 

Fed.  860;   affirmed,  Brauer  v. 

Compania    de    Navigacion    La 

Flecha,  66  Fed.  777,  35  U.  S. 

App.    44,    and    Compania    de 

Navigacion      La      Flecha      v. 

Brauer,  168  U.  S.  104,  18  Sup. 

Ct.  R.  12,  42  L.  Ed.  398),  215, 

452,  464,  485. 
The     Humboldt     (97     Fed.     656), 

1268. 
The   Hyades    (124   Fed.   58,   59   C. 

C.  A.  424,  aff'g.,  118  Fed.  85), 

371,    384. 
The    Hyperion's    Cargo     (2    Low. 

93),  856. 
The    Idaho    (29    Fed.    Rep.    187), 

1150. 
The    Idaho     (93    U.    S.     575;     11 

Blatch.    218),    160,    740,    749, 

750. 
The   India    (49    Fed.   76,   1   C.   C. 

A.  174,  2  U.  S.  App.  83),  837, 

841. 
The  lona  (80  Fed.  933),  156. 
The  Ionic   (5  Blatch.  538),  329. 
The  Iowa  (50  Fed.  561),  215. 
The  Ira  B.  Ellems   (50  Fed.  934, 

2   C.  C.   A.   85,  aff'g.,  48   Fed. 

591),  492. 
The    Irrawaddy    (171    U.    S.    187, 

18   Sup.  Ct.  R.  831,  43  L.  Ed. 

130,    reversing    82    Fed.    472; 

s.  c.  83  Fed.  987,  31  C.  C.  A. 

593),   345,   362,   364,   387. 
The    Isaac    Reed    (82    Fed.    566), 

449,  602,  1355. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

The  Isabella  (8  Ben.  139),  490. 
The   Ismaele    (14   Fed.  Rep.  491; 

22  id.  559),  165. 
The    Isola    di    Procida    (124    Fed. 

942),   161. 
The  Jaedern   (L.  R.    (1892)    Prob. 

351,  61  L.  J.  P.  89),  840,  844, 

846. 
The  James  Baird    (90  Fed.  669), 

842. 
The  James  Martin  (88  Fed.  649), 

800. 
The  Jane  and  Matilda   (1  Hagg. 

187),  469. 
The  Jane  Grey  (99  Fed.  582;  s.  c. 

95   Fed.   693),   344,   380. 
The  Jefferson  (31  Fed.  Rep.  489), 

489,    490. 
The   J.    E.    Owen    (54    Fed.    185), 

843. 
The  Johanne    (48  Fed.  733),  602. 
The  John  P.  Best  (14  Phila.  527), 

602. 
The    Joseph    Oteri,    Jr.     (66    Fed. 

581,  13  C.  C.  A.  645,  30  U.  S. 

App.    1),    792. 
The  Julia   (14  Moore,  P.  C.  210), 

92. 
The  Julia  Blake   (107  U.  S.  418), 

792. 
The  Juniata  Paton    (1  Biss.   15), 

484. 
The  Kansas  (87  Fed.  766),  624. 
The  Katie   (40  Fed.  480),  344. 
The  Katy  (   (1895)  P.  56),  838. 
The   Kensington    (183    U.    S.    263, 

46  L.  Ed.  190,  22  Sup.  Ct.  R. 

102,    reversing    94    Fed.    885, 

36  C.  C.  A.  533,  and  88  Fed. 

331),  214,  431,  452,  497. 
The  Keystone  (31  Fed.  Rep.  412), 

489,    492. 
The    Kimball    (3    Wall.    37),    830, 

878. 
The  Kirkhill    (99  Fed.  575,  39  C. 

C.  A.  658),  603. 


CCXCVl 


TABLE   OF    CASES   CITED. 


[BEFEBENCES    ABE 

The  La  Bourgoyne    (—  C.   C.  A. 

— ,  144  Fed.  781),  344,  347. 
The    La    Bourgoyne     (104     Fed. 

823),   344. 
The  Lady  Franklin  (8  Wall.  325), 

158,    161. 
The   La   Kroma    (138    Fed.    936), 

165,  1352. 
The  Langford  (143  Fed.  150),  606. 
The  Lennox    (90   Fed.    308),    449, 

1352,  1355. 
The   Live   Yankee    (Deady,   420), 

1352. 
The  Logs  of  Mahogany  (2  Sumn. 

589),  828,  878. 
The    Longfellow    (104   Fed.    363), 

344. 
The  Loon  (7  Blatch.  244),  158. 
The    Lydian    Monarch     (23    Fed. 

Rep.  298),  430,  490. 
The   Lyon    (1   Brown   Adm.   59), 

92. 
The   Maggie   Hammond    (9   Wall. 

435),  74. 
The    Maggie    M.     (30    Fed.    Rep. 

692),  602. 
The  Main  v.  Williams  (152  U.  S. 

128),  344. 
The  Majestic    (166  U.   S.  375,   17 

Sup.    Ct.    R.    597,    41    L.    Ed. 

1039,  reversing  Potter  v.  The 

Majestic,    60    Fed.    624,    9    C. 

C.  A.  161,   20  U.  S.  App.  503, 

23  L.  R.  A.  746;  s.  c.  56  Fed. 

244;    s.  c.   69   Fed.  844),   271, 

275,  1069,  1299. 

The  Mamie   (110  U.  S.  742),  344. 

The   Manitoba    (122    U.    S.    Ill), 
344. 

The  Manitoba  (104  Fed.  145),  349, 

367,  373,  380. 
The  Manitou   (127  Fed.  554,  63  C. 

C.  A.  109,  aft'g.,  116  Fed.  60), 

374. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

The  Maori  King  v.  Hughes  (65  L. 
J.  Q.  B.  168,  (1895)  2  Q.  B. 
550,  aft'g.,  64  L.  J.  Q.  B.  744), 
365,  366,  464,  505. 

The  Marechal  Suchet  (112  Fed. 
440),  371,  384. 

The  Margaret  (94  U.  S.  494),~92. 
The    Marine    City    (6    Fed.    415), 
344. 

The  Marinin  S.  (28  Fed.  Rep. 
664),  603. 

The  Marinin  S.  (32  Fed.  Rep. 
918),  602. 

The  Marlborough  (47  Fed.  667), 
371,  384,  485. 

The  Mary  Ann  Guest  (1  Blatchf. 
358),   744. 

The  Mary  L.  Peters  (68  Fed.  919; 
affirmed,  no  opinion,  79  Fed. 
998,  25  C.  C.  A.  681,  26  U.  S. 
App.  784),  380. 

The  Mascotte  (51  Fed.  605,  2  C.  C. 
A.  399,  1  U.  S.  App.  251,  aff'g., 
in  part  48  Fed.  119),  1352. 

The  Mayor,  Aldermen  and  Burg- 
esses of  the  Borough  of  Pres- 
ton V.  Biornstad  (L.  R. 
(1898)   App.  Cas.  513),  92. 

The  M.  C.  Currie   (132  Fed.  125), 

385,    688. 
The  Merida    (107  Fed.  146,  46  C. 

C.  A.   208),  382. 

The  Merrimac  (2  Sawyer,  586), 
92. 

The  Merrimack  (8  Cranch,  317), 
1318. 

The  Mexican  Prince  (91  Fed. 
1003,  34  C.  C.  A.  168,  aff'g., 
on  opinion  of  court  below, 
Steinwender  v.  The  Mexican 
Prince,  82  Fed.  484),  374, 
382. 

The  Mill  Boy   (4  McC.  383),  710. 


TABLE   OF    CxVSES    CITED. 


CCXCVll 


[BEFEBENCES    ABE 

The  Millie  R.  Bohannon  (64  Fed. 

883),  370. 
The    Milwaukee    Belle     (2     Biss. 

197),  607. 
The  Minnehaha    (Lush.   335),  92. 
The    Minnetonka    (132    Fed.    52), 

443,  1269,  1299. 
The  Minnie  E.  Kelton   (109  Fed. 

164,  48  C.  C.  A.  271),  776. 
The    Mississippi     (76    Fed.    375), 

688. 
The    Mississippi     (113    Fed.    985; 

afprmed  without  opinion,  120 

Fed.   1020,   56   C.   C.   A.    525), 

355,    358. 
The   M.   M.   Chase    (37   Fed.   Rep. 

708),  774. 
The    M.    Moran    (107    Fed.    526), 

344. 
The  Mohawk    (8  Wall.   153),  281, 

489,  664,  788,  815,  816,  820. 
The  Mondego  (56  Fed.  268),  635. 
The  Montana  (17  Fed.  377),  492. 
The  Morning  Mail    (17  Fed.  Rep. 

545),  490. 
The    Musselcrag     (125    Fed.    786, 

modified  in  Corsar  v.  Spreck- 

els   &  Bros.   Co.,  —  C.   C.   A. 

— ,  141  Fed.  260),  352,  383. 

The   Napolitan   Prince    (134   Fed. 

159),  1163. 
The  Natchez    (31  Fed.  Rep.  615), 

768. 
The  Nathaniel  Hooper    (11  Mass. 

229),  801. 
The  Nath.  Hooper  (3  Sumn.  542), 

801,    818. 
The   Neaffie    (1   Abb.  U.   S.   465), 

92. 
The  Nederland  (14  Fed.  Rep.  63), 

1147. 
The  Nellie   Floyd    (116   Fed.    80; 

affirmed,  Neilson  v.  Coal,  etc., 

Co.   122  Fed.  617,   60  C.  C.  A. 

175),   366,   371. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

The  Nether  Holme   (50  Fed.  434; 

reversed,  Hine  v.  Perkins,  55 

Fed.   996,   5   C.   C.   A.  377,   14 

U.  S.  App.  386),  840. 
The   Netherland    (14  Phila.   601), 

904. 
The  Nettie  Quill    (124  Fed.  667), 

92,    383. 
The  New  England  (110  Fed.  415), 

215,  1299. 
The   New   Orleans    (26   Fed.   Rep. 

44),  604,   605,  611. 
The  New  Philadelphia    (1  Black, 

62),  93. 
The  New  World  v.  King  (16  How. 

469),  11,  401,  895. 
The  Niagara   (84  Fed.  902,  55  U. 

S.   App.   445,  28   C.   C.  A.  528, 

aif'g.,  77  Fed.  329),  377. 
The  Nifa  (Prob.  (1892), 411),  839. 
The  Nine  Thousand  Dry  Hides  (6 

Ben.  190),  812. 
The  Nith   (36  Fed.  Rep.  86),  145, 

602. 
The  Nith  (36  Fed.  Rep.  383),  603. 
The     Nitro-Glycerine     Case      (15 

Wall.  524),  145,  511,  795,  796. 
The    Normannia    (62    Fed.    469), 

1067. 
The  Northern  Belle  (9  Wall.  526), 

281,  497. 
The    Northern    Belle    v.    Robson 

(154    U.    S.    571,    14    Sup.    Ct. 

R.   1166,   19   L.   Ed.   748),   379. 
The  Norway  (3  Moore,  P.  C.  245), 

800. 
The     Nutmeg   State      (103     Fed. 

797),  130. 
The  Oconto    (5  Biss.   460),  92. 
The  Olbers   (3  Ben.  148),  163. 
The    Oneida     (128    Fed.    687,    63 

C.    C.    A.    239,    reversing    108 

Fed.  886),  367,  369. 
The    Ontario    (106    Fed.    324;    af- 
firmed,  Grubman   v.   The  On- 
tario,  115   Fed.   769,   53   C.   C. 

A.  199),  372,  384. 


ecxcviii 


TABLE   OF    CASES   CITED. 


[references  are 

The  Oranmore  (92  Fed.  396,  aff'g., 

24  Fed.  922),  215. 
The  Orcadian  (116  Fed.  930),  355. 
The  Oregon    (Deady,  179),  120. 
The  Oregon   (133  Fed.  609,  68  C. 

C.  A.  603),  892,  898,  953,  1072, 

1156. 
The  Oriflamme   (1   Sawyer,  176), 

163. 
The  Oriflamme    (3   Sawyer,  397), 

895,  1409. 
The  Palmas  (108  Fed.  87,  47  C.  C. 

A.  220),  354,  375. 
The  Paragon   (1  Ware,  322),  603, 

604. 
The  Parana  (2  P.  Div.  118),  1366. 
The  Patria  (132  Fed.  971,  68  C.  C. 

A.    397,    aff'g.,    125    Fed.    425 

and  118  Fed.  109),  449,  1353. 
The  Pearlmoor    (L.  R.   (1904)    P. 

286,  73  L.  J.  P.  50),  398. 
The   Peter   der   Grosse    (L.   R.    1 

P.  &  D.  414),  165. 
The  Peytona   (1  Ware,  541),  688 
The  Peytona    (2  Curtis,  21),   688 
The  Phoenicia    (90  Fed.   116;    af- 
firmed on  opinion  of  court  fee 

low,  99  Fed.  1005,  40  C.  C.  A 

221),   373. 
The  Pilot  Boy  (23  Fed.  Rep.  103) 

1147. 
The  Polynesia  (16  Fed.  Rep.  702) 

490. 
The   Pope   Catlin    (31   Fed.  Rep, 

408),   1150. 
The    Portsmouth    (9    Wall.    682) 

485. 
The     Portuense     (35     Fed.     Rep 

670),  489. 
The  President  (92  Fed.  673),  1157 

1169. 
The  Presque  Isle  (140  Fed.  202) 

367. 
The  Princeton  (3  Blatch.  54),  92 
The    Prinz    Georg    (23    Fed.   Rep 

906),  1156. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

The    Prinzess    Irene    (139    Fed. 

810),  1161. 
The  Priscilla  (114  Fed.  836,  52  C. 

C.  A.  470,  reversing  106  Fed. 

739),    120,    1352. 
The  Prize  Cases    (2  Black,  635), 

317,   318,   322. 
The      Propeller      Commerce      (1 

Black,  574),  75. 

The  Propeller  Mohawk  (8  Wall. 
153),  281,  664,  788,  815,  816, 
820. 

The  Propeller  Niagara  v.  Cordes 
(21  How.  7),  74,  75,  311,  497. 
645. 

The  Protection  (102  Fed.  516,  42 
C.  C.  A.  489),  617,  1363. 

The  Prussia  (100  Fed.  484),  651, 
1369. 

The  Prussia  (93  Fed.  837,  35  C. 
C.  A.  625,  aff'g.,  88  Fed.  531), 
362. 

The  Queen  of  the  Pacific  (180  U. 
S.  49,  45  L.  Ed.  419,  21  Sup. 
Ct.  R.  278,  reversing  Pacific 
Coast  S.  S.  Co.  V.  Bancroft- 
Whitney  Co.  94  Fed.  180,  36 
C.  C.  A.  135  and  Bancroft- 
Whitney  Co.  V.  The  Queen  of 
the  Pacific,  78  Fed.  155,  61 
Fed.  213  and  75  Fed.  74),  442. 

The  Queensmore  (53  Fed.  1022, 
4  C.  C.  A.  157,  8  U.  S.  App. 
287),  800. 

The  Quickstep   (9  Wall.  665),  92. 

The    Race    Horse    (3    Rob.    Adm. 

101),  826. 
•The  Rapid  Transit  (52  Fed.  320), 
344. 

The  Ravensdale  (75  Fed.  413,  s.  c. 
75  Fed.  408,  410),  184,  689, 
828. 

The  R.  D.  Bibber  (50  Fed.  841,  2 
C.  C.  A.  50),  300. 

The  Rebecca   (1  Ware,  187),  603. 


TABLE   OP    CASES   CITED. 


CCXCIX 


[referencks  are 

The  R.   E.   Lee    (2  Abb.    (N.   S.) 

49),  1268. 
The  Republic   (61  Fed.   109,  9  C. 
C.  A.  386,  aff'g.,  57  Fed.  240), 
344. 
The  Reuben  Dowd  (46  Fed.  800), 

855. 
The    Richard    Winslow    (67    Fed. 

259),  688. 
The  Rodney  (L.  R.  (1900)  P.  112, 

69  L.  J.  P.  29),  382. 
The  Rosa  (53  Fed.  132),  344. 
The  Rosedale  (88  Fed.  324;  aff'd., 

on  opinion  of  court  below,  92 

Fed.   1021,   35   C.   C.  A.   167), 

347,    387. 
The  Sabioncello  (7  Ben.  357),  602. 
The     Saginaw     (139     Fed.     906), 

1397,  1401. 
The    S.    A.    McCaulley    (99    Fed. 

203),   344. 
The    Samuel    F.    Houseman    (108 

Fed.    875,    48    C.    C.    A.    120, 

aff'g.,   103  Fed.   663),   384. 
The    Sandfield    (92    Fed.    663,    34 

C.   C.   A.    612,   aft'g.,   79   Fed. 

371),    365,   372,   382,   384,   464. 
The  San  Rafael    (—  C.  C.  A.  — , 

141    Fed.    270,   modifying   134 

Fed.  749),  344,   1401. 
The  Saratoga  (20  Fed.  Rep.  869), 

422. 
The  Saugerties  (44  Fed.  625),  177. 
The  Savona  (L.  R.   (1900)  P.  252, 

69  L.  J.  P.  95),  633. 
The   Scandinavia    (49    Fed.    658), 

688. 
The  Schooner  Arthur  B.   (1  Alas- 
ka, 403),  830. 
The  Schooner  Emma  Johnson   (1 

Sprague,    527),    75. 
The   Schooner  Freeman  v.  Buck- 
ingham   (18   How.   182),    160, 

161. 
The    Schooner    Reeside    (2    Sum. 

567),   483,  490. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

The  Schooner  Volunteer   (1  Sum. 

551),   875,   877. 
The  Scotland  (118  U.  S.  518),  344. 
The  Seaboard  (119  Fed.  375),  360, 

784. 
The    Seefahrer     (183    Fed.    793), 

165. 
The    Seguranca    (68    Fed.    1014), 

700. 
The    Ship    Nathaniel    Hooper    (3 

Sum.  542),  818. 
The  Silvia  (171  U.  S.  462,  19  Sup. 

Ct.  R.  7,  43  L.  Ed.  241,  aff'g., 

68  Fed.  230,  15  C.  C.  A.  262, 

35  U.  S.  App.  395  and  64  Fed. 

607),  347,  363,  373,  382. 
The    Sinnickson     (24    Fed.    Rep. 

304),  490. 
The  Sintram.(64  Fed.   884),  370, 

384. 
The  Siren    (7  Wall.  152),  886. 
The    Soblomsten    (L.    R.    1   Adm. 

293),    824. 
The   Southwark    (191  U.   S.  1,   48 

L.  Ed.   65,   24   Sup.  Ct.   1,  re- 
versing 108  Fed.  880,  48  C.  C. 

A.    123    and    104    Fed.    103), 

349,  362,  364,  366,  367. 
The  St.  Bernard    (105  Fed.  994), 

850. 
The   St.   Cuthbert    (97  Fed.   340), 

329,    344. 
The   St.   Georg    (104   Fed.  898,  44 

C.    C.    A.    246,    reversing    95 

Fed.  172),  688. 
The  St.  Hubert   (107  Fed.  727,  46 

C.   C.   A.   603,   aff'g.,  102   Fed. 

362),  442,   458. 

The  St.   Patrick   (14   Phila.  596), 

302. 
The  Steam  Hopper  No.  66  (75  L. 

J.  P.  22),   346. 
The  Stella    (L.  R.    (1900)    P.  161, 

81  Law  T.   (N.  S.)    235,  69  L. 

J.  P.  70),  1075. 


ccc 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


[beferences  are 

The  Stevenson  (17  Fed.  Rep.  540), 

480. 
The    Stranger     (6    Brown    Adm. 

281),   92. 
The  Strathdon  (89  Fed.  374),  344, 

387. 
The  Styria    (101  Fed.   728,  41  C. 

C.  A.   639,  reversing  93   Fed. 

474),   323. 
The  Success  (7  Blatch.  551),  799. 
The  Sue  (22  Fed.  Rep.  843),  972. 
The  Surrey    (26  Fed.   Rep.   791), 

688,    697. 
The     Tanbark     Case     (1    Brown 

Adm.    151),   869. 
The  Tangier   (32  Fed.  Rep.  230), 

799,    800. 
The    Tennedos     (137    Fed.    443), 

373. 
The  Teutonia  (L.  R.  3  Adm.  394), 

322,    815,    819. 
The  Thames  (14  Wall.  98),  155. 
The  Thames  (61  Fed.  1014,  10  C. 

C.  A.  232,  8  U.  S.  App.  580), 

184,    366,    606. 
The  Thos.  Melville  (31  Fed.  Rep. 

486),   490,   602. 
The  Tigress   (32  L.  J.  Adm.  97), 

773. 
The   Timor    (67    Fed.   356,   14   C. 

C.  A.  412,  35  U.  S.  App.  278, 

reversing  61  Fed.  633  and  46 

Fed.  859),  449,  1355. 
The  Titania   (131  Fed.  229,  65  C. 

C.  A.  215,  aff'g.,  124  Fed.  975), 

156,   158,    688,   689,    691. 
The  Tjomo    (115   Fed.   919),  354, 

363. 
The  Tommy   (16  Fed.  Rep.  601), 

602. 
The  Tommy  (142  Fed.  1034),  344. 
The   Tongoy    (55   Fed.    329),    157, 

164. 
The  Tribune   (3  Sum.  144),  1370. 
The  Trinacria  (42  Fed.  863),  215. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

The  Valencia  (110  Fed.  221;  af- 
firmed. Pacific  Steam  Whal- 
ing Co.  V.  Grismore  117  Fed. 
68,  54  C.  C.  A.  454),  1152, 
1169. 

The  Valentine  (131  Fed.  352), 
381. 

The  Velona    (3   Ware,   139),   788. 

The  Victoria   (114  Fed.  962),  354. 

The  Vidette  (34  Fed.  Rep.  396), 
773. 

The  Viola  (90  Fed.  750),  387,  847, 
853. 

The  Virginia  Ehrman  (97  U.  S. 
317),    344. 

The  Volunteer  (1  Sumn.  551), 
875,    877. 

The  Vortigem  (68  Law  J.  P.  49, 
Prob.  D.  (1899)  140,  80  Law 
T.  (N.  S.)  382,  47  Wkly.  Rep. 
437),    368,    376. 

The  Waikato  v.  New  Zealand 
Shipping  Co.    (68   Law  J.   Q. 

B.  1,  (1899)  1  Q.  B.  56,  79 
Law  T.  (N.  S.)  326,  aff'g.,  67 
Law  J.  Q.  B.  514,  (1898)  1 
Q.  B.  645,  78  Law  T.  (N.  S.) 
197,  8  Asp.  351),  465. 

The  Waldo  (Davies,  161),  169, 
604. 

The  Wanderer  (29  Fed.  260),  167. 

The  Warren  Adams  (74  Fed.  413, 
20  C.  C.  A.  486,  38  U.  S.  App. 
356;  petition  for  writ  of  cer 
tiorari  denied,  163  U.  S.  679), 
370,   384,   490,   1352,   1355. 

The  Wasco  (53  Fed.  546),  911, 
1019. 

The  Webb   (14  Wall.  406),  93. 

The  Wells   City   (61  Fed.  857,  10 

C.  C.  A.  123,  26  U.  S.  App.  76, 
aff'g.,   57   Fed.   317),   386. 

The  Westminster  (127  Fed.  680, 
62  C.  C.  A.  406,  aff'g.,  116  Fed. 
123  and  102  Fed.  366),  442, 
444,    447. 


TABLE   OF    CASES   CITED. 


CCCl 


[references  are  to  sections.] 


The  Whitlieburn    (89   Fed.   526), 

352. 
The  Wildcroft    (130  Fed.   521,   65 

C.   C.  A.   145,  affg.,   124   Fed. 

631    and    126   Fed.    229),    367, 

382. 
The    William    Power     (131    Fed. 

136),    353. 
The  Williamette  Valley   (71  Fed. 

712),   1056,   1424. 
The  Willie  D.  Sandhoval  (92  Fed. 

286),  160. 
The  Xantho    (12  App.  Cas.   503), 

483,  487. 
The  Zenobia   (Abbott's  Adm.  48), 

1370. 
Theroux  v.  Railway  Co.   (64  Fed. 

84,  12  C.  C.  A.  52),  1396. 
Thin  V.  Richards  &  Co.   (2  Q.  B. 

(1892)     141,    62    L.    J.    Q.    B. 

39),  368. 
Thomas    v.    Black    (8    Del.    507), 

1433. 
Thomas  v.   Bost.  R.  R.    (10  Met. 

472),  76,  702. 
Thomas  v.  Day  (4  Esp.  262),  124. 
Thomas  v.  Express  Co.  (73  Minn. 

185,  75  N.  W.  1120),  743,  749. 
Thomas    v.    Lancaster    Mills    (71 

Fed.   481,   19   C.   C.   A.   88,   34 

U.  S.  App.  404,  a/T'fir.,  63  Fed. 

200),   214,   300,   477. 
Thomas  v.  Railroad  Co.   (10  Met. 

472),  76,  702. 
Thomas  v.  Railroad  Co.   (148  Pa. 

St.  180,  23  Atl.  989,  15  L.  R. 

A.   416),    1412. 
Thomas  v.  Railroad   Co.    (3  Pen- 

newill,  81,  50  Atl.  285),  1334. 
Thomas  v.  Railroad   Co.    (101  U. 

S.  71),  918. 
Thomas  v.  Railroad  Co.   (1  Utah, 

233),  1384. 
Thomas  v.   Railway  Co.    (25   Ky. 

Law    Rep.    1051,    76    S.    W. 

1093),  231,   804,   867. 


Thomas   v.    The   Railway    (L.   R. 

5  Q.  B.  226),  915. 
Thomas  v.  Railway  Co.  (72  Mich. 

355),  964,   1065. 
Thomas   v.   Railway  Co.    (122   N. 

Car.  1005,  30  S.  E.  Rep.  343), 

1110. 
Thomas  v.   Royster   (98   Ky.   206, 

32  S.  W.  Rep.  613),  1389. 
Thomas  v.   Snyder    (39  Penn.   St. 

317),  810. 
Thomas   v.   Winchester    (6   N.  Y. 

397),  798. 
Thomas,  etc.,  Co.  v.  Railway  Co. 

(62  Wis.  642),  1365,  1369. 
Thompson    v.    Dominy    (14   M.   & 

W.  403),  197. 
Thompson    v.    Fargo    (49    N.    Y. 

188),   736,   1316. 
Thompson    v.    Railroad    Co.    (122 

Ala.  378,  24  So.  931),  177. 
Thompson  v.  Railroad  Co.  (47  La. 

Ann.  1107,  17  So.  503),  1022. 
Thompson  v.  Railroad  Co.  (54  Ga. 

509),  1417. 
Thompson    v.    Railroad    (28    Md. 

396),    758. 
Thompson    v.    Railroad    Co.     (51 

Mo.  190),  1417. 
Thompson  v.  Railway  Co.  (11  Tex. 

Civ.  App.  145,  32  S.  W.  Rep. 

427),    226. 
Thompson   v.    Small    (1   Com.   B. 

328,  354),  660,  865. 
Thompson  v.  Storage  Co.  (97  Mo. 

App.  135,  70  S.  W.  Rep.  938), 

46. 
Thompson  v.  Trail    (2   Car.  &  P. 

334),  193,  865. 
Thompson  v.  Truesdale  (61  Minn. 

129,  63  N.  W.  259,  52  Am.  St. 

Rep.   579),   1055. 
Thompson,    etc.,    Electric    Co.    v. 

Simon  (20  Or.  60,  25  Pac.  147, 

23  Am.  St.  Rep.  86,  10  L.  R. 

A.  251),  76. 


cccn 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


[BEFEEENCES    ABE 

Thorington  v.  Smith  (8  Wall.  1), 

317. 
Thorne  v.  Deas  (4  Johns.  84),  34. 
Thorogood   v.   Bryan    (8   Com.   B. 

115),   1235,   1383. 
Thorp    V.    Brookfield    (36    Conn. 

320),  1230. 
Thorp    V.    Railroad    Co.    (61    Vt. 

378),  1058. 
Thorpe  v.  Railroad  Co.   (76  N.  Y. 

402),  972,  1135. 
Thrall  v.  Knapp    (17   Iowa,  469), 

1434. 
Thrift  V.  Youle  (2  C.  P.  Div.  434), 

489. 
Thurber    v.    Railroad    (60    N.    Y. 

326),  1174,  1227. 
Thurston  v.  Railroad  Co.   (4  Dill. 

321),  966. 
Thweatt  v.  Railway  Co.   (31  Tex. 

Civ.  App.  227,  71  S.  W.  976), 

980. 
Thyll  V.  Railroad  (87  N,  Y.  Supp. 

345,  92  App.  Div.  513,  modify- 
ing 84  N.  Y.  Supp.  175),  449, 

709,   1355. 
Tibbits  &  Son  v.  Railroad  Co.  (49 

111.  App.  567),  165,  430. 
Tibby    v.    Railway    Co.    (82    Mo. 

292),  1195. 
Tiedeman  v.  Knox   (51  Md.  612), 

176. 
Tierney  v.  Railroad  Co.  (10  Hun, 

569),    650. 
Tierney  v.  Railroad  Co.  (76  N.  Y, 

305),   649. 
Tift    V.    Railway    Co.    (123    Fed. 

789),   521,   527. 
Tift    V.    Railway    Co.     (138    Fed. 

753),    530. 
Tilden  V.  Minor  (45  Vt.  196),  175. 
Tilden   v.   Rhode   Island    Co.    (— 

R.    I.   — ,    63    Atl.   Rep.    675), 

898. 
Tilley  v.  Railroad   (24  N.  Y.  471; 

9  N.  Y.  252),  1397. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Tilson   V.   Howard    (57   Ga.   410), 

175. 
Timmons  v.  Railroad  Co.  (6  Ohio 

St.  105),  1181. 
Tindall  v.  Taylor   (28  Eng.  L.  & 

Eq.   210),    1315. 
Tindall  v.  Taylor  (4  El.  &  B.  219), 

197,  865. 
Tingley  v.  Railroad  Co.   (96  N.  Y. 

Supp.  865,  109  App.  Div.  793), 

1006. 
Tirrell    v.    Gage    (4   Allen,    245), 

826. 
Tisdale  v.  Norton    (8  Mete.  388), 

1430. 
Tishomingo,    etc.,    Institution    v. 

Johnson,    Nesbitt    &    Co.    ( — 

Ala.  — ,  40  So.  Rep.  503),  184. 
Tobin   v.    Crawford    (5   M.    &   W. 

235),    808. 
Tobin   V.    Crawford    (9   M.   &   W. 

716),  808. 
Tobin    V.    Railroad    Co.    (59    Me. 

183),  991. 
Tobin   V.   Railroad    (211   Pa.   457, 

60  Atl.  999),   1181. 
Todd    V.    Railroad    Co.    (3    Allen, 

18),  1209,  1210,  1211. 
Todd    V.    Railroad    Co.    (7    Allen, 

207),  1209,   1210,  1211. 
Tolman  v.  Abbott  (78  Wis.  192), 

233. 
Tolman  v.  Railroad  Co.  (98  N.  Y. 

198),   1418. 
Tolson  V.   Coasting  Co.    (6  Mack. 

37),  1417. 
Tomlinson    v.    Derby    (43    Conn. 

562),  1397. 
Tompkins  v.  Railroad  Co.  (66  Cal. 

163),    917,    1236. 
Tompkins  v.  Saltmarsh   (14  S.  & 

R.  275),  32. 
Tons    (151)    of    Coal    (4    Blatch. 

362),  869,  871. 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


cceiii 


[BEFEBENCES    ABE 

Toomey  v.  Railway   (3  C.  B.   (N. 

S.)    146),  1412. 
Torpey  v.  Williams  (3  Daly,  162), 

1246,    1286. 
Torrey   v.    Kelly    (121    Fed.    542, 

57  C.  C.  A.  604),  1169. 
Torrey  v.  Railroad  Co.  (147  Mass. 

412),  1197. 
Tower  v.  Utica  Railroad   (7  Hill, 

47),   67,   109,    1265. 
Tower  Co.  v.  Southern  Pacific  Co. 

(184  Mass.  472,  69  N.  E.  348), 

604. 
Towler    v.    Railroad    Co.    (18    W. 

Va.  579),  1419. 
Towns   V.    Railroad    Co.    (37    La. 

Ann.   630,   55  Am.  Rep.   508), 

1397. 
Townsend  v.  City  of  Boston  (187 

Mass.  283,  72  N.  B.  991),  942. 
Townsend    v.    Jennison    (9    How. 

407),  208. 
Townsend  v.  Railroad  Co.   (56  N. 

Y.  295),  1039,  1045,  1065,  1066, 

1090,    1445. 
Townsend    v.    Railway    Co.    (106 

Tenn.  162,  61  S.  W.  56),  1123. 
Toy    V.    Railroad    Co.    (56    N.    Y. 

Supp.  182,  26  Misc.  792),  426, 

433. 
Tozer  v.   United   States    (52  Fed. 

917),  566. 
Trabing   v.    Navigation    Co.    (121 

Cal.   137,   53   Pac.   644),   1093, 

1096,  1441. 
Tracy   v.    Car   Co.    (67    How.   Pr. 

154),  1132. 
Tracy    v.    Railroad    Co.    (80    Mo. 

App.  389),   510. 
Tracy   v.   "Wood    (3   Mason,   132), 

29,  32. 
Trainor  v.   Steamship   Co.    (16   S. 

C.   R.    (Can.)    156),  465. 
Trammel  v.   Dinsmore    (102   Fed. 

794,    42    C.    C.    A.    623),    574, 

575. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Transfer   Co.    v.    Neiswanger    (18 

Mo.  App.  103),  702. 
Transit    Co.    v.    Dwyer    (3    Colo. 

App.   408,   33   Pac.   815),   1173. 
Transit   Co.   v.   Dwyer    (20    Colo. 

132,  36  Pac.  1106),  1223. 
Transportation  Co.  v.  Barber   (56 

N.  Y.  544),  88,  749,  750,  786, 

880. 
Transportation    Co.   v.    Block    (86 

Tenn.  392),  82,  84. 
Transportation   Co.   v.   Bolles    (80 

111.  473),  795. 
Transportation    Co.    v.    Cornforth 

(3  Colo.  280),  84,  505. 
Transportation  Co.  v.  Downer  (11 

Wall.     129),     449,    487,     1354, 

1355. 
Transportation  Co.  v.  Flour  Mills 

Co.     (92    111.    App.    628),    230, 

233. 
Transportation  Co.  v.  Harper  (118 

Ga.  672,  45  S.  E.  458),  900. 
Transportation  Co.  v.  Hawley   (1 

Daly,  327),  688. 
Transportation  Co.  v.  Hoyt  (69  N. 

Y.   230),   815. 
Transportation    Co.    v.    McClary 

(66   111.  233),   1360. 
Transportation    Co.    v.    McKenzie 

(25    S.    C.    R.     (Can.)     38), 

172. 
Transportation    Co.    v.    Moore    (5 

Mich.  368),  401,  411. 
Transportation     Co.     v.     Newhall 

(24    111.    466),    131,    401,    415, 

441,  451,  455. 
Transportation  Co.  v.  Oil  Co.   (63 

Penn.    St.    14),   450,   496,   504. 
Transportation    Co.    v.    Sweetzer 

(25  W.  Va.  434),  574. 
Transportation     Co.    v.     Theilbar 

(86  111.  71),  1298. 
Transportation  Co.  v.  Wallace  (68 

Penn.  St.  302),  130,  613,  655. 


ceciv 


TABLE   OP   CASES   CITED. 


[BEFEBENCES    ABE 

Transportation  Line  v.  Hope   (95 

U.  S.  297),  92. 
Trapp  V.  Railway  Co.  (—  S.  Car. 

— ,  51  S.  E.  Rep.  919),  1067, 

1129. 
Travelers  Ins.  Co.  v.  Austin   (IIG 

Ga.  26G,  42  S.  B.  522,  59  L.  R 

A.  107),  1004. 
Travis    v.    Thompson    (37    Barb. 

236),   867,   884. 
Tray  wick  v.  Railway  Co.    (71   S. 

Car.  707,  50  S.  E.  Rep.  549), 

1369. 
Tread  well    v.    Aydlett    (9    Heisk. 

388),  762. 
Treadwell    v.    Insurance    Co.     (6 

Cow.  270),  801. 
Treadwell    v.    Whittier    (80    Cal. 

575,   22   Pac.   266,   5   L.   R.   A. 

498,    13    Am.    St.    Rep.    175), 

100. 
Treat  v.  Railroad  Co.   (131  Mass. 

371),  1197. 
Treleven  v.  Railroad  Co.  (89  Wis. 

598,  62   N.  W.   536),  677,   685. 
Trent  Nav.  Co.  v.  "Wood   (3  Esp. 

127),  75,  275. 
Trezona    v.     Railway     Co.     (107 

Iowa,  22,  77  N.  W.  486,  43  L. 

R.  A.  136),  1043. 
Trice  v.  Railway  Co.    (40  W.  Va. 

271,  21  S.  E.  Rep.  1022),  1065. 
Trimble   v.    Railroad    (162    N.    Y. 

84,  56  N.  E.  532,  48  L.  R.  A. 

115,  aft'g.,  57  N.  Y.  Supp.  437, 

39  App.  Div.  403),  462,  1250, 

1251,  1306. 
Trinidad    Shipping,    etc.,    Co.    v. 

Frame  (88  Fed.  528),  387. 
Trotlinger    v.    Railroad    Co.     (11 

Lea,  533),  1041. 

Trottas'  Adm'r.  v.  Johnson,  Briggs 
&  Pitts  (—  Ky.  L.  R.  — ,  90 
S.  W.  Rep.  540),  1395. 

Trow  v.  Railroad  (24  Vt.  487), 
1174. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Trowbridge  v.   Chapin    (23   Conn. 

595),  107. 
Truax  v.  Railroad  Co.   (13  Houst. 

233,  251),  115,  137. 
Truesdell  v.  Erie  R.  Co.  (99  N.  Y. 

Supp.  694),  933. 
Trumbull    v.    Donahue    (18    Colo. 

App.   460,   72   Pac.   684),   1198. 
Trumbull    v.    Erickson    (97    Fed. 

891,    38    C.    C.    A.    536),    895, 

1198,  1230. 
Tucker  v.  Cracklin  (2  Stark.  385), 

1352. 
Tucker  v.  Draper  (62  Neb.  66,  86 

N.  W.  Rep.  917,  54  L.  R.  A. 

321),  1392. 

Tucker    v.    Railroad     (33    N.    Y. 

Supp.  93,  12  Misc.   117;    s.   c. 

32    N.    Y.    Supp.    1,    11    Misc. 

366,  reversing  30  N.  Y.  Supp. 

811,  10  Misc.  35),  505. 
Tucker   v.   Railway   Co.    (54    Mo. 

179),    1222. 
Tucker  v.   State   (89  Md.  471,  43 

Atl.    Rep.    778,    44    Atl.    Rep. 

1004),  1391. 

Tuley  v.  Railroad  (41  Mo.  App. 
432),  1195. 

Tuller  V.  Talbot  (23  111.  357),  895, 
897,   958. 

Tully  V.  Railroad  Co.  (3  Penne- 
will,  455,  50  Atl.  95),  990. 

Turner  v.  Israel  (64  Ark.  244), 
175. 

Turner  v.  Liverpool  Docks  Trus- 
tees (6  Exch.  543),  771. 

Turner  v.  McCook  (77  Mo,  App. 
196),  1060. 

Turner  v.  Railroad  (34  Cal.  594), 

1438. 
Turner   v.    Railroad   Co.    (37   La. 

Ann.  648),  933. 
Turner   v.    Railroad    Co.    (20   Mo. 

App.  632),  167,  241,  462. 


TABLE   iOF    CASES    CITED. 


CCCV 


[befebences  are 

Turner    v.    Railway    Co.    (40    W. 

Va.    675,    22    S.    E.    Rep.    83), 

1401. 
Turner  v.  Railway  (15  Wash.  213, 

46  Pac.  243,  55  Am.  St.  Rep. 

883),    1221,    1424,    1426,    1431. 
Turney  v.  Wilson   (7  Yerg.  339), 

52,  486. 
Turnpike  Co.  v.  Stewart   (2  Met. 

(Ky.)   119),  1236. 
Turrill  v.  Crawley  (13  Q.  B.  197), 

882. 
Tuteur  v.  Railroad  Co.    (77  Wis. 

505,  46  N.  W.  Rep.  897),  1397. 
Tuttle  V.  Railway  Co.  (26  Ky.  Law 

Rep.  152,  80  S.  W.  802),  1083. 
Tutwiler  Coal  Co.  v.  Enslen  (129 

Ala.    336,    30    So.    Rep.    600), 

1397. 
Twist  V.  Railroad  Co.   (39  Minn. 

164),  1228. 
Two   hundred   and   sixteen   Loads 

and  678  Barrels  of  Fertilizer 

(88  Fed.  984),  857. 
Two     hundred     and     seventy-five 

Tons    of    Mineral    Phosphates 

(9  Fed.  209),  856. 
Two    thousand    Tons    of    Coal   ex 

The  Michigan    (135  Fed.  734, 

68   C.   C.   A.   372),   834,   836. 
Two    thousand    and    ninety-eight 

Tons  of  Coal  In  re  (135  Fed. 

317,    67    C.    C.    A.    671),    842, 

849. 
Tyler  v.  Freeman   (3  Cush.  261), 

1305. 
Tyler  v.  Railway  Co.    (Tex.   Civ. 

App.,    79    S.    W.    Rep.    1075), 

892,  922. 
Tyler  v.  W.  U.  Tel.  Co.    (60  111. 

421),  95. 
Tyne    &    Blyth    Shipping    Co.    v. 

Leech,    Harrison    &    Forwood 

(69  L.  J.  Q.  B.  353,   (1900)   2 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Q.  B.   12,  48  Wkly.  Rep.  590, 
5  Com'l  Cas.  155),  851. 
Tyson  v.  Booth   (100  Mass.  258), 
1434. 


u 


Udell  V.  Railroad  Co.  (13  Mo.  App. 

254),  505. 
Ullman  v.  Railway  Co.   (93  N.  Y. 

Supp.   480),   177. 
Ullman  v.  Railway  Co.   (112  Wis. 

150,  88  N.  W.  41,  56  L.  R.  A. 

246,    88    Am.    St.    Rep.    949), 

426,  428. 
Ulrich  v.  Railroad  Co.  (108  N.  Y. 

80),   1075. 
Unger  v.  Railroad  (51  N.  Y.  497), 

952. 
Union   Feed   Co.   v.    Pac.    Clipper 

Line    (31   Wash.   28,    71   Pac. 

552),   1315. 
Union    Freight    Co.    v.    Winkley 

(159  Mass.  133,  34  N.  E.  Rep. 

91,  38  Am.  St.  Rep.  398),  810. 
Union  Ins.  Co.  v.  Groom  (4  Bush, 

289),  489. 
Union  State  Bank  v.  Railroad  Co. 

(66  Neb.  159,   92  N.  W.  Rep. 

131,    59    L.    R.    A.    939),    233, 

241. 
Union    Steamboat    Co.    v.    Knapp 

(73  HI.  506),  687,  695. 
Union  Stockyards  Co.  v.  Westcott 

(47  Neb.  300,  66  N.  W.  419), 

177,    187. 
Union  Trust  Co.  v.  Railroad    (64 

Fed.    992;    reversed.     Walker 

V.    Keenan,    73    Fed.    755,    19 

C.   C.   A.    668,    34   U.    S.   App. 

691),   556. 


eccvi 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED, 


[BEFEBENCES    ABE 

United  Electric,  etc.,  Co.  v.  State 

(—  Md.  — ,  60  Atl.  Rep.  248), 

1397. 
United     Railways,     etc.,     Co.     v. 

State    (93    Md.    619,    49    Atl. 

923,    86    Am.    St.    Rep.    453), 

980,  984. 
United  Railways,  etc.,  Co.  v.  Weir 

(—  Md.  — ,  62  Atl.  Rep.  588), 

1179. 
United   States   v.   Grossmayer    (9 

Wall.  73),  322. 
United  States  v.  Harris   (85  Fed. 

533,  29  C.  C.  A.  327,  aff'g.,  78 

Fed.  290),   638. 
United  States  v.  Lapene  (17  Wall. 

601),   322. 
United  States  v.  Mellen   (53  Fed. 

229),  566. 
United  States  v.  Milwaukee,  etc.. 

Transit   Co.    (142    Fed.    247), 

539. 
United    States    v.    Morsman    (42 

Fed.  448),  524. 
United   States  v.   Pacific  Ex.   Co. 

(15  Fed.  Rep.   867),  80. 
United  States  v.  Palmer  (3  Wheat. 

610),  317. 
United  States  v.  Power  (6  Mont. 

271),  37,  40. 
United  States  v.  Railroad  Co.  (40 

Fed.  101),  552. 
United  States  v.  Railroad  Co.  (81 

Fed.  783),  576. 
United  States  v.  Railroad  Co.  (115 

Fed.  373),  525. 
United     States    v.    Railroad     Co. 

(125   Fed.   252;    affirmed,   134 

Fed.    198,    67    C.    C.    A.    220), 

557. 
United  States  v.  Railway  Co.   (82 

Fed.   563),   526. 
United  States  v.  Railway  Co.  (109 

Fed.  831;   s.  c.  114  Fed.  683), 

557. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

United  States  v.  Railway  Co.  (127 

Fed.    785,    62    C.    C.    A.    465), 

543. 
United  States  v.  Railway  Co.  ( — 

C.    C.   A.   — ,   143    Fed.    266), 

557. 
United   States  v.   Tozer    (39  Fed. 

369),  543. 
United  States  v.  Wilder   (3  Sum- 
ner, 308),  886. 
United  States,  etc.,  Co.  v.  Oliver 

(16  Neb.  612),  761. 
United  States  Brewing  Co.  v.  Stol- 

tenberg  (211  111.  531,  71  N.  E. 

Rep.  1081),  1397. 
United  States  Electric,  etc.,  Co.  v. 

Sullivan   (22  App.  D.  C.  115), 

1384,  1397. 
United  States  Ex.  Co.  v.  Backman 

(28  Ohio  St.  144),  80,  82. 
United  States  Ex.  Co.  v.  Root  (47 

Mich.   231),  80. 
United    States   Ex.    Co.    v.    Rush 

(24  Ind.  403),  243. 
United    States    Mail    Line    Co.    v. 

Mfg.    Co.    (19   Ky.   Law   Rep. 

833,  101  Ky.  658,  42  S.  W.  Rep. 

342),   236,  1304. 
United  States  Watch  Case  Co.  v. 

Express  Co.   (120  N.  Car.  351, 

27  S.  E.  Rep.  74),  444. 
Upperton    v.    Steamship    Co.     (9 

Com'l  Cas.  50,  89  Law  T.  (N. 

S.)    289),  497. 

Upshare  v.  Aidee  (1  Comyns,  25), 

69,  1241. 
Uptegrove    v.    Railroad    Co.     (16 

Misc.  14,  37  N.  Y.  Supp.  659), 

61L 
Uren  v.  Hagar  (95  Fed.  493),  837. 

Usher  v.  Railroad  Co.   (126  Penn. 

St.   207),   1390. 

Usher   v.    Railway   Co.    ( —   Kan. 
— ,  80  Pac.  Rep.  956;,  1060. 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


cccvn 


[references  are 

Utah,  etc.,  Co.  v.  Coal  Co.  (26 
Utah,  299,  73  Pac.  Rep.  524), 
1389. 


Valente  v.   Gibbs    (6  C.  B.  270), 

497. 
Valentine  v.  Railroad  Co,    (92  N. 

Y.  Supp.  645),  750. 
Van  Akin  v.  Railroad  Co.   (87  N. 

Y.    Supp.    871,    92    App.    Div. 

23),  449,  1355. 
Van  Amburgh  v.  Railroad  Co,  (37 

La.    Ann,    650,    55    Am.    Rep. 

517),    1384. 
Van  Anda  v.  Navigation  Co.  (Ill 

Fed.  765,  49  C.  C.  A.  596,  55 

L.  R.  A.  544),  1156. 
Van    Baalen    v.    Dean    (27   Mich. 

104),  782. 
Van    Brunt   v.    Railroad    Co.    (78 

Mich.  530),  1397. 
Van  Buskirk  v.  Purinton  (2  Hall, 

561),  865,  884. 
Van  Buskirk  v.  Roberts  (31  N.  Y. 

661),   238,   1109. 
Van  Camp  v.  Railway  (137  Mich. 

467,    100    N.    W.    Rep.    771), 

1104. 
Van    Casteel    v.    Booker     (2    Ex. 

691),  771. 
Vancleve  v.  Railroad  Co.  (107  Mo. 

App.  96,  80  S.  W.  Rep.  706), 

957. 
Vanderbilt  v.  Turnpike  Co.  (2  N. 

Y.  479),  1441. 

Vandercook  v.  Railroad  Co.  (125 
Mich.  459,  84  N.  W.  616), 
1428. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Vanderwerken  v.  Railroad  Co.   (6 

Abb.   Pr.   239),    1387. 
Van  de  Venter  v.  Railway  Co.  (26 

Fed.  Rep.  32),  895. 
Vandewenter  v.  Railroad  Co.   (27 

Barb.    244),    1387. 
Van    Doren   v.    Railroad    Co.    (93 

Fed.    260,    35    C.    C.    A.    282), 

1388. 
Van    Dusan   v.    Railway    Co.    (97 

Mich.   439,   56   N.   W.   848,   37 

Am.  St.  Rep.  354,  1061,  1065. 
Van  Etten  v.  Newton    (134  N.  Y. 

143,  31  N.  E.  334,  30  Am.  St. 

Rep.  630,  aff'g.,  8  N.  Y.  Supp. 

478),    853. 
Van    Gent    v.    Railway    Co.     (80 

Iowa,  526,  45  N.  W.  R.  913), 

1397. 
Van    Horn    v.    Kermit    (4    E.    D. 

Smith,  453),   1271,   1286. 
Vankirk  v.  Pennsylvania  Co.   (76 

Penn.    St.    66,    18    Am.    Rep. 

404),  1088. 
Van    Natta   v.    Insurance   Co.    (2 

Sandf.  490),  783. 
Van  Nostrand  v.  Moore  (52  N.  Y. 

12),   165. 
Van   Ostran   v.   Railroad   Co.    (35 

Hun,  590),   1184. 
Van  Ostran  v.  Railroad  Co.   (104 

N.   Y.   683),   1184. 
Van  Ostrand  v.  D.  &  H.  Co.    (99 

N.  Y.  Supp.  548),  1219. 
Van    Patten   v.    Chicago,   etc.,   R. 

Co.   (81  Fed.  547),  528,  533. 
Van    Santvoord    v.    St.    John    (6 

Hill,    160),    48,    130,    133,    134. 

231,  665,   696. 
Van  Shaack  v.  N.  T.  Co.  (3  Biss. 

394),  408. 

Van  Winkle  v.  Railroad  Co.    (46 
Hun,  564),  920. 

Van  Winkle  v.  Steamship  Co.  (37 
Barb.  122),   740. 


CCCVlll 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


[befebences  are 

Varble  v.  Bigley  (14  Bush  (Ky.), 

698),  37,  47,  92. 
Vaughan  v.  Railroad  Co.  (13  R.  I. 

578),  885. 
Vaughn  v.  Bunker  Hill,  etc.,  Co. 

(126  Fed.  895),  1390. 
Vaughn  v.  Casks  of  Wine  (7  Ben. 

506),    165. 
Vaughn  v.  Railroad  Co.   ( —  R.  I- 

— ,    61    Atl.    Rep.    695),    184, 

711. 
Vaughn   v.   Railway  Co.    (62  Mo. 

App.   461;    s.  c.  78  Mo.   App. 

639),  426. 
Vawter  v.   Railroad   Co.    (84   Mo. 

679),   1390. 
Verner  v.  Sweitzer   (32  Penn.  St. 

208),  70,  401,  415,  1299. 
Verrall  v.  Robinson  (5  Tyrwhitt's 

Exch.   1069;    4  Dowling  242), 

739. 
Vetalaro    v.    Perkins    (101    Fed. 

393),  1395. 
Vick  V.   Railroad   Co.    (95   N.   Y. 

267,  47  Am.  Rep.  36),  1004. 
Vicksburg   v.    McLain    (67    Miss. 

4),  1401. 
Victor   V.    Railroad   Co.    (164    Pa. 

St.    195,    30    Atl.    381),    1123, 

1177. 
Vimont  v.  Railroad  Co.  (71  Iowa, 

58),  1117,  1180,  1221. 
Vincent  v.   Railroad   Co,    (49   111. 

33),  521. 
Vincent  v.  Stinehour   (7  Vt.  62), 

1430. 
Vincent  &  Hayne  v.  Railroad  (114 

So.    1021,    38    So.    Rep.    816), 

231. 
Viner  v.  Steamship  Co.  (50  N.  Y. 

23),  674. 
Vinton    v.    Railroad     (11    Allen, 

304),  978. 
Violett  V.  Stettinius  (5  Cranch  C. 

Ct.  559),  660. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Virginia  Coal  &  Iron  Co.  v.  Rail- 
road Co.  (98  Va.  776,  37  S. 
E.  Rep.  310),  226. 

Vlierboom  v.  Chapman  (13  M.  & 
W.  230),  788,  818. 

Voigt  V.  Railway  Co.  (79  Fed. 
561;  reversed  without  opin- 
ion, 102  Fed.  1000;  s.  c.  176 
U.  S.  498,  20  Sup.  Ct.  R.  385), 
1018,    1073. 

Volunteer,  Schooner  (1  Sumn. 
551),  875. 

Vose  V.  Allen  (3  Blatch.  289), 
688. 

Voss  V.  "Wagner  Palace  Car  Co. 
(16  Ind.  App.  271,  44  N.  B. 
1010;  s.  c.  43  N.  E.  20),  1146. 

Vowell  V.  Coal  Co.  (31  Wash.  103. 
71  Pac.  Rep.  725),  1401. 

Vredenburg  v.  Behan  ( 33  La.  Ann. 
627),   1397. 

Vredenburgh  v.  Railroad  Co.  (12 
N.  Y.  Suppl.  18),  1118. 


w 


Wade    V.    Leroy    (20    How.    34), 

1423. 
Wade    V.    Lutcher,    etc.,    Co.    (74 

Fed.  517,  41  U.  S.  App.  45,  20 

C.  C.  A.  515,  33  L.  R.  A.  255), 

61. 
Wade  V.  Wheeler   (3  Lans.  201), 

72. 
Wade  V.  Wheeler  (47  N.  Y.  658), 

113. 
Wadhams  &  Co.  v.  Balfour  (32  Or. 

313,  51  Pac.  642),  175. 
Wagner  v.   Railroad  Co.    (97  Mo. 

512),  899,  1233. 


TxVBLE   OF    CASES   CITED. 


CCCIX 


[references    ABE 

Wagoner    v.    Railroad    Co.    (Tex. 

Civ.  App.,  94  S.  W.  Rep.  293), 

927. 
Wahl  V.  Holt   (26  Wis.  703),  226. 
Wahl  V.  Shoulders   (14  Ind.  App. 

665,  43  N.  E.  458),  1418. 
Wait   V.    Railroad    Co.    (165    Mo. 

612,   65  S.  W.  1028),  1217. 
Waite  V.  Gilbert   (10  Cush.  177), 

1366. 
Waite  V.   Railway    (El.   B.  &  El. 

719),  1229. 
Walcott  V.  Canfield  (3  Conn.  194), 

1327. 
Wald  V.  Railroad  (162  111.  545,  44 

N.  E.  888,  35  L.  R.  A.  356,  53 

Am.    St.   Rep.    332,   reversing 

60  111.  App.  460),  282,  304. 
Wald    V.    Railroad    Co.     (92    Ky. 

645),   704. 
Waldron  v.  Fargo  (170  N.  Y.  130, 

62  N.  E.  Rep.  1077,  reversing 

64  N.  Y.  Supp.  798),  172,  336, 

339,   457. 
Waldron  v.  Railroad  Co.   (1  Dak. 

336),   1250,   1301. 
Waldron     v.     Railway     Co.      (22 

Wash.  253,  60  Pac.  653),  462, 

866. 
Waldron   v.   Romaine    (22    N.   Y. 

368),  194. 
Walker  v.  Eikleberry  (7  Okl.  599, 

54   Pac.   Rep.    553,    13   Am.   & 

Eng.    R.    Cas.    (N.    S.)    253), 

714. 
Walker  v.  Green  (60  Kan.  289,  56 

Pac.   477),    1202. 
Walker  v.   Keenan    (73   Fed.  755, 

19  C.  C.  A.  668,  34  U.  S.  App. 

691,    reversing    Union    Trust 

Co.  V.  Railroad,  64  Fed.  992), 

556. 
Walker  v.  McNeill  (17  Wash.  582, 

50  Pac.  Rep.  518),  1398. 
Walker  v.  Piatt    (69  N.  Y.   Supp. 

943,  34  Misc.  799),  1298. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Walker    v.    Price    (62    Kan.    327, 

62  Pac.  1001,  84  Am.  St.  Rep. 

392,    reversing     (Kan.    App.) 

59  Pac.  Rep.  1102),  1028,  1043, 

1052. 
Walker  v.  Railroad  Co.   (Ill  Ala. 

233,  20  So.  358),  779. 
Walker   v.   Railroad   Co.    (41   La. 

Ann.    795,    17    Am.    St.    Rep. 

417),  1177. 
Walker    v.    Railroad     (49    Mich. 

446),   179. 
Walker   v.   Railway    (2    E.   &   B. 

750),   395. 
Walker  v.  Railway  Co.    (110  La. 

718,  34  So.  Rep.  749),  1395. 
Walker  v.  Railway  Co.  (104  Mich. 

617,    62    N.    W.    Rep.    1032), 

1397. 
Walker   v.   Railway   Co.    (15   Mo. 

App.  333),   1041,   1056. 
Walker  v.  Railway  Co.   (63  Barb. 

260),    1409. 
Walker  v.  Skipwith  (Meigs,  502), 

53,  68. 
Walker    v.    Steamboat    Co.     (117 

Fed.   784;    affirmed,  Wilming- 
ton Steamboat  Co.  v.  Walker, 

120  Fed.  97,  56  C.  C.  A.  49), 

1414. 
Walker  v.  Westfield   (39  Vt.  248), 

1417. 
Wall   V.   Cameron    (6   Colo.   275), 

1440. 
Wall  V.  Railroad  Co.   (200  111.  66, 

65  N.  E.  Rep.  632),  1396. 
Wallace  v.  Clayton   (42  Ga.  443), 

282. 
Wallace    v.    Navigation    Co.    (134 

Mass.  95),  1233. 
Wallace  v.  Railroad  Co.  (118  Fed. 

422,  55  C.  C.  A.  192,  574. 
Wallace  v.  Railroad  Co.  (98  N.  C. 

494),    1217. 
Wallace  v.  Railroad  Co.  (8  Houst. 

529),   936,   937. 


eccx 


TABLE  OF   CASES  CITED. 


[BEFEBENCES    ABE 

Wallace  v.  Railway  Co.   (10  Det. 

L.  N.   331,   133  Mich.  633,   95 

N.  W.  750),  634.  637. 
Wallace  v.  Woodgate  (Ryan  &  M. 

193),  871. 
Waller   v.   Railway   Co.    (59    Mo. 

App.  410),  936. 
Walley   v.   Montgomery    (3    East, 

585),   194. 
Wallingford   v.   Railroad   Co.    (26 

S.  C.  258),  287,  450. 
Walsh  V.  Blakely   (6  Mont.  194), 

761. 
Walsh  V.  Railroad  Co.  (160  Mass. 

571,  36  N.  E.  Rep.  584,  39  Am. 

St.   Rep.   514),   1388. 
Walsh   V.   Railroad   Co.    (42  Wis. 

23),    966,    1404. 
Walsh    V.    Rosenberg    (97    N.    Y. 

Supp.    328),    1401. 
Walston   V.   Myers    (5   Jones    (N. 

C.)    174),  92. 
Walter   v.   Railroad    ( —  Ala.   — , 

39  So.  Rep.  87),  1348. 
Walters  v.  Railroad  Co.   (66  Fed. 

862,  14  C.  C.  A.  267,  30  U.  S. 

App.    25,   aft'g.,   63   Fed.   391; 

s.   c.   56  Fed.   369),  184. 
Walters  v.  Railroad  Co.  (41  Iowa, 

71),  1229. 
Walters  v.  Railway  Co.  ( —  Mich. 

— ,  102  N.  W.  Rep.  745),  708. 
Walters  v.  Railway  Co.    (1  Terr. 

L.  R.  88),  420. 

Walters  v.  Railway  Co.  (113  Wis. 

367,  89  N.  W.  140),  1118,  1177. 
Walthers  v.  Railroad  Co.    (72  111. 

App.   354),  933,   1181. 
Wamsley   v.    Steamship   Co.    (168 

N.  Y.  533,  61  N.  E.  896,  85  Am. 

St.  Rep.  699,  reversing  63  N. 

Y.    Supp.    761,    50    App.    Div. 

199;  s.  c.  56  N.  Y.  Supp.  284, 

37  App.  Div.  553),  1372. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Ward    V.    Felton    (1    East,    507),       ■ 

809. 
Ward   V.   Railroad   Co.    (56   Hun, 

268),    1085. 
Ward  V.  Railroad   (47  N.  Y.  29), 

1366. 
Ward  V.  Railroad   Co.    (102  Wis. 

215,  78  N.  W.  442),  1017,  1198. 
Ward    V.    Railway    (165    111.    462, 

46  N.  E.  365,  reversing  61  111. 

App.  530),  1122. 
Ward    V.    Railway    Co.    (158    Mo. 

226,  58  S.  W.  28),  445,  548. 
Ward  V.  White  (Va.,  9  S.  E.  Rep. 

1021),   1434. 
Ward's    Line    Co.    v.    Elkins    (34 

Mich.  439),  1366,  1371. 
Warden  v.  Greer   (6  Watts,  424), 

75,  334. 
Wardlaw   v.   Railway    Co.     (Cal., 

42  Pac.  Rep.  1075),  1184. 
Wardrobe    v.    Stage    Co.    (7    Cal. 

118),  1438. 
Wardwell     v.     Railway     Co.     (46 

Minn.   514,   49   N.  W.  206,   24 

Am.  St.  Rep.  246,  13  L.  R.  A. 

596),   1034,   1085,    1086. 
Ware  v.  Gay  (11  Pick.  106),  1414. 
Ware    v.    Railroad    Co.    (119    111. 

App.  456),  892. 
Warehouse    &    Builders'     Supply 

Co.  V.  Galvin  (96  Wis.  523,  71 

N.  W.  804),   864. 
Warfield   v.   Railroad   Co.    (40   N. 

Y.    Supp.    783,    8    App.    Div. 

479),   1219. 
Warfield    v.    Railroad    Co.     (104       ,; 

Tenn.  74,  55  S.  W.  304,  78  Am. 

St.  Rep.  911),  1025. 
Waring  v.   Insurance  Co.    (45   N. 

Y.  606),  783. 
Warner  v.  Railroad  Co.  (168  U.  S. 

339,  18  Sup.  Ct.  68  reversing 

7  App.  D.  C.  79),  1219. 


J 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


CCCXl 


[befebences  are 

Warner  v.  Railroad  Co.  (113  Cal. 

105,  45  Pac.   187,   54  Am.   St. 

Rep.  327),  1438,  1441. 
Warner    v.    Railroad     (22    Iowa, 

166),  1278. 
Warner  v.  Railroad  Co.  (94  N.  C. 

250),   1394. 
Warner  v.  Transportation  Co.   (5 

Rob.   490),   433. 
Warner  v.  W.  T.  Co.  (5  Rob.   (N. 

Y.)   490),  330. 
Warren    v.    Englehart    (13    Neb. 

283,  13  N.  W.  Rep.  401),  1394. 
Warren  v.  Railroad  Co.   (8  Allen, 

227),  923,  933,  940,  1006. 
Washburn   v.   Railroad    (3    Head, 

638),  906,  1004,  1022,  1200. 
Washburn-Crosby  Co.  v.  Johnston 

&  Co.   (125  Fed.  273,  60  C.  C. 

A.  187),    401,    1355. 
Washburn-Crosby  Co.  v.  Railroad 

Co.    (180  Mass.  252,  62  N.  E. 

Rep.  590),  115,  137,  173. 
Washburn   Man.    Co.    v.   Railroad 

(113  Mass.  490),  261. 
Washington  Ins.  Co.  v.  Reed   (20 

Ohio,    199),    487. 
Wasserberg  v.  Steamship  Co.   (28 

N.  Y.  Supp.  520,  8  Misc.  78), 

1299. 
Waterbury   v.   Railroad   Co.    (104 

Iowa,  32,  73  N.  W.  341),  935, 

1207. 
Waters  v.  Insurance  Co.   (5  El.  & 

B.  870),  783. 
Waters  v.  Towers   (8  Exch.  401), 

1370. 
Watson    V.    Duykinck    (3    Johns. 

335),  830. 
Watson    V.    Hoosac    Tunnel    Line 

(13  Mo.  App.  263),  177. 
Watson  V.  Oxanna  Land   Co.    (92 

Ala.    320,    8     So.     770),     937, 

1012. 
Watson  V.  Railroad  Co.    (92  Ala. 

320,  8  So.  Rep.  770),  1012. 


TO   SECTIONS.] 

Watson  V.  Railroad  Co.   (55  N.  J. 

Law  (26  Vroom)   125,  26  Atl. 

Rep.    136,    39    Am.    St.    Rep. 

624,   19    L.   R.   A.    487),   1189, 

1221. 
Watson   V.   Railroad   Co.    (133   N. 

Car.  188,  45  S.  E.  Rep.  555), 

1397. 
Watson  V.  Railroad  Co.  (104  Tenn. 

194,  56  S.  W.  1024,  49  L.  R.  A. 

454),   1052,   1054. 
Watson  V.   Railway   Co.    (15  Jur. 

448),  229,  241. 
Watson   V.   Railway   Co.    (81   Ga. 

476),   1177. 
Watson  V.  Railway  Co.  (66  Iowa, 

164),  1174. 
Watson  V.  Railway  Co.   (54  N.  Y. 

Supp.  201,  24  Misc.  628),  1052. 
Watt  V.  Potter  (2  Mason,  77),  668. 
Way    V.    Railway    Co.    (64    Iowa, 

48),  1001,  1056. 
Weaver  v.  Railroad  Co.  ( —  Mich. 

— ,    102    N.    W.    Rep.    1037), 

1003,  1073. 
Weaver  v.  Railroad    (21   App.   D. 

C.  499),  1396,  1402. 
Weaver  v.  Ward  (Hob.  134),  1430. 
Webb  V.   Railroad   Co.    (88   Tenn. 

119,  12  S.  W.  Rep.  428),  1389. 
Webb,  Str.    (14  Wall.  406),  92. 
Webber  v.   Railway  Co.    (3   H.   & 

C.  771),  229. 
Weber   v.   Railway  Co.    (100   Mo. 

194),   1179. 
Weber    Co.    v.   Railway   Co.    (113 

Iowa,  188,  84  N.  W.  1042;  s.  c. 

92   Iowa,  364,   60  N.  W.  Rep. 

637),   1251. 
Webster  v.  Mining  Co.    (137  Cal. 

399,  70   Pac.  276,  92  Am.   St. 

Rep.    181),   1394. 
Webster     v.     Railroad     Co.     (161 

Mass.    298,    37    N.    E.    165,   24 

L.  R.   A.   521),   1006,   1015. 
Webster    v.    Railroad    (38    N.    Y. 

260),  1236. 


cccxu 


TABLE  OP   CASES   CITED. 


[BEFEBENCES   ABE 

Webster  v.  Railroad  Co.   (115  N. 

Y.  112),  1200. 
Webster  v.  Railroad   Co.    (32   N. 

Y.  Supp.  590),  1414. 
Webster  v.  Railroad   Co.    (32   N. 

Y.   Supp.  590),  1414. 
Wedikind  v.  Railway  Co.  (20  Nev. 

292),  1414. 
Weed  V.  Barney   (45  N.  Y.  344), 

685,   714,   722,   725. 
Weed  V.  Railroad  Co.    (17  N.  Y. 

362),   657,   1098,   1109,   1429. 
Weed  V.  Railroad  (19  Wend.  534), 

230,    916,     1246,     1276,     1296, 

1326,   1336. 
Weeks   v.   Railroad    Co.    (40    La. 

Ann.  800),  1219. 
Weeks  v.  Railroad   (9  Hun,  669), 

1264. 
Weems  v.  Mathieson  (4  Macq.  H. 

L.  Cas.  215),  1397. 
Wegener  v.   Smith    (15   Com.   B. 

285),  807. 
Wehman   v.   Railway   Co.    ( —   S. 

Car.  — ,  54   S.  E.  Rep.   360), 

1367. 
Wehmann    v.    Railway    Co.     (58 

Minn.  22,  59  N.  W.  546),  141, 

262,  475. 
Weightman    v.    Railway    Co.    (70 

Miss.  563,  12  So.  586,  35  Am. 

St.  Rep.  660,  19  L.  R.  A.  671), 

992. 
Weikle  v.  Railway  Co.   (64  Minn. 

296,   66  N.   W.   963),   732. 
Weil  V.  Railroad   Co.    (119  N.  Y. 

147),  1229. 

Weiller  v.  Railroad  Co.    (134  Pa. 

St.   310,   19   Atl.   Rep.   702,   19 

Am.  St.  Rep.  700),  426. 
Weinschenck  v.  Railroad  Co.   ( — 

Mass.  — ,  76  N.  E.  Rep.  662), 

927. 


TO   SECTIONS.] 

Weir  V.   Express    Co.    (5    Phila. 

355),  442. 
Weir  V.  Northwestern  Commercial 

Co.     (134    Fed.    991),    838. 
Weir   V.   Railway   Co.    (98   N.   Y. 

Supp.    268),    1414. 
Weis   V.   Railroad   Co.    (97   N.   Y. 

Supp.   993),  239. 
Weisenberg   v.    City   of   Appleton 

(26  Wis.  56),  1423. 
Weisman  v.  Railroad  Co.    (22  R. 

I.  128,  47  Atl.  318),  177. 
Weisshaar   v.    Kimball    S.    S.    Co. 

(128  Fed.  397,  63  C.  C.  A.  139, 

65  L.  R.  A.  84,  reversing  In 

re  Kimball  S.  S.  Co.  123  Fed. 

838),  344,  1173. 
Welch  V.  Hicks  (6  Cow.  504),  815. 
Welch  V.  Pullman  C.  Co.  (16  Abb. 

Pr.    (N.    S.)    352;    43    N.    Y. 

Supr.  Ct.  457),  1130,  1132. 
Welch  V.  Railroad  Co.   (68  N.  H. 

206,    44    Atl.    304),    712,    714, 

1332. 
Welch  V.  Railway  Co.  ( —  N.  Dak. 

— ,  103  N.  W.  Rep.  396),  442, 

464,  641. 
Welfare  v.  Railway  (L.  R.  4  Q.  B. 

693),   940. 
Weller  v.  Railway  (L.  R.  9  C.  P. 

126),    1122. 
Wellman  v.   Morse    (76   Fed.  573, 

22  C.   C.  A.   318),   855. 
Wellman  v.  Railway  Co.  (83  Mich. 

,592),  574,   1023. 
Wells    V.    Express    Co.     (55    Wis. 

23),  80,  749,  750,  751. 
Wells   V.   Railroad   Co.    (67   Miss. 

24),   1060,   1067. 
Wells    V.    Railroad     (6    Jones    L. 

47),  113,  122. 
Wells  V.   Railroad   Co.    (49   N.  Y. 

Supp.  510.  25  App.  Div.  365), 

992. 
Wells  V.  Railroad   (26  Barb.  641; 

24  N.  Y.  181),  1075. 


TABLE  OF    CASES  CITED. 


cccxin 


[BEFEEENCES   ABE   TO   SECTIONS.] 


Wells  V.  Stm.  Nav.  Co.   (2  N.  Y. 

204),  13,  40,  45,  92. 
Wells  V.  Stm.  Nav.  Co.   (8  N.  Y. 

375),   14,  92. 
Wells  V.   Steamship   Co.    (4  Cliff. 

228),  325,  740. 
Wells  V.  Thomas  (27  Mo.  17),  867. 
Wells,    Fargo   &   Co.    v.   Bell    (65 

Ohio  St.  408,  62  N.  E.  1035), 

431. 
Wells  Fargo  &  Co.  v.  Hanson  ( — 

Tex.   Civ.   App.  — ,   91   S.   W. 

Rep.  321),  1372. 
Welsh   V.   Railroad    (10   Ohio   St. 

65),  339,  410,  450. 
Welsh  V.  Railroad  Co.    (62  N.  J. 

L.  655,  42  Atl.  736),  990. 
Welty  V.  Railroad   Co.    (105   Ind. 

55),  1230. 
Wendell  v.  Railroad  Co.  (91  N.  Y. 

420),  1228. 
Wenona    Coal    Co.    v.    Holmquist 

(152    111.    592),    1174. 
Wentworth  v.  Outhwaite  (10  M.  & 

W.  436),  769,  772. 
Wentz   V.   Railway    (5   Thomp.   & 

C.  556;   3  Hun,  241),  1043. 
Wenz  V.  Railway  Co.  (108  Ga.  290, 

33  S.  E.  Rep.  970),  1054. 
Werle  v.  Railroad  Co.    (98  N.  Y. 

650),  1197,   1198. 
Werner    v.    Evans    (94    111.    App. 

328),    1246. 
Werner  v.  Railway  Co.   (105  Wis. 

300,   81  N.  W.  416),   1127. 
Wernwag    v.    Railroad    Co.     (117 

Penn.  St.  46),  678. 
Wertheimer   v.    Railroad    Co.    (17 

Blatchf.   421),   449. 
West    V.    Forrest    (22    Mo.    344), 

1422. 
West    V.    The    Railroad    (4    Seld. 

57).  242. 
West     V.     Steamboat     (3     Clark, 

532),   165. 


West  Coast  Naval  Stores  Co.  v. 
Railroad  Co.  (121  Fed.  645, 
57  C.  C.  A.  671),  946. 

West  Ham  Corporation  v.  Rail- 
way Co.  (64  L.  J.  Q.  B.  340), 
931. 

West  Memphis  Packet  Co.  v. 
White  (99  Tenn.  256,  41  S. 
W.  583,  38  L.  R.  A.  427),  980, 
985. 

Westbrook  v.  Railroad  Co.  (66 
Miss.  560),  1228. 

Westcott  V.  Fargo  (63  Barb.  353), 
401,  463. 

Westcott  V.  Fargo  (61  N.  Y.  542), 
401,  402,  425,  442,  451,  454, 
1355. 

Westcott  V.  Railway  Co.  ( — 
Wash.  — ,  84  Pac.  Rep.  588), 
921. 

Western  Sash  &  Door  Co.  v.  Rail- 
road Co.  (177  Mo.  641,  76  S. 
W.   998),   234. 

Western  Trans.  Co.  v.  Barber  (56 

N.  Y.  544),  749,  750,  786,  880, 

888. 
Western     Transportation     Co.    v. 

Hawley    (1  Daly,  327),  688. 
Western     Transportation    Co.     v. 

Newhall     (24    111.    466),    131, 

401,  441,  451,  455. 
Weston     v.     Railroad     Co.      ( — 

Mass.  — ,  76  N.  E.  Rep.  1050), 

1369. 
Weston  V.  Railroad  Co.  (73  N.  Y. 

595),   935. 
Western  Union,  etc.,  Co.  v.  Lips- 
comb   (22    App.    D.    C.    104), 

1384. 
Western   Union   Telegraph   Co.   v. 

Woods  (88  III.  App.  375),  100. 
Weston  V.  Railway   (54  Me.  376), 

1366. 
Wetzel   V.   Power    (5  Mont.   214), 

1314. 


CCCXIV 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


[BEFEBENCES    ARE 

Wetzell  V.  Railroad  Co.    (12  Mo. 

App.  599),  505. 
Weyland   v.    Elkins    (Holt   N.    P. 

227).   249. 
Weyand  v.  Railway  Co.  (39  N.  W. 

Rep.  899),   188,   192. 
Whalen  v.  Railway  (60  Mo.  323), 

1230. 
Whaley  v.  Catlett  (103  Tenn.  347, 

53    S.    W.    Rep.    131),    1386, 

1396. 
Whalley  v.  Wray  (3  Esp.  74),  38. 
Whalon  v.  Aldrich  (8  Minn.  346), 

1366. 
Wheat   V.    Railroad    Co.    (4    Kan. 

370),   748. 
Wheelan  v.  Railway  Co.  (85  Iowa, 

167,  52  N.  W.  Rep.  119),  1397. 
Wheeler    v.    Navigation    Co.     (72 

Hun,  5,  25  N.  Y.  Supp.  578), 

1069. 
Wheeler    v.    Navigation    Co.    (125 

N.  Y.  155),  344. 
Wheeler  v.  Railroad  Co.    (115  U. 

S.   29),    172,   417. 
Wheeler    v.    Railway    Co.    (70    N. 

H.   607,   50   Atl.   103,  54  L.  R. 

A.   955),   1173,   1230. 
Wheelwright    v.    Beers    (2    Hall, 

391),  1360. 
Wheelwright  v.  Railroad  Co.  (135 

Mass.  225),  1418. 
Whelan   v.   Railroad   Co.    (84   Ga. 

506,     10     S.    E.     Rep.     1091), 

1177. 
Whicher    v.     Railroad     Co.     (176 

Mass.    275,    57    N.    E.    601,    79 

Am.  St.  Rep.  314),  1132. 
Whipple  V.  Railway  Co.   (11  Phil. 

345),    1216. 
Whirley    v.    Whiteman    (1    Head, 

610),   1227,   1229. 
Whitaker   v.   Railroad    (51   N.   Y. 

295),  1098. 
Whitaker  v.  Railway   (L.  R.  5  C. 

P.  464),  1122. 


TO    SECTIONS.] 

Whitaker    v.    Warren    (60    N.    H. 

20),   1378. 
White  v.  Ashton    (51  N.  Y.  280), 

168,  613. 
White  v.  Bascom  (28  Vt.  268),  37, 

779,    1305. 
White  v.  Boulton   (Peake's  Cases, 

113),  893. 
White  v.  Humphrey  (11  Q.  B.  43), 

714. 
White  v.  Mary  Ann  (6  Cal.  462), 

92. 
White    V.    Maxcy    (64    Mo.    552), 

1386. 
White     V.     Navigation     Co.      (36 

Wash.  281,  78  Pac.  909),  942, 

1207. 
White  V.   Railroad   Co.    (133   Ind. 

480,  33  N.  E.  273),  1038,  1060. 
White  V.  Railroad  Co.   (136  Mass. 

321),   923. 
White  V.  Railroad  Co.   (107  Mich. 

681,  65  N.  W.  521),  1036. 
White    V.    Railroad    Co.    (19    Mo. 

App.  400),  1417. 
White  V.  Railroad  Co.    (30  N.  H. 

207),   923. 
White  V.  Railroad  Co.  (115  N.  Car. 

631,  20  S.  E.  Rep.  191,  44  Am. 

St.  Rep.  489),  1017,  1093. 
White  V.  Railway  (2  Com.  B.   (N. 

S.)   7;  40  Eng.  L.  &  Eq.  255), 

397,    1338. 
White  V.  Railway  Co.    (Tex.  Civ. 

App.,    86    S.    W.    Rep.    962), 

1300. 
White  V.  Railway  Co.    (20  Wash. 

132,   54   Pac.   999),   1218. 
White  V.  Railway  Co.   (26  W.  Va. 

36),  1024. 
White  V.  Vann   (6  Hun,  70),  867. 
White   V.    Webb    (15   Conn.    302), 

782,   785. 
White   V.   Weir    (53    N.   Y.    Supp. 

465,   33   App.   Div.   145),   472. 


TABLE   OP    CASES   CITED, 


CCCXV 


[BEFEBENCES   ABE  TO   SECTIONS.] 


White    V.    Welsh    (38    Penn.    St. 

396),   772. 
White    V.    Winnisimmet    Co.     (7 

Cush.  155),  66,  67,  128.  333. 
White  Live  Stock  Commission  Co. 

V.  Railroad  Co.    (87  Mo.  App. 

330),   148,   254. 
Whitehead  v.   Anderson    (9   M.   & 

W.   518),  758,  760,  769,  770. 
Whitehead  v.  Railway  Co.  (99  Mo. 

263),   899,   964. 
Whitesides  v.  Russell   (8  Watts  & 

S.  44),   1352,  1355. 
Whitesides  v.  Thurlkill  (12  Sm.  & 

M.    599),   483. 
Whitford  v.  Railroad   Co.    (23   N. 

Y.  465),  1376,  1387. 
Whiting  V.  Railroad  Co.  (89  N.  Y. 

Supp.   584,   97  App.  Div.   11), 

920. 
Whitley   v.   Railway   Co.    (122   N. 

Car.  987,  29  S.  E.  Rep.  783), 

991. 
Whitlock  V.  Comer  (57  Fed.  565), 

1180. 
Whitlow    V.     Railway     Co.     (114 

Tenn.  344,  84  S.  W.  Rep.  618, 

68   L.   R.   A.   503),   1387,   1388. 
Whitman  v.   Vanderbilt    (75   Fed. 

422,  21  C.  C.  A.  422,  38  U.  S. 

App.  693),  163,  855. 
Whitmore  v.  Bowman   (4  Greene, 

148),  66. 
Whitmore   v.    S.   B.   Caroline    (20 

Mo.   513),   86. 
Whitney  v.   Beckford    (105   Mass. 

267),   885. 
Whitney    v.    Car    Co.    (143    Mass. 

243),   1131,   1132,   1134. 
Whitney    v.     Insurance    Co.     (18 

Johns.  208),  802. 
Whitney  v.  Railroad  Co.  (102  Fed. 

850,   43  C.   C.  A.   19,   50   L.  R. 

A.  615),   1004,   1073. 


Whitney    v.     Railway     (27    Wis. 

327),'  1291,   1360. 
Whitney  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Railroad  Co. 

(38  S.  Car.  365,  17  S.  E.  Rep. 

147,    37    Am.    St.    Rep.    767), 

711. 
Whittlesley   v.   Railway   Co.    (121 

Iowa,  597,  90  N.  W.  516),  949, 

1414. 
Whitworth  v.  Railroad   (87  N.  Y. 

413),   130,    131,    472. 
Whitworth  v.  Railway  Co.   (45  N. 

Y.  Super.  602),  1355. 
Wibert  v.  Railroad  (19  Barb.  36), 

1366. 
Wibert  v.  Railroad   (12  N.  Y.    (2 

Ker.)  245),  496,  520,  652,  654. 
Wice  V.  Railway  Co.  (193  111.  351, 

56  L.  R.  A.  268,  61  N.  E.  1084, 

reversing    93    111.    App.    266), 

1182. 
Wicks    V.    Railroad    Co.    (15    Ky. 

Law  Rep.  605),  1033. 
Wiegand  v.  Railroad  Co.  (75  Fed. 

370;  aff'd.,  on  opinion  of  court 

helow,  79  Fed.  991,  25  C.  C.  A. 

681),  1287,  1291. 
Wiggins    V.    Hathaway    (6    Barb. 

632),  94. 
Wiggins    V.    King    (91    Hun,    340, 

36  N.  Y.   Supp.  768),  1065. 
Wight  V.  Railroad  Co.   (167  U.  S. 

512,  17  Sup.  Ct.  R.  822,  42  L. 

Ed.   258),   536,   545. 
Wightman    v.    Railroad    Co.     (73 

Wis.  169),  1055. 
Wilburn  v.  Railway  Co.    (36  Mo. 

Ap.   203),   1118. 
Wilburn  v.  Railway  Co.    (48  Mo. 

App.  224),  895. 
Wilby  V.  Railway   (2   Hurl.  &  N. 

703),  229,  242,  472. 
Wilcox  V.  Parmelee  (3  Sand.  610), 

246,  617,  619. 
Wilcox  V.  Railroad  Co.   (24  Minn. 

269),  674. 


CCCXVl 


TABLE   OF    CASES   CITED. 


[BEFEBENCES   ABE 

Wilde  V.   Transportation   Co.    (47 

Iowa,  247),  84,  172,  417. 
Willard  v.  Bridge   (4  Barb.  361), 

674. 
Willard  v.  Dorr    (3  Mason,   166), 

744. 
Willetts    V.    Railroad     (14    Barb. 

585),  1417. 
William  Arthur  Dixon  v.  Naviga- 
tion  Co.    (Can.   Sup.   Ct.    Cas. 

(Cameron)    66),   1249. 
Williams  v.  Branson  (1  Murphey, 

417),  75,  483. 
Williams  v.  East  Ind.  Co.  (3  East, 

192),  796. 
Williams  v.  Gill   (122  N.  Car.  967, 

29  S.  E.  Rep.  879),  1094,  1102. 
Williams  v.  Grant  (1  Conn.  487), 

270,   296,   490. 
Williams  v.  Railroad  Co.  (91  Ala. 

635),    1381,    1382,    1389. 
Williams  v.  Railroad   Co.    (88   N. 

Y.    Supp.    434,    93    App.    Div. 

582),  212,  406,  1278. 
Williams   v.   Railroad    (93    N.    C. 

42),  161. 
W^illiams  v.  Railroad  Co.  (28  Tex. 

Civ.  App.  503,  67  S.  W.  1085), 

1113,  1198. 
Williams     v.     Railroad     Co.     (18 

Utah,  210,  54  Pac.  991,  72  Am. 

St.     Rep.     777),     1004,     1022, 

1072,    1073. 
Williams  v.  The  Railroad    (9  W. 

Va.  33),  1334. 
Williams  v.  Railway  Co.  (138  Fed. 

571),  1390. 
Williams  v.  Railway  Co.   (117  Ga. 

830,  43  S.  E.  980),  508,  509. 
Williams  v.  Railway  Co.   (40  La. 

Ann.   417),   1095. 
W^illiams    v.    Railway    Co.     (Tex. 

Civ.  App.,  78  S.  W.  Rep.  45), 

1174.   1223,   1224. 


TO   SECTIONS.] 

Williams     v.     Railway     Co.     (39 

Wash.  77,  80  Pac.  Rep.  1100), 

895,   1413. 
Williams  v.  Smith  (2  Caines,  13), 

815. 
Williams   v.    Steamship    Co.    (126 

Fed.  591),  1396. 
Williams  v.  Taylor  (4  Port.  234), 

335. 
Williams  v.  Vanderbilt   (28  N.  Y. 

217),  226,  916,  1109,  1429. 
Williams   v.   Walton,    etc.    Co.    (9 

Houst.  322,  32  Atl.  Rep.  726), 

1397. 
Williams  v.  Webb  (58  N.  Y.  Supp. 

300,    27   Misc.    508,    modifying 

49  N.  Y.  Supp.  1111,  22  Misc. 

513;  s.  c.  53  N.  Y.  Supp.  123, 

32  App.  Div.  389;   s.  c.  47  N. 

N.    Supp.    534,    21    App.    Div. 

192;  s.  c.  34  N.  Y.  Supp.  425, 

88   Hun,   181;    s.   c.  32   N.   Y. 

Supp.  332,  84  Hun,  309),  1130, 

1131,  1132. 
Williamson  v.  Stage  Co.  (24  Iowa, 

171),  1436. 
Willingford    v.    Railroad    Co.    (26 

S.  Car.  258,  2  S.  E.  Rep.  19), 

500. 
Willis  v.  Railroad    (62  Me.   488), 

450. 
Willis  V.  Railroad   (34  N.  Y.  670; 

32     Barb.     398),     1197,     1198, 

1216. 
Willis  V.  Railroad  Co.  (120  N.  Car. 

508,  26  S.  E.  Rep.  784),  1000. 
Willis    V.    Railway    Co.    (61    Tex. 

432,  48   Am.  Rep.   301),   1387. 
Willis   Coal    Co.    v.    Grizzell    (198 

111.    313,    65    N.    E.    Rep.    74), 

1394. 
Williscroft  v.  Cargo  of  the  Cyre- 

nian  (123  Fed.  169),  846. 
Willmott  V.  Railway  Co.  (106  Mo. 

535),  1197. 


TABLE  OF   CASES  CITED. 


CCCXVH 


[BEFEBENCES   ABE   TO    SECTIONS.] 


Willock  V.  Railroad  Co.    (166   Pa. 

St.   184,   30  Atl.  948,  27  L.  R. 

A.  228,  45  Am.  St.  Rep.  674), 

450,   783,   784. 
Willock  V.   Railway   Co.    (79  Mo. 

App.  76),  760. 
Willoughby  v.  Horridge   (74  Eng. 

C.  L.  R.  742;  12  C.  B.  742;  16 

Eng.  L.  &  E.  437),  66,  110. 
Willson  V.  Railroad  Co.   (5  Wash. 

621,  32  Pac.  468),   1407,  1433. 
Wilmshurst   v.    Bowker    (5    Bing. 

N.  C.  541),  1318. 
Wilsey    v.    Railroad   Co.    (83    Ky. 

511),  1033,  1041,  1067,  1103. 
Wilson  V.  Adams  Express  Co.  (43 

Mo.    App.    659;    s.    c.    27    Mo. 

App.  360),  672,   682. 
Wilson  V.  Bank  of  Victoria  (L.  R. 

2  Q.  B.   203),   825. 
Wilson    V.    Barker    (4    B.    &    Ad. 

271),  1444. 
Wilson  V.  Brett  (11  M.  &  W.  113), 

7,  11. 
Wilson  V.  Burnstead   (12  Neb.  1), 

1389. 
Wilson  V.    Canadian   Development 

Co.    (33   S.   C.  R.   432),  451. 
Wilson   V.   Dickson    (2   B.   &  Aid. 

2),  791. 
Wilson    V.    Express    Co.    (27    Mo. 

App.  360),  672,  682. 
Wilson  V.  Dock  Co.   (L,  R.  1  Ex. 

177),  1371. 
Wilson   V.   Hamilton    (4   Ohio   St. 

722),  66,   67,  333,  339,   450. 
Wilson  V.  Kymer  (1  M.  &  S.  157), 

807,  877. 
Wilson   V.   Miller    (2   Starkie,   1), 

790. 
Wilson  V.  Newport  Dock  Co.    (L. 

R.    1   Exch.    177),    1367,    1369, 

1370. 
Wilson  V.   Piatt   (84  N.  Y.   Supp. 

143),  408. 


Wilson  V.  Railroad  (129  Fed.  774; 

afflrmed,  133  Fed.  1022,  66  C, 

C.   A.   486),   88. 
Wilson   V.   Railroad   Co.    (94    Cal. 

166,  29  Pac.  861,  17  L.  R.  A. 

685),  662,  684,  708,  1354. 
Wilson  V.  Railroad    (56  Me.   60), 

864,    1278. 
Wilson  V.  Railroad  Co.   (26  Minn. 

278),  1221,  1223,  1224. 
Wilson  V.  Railroad  Co.   (31  Minn. 

481),   895. 
Wilson  V.  Railroad  Co.   (68  Miss. 

9,  8  So.  Rep.  330),  1126. 
Wilson  V.  Railroad  Co.   (77  Miss. 

714,  28  So.  Rep.  567,  52  L.  R. 

A.  357),  1077. 
Wilson   V.   Railroad   Co.    (32   Mo. 

App.   682),    1132. 
Wilson  V.  Railroad  Co.   (92  N.  Y. 

Supp.  1091),  263. 
Wilson     V.     Railroad     (21    Gratt. 

654),  261,   1296,  1298. 
Wilson    V.    Railway    (9    Com.    B. 

(N.  S.)    632),  1366. 
Wilson  V.  Railway  (18  Eng.  L.  & 

Eq.   557),  461. 
Wilson    V.    Railway    Co.    (82    Ga. 

386),  105,  113. 
Wilson  V.  Railway   (57  Me.  138), 

1279. 
Wilson    V.    Railway    Co.    (66    Mo, 

App.   388),   630,   1366. 
Wilson  V.   Shipping   Co.    (24  Fed. 

Rep.    815),   688. 
Wilson   V.    Wilson    (26    Penn.    St. 

393),  1318. 
Wilson   S.   Mach.   Co.  v.  Railroad 

Co.    (71  Mo.   203),   674,  702. 
Wilton  V.  Railroad  Co.  (125  Mass. 

130),    1020,   1022. 
Wilton  V.  Railroad  Co.  (107  Mass. 

108),  995,  1020,  1022,  1226. 
Wilton  V.   S.   Nav.  Co.   (10   C.   B. 

(N.    S.)    453),  1028. 


CCCXVlll 


TABLE   OP   CASES   CITED. 


[BEFEBENCES    ABE 

Wiltse   V.    Town   of    Tilden,     (77 

Wis.  152,  46  X.  W.  Rep.  234), 

1394,  1401. 
Wimpleberg   v.   Railroad   Co.    (81 

N.  Y.  Supp.  963,  83  App.  Div. 

19),   1174. 
Winchester  v.  Busby   (16  S.  C.  R. 

(Can.)  336),  866. 
Wing  V.  Railway  Co.  (1  Hilt.  241), 

505. 
Wingard  v.  Banning  (39  Cal.  543), 

779. 
Winheim  v.   Field    (107   111.   App. 

145),  100,  102. 
Winkler  v.  Railway  Co.    (21  Mo. 

App.   99),   1126. 
Winne  v.  Railroad  Co.    (31  Iowa, 

583),   1362. 
Winnegar  v.  Railroad  Co.  (85  Ky. 

547),  1389. 
Winnt  V.   Railroad   Co.    (74   Tex. 

32),   1389,   1397. 
Winship     v.     Railroad     Co.     (170 

Mass.  464,  49  N.  E.  647),  1011. 
Winslow    V.    Railroad     Co.     (165 

Mass.   264,   42    N.    E.    1133), 

1219. 
Winslow  V.  Railroad  (42  Vt.  700), 

670,  672,  704. 
Winsor  Coal   Co.  v.  Railroad   Co. 

(52  Fed.  716),  574. 
Winters   v.   Railway  Co.    (99  Mo. 

509),    1229. 
Wintuska's  Adm'r  v.  Railroad  Co. 

(14  Ky.  L.  R.   579,  20   S.  W. 

Rep.  819),  1388. 
Wise  V  Railway  (1  H.  &  N.  63), 

397. 
Witbeck    v.    Holland    (45    N.    Y. 

13),  113,   611,  667,  716. 
Witbeck    v.    Schuyler    (44    Barb. 

469),  111. 
Withers  v.  N.  J.  etc.  Co.  (48  Barb. 

455),   688. 
Withers    v.    Railway     (27    L.    J. 

Exch.  417;  1  F.  &  F.  165),  948. 


TO   SECTIONS.] 

Withey  v.  Railroad  Co.   ( —  Mich. 

— ,   104  N.  W.  Rep.  773,   1  L. 

R.   A.    (N.    S.)    352),   1277. 
Witt    V.    Railroad    Co.    (99    Tenn. 

442,  41  S.  W.  Rep.  1064),  183. 
Witting  V.   Railroad   Co.    (28   Mo. 

App.  103),  1355. 
Witting  V.  Railroad  Co.   (101  Mo. 

631),  1355. 
Wolcott  V.  Insurance  Co.   (4  Pick. 

429),  603. 
Wolf    V.    Am.    Exp.    Co.    (43    Mo. 

421),   287,   289,    304,   401,    450, 

1355. 
Wolf   V.   Brooklyn   Ferry   Co.    (66 

N.  Y.  Supp.  298,  54  App.  Div. 

67),  942. 
Wolf    V.    Hough     (22    Kan.    659), 

867. 
Wolf  V.  Railroad  Co.  (55  Ohio  St. 

517,  45  N.  E.  Rep.  708,  36  L. 

R.   A.   812),   1389,   1392. 
Wolf  V.  Summers   (2  Camp.  631), 

1241,  1303. 
Wolfe   V.   Railway    Co.     (97    Mo. 

473),  749. 
Wolff   V.    Horncastle    (1   B.    &   P. 

316),    783. 
Wolff  V.  The  Vaderland    (18  Fed. 

Rep.  739),  489,  492. 
Wolford   V.    Mining   Co.    (63    Cal. 

483),    1401. 
Womack  v.  Railroad  Co.    (80  Ga. 

132),  1384. 
Wood  V.   Crocker    (18   Wis.   345), 

704,  713. 
Wood   V.   Hubbard    (62   Fed.    753, 

10  C.  C.  A.  623),  801. 
Wood    V.    Keyser     (84    Fed.    688; 

afPd,  on  opinion  of  court  he- 
low,  87  Fed.  1007,  31  C.  C.  A. 

358,  59  U.   S.  App.  202),  837, 

841. 
Wood   V.   Railroad    Co.    (100   Ala. 

660,   13   So.   552),   1207. 


TABLE  OF   CASES  CITED. 


cecxix 


[BEFEBENCES   ABE   TO   SECTIONS.] 

Wood    V.    Railroad    Co.     (84     Ga. 

363),  922. 
Wood   V.   Railroad   Co.    (59   Iowa, 

196),    630. 
Wood  V.  Railroad  Co.  (19  Ky.  Law 

Rep.   924,   101   Ky.   703,   42   S. 

W.  349),  972. 
Wood  V.  Railroad  Co.   (98  Me.  98, 

56  Atl.   457,   99  Am.   St.  Rep. 

339),  1241,  1274,  1275,  1278, 

1300. 
Wood  V.   Railroad   Co.    ( —  N.   J. 

Law    — ,    63    Atl.    Rep.    867), 


1077. 
Wood  V.  Railroad  Co.  (177  Pa.  St. 

306,   35   Atl.   699,   35   L.  R.   A. 

199,    55    Am.    St.    Rep.    728), 

1430. 
Wood   V.   Railway   Co.    (68   Iowa, 

491),  630. 
Wood   V.   Railway   Co.    (49   Mich. 

370),  1118,  1123.  1187. 
Wood  V.  Railway  Co.  (118  N.  Car. 

1056.  24  S.  E.  Rep.  704),  442. 

444. 
Wood  V.  Railway    (27  Wis.  541). 

134. 
Wood  V.  Sewall's  Adm'r  (128  Fed. 

141).   855. 
Woodburn    v.    Railway    Co.     (40 

Fed.   Rep.   731),   425. 
Woodbury  v.  Frink   (14  111.  279), 

1352. 
Wooden   v.  Austin    (51  Barb.   9), 

92. 
Wooden  v.   Railroad  Co.    (126   N. 

Y.   10),    1388. 
Woodger  v.  Railway  Co.   (L.  R.  2 

C.  P.  318),  1366,  1367,  1370. 
Woodleife    and    Curties    (1    Rolle 

Abr.   2),  48. 
Woodley  v.  Michell  (11  Q.  B.  Div. 

47).   483. 
Woodman   v.   Nottingham    (49   N. 

H.    387),    780. 


Woodruff  V.  Noyes  (15  Conn.  335), 

764. 
Woodruff    Sleeping     Car     Co.     v. 

Diehl     (84    Ind.    474).    1130, 

1134. 
V/oods  V.  Devin  (13  111.  746),  127, 

1246. 
Woodward    v.    Railroad    (1    Biss. 

403).  238. 
Woodward    v.    Railroad     Co.    (10 

Ohio    St.    121),    1390. 
Woolery  v.  Railway  Co.   (107  Ind. 

381),    1224. 
Woolsey  v.  Railroad  Co.   (39  Neb. 

798,  58  N.  W.  444,  25  L.  R.  A. 

79),   964,   1218. 
Wooster  v.   Tarr    (8  Allen,   270), 

815. 
Wooten  V.  Railroad  Co.   (79  Miss. 

26,   29   So.  Rep.  61),  1182. 
Worden  v.  Railroad  Co.  (72  Iowa, 

201),  1389. 
Work  V.  Leathers  (97  U.  S,  103), 

497. 
Worley  v.  Railroad  Co.  (1  Handy, 

481),  1384. 
Wormsdorf    v.    Railway    Co.     (75 

Mich.  472),  952. 
Worthington  v.  Railroad   Co.    (64 

Vt.   107,  23  Atl.   590,   15  L.  R. 

A.  326),  1174,   1197.   1198. 
Wright  V.  Caldwell   (3  Mich.  51), 

117,  127. 
Wright  V.  Compton  (53  Ind.  337), 

1422. 
Wright  V,  New  Zealand  Shipping 

Co.   (4  Ex.  D.  165).  846. 
Wright  V.   Railroad    Co.    (4   Colo. 

App.  102,  35  Pac.  196),  985. 
Wright  V.  Railroad  Co.    (4  Allen, 

289),    1382. 
Wright   V.    Railroad    Co.    (122    N. 

Car.  852,  29   S.  E.  Rep.  100), 

1004. 
Wright  V.  Railroad  Co.    (21  R.  L 

554,  45  Atl.  548).  1084. 


cccxx 


TABLE  OP    CASES  CITED. 


[befebences  are 

Wright  V.  The  Railway   (L.  R.  8 

Exch.  137),  916. 
Wright  V.   Railway  Co.    (78   Cal. 

360),  1058,  1082.  1431. 
Wright   V.    Railway   Co.    ( —  Mo. 

App.  — ,  94  S.  W.  Rep.  555), 

651. 
Wright  V.  Snell  (5  B.  &  Aid.  350), 

865. 
Wright,  etc.,  Co.  v.  Warren    (177 

Mass.    283,    58    N.    E.    1082), 

187,  674. 
Wunsch  V,  Railroad  Co.   (62  Fed. 

878),    1249. 
Wupperman  v.  The  Carib  Prince 

(63  Fed.  266;  affirmed,  68  Fed. 

254;      reversed.     The      Carib 

Prince,    170    U.    S.    655),    363, 

364,  365,  372,  375. 
Wyatt  V.  Williams  (43  N.  H.  102), 

1389. 
WyckofE  V.   Ferry  Co.    (52   N.   Y. 

32),  67,   128. 
Wyld    V.    Pickford    (8    M.    &   W. 

443),    11,   337,    392,   439,    132G. 
Wylde  V.  The  Railroad   (53  N.  Y. 

156),  264,  1216. 
Wyllie    V.     Harrison     (13     Court 

Sess.    Cas.,    4th    Series,    92), 

840,  846. 
Wyman  v.  Railroad  (46  Me.  162), 

915. 
Wyman  v.  Railroad  Co.  (34  Minn. 

210),   1041,   1082. 
Wyman   v.   Railroad    Co.    (4   Mo. 

App.  35),  254. 
Wymore    v.    Mahaska    (78    Iowa, 

398),  1229. 
Wynantskill  Knitting  Co.  v.  Mur- 
ray   (90   Hun,    554,    36    N.   Y. 

Supp.   26),   694. 
Wynn  v.  Railroad   Co.   (14  N.  Y. 

Suppl.  172),  903. 


TO   SECTIONS.] 

Wyrick   v.    Railway   Co.    (74   Mo. 
App.   406),   408. 


Yahn  v.  Ottumwa  (60  Iowa,  429), 

1383. 
Yarnell  v.  Railroad  Co.   (113  Mo. 

570,  21  S.  W.  1,   18  L.  R.  A. 

599),  991,  1111.  1112,  1412. 
Yarrington  v.  Delaware,  etc.,  Co. 

(143  Fed.  565).  1017. 
Yate    V.    Willan     (2     East,    128), 

1337. 
Yates  V.  Duff   (5  Car.  &  P.  369), 

1166. 
Yates  V.  Railroad  (67  N.  Y.  100), 

1446. 
Yeaton  v.  Railroad  Co.   ( —  N.  H. 

— ,  61  Atl.  Rep.  522),  1397. 
Yeoman    v.    The    King    (2    K.    B. 

(1904)    429,    73    L.   J.    K.    B. 

904),   838. 
Yeomans  v.  Nav.  Co.  (44  Cal.  71), 

1018. 
Yoakum    v.    Dryden     (Tex.    Civ. 

App.,  26  S.  W.  Rep.  312),  125. 
York  Co.  V.  Railroad  Co.   (3  Wall. 

107),    108,    139,    279,   430,    457. 

475,  479. 
Yorke  v.  Grenaugh   (2  Ld.  Raym. 

866),  882,  883. 
Yorton   v.   Railway   Co.    (54   Wis. 

234),  1065. 
Young  V.  Fewson  (8  Car.  &  P.  55), 

1157,  1425. 
Young  V.   Kimball    (23   Penn.    St. 

193),    782. 
Young  V.  Railroad  Co.   (115  Penn. 

St.  112),   1049. 
Young  V.  Railroad  Co.   (171  Mass. 

33,  50  N.  B.   455,  41  L.  R.  A. 

193),   933,   1006. 
Young    V.    Railway    Co.    (80    Ala. 

100),  749. 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


ccexxj 


[eeferences 

Young   V.    Railway   Co.    (120    Ga 

25,  47  S.  E.  Rep.  556,  102  Am 

St.  Rep.  68,  65  L.  R.  A.  436), 

1040. 
Young  V.  Railway  Co.   (100  Iowa, 

357,  69   N.  W.  682),   1182. 
Young    V.    Railway    Co.     (51    La. 

Ann.    295,    25    So.    Rep.    69), 

990. 
Young    V.    Railway    Co.    (33     Mo. 

App.  509),  1342. 
Young   V.    Railway     Co.    ( —   Mo. 

App.  — ,  84  S.  W.  Rep.  175), 

1217. 
Young    V.    Railway    Co.     ( —    Mo. 

App.  — ,  88  S.  W.  Rep.  767), 

1118. 
Young    V.    Railway    Co.     (93    Mo. 

App.    267),    992,    1075,   1127. 
Young  V.    Railway   Co.    (60   N.   J. 

L.  193,  37  Atl.  1013),  1174. 
Youqua  v.  Nixon  (1  Peters'  C.  Ct. 

221),   625. 


Zabriskie  v.  Smith  (13  N.  Y.  322) 

1405. 
Zackry  v.  Railroad  Co.   (74  Miss 

520,    21    So.    246,    60    Am.    St 


ARE   TO    SECTIONS.] 

Rep.  529,  36  L.  R.  A.  546;  s.  c. 

75  Miss.  746,  23  So.  Rep.  434. 

65  Am.  St.  Rep.  617,  41  L.  R. 

A.   385),   966,   967. 
Zagelmeyer  v.   Railroad   Co.    (102 

Mich.    214,   60   N.   W.    436,    47 

Am.   St.  Rep.   514),   1033. 
Zeigler  Bros.  v.  Railroad  Co.    ( — 

Miss.    — ,    39    So.    Rep.    811), 

1285. 
Zemp  V.  Railroad  (9  Rich.  (Law), 

84),   1174. 
Zimmer  v.   Railroad   Co.    (137   N. 

Y.    460,    33    N.    E.    642,    aft'g 

16   N.   Y.   Supp.   631,  62   Hun, 

619),   426,   451,   454,   457. 
Zimmerman   v.   Railroad    Co.    (43 

N.  Y.  Supp.  883,  14  App.  Div. 

562),   1118. 
Zinn  V.  Steamboat  Co.    (49  N.  Y. 

442),   667,   695,   720. 
Zion  V.   Southern  Pacific  Co.    (67 

Fed.  500),  1433. 
Zollinger  v.   Str.  Emma   (3  C.  L. 

J.  285),  731. 
Zouch  V.  Railway  Co.   (-36  W.  Va. 

524,   15   S.   E.  Rep.  185,   17  L. 

R.  A.  116),  401,  426,  430,  432. 
Zunz  V.   Railway    (L.   R.   4   Q.   B. 

539),    408. 
Zwilchenbart     v.     Henderson     (9 

Exch.   722),   807. 


THE  LAW  OF  CARRIERS 


THE  LAW  OF  CARRIERS 


CHAPTER  I. 
OF  BAILMENTS  AND  CARRIERS  GENERALLY. 


:  1,  Bailment    defined. 

2.  Classification  of  bailments. 

3.  Application  of  rule  to  carriers. 

4.  Liability      of      common      car- 

rier      distinguished       from 
that  of  other  bailees. 

5.  Questions     of     negligence     in 

law  of  carriers. 

6.  Degree    of    diligence    required 

depends   on   circumstances. 

7.  Negligence   in  one   bailee  not 

necessarily   so   in   another. 

8.  Apportionment     of     diligence 

according  to  benefit. 


§  9.  Law  of  bailment  insufficient 
to  determine  liability  of 
common  carriers. 

10.  Comparative    degrees   of    dili- 

gence  and   negligence, 

11.  Utility  of  this  classification. 

12.  Common    carrier    not    usually 

agent  of  owner  of  goods. 

13.  But    may    be    agent    in    cases 

of  emergency. 

14.  Bailees  liable  for  malfeasance 

and  fraud. 


Sec.  1.  (§1.)  Bailment  defined, — Every  carrier  of  goods 
is  a  bailee;  for  their  carriage  necessarily  presupposes  the  de- 
livery of  the  goods  for  that  purpose ;  and  the  delivery  of  goods 
on  a  condition,  expressed  or  implied,  that  they  shall  be  re- 
stored or  accounted  for  by  the  bailee  to  the  bailor  according 
to  his  directions,  as  soon  as  the  purpose  for  which  they  are 
bailed  shall  be  answered,  constitutes  a  bailment.  The  word 
bailment  is  therefore  one  of  very  comprehensive  signification, 
and  includes,  in  its  general  meaning,  all  cases  in  which  per- 
sonal property  is  intrusted  by  one  person  to  another,  under 
an  engagement,  either  express  or  implied,  to  keep,  to  carry, 
to  improve,  to  mend  or  repair,  or  for  the  purpose  of  having 
any  special  service  performed  in  respect  to  it,  and,  when  the 
special  purpose  shall  have  been  accomplished,  to  return  it  to 
the  owner  or  to  deliver  it  to  another,  according  to  the  bailor's 
1  1 


2  THE  LAW  OF   CARRIERS.  [§  2. 

directions,  or  to  conform  to  the  object  or  purpose  of  the  trust, 
whatever  it  may  be.^ 

Sec.  2.  (§  2.)  Classification  of  bailments. — According  to 
the  compensation  to  be  received,  the  degree  of  responsibility 
to  be  assumed,  or  the  character  of  the  duty  to  be  performed 
by  the  person  to  whom  the  bailment  is  made,  who  is  called 
the  bailee,  bailments  have  been  divided  into  number  of  classes, 
and  some  of  these  classes  again  into  subdivisions.  This  classi- 
fication was  first  brought  into  the  common  law  by  Lord  Holt 
in  his  celebrated  judgment  in  the  case  of  Coggs  v.  Bernard,2 
and  is  said  to  have  been  adopted  by  him  from  the  civil  law.-"* 
The  most  general  division  of  them  according  to  this  classifi- 
cation is  into,  first,  such  as  are  for  the  exclusive  benefit  of 
the  bailor  or  of  some  person  other  than  the  bailee;  secondly, 
such  as  are  for  the  exclusive  benefit  of  the  bailee;  and  thirdly, 
such  as  are  for  the  benefit  of  both  parties.  The  first  of  these 
divisions  includes  what  are  known  as  deposits  (depositum), 
which  are  naked  bailments  of  goods  to  be  kept  for  the  bailor 
without  recompense  and  to  be  returned  when  the  bailor  shall 
require  it,  and  mandates  (mandatum),  which  are  defined  to 
be  bailments  of  goods  to  be  carried  from  place  to  place  or  to 
have  some  act  performed  about  them  without  reward  or  recom- 
pense ;  the  second  embraces  only  gratuitous  loans  to  the  bailee 
{commodatum)  ;  and  the  third  pledges  to  secure  a  debt  or  the 
fulfillment  of  some  engagement,  and  a  hiring  for  reward  or 
compensation  (pignus)  ;  and  this  last  subdivision  is  again  di- 
vided into  the  hiring  a  thing  for  use  (locatio  rei)  ;  the  hiring 
of  work  and  labor  {locatio  operis  faciendi)  ;  the  hiring  of  care 
and  services  to  be  performed  on  the  thing  delivered    (locatio 

1.  Various    definitions     of     bail-  that    special     purpose     is     accom- 

ment    are    given    in    Schouler    on  plished."  Id.   §   2.     See,  also,  Mr 

Bailments  and  Carriers,  §  2,  note.  Schouler's   note  to   Coggs   v.   Ber- 

Mr.  Schouler  himself  defines  bail-  nard,    1    Smith's    Leading    Cases, 

ment  as  "A  delivery  of  some  chat-  9th  Am.  Ed.,  400. 

tel  by  one  party  to  another,  to  be  2.  Lord   Raym.    909;    ]    Smith's 

held  according  to  the  special  pur-  Ld.  Cases  283. 

pose  of  the  delivery,  and  to  be  re-  3.  Story  on  Bail.,  §  8. 
turned    or    delivered     over     when 


§  3.]  OF   BAILMENTS  AND   CARRIERS  GENERALLY,  3 

custodiae)  ;  and  the  hiring  of  the  carriage  of  goods  from  one 
place  to  another  {locatio  operis  mercium  vehendai'um) ^ 

Sec.  3.  (§3.)  Application  of  rules  to  carriers. — According 
to  these  divisions  and  definitions,  the  carriage  of  goods  is 
always  either  a  mandate,  when  it  is  gratuitous  or  without  com- 
pensation to  the  carrier,  or  a  hiring,  when  he  is  paid  for  the 
service ;  and  under  these  heads,  the  duties  and  obligations  of 
carriers  of  goods  were  formerly  treated  in  connection  with  the 
general  subject  of  bailments  and  as  a  part  of  it.  But  it  must 
be  evident  from  this  statement  that,  while  this  classification 
of  the  different  kinds  of  bailments  according  to  their  various 
purposes  may  be  extremely  convenient  for  the  treatment  of 
the  general  subject  in  all  its  different  branches,  it  is  almost 
wholly  unimportant  in  connection  with  the  subject  of  the 
duties  and  liabilities  of  the  carriers  of  goods,  except  to  show 
in  what  particular  character  of  bailment  the  carrier  holds 
the  goods  intrusted  to  him,  and  that,  which  is  equally  appar- 
ent, most  of  the  general  principles  of  the  bailments  of  goods 
have  little  or  no  application  to  questions  in  which  he  may  be 
concerned.  Besides,  the  extraordinary  responsibilities  which 
are  imposed  by  the  law  upon  common  or  public  carriers  of 
goods  for  hire,^  who  are  by  far  the  most  important  agents 
of  commerce  in  modern  times,  are  founded  upon  reasons  which 
have  no  application  to  ordinary  bailments,  and  in  fact  make 
such  carriers  exceptions  from  the  general  rules  and  principles 
by  which  the  liability  of  other  bailees  is  to  be  tested. 

Sec.  4.  (§  4.)  Liability  of  common  carrier  distinguished 
from  that  of  other  bailees. — It  will  therefore  be  found  that 
while  private  carriers,  whether  with  or  without  reward,  are 
strictly  bailees  and  nothing  more,  and  that  questions  as  to 
their  liability  are  to  be  determined  by  the  ordinary  rules  which 
govern  the  responsibility  of  bailees,  the  common  carrier  of 
goods  stands  upon   an   entirely  different  footing,   and  when 

4.  Lord       Holt's       classification  three  greater  classifications  given 
was,   in  terms,  into  "six  sorts  of  in   the  text.     See    Schouler,   Bail- 
bailments,"  but  the  six  sorts  nat-  raents,    §    14. 
urally    reduce    themselves    to    the  5.  See  post,   §   4. 


4  THE  LAW  OF   CARRIERS.  [§  5. 

questions  as  to  his  liability  for  the  loss  of  the  goods  or  their 
injury  whilst  in  his  custody  for  the  purpose  of  carriage  arise, 
they  must  be  decided  upon  principles  peculiarly  applicable  to 
them,  and  which  have  no  application  to  any  other  kind  of 
bailment  except  that  to  the  innkeeper  by  his  guest.  In  all 
other  cases  of  bailment,  for  instance,  the  very  foundation  of 
the  bailee's  liability  is  negligence  in  some  degree,  either 
greater  or  less,  according  to  the  particular  nature  of  the  bail- 
ment, and  before  he  can  be  made  liable  the  requisite  negli- 
gence must  be  shown.  But  the  question  of  negligence,  when 
the  purely  common-law  relation  of  common  carrier  to  the  goods 
exists,  is  ordinarily  wholly  foreign  to  the  inquiry  whether  such 
a  carrier  is  to  be  held  liable  for  their  loss  or  injury,  and,  as 
will  hereafter  be  seen,^  evidence  on  his  part  of  the  most  exact 
diligence  will  be  wholly  irrelevant  and  inadmissible.  If,  for 
example,  the  private  carrier  or  any  other  ordinary  bailee  be 
robbed  of  the  goods,'^  or  if  they  should  be  accidentally  de- 
stroyed by  fire  or  any  other  calamity,  without  negligence  on 
his  part,^  the  law  will  excuse  him;  but  if  they  be  taken  from 
a  common  carrier  by  a  force  ever  so  irresistible  less  than 
the  public  enemy,^  or  if  they  should  be  destroyed  by  fire  ever 
so  unavoidable,^^  he  will  nevertheless  be  liable  for  them.  He 
is  an  insurer  of  the  goods  against  all  losses  except  those  caused 
by  the  act  of  God,  the  public  enemy,  the  law,  the  owner,  or  the 
inherent  nature  of  the  goods.^i  His  extraordinary  liability 
rests  upon  a  rule  of  law,  applicable  to  but  two  classes,  which 
had  its  rise  in  reasons  of  public  policy,^  2  qj^^  ^lot  upon  the 
contract  of  bailment,  although  without  the  bailment  the  lia- 
bility cannot  exist. 

Sec.  5.    (§5.)    Questions  of  negligence  in  law  of  carriers. — 

Still,  questions  of  negligence  are  of  constant  occurrence  in 
dealing  with  the  subject  of  the  liability  of  carriers.  The  pri- 
vate carrier  cannot  be  held  liable  unless  it  be  shown  that  he 

6.  See  post,  §§  266-319.  10.  See  post,  §  279. 

7.  See  post,  §  39.  11.  See  post,   §§   269-319. 

8.  See  post,  §  40.  12.  See  post,  §  315. 
8.  See  post,  §  315. 


§  6.]  OF   BAILMENTS  AND   CARRIERS  GENERALLY.  5 

has  been  guilty  of  either  negligence  or  misfeasance  which  has 
occasioned  the  loss.^^  The  liability  of  the  passenger  carrier 
for  an  injury  to  his  passenger  generally  depends  exclusively 
upon  the  question  of  negligence.^*  And,  although  the  common 
carrier  of  goods,  when  he  is  not  protected  by  contract,  is  liable 
for  the  consequences  of  every  casualty  resulting  in  the  loss  oC 
the  goods,  except  such  as  are  excepted  by  the  law  as  above 
stated,  yet  when  he  attempts  to  exonerate  himself  from  lia- 
bility by  showing  that  the  cause  of  the  loss  comes  within  one 
or  the  other  of  these  exceptions,  he  may  be  met  by  proof  that, 
but  for  his  negligence,  the  occasion  of  the  loss  would  have 
been  avoided.^^  So,  if  the  goods  be  of  a  perishable  nature, 
and  he  attempt  to  defend  himself  against  liability  for  their  loss 
by  showing  that  it  was  attributable  to  the  principle  of  inherent 
infirmity  and  decay,  as  he  may  do,  it  may  be  shown  that  ho 
failed  to  bestow  upon  them  the  necessary  care  to  arrest  or 
prevent  such  decay,  and  was  therein  guilty  of  negligence  but 
for  which  the  loss  would  not  have  occurred.^ ^  And  v/hen  he 
has  made  exceptions  to  his  liability  by  his  contract  in  addi- 
tion to  those  allowed  him  by  the  law,  and  undertakes  to 
screen  himself  from  liability  for  a  loss  by  showing  that  it  was 
produced  by  one  of  the  excepted  causes,  it  will  be  a  complete 
avoidance  of  his  defense  to  show  that  he  did  not  use  the  proper 
diligence  to  prevent  or  to  escape  from  the  danger.^ '^ 

Sec.  6.  (§6.)  Degree  of  diligence  required  depends  on  cir- 
cumstances.— The  liability  of  all  carriers  of  goods  may  there- 
fore turn  upon  the  question  of  negligence;  and  hence  the  law 
as  to  the  liability  of  bailees  in  general  for  negligence,  of  which 
the  law  of  bailments  is  in  a  large  part  made  up,  becomes  fre- 
quently of  the  greatest  importance  in  furnishing  the  rule  as 
to  the  degree  or  character  of  the  negligence  for  which  the 
carrier  as  well  as  other  bailees  will  be  held  responsible.  It 
is  evident,  however,  that  the  same  degree  of  care  and  diligence 

13.  See  post,  §   37  et  seq.  16.  See   post,    §§    337.   338. 

14.  See  post,   §  892  et  seq.  17.  See  post,  §  477. 

15.  See  post,  §  319. 


6  THE  LAW   OF   CARRIERS.  [§  6. 

in  the  custody  of  the  goods  should  not  be  required  of  the  bailee; 
under  all  circumstances;  and  it  follows  as  a  consequence  that 
there  cannot  be  a  more  inflexible  rule  as  to  the  degree  of  neg- 
ligence which  will  put  him  so  much  in  fault  as  to  make  him 
responsible  for  the  loss  or  injury  which  may  ensue;  "for  neg- 
ligence in  a  legal  sense,"  says  a  distinguished  writer  and  judge, 
"is  no  more  nor  less  than  this:  the  failure  to  observe,  for  the 
protection  of  the  interests  of  another  person,  that  degree  of 
care,  precaution  and  vigilance  which  the  circumstances  justly 
demand,  whereby  such  other  person  suffers  injury,  "^^     <<j^ 
man  would  not  be  expected  to  take  the  same  care  of  a  bag  of 
oats  as  of  a  bag  of  gold;  of  a  bale  of  cotton,  as  a  box  of  dia- 
monds or  other  jewelry;  of  a  load  of  common  wood,  as  of  a 
box  of  rare  paintings;  of  a  rude  block  of  marble,  as  of  an 
exquisitely   sculptured   statue.      The   value,    especially,    is   an 
important  ingredient  to  be  taken  into  consideration  upon  everj' 
question  of  negligence;  for  that  may  be  gross  negligence  in 
the  case  of  a  parcel  of  extraordinary  value,  which  in  the  case 
of  a  common  parcel  would  not  be  so."^^     So  the  customs  of 
trade  or  of  particular  places  are  to  be  taken  into  considera- 
tion; for  that  care  and  attention  which  are  bestowed  upon 
their  goods  by  those  engaged  in  a  particular  trade,  or  gen- 
erally or  universally  by  those  who  inhabit  a  particular  place 
or  locality,  may  be  very  fairly  taken  as  evidence  that  that 
degree  of  care  and  attention  was  all  that  was  needed  for  their 
protection  or  preservation.     So  too  it  cannot  be  doubted  but 
that  the  bailee's  duty  would  require  him  to  be  more  vigilant 
at  some  times  and  at  some  places  than  at  others,  and  the  same 
conduct  which  might  be  considered  prudent  at  one  time  or  at 
one  place  would  perhaps  be  deemed  negligent  at  another.     A 
man,  for  instance,  intrusted  with  a  large  sum  of  money,  might 
prudently  venture  to  travel   alone  with  it  in  the  day-time, 
when  it  would  be  imprudent  to  do  so  at  night,  or  by  one  route 
when  it  would  be  rashness  to  undertake  the  same  journey  by 
another.    And  goods  entrusted  to  a  bailee  might  require  very 

18.  Cooley  on  Torts,  630.  19.  Story  on  Bail.,  §   15. 


§  7.]  OF   BAILMENTS  AND   CARRIERS  GENERALLY.  7 

different  attention  at  one  season  or  in  one  climate  from  that 
which  would  be  required  in  another.  Goods  of  great  weight 
or  bulk  might  be  prudently  left  unguarded,  while  those  of 
smaller  bulk,  and  more  liable  for  that  reason  to  be  stolen, 
should  be  carefully  watched.  So  if  robbers  or  highwaymen 
are  known  to  infest  a  particular  district  or  coimtry,  much 
more  precaution  will  be  required  of  the  bailee  than  in  districts 
which  are  not  so  infested ;  and  if  the  bailee  undertake  to  carry 
the  goods  through  a  hostile  country  by  his  servants  or  agents, 
care  will  be  required  in  the  selection  of  such  servants  as  may 
be  possessed  of  the  requisite  coolness  and  courage  for  the 
emergencies  which  may  arise,  qualities  which  might  be  wholly 
unnecessary  in  those  otherwise  employed-^*^  In  short,  the 
bailee  must  proportion  his  care  as  well  to  the  risk  and  danger 
to  which  the  goods  may  be  exposed  as  to  the  extent  of  the 
loss  which  is  likely  to  be  sustained  by  improvidence  on  his 
part,  and  all  the  circumstances  of  time  and  place,  of  the  value 
and  character  of  the  goods,  and  the  usages  and  customs  of 
others,  placed  in  similar  situations  and  engaged  in  the  same 
business,  must  be  weighed  and  considered  in  order  to  arrive 
at  a  correct  conclusion  with  regard  to  the  conduct  of  the 
bailee. 

Sec.  7.  (§7.)  Negligence  in  one  bailee  not  necessarily  so 
in  another. — It  is  also  obvious  that  that  which  would  be  gross 
negligence  in  one  bailee  might  not  be  so  in  the  case  of  another. 
A  person  professing  the  required  skill  for  the  purposes  of  the 
bailment,  although  it  might  be  undertaken  upon  an  agree- 
ment that  no  compensation  was  to  be  paid,  would  be  liable 
for  a  failure  to  apply  that  requisite  skill,  whether  he  really 
possessed  it  or  not.  This  is  illustrated  by  the  case  of  Shields 
V.  Blackburne,2i  in  which  the  defendant,  at  the  request  of  the 
plaintiff,  voluntarily  and  without  compensation,  undertook  to 
send  to  him  a  quantity  of  leather  which  the  defendant  by 
mistake  entered  as  wrought  instead  of  as  dressed  leather,  in 

20.  Holladay     v.     Kennard,     12        21.  1  H.  BI.  158. 
"Wall.  254. 


8  THE  LAW  OF   CARRIERS.  [§  8. 

consequence  of  which  it  was  seized  by  the  government.  The 
question  being  whether  the  defendant  was  liable  for  the  loss 
of  the  leather  occasioned  by  his  mistake,  Lord  Loughborough 
is  reported  to  have  said:  "I  agree  with  Sir  William  Jones 
that  when  a  bailee  undertakes  to  perform  a  gratuitous  act 
from  which  the  bailor  alone  is  to  receive  benefit,  then  the 
bailee  is  liable  only  for  gross  negligence.  But  if  a  man  gra- 
tuitously undertakes  to  do  a  thing  to  the  best  of  his  skill,  when 
his  situation  or  profession  is  such  as  to  imply  skill,  an  omis- 
sion of  that  skill  is  imputable  to  him  as  gross  negligence.  If, 
in  this  case,  a  shipbroker  or  a  clerk  in  the  custom-house  had 
undertaken  to  enter  the  goods,  a  wrong  entry  would  in  them 
be  gross  negligence,  because  their  situation  and  employment 
necessarily  implies  a  competent  degree  of  knowledge  in  mak- 
ing such  entries."  This,  however,  as  is  manifest,  is  not  mak- 
ing an  exception  to  the  general  rule,  since  it  does  not  render 
an  unpaid  bailee  or  agent  liable  for  less  than  gross  negligence, 
but  renders  that  gross  negligence  in  some  agents  which  would 
not  be  so  in  others.22 

Sec.  8.     (§8.)     Apportionment  of  diligence  according  to 

benefit. — It  must  also  be  evident  that  if  degrees  in  diligence 
or  in  its  opposite,  negligence,  are  to  be  admitted  at  all  to 
qualify  the  responsibility  of  the  bailee,  some  distinction  should 
be  made  between  cases  in  which  the  bailment  is  for  the  ex- 
clusive benefit  of  the  bailor  and  those  in  which  the  advantage 
is  all  on  the  side  of  the  bailee,  or  in  which  it  is  mutually  bene- 
ficial. Such  a  distinction  seems  at  once  rational,  just  and  con- 
venient, and  we  find  it  accordingly  adopted  in  the  common 
law  of  bailments.  When,  therefore,  the  bailment  is  for  the 
sole  benefit  of  the  bailor,  the  law  requires  only  slight  dili- 
gence on  the  part  of  the  bailee  and  makes  him  liable  only 
for  gross  neglect.  When  it  is  for  the  sole  benefit  of  the  bailee, 
the  law  requires  great  diligence  on  his  part  and  makes  him 
liable  for  slight  neglect;  and  when  it  is  or  is  intended  to  be 
reciprocally  beneficial  to  both  parties,  ordinary  diligence  on 

22.  Wilson    v.    Brett,    11    M.    &    W.   113. 


§  9.]  OF   BAILMENTS  AND   CARRIERS  GENERALLY.  9 

the  part  of  the  bailee  is  required  and  he  becomes  responsible 
for  ordinary  neglect.^^  And  a  like  apportionment  of  the  extent 
of  diligence  to  be  required  and  of  the  responsibility  to  be  in- 
curred by  bailees,  according  to  the  benefit  which  is  to  accrue 
from  the  bailment,  is  said  to  be  made  universally  in  the  laws 
of  civilized  nations. 

Sec.  9.  (§  9.)  Law  of  bailments  insufficient  to  determine 
liability  of  common  carrier. — It  follows,  as  a  necessary  con- 
sequence from  what  has  been  said,  that  the  law  of  bailments, 
as  has  been  already  incidentally  mentioned,  consists,  in  a  great 
measure,  of  rules  and  principles  by  which  the  liabilities  of  per- 
sons who  are  intrusted  with  the  custody  of  the  chattels  of 
others  is  to  be  determined  when  such  chattels  have  been  lost 
or  injured  by  the  negligence  of  such  bailees;  for  it  is  only 
for  their  negligence  or  misfeasance  or  malfeasance  that  bailees 
in  general  are  chargeable.  It  is  therefore  to  that  law  that  we 
must  have  recourse  in  order  to  determine  upon  the  liability 
of  all  those  carriers  whose  liability  depends  entirely  upon 
questions  of  negligence.  But  as  the  general  law  of  bailments 
does  not  admit  the  responsibility  of  ordinary  bailees  when 
the  loss  or  injury  has  occurred  without  negligence,  it  furnishes 
but  little  guidance  in  the  determination  of  questions  which 
arise  in  regard  to  the  responsibility  of  that,  by  far  the  most 
important  class  of  carriers,  who  are  held  to  be  insurers  against 
all  accidents  not  attributable  to  the  act  of  God,  the  public 
enemy,  the  owner,  the  law,  or  the  nature  of  the  goods. 

Sec.  10.  (§10.)  Comparative  degrees  of  diligence  and  neg- 
ligence.— It  being  agreed,  as  it  seems,  by  the  universal  sense 
of  mankind,  that  when  the  question  of  liability  depends  solely 
upon  that  of  negligence,  there  should  be  a  graduation  of  the 
fault  according  to  the  circumstances  surrounding  the  bailee, 
or  under  which  he  is  charged  with  the  custody  of  the  goods, 
writers  upon  this  subject,  and  those  who  have  been  called  upon 
to  apply  the  law,  have,  for  convenience  of  definition,  divided 

23.  See     these     rules     concisely     tabulated    in    Schouler    on     Bail- 
ments,  §§   14-16. 


10  THE  LAW   OF   CARRIERS.  [§11. 

diligence  and  its  corresponding  negligence  into  three  kinds  or 
degrees.  "There  may  be,"  says  the  author  of  the  Commen- 
taries on  Bailments,  "a  high  degree  of  diligence,  a  common 
degree  of  diligence  and  a  slight  degree  of  diligence ;  and  these, 
with  a  view  to  the  business  of  life,  seem  all  that  are  neces- 
sary to  be  brought  under  review.  Common  or  ordinary  dili- 
gence is  that  degree  of  diligence  which  men  in  general  exert 
in  respect  to  their  own  concerns.  It  may  be  said  to  be  the 
common  prudence  which  men  of  business  and  heads  of  fami- 
lies usually  exhibit  in  affairs  which  are  interesting  to  them. 
High  or  great  diligence  is,  of  course,  extraordinary 
diligence,  or  that  which  very  prudent  persons  take  of  their 
own  concerns;  and  low  or  slight  diligence  is  that  which  per- 
sons of  less  than  common  prudence,  or  indeed  of  any  prudence 
at  all,  take  of  their  own  concerns."  And  so,  he  says,  there 
are  three  corresponding  degrees  of  negligence;  "for  negli- 
gence may  be  ordinary,  less  than  ordinary,  or  more  than  ordi- 
nary; ordinary  negligence  being  the  want  of  ordinary  dili- 
gence, slight  negligence  the  want  of  great  diligence,  and  gross 
negligence  the  want  of  slight  diligence.  "2* 

Sec.  11.  (§11.)  Utility  of  this  classification. — It  is  true  it 
has  been  said  that  it  may  be  doubted  whether  the  terms  slight, 
ordinary  and  gross  can  be  usefully  applied  in  practice  to  dis- 
tinguish the  different  degrees  of  negligence  on  account  of  their 
ambiguous  and  inexact  meaning.^^  But  while  this  may  be 
true,  it  does  not  follow  that  all  distinction  between  the  degrees 
of  negligence  should  be  ignored.  All  negligence  is  not  the 
same,  although  it  has  been  said,  and  perhaps  rightly,  that 
where  human  life  is  at  stake,  as  in  the  carriage  of  passengers 
by  the  dangerous  agency  of  steam,  it  will  admit  of  no  degrees. 

24.  And    these    degrees    of    dili-  25.  Steamboat     New    World     v. 

gence   and   negligence   have   their  King,    16  How.     474;     Wilson    v. 

appropriate    designations    in     the  Brett,   11  M.   &  W.   113;    Wyld   v. 

Civil   Law,   as   diligentia,   exactis-  Pickford,  8    id.    443;     Hinton     v. 

sima  diligentia,  levissima  diligen-  Dibbin,  2  Q.  B.  646. 
tia,    lata   culpa,    levis    culpa,   and 
levissima  culpa. 


§12.]  OF   BAILMENTS  AND   CARRIERS  GENERALLY.  11 

But  the  case  is  different  when  the  subject  of  the  bailment  is 
property,  and  its  propriety  in  such  cases  has  never  been  prac- 
tically denied.  The  objection  is  to  the  terms  used  to  describe 
the  difference  in  the  degrees  of  the  diligence  or  negligence, 
and  not  that  the  distinction  does  not  exist  in  fact.  Their  un- 
certainty, however,  arises  from  the  nature  of  the  subject,  and 
until  others  are  suggested  not  liable  to  the  objection,  we  must 
continue  to  use  them  as  familiar  legal  terms  and  as  suggestive 
of  the  ideas  intended  to  be  conveyed  by  them  with  tolerable 
certainty.26 

Sec.  12.  (§  12.)  Common  carrier  not  usually  agent  of  owner 
of  goods. — Common  carriers  are  sometimes  spoken  of,  in  cases 
which  discuss  questions  as  to  their  liability,  as  the  agents  of 
the  owners  of  the  goods.  But  the  relation  of  principal  and 
agent  does  not  strictly  exist  between  them.  The  carrier  is 
only  the  instrument  employed  by  the  owner  to  accomplish  his 
purpose  with  reference  to  the  goods.  He  is  bound,  it  is  true, 
to  obey  the  directions  of  the  bailor  as  to  the  disposition  to  be 
made  of  them.  But  after  they  have  been  delivered  to  the 
carrier,  the  owner  can  demand  them  back  only  upon  the  pay- 
ment of  the  freight  which  the  carrier  would  have  earned,  unless 
the  carrier  chooses  voluntarily  to  give  them  up  otherwise; 
nor  can  he  v/ilfully  and  capriciously  change  his  directions  as 
to  their  destination.  The  carrier  is  in  no  wise  under  his  con- 
trol, nor  can  the  owner  dictate  to  him  what  route  he  shall 
travel,  nor  control  in  any  way  his  movements  or  his  conduct, 
nor  can  he  be  made  to  respond  to  others  for  any  injury  or 
damage  which  may  be  done  by  the  carrier  in  the  course  of  his 
employment  by  his  negligence  or  torts.  It  is  therefore  incor- 
rect to  speak  of  the  common  carrier  as  the  agent  of  the  owner 
or  bailor  of  the  goods ;  and  so  it  would  be  of  the  private  car- 
rier as  well,  except  when  such  carrier  and  owner  stood  towards 
each  other  strictly  in  the  relation  of  master  and  servant. 

Sec.  13.  (§13.)  But  may  be  agent  in  cases  of  emergency. — 
The  carrier  may,  however,  under  circumstances  of  great  emer- 

26.  See   Schouler  on   Bailments,     §§  15,  16. 


12  THE  LAW   OF    CARRIERS.  [§  14. 

crency  acquire  a  superinduced  authority  as  agent  from  the  very 
nature  and  necessity  of  the  case,  and  his  acts  under  such  au- 
thority will  be  completely  binding  upon  the  owner  of  the 
goods.  But  this  agency  arises  strictly  from  the  necessity  of 
the  case,  and  if  it  can  be  shown  not  to  have  existed,  all  his 
acts,  not  relating  to  the  purpose  for  which  the  goods  have 
been  bailed  to  him,  will  be  nullities  so  far  as  their  owner  is 
concerned.2^  But  aside  from  such  exceptional  cases,  he  is  a 
stranger  to  the  goods  except  for  the  purposes  of  carriage  and 
preservation  according  to  his  contract,  and  must  be  regarded 
as  a  contractor  with  the  owner  and  not  as  his  agent  or  ser- 
vant. ^^ 

Sec.  14.  (§14.)  Bailees  liable  for  malfeasance  and  fraud. — 
All  bailees  are  liable  for  malfeasance  and  fraud  under  all 
circumstances.  And  as  the  policy  of  the  law  forbids  all  con- 
tracts to  exonerate  parties  from  liability  for  their  own  frauds 
or  tortious  acts  to  the  injury  of  another,  no  carrier  or  other 
bailee  will  be  permitted  to  provide,  even  by  the  most  solemn 
stipulations,  for  his  immunity  from  their  consequences.  Pri- 
vate carriers  and  other  ordinary  bailees  upon  whom  the  law 
casts  no  obligation  to  accept  the  bailment  or  to  undertake  the 
duty  it  imposes,  but  merely  an  obligation  to  execute  the  trust 
with  proper  diligence  when  it  has  been  undertaken,  may,  how- 
ever, protect  themselves  against  accountability  for  negligence 
or  misfeasance,  as^these  consist  only  of  omissions  of  diligence 
and  not  of  acts  implying  moral  turpitude  or  of  positive  wrong. 
Being  free  to  engage  in  the  particular  service  or  not  as 
they  may  please,  they  may  do  so  upon  whatever  terms  may 
be  agreed  upon  with  the  other  party  short  of  irresponsibility 
for  unfaithful  or  dishonest  conduct.^^  But  common  or  public 
carriers  upon  whom  the  law  imposes  the  duty  of  carrying  for 
all  who  may  apply  according  to  their  professions,  are  held  more 
absolutely  answerable  for  their  defaults,  and,  according  to  the 

27.  story  on  Agency,  §  118.  Comstock,  204;  4  Selden,  375. 

28.  Wells    V.    The    Nav.    Co.,    2        29.  See  post,  §  40. 


§]4.]  OF  BAILMENTS  AND   CARRIERS  GENERALLY.  13 

weight  of  authority  in  this  country,  as  will  hereafter  be  seen, 
will  not  be  permitted  to  provide  by  contract  or  in  any  other 
manner  against  being  made  responsible  for  the  negligence  of 
themselves  or  their  servants.^^ 

30.  See  post,  §  450. 


CHAPTER  II. 

OF   CARRIERS  WITHOUT  HIRE  AND  PRIVATE   CAR- 
RIERS. 


§  15,  In  general. 

I,      CARRIERS    WITHOUT    HIRE 

16.  Who  deemed  to  be. 

17.  Liability     for     gross     negli- 

gence. 

18.  Undertaking  to   carry    is    a 

sufficient  consideration. 

19.  Carriage       not       gratuitous 

where  carrier  has  right  to 
demand    compensation. 

20.  Presumption  that  carriage  is 

gratuitous. 

21.  Not   gratuitous    where    indi- 

rect compensation  derived. 

22.  Question  of  gross  negligence 

one  of  fact. 

23.  Not   liable   for    loss   by    rob- 

bery unless  negligent. 

24.  Degree   of  negligence  which 

creates        liability    —    In- 
stances. 

25.  Same  subject — Further  illus- 

trations. 

26.  Same  subject — Further  illus- 

trations. 

27.  Same     subject — Other     illus- 

trations. 

28.  Loss  of  own  goods  at  same 

time,  presumptive  but  not 

conclusive  evidence  of  dil- 
igence. 

29.  Same    subject — Reckless  ex 

posure  of  own  goods. 

30.  Same  subject — Loss  of  bail- 

or's goods  only. 


§  31.  No     presumption     of     negli- 
gence. 

32.  Question     of     gross     negli- 

gence, how  determined. 

33.  Same      subject  —  Statements 

of  bailee,  when  evidence 

34.  Requisites      of      declaration 

against  private  carrier. 

II.      PRIVATE   CARRIERS  FOB  HIRE. 

35.  Who  are. 

36.  Less     numerous     than     for- 

merly. 

37.  Degree  of  diligence  required. 

38.  Same    subject — Illustrations. 

39.  Liability  for  loss  by  theft  or 

robbery. 

40.  Private  carrier  may  contract 

for  non-liability. 

41.  Liability  for  injury  to  goods 

subsequently   lost   by   acci- 
dent. 

42.  Test  of  private  carrier's  lia- 

bility. 

43.  How  compares  with  liability 

of  common  carrier. 

44.  Common   carrier   cannot   be- 

come    private     carrier    by 
contract. 

45.  Private    carrier    cannot    be- 

come   common    carrier    by 
contract. 

46.  Lien   of   private    carrier    on 

goods. 


Sec.  15.     (§15.)    In  general. — Bailees  of  goods  for  carriage, 
as  has  been  already  indicated,  are  of  three  kinds,  viz. :  carriers 

14 


§  16.]  CARRIERS  WITHOUT  HIRE.  15 

without  hire  or  reward,  private  carriers  for  hire,  and  com- 
mon or  public  carriers  for  hire.  Neither  carriers  without  re- 
ward nor  other  private  carriers  are,  as  to  their  responsibility, 
in  any  wise  distinguishable  from  other  ordinary  bailees;  and, 
after  what  has  been  already  said  upon  the  general  subject  of 
bailments,  but  little  difficulty  will  be  found  in  ascertaining  or 
applying  the  rules  by  which  their  responsibility  is  to  be  meas- 
ured. Common  carriers,  however,  in  company  with  innkeep- 
ers, are  exceptions  in  many  respects  in  the  government  of  the 
general  law,  being  bailees  upon  whom  it  imposes  extraordinary 
liabilities.  The  law  applicable  to  the  former  two  classes  of 
carriers  may  therefore  be  disposed  of,  after  what  has  been 
already  said,  with  a  brevity  commensurate  with  its  actual  im- 
portance as  compared  with  that  which  relates  to  the  common 
carrier. 

I.  CAKRIERS  WITHOUT  HIRE. 

Sec.  16.  (§16.)  Who  deemed  to  be. — All  carriers  without 
hire  may  be  said  to  be  private  carriers.  It  is  true  that  one 
engaged  in  the  business  of  a  common  carrier  may  carry  the 
goods  of  another  if  he  chooses  without  compensation,  as  a  mere 
matter  of  gratuity,  but  in  so  doing  he  becomes,  as  to  the  par- 
ticular goods,  a  private  carrier;  for  the  law,  as  we  shall  here- 
after see,  will  not  subject  even  the  common  carrier  to  the 
extraordinary  responsibilities  of  that  vocation  unless  he  has 
been  paid  for  the  service  he  undertakes,  or  has  a  right  to  his 
hire,  either  by  express  or  implied  contract.^  If,  therefore,  he 
has  accepted  the  goods  to  be  carried  without  charge  from 
motives  of  friendship  or  charity,  or  from  any  consideration 
which  the  law  does  not  regard  in  the  light  of  pecuniary  or 
valuable  compensation,  he  becomes  responsible  for  their  safety 
only  in  the  character  of  an  ordinary  unpaid  bailee,  known  to 
the  law  of  bailments  as  a  mandatary.  But  cases  of  gratuitous 
carriage  most  frequently  occur  in  bailments  to  persons  who 
have  never  undertaken  to  carry  for  others,  but  who,  for  an- 

1.  See  post,   §   61. 


16  TIIE  LAW   OF    CARRIERS.  [§  17. 

other's  convenience  or  accommodation,  are  induced  in  the  par- 
ticular instance,  when  about  to  commence  a  journey  for  pur- 
poses of  their  own,  and  not  for  the  purpose  of  carrying  the 
goods,  to  accept  sums  of  money  or  articles  of  value  to  be  car- 
ried with  them  and  delivered  according  to  the  request  of  the 
sender;  and  such  offices  of  friendship  or  kindness  are  usually 
undertaken  with  no  thought  of  the  responsibility  assumed,  and 
without  the  knowledge  that  in  doing  so  they  make  themselves 
carriers  in  the  eyes  of  the  law.  One  of  the  reasons  assigned 
for  the  infrequency  of  actions  against  such  bailees  is  the  ex- 
treme reluctance  on  the  part  of  bailors  to  make  their  friends 
the  victims  of  a  meritorious,  although  it  may  be  a  negligent, 
kindness.2  Still,  the  authorities  furnish  numerous  instances 
of  suits  against  gratuitous  bailees  or  mandataries,  a  number 
of  which  have  been  against  carriers  without  reward. 

Sec.  17.  (§  17.)  Liability  for  gross  negligence. — The  ques- 
tion whether  a  bailee  under  such  circumstances  should  be  held 
liable  at  all,  even  for  the  grossest  negligence,  would  seem  to 
be  one  about  which  casuists  might  differ,  and  was,  it  seems, 
never  settled  in  the  common  law  until  it  was  unanimously  re- 
solved by  the  judges  in  the  celebrated  case  of  Coggs  v.  Ber- 
nard^ that  such  liability  was  incurred  by  the  gratuitous  bailee 
for  carriage.  This  was  the  only  question  for  decision  in  that 
case,  although  it  was  made  the  occasion  for  "the  elaborate 
judgment  of  Lord  Hold,  which  contains  the  first  well-ordered 
exposition  of  the  English  law  of  bailments."'*  The  facts  of 
the  case  were  simply  that  the  defendant  had  undertaken  to 
remove  certain  casks  of  brandy  from  one  cellar  to  another, 
but  did  it  so  carelessly  that  one  of  the  casks  was  burst  and 
the  brandy  spilled.  After  judgment  for  the  plaintiff,  a  motion 
for  its  arrest  was  made,  because  the  declaration  had  not 
averred  that  the  defendant  had  undertaken  the  service,  either 
in  the  character  of  a  common  porter  or  carrier  or  for  reward, 
but,  for  aught  that  appeared,  had  undertaken  it  gratuitously. 

2.  Story  on  Bailments,  §  218.  Ld.     Cas.     (9th     Am.     Ed.),     354. 

3.  Ld.    Raym.    909;     1    iSmith's         4.  Idem.  note. 


§  18.]  CARRIERS  WITHOUT  HIRE.  17 

But  the  motion  was  denied,  because,  even  if  it  had  been  un- 
dertaken without  reward,  the  defendant  was  liable  if  he  had 
been  grossly  negligent  in  its  execution. 

Sec.  18.  (§18.)  Undertaking  to  carry  is  a  sufficient  con- 
sideration.— And  where  the  plaintiff  declared  against  the  de- 
fendant for  losing  a  hare  which  he  had  undertaken  to  carry 
for  the  plaintiff,  on  demurrer  to  the  ideclaration  because  the 
plaintiff  had  not  declared  upon  the  custom  of  the  realm,  and 
that,  therefore,  the  defendant  must  be  taken  to  have  been  a 
private  person,  and  because  there  being  no  consideration  laid, 
the  promise  alleged  was  merely  nudum  pactum,  it  was  deter- 
mined according  to  Coggs  v.  Bernard,  that  though  it  did  not 
appear  that  the  defendant  was  to  be  compensated  for  his  serv- 
ice, and  was  not,  therefore,  obliged  to  undertake  it,  yet,  hav- 
ing voluntarily  undertaken  it,  he  became  liable  for  the  dam- 
age arising  from  his  negligence;  and  judgment  was  accord- 
ingly given  for  the  plaintiff.^  So^  though  an  agreement  by  a 
railroad  company,  after  carrying  goods  safely  to  their  desti- 
nation, to  transfer  them  to  another  carrier  for  more  conven- 
ient delivery  to  the  consignee,  is  a  mere  nudum  pactum,  yet,  if 
it  enters  upon  the  performance  of  the  agreement,  but  performs 
it  so  negligently  that  the  goods  are  thereby  lost,  the  company 
is  liable.^ 

Sec.  19.  (§  19.)  Carriage  not  gratuitous  where  carrier  has 
right  to  demand  compensation. — The  test  of  the  liability  in 
such  cases  is,  therefore,  the  gross  negligence  of  the  bailee;  and 
this  is  to  be  determined,  not  by  any  definite  or  fixed  rule — for 
as  we  have  seen,  this  is  impossible  from  the  very  nature  of  the 
subject, — but  by  the  application  of  the  facts  of  each  case,  of 
the  knowledge  derived  from  common  experience  and  observa- 
tion in  the  affairs  of  life,  which  may  be  called  the  common 
sense  of  mankind.  Preliminary,  however,  to  the  question  of 
negligence,  it  must  be  ascertained  whether  the  bailment  was 
in  fact  accepted  as  a  mere  gratuity,  or  the  service  undertaken 

5.  Hutton  V.  Osborne,  1  Sel.  N.  6.  Melbourne  v.  Railroad,  88 
P.  420.  Ala.   443. 


IS  THE  LxVW   OP   CARRIERS.  [§  20. 

under  such  circumstances  as  preclude  the  carrier  from  the 
right  to  set  up  a  claim  for  compensation.  And  this  is  a  ques- 
tion which  is  not  always  free  from  difficulty.  Thus,  where  a 
package  of  money  was  delivered  for  carriage  to  the  clerk  of 
a  steamboat,  and  the  proof  was  that  at  the  time  nothing  was 
said  about  compensation  for  the  carriage,  and  that  it  was  not 
usual  for  boats  engaged  in  that  trade  to  charge  for  carrying 
such  packages,  it  was  contended  on  behalf  of  the  defendant 
that  the  bailment  w^as  a  mere  mandate  and  that,  therefore,  he 
was  bound  to  only  ordinary  diligence;  but  it  was  held  that, 
no  express  agreement  having  been  made  as  to  the  compensa- 
tion, the  carrier  was  entitled  to  it  if  he  chose  to  demand  it, 
and  that  he  w^as,  therefore,  a  common  carrier  of  the  package 
for  hire  and  was  bound  as  such,  and  not  as  a  carrier  without 
hire."^  So  it  can  make  no  difference  what  the  intentions  of  the 
carrier  were,  if  those  intentions  have  not  been  communicated 
to  the  bailor  in  such  a  manner  as  to  induce  him  to  conclude 
that  no  compensation  will  be  charged,  or  so  as  to  influence 
his  conduct  in  the  transaction.^  And  where  goods  were  de- 
livered to  the  carrier  to  be  sold  at  the  place  of  his  destination, 
the  proceeds  to  be  returned  to  the  owner  of  the  goods  by  the 
carrier,  it  was  held  that  in  bringing  back  the  proceeds  the  car- 
rier was  not  acting  gratuitously,  but  as  a  carrier  for  hire,  al- 
though he  was  only  to  be  paid  the  usual  freight  upon  the 
goods.^ 

Sec.  20.  (§20.)  Presumption  that  carriage  is  gratuitous, 
when. — These  were,  however,  cases  of  common  carriers,  and 
it  is  evident  that,  when  the  question  is  whether  such  carriers, 
or  others  usually  or  even  occasionally  employed  in  the  busi- 
ness of  carrying  goods  for  others  for  hire,  have  performed  the 
service  gratuitously  in  a  particular  instance,  the  presumption 
will  be  that  it  was  done  upon  their  usual  terms  as  to  compen- 
sation, and  not  as  a  mere  gratuity,  especially  if  the  goods  be 

7.  Kirtland  v.  Montgomery,  1  9.  Kemp  v.  Coughtry,  11  Johns. 
Swan,   452.  107;     Harrington    v.     M'Shane,     2 

8.  Gray   v.   Packet   Co.,    64   Mo.  Watts,  443. 
47. 


§  21.]  CARRIERS  WITHOUT  HIRE.  19 

of  the  kind  which  they  are  in  the  habit  of  carrying.  But  in 
bailments  to  persons  not  so  employed,  the  presumption  would 
ordinarily  be  the  other  way,  unless  from  all  the  circumstances 
it  appeared  that  the  bailee  was  to  be  paid. 

Sec.  21.  (§21.)  Not  gratuitous  where  indirect  compensa- 
tion derived. — Sometimes,  also,  the  consideration  for  the  car- 
riage consists,  not  in  a  direct  compensation  to  the  carrier  for 
the  transportation,  but  in  some  incidental  or  consequential  ad- 
vantage which  he  derives  or  expects  to  accrue  to  him  from  the 
carriage;  and  if  this  be  the  inducement  to  its  performance, 
he  will  not  be  allowed  to  rely  upon  the  defense,  when  the  goods 
have  been  lost  by  his  negligence,  that  he  was  a  mandatary 
in  the  carriage,  even  when  the  agreement  was  in  terms  that 
nothing  should  be  charged  for  it.  And,  accordingly,  when  by 
either  contract  or  usage  the  shipper  of  grain,  or  any  other 
commodity  which  is  carried  in  sacks,  has  the  right  to  the  car- 
riage of  the  sacks  when  emptied  free  of  charge,  the  carrier 
cannot,  if  they  are  lost  by  his  negligence,  claim  that  they  were 
carried  gratuitously  and  thereby  escape  liability.^  *^  And,  upon 
the  same  principle,  it  has  been  often  held  that,  when  the  ship- 
per of  goods  who  pays  freight  upon  them  is  permitted  to  travel 
upon  the  same  conveyance  nominally  as  a  free  passenger  and 
without  paying  any  distinct  consideration  for  his  passage,  he 
is  not  carried  gratuitously,  but  for  a  consideration  which  makes 
the  carrier  liable  to  the  same  degree  as  though  he  had  pur- 
chased and  paid  for  his  ticket.^  ^  And  so  it  is  well  settled  that, 
when  one  has  paid  to  become  a  passenger  upon  a  public  con- 
veyance, the  carrier  is  not  a  gratuitous  bailee  of  his  baggage, 
but  that  the  price  of  the  passage  is  also  compensation  for  the 
carriage  of  his  baggage,  and  that,  as  to  such  baggage,  the  car- 
rier becomes  a  common  carrier  for  hire.^^ 

Sec.  22.  (§  22.)  Question  of  gross  negligence  one  of  fact. — 
Having  ascertained  that  the  carriage  is  gratuitous,  it  then  be- 

10.  Pierce  v.  The  Railroad.  23  11.  See  post,  §  1021. 
Wis.  387;  Aldridge  v.  The  Rail  12.  See  post,  §  1241. 
way,  15  Com.  B.  N.  S.  582. 


20  THE  LAW   OF    CARRIERS.  [§  22. 

comes  necessary  to  decide  whether  the  carrier  has  made  him- 
self liable  for  their  loss  by  that  degree  of  negligence  which  the 
law  characterizes  as  gross,  which  is  of  course  a  question  to  be 
decided  by  no  legal  rule,  but  by  the  exercise  of  common  reason 
and  by  comparison  with  that  conduct  which,  under  the  same 
circumstances,  experience  and  common  knowledge  would  lead 
us  to  expect  of  men  of  ordinary  sense  and  prudence.  Anal- 
ogous cases  can  afford  but  little  guidance  in  forming  our  con- 
clusions in  any  particular  case,  because  there  are  always  points 
of  difference  in  the  circumstances,  which,  however  much  the 
cases  may  resemble  each  other  superficially,  would  make  it 
unsafe  to  make  the  one  a  test  of  the  other.  The  question  in 
every  case  is  almost  exclusively  one  of  fact,  and  its  determina- 
tion belongs  therefore  to  the  jury  and  not  to  the  law.  Still  it 
may  not  be  inappropriate  to  refer  to  some  few  of  those  which 
have  been  determined  in  reference  to  the  question  of  negli- 
gence in  carriers  as  mandataries. 

Sec.  23,  (§23.)  Not  liable  for  loss  by  robbery  unless  negli- 
gent.— The  carrier  without  hire  will  not  be  held  liable  for  the 
loss  of  the  property  by  theft  or  robbery,  provided  he  has  used 
ordinary  prudence.  Where  a  box,  belonging  to  one  who  in- 
tended going  upon  the  vessel  but  was  casually  left  behind,  was 
broken  open  by  the  captain  after  the  vessel  had  got  to  sea, 
upon  the  suggestion  that  it  might  contain  contraband  goods, 
and  its  contents,  which  were  valuable,  exposed  to  the  view  oP 
the  passengers,  and  instead  of  being  nailed  up  in  the  box  as 
before  were  put  into  the  captain's  chest  in  the  cabin  and  were 
stolen.  Lord  Ellenborough  instructed  the  jury  that  where  a 
person  does  not  carry  for  hire,  he  is  bound  to  take  proper 
and  prudent  care  of  that  which  is  committed  to  him,  and  that 
when  the  captain  opened  the  box  and  intermeddled  with  its 
contents,  he  was  bound  at  least  to  replace  it  in  its  former  state 
of  security  and  to  restore  all  the  guards  with  which  it  had 
been  before  protected,  and  that  having  learned  the  value  of 
the  property  and  exposed  it  to  view,  the  duty  of  vigilance  was 
enhanced.     He  therefore  left  it  to  the  jury  whether  the  de- 


§  24.]  CARRIERS  WITHOUT  HIRE.  21 

fendant  had  been  guilty  of  negligence,  and  they  found  a  ver- 
dict for  the  plaintiff.^  ^ 

Sec.  24.  (§24.)  Degree  of  negligence  which  creates  liability 
— Instances — In  one  case^^  gold  dust  was  sent  from  Sacra- 
mento to  San  Francisco  by  a  steamer,  notwithstanding  notice 
that  it  would  not  charge  or  become  responsible  for  such  mer- 
chandise. It  was,  however,  accepted  and  carried  on  these 
terms,  and  when  the  boat  reached  its  destination  late  at  night, 
the  clerk  went  up  into  the  city  leaving  the  gold  dust  in  his 
oflSce,  no  otherwise  secured  than  by  the  locking  of  the  door 
of  the  office,  and  in  his  absence  the  door  was  opened  and  the 
dust  stolen.  An  action  was  brought  to  recover  its  value  from 
the  owners  of  the  steamer  as  common  carriers,  but  the  court 
thought  that  there  had  been  no  such  negligence  as  to  charge 
them  as  gratuitous  carriers,  and  that  no  recovery  could  be  had 
against  them  as  common  carriers,  as  they  had  received  no 
compensation  for  the  service. 

Sec.  25.  (§25.)  Same  subject — Further  illustrations. — But 
in  another  case  the  passenger  on  a  steamboat  was  urged  by  the 
clerk  to  deposit  his  money  in  the  iron  safe  of  the  boat,  as  there 
were  thieves  on  board,  and  the  passenger  thereupon  did  give 
it  to  him,  and  it  was  locked  up  in  the  safe  with  the  under- 
standing that  no  charge  would  be  made  for  keeping  it.  When 
the  boat  arrived  in  port  an  extra  guard  was  put  over  the  office 
while  the  clerk  went  ashore  to  attend  to  the  business  of  the 
boat,  after  having  locked  up  the  safe  and  office,  taking  the 
keys  with  him.  Notwithstanding  these  precautions,  however, 
the  office  and  safe  were  both  opened  and  the  money  of  the 
passenger  stolen.  In  the  action  for  its  recovery  against  the 
owner  of  the  boat,  it  seems  to  have  been  thought  by  the  court 
that,  though  a  mandatary,  the  carrier  had  not  "used  a  degree 
of  diligence  and  attention  adequate  to  the  performance  of  the 

13.  Nelson      v.      Mackintosh,     1         14.  Fay  v.  Steamer  New  World, 
Starkie,    237.      See,    also,    Ouder-     ]  Cal.  348. 
kirk  V.  Bank,  119  N.  Y.  263. 


22  THE  LAW   OP    CARRIERS.  [§  26. 

trust,"  and  was  therefore  liable;  and  a  judgment  upon  a  ver- 
dict in  favor  of  the  plaintiff  was  affirmed.i^ 

Sec.  26.  (§26.)  Same  subject — Further  illustrations. — A 
sum  of  money  was  intrusted  by  one  acquaintance  to  another 
with  the  request  that  upon  his  return  to  his  home  he  would 
deliver  it  as  directed,  with  which  request  he  promised  to  com- 
ply. Finding  afterwards  that  he  would  not  be  able  to  return 
as  soon  as  he  expected,  he  turned  over  the  money  to  a  neighbor 
who  was  on  the  eve  of  starting  for  the  place  to  which  it  was 
to  be  carried,  with  the  same  directions  as  to  its  delivery. 
This  was,  however,  done  at  a  conspicuous  place  upon  a  race- 
track, and  was  witnessed  by  a  number  of  persons.  In  return- 
ing to  his  home  the  friend  to  whom  the  money  had  been  thus 
turned  over  had  his  pocket  picked  upon  the  cars,  and  the 
money  was  lost.  In  an  action  against  the  party  to  whom  the 
money  was  first  delivered  by  the  bailor,  it  was  held  that  he 
was  liable  upon  two  grounds.  In  the  first  place  it  was  said 
that  the  unauthorized  delivery  of  the  money  by  the  manda- 
tary to  another  was  a  conversion  which  would  make  him  re- 
sponsible for  the  loss;  and  in  the  second,  he  was  liable  on  the 
ground  of  gross  negligence.  His  conduct,  it  was  said,  evinced 
such  a  degree  of  heedless  incaution  and  disregard  of  common 
prudence  as  might  justly  be  considered  as  amounting  to  the 
grossest  negligence. ^^ 

Sec.  27.  (§27.)  Same  subject — Other  illustrations. — An  ex- 
press company  received  a  package  containing  a  watch  which  it 

15.  Jenkins  v.  Motlow,  1  Sneed,  robbery  or  for  any  other  purpose, 

248.     The  learned  judges  who  de-  it  would  seem  unquestionable  that 

cided    these    cases    certainly    dif-  the  carrier  at  once  becomes  a  com- 

fered  widely  in  their  views  as  to  mon  carrier  as  to  the  money  as  he 

the    character   and    extent   of   the  is  of  the  passenger's  baggage,  the 

negligence  necessary  to  impose  a  price  paid   for  the  passage  being 

liability  upon  a  gratuitous  bailee,  also  the  hire  for  the  carriage  of 

The   last  case  seems    to    be    cor-  whatever    the    passenger    commits 

rectly  decided,  but  upon  the  wrong  to  the  custody  of  the  carrier, 
ground.    When  the  passenger  puts         16.  Colyar    v.    Taylor,    1    Cold, 

his  money  in  the  safe  of  the  car-  372. 
rier  at  his  request,  to  prevent  a 


§  27.]  CARRIERS  WITHOUT  HIRE,  23 

promised  to  carry  gratuitously,  and  upon  its  arrival  at  desti- 
nation, there  being  rumors  of  an  expected  raid  upon  the  town 
by  Confederate  troops,  sent  it  promptly  by  one  of  its  messen- 
gers to  the  house  of  the  consignee;  but  he,  finding  upon  in- 
quiry that  the  consignee  was  absent  from  home,  without  leav- 
ing any  notice  at  the  house  of  the  arrival  of  the  package, 
returned  it  to  the  company's  office,  where  it  was  locked  up  in 
its  safe.  The  expected  raid  was  made  the  next  day,  after  a 
similar  attempt,  however,  to  make  the  delivery,  with  the  same 
result,  the  safe  broken  open,  and  the  watch  taken  and  lost  to 
the  consignee.  She  sued  the  company  and  recovered  the  value 
of  the  watch,  the  court  being  of  opinion  that  the  defendant 
had  made  itself  liable  by  its  gross  negligence  in  not  leaving 
notice  at  the  consignee's  residence,  so  that  the  package  could 
have  been  sent  for  by  her  on  the  same  evening  (which  would 
probably  have  been  done  by  her),  and  in  putting  it  in  the 
safe,  which  the  company  must  have  known  would  be  the  first 
object  of  attack  in  case  of  a  raid  such  as  was  expected.  "In 
this  perplexing  state  of  facts,"  said  Robertson,  C.  J.,  "hard  as 
it  may  be  to  impute  to  the  agent  culpable  or  gross  negligence, 
we  are  so  far  inclined  to  that  conclusion  as  to  feel  at  least 
such  an  equipoise  as  not  to  be  able  to  reverse  the  judgment 
of  the  circuit  court  on  any  solid  or  satisfactory  grounds.  "^'^ 
But  where  the  captain  of  a  ship  received  a  number  of  watches, 
for  which  it  was  not  shown  that  he  was  to  receive  any  recom- 
pense, and  put  them  into  his  own  chest  and  in  his  own  cabin 
upon  the  ship,  and  while  the  ship  was  anchored  in  the  river  she 
was  boarded  by  robbers,  the  chest  violently  taken  out  of  the 
cabin,  where  he  was  sleeping,  and  broken  open  and  plundered 
of  its  contents,  it  was  held  that  he  had  taken  ordinary  care  of 
them,  and  that,  being  a  carrier  without  hire,  he  was  not  liable 
for  the  loss.i® 

17.  Adams  Ex.  Co.  v.  Cressap,  6  cnerated     upon     facts     somewhat 

Bush.  572.    But  see  Adams  Ex.  Co.  similar. 

V.    Darnell,    31    Ind.    20;    Howard  18.  Pender  v.  Robbins,   6  Jones 

Ex.  Co.  V.  Wile,  64  Penn.  St.  201,  (Law),  207. 
in  which  the  paid  bailee  was  ex- 


24  THE  LAW  OF   CARRIERS.  [§  28. 

Sec.  28.  (§28.)  Loss  of  own  goods  at  same  time  presump- 
tive but  not  conclusive  evidence  of  diligence. — The  fact  that 
the  gratuitous  bailee  has  lost  his  own  property  together  with 
that  of  the  bailor  with  which  he  was  intrusted,  at  the  same 
time  and  by  the  same  means,  will  of  course  be  strong  pre- 
simiptive  evidence  in  his  favor;  but  it  will  not  be,  by  any 
means,  conclusive  of  the  question  of  honesty  or  diligence,  al- 
though the  opinion  of  Lord  Holt  in  Coggs  v.  Bernard  seems  to 
have  been  different.  "For  if,"  says  he,  "the  bailee  keeps  the 
goods  bailed  to  him  but  as  he  keeps  his  own,  though  he  keeps 
liis  own  but  negligently,  yet  he  is  not  chargeable  for  them ;  for 
the  keeping  them  as  he  keeps  his  own  is  an  argument  of  his 
honesty.  .  .  .As  suppose  the  bailee  is  an  idle,  drunken, 
careless  fellow,  and  comes  home  drunk  and  leaves  all  his  doors 
open,  and  by  reason  thereof  the  goods  happen  to  be  stolen,  and 
his  own,  yet  he  shall  not  be  charged,  because  it  is  the  bailor's 
own  folly  to  trust  such  an  idle  fellow.  So  that  this  sort  of 
bailee  is  the  least  responsible  for  neglects  and  under  the  least 
obligation  of  any  one,  being  bound  to  no  other  care  of  the 
bailed  goods  than  he  takes  of  his  own." 

Sec.  29.  (§29.)  Same  subject — Reckless  exposure  of  own 
goods. — But  it  has  been  said  that  a  man  might,  in  respect  to 
his  own  property,  be  willing  to  encounter  extraordinary  risks 
or  adventures  upon  mere  gambling  speculations,  with  a  view 
to  a  particular  advantage  or  from  a  natural  disposition  to  rash- 
ness, which  would  be  wholly  unjustifiable  in  respect  to  the 
goods  of  another  placed  in  his  custody.  And  it  has  accord- 
ingly been  held  in  a  number  of  cases  that  the  mandatary, 
whether  for  carriage  or  for  some  other  purpose,  may  become 
liable  by  reason  of  his  gross  negligence  in  the  care  of  the  prop- 
erty bailed  to  him,  although  he  may  have  taken  the  same  care 
of  it  as  of  his  own.^^ 

Sec.  30.     (§30.)     Same  subject — Loss  of  bailor's  goods  only. 

— Still,  there  are  authorities  of  the  highest  respectability  which 

19.  Doorman  v.  Jenkins,  2  A.  &     Mo.    109;    Story    on     Bail.     §     64; 
E.  256;    Booth  v.  Wilson,   1   B.  &     Tracy  v.  Wood,  3  Mason,  132. 
Aid.  59;  McLean  v.  Rutherford,  8 


§  31.]  CARRIERS  WITHOUT  HIRE.  25 

maintain  with  Lord  Holt,  that  if  the  bailee  be  guilty  of  an  act 
of  gross  negligence  in  regard  to  his  own  goods  as  well  as  those 
bailed  to  him,  and  they  are  both  lost,  he  cannot  be  held  liable.-" 
And  whether  conclusive  or  not,  the  fact  that  he  had  at  the  same 
time  lost  his  own  goods  would  be  a  strong  argument  not  only 
of  good  faith  but  of  diligence,  unless  it  were  shown  that  he 
was  an  "idle,  careless  or  drunken  fellow,"  who  took  no  care 
of  his  own  goods ;  and  even  then,  the  bailor  would  perhaps  de- 
serve to  lose  his  goods  for  trusting  him.  But  if  he  lost  the 
bailor's  goods  without  losing  his  own,  which  he  was  at  the 
same  time  carrying  and  which  were  equally  the  subjects  of 
theft  or  robbery,  it  would,  on  the  other  hand,  be  very  strong 
evidence  of  bad  faith  or  negligence. 21 

Sec.  31.  (§31.)  No  presumption  of  negligence.— The  man- 
datary is  entitled  to  the  benefit  of  that  rule  of  law  by  which 
every  man  is  to  be  presumed  to  have  done  his  duty  until  the 
contrary  is  shown.  Where,  therefore,  such  a  bailee  received  a 
letter  containing  money  which  he  promised  to  deliver  to  an- 
other, and  there  was  no  evidence  accounting  for  its  non-de- 
livery, it  was  held  that  the  most  that  could  be  presumed  against 
the  bailee  was  that  it  had  been  lost  by  his  gross  negligence,  and 
that  a  tort  under  such  circumstances,  by  its  appropriation  to 
his  use,  would  not  be  presumed  so  as  to  prevent  a  recovery  in 
an  action  of  assumpsit.-^  And  in  another  case  against  a  man- 
datary for  carriage,  it  was  ruled  that  the  plaintiff,  in  order  to 
recover,  must  show  either  an  appropriation  by  the  defendant 
to  his  own  use  of  the  money  or  property  bailed,  or  that  he  had 
demanded  it  and  that  the  bailee  had  refused  to  deliver  it  or  to 
give  any  satisfactory  account  of  its  loss.^^ 

Sec.  32.  (§32.)  Question  of  gross  negligence,  how  deter- 
mined.— What  is  or  is  not  gross  negligence  in  such  a  bailee  is 
sometimes  a  miKcd  question  of  law  and  fact,  but  generally  one 

20.  Story  on  Bail.  §  63;  2  Kent's  22.  Graves  v.  Ticknor,  6  N.  H. 
Com.     sec.     40;     Knowles    v.   The     537. 

Railway,  38   Me.   55.  23.  Beardslee  v.  Richardson,   11 

21.  Bland    v.    Womack,    2    Mur-     Wend.  25. 
phy,  373. 


26  THE  LAW  OF    CARRIERS.  [§33. 

exclusively  of  the  fact  to  be  determined  by  a  jury  under  all 
the  circumstances.24  And  all  the  circumstances  which  njay 
explain  the  manner  of  the  loss,  including  the  conduct  of  the 
bailee  in  the  custody  of  the  property  and  immediately  upon 
the  discovery  of  its  loss,  may  be  considered;  and  accordingl}'' 
proof  has  been  admitted  that  upon  such  discovery  the  defend- 
ant raised  the  hue  and  cry  and  made  assiduous  exertions  to 
find  the  lost  property ;  and  though  this,  it  was  said,  would  have 
been  the  course  of  a  guilty  man,  yet  it  was  also  one  which  an 
innocent  man  would  naturally  take,  and  which,  if  he  did  not 
take,  all  would  condemn  him.^s 

Sec.  33.  (§33.)  Same  subject — Statements  of  bailee,  when 
evidence. — So  in  another  case  where  the  party  sued  had  been 
intrusted  with  a  sum  of  money  which  he  agreed  to  carry  for 
accommodation  and  deliver  according  to  the  request  of  the 
bailor,  evidence  was  admitted  of  what  he  said  about  the  man- 
ner and  circumstances  of  the  robbery  to  the  person  whom  he 
next  met  upon  the  road.^^  Statements  made  by  a  mandatary 
in  such  case^;  at  the  time  of  demand  and  refusal  to  deliver  the 
property,  in  which  he  gives  an  account  of  the  loss  by  accident 
or  theft  with  the  attending  circumstances,  are  also  admissible 
as  part  of  the  res  gestae,  and  as  such,  he  is  entitled  to  the  bene- 
fit of  them  as  evidence  in  his  favor.^^  It  would  seem,  indeed, 
that  for  reasons  of  necessity  and  to  prevent  a  failure  of  justice 
from  the  absolute  impossibility,  in  many  cases,  of  showing  by 
direct  proof  the  fact  and  manner  of  the  loss,  great  latitude  has 
been  allowed  in  admitting  evidence  of  the  attendant  circum- 
stances; and  it  was  held,  before  the  law  removed  the  disabili- 
ties of  parties  in  interest  to  testify,  as  it  now  has  generally 
done,  that  the  mandatary  himself  was  a  competent  witness  to 
prove  a  robbery  upon  the  road  at  night.^^  And  no  doubt  the 
character  of  the  bailee  for  prudence  and  discretion  in  the  man- 

24.  Beauchamp  v.  Powley,  1  M.  26.  Lampley  v.  Scott,  24  Miss. 
&  Rob.  38;  Storer  v.  Gowen,  18  Me.     528. 

174;  Tracy  v.  Wood,  3  Mason,  132.         27.  Beardslee  v.  Richardson,   11 

25.  Tompkins   v.    Saltmarsh,    14     Wend.  25. 

S.  &  R.  275.  28.  Lampley  v.  Scott,  supra. 


§34.]  CARRIERS  WITHOUT  HIRE.  27 

agement  of  his  business  generally  may  be  shown,  especially  if 
it  be  known  to  the  bailor;  for  the  law  will  not  require  of  the 
bailee  more  care  and  diligence  than  the  bailor  had  a  right  to 
expect  from  his  known  habits  and  character  in  this  regard, 
and  if,  being  a  stranger,  he  trusts  him  and  he  should  turn  out 
to  be  a  careless,  negligent  sort  of  person,  it  would  be  the 
bailor's  own  folly.^^ 

Sec.  34.  (§34.)  Requisites  of  declaration  against  private 
carrier. — In  declaring  against  the  mandatary,  it  is  not  neces- 
sary to  set  out  any  consideration  further  than  the  delivery  of 
the  goods  and  the  undertaking  to  carry  out  the  purposes  of 
the  bailment.  This  is  indeed  the  only  consideration  which  can 
be  alleged,  and  is  sufficient  in  law.  For  "a  bare  being  trusted 
with  another  man 's  goods  paust  be  taken  to  be  a  sufficient  con- 
sideration if  the  bailee  once  enter  upon  the  trust  and  take  the 
goods  into  his  possession. ' '  The  question  of  compensation  may 
be  important  in  determining  the  extent  of  the  rights  and  obli- 
gations of  the  parties  or  the  class  of  bailments  in  which  a  par- 
ticular transaction  is  embraced,  but  it  is  not  essential  to  the 
existence  of  the  contract  or  to  its  obligation.  Nor  need  the 
plaintiff  allege  the  particular  character  or  degree  of  the  neg- 
ligence upon  which  he  relies  for  his  recovery,  but  the  allega- 
tion of  negligence  generally  is  sufficient.^*^  But  the  bailee  must 
have  actually  entered  upon  the  execution  of  the  trust.  A 
mere  executory  promise  to  do  so  will  be  nudum  pactum,  and 
will  impose  no  obligation  whatever;  for  the  mandatary  is  not 
answerable  for  omitting  to  do  an  act  for  another,  and  is  only 
responsible  when  he  attempts  or  undertakes  to  do  it  and  does 
it  amiss.  In  other  words,  he  may  become  liable  for  a  mis- 
feasance but  not  for  a  nonfeasance,  even  though  special  dam- 
ages are  averred.^^     The  goods,  therefore,  in  the  case  of  the 

29.  Knowles  v.  Railway,  38  Me.  borne,  1  Sel.  N.  P.  420;  Coggs  v. 
55;  Coggs  V.  Bernard,  supra.  Bernard,  supra. 

30.  McCauley  v.  Davidson,  10  31.  Thorne  v.  Deas,  4  Johns.  84; 
Minn.  418;  Nelson  v.  Mackintosh,  Salem  Bank  v.  Gloucester  Bank, 
1  Starkie,  237;  Balfe  v.  West,  22  17  Mass.  1;  Shillibeer  v.  Glyn,  3 
Eng.  L.  &  Eq.  506;   Hutton    v.  Os-  M.  &  W.  143. 


28  THE  LAW  OF   CARRIERS.  [§  35. 

carrier  without  hire,  must  have  been  delivered  to  and  accepted 
by  him  in  order  to  impose  upon  him  any  liability  for  their 
safety  or  for  a  failure  to  execute  a  trust  in  regard  to  them. 

II.     PRIVATE  CARRIERS  FOR  HIRE. 

Sec.  35.  (§35.)  Who  are. — Private  carriers  for  hire  are 
such  as  make  no  public  profession  that  they  will  carry  for  all 
who  apply,  but  who  occasionally  or  upon  the  particular  occasion 
undertake  for  compensation  to  carry  the  .goods  of  others  upon 
such  terms  as  may  be  agreed  upon.32  They  are  not  common 
carriers,  because  they  do  not  make  the  carriage  of  goods  for 
others  a  business,  and  do  not  hold  themselves  out  to  the  public 
as  ready  and  willing  to  carry  indifferently  for  all  persons  any 
particular  class  of  goods  or  goods  of  any  kind  whatever;  and* 
hence  the  law  does  not  compel  them  to  accept  and  carry  goods 
for  anybody.  Having  never  professed  by  their  course  of  busi- 
ness, or  in  any  other  manner,  to  carry  for  all  indifferently, 
they,  unlike  common  carriers,  may  refuse  at  will  to  carry  the 
goods  which  may  be  offered,  without  incurring  any  liability 
whatever,  and  may  carry  for  one  person  and  at  the  same  time 
refuse  to  carry  for  another.^^  But,  being  carriers  for  hire, 
their  reward  is  regarded  as  the  consideration  for  the  under- 
taking and  the  consequent  liability;  and  the  trust  being  for 
the  mutual  benefit  of  the  bailor  and  themselves,  they  belong  to 
a  different  class  of  bailees  from  mandataries  and  incur  a 
greater  degree  of  responsibility. 

Sec.  36.  (§  36.)  Less  numerous  than  formerly. — Before  the 
invention  of  steam  and  the  wonderful  improvement  in  the 
means  of  transportation  in  modern  times,  the  business  of  the 
private  carrier  for  hire  was  much  more  important  than  it  is 
now.  Much,  perhaps  most,  of  the  business  of  transporting 
merchandise  by  land  was  done  by  wagoners  who  did  not  pro- 

32.  "A    private    carrier    is    one  reward."     Pennewill   v.   Cullen.   5 

who,    without    being    engaged    in  Harr.   (Del.)   238. 

such  business  as  a  public  employ-  33.  Piedmont   Mfg.    Co.   v.  Rail- 

ment,  undertakes  to  deliver  goods  road,   19  S.  C.   353. 
in   a   particular   case   for  hire   or 


§37.]  PRIVATE  CARRIERS  FOR  HIRE.  29 

fess  to  be,  and  were  not,  in  fact,  public  or  common  carriers, 
and  consequently  the  law  affecting  the  rights  and  responsibili- 
ties of  such  bailees  was  of  very  great  importance  to  them  as 
well  as  to  the  public,  who  depended  upon  them  in  a  very  great 
measure  as  instruments  of  commercial  intercourse.  But  the 
great  multiplication  of  common  carriers,  whose  routes  now 
traverse  alhiost  every  neighborhood  and  whose  employment 
affords  greater  security  and  facilities  in  transportation,  has 
almost  displaced  private  carriers  and  made  their  business  com- 
paratively insignificant.  Still,  many  important  business  trans- 
actions take  place  through  the  intervention  of  private  carriers, 
although  the  law  applicable  to  the  class  of  bailees  to  which 
they  belong  has  become,  perhaps,  more  important  in  relation 
to  wharfingers,  warehousemen  and  the  like,  than  to  private 
carriers  for  hire. 

Sec.  37.  (§37.)  Degree  of  diligence  required.— The  bail- 
ment to  the  private  carrier  for  hire  being  for  the  mutual  bene- 
fit of  the  parties,  the  law  exacts  of  him  a  higher  degree  of 
diligence  than  of  the  carrier  without  hire.  The  measure  of  his 
duty  is  what  is  known  as  ordinary  diligence,  and  for  the  lack 
of  this,  he  will  be  held  liable.^^  Being  required  to  exercise  a 
greater  degree  of  care  and  attention  than  the  mandatary,  he 
must,  in  order  to  exculpate  himself  when  a  loss  has  occurred, 
be  able  to  show  that  he  has  omitted  none  of  those  ordinary 
precautions  for  the  safety  of  the  property  which,  according  to 
common  experience,  men  of  judgment  and  prudence  would 
have  used  under  the  same  circumstances  in  their  care  of  the 

34.  In  United  States  v.  Power,  6  Ohio,  73."  The  private  carrier  is 
Mont.  271,  the  court  say:  "As  a  liable  for  ordinary  neglect.  White 
private  carrier  the  respondent  v.  Bascom,  28  Vt.  268;  Varble  v. 
was  bound  to  use  ordinary  care, —  Bigley,  14  Bush  (Ky.),  698;  Pen- 
such  care  and  diligence  as  a  rea-  newill  v.  Cullen,  5  Harr.  (Del.) 
sonably  prudent  man  would  ex-  238;  Jaminet  v.  Moving  Co.,  109 
ercise  in  the  conduct  of  his  own  Mo.  App.  257,  84  S.  W.  Rep.  128, 
business  or  in  the  preservation  of  citing  Hutchinson  on  Carr. ;  Rail- 
his  own  property.  Ang.  Carr.  §  way  v.  Glascock  &  Warfield,  117 
47;  Story,  Bailm.  §  399;  2  Greenl.  Ga.  938,  43  S.  E.  Rep.  981,  citing 
Ev.  §  219;  Ames  v.  Belden,  17  Hutchinson  on  Carr. 
Barb.  515;   Samms  v.  Stewart,  20 


30  THE  LAW  OP  CARRIERS.  [§  38. 

property,  had  it  been  their  own;  and  whether  such  care  was 
used,  under  the  circumstances,  is  to  be  determined  in  every 
case  as  a  question  of  fact  by  a  jury,  under  instructions  from 
the  court  as  to  the  particular  degree  of  negligence  necessary 
to  impose  liability  upon  the  bailee. 

Sec.  38,  (^  38.)  Same  subject — Illustrations. — Illustrations 
of  the  application  of  the  law  in  cases  of  private  carriers  may 
be  found  in  the  case  of  Beck  v.  Evans,^^  where  the  defendant 's 
wagoner  was  intrusted  with  a  cask  of  brandy  to  be  carried  for 
hire.  Upon  the  way,  the  wagoner  was  informed  that  the  cask 
was  leaking,  but  took  no  steps  to  ascertain  whether  the  in- 
formation was  correct  or  to  stop  the  leak.  Several  hours, 
however,  after  he  had  been  told  of  it,  he  took  the  cask  out  of 
the  wagon  and  saved  what  remained  of  the  brandy.  It  was  left 
to  the  jury  to  say  whether  the  loss  arose  from  the  negligence 
of  the  wagoner  in  not  examining  the  cask  as  soon  as  he  was 
told  of  its  leaky  condition ;  and  they  having  found  a  verdict  for 
the  plaintiff,  a  rule  to  set  it  aside  was  refused  in  the  Court  of 
King's  Bench,  on  the  ground  that  the  defendant  had  miscon- 
ducted himself  in  not  performing  a  duty  which,  by  his  servant, 
he  was  bound  to  perform.  In  a  much  older  case^^  the  defend- 
ant was  declared  against,  ' '  for  that  the  plaintiff  did  undertake 
reasonably  to  content  him  for  the  carriage,"  in  consideration 
whereof  he  undertook  to  carry  safely  a  sum  certain  of  money 
to  an  inn  and  there  deliver  it  to  the  plaintiff,  and  that  he  had 
not  done  so;  and  it  was  held  that  the  defendant  who  had  ac- 
cepted the  money  to  be  carried  was  liable,  although  he  was 
not  a  common  carrier,  and  although  no  certain  sum  had  been 
promised  to  him  as  the  price  of  the  carriage.  In  Brind  v. 
Dale,^^  the  plaintiff  hired  the  carriage  of  his  goods  by  one  of 
the  defendant's  carts,  and  they  were  lost.  Lord  Abinger,  in 
his  instructions  to  the  jury,  said:  "I  take  it  that  if  a  man 
agrees  to  carry  goods  for  hire,  although  not  a  common  carrier, 
he  thereby  agrees  to  make  good  the  losses  arising  from  the 
negligence  of  his  own  servants,  although  he  would  not  be 
liable  for  losses  by  thieves,  or  by  any  taking  by  force,  or  if 

35.  16  East,  244.  36.  Rogers  v.  Head,  Cro.  Jac.  262. 

37.  8  Car.  &  P.  207. 


§  39.]  PRIVATE  CARRIERS  FOR  HIRE.  31 

the  owner  aceompanies  the  goods  to  take  care  of  them  and 
was  himself  guilty  of  negligence;  for  it  is  a  rule  of  law  that 
a  party  cannot  recover  if  his  own  negligence  was  as  much  the 
cause  of  the  loss  as  that  of  the  defendant. '  '^^ 

Sec.  39.  (§39.)  Liability  for  loss  by  theft  or  robbery.— Al- 
though it  is  said  that  the  private  carrier  is  not  to  be  held  liable 
for  a  theft  or  robbery  by  which  the  goods  are  lost,  if  the  jury 
should  be  of  the  opinion  that  he  has  not  been  guilty  of  that 
degree  of  negligence  which  is  a  condition  to  his  liability,  a  dis- 
tinction is,  it  seems,  to  be  drawn  between  a  robbery  or  taking 
by  force  and  a  theft  which  is  accomplished  secretly  and  by 
cunning,  in  this,  that  in  the  case  of  a  theft  the  presumption 
more  readily  arises  that  the  carrier  was  not  in  the  exercise  of 
that  diligence  which  was  his  duty  than  in  the  case  of  a  robbery 
or  forcible  capture  of  the  property,  especially  if  it  be  done 
openly  and  not  in  secret  or  under  the  cover  of  darkness.^^  In- 
deed, by  the  civil  law,  theft  ordinarily  constitutes  no  excuse 
to  the  bailee  for  hire,  because,  it  is  said,  it  can  scarcely  arise 
without  his  negligence.  It  is  therefore,  in  that  law,  presump- 
tive evidence  of  negligence  of  itself,  but  may  be  shown  to  have 
occurred  without  the  bailee's  fault,  and  then  he  will  be  ex- 
cused.'*" But,  by  our  law,  there  is  nothing  in  the  case  of  theft, 
independently  of  the  circumstances  under  which  it  was  com- 
mitted, from  which  we  have  a  right  to  infer  that  there  must 
have  been  negligence.  In  other  words,  the  mere  fact  of  theft 
raises  no  presumption  of  neglect  in  the  bailee,  nor,  on  the  c+her 
hand,  does  it  per  se  exempt  him  from  responsibility.  But 
whether  there  has  or  has  not  been  a  due  degree  of  care  must  be 
decided  upon  all  the  circumstances  of  each  case.^^ 

Sec.  40.     (§40.)     Liability  may  be  regulated  by  contract. — 

Negligence  being  in  the  nature  of  an  omission  simply  of  that 
degree    of   care   which,   under   all   the   circumstances,   is   the 

38.  Cailiff  v.  Danvers,  1  Peake,  39.  Hodgson  v.  Fullarton,  4 
N.  P.   114;   Robinson  v.  Dunmore,     Taunt.  787;   Montagu  v.  Janverin, 

2  Bos.  &  P.  416;  Whalley  v.  Wray,     3  Taunt.  442. 

3  Esp.    74;    Bowman   v.   Teall,   23         40.  Stcry  on  Bail.   §   239 
Wend.  306.  41.  Stciy  on  Bail.  §  39. 


32  THE  LAW    OF    CARRIERS.  [§40. 

bailee's  duty,  without  any  criminality  of  purpose,  and  bein?, 
at  least  when  within  a  certain  degree,  entirely  consistent  with 
good  faith,  the  private  carrier  may,  by  contract  with  his  em- 
ployer, exonerate  himself  from  liability  on  account  of  his  in- 
attention or  want  of  diligence  or  skill  in  the  execution  of  the 
trust.  He  may  stipulate  that  he  shall  in  no  event  be  liable 
except  for  fraud  or  its  equivalent.'*^  So  he  may  by  special 
contract  increase  his  liability  beyond  that  which  the  law  would 
have  otherwise  imposed;  as  where  the  owner  of  the  goods 
found  fault  with  some  of  the  appliances  of  the  carrier  which 
he  was  about  to  use  in  moving  the  goods,  and  the  latter  re- 
plied, "I  will  warrant  the  goods  shall  go  safe,"  and  the  owner 
upon  this  assurance  permitted  him  to  go  on  with  them,  and 
the  goods  were  in  fact  injured  from  the  very  defect  of  which 
the  owner  had  complained,  it  was  held  that  the  carrier  could 
be  held  upon  his  special  undertaking,  and  that  the  words  used 
by  him  to  the  owner  of  the  goods  amounted  to  a  warranty 
that  the  goods  should  go  safely.'*^  Said  the  court,  per  Cham- 
bre,  J.,  "the  defendant  is  not  a  common  carrier  by  trade,  but 
has  put  himself  into  the  situation  of  a  common  carrier  by 
his  particular  warranty."  So  in  Coggs  v.  Bernard,  it  was  con- 
sidered, notwithstanding  Lord  Coke's  opinion  to  the  contrary 
in  Southcote's  Case,^^  that  in  a  gratuitous  bailment,  the 
promise  of  the  defendant  to  lay  the  goods  down  safely  intro- 
duced a  special  term  into  his  contract  which  increased  his 
liability.  But  even  an  express  undertaking  by  a  private  car- 
rier to  carry  goods  safely  and  securely  is  but  an  undertaking 
to  carry  them  safely  and  securely,  free  from  any  negligence  of 
himself  or  his  servants.  In  other  words,  it  is  a  mere  contract 
for  the  observance  of  due  care,  and  does  not  insure  the  safety 
of  the  goods  against  losses  by  thieves,  by  robbery  or  by  un- 
avoidable accidents  ;^^  and  does  not  give  rise  to  that  extraordi- 

42.  "Wells  V.   Steam  Nav.   Co.,   2        44.  4  Rep.  84, 

Corns.  204;  Alexander  v.  Green,  3  45.  Story  on  Bail.  §  457;  Oakley 

Hill,  9.  V.  Packet  Co.,   11  Exch.   618;    Col- 

43.  Robinson  v.  Dunmore,  2  Bos.  lett  v.  The  Railway  Co.,  16  Q.  B. 
&  P.  416.  984.     "An  express  provision  in  a 


§40.] 


PRIVATE  CARRIERS  FOR  HIRE. 


33 


nary  liability  which  belongs  to  the  common  carrier.  The  pri- 
vate carrier  may,  however,  by  express  terms  warrant  the  safety 
of  the  goods  and  thus  become  liable  to  the  same  extent  as  the 
common  carrier,  as  every  bailee  to  whom  goods  are  intrusted 
may  undoubtedly  for  a  consideration  insure  their  safety.  But 
an  express  warranty  as  to  a  particular  risk  will  not  be  ex- 
tended to  a  different  one;  as  where  the  carrier  expressly  as- 
sumes the  risk  of  breakage,  he  will  not  be  liable  for  a  loss  by 
accidental  fire.^^  Nor  will  an  express  exclusion  of  a  certain 
risk  be  construed  as  an  assumption  of  all  risks  not  excluded.'*^ 


contract  of  bailment  for  hire  to 
keep  the  subject  of  the  trust  safe- 
ly will  not  enlarge  the  common- 
law  liability  of  the  bailee.  That 
is  an  obligation  which  the  law 
implies,  that  is  to  keep  as  safely 
as  an  ordinarily  prudent  man 
would  his  own  goods.  2  Blacks. 
Com.  453.  Such  a  provision  will 
not  constitute  the  bailee  an  in- 
sui'er  of  the  safety  of  the  thing 
bailed;  and  should  it  be  destroyed 
by  inevitable  casualty,  or  stolen 
without  the  fault  of  the  bailee,  he 
will  not  be  responsible.  Foster  v. 
Essex  Bank,  17  Mass.  501.  In 
that  case  Chief  Justice  Parker,  in 
remarking  upon  the  agreement  to 
keep  the  money  deposited  safely, 
as  imposing  no  greater  duty  than 
the  exercise  of  ordinary  care, 
says:  'Anything  more  than  this 
would  amount  to  an  insurance  of 
the  goods,  which  cannot  be  pre- 
sumed to  be  intended,  unless  there 
be  an  express  agreement  and  an 
adequate  consideration  therefor.' " 
Hubbard,  J.,  in  Ames  v.  Belden, 
17  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  517.  See,  also, 
Jaminet  v.  Moving  Co.,  109  Mo. 
App.  257,  84  S.  W.  Rep.  128,  cit- 
ing Hutchinson  on  Carr. 
46.  Scaife  v.  Farrant,   L.  R.    10 


Exc.  358;  Ames  v.  Belden,  17  Barb. 
513. 

47.  United  States  v.  Power,  6 
Mont.  271.  In  this  case  a  private 
carrier  had  undertaken  to  carry 
supplies  for  the  government,  and 
the  contract  contained  these 
words:  "All  rail  to  Missouri  riv- 
er; during  navigation,  on  Mis- 
souri river.  No  river  risk  on  the 
part  of  the  contractor  for  unavoid- 
able accidents.  Land  haul  only 
when  ground  is  frozen."  "While 
certain  of  the  goods  were  being 
transported  by  steamer  up  the 
Missouri  river,  they  and  the 
steamer  were  burned  by  an  acci- 
dental fire.  It  was  admitted  that 
the  carrier  used  "the  best  care 
and  precautions,"  but  it  was 
sought  to  hold  him  as  an  insurer. 
It  was  contended  by  the  attorney 
for  the  United  States  that  the  lan- 
guage used  excluding  river  risks 
was  equivalent  to  saying  "un- 
avoidable accidents  on  account  of 
river  risks  excepted,"  and  that 
such  unavoidable  accidents  as 
arose  from  river  risks  being  alone 
excepted,  all  other  unavoidable  ac- 
cidents were  included;  and  that 
thus  the  respondent  was  liable  for 
a    loss    by   fire    occurring    on    the 


34  THE  LAW   OF    CARRIERS.  [§  41. 

But  all  the  contracts,  either  to  increase  or  lessen  the  responsi- 
bility of  the  bailee,  must  be  clear  and  explicit;  for  extraordi- 
nary liabilities  will  not  be  imposed  upon  him,  nor  will  he  be 
released  from  his  legal  and  reasonable  obligations  to  the  j)reju-; 
dice  of  the  bailor,  by  mere  inference.  So  his  liability  may  be 
modified  by  the  previous  course  of  dealing  between  the  par- 
ties, or  by  the  usages  of  the  carrier  in  his  business;  but  cus- 
toms and  usages,  to  be  available  for  the  exoneration  of  the 
carrier,  must  have  existed  for  such  a  length  of  time  as  to  have 
become  known  and  established.^* 

Sec.  41.  (§  41.)  Liability  for  injury  to  goods  subsequently 
lost  by  accident. — If  the  goods  are  injured  by  the  negligence 
of  the  bailee,  he  will  be  responsible  to  the  owner  to  the  extent 
of  the  damage,  notwithstanding  a  subsequent  destruction  of 
them  while  in  the  bailee 's  possession  by  an  accident  for  which 
he  was  not  responsible.  This  was  held  where  goods  were  de- 
posited in  a  warehouse  for  custody,  and  while  there  were  in- 
jured through  the  carelessness  of  the  warehouseman;  but  be- 
fore they  were  taken  away  by  the  owner  they  were  destroyed 
by  a  sudden  freshet,  which  caused  the  water  of  the  river  near 
which  the  warehouse  stood  to  rise  and  overflow  the  loom 
in  which  the  goods  were  deposited.  Every  exertion  possible 
had  been  made  by  the  warehouseman  and  his  servants  to  save 
them,  and  he  was  therefore  clearly  not  liable  for  their  loss; 
but  it  was  held  that  their  destruction  did  not  release  him  from 
liability  for  the  previous  injury  which  they  had  sustained 
through  his  negligence.  The  cause  of  action,  it  was  said,  ex- 
isted before  and  at  the  time  of  their  destruction,  and  there 
was  no  principle  which  would  enable  the  defendant  to  plead 
the  flood  or  the  consequent  destruction  of  the  goods  in  bar  to 
an  action  for  his  previous  wrong.^^ 

Sec.  42.     (§42.)     Test  of  private  carrier's  liability.— The 

test  of  the  proper  performance  of  his  duty  by  the  private  car- 
river   though   it  was  entirely   un-        48.  Story   on   Bail.   §    543. 
avoidable.      The    court,    however,         49.  Powers    r.    Mitchel,    3    Hill, 
held  the  carrier  not  liable.  545;  Story  on  Bail.  §  414. 


§  42.]  PRIVATE  CARRIERS  FOR  HIRE.  35 

rier  for  hire  is,  in  almost  every  ease,  the  extent  of  the  diligence 
and  care  which  have  been  exercised  by  him ;  and  the  question 
of  his  liability,  when  the  loss  has  not  arisen  from  his  malfea- 
sance, turns  upon  the  inquiry  whether  or  not  he  has  been  guilty 
of  negligence,  in  the  omission  of  care  and  diligence,  to  that 
degree  Avhich  the  law  denominates  gross  or  ordinary.  But,  as 
we  have  seen,  in  dealing  with  the  subject  of  the  liability  of 
the  public  or  common  carrier,  when  it  has  not  been  limited  by 
his  contract,  questions  of  diligence  and  negligence  are  gener- 
ally impertinent,  because  they  are  regarded  as  insurers  of  the 
safety  of  the  goods  against  all  losses  except  such  as  arise  from 
the  acts  of  God  or  of  the  public  enemy.  But  since  the  law 
has  been  modified,  as  it  has  been  universally,  so  that  they  may 
limit  their  liability  almost  to  the  same  extent  as  private  car- 
riers for  hire,  the  common-law  liability  is  rarely  assumed  by 
the  more  important  and  extensively  employed  public  carriers; 
and  when  they  have  limited  or  qualified  it,  as  they  are  now 
permitted  to  do,  the  question  of  their  liability  when  the  goods 
have  been  lost  or  injured  is  generally  purely  one  of  negligence, 
as  it  is  in  the  case  of  the  private  carrier.  For,  when  it  has 
been  agreed  by  the  parties  to  the  contract  of  affreightment 
that  the  carrier  shall  not  be  held  liable  for  losses  occurring 
from  certain  accidents  or  causes,  it  may  still  be  shown  that, 
notwithstanding  the  loss  or  injury  arose  from  one  of  the  ex- 
cepted causes,  it  would  not  have  occurred  but  for  the  negli- 
gence of  the  carrier  or  his  servants,  or  might  have  been 
avoided  by  the  use  of  proper  diligence;  which,  if  successfully 
proven,  will  deprive  the  carrier  of  all  the  benefit  of  his  contract 
in  that  regard.^^  If,  for  instance,  it  be  agreed  that  the  carrier 
shall  not  be  held  liable  for  losses  by  fire,  the  construction  put 
upon  the  contract  will  be  that  only  fire  which  was  not  attrib- 
utable to  his  fault  or  negligence  was  contemplated  or  intended, 
and  if  it  can  be  shown  that  the  fire  which  caused  the  loss 
originated  from  his  carelessness,  or  that  he  could  have  escaped 
from  it  without  the  loss  by  the  use  of  diligence,  he  will  be 

50.  Parrill   v.   Railway    Co.,    23     Ind.  App.  638,  55  N.  E.  Rep.  1026, 
citing  Hutchinson   on   Carr. 


36  THE  LAW  OF   CARRIERS,  [§  43. 

held  responsible  to  the  same  extent  as  if  he  had  been  a  carrier 
without  any  contract  whatever  as  to  his  liability. 

Sec.  43.  (H3.)  How  compares  with  liability  of  common 
carriers. — Thus  the  common  carrier  in  many  instances  has 
come  to  stand  upon  the  same  footing  as  the  private  carrier  for 
hire,  the  liability  of  both  very  often  depending  upon  questions 
of  diligence  and  negligence,  which  in  their  application  to  the 
two  classes  of  carriers  mean  the  same  thing,  that  being  dili- 
gence or  its  opposite  in  the  case  of  private  carriers  for  hire 
which  is  so  as  to  the  common  carrier.  A  great  part  of  the  law 
which  affects  the  public  carrier,  therefore,  as  it  is  now  under- 
stood and  applied,  is  equally  applicable  in  cases  which  arise 
as  to  the  liability  of  those  who  carry  privately  for  reward ;  and 
it  will  be  found  that  most  of  the  questions  which  can  occur 
in  reference  to  the  duties  and  obligations  of  the  latter  can  be 
solved  upon  the  principles  which  now  form  perhaps  the  most 
important  portion  of  the  law  relating  to  common  carriers. 
Much  of  the  law,  therefore,  which  will  hereafter  be  stated  in 
reference  to  the  responsibility  of  the  common  carrier  for  his 
negligence  will  be  equally  applicable  to  the  case  of  the  private 
carrier  for  hire. 

Sec.  44.  (§44.)  Common  carrier  cannot  become  private 
carrier  by  contract. — It  is,  however,  by  no  means  to  be  under- 
stood that  the  common  carrier  can  by  his  contract  or  in  other 
mode  become,  as  to  the  carriage  of  particular  goods,  merely  a 
private  carrier  for  hire  whilst  he  is  in  fact  a  common  carrier 
of  such  goods  generally.  If  he  could  do  this,  he  could,  of 
course,  provide  by  contract  against  liability  for  losses  occur- 
ring from  the  negligence  of  himself  or  his  servants,  which,  as 
we  have  seen,  it  is  competent  for  the  private  carrier  to  do.  But 
according  to  the  weight  of  authority,  at  least  in  this  country, 
as  we  shall  hereafter  see,^^  common  carriers  will  not  be  per- 
mitted, under  any  circumstances  or  in  any  manner,  to  protect 
themselves  against  the  consequences  of  their  own  negligence 
in  the  carriage  of  either  goods  or  passengers.  They  may  be- 
come the  carriers  of  goods  gratuitously,  and  the  law  will  then 

51.  See  post,  §  418. 


§  44.]  PRIVATE   CARRIERS  FOR  HIRE.  37 

hold  them  liable  only  as  mandataries ;  that  is,  only  for  losses 
occurring  through  gross  negligence.  But  so  long  as  they  are 
compensated  for  the  carriage  they  are  common  carriers,  con- 
tract or  no  contract.-^2  ^  common  carrier  may,  however,  un- 
doubtedly become  a  private  carrier  or  a  bailee  for  hire,  when, 
as  a  matter  of  accommodation  or  special  engagement,  he  un- 
dertakes to  carry  something  which  it  is  not  his  business  to 
carry.^2  The  relation  in  such  a  case  is  changed  from  that  of  a 
common  carrier  to  that  of  a  private  carrier,  and  where  this  is 
the  effect  of  the  special  arrangement,  the  carrier  is  not  liable 
as  a  common  carrier  and  cannot  be  proceeded  against  as  such.^'* 
But  it  has  been  held  that  even  though  the  carrier  enters  into 
a  special  undertaking  with  a  particular  shipper  to  operate 
each  day  a  special  train  for  such  shipper's  accommodation,  and 
further  agrees  that  he  will  not  receive  for  carriage  on  the  train 
so  provided  the  goods  of  other  shippers  which  are  of  like  char- 
acter to  those  offered  by  the  shipper  with  whom  he  has  con- 
tracted, if  he  proceeds  to  accept  for  transportation  thereon 
other  classes  of  goods  tendered  by  other  shippers,  his  contract 
will  be  of  no  avail  in  divesting  him  of  his  character  as  a  com- 
mon carrier  as  to  such  train,  and  he  may  not  lawfully  refuse 
for  carriage  thereon  the  goods  of  other  shippers,  although  they 
be  of  like  kind  to  those  offered  by  the  shipper  with  whom  he 
has  contracted.^^ 

52.  Davidson  v.  Graham,  2  Ohio  road  Co.,  13  Oreg.  352;  Central 
St.  140;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Lockwood,  R.  Co.  v.  Lampley,  76  Ala.  357; 
17  Wall.  357;  Hooper  v.  Wells,  Memphis  News  Publishing  Co.  v. 
Fargo  &  Co.,  27  Cal.  11;  Chris-  Railway  Co.,  110  Tenn.  684,  75  S. 
tenson  v.  The  Am.  Ex.  Co.,  15  W.  Rep.  941,  63  L.  R.  A.  150,  cit- 
Minn.   270;   Bank   of  Kentucky  v.  ing  Hutchinson  on  Carr. 

The  Adams  Ex.   Co.,   3   Otto,   180;  54.  Kimball   v.   Railroad  Co.,   26 

Kirby    v.    Adams    Ex.    Co.,    2    St.  Vt.    249;     Honeyman    v.    Railroad 

Louis  Ct.   of  App.   369;    Parrill  v.  Co.,   supra;  Railroad   Co.   v.  Wal- 

Railway  Co.,  23  Ind.  App.  638,  55  lace,   24   U.    S.    App.    589,   66   Fed. 

N.  E.  Rep.  1026,  citing  Hutchinson  Rep.   506,   30   L.  R.   A.   161,    14   C. 

on  Carr.;    Hears  v.  Railroad   Co.,  C.    A.    257,    citing   Hutchinson   on 

75  Conn.  171,  52  Atl.  Rep.  610,  96  Carr. 

Am.  St.  Rep.  192,  56  L.  R.  A.  884.  55.  Memphis    News     Publishing 

53.  Railroad    Co.    v.    Lockwood,  Co.  v.  Railway,  supra. 
17  Wall.  357;   Honeyman  v.  Rail- 


38  THE  LAW   OF   CARRIERS.  [§  45. 

Sec.  45.  (H5.)  Private  carrier  cannot  become  common 
carrier  by  contract. — Nor  can  the  private  carrier  become  a  com- 
mon carrier  by  contract  with  his  employer.  He  may  assume 
liabilities  to  his  bailor  co-extensive  with  those  of  the  public 
carrier  at  common  law,  and  may  undertake  to  carry  upon 
terms  which  may  be  agreed  upon.  He  may  become  an  insurer 
against  all  possible  hazards,  and  he  may  say  that  he  will  an- 
swer for  nothing  but  a  loss  happening  through  his  own  fraud 
or  want  of  good  faith.^^  He  may  warrant  the  safety  of  his 
charge,  and  thereby  put  himself  in  the  "situation"  of  a  com- 
mon carrier  as  to  the  party  who  has  intrusted  him  with  the 
goods.  But  still,  he  does  not  carry  in  a  public  capacity,  and 
does  not  subject  himself  to  liability  to  actions  for  refusal  to 
carry  nor  for  preferences  as  to  those  whom  he  will  serve.  He 
is  a  carrier  exactly  according  to  his  contract  and  no  further, 
and  may  carry  when  and  as  he  pleases  and  for  whom  he 
pleases,  being  responsible  only  to  those  for  whom  he  under- 
takes; and  in  actions  against  him  for  loss  or  damage  to  the 
goods,  he  must  be  declared  against  as  a  private  and  not  as  a 
common  carrier.^^ 

Sec.  46.  (§46.)  Lien  of  private  carrier  on  goods. — It  seems 
not  to  be  well  settled  whether  a  private  carrier  for  hire  has  a 
lien  upon  the  goods  in  respect  to  which  he  performs  the  service 
or  not.  There  would  seem  to  be  no  very  satisfactory  reason 
why  he  should  not  have  the  same  right  to  retain  the  goods  until 
his  charges  for  their  carriage  are  paid,  as  the  warehouseman, 
the  wharfinger  or  the  artisan,  who,  by  his  labor  and  skill,  has 
added  to  their  value.^^     The  general  rule  certainly  is  that, 

56.  Wells  V.  Steam  Nav.  Co.,  2  public  carrier."  Jones  on  Liens, 
Comstock,    204.  §    276.      But    see    Riddle    v.   Rail- 

57.  Kimball  v.  The  Railroad,  26  road  Co.,  1  Inter.  St.  Com.  Rep. 
Vt.  247;   Robinson  v.  Dunmore,  2  604. 

Bos.  &  P.  416.  "Some       commentators       insist 

58.  "Upon  general  principles,  that,  on  principle,  a  private  car- 
there  seems  to  be  no  reason  why  rier  should  have  a  lien,  but  say 
a  private  carrier  should  not  have  the  decisions  hold  he  has  none. 
a  lien  for  performing  services  *  *  *  We  have  searched  the 
similar    to    those    rendered    by    a  books  and  have  found  no  case  al- 


§46.]  PRIVATE  CARRIERS  FOR  HIRE.  39 

where  the  bailee  of  a  chattel  has  increased  its  value  by  his 
labor,  he  has  a  specific  lien  upon  it  for  his  compensation,  which 
means  no  more  than  the  right  to  retain  it  until  his  charges  for 
the  particular  service  are  paid,  but  not  for  a  general  balance 
of  account.  Upon  similar  grounds  it  has  been  held  that  wharf- 
ingers and  warehousemen  who  have  rendered  service  in  respect 
to  the  particular  goods  for  the  owner's  benefit  have  such  a 
lien,  although  their  services  may  have  added  nothing  to  thejr 
intrinsic  value  ;^^  and  it  would  seem  that  for  the  same,  and 
even  for  stronger  reasons,  the  same  right  should  be  conceded 
to  the  private  carrier  for  hire.  But  it  seems  to  have  been 
held  otherwise  in  at  least  one  case  in  this  country.^'^ 

lowing  a  lien  to  a  private  carrier."  59.  Story  on  Bail.  453,  453a. 

Thompson  v.  Storage  Co.,  97  Mo.  60.  Fuller  v.  Bradley,   25   Pena. 

App.  135,  70  S.  W.  Rep.  938,  citing  St.  120. 
Hutchinson  on  Carr. 


CHAPTER  III. 
WHO  IS  A  COMMON  CARRIER. 


47.  Common  carrier  defined. 

48.  Same  subject — The  essential 

characteristics. 

49.  His     employment     must    be 

public  in  its  nature. 

50.  Same      subject — Exceptional 

cases — Gordon   v.   Hutchin- 
son. 

51.  Same    subject — The    rule    in 

England. 

52.  Same  subject — The    rule    in 

Tennessee. 

53.  Same     subject — Further     of 

the  Tennessee  rule. 

54.  Same   subject — These   excep- 

tional  cases  not  elsewhere 
followed — Illustrations. 

55.  Same  subject — Further  illus- 

trations. 

56.  Same    subject — Other    cases 

illustrating  general  rule. 

57.  Same    subject — The    general 

rule  well  settled. 

58.  Same     subject — How      com- 

mon carrier  compares  with 
innkeeper. 

59.  Goods   must  be   of   kind   he 

professes  to  carry. 

60.  Must  undertake  to  carry  by 

customary       means       and 
route. 

61.  Carriage  must  be  for  hire. 

62.  Action  must  lie  for  refusal 

to  carry. 

63.  Regular   trips   or   fixed    ter- 

mini not  necessary. 

64.  Kind  of  vehicle  or  vessel  and 

distance  immaterial. 


§  65.  Hoymen,  bargemen,  lighter- 
men, canal-boatmen,  etc., 
are  common  carriers. 

66.  Ferrymen   are   common   car- 

riers when. 

67.  Whether  ferrymen  are  com- 

mon carriers  of  goods  re- 
tained in  the  custody  of 
passenger. 

68.  Proprietors  of  land  vehicles 

like  stage-coaches,  omni- 
buses, carts,  wagons,  etc., 
are  common  carriers  when. 

69.  Vehicles      carrying      passen- 

gers usually  liable  as  com- 
mon carriers  only  as  to 
baggage. 

70.  Proprietors  of  local  land  ve- 

hicles are  common  car- 
riers. 

71.  Vv^'arehousemen,    wharfingers 

and  forwarders  of  freight, 
when  common  carriers. 

72.  Same    subject — When    liabil- 

ity begins. 

73.  Water-craft,     railways     and 

express  companies  are 
chief  carriers. 

74.  Owners  of  ships  are  usually 

common  carriers. 

75.  Owners    of    steamboats    and 

canal-boats  are  common 
carriers. 

76.  Railroad  companies  are  com- 

mon  carriers. 

77.  Railroad    receivers,    trustees, 

etc.,  are  common  car- 
riers. 


40 


§47.] 


WHO  IS  A  COMMON   CARRIER. 


41 


78.  Street    railways    are    com- 

mon carriers. 

79.  Sleeping       and       parlor-car 

companies  not  common 
carriers. 

80.  Express       companies       are 

common  carriers. 

81.  Same   subject — Peculiarities 

of  their  business. 

82.  Same   subject — Attempts  to 

secure  exemption. 

83.  Same    subject — Cannot     es- 

cape liability  by  assuming 
name    of    "forwarders." 

84.  Same    subject — Nor    by    as- 

suming name  of  "dispatch 
company,"  "fast  freight 
line,  etc." 

85.  Special    circumstances    un- 

der which  carrier  not 
deemed  to  be  common 
carrier. 

86.  Same       subject  —  Illustra- 

tions. 

87.  Whether  railroad  transport- 

ing cars  by  contract  is 
common  carrier. 

88.  Same    subject — How,    when 

railroad  company  does  not 
own  cars — Circus  train. 

89.  Owners  of  canal  and  ferrj^- 

boats  may  show  that  thoy 
are  not  common   carriers. 


§  90.  No  carrier  required  to  car- 
ry every  kind  of  goods. 

91.  Same     subject   —   Illustra- 

tions. 

92.  How     when     possession    of 

goods   not  taken — Tcv.ing 
boats. 

93.  Passenger       carriers       not 

common    carriers    ol    per- 
sons. 

94.  Postmasters,       mail       con- 

tractors and   carriers  not 
common  carriers. 

95.  Telegraph     and     telephone 

companies     not     common 
carriers. 

96.  Livery    stable    keepers    are 

not  common  carriers. 

97.  Messenger   companies. 

98.  Log-driving   companies    not 

common  carriers. 

99.  Drovers    and     agisters     not 

common  carriers. 

100.  Ow"ners    and    managers     of 

passenger  elevators. 

101.  Same    subject — Must    allow 

passengers  reasonable 

time  to  enter  or  leave  car. 

102.  Same   subject — When  negli- 

gence will  be  presumed. 

103.  Bridge,  canal  and  turnpike 

companies. 


Sec.  47.     (§47.)     Common  carrier  defined. — A  eommon  or 

public  carrier  is  one  who  undertakes  as  a  business,  for  hire  or 

reward,  to  carry  from  one  place  to  another  the  goods  of  all 

persons  who  may  apply  for  such  carriage,  provided  the  goods 

be  of  the  kind  which  he  professes  to  carry,  and  the  person  so 

applying  will  agree  to   have  them   carried  upon  the   lawful 

terms  prescribed  by  the  carrier ;  and  who,  if  he  refuses  to  carrj' 

such  goods  for  those  who  are  willing  to  comply  with  his  termsj 

becomes  liable  to  an  action  by  the  aggrieved  pari}'-  for  such 

refusal.^ 

1.  The   definition   of  a   common    this  country  is  that  of  C.  J.  Par- 
carrier    most    usually    adopted    in    ker,    in    Dwight     v.     Brewster,     1 


42 


THE  LAW   OF    CARRIERS. 


[§48. 


Sec.  48.     (i5  47a.)     Same  subject — The  essential  character- 
istics.  To  bring  a  person,  therefore,  within  the  description  of 

a  common  carrier  the  following  characteristics  must  appear: 


Pick.  50.  He  is  there  defined  to 
be  "one  who  undertakes  for  hire 
to  transport  the  goods  of  such  as 
choose  to  employ  him,  from  place 
to  place."  In  Gisbourn  v.  Hurst, 
1  Salk.  249.  he  is  said  to  be  "any 
man  undertaking  for  hire  to  car- 
ry the  goods  of  all  persons  indif- 
ferently." And  this  is  said  by  C. 
.1.  Gibson,  in  Gordon  v.  Hutchin- 
son, 1  Watts  &  S.  285,  to  be  "the 
best  definition  of  a  common  car- 
rier in  its  application  to  the  busi- 
ness of  this  country."  The  case 
of  Gisbourn  v.  Hurst  was  one  of 
trover  for  goods  which  had  been 
put  with  the  carrier's  wagon  into 
a  barn  and  taken  as  distress  for 
the  rent  due  by  the  tenant.  The 
carrier  had  been  in  the  habit  of 
carrying  cheese  to  London  and 
loading  back  with  goods  for  all 
persons  indifferently,  and  the 
court  held  that  he  was  to  be  con- 
sidered a  common  carrier  and  in 
the  exercise  of  a  public  emploj- 
ment,  and  the  goods  therefore 
privileged  from  distress. 

In  Chitty  on  Carriers,  the  com- 
mon carrier  is  defined  to  be  one 
who,  by  the  ancient  law,  held  as  it 
were  a  public  office  and  was 
bound  to  the  public,  and  who,  to 
become  liable  as  a  common  car- 
rier, must  exercise  the  business 
of  carrying  as  a  public  employ- 
ment, and  must  undertake  to  car- 
ry goods  for  all  persons  indis- 
criminately and  hold  himself  out 
as  ready  to  engage  in  the  trans- 
portation of  goods  for  hire,  as  a 
business,  and  not  as  a  casual  oc- 
cupation. 


"Common  carriers,"  says  Chan- 
cellor Kent,  "undertake  generally, 
and  not  as  a  casual  occupation, 
and  for  all  people  indifferently,  to 
convey  goods  and  deliver  them  at 
a  place  appointed,  for  hire,  as  a 
business,  and  with  or  without  a 
special  agreement  as  to  price." 
2  Com.  598. 

"To  bring  a  person,"  says  Judge 
Story,  "within  the  description  of  a 
common  carrier,  he  must  exercise 
it  as  a  public  employment;  he 
must  undertake  to  carry  goods  for 
persons  generally,  and  he  must 
hold  himself  out  as  ready  to  en- 
gage in  the  transportation  of 
goods  for  hire,  as  a  business, 
not  as  a  casual  occupation  pro 
hac  vice.  A  common  carrier  has 
therefore  been  defined  to  be  one 
who  undertakes  for  hire  or  re- 
ward to  transport  the  goods  of 
such  as  choose  to  employ  him, 
from  place  to  place."  Story  on 
Bail.  §  495. 

These  definitions  are  substan- 
tially the  same  and  are  adopted 
and  used  indifferently.  The  one 
given  in  the  text  is  made  some- 
what less  general  by  confining  the 
obligation  to  the  carriage  of  such 
goods  as  the  carrier  professes  to 
carry,  and  by  adding  the  require- 
ment on  the  part  of  the  bailor  of 
a  compliance  or  a  readiness  to 
comply  with  the  lawful  terms  pre- 
scribed by  the  carrier,  and  his  li- 
ability to  an  action  for  a  refusal 
to  carry  according  to  the  course 
of  his  employment.  No  carrier 
undertakes  to  carry  all  sorts  of 
goods,  but  only  such  as  are  of  the 


§48.] 


WHO  IS  A  COMMON  CARRIER. 


43 


1.  He  must  be  engaged  in  the  business  of  carrying  goods  for 
others  as  a  public  employment,  and  must  hold  himself  out  as 
ready  to  engage  in  the  transportation  of  goods  for  persons 
generally  as  a  business,  and  not  as  a  casual  occupation.  2.  He 
must  undertake  to  carry  goods  of  the  kind  to  which  his  busi- 
ness is  confined.  3.  He  must  undertake  to  carry  by  the 
methods  by  which  his  business  is  conducted  and  over  his  estab- 
lished road.  4.  The  transportation  must  be  for  hire.  5.  An 
action  must  lie  against  him,  if  he  refuses  without  sufficient 
reason  to  carry  such  goods  for  those  who  are  willing  to  com- 
ply with  his  terms.  And  this  duty  or  obligation  to  the  public 
by  reason  of  the  public  nature  of  the  employment  and  the 
increased  responsibility  imposed  upon  him  by  the  law  upon 
the  grounds  of  public  policy,^  mainly  distinguish  the  common 
from  the  mere  private  carrier  for  hire.  Each  of  these  char- 
acteristics will  now  be  separately  considered. 


description  he  professes  to  carrj', 
and  even  these  he  is  not  compelled 
to  carry  unless  their  owner  will 
comply  with  his  terms,  in  pre- 
scribing which  he  is  allowed  con- 
siderable latitude,  as  we  shall  see. 
The  obligation  by  law  to  carry  is 
essential  to  constitute  the  voca- 
tion of  the  common  carrier,  and 
the  liability  to  an  action  for  a  re- 
fusal to  carry  is  said  by  Nesbit,  J., 
in  Fish  v.  Chapman,  2  Ga.  349,  to 
be  perhaps  the  safest  criterion  of 
the  character  of  the  carrier.  But 
a  refusal  to  carry  cannot  be  made 
the  ground  for  an  action  without 
a  compliance  or  offer  to  comply 
with  such  terms  of  the  carrier  as 
he  may  lawfully  impose  as  the 
condition  of  the  service.  See,  al- 
so, Varble  v.  Bigley,  14  Bush,  698; 
Schloss  V.  Wood,  11  Col.  287;  Lang 
V.  Brady,  73  Conn.  707,  49  Atl. 
Rep.  199;  Railway  Co.  v.  Lipp- 
man,  110  Ga.  665,  36  S.  E.  Rep. 
202,  50  L.  R.  A.  673,  citing  Hutch- 


inson on  Carr.;  Bassett  &  Stone 
V.  Mining  Co.,  —  Ky.  — ,  88  S. 
W.   Rep.   318. 

2.  The  rule  rendering  common 
carriers  liable  for  every  loss,  ex- 
cept that  which  is  caused  by  the 
act  of  God  or  the  king's  enemies, 
was  not  a  part  of  the  ancient 
common  law.  It  is  a  compara- 
tively modern  innovation,  intro- 
duced in  consequence  of  the  grow- 
ing commercial  relations  of  the 
country,  an  imperfect  police,  im- 
perfect protection  from  the  gov- 
ernment, and  frequent  losses  by 
robbery.  "The  first  case  in  which 
the  principle  was  recognized  and 
settled  is  that  of  Woodliefe  and 
Curtis  in  the  thirty-eighth  year  of 
the  reign  of  Elizabeth.  And  the 
reason  of  the  rule  is  not,  as  stated 
by  Sir  Edward  Coke,  solely  or 
principally  because  the  carrier 
hath  his  hire;  for  other  bailees 
for  hire  and  private  carriers  for 
hire   are   not   liable   in    the   same 


44  THE  LAW   OF    CARRIERS.  [§  49. 

Sec.  49.  (§48.)  1.  His  employment  must  be  public  in  its 
nature. — What  circumstances  will  be  sufficient  to  invest  the 
employment  of  the  carrier  in  particular  cases  with  the  char- 
acter of  a  public  one,  and  what  professions  or  course  of  deal-' 
ing  on  his  part  will  be  considered  as  enough  to  constitute  him 
a  common  carrier  instead  of  a  private  carrier  for  hire,  is,  how- 
ever, sometimes  a  question  of  no  little  difficulty,  and  has  given 
rise  to  considerable  diversity  of  opinion  and  controversy.  The 
criterion  by  which  it  is  to  be  determined  whether  he  belongs 
to  the  one  class  or  the  other  is  generally  considered  to  be, 
whether  he  has  held  himself  out  or  has  advertised  himself  in 
his  dealings  or  course  of  business  with  the  public  as  being 
ready  and  willing,  for  hire,  to  carry  particular  classes  of  goods 
for  all  those  who  may  desire  the  transportation  of  such  goods 
between  the  places  between  which  he  professes  in  this  manner 
his  readiness  and  willingness  to  carry.  If  he  has  done  so,  he 
is  of  course  to  be  regarded  as  a  common  carrier;  but  if  not, 
he  will  be  treated  only  as  a  private  carrier  for  hire.^ 

manner  and  to  the  same  extent."  referring  to  the  case  of  Fish  v. 
Per  Bockee,  Sen.,  in  Van  Sant-  Chapman,  supra,  as  "a  powerful 
voord  V.  St.  John,  6  Hill,  157.  But  and  business-like  judgment,"  pro- 
per Holt,  C.  J.,  in  Lane  v.  Cot-  ceeded  to  say  that  "the  real  test 
ton,  1  Salk.  143:  "A  carrier  is  whether  a  man  is  a  common  car- 
liable  in  respect  of  his  reward,  rier,  whether  by  land  or  water, 
and  not  of  the  hundreds  being  therefore,  really  is,  whether  he 
answerable  over  to  him;  for  the  has  held  out  that  he  will,  so  long 
hundred  is  liable  by  the  stat-  as  he  has  room,  carry  for  hire 
ute  of  Winchester,  but  he  was  the  goods  of  every  person  who  will 
so  at  common  law;  and  the  bring  goods  to  him  to  be  carried, 
reason  why  robbery  did  not  ex-  The  test  is  not  whether  he  is  car- 
cuse  him  was,  because  it  might  be  rying  as  a  public  employment  or 
by  consent  and  combination  car-  whether  he  carries  to  a  fixed 
ried  on  in  such  a  manner  that  no  place,  but  whether  he  holds  out, 
proof  could  be  had  of  it."  either  expressly  or  by  a  course  of 
3.  In  Nugent  v.  Smith,  L.  R.  1,  conduct,  that  he  will  carry  for 
Common  Pleas  Div.  19  and  423  hire,  so  long  as  he  has  room,  the 
(187.5),  it  was  considerably  dis-  goods  of  all  persons  indifferently 
cussed  in  both  the  common  pleas  "who  send  him  goods  to  be  car- 
court  and  in  the  court  of  appeal,  ried.  If  he  does  this,  his  first 
to  which  the  case  was  carried.  In  responsibility  naturally  is  that  he 
the  former  court,  Brett,  J.,  after  is  bound  by  a  promise,  implied  by 


§  50.]  WHO  IS  A  COMMON  CARRIER.  45 

Sec.  50.  (§  49.)  Same  subject — Exceptional  cases — Gordon 
V.  Hutchinson. — This,  however,  seems  not  to  be  the  universal 
test;  and  some  of  the  cases  upon  this  subject  in  this  country 
have  denied  the  necessity  for  any  public  profession  or  under- 
taking, in  order  to  impose  upon  the  carrier  the  character  and 
the  consequent  liability  of  the  common  carrier,  and  have  held 
that  one  who  has  never  assumed  the  character  of  a  public 
carrier,  and  although  his  contract  to  carry  may  be  confined 
to  the  one  particular  instance  or  pro  hac  vice,  as  it  is  termed, 
may  assume,  thereby,  all  the  responsibility  of  the  common  car- 
rier, if  he  and  the  class  of  carriers  to  which  he  belongs  have 
been  in  the  occasional  habit  of  accepting  the  goods  of  others 
for  transportation  for  hire.  The  leading  case  upon  this  theory 
of  the  responsibility  incurred  by  such  carriers  is  that  of  Gor- 
don V.  Hutchinson,^  which  carries  the  great  weight  of  the 
authority  of  C.  J.  Gibson,  who  delivered  the  opinion  of  the 
court  in  favor  of  that  view  of  the  question  under  the  circum- 
stances of  difficulty  which  then  existed  in  the  carrying  business 
of  this  country.  In  this  case,  the  defendant,  who  was  a  farmer, 
applied  at  the  store  of  the  plaintiff,  to  be  employed  to  haul  a 

law,   to   receive   and   carry   for    a  trade   or  business  for  all  persons 

reasonable    price    the    goods    sent  indifferently     who     will     employ 

to  him   upon   such   an   invitation,  them,   and  the  policy  in  question 

This     responsibility     is     not     one  is  not  applied  to  such  trades;  the 

adopted  from   the  Roman  law  on  policy  is  applied   to  the  trade  of 

grounds   of    policy;    it    arises   ac-  common    carriers,    because    when 

cording  to  the  general   principles  the  common  law  adopted  that  pol- 

which  govern  all  implied  promises,  icy  the  business  of  common   car- 

And     his     second     responsibility,  riers  in  England  was  exercised  in 

which  arises  upon  reasons  of  pol-  a   particular   manner   and   subject 

icy,  is  that  he  carries  the  goods  to     particular     conditions     which 

upon     a     contract     of     insurance,  called    for    the    adoption    of    that 

This    policy   has   fixed    the    latter  policy." 

liability  upon  common  carriers  by  See    also,    Roussel     v.     Aumais, 

land  and  water,  not  because  they  (Canada)  Rap.  Jud.  Que.  18  C.  S. 

hold  themselves  out  to  carry  for  474;     Memphis    News    Publishing 

all   persons   indifferently;    if   that  Co.  v.  Railway,  110  Tenn.  684,  75 

were  all,  there  would  be  no  ground  S.  W.  Rep.  941,   63   L.  R.  A.   150, 

for  the  policy;   it  would  be  with-  citing  Hutchinson  on  Carr. 

out   reason;    many    other   persons  4.  1  Watts  &  S.  285. 
hold  themselves  out  to  act  in  their 


46  THE  LAW  OP   CARRIERS.  [§  51. 

load  of  goods  for  him,  from  Lewistown  to  Bellefonte,  on  his 
return  from  the  former  place,  to  which  he  was  going  with  a 
load  of  iron.  He  received  an  order  from  the  plaintiff  and 
loaded  the  goods  upon  his  wagon  for  his  return  trip.  On  the 
way,  the  head  came  out  of  a  hogshead  of  molasses  and  it  was 
wholly  lost.  An  action  was  brought  against  the  carrier  for 
its  value,  and  it  was  held  that  the  farmer,  under  the  circum- 
stances, had  made  himself  in  this  service  a  common  carrier  and 
was  liable  as  such. 

Sec.  51.  (§50.)  Same  subject — The  rule  in  England. — It 
was,  however,  admitted  that  the  rule  was  different  in  England, 
and  the  decision  was  rested  entirely  upon  the  difference  in  the 
occupations  of  the  people  and  in  the  means  of  transportation. 
"Rules,"  it  is  said,  "which  have  received  their  form  from  the 
business  of  a  people  whose  occupations  are  definite,  regular 
and  fixed,  must  be  applied  with  much  caution  and  no  little 
qualification  to  the  business  of  a  people  whose  occupations  are 
vague,  desultory  and  irregular.  In  England,  one  who  holds 
himself  out  as  a  general  carrier  is  bound  to  take  employment 
at  the  current  prices,  but  it  will  not  be  thought  that  he  is 
bound  to  do  so  here.  In  England,  the  obligation  to  carry  at 
request,  upon  the  carrier's  particular  route,  is  the  criterion  of 
the  profession ;  but  it  is  certainly  not  so  w;th  us.  .  .  .  The 
defendant  is  a  farmer,  but  has  occasionally  done  jobs  as  a 
carrier.  That,  however,  is  immaterial.  He  applied  for  the 
transportation  of  these  goods  as  a  matter  of  business,  and 
consequently  on  the  usual  conditions.  His  agency  was  not 
sought  in  consequence  of  a  special  confidence  reposed  in  him. 
There  was  nothing  special  in  the  case.  On  the  contrary,  the 
employment  was  sought  by  himself,  and  there  is  nothing  to 
show  that  it  was  given  on  terms  of  diminished  responsibility.'' 
And  the  same  judge,  in  the  case  of  Steinman  v.  Wilkins,*'* 
speaking  of  the  common  carrier,  observed  that  in  England  he 
was  bound  by  the  custom  of  the  realm  to  carry  for  all  em- 
ployers, "but  it  is  by  no  means  certain,"  said  he,  "that  our 

5.  7  Watts  &  S.  466, 


§  52,]  WHO  IS  A  COMMON  CARRIER.  47 

ancestors  brought  the  principle  with  them  from  the  parent 
country  as  one  suited  to  their  condition  in  a  wilderness.  We 
have  no  trace  of  an  action  for  refusing  to  carry,  and  it  is 
notorious  that  the  wagoners,  who  were  formerly  the  carriers 
between  Philadelphia  and  Pittsburg,  frequently  refused  to  load 
at  the  current  price." 

Sec.  52.  (§51.)  Same  subject — The  rule  in  Tennessee. — In 
the  case  of  Moss  v.  Bettis,^  the  facts  were  that  the  defendant 
was  a  farmer,  but  "after  his  crops  were  laid  by,"  he  would 
run  boats  for  himself  or  any  one  else  who  would  employ  him. 
He  had  built  a  flat-boat  to  transport  to  market  a  cargo  of  his 
own  staves,  but,  at  the  instance  of  the  plaintiff,'^  abandoned 
that  project  and  loaded  his  own  and  another  boat  furnished  by 
the  plaintiff  with  plaintiff's  lumber,  and  undertook  to  carry 
it  by  river  to  market.  The  boats  struck  some  obstruction  in 
the  river  and  were  sunk,  occasioning  the  loss  of  some  of  the 
lumber;  and  it  was  held  in  the  action  against  him  by  the 
plaintiff  to  recover  its  value,  that  he  was  a  common  carrier 
in  the  performance  of  the  service  for  the  plaintiff  and  was 
liable  as  such.  The  decision  was  based  mainly  upon  several 
previous  Tennessee  cases,^  which  were  supposed  to  sustain  the 
conclusion  of  the  court. 

Sec.  53.  (§  52.)  Same  subject — Further  of  the  Tennessee 
rule. — But  this  exception  by  the  Tennessee  courts  to  the  com- 
mon law,  which  has  brought  into  the  family  of  common  carriers 
a  class  which  does  not  properly  belong  there,  seems  to  be 
confined  to  carriers  by  river  craft,  and  to  have  been  first  made 
because  the  prevalence  of  this  mode  of  transportation  seemed 
to  make  it  necessary  that  such  carriers  should  be  held   to   a 

6.  4  Heisk.   661.  that   great   importance   seemed   to 

7.  In  this  case  it  was  said  by  be  given  to  the  fact  that  the  de- 
the  court  that  the  liability  of  the  fendant  had  applied  for  employ- 
defendant   did   not   in   any   degree  ment  to  the  plaintiff. 

depend  upon  the  fact  that  the  ap-  8.  Craig  v.  Childress,  Peck,  270; 

plication    for    his    employment    in  Johnson  v.  Friar,  4  Yer.  48;   Gor- 

the    service    had    come    from    the  don   v.   Buchanan,   5   id.   71;    Tur- 

plaintiff.    But  in  Gordon  v.  Hutch-  ney  r.  Wilson,   7  id.  340. 
inson,    supra,    it    will    be    noticed 


48 


THii  LAW   OF   CARRIERS. 


[§53. 


stricter  accountability  than  mere  private  carriers.  To  this 
extent  it  has  been  adhered  to  as  established  by'  precedent, 
although  it  may  now  and  then  occasion  a  hardship  to  the 
accommodating  carrier,  even  when  he  is  not  to  blame,  as  it 
seems  to  have  done  in  the  case  last  stated.  As  to  carriers  by 
land,  the  rule  seems  to  be  as  at  common  law.^  And  although 
the  Pennsylvania  cases,  which  extend  the  exception  to  carriers 
by  land,  are  often  referred  to  as  authority  of  weight  for  rigidly 
including  in  the  class  of  common  carriers  all  who  legitimately 
belong  there,  the  opinion  expressed  in  them,  that  the  common- 
law  definition  of  a  common  carrier  is  inapt  and  inappropriate 
in  a  new  country,  and  was  not  brought  to  this  country  with 
the  great  body  of  the  law  from  the  mother  country,  has  received 
judicial  sanction  in  no  other  state  except  Tennessee.^*^ 


9.  Walker    v.    Skipwith,    Meiga, 
502. 

10.  Several  cases  in  other  states 
are  uniformly  cited  in  connection 
with  that  of  Gordon  v.  Hutchin- 
son as  giving  support  to  the  posi 
tion  there  taken,  that  one  mav  be- 
come a  common  carrier  from  a 
casual  employment  pro  Jiac  vice. 
But  they  will  be  found  upon  exam- 
ination to  add  but  little  if  any 
weight  to  that  view  of  the  ques- 
tion. Powers  V.  Davenport,  7 
Blackf.  497,  was  the  case  of  a 
wagoner,  who  undertook  to  carry 
goods  for  the  plaintiff  from  Cin- 
cinnati to  Crawfordsville,  under  a 
written  contract  to  deliver  them 
in  good  order  and  condition.  It 
was  proven  that  the  defendant,  in 
order  to  visit  his  house,  deviated 
from  the  direct  and  customary 
route,  and  while  so  doing  a  bridge 
over  which  he  was  passing  broke 
down  and  the  goods  were  thereby 
injured.  He  was  sued  upon  his 
special  undertaking,'  and  the  court 
expressly  declined  to  consider  the 


question  whether  he  was  liable  as 
a  common  carrier,  saying  that  the 
question  whether  he  was  carrying 
the  goods  in  that  capacity  was  im- 
material. But  he  was  held  liable 
upon  his  special  undertaking.  He 
would  have  been  unquestionably 
liable  aside  from  his  contract, 
even  as  a  private  carrier  for  hire. 
He  had  no  legal  excuse  for  the 
deviation,  and  when  he  made  it 
for  his  own  convenience  or  pleas- 
ure, he  of  course  took  upon  him- 
self the  risk  of  the  consequences 
from  any  accident  which  would 
not  have  occurred  upon  the  direct 
route  which  it  was  a  plain  viola- 
tion of  his  duty  not  to  keep,  and 
in  not  keeping  it  he  was  guilty  of 
at  least  ordinary  negligence.  In 
McClure  v.  Richardson,  Rice,  215, 
defendant  was  sued  as  the  owner 
of  a  boat  of  which  one  Howzer 
was  the  patroon  or  captain,  and 
on  which  the  defendant  used  to 
carry  his  own  cotton  to  market, 
occasionally,  however,  taking  cot- 
ton for  his  neighbors  when  he  did 


J 


§  54.]                                  WHO  IS  A  COMMON   CARRIER.  49 

Sec,  54.  (§  53.)  Same  subject — These  exceptional  cases  not 
elsewhere  followed — Illustrations. — Elsewhere  no  such  excep- 
tion has  been  made,  and  the  carrier  has  been  subjected  to  the 
extraordinary  liability  of  the  common  carrier  only  when  it  has 

not  have  a  load   of  his   own,   for  for  a  refusal,  and  in  this  respect 

which    he    charged    them.      While  it  agrees  with  Gordon  v.  Hutchin- 

the  boat  was  on  its  way,   having  son. 

on  board  the  cotton  of  the  defend-  In  Moses  v.  Norris,  4  N.  H.  304, 
ant  and  of  several  of  his  neigh-  decided  in  1828.  the  action  was 
bors,  the  plaintiff  applied  to  the  against  the  defendant  for  the  loss 
patroon  to  take  some  of  his  on  of  some  bars  of  iron  which  he 
board,  which  the  latter  agreed  to  had  undertaken  to  carry  from 
do  for  an  agreed  freight.  A  part  Portsmouth  to  Exeter  in  a  sled, 
of  this  cotton  was,  while  upon  the  which  on  the  way  broke  down, 
boat,  destroyed  by  fire,  and  the  Nothing  is  said  in  the  report  of 
plaintiff  sued  to  recover  his  loss  the  case  about  the  nature  of  the 
from  the  owner  of  the  boat.  The  employment  of  the  defendant  fur- 
defense  was  that  the  patroon  had  ther  than  that  he  was  a  carrier 
no  authority  to  take  on  board  the  for  hire;  whether  he  was  a  car- 
plaintiff's  cotton,  or  to  make  the  rier  for  all  who  applied,  or  held 
contract  to  carry  it.  But  it  was  himself  out  as  such  or  not,  does 
held  that  under  all  the  circum-  not  appear.  But  he  was  held  li- 
stances  he  did  have  such  author-  able,  Richardson,  C.  J.,  saying: 
ity,  and  that  the  defendant  was  "It  seems  to  be  well  settled  that 
liable  for  the  cotton  as  a  common  all  persons  carrying  goods  for 
carrier.  "If  the  defendant,"  said  hire  come  under  the  denomina- 
the  court,  "had  previously  em-  tion  of  common  carriers."  But 
ployed  his  boat  for  his  own  pur-  an  assertion  so  broad,  if  under- 
poses  exclusively,  it  could  not  stood  without  qualification,  is 
have  been  fairly  inferred  that  the  wholly  untenable  according  to  all 
agent  could  do  what  his  employer  the  authorities,  even  those  whicn 
never  had  done;  but  his  employer  are  cited  for  it  in  the  case  (Bui- 
had  used  his  boat  in  some  measure  ler's  N.  P.  70;  Rogers  v.  Head, 
for  the  community  in  which  he  Cro.  J.  262;  Dale  v.  Hall,  1  Wil. 
lived,  and,  from  his  course  of  281;  1  Sel.  N.  P.  240);  and  con- 
dealing  with  it,  had  held  himself  sidering  that  it  was  said  before 
out  as  a  common  carrier."  The  the  law  upon  the  subject  had  re- 
liability as  common  carrier  was  ceived  any  investigation  in  this 
thus  rested  expressly  upon  the  country,  it  is  entitled  to  bi't  little 
ground  of  the  holding  out  to  the  weight.  In  Chevallier  v.  Straham, 
community.  But  the  case  seems  2  Tex.  115,  the  defendant's  prin- 
to  lack  one  necessary  element  to  cipal  business  was  farming,  but 
complete  the  character  of  common  at  a  certain  season  of  the  year 
carrier,  and  that  is,  the  obligation  known  as  the  hauling  season,  he 
to  carry  for  those  who  might  ap-  engaged  in  the  carrying  business, 
ply  and  the  liability  to  an  action  and    ran   his   wagon   wherever   he 

4 


50  THE  LAW   OF    CARRIERS.  [§  54. 

been  shown  that  by  his  professions,  or  previous  course  of  busi- 
ness, he  has  held  himself  out  as  such  a  carrier,  or  when  it 
must  be  so  presumed  from  the  very  nature  of  his  employment. 
Thus,  in  Samms  v.  Stewart,^^  a  case  was  presented  which 
was  very  similar  to  that  of  Gordon  r.  Hutchinson.  In  this  case 
it  appeared  that  Samms  was  a  farmer,  living  at  or  near  New 
Hope,  in  the  vicinity  of  Cincinnati,  and  had  been  in  the  habit 
for  many  years  of  carrying  marketing  from  New  Hope  to 
Cincinnati,  and  that,  when  about  going  to  the  latter  city  with 
marketing,  he  frequently  asked  the  merchants  of  New  Hope 
for  return  loads  of  goods.  On  one  such  occasion  he  received 
from  Stewart  &  McKibben  a  box  of  goods  to  be  carried  from 
Cincinnati  to  New  Hope  in  his  wagon.  The  box  was  stolen 
from  his  wagon  on  the  way,  and  the  action  was  brought  to 
charge  him  with  the  value  of  the  goods  as  a  common  carrier. 
The  court  below,  relying  on  Gordon  v.  Hutchinson,  held  Eini 
so  liable,  but  the  supreme  court  reversed  the  judgment,  hold- 
ing that  case  to  be  opposed  to  the  current  of  authorities. 
"We  see  no  reason,"  said  the  court,  "why  the  law  applicable 
to  a  common  carrier  should  be  applied  to  a  farmer  who  makes 
a  personal  application  to  a  merchant  for  a  load  of  goods  on  his 
return  trip  from  market.  The  merchant  has  it  in  his  power 
to  make  such  special  bargain  as  he  chooses  as  to  what  shall  be 
the  liability  of  the  farmer  in  case  the  goods  are  lost.  The 
farmer  has  assumed  no  character  to  the  community  entitling 
him  to  peculiar  confidence,  and  the  merchant  is  left,  as  in  or- 
dinary cases,  to  an  inquiry  as  to  his  character  and  qualifica- 
tions.    Nor  do  we  suppose  it  would  make  any  difference  how 

could  procure  employment  in  that  Incurred  by  those  who  make  the 

way.     Under  these  circumstances,  carrying    business    their    constant 

he  was  held  liable  as  a  common  or  principal  occupation.     The  only 

carrier,     the     court     saying     that  question,    therefore,    in    this    case, 

there  were  ncf  grounds  in  reason  was,  whether,  to  constitute  one  a 

why   the   occasional   carrier,    who  common    carrier,    he   should    hold 

periodically,    in    every    recurring  himself  out  as  such  continuously, 

year,  abandons  his  other  pursuits  and  whether  he  might  not  become 

and  assumes  that  of  transporting  one  by  so  holding  himself  out  dur- 

goods    for    the    public,    should   be  ing  a  certain  period  of  the  year, 

exempted   from   any   of   the    risks  11.  20  Ohio,  69. 


§  55,]  WHO  IS  A   COMMON   CARRIER.  51 

many  applications  of  this  kind  had  been  made  by  the  party 
thus  carrying,  or  to  how  many  different  persons  they  may 
have  been  made,  they  would  still  remain  so  many  special  and 
individual  transactions. ' ' 

So  in  Fish  v.  Clark,i2  the  facts  were  very  nearly  the  same  as 
in  the  foregoing  case  of  Moss  v.  Bettis.  The  defendants,  one 
of  whom  was  a  manufacturer  of  staves  and  the  other  a  cooper, 
owned  a  boat  in  common  for  the  purpose  of  transporting  their 
staves  and  barrels  to  market.  Wanting  employment  for  their 
boat,  one  of  them  applied  to  the  plaintiffs  for  a  load  of  freight 
to  New  York,  which  was  given  them.  Defendants  furnished 
hands,  and  one  of  them  commanded  the  boat,  plaintiffs  only 
furnishing  the  freight.  On  the  trip,  by  a  breakage  in  the 
canal,  and  without  fault  or  negligence  of  the  defendants,  the 
boat  was  sunk.  It  was  proven  that  on  one  or  more  occasions 
during  the  previous  year  the  defendants  had  carried  for  the 
plaintiffs  in  the  same  way.  The  question  was,  whether,  under 
these  circumstances,  the  defendants  were  common  carriers, 
and  it  was  held  that  they  were  not.  "According  to  all  the 
authorities,"  say  the  court,  "it  is  an  essential  characteristic 
of  the  common  carrier  that  he  hold  himself  out  as  such  to  the 
world;  that  he  undertake  generally,  and  for  all  persons  in- 
differently, to  carry  goods  and  deliver  them  for  hire,  and  that 
his  public  profession  of  his  employment  be  such  that,  if  he 
refuse  without  some  just  ground  to  carry  goods  for  any  one 
in  the  course  of  his  employment,  and  for  a  reasonable  and 
customary  price,  he  is  liable  to  an  action."  By  this  test  it 
seemed  clear  that  the  defendants  had  not  performed  the  serv- 
ice for  the  plaintiffs  in  the  character  of  common  carriers; 
and  it  was  further  considered  that  the  fact  that  the  defendants 
had  applied  for  the  employment  could  not  affect  the  question 
of  their  liability  or  the  capacity  in  which  they  had  been  em- 
ployed. 

Sec.  55.     (§  53a.)     Same  subject — Further  illustrations. — So 

in  Steele  v.  McTyer,^^  it  appeared  that  a  custom  existed  in 

12.  2  Lans.   176;    s.   c.   49   N.  Y.         13.  31  Ala.  667. 
122.  A  boat  used  by  its  owners  and 


52  THE  LAW   OF   CARRIERS.  [§55. 

Alabama  to  build  flat  boats,  load  them  with  cotton  of  any 
person  having  cotton  for  transportation,  and  of  then  running 
the  boats  down  the  river  to  Mobile,  where  the  boats,  when 
unloaded,  were  sold  for  wood  or  lumber,  without  making  any 
further  trips.  In  accordance  with  this  custom,  defendants  had 
had  a  flat  boat  constructed,  and,  after  taking  on  board  the 
cotton  of  the  plaintiff  and  three  other  persons  at  their  respec- 
tive landings,  had  started  down  the  river  to  Mobile.  On  the 
way  the  boat  was  sunk,  and  the  cotton  of  the  plaintiff  was 
lost,  and  an  action  was  brought  to  charge  the  defendants  as 
common  carriers.  "If  the  appellants  (,the  defendants)  built 
or  procured  a  flat  boat,"  said  Walker,  J.,  "with  which  to 
carry  cotton  down  the  Cahaba  river  and  thence  to  Mobile, 
though  only  for  a  single  trip,  and  held  themselves  out  as  ready 
and  willing  to  carry  cotton  on  their  boat  for  the  people  gener- 
ally who  wished  to  send  their  cotton  to  Mobile,  then  they 
would  be  common  carriers,  and  those  who  placed  cotton  upon 
the  boat  could  not  be  affected  by  any  private  instructions 
which  might  have  been  given  to  the  master  of  the  boat  as  to 
the  point  on  the  river  above  which  he  was  to  take  on  no  cotton. 
On  the  contrary,  if  the  appellants  did  not  hold  themselves  out 
as  ready  and  willing  to  carry  cotton  for  the  public  generally, 
to  the  extent  of  a  proper  load  of  the  boat,  or,  in  other  words, 
did  not  constitute  themselves  the  servants  of  the  public  in 
that  busimess,  but  only  proposed  to  take  the  cotton  of  some 
particular  persons  wjth  whom  engagements  were  made,  they 
were  not  common  carriers.  If  the  appellants,  having  engaged 
a  part  of  the  loading  for  the  boat,  held  themselves  out  as 
ready  to  carry  for  any  person  or  persons  to  the  extent  of  the 
remaining  capacity  of  the  boat,  then  they  would  be  liable  as 
common  carriers  to  such  persons  as  availed  themselves  of  such 
offer  of  their  services  to  the  public  generally  as  carriers.  These 
questions,  under  the  proof,  should  have  been  left  to  the  jury. 

managers  for  their  own  purposes  point  to  another,  and  which  is  not 
and  those  of  others  who  agree  to  shown  to  have  been  held  out  as  a 
pay  certain  rates  for  the  transpor-  common  carrier,  cannot  be  de- 
lation   of    their    goods    from    one  clared  to  be  such  at  the  instance 


§  56.]  WHO  IS  A  COMMON   CARRIER.  53 

.  .  .  The  evidence  that  the  defendants  had  been  in  formi-r 
years  engaged  for  the  public  generally  in  the  transportation 
of  cotton  to  Mobile  on  flat  boats,  would  be  proper  for  the 
consideration  of  the  jury  in  determining  the  question  whether 
they  were  common  carriers;  but  it  would  not  necessarily  be 
conclusive.  It  might  be  that,  notwithstanding  they  had  previ- 
ously acted  as  common  carriers,  they  had  abandoned  the  service 
of  the  public,  and  were  simply  engaged  in  the  execution  of 
special  contracts.  To  constitute  them  common  carriers,  they 
must  be  engaged  in  the  service  of  the  public." 

Sec.  56.  (§54.)  Same  subject — Other  cases  illustrating 
general  rule. — The  question  of  his  liability  had  been  previously 
determined  in  favor  of  the  carrier  by  the  New  York  court 
and  upon  the  same  ground  in  Allen  v.  Sackrider,^*  in  which 
the  facts  were  similar.  The  defendants  being  the  owners  of 
a  sloop,  but  not  engaged  with  it  in  the  business  of  carrying 
goods  generally,  and  not  holding  themselves  out  to  the  world 
as  carriers  generally,  were  applied  to  by  the  plaintiffs  to  make 
a  trip  for  them  and  bring  back  goods,  as  they  had  done  on  a 
previous  occasion  for  them.  On  her  return  the  sloop  was 
driven  ashore  and  her  cargo  injured,  for  which  the  plaintiffs 
sued.  The  liability  of  the  defendants  turned  entirely  on  the 
question  whether  they  were  common  carriers  in  the  under- 
taking for  the  plaintiffs,  and  it  was  held  that  such  casual  use 
of  the  sloop  did  not  make  its  owner  a  common  carrier. 

Sec.  57.  (§  55.)  Same  subject — The  general  rule  well  set- 
tled.— These  cases  undoubtedly  state  the  law  as  it  is  settled  in 
England  and  generally  understood  in  this  country;  and  it 
would  seem  clear  that  no  one  should  be  treated  as  a  common 
carrier  unless  he  has  in  some  way  held  himself  out  to  the  public 
as  a  carrier,  in  such  manner  as  to  render  him  liable  to  an 
action  if  he  should  refuse  to  carry  for  any  one  who  wished  to 

of  such  agreeing  parties.     Flautt  Fed.  Rep.  691;  Sumner  v.  Caswell, 

V.  Lashley,  36  La.  Ann.  106.  20  Fed.  Rep.  249. 

A  vessel  chartered  to  transport        14.  37  N.  Y.  341.    See,  also.  Fish 

a    specific    cargo    only    is    not    a  v.  Clark,  49  N.  Y.  122. 
common   carrier.       The    Dan,     40 


54 


THE  LAW   OF   CARRIERS. 


[§57. 


employ  him  in  the  particular  kind  of  service  which  he  thus 
proposes  to  undertake.  Otherwise  he  does  not  come  within 
the  description,  nor  can  he  be  subjected  to  the  liability  of  the 
common  carrier  when  the  goods  have  been  lost  without  negli- 

15 


genee. 

15.  Story  on  Bail.  495;  2  Kent's 
Com.  598;  Satterlee  v.  Groat,  1 
Wend.  272;  Citizens'  Bank  v.  Nan- 
tucket S.  B.  Co.,  2  Story,  17; 
Dwight  V.  Brewster,  1  Pick.  50; 
Forward  v.  Pittard,  1  Term.  27; 
Palmer  v.  G.  J.  Railway,  4  M.  &  W. 
749;  Riley  v.  Home,  5  Bing.  217; 
Lane  v.  Cotton,  1  Ld.  Raym.  646; 
Crouch  V.  Railway  Co.,  14  Com.  B. 
255;  Coggs  V.  Bernard,  1  Smith's 
Lead.   Cas.   283   and  notes. 

It  would  be  useless  to  multiply 
the  citation  of  authorities  upon  a 
proposition  which  has  become  one 
of  the  elementary  principles  of 
the  law  in  reference  to  carriers. 
Only  a  few,  therefore,  of  the  cases 
upon  the  subject,  which  may  be 
considered  leading,  are  referred  to. 
But  as  the  opinion  of  Nesbit,  J., 
in  Fish  v.  Chapman,  2  Ga.  353, 
expresses  the  law  upon  the  sub 
ject  with  great  force,  and,  as  gen- 
erally admitted,  with  accuracy,  we 
append  a  portion  of  it.  This,  like 
the  Pennsylvania  case  of  Gordon 
V.  Hutchinson,  ante,  was  the  case 
of  the  employment  of  a  farmer 
who,  never  having  held  himself 
out  as  a  carrier  generally,  was 
employed  by  the  plaintiff  to  carry 
goods,  which,  in  crossing  a  stream 
upon  the  way,  were  injured  by 
the  upsetting  of  the  wagon.  Af- 
ter giving  the  definitions  of  a 
common  carrier  from  Kent's  Com. 
and  Story  on  Bail,  and  stating 
that  he  was  obliged  to  receive  and 
carry    for    all    who    offered    their 


goods,  and  could  not  either  by 
contract  or  notice  lessen  the  lia- 
bility which  the  law  imposes  upon 
him,  the  learned  judge  proceeded: 
"It  is  from  these  definitions  and 
the  two  propositions  stated,  that 
we  are  to  determine  what  consti- 
tutes a  person  a  common  carrier. 
I  infer,  then,  that  the  business 
must  be  habitual  and  not  casual. 
An  occasional  undertaking  to  car- 
ry goods  will  not  make  a  person 
a  common  carrier;  if  it  did,  then 
it  is  hard  to  determine  who,  in  a 
planting  and  commercial  commu- 
nity like  ours,  is  not  one.  There 
are  few  planters  in  our  state  own- 
ing a  wagon  and  team  who  do  not 
occasionally  contract  to  carry 
goods.  It  would  be  contrary  to 
reason  and  excessively  burden- 
some, nay,  enormously  oppressive, 
to  subject  a  man  to  the  responsi- 
bilities of  a  common  carrier  who 
might,  once  a  year  or  oftener  at 
long  intervals,  contract  to  haul 
goods  from  one  point  in  the  state 
to  another.  Such  a  rule  would  be 
exceedingly  inconvenient  to  the 
whole  community;  for  if  estab- 
lished, it  might  become  difficult 
in  certain  districts  of  our  state  to 
procure  transportation. 

"The  undertaking  must.be  gen- 
eral and  for  all  people  indiffer- 
ently. The  undertaking  may  be 
evidenced  by  the  carrier's  own  no- 
tice or  practically  by  a  series  of 
acts,  by  his  known  habitual  con- 
tinuance in  this  line  of  business. 


§58.] 


WHO  IS  A  COMMON  CARRIER. 


55 


Sec.  58.  (§56.)  Same  subject — How  common  carrier  com- 
pares with  innkeeper. — There  is  the  same  difference  between 
the  common  or  public  carrier  for  hire  as  between  the  innkeeper 


He  must  thus  assume  to  be  the 
servant  of  the  public;  he  must  un- 
dertake for  all  people.  A  special 
undertaking  for  one  man  does  not 
make  a  wagoner  or  anybody  else 
a  common  carrier.  I  am  very  well 
aware  of  the  importance  of  hold- 
ing wagoners  in  this  country  to  a 
rigid  accountability;  they  are 
from  necessity  greatly  trusted; 
valuable  interests  are  committed 
to  them,  and  they  are  not  always 
of  the  most  careful,  sober  and 
responsible  class  of  our  citizens. 
Still  the  necessity  of  an  inflexible 
adherence  to  general  rules  we  can- 
not and  wish  not  to  escape  from. 
To  guard  this  point,  therefore,  we 
say  that  he  who  follows  wagoning 
for  a  livelihood,  or  he  who  gives 
out  to  the  world  in  any  intelli- 
gible way  that  he  will  take  goods 
or  other  things  for  transportation 
from  place  to  place,  whether  for 
a  year,  a  season  or  less  time,  is  a 
common  carrier  and  subject  to  all 
his  liabilities. 

"One  of  the  obligations  of  a 
common  carrier,  as  we  have  seen, 
is  to  carry  the  goods  of  any  per- 
son offering  to  pay  his  hire;  with 
certain  specific  limitations,  this  is 
the  rule.  If  he  refuse  to  carry, 
he  is  liable  to  be  sued  and  to  re- 
spond in  damages  to  the  person  ag- 
grieved, and  this  is  perhaps  the 
safest  test  of  his  character.  By 
this  test,  was  Mr.  Fish  a  common 
carrier?  There  is  no  evidence  to 
make  him  one  but  his  contract 
with  Chapman  &  Ross.  Suppose, 
after  executing  this  contract,  an- 
other application   had  been  made 


to  him  to  carry  goods,  which  he 
refused,  could  he  be  made  liable 
in  damages  for  such  refusal  upon 
this  evidence?  Clearly  not.  There 
is  not  a  case  in  the  books  but 
one  to  which  I  shall  presently 
advert,  which  would  make  him 
liable  upon  proof  of  a  single  car- 
rying operation.  ...  In  con- 
flict with  these  views,  it  has  been 
held  in  Pennsylvania  that  'a  wag- 
oner who  carries  goods  for  hire 
is  a  common  carrier,  whether 
transportation  be  his  principal 
and  direct  business  or  an  occa- 
sional incidental  employment.' 
Gibson,  C.  J.,  in  Gordon  v.  Hutch- 
inson, 1  W,  &  S.  285.  This  de- 
cision no  doubt  contemplates  an 
undertaking  to  carry  generally 
without  a  special  contract,  and 
does  not  deny  to  the  undertaker 
the  right  to  define  his  liability. 
There  are  cases  in  Tennessee  and 
New  Hampshire  which  favor  the 
Pennsylvania  rule,  but  there  can 
be  but  little  doubt  that  that  case 
is  opposed  to  the  principles  of  the 
common  law,  and  its  rule  wholly 
inexpedient."  And  in  Harrison  v. 
Roy,  39  Miss.  396,  it  was  said  that 
while,  under  the  circumstances 
of  that  case,  the  wagoner  had 
made  himself  liable  as  a  common 
carrier,  if  the  transaction  had 
been  a  mere  isolated  undertaking, 
such  as  he  had  not  been  in  the 
habit  of  engaging  in,  and  which 
was  foreign  to  his  regular  and 
usual  business,  there  would  have 
been  force  in  the  position  that  he 
could  not  be  so  held. 


56  THE  LAW  OF   CARRIERS.  [§59. 

and  the  man  who  occasionallj^  and  not  as  a  public  business, 
entertains  travelers;  and  the  test  for  determining  whether  he 
who  carries  is  to  be  regarded  as  a  common  carrier  is  the  same 
as  that  which  must  be  applied  when  the  question  is  whether 
he  who  entertains  travelers  or  strangers  is  an  innkeeper.  There 
should  be  the  same  necessity  in  both  cases  for  a  public  pro- 
fession, or  a  course  of  dealing  which  will  be  equivalent  to  a 
profession  of  being  engaged  in  the  business  for  the  accommoda- 
tion of  the  general  public,  and  there  must  be  the  same  obliga- 
tion to  receive  and  become  accountable  for  the  goods  of  all 
who  apply ;  and  to  make  one  liable  as  an  innkeeper  there  can 
be  no  question,  upon  the  authorities,  but  that  there  must  be 
such  an  assumption  of  the  character  or  "public  holding  out" 
in  the  business  as  will  put  the  party  under  legal  compulsion 
to  entertain  the  traveling  public.  "To  render  a  person  liable 
as  a  common  innkeeper,"  says  the  court  in  Lyon  v.  Smith,- ^ 
"it  is  not  sufficient  to  show  that  he  occasionally  entertains 
travelers.  .  .  .  The  person  who  occasionally  entertains 
others  for  a  reasonable  compensation  is  no  more  subject  to 
the  extraordinary  responsibility  of  an  innkeeper  than  is  he 
liable  as  a  common  carrier  who,  in  certain  special  cases,  carries 
the  property  of  others  from  one  place  to  another  for  hire." 

Sec.  59.  (§  56a.)  2.  Goods  must  be  of  kind  he  professes  to 
carry. — In  the  second  place,  in  order  to  charge  one  as  a  com- 
mon carrier  of  goods,  the  goods  in  question  must  be  of  the 
kind  to  which  his  business  is  confined.  No  carrier  undertakes 
to  carry  all  kinds  of  goods,  but  only  such  as  are  of  the  descrip- 
tion which  he  professes  to  carry.  A  common  carrier  is,  there- 
fore, not  liable  as  such  where,  by  special  engagement  or  as  a 
matter  of  accommodation  merely,  he  undertakes  to  carry  a 
class  of  goods  which  it  is  not  his  business  to  carry.^'^  Illus- 
trations of  this  rule  will  be  given  in  a  subsequent  section.^^ 

16.  1   Iowa,*   184.  Lampley,    76    Ala.    357;    Railroad 

17.  See  ante,  §  44;  Kimball  v.  v.  Wallace,  24  U.  S.  App.  589,  14 
Railroad,  26  Vt.  249;  Honeyman  C.  C.  A.  257,  66  Fed.  506,  30  L.  R. 
V.  Railroad  Company,  13  Oreg.  352;  A.  161,  citing  Hutchinson  on  Carr. 
Central     Railroad,     etc.,     Co.     v.        18.  See  post,  §§   90,  91. 


§60.] 


WHO  IS  A  COMMON   CARRIER. 


57 


Sec.  60.  (§  56b.)  3.  Must  undertake  to  carry  by  customary 
means  and  route. — Common  carriers  of  goods  do  not  undertake 
to  carry  by  any  or  all  means,  but  only  by  those  means  and 
methods^  ^  and  over  the  route^^  to  which  their  business  is  con- 
fined. Thus  common  carriers  by  wagon  cannot  be  required  to 
carry  by  railroad,  nor  can  carriers  by  water  be  required  to 
carry  by  land,  nor  can  a  carrier  be  required  to  carry  to  a 
point  or  by  a  route  to  which  his  business  does  not  extend. 
And  even  if  a  carrier  should,  in  a  particular  instance,  under- 
take by  a  special  contract  to  carry  goods  by  unusual  and 
exceptional  methods  or  routes,  his  liability  would  be  based 
upon  his  contract  and  not  by  the  ordinary  rules  governing 
common  carriers.^i 

Sec.  61.  (§57.)  4.  Carriage  must  be  for  hire. — In  the  fourth 
place,  compensation  to  the  carrier  in  some  form,  either  by 
the  payment  of  his  price,  or  a  promise,  express  or  implied,  to 
pay  it,22  or  a  payment  or  promise  to  pay  for  something  which 


19.  Coup  V.  Wabash  Ry.  Co.,  56 
Mich.  111. 

20.  Pitlock  V.  Wells,  Fargo  & 
Co.,  109  Mass.  452;  Pittsburg,  etc., 
R.  Co.  V.  Morton,  61  Ind.  539. 

21.  Railroad  Co.  v.  Wallace,  24 
U.  S.  App.  589,  14  C.  C.  A.  257,  66 
Fed.  506,  30  L.  R.  A.  161,  citing 
Hutchinson  on   Carr. 

22.  In  Citizens'  Bank  v.  The 
Nantucket  S.  B.  Co.,  2  Story,  16, 
Judge  Story  disposes  of  the  ques- 
tion of  compensation  to  the  car- 
rier in  the  following  language: 
"In  the  next  place,  I  take  it  to  be 
exceedingly  clear  that  no  person 
is  a  common  carrier  in  the  sense 
of  the  law  who  is  not  a  carriei 
for  hire;  that  is,  who  does  not 
receive  or  is  not  entitled  to  re- 
ceive any  recompense  for  his  serv- 
ices. The  known  definition  of  a 
common  carrier  in  all  our'  books 
fully    establishes    this    result.      If 


no  hire  or  recompense  is  payable 
ex  debito  justitice,  but  something 
is  bestowed  as  a  gratuity  or  vol- 
untary gift,  then,  although  the 
party  may  transport  either  per- 
sons or  property,  he  is  not  in  the 
sense  of  the  law  a  common  car- 
rier, but  he  is  a  mere  mandatory 
or  gratuitous  bailee,  and  of  course 
his  rights,  duties  and  liabilities 
are  of  a  very  different  nature  and 
character  from  those  of  a  com- 
mon carrier.  In  the  present  case, 
therefore,  it  is  an  important  in- 
quiry whether,  in  point  of  fact, 
the  respondents  were  common 
carriers  of  money  and  bank  notes 
and  checks  for  hire  or  recompense 
or  not.  I  agree  that  it  is  not 
necessary  that  the  compensation 
should  be  a  fixed  sum  or  known 
as  freight,  for  it  will  be  sufficient 
if  a  hire  or  recompense  is  to  be 
paid  for  the  service  in  the  nature 


58  THE  LAW   OF    CARRIERS.  [§  61. 

will  include  the  carriage  as  an  incident  thereto,  is  essential 
to  constitute  him  a  common  carrier;  for  if,  as  we  have  seen,--'* 
he  receives  no  hire,  he  is  merely  a  gratuitous  bailee  or  manda- 
tary and  can  be  held  liable  only  for  gross  negligence^-*  But, 
though  he  has  received  no  direct  compensation  for  the  particu- 
lar service  and  would  not  be  entitled  to  recover  for  it  eo 
nomine,  and  even  though  by  his  express  contract  he  was  to 
receive  nothing  for  it,  yet  if,  when  all  the  circumstances  are 
taken  together,  it  appears  that  the  compensation  was  paid  or 
promised  for  the  entire  service,  he  will  not  be  considered  as 
a  gratuitous  bailee  as  to  any  part  of  it.  As  where  grain  was 
shipped  in  sacks,  and  the  agreement  was  that  the  carrier  was 
not  to  charge  for  returning  the  empty  sacks,  it  was  held  that 
he  was  not  a  gratuitous  carrier  in  bringing  back  the  sacks, 
the  compensation  paid  nominally  for  the  carriage  of  the  grain 
covering  also  the  service  as  to  the  empty  sacks.^^     So  where 

of  a  quantum  meruit,  to  or  for  the  S.  App.  45,  20  C.  C.  A.  515,  74  Fed. 
benefit  of  the  company.  And  I  517,  33  L.  R.  A.  255,  citing  Hutch- 
further  agree  that  it  is  by  no  inson  on  Carr. 
means  necessary  that,  if  hire  or  23.  Ante,  §  16. 
freight  is  to  be  paid,  the  goods  or  24.  "To  originate  the  excep- 
merchandise  or  money  or  other  tional  liability  of  the  common 
property  should  be  entered  upon  carrier,"  says  Clopton,  J.,  "al- 
any  freight  list,  or  the  contract  though  founded  on  reasons  of 
be  verified  by  any  written  memo-  public  policy,  and  to  create  the 
randum.  But  the  existence  or  relation,  there  must  exist  privity 
non-existence  of  such  circum-  of  contract,  express  or  implied, 
stances  may  nevertheless  be  im-  and  a  title  to  compensation  for 
portant  in  ascertaining  what  the  the  services.  Public  policy  oper- 
true  understanding  of  the  parties  ates  on  those  only  who  transport 
is  as  to  the  character  of  the  bail-  for  reward  or  hire.  Where  there 
ment."  And  see  to  the  same  pur-  is  no  right  to  remuneration,  the 
port,  Kirtland  v.  Montgomery,  1  party  who  carries  incurs  no  lia- 
Swan,  452.  bility  other  than  that  of  a  gratui- 
Where  an  individual  or  corpora  tons  bailee."  In  Central  Railroad, 
tion  constructs  a  railroad  wholly  etc.,  Co.  v.  Lampley,  76  Ala.  357, 
upon  its  own  land,  and  for  the  citing  Citizens'  Bank  v.  Nantucket 
conduct  of  its  own  private  busi-  S.  B.  Co.,  2  Story,  16;  Knox  v. 
ness,  the  fact  that  it  occasionally  Rives,  14  Ala.  249. 
permits  persons  to  ride  gratuit-  25.  Pierce  v.  The  Railroad,  23 
ously  upon  its  cars  does  not  con-  Wis.  387;  Aldridge  v.  The  Rail- 
stitute  it  a  carrier  of  passengers,  way,  15  Com.  B.  N.  S.  582. 
Wade  V.  Lutcher,  etc.,  Co.,  41  U. 


§62.]  WHO  IS  A  COMMON  CARRIER,  59 

the  carrier  was  to  sell  the  goods  and  return  the  proceeds,  the 
freight  paid  upon  the  goods  would  also  be  regarded  as  com- 
pensation for  bringing  back  the  proceeds.2« 

Sec.  62.     (§  57a.)     5.  Action  must  lie  for  refusal  to  carry. — 

Lastly,  the  party  must  be  under  such  a  legal  obligation  to 
carry  that  an  action  will  lie  against  him  for  a  refusal  without 
sufficient  excuse.-^  "The  true  test  of  the  character  of  a  party, 
as  to  the  fact  whether  he  is  a  common  carrier  or  not,"  says 
Chief  Justice  Simpson,  "is  his  legal  duty  and  obligation  with 
reference  to  transportation.  Is  it  optional  with  him  whether 
he  will  or  will  not  carry,  or  must  he  carry  for  all?  If  it  is 
his  legal  duty  to  carry  for  all  alike  who  comply  with  the  terms 
as  to  freight,  etc.,  then  he  is  a  common  carrier,  and  is  subject 
to  all  those  stringent  rules  which,  for  wise  ends,  have  long  since 
been  adopted  and  uniformly  enforced,  both  in  England  and  in 
all  the  states,  upon  common  carriers.  If,  on  the  contrary,  he 
may  carry  or  not  as  he  deems  best,  he  is  but  a  private  indi- 
vidual, and  is  invested,  like  all  other  private  persons,  with  the 
right  to  make  his  own  contracts,  and  when  made  to  stand  upon 
them. "28  "One  of  the  obligations  of  a  common  carrier,"  says 
Nisbet,  J.,  "is  to  carry  the  goods  of  any  person  offering  to 
pay  his  hire ;  with  certain  specific  limitations  this  is  the  rule. 
If  he  refuse  to  carry,  he  is  liable  to  be  sued,  and  to  respond 
in  damages  to  the  person  aggrieved,  and  this  is  perhaps  the 
safest  test  of  his  character. "^^ 

Sec.  63.  (§  57b.)  Regnlar  trips  or  fixed  termini  not  neces- 
sary.— It  is  not  necessary,  where  the  other  elements  exist,  that 
the  carrier  should  make  regular  trips^*^  or  travel  only  between 
fixed  termini.^i 

26.  Kemp  v.  Coughtry,  11  28.  In  Piedmont  Manfg.  Co.  v. 
Johns.      107;     Harrington    v.    Mc-     Railroad   Co.,  supra. 

Shane,   2  Watts,    443;     Emery    v.  29.  In  Fish  v.  Chapman,  supra. 

Hersey,  4   Greenl.   407;    Mosely  v.  See  also,  Lanning  v.  Railroad  Co., 

Lord,  2  Conn.  389.  1  N.  J.  Law  J.,  21. 

27.  Fish  V.  Chapman,  2  Ga.  349;  30.  Pennewill  v.  Ciillen,  5  Harr. 
Nugent  V.  Smith,  L.  R.  1  C.  P.  Div.  238. 

19,  423;  Piedmont  Manuf.  Co.  v.  31.  Liver  Alkali  Co.  v.  Johnson, 
The  Railroad,   19  S.  C,   353.  L.  R.  7  Ex.  267;  9  id.  338. 


60  THE  LAW   OF   CARRIERS.  [§  64. 

Sec.  64.  (§58.)  Kind  of  vessel  or  vehicle  and  distance 
immaterial. — So  it  is  wholly  immaterial  in  what  kind  of  vessel 
or  vehicle  or  for  what  distance  the  carrying  is  done.     Thus — 

Sec.  65.  (§  58a.)  Hoymen,  bargemen,  lightermen,  canal- 
boatmen,  etc.,  are  common  carriers. — Hoymen,  bargemen, 
lightermen,  and,  in  short,  boatmen  of  every  description  upon 
rivers,  canals,  lakes  or  the  sea,  come  within  the  denomination 
of  common  carriers  if  they  engage  in  the  business  of  carrying 
or  transporting  goods  indifferently  for  all  who  may  employ 
them.^2 

Sec.  66.     (§  58b.)     Ferrymen  are  common  carriers  when. — 

So  .ferrymen  are  common  carriers  as  to  the  baggage  of  their 
passengers  and  as  to  all  goods  or  chattels  which  they  make 
it  their  business  to  transport;  or  if  they  hold  themselves  out 
to  the  public  as  engaged  in  the  business  of  ferrying  goods  or 
property,  either  generally  or  of  a  particular  kind.^^  But  the 
nature  of  a  ferry  depends  in  a  great  measure  upon  the  char- 
acter of  the  road  of  which  it  forms  a  part.  If  the  road  is  a 
footpath,  the  ferry  may  be  for  foot  passengers  only.  If  it  be 
an  ordinary  highroad,  the  ferry  will  be  not  merely  for  foot 
passengers  and  their  baggage,  but  for  horses  and  carriages 

32.  Canal-boatmen  are  common  Ark.  3;  Powell  v.  Mills,  37  Miss, 
carriers  under  ordinary  circum-  691;  Griffith  v.  Cave,  22  Cal.  535; 
stances.  Bowman  v.  Teall,  23  Hall  v.  Renfro,  3  Met.  (Ky.)  51; 
Wend.  309;  Parsons  v.  Hardy,  14  Self  v.  Dunn,  42  Ga.  528;  Cook  v. 
Wend.  215;  De  Mott  v.  Laraway,  Gourdin,  2  Nott  &  McC.  19;  Ruth- 
14  Wend.  225;  Humphreys  v.  erford  v.  McGowen,  1  id.  17;  May 
Reed,  6  Whart.  435;  Fuller  v.  v.  Hanson,  5  Cal.  360;  Whitmore 
Bradley,  25  Penn.  St.  120.  But  v.  Bowman,  4  Greene  (Iowa), 
not  where  they  are  not  public  car-  148;  Babcock  v.  Herbert,  3  Ala. 
riers.  Fish  v.  Clark,  49  N.  Y.  122;  392;  Miller  v.  Pendleton,  8  Gray, 
Beckwith  v.  Frisbie,  32  Vt.  559;  547;  Claypool  v.  McAllister,  20 
Spann  v.  Transportation  Co.,  11  HI.  504;  Albright  v.  Penn,  14  Tex. 
Misc.  Rep.  680,  33  N.  Y.  Supp.  566.  290;    Smith    v.    Seward,     3     Barr, 

33.  Lewis  v.  Smith,  107  Mass.  342;  Pomeroy  v.  Donaldson,  5  Mo. 
334;  White  v.  Winnissimmet,  7  30;  Cohen  v.  Hume,  1  McCord, 
Cash.  156;  Sanders  v.  Young,  1  439;  Littlejohn  v.  Jones,  2  McMul- 
Head,  219;  Fisher  v.  Clisbee,  12  Ian,  365;  Clark  v.  Union  Ferry 
111.  344;  Wilson  v.  Hamilton,  4  Co.,  35  N.  Y.  485;  Le  Barron  v. 
Ohio  St.  722;   Harvey  v.  Rose,  26  Ferry  Co.,  11  Allen,  312, 


§67.]  WHO  IS  A  COMMON   CARRIER.  61 

and  all  goods  which  may  be  carried  upon  the  road.^^  And 
one  who  keeps  a  ferry,  not  for  public  accommodation,  but 
simply  for  the  convenience  of  the  customers  of  his  mill,  and 
charges  no  ferriage,  is  not  a  common  carrier,  no  matter  what 
advantage  he  may  derive  from  it  incidentally  ;=^5  and  even 
though  compensation  may  sometimes  be  made,  not  as  a  charge, 
but  as  a  gratuity .^^ 

Sec.  67.  Whether  ferrymen  are  common  carriers  of  goods 
retained  in  the  custody  of  passenger. — While  the  cases  uni- 
formly concede  that  a  ferryman  who  holds  himself  out  as 
being  ready  and  willing  to  carry  or  transport  for  hire  the 
goods  of  all  who  may  wish  to  employ  him  is,  as  to  the  goods 
in  his  custody,  a  common  carrier,  the  courts  have  differed 
in  their  views  as  to  the  extent  of  the  liability  assumed  in 
those  cases  where  the  owner  of  the  goods  accompanies  them 
and  continues  to  retain  them  under  his  control.  On  the  one 
hand  it  is  held  that  as  soon  as  the  goods  are  placed  upon  the 
ferryman's  vehicle  for  the  purpose  of  being  transported,  they 
are  in  the  custody  of  the  ferryman  as  a  common  carrier,  and 
that  the  fact  that  the  owner  retains  them  under  his  control 
merely  places  him  in  the  position  of  an  agent  of  the  ferryman.^^ 
On  the  other  hand  it  is  said  that  such  a  rule  rests  upon  no 
just  principle,  and  that  'in  such  cases  the  ferryman  does  not 
assume  toward  the  goods  the  responsibility  of  a  common  car- 

34.  Willoughby  v.  Horridge,  16  brings  with  him,  whether  inani- 
Eng.  L.  &  Eq.  437.  mate    or    live    stock,    is    put    ipso 

35.  Self  V.  Dunn,  42  Ga.   528.  facto  absolutely   into   the   custody 

36.  Littlejohn  v.  Jones,  2  Me-  of  the  ferryman,  and  if  the  owner 
Mullan,  366.  continues    his    control    over    it   to 

37.  While  none  of  the  cases  any  extent,  he  does  so  as  the 
deny  that  a  ferryman  who  carries  agent  of  the  ferryman,  and  the 
for  hire  is  a  common  carrier,  absolute  responsibility  of  the  fer- 
there  is  considerable  diversity  of  ryman  as  a  common  carrier  at 
opinion  as  to  the  extent  of  the  lia-  once  commences.  Fisher  v.  Clis- 
bility  assumed  by  him.  In  some  bee,  12  111.  344;  Powell  v.  Mills, 
of  the  cases  it  is  held  that  as  37  Miss.  691;  Wilson  v.  Hamil- 
soon  as  the  passenger  comes  with  ton,   4  Ohio  St.  722. 

his  property  upon  the  ferryman's  In  others  it  is  said  that  the 
boat,     the     property     which     he    presumption  is,  that  the  property 


62 


THE  LAW   OF    CARRIERS. 


[§67. 


rier.2^  The  latter  rule  would  seem  to  be  more  in  accord  with 
the  principles  which  govern  the  carrier's  common  law  liability. 
In  order  to  impose  upon  one  who  undertakes  the  transporta- 
tion of  goods  the  stringent  responsibility  of  a  common  carrier, 


goes  into  the  ferryman's  custody 
as  a  common  carrier,  and  that 
the  burden  is  upon  him  of  show- 
ing that  he  did  not  have  such  con- 
trol over  it  as  invested  him  with 
the  character  of  common  carrier 
in  respect  to  it,  and  that  a  prima 
facie  case  is  established  against 
him  if  it  be  shown  that  the  ferry 
was  a  public  one  and  that  the 
property  was  put  upon  the  boat. 
38.  Wyckoff  v.  Ferry  Co.,  52 
N.  Y.  32.  In  this  case  the  owner 
of  a  horse  and  wagon  drove  upon 
a  ferryboat,  and,  remaining  in 
the  wagon,  kept  control  of  the 
vehicle  and  horse  until  the  acci- 
dent happened.  The  law  as  to 
the  liability  of  the  ferryman  as 
a  common  carrier  was  thus  qual- 
ified by  Allen,  J.:  "A  ferryman," 
said  he,  "is  not  a  common  carrier 
of  the  property  retained  by  a  pas- 
senger in  his  own  custody  and 
under  his  own  control,  and  liable 
as  such  for  all  losses  and  injuries 
except  those  caused  by  the  act 
of  God  or  the  public  enemies. 
The  cases  which  go  the  length 
of  holding  that  the  ferryman  is 
chargeable  as  a  common  carrier 
for  the  absolute  safety  of  prop- 
erty thus  carried,  and  that  the 
owner,  in  taking  care  of  the  prop- 
erty during  the  passage  of  the 
boat,  may  be  regarded  as  agent 
of  the  ferryman,  do  not  stand  up- 
on any  just  principle,  and  are 
not  within  the  reasons  of  public 
policy  upon  which  the  extreme 
liability  of  common  carriers  rests. 
.    .    .    While    ferrymen,    by    rea- 


son of  the  nature  of  the  franchise 
they  exercise  and  the  character 
of  the  services  they  render  to  the 
public,  are  held  to  extreme  dili- 
gence and  care  and  to  a  stringent 
liability  for  any  neglect  or  omis 
sion  of  duty,  they  do  not  assume 
all  the  responsibilities  of  common 
carriers.  Property  carried  upon 
a  ferryboat  in  the  custody  and 
control  of  the  owner,  a  passenger, 
is  not  at  the  sole  risk  of  either 
the  ferryman  or  the  owner.  If 
lost  or  damaged  by  the  act  or 
neglect  of  the  ferryman,  he  must 
respond  to  the  owner.  The  ordi- 
nary rules  governing  in  actions 
for  negligence  apply;  and  a  plain- 
tiff cannot  recover  if  he  is  guilty 
of  negligence  on  his  part,  con- 
tributing to  the  loss.  The  lia- 
bility of  a  common  carrier,  in  all 
its  extent,  only  attaches  when 
there  is  an  actual  bailment,  and 
the  party  sought  to  be  charged 
has  the  exclusive  custody  and 
control  of  property  for  carriage. 
A  ferryman  does  not  undertake 
absolutely  for  the  safety  of  goods 
carried  with  and  under  the  con- 
trol of  the  owner;  but  he  does 
undertake  for  their  safety  as 
against  the  defects  and  insuffi- 
ciencies of  his  boat  and  other  ap- 
pliances for  the  performance  of 
the  service,  and  for  the  neglect 
or  want  of  skill  of  himself  and 
his  servants.  At  the  same  time, 
the  owner  of  the  property,  retain- 
ing the  custody  of  it,  is  bound  to 
use  ordinary  care  and  diligence  to 
prevent    loss    or    injury."      Fisher 


§68.J 


WHO  IS  A  COMMON  CARRIER. 


63 


it  is  essential,  as  will  be  seen  in  a  later  section/'^'-*  that  he  have 
exclusive  control  of  the  goods.  With  this  essential  element 
lacking  when  the  owner  himself  retains  control  of  the  goods, 
the  liability  of  the  ferryman  as  a  common  carrier  should  be 
qualified ;  and  when  the  goods  are  lost  or  injured,  his  liability 
should  be  governed  by  the  ordinary  rules  in  actions  for  negli-* 
gence. 

Sec.  68.  (§59.)  Proprietors  of  land  vehicles  like  stage- 
coaches, omnibuses,  carts,  wagons,  etc.,  are  common  carriers 
when. — The  proprietors  of  land  vehicles  of  every  kind,  such 
as  stage  and  hackney  coaches,^^  oranibuses,-*i  cabs,  drays,  carts, 
wagons,  sleds,^2  ^nd  street  cars,^^  who  make  it  a  business  to 
carry  for  hire  the  goods  of  such  as  choose  to  employ  them, 
even  though  it  may  be  within  the  limits  of  the  same  town  or 
city,  are  reckoned  as  common  carriers  and  held  liable  as  such. 
Stage-coaches  are  employed  principally  for  the  carrying  of 
passengers,  and  were  formerly  very  extensively  used  for  that 


V.  Clisbee;  Powell  v.  Mills;  and 
Wilson  V.  Hamilton,  supra,  were 
disapproved. 

See  also,  Tower  v.  The  Utica 
Railroad,  7  Hill,  47;  Richards  v. 
The  Railway,  7  Com.  B.  839; 
Midland  Railroad  v.  Bromley,  17 
C.  B.  (N.  S.)  372;  Brind  v.  Dale, 
8  Car.  &  P.  207;  East  India  Co. 
V.  Pullen,  2  Strange,  690. 

The  same  view  of  the  liability 
of  the  ferryman  was  taken  by 
Dewey,  J.,  in  White  v.  Winnis- 
simmet  Co.,  7  Cush.  155;  see  as 
to  delivery  to  ferryman,  post,  § 
128. 

39.  See  post,  §   119. 

40.  As  to  hackney  coaches. 
Bonce  v.  Dubuque,  etc.,  Co.,  53 
Iowa,  278;  Budd  v.  Carriage  Co., 
25  Or.  314,  35  Pac.  Rep.  660,  27 
L.   R.   A.   279. 

41.  As  to  omnibuses,  Parmelec 
V.   Lowitz,    74    111.    116;    Dibble    v. 


Brown,  12  Ga.  217;  Parmelee  v. 
McNulty,  19  111.  556.  In  the  last 
case,  it  was  said  that  "the  court 
was  authorized  to  take  notice 
that  the  owner  of  an  omnibus 
line  is  a  common  carrier  just  as 
much  as  the  owner  of  a  railroad 
or  a  line  of  steamboats.  The 
court  will  take  notice  of  the  gen- 
eral meaning  of  words,  and  we 
know  that  an  omnibus  line  means 
a  line  of  coaches  for  the  carriage 
of  passengers  and  their  bag- 
gage." 

The  owner  of  a  "licensed  bus" 
is  not  necessarily  a  common  car- 
rier, and  proof  of  that  fact  will 
not  be  sufficient  to  hold  him  as 
such.  Atlantic  City  v.  Dehn,  69 
N.   J.  Law,  233,  54  Atl.  Rep.  220. 

42.  See  post,    §    70. 

43.  As  to  street  cars,  Levi  v. 
R.  R.  Co.,  n  Allen,  300. 


64  THE  LAW   OF   CiVRRIERS.  [§  6S. 

purpose.  The  carriage  of  goods,  except  the  luggage  of  pas- 
sengers, is  not  strictl}^  their  business;  but  in  practice  they 
generally  combine  the  carriage  of  light  packages  with  their 
passenger  traffic,  and  there  is  no  doubt  but  that  whenever  they 
are  so  in  the  habit  of  carrying  goods  for  hire  or  are  so  adver- 
tised or  held  out,  their  proprietors  are  common  carriers  as  to 
such  goods.'*"*  But  where  no  such  usage  exists,  and  the  pro- 
prietor holds  himself  out  to  the  public  as  engaged  only  in  the 
carriage  of  passengers,  he  cannot  be  held  liable  as  a  common 
carrier,  although  it  may  have  been  the  practice  of  the  driver 
of  the  coach,  without  the  knowledge  of  the  proprietor,  to  carry 
parcels  for  a  compensation.  But  if  such  practice  is  known, 
and  is  submitted  to  by  the  proprietor  as  a  part  of  the  com- 
pensation of  the  driver,  the  rule  would  be  different,  unless  the 
owner  of  the  package,  being  informed  of  the  fact  that  it  was 
not  a  part  of  the  customary  business  of  the  coach  to  carry 
packages,  contracts  with  the  driver,  trusting  solely  to  his 
responsibility.'*^  And  it  has  been  held  that  where  the  confi- 
dence, under  such  circumstances,  is  reposed  in  the  driver  alone, 
he  cannot  be  held  to  the  responsibility  of  a  common  carrier, 
but  only  to  that  of  an  ordinary  bailee  for  hire.^^     Stage  pro- 

44.     Hollister     v.     No-wlen,      19  a    particular    case,     or     by     their 

Wend.    234;    Cole   v.    Goodwin,    19  general   course   of   business.    Pow- 

Wend.   251;    Walker   v.    Skipwith,  ell  v.  Mills,  30  Miss.  231. 
Meigs,   502;    Peixotti  v.  McLaugh-         45.     Dwight  v.  Brewster,  supra; 

lin,    1     Strob.     468;      Dwight     v.  Beckman  v.  Shouse,  5  Rawle,  179; 

Brewster,  1  Pick.  50;   McHenry  v.  Butler    v.    Basing,    2    Car.    &    P. 

The  Railroad  Co.,    4    Har.    (Del.)  613;   Blanchard  v.  Isaacs,  3  Barb. 

448;    Frink    v.    Coe,   4    G.    Greene,  388.     See,  also,   §   91. 
555;    Sales  v.  Western   Stage  Co.,        46.     Bean    v.    Sturtevant,    8    N. 

4    Iowa,    547.      Prima    facie,     the  H.   146.     In  Sheldon  v.  Robinson, 

proprietors  of  stage-coaches,  used  7  N.  H.  157,  it  appeared  that  the 

for    carrying    the    mails,    passen-  defendant  was  in  the  employment 

gers   and   their   baggage,   are   not  of  a   stage   company  as  a   driver, 

to    be     considered     common     car-  and  that  the  drivers  of  the  stage- 

riers    as    to    articles    not    strictly  coaches    were     generally     in     the 

within    their   line   of   business,    in  habit     of     carrying     packages     of 

the  technical   sense  of  that  term,  money    for    an   insignificant   com- 

They   may,   however,   make   them-  pensation,  being  the  same,  wheth- 

selves  such  by  special  contract  in  er  the  package  contained  more  or 


§  69.]  WHO  IS  A  COMMON  CARRIER.  65 

prietors,  however,  who  carry  passengers  are  liable  as  commou 
carriers  for  their  baggage,  as  we  shall  hereafter  see. 

Sec.  69.  (§  60.)  Vehicles  carrying  passengers  usually  liable 
as  common  carriers  only  as  to  baggage. — As  hacks,  omnibuses, 
cabs,  street  cars  and  the  like  vehicles  are  employed  almost 
exclusively  for  the  conveyance  of  passengers  in  a  city  or  its 
vicinity,  a  case  which  would  make  their  proprietors  liable  as 
common  carriers,  except  for  the  baggage  of  their  passengers, 
would  be  exceptional ;  but  such  cases  may  and  undoubtedly  do 
occur.  As  to  such  baggage  they  are  unquestionably  liable  as 
common  carriers,  in  common  with  all  other  passenger  carriers, 
though  this  was  long  since  disputed,  unless  a  price  distinct  from 
the  fare  of  the  passenger  was  paid  for  its  carriage.-*'^  But  this 
authority  has  been  disregarded,  and  the  rule  may  be  said  to 
be  now  settled  that  all  kinds  of  passenger  carriers  by  receiving, 
in  their  vehicles  or  upon  their  vessels,  passengers  and  their 
baggage,  subject  themselves  to  the  responsibility  of  common 
carriers  of  goods  in  general  as  to  such  baggage;  and  they 
become  to  this  extent  common  carriers,  although  only  the 
ordinary  fare  for  the  trip  has  been  paid  by  the  passenger,  and 

less.     This   compensation   was   re-  matter    of    convenience;    or    that 

ceived    by    the    drivers     to     their  he  ever  held  himself  out  as  ready 

own  use.     It  did  not  appear  that  to    engage    in    the    transportation 

defendant  had  ever  advertised  or  of    whatever    was    requested,    not- 

in   any   way   held   himself   out  as  withstanding    it    may    have    been 

ready   to   carry,    farther   than   by  unusual  for  him  and  other  drivers 

this  habit  of  receiving  what  was  (to  refuse)  to  carry  it.    This  was 

offered   for   carriage.     Parker,   J.,^  not   his  general  employment,  and 

said:      "This   does   not  show  him  there  is  nothing  to  show  that  he 

to  have  exercised  the  business  of  would    have    been    liable    had    he 

carrying    packages     as     a     public  refused  to  take  this  money,  espe- 

employment,    because    his     public  oially  as  he  was  in  the  service  of 

employment  was  that  of  a  driver  another,    and,    as     such     servant, 

of  a  stage-coach,  in  the  employ  of  might  have  had  duties  to  perform 

others.     It  does  not  show  that  he  inconsistent   with   the   duty    of   a 

ever  undertook  to  carry  goods  or  common   carrier." 

money   for   persons   generally,    al-  47.     Middleton     v.     Fowler,      1 

though    he    may,     in     fact,     have  Salk.    282;    Upshare    v.    Aidee,    1 

taken   all   that  was   offered,   as   a  Comyns,    25. 

6 


66  THE  LAW   OF    CARRIERS.  [§  70. 

even,  indeed,  when  no  fare  is  shown  to  have  been  paid,  the 
passenger  being  liable  therefor  if  not  paid.^^ 

Sec.  70.  (§61.)  Proprietors  of  local  land  vehicles  are  com- 
mon carriers. — On  the  other  hand,  the  proprietors  of  land  vehi- 
cles which  are  not  employed  upon  any  regular  line  of  trans- 
portation, but  are  used  exclusively  for  the  carriage  of  the  goods 
of  others  for  hire  to  places  in  the  same  town,  city  or  neighbor- 
hood to  which  the  owners  of  such  goods  may  desire  them  to 
be  conveyed,  and  who  may  be  said  to  engage  in  a  sort  of  job- 
bing business  as  carriers,  such  as  drays,  carts,  express  or  de- 
livery wagons,  sleds  and  trucks,  are  according  to  a  number 
of  authorities  in  this  country,  strictly  common  carriers  as  to 
such  goods.^^  Thus  city  express  companies,  engaged  in  carry- 
ing the  baggage  of  travelers  from  one  depot  to  another,  or  to 
hotels,  are,  as  to  such  baggage,  common  carriers,^^  and  where 
the  defendant,  in  the  course  of  his  employment,  had  under- 
taken to  haul  upon  a  sled,  drawn  by  oxen,  a  hogshead  of  sugar 
from  the  river  landing  to  the  store  of  the  plaintiffs,  and  the 
hogshead  rolled  from  the  sled  into  the  river  and  was  damaged, 
he  was  held  liable  as  a  common  carrier.  "Every  one,"  said  the 
court,  "who  pursues  the  business  of  transporting  goods  Cor 
hire  for  the  public  generally,  is  a  common  carrier.  .  .  . 
Draymen,  cartmen  and  porters,  who  undertake  to  carry  goods 
for  hire  as  a  common  employment  from  one  part  of  a  town 
to  another,  come  within  the  definition.  So  also  does  the  driver 
of  a  slide  with  an  ox  team.     The  mode  of  transporting  is  im- 

48.  McGill  V.  Rowand,  3  Barr,  v.  Pool's  Assignee,  108  Ky.  124, 
451;  Hollister  v.  Nowlen,  19  55  S.  W.  Rep.  887,  94  Am.  St.  Rep. 
Wend.    234;    Cole   v.   Goodwin,   id.     348,  49  L.  R.  A.  251. 

251;  Bomar  v.  Maxwell,  9  Humph.         50.     Richards     v.     Westcott,     2 

621;   Hawkins  v.  Hoffman,  6  Hill,  Bosw.    589;    Verner    v.    Sweitzer, 

586;   Brooke  v.  Pickwick,  4  Bing.  32  Penn.  St.  208.     Draymen,  cart- 

218.  men,  etc.,  are.     Robertson  v.  Ken- 

49.  Story  on  Bail.  §  496;  2  nedy,  2  Dana,  431;  Powers  v. 
Kent's  Com.  598,  n;  Jackson,  etc.,  Davenport,  7  Blackf.  497;  Mc- 
Iron  Works  v.  Hurlburt,  158  N.  Henry  v.  Railroad  Co.,  4  Harr. 
Y.  34,  52  N.  E.  Rep.  665,  70  Am,  448;  Hebard  v.  Riegel,  67  111.  App. 
St.  Rep.  432,  afflrming  s.  c.  36  N.  584,  citing  Hutchinson  on  Carr. 
Y.   Supp.    808,    15   Misc.   93;    Cayo  . 


§70.; 


WHO  IS  A  COMMON  CARRIER, 


67 


material.  "^^  So  where  the  defendant  was  a  lighterman,  who 
carried  goods  between  wharves  and  ships  for  any  person  who 
chose  to  employ  him,  he  was  held  liable  as  a  common  carrier.-"'-' 
And  where  a  drayman,  whose  occupation  was  such  as  to  bring 
him  within  the  definition  of  a  common  carrier,  entered  into 
a  contract  to  carry  certain  goods  to  a  point  beyond  the  ter- 
ritorial limits  within  which  his  business  was  usually  confined, 
it  was  held  that  his  liability  as  a  common  carrier  continued 
until  the  contract  was  performed;  his  liability  in  such  a  case 
being  similar  to  that  of  a  common  carrier  by  railroad  which 
had  contracted  to  carry  goods  to  a  point  beyond  its  own  line.^^ 
But  where  the  defendant  was  engaged  in  the  business  of 
trucking  goods  from  a  railroad  depot  to  different  stores  within 
a  city,  but  for  particular  customers,  and  at  a  price  in  each  case 


51.  Robertson  v.  Kennedy,  2 
Dana,   430. 

52.  Ingate  v.  Christie,  3  Car. 
&  Kir.  61.  But  in  Brind  v.  Dale, 
8  Car.  &  P.  207,  it  appeared  that 
the  defendant  was  the  owner  of 
a  number  of  carts  which  were 
kept  ready  to  be  hired  by  any  per- 
son who  chose  to  employ  them, 
either  by  the  hour,  day  or  job, 
defendant  being  what  was  called 
a  town  carman.  One  of  these 
carts  was  employed  by  the  plain- 
tiff to  carry  certain  packages  a 
short  distance.  The  cart  was 
driven  by  the  defendant,  plain- 
tiff agreeing  to  go  along  with  it 
and  keep  watch  upon  the  goods. 
At  the  end  of  the  trip  it  was 
found  that  one  of  the  packages 
was  missing.  Lord  Abinger  in- 
structed the  jury  that,  in  his 
opinion,  the  defendant,  who  was 
sued  for  the  lost  package,  was 
not,  in  performing  the  service  of 
carriage  under  the  circumstances. 


a  common  carrier.  Of  this  case 
Judge  Story  remarks:  "What 
substantial  distinction  is  there  in 
the  case  of  parties  who  ply  for 
hire  in  the  carriage  of  goods  for 
all  persons  indifferently,  whether 
the  goods  are  carried  from  one 
town  to  another,  or  from  one 
place  to  another  in  the  same 
town?  Is  there  any  substantial 
difference  whether  the  parties 
have  fixed  termini  of  their  busi- 
ness or  not,  if  they  hold  them- 
selves out  as  ready  and  willing 
to  carry  goods  for  any  persons 
whatsoever,  to  or  from  any  places 
in  the  same  town  or  in  different 
towns?"  Story  on  Bail.  §  496,  n. 
But  see  what  is  said  on  this  sub- 
ject by  Perley,  J.,  in  Moses  v. 
The  Railroad,  24  N.  H.  71,  who 
treats  the  question  as  doubtful, 
upon   principle. 

53.  Farley  v.  Lavary,  107  Ky. 
523,  54  S.  W.  Rep.  840,  47  L.  R. 
A.    383. 


68  THE  LAW  OF   CARRIERS.  [§  71. 

fixed  by  special  contract,  it  was  held  that  he  was  not  a  com- 
mon carrier.^''"* 

Sec.  71.  (^  62.)  Warehousemen,  wharfingers  and  forwarders 
of  freight,  when  common  carriers. — Warehousemen,  wharfing- 
ers and  forwarders  of  freight,  so  long  as  they  confine  them- 
selves to  the  business  which  their  names  import,  cannot  be 
held  liable  as  common  carriers.  If  goods  are  deposited  with 
them  merely  as  the  initiatory  step  towards  starting  them  in 
itinere,  they  having  undertaken  to  do  no  more  than  to  safely 
keep  them  and  forward  them  when  the  opportunity  offers,  and 
being  in  no  wise  interested  in  their  carriage  after  delivery  to 
the  carrier,  it  would  be  contrary  to  the  well-settled  principles 
of  the  law  to  hold  them  to  the  responsibilities  of  common  car- 
riers. And  although  a  wharfinger  may  accept  goods  for  the 
purpose  of  being  transported,  if  the  goods  so  accepted  are 
those  only  of  his  own  wharf  customers,  the  goods  of  strangers 
not  being  received,  he  is  nol^,  as  to  such  goods,  a  common 
carrier  and  cannot  be  held  liable  as  such.^^  But  where  ware- 
housemen, wharfingers,  or  forwarders  of  freight  combine  the 
two  characters,  treating  the  deposit  with  them  as  being  merely 
for  the  convenience  of  further  carriage  or  to  encourage  or 
promote  their  business  as  common  carriers,  they  will  be  held 
to  a 'strict  liability  as  such  from  the  time  of  the  delivery  to 
them.  In  such  cases  the  deposit  is  a  mere  accessory  to  the 
carriage,  and  for  the  purpose  of  facilitating  it,  and  the  liabil- 
ity as  carrier  begins  with  the  receipt  of  the  goods.^^ 

54.  Faucher  v.  Wilson,  68  N.  whether  he  holds  himself  out  to 
H.  338,  38  Atl.  Rep.  1002,  39  L.  the  world  as  such,  and  he  can 
R.  A.  431.  hold    himself    out    as    a    common 

55.  Chattock  &  Co.  v.  Bellamy  carrier  by  engaging  in  the  busi- 
&  Co.    (1895),  64  L.  J.  Q.  B.  250.  ness  generally,  or  by  announcing 

56.  Story  on  Bail.  §  536;  For-  or  proclaiming  it  by  cards,  adver- 
ward  V.  Pittard,  1  T.  R.  27;  tisements,  or  by  any  other  means 
Schloss  V.  Wood,  11  Colo.  287.  In  that  would  let  the  public  know 
this  case  the  court  cite  this  sec-  that  he  intended  to  be  a  common 
tion  with  approval,  and  say:  or  general  carrier  for  the  public. 
"Whether  a  person  is  a  common  Railway  Co.  v.  Nichols,  9  Kans, 
carrier     depends     wholly     upon  252,  253.    Were  the  appellees  act- 


§  72.]  WHO  IS  A  COMMON   CARRIER.  69 

Sec.  72.  (§63.)  Same  subject — When  liability  begins. — 
But  if  a  person  who  is  at  the  same  time  both  a  warehouseman 
and  a  forwarding  merchant  receive  goods  on  deposit  to  be' 
forwarded  by  his  line  according  to  the  future  orders  of  the 
owner,  or  if  anything  is  still  to  be  done  by  the  owner  to  put 
them  in  readiness  for  shipment,  he  is  not  chargeable  as  a  car- 
rier, but  merely  as  a  warehouseman,  initil  such  orders  are 
given  or  until  they  are  put  in  condition  for  carriage ;  as  where 
the  goods  are  deposited  without  instructions  as  to  their  place 
of  destination,  either  by  marks  or  otherwise,  or  to  await 
orders,^^  or  until  the  charges  for  the  transportation  are  paid, 
if  that  is  required  by  the  carrier;  or  if  anything  remains  to 
be  done  or  any  expense  to  be  incurred  to  put  them  in  a  condi- 
tion to  bear  transportation.^**  And  if  the  carrier  sliould  require 
the  prepayment  of  freight  charges  as  a  condition  to  his  assum- 
ing any  obligation  in  respect  to  transporting  the  goods,  and 
they  are  placed  in  cars  standing  on  a  spur  track  from  whicli 
place  it  is  necessary  to  move  them  to  a  freight  depot  to  be 
weighed  in  order  to  compute  the  proper  charges,  the  delivery 
of  the  goods  for  transportation  will  be  treated  as  having  been 
made  at  the  freight  depot,  and  the  carrier's  liability,  until 
the  goods  are  weighed  and  the  charges  paid,  will  be  that  of  a 
warehouseman.^^  If  the  warehouseman  is  also  to  be  the  car- 
rier or  is  interested  in  the  carriage,  as  soon  as  the  orders  are 
given  to  forward  the   goods,   or  other  conditions  performed 

ing   in   the    premises   as   common  Eldridge,   100   Mass.   455;    Murray 

carriers    or     forwarders     merely?  v.    Steamship   Co.,    170   Mass.    166, 

This    question    should    have    been  48    N.    E.   Rep.    1093,    64    Am.    St. 

submitted  to  the  jury  with  proper  Rep.  290;  Railway  v.  Beard   (Tex. 

instructions."      See   also,   Pontifex  Civ.    App.),    78    S.    W.    Rep.    253; 

&  Wood  (Lim.)   v.  Hartley  (App.)  Schmidt  v.   Railway  Co.,   90   Wis. 

(1893),  62  L.  J.  Q.  B.   196.  504,  63  N.  W.  Rep.  1057.     See  also 

57.     Michigan         Railroad         v.  §  112. 

Shurtz,    7    Mich.    515;     Moses     v.  58.     Wade    v.    Wheeler,  3    Lans. 

The  Railroad,  4   Foster,    71;    Rog-  201. 

ers    V.    Wheeler,    52     N.     Y.     262;  59.     Dixon   v.  Railway,    110   Ga. 

O'Neil   V.   The  Railroad,   60   N.   Y.  173,    35    S.     E.     Rep.     369,     citing 

138;    Fitchburg,   etc..   Railroad    v.  Hutchinson  on   Carr. 
Hanna,    6    Gray,    539;    Barron     v. 


70  THE  LAW  OF   CARRIERS.  [§  73. 

upon  which  their  transportation  was  suspended,  he  holds  the 
goods  for  immediate  shipment,  and  his  liability  as  a  commoi; 
carrier  at  once  commences.  And  although  he  may  delay  in 
sending  them  forward,  or  for  his  own  convenience  place  them 
temporarily  in  store,  his  liability  as  a  common  carrier  will 
still  remain.^"  But  if  the  warehouseman  or  forwarding  agent 
have  no  interest  in  the  vessel  or  vehicles  by  which  the  goods 
are  to  be  transported  and  no  interest  in  the  freight  to  be 
earned,  he  will  not  be  liable  as  a  common  carrier,  although  he 
take  upon  himself  to  pay  the  expenses  of  the  transportation 
for  which  he  is  to  receive  compensation  from  the  owner  of 
the  goods.^^ 

Sec.  73.  (§64.)  Water-craft,  railways  and  express  com- 
panies are  chief  carriers. — But  by  far  the  greater  part  of  the 
carrying  business  is  now  done  by  sea-going  and  coasting  ves- 
sels, vessels  and  steamboats  upon  lakes  and  rivers,  canal-boats, 
railways  and  express  companies.  These,  in  fact,  except  in 
mere  local  transportation,  have  an  almost  complete  monopoly 

60.  Schmidt  v.  Railway  Co.,  232;  Brown  v.  Denison,  2  Wend. 
supra.  593;    Ackley    v.    Kellogg,    8    Cow. 

Where  the  agent  of  a  steamboat  223;     Stannard    v.    Prince,    64    N. 

company    informed    a    prospective  Y.    300;    Teall    v.    Sears,    9    Barb, 

passenger    that    it    would    be    ad-  317. 

visable  for  her  to  forward  her  If  the  owner  of  goods  deposits 
baggage  to  the  steamer  a  few  them  for  storage  with  a  ware- 
days  in  advance  of  the  time  of  houseman  who  is  also  a  common 
sailing,  and  that  it  would  be  carrier,  and  later  terminates  the 
placed  in  her  stateroom  as  soon  storage  agreement,  pays  the  stor- 
as  received,  and  the  baggage  was  age  charges,  and  orders  the  goods 
sent  as  directed,  but  for  tempo-  to  be  carried  to  his  residence,  the 
rary  convenience  was  placed  in  a  liability  of  common  carrier  com- 
storehouse  where  it  was  destroyed  mences  at  the  time  of  the  accept- 
by  fire,  the  steamship  company  ance  of  the  owner's  order  for 
was  held  responsible  as  a  common  transportation;  and  if  the  goods 
carrier  for  the  loss.  North  Ger-  are  destroyed  by  fire  after  such 
man  Lloyd  S.  S.  Co.  v.  Bullen,  order  is  given,  but  before  deliv- 
111  111.  App.  426.  ery,    the    warehouseman    will     be 

61.  Story  on  Bail.,  §  502;  liable  as  a  common  carrier  for 
Briggs  %■>.  The  Railroad,  6  Allen,  their  loss.  Snelling  v.  Yetter,  49 
246;  Piatt  V.  Hibbard,  7  Cow.  N.  Y.  Supp.  917,  25  App.  Div.  590. 
497;  Roberts  v.  Turner,  12  Johns. 


§  74.]  WHO  IS  A  COMMON  CARRIER.  71 

of  the  carrying  trade,  and  have  become  so  identified  with  the 
business  that  the  very  name  of  common  carrier  suggests  them 
at  once  to  the  mind,  and  the  case  in  which  litigation  should 
arise,  involving  the  duties  and  liabilities  of  the  common  carrier, 
which  did  not  concern  one  of  these,  would  be  exceptional. 

Sec.  74.  (§65.)  Owners  of  ships  are  usually  common  car- 
riers.— Ships  have  always  been  the  great  carriers  in  the  com- 
merce of  the  world;  but  it  was  not  determined  until  the  time 
of  Charles  II.,  in  England,  that  they  were  common  carriers, 
and  liable  as  such.  The  question  there  first  arose  in  the  Court 
of  King's  Bench  in  the  case  of  Morse  v.  Slue,  reported  in  1 
Ventris,  190,  and  it  was  decided,  upon  great  consideration,  as 
we  are  told,  that  the  master  of  the  ship,  although  entirely 
blameless,  was  liable  for  the  goods  which  had  been  intrusted 
to  him  for  carriage,  the  loss  not  having  occurred  by  the  act  of 
God  or  of  the  king's  enemies,  but  from  robbery.  This  judg- 
ment has  never  since  been  questioned  and  has  often  been  recog- 
nized by  courts  of  the  highest  authority  as  incontrovertible 
law.^2  ^Q(j  they  are  liable  as  common  carriers  whether  the 
transportation  be  from  port  to  port  within  the  same  state  or 
country,  or  beyond  the  sea,  at  home  or  abroad.^^  But,  although 
the  owners  of  ships  are  in  general  terms  said  to  be  common 
carriers,  yet  this  is  to  be  understood  with  the  qualification  that 
they  bring  themselves  within  the  terms  of  the  definition  of  a 
common  carrier ;  and  the  question,  whether  common  carrier  or 
not,  when  applied  to  a  ship  as  well  as  when  the  question  is  as 
to  the  character  in  which  any  other  vehicle  of  transportation 
by  water  is  employed,  is  to  be  determined  exactly  upon  the 
same  principles  as  when  the  reference  is  to  a  carrier  by  land ; 

62.     Laveroni      v.      Drury,       8  Propeller   Niagara   v.    Cordes,     21 

Exch.   166;    16  Eng.  L.  &  E.   510;  id.  7;  The  Delaware,  14  Wall.  579; 

Coggs     V.     Bernard,     Ld.      Raym.  The  Maggie  Hammond,  9  id.  435. 
909;    Boson    v.    Sanford,    2    Salk.        63.     Elliott  v.  Rossell,  10  Johns. 

440;    King   v.   Shepherd,   3    Story,  1.     Proprietors    of     ocean    steam- 

349;    Hastings  v.  Pepper,  11  Pick,  ships   are   common   carriers.     Liv- 

41;   Gage  v.  Tirrell,  9  Allen,  299;  erpool    Steam.   Co.   v.   Phenix   Ins. 

Clark   V.   Barnwell,    12   How.   272;  Co.,  129  U.  S.  397. 


72 


THE  LAW   OF   CARRIERS. 


[§75. 


and   every  ship  which   carries  for  hire  is  not  necessarily  a 
common  carrier.^^ 

Sec.  75.  (§66.)  Owners  of  steamboats  and  canal-boats  are 
common  carriers. — Steam  vessels  engaged  in  the  coasting  trade 
and  in  the  navigation  upon  our  bays,  sounds  and  lakes,  are 
also  common  carriers  when  engaged  in  the  carrying  trade  for 
the  general  public,  as  has  been  repeatedly  held.^^  So  steam- 
boats upon  our  navigable  rivers  are  almost  universally  carriers 
of  both  passengers  and  freight,  and  as  to  such  freight  and  the 
baggage  of  their  passengers  they  are  strictly  common  carriers ; 
and  at  least  as  to  such  freight  as  is  usually  carried  by  them, 
they  will  be  considered  conclusively  liable  as  common  car- 
riers.®^    And  owners  of  canal-boats  come  strictly  within  the 


64.  It  is  stated  by  Mr.  Parsons 
in  his  work  on  Shipping,  p.  174, 
and  by  other  authorities,  that  no 
ship  is  a  common  carrier  that  does 
not  ply  regularly  on  some  definite 
route  or  between  certain  termini 
as  a  packet,  and  that  a  general 
ship  is  not  a  common  carrier.  The 
law  has,  however,  been  generally 
assumed  to  be  otherwise.  In  the 
Liver  Alkali  Co.  v.  Johnson,  L.  R. 
9  Exch.  338,  this  point  came  di- 
rectly before  the  court  of  Exche- 
quer Chamber.  The  defendant 
was  a  barge  owner  and  let  out 
vessels  for  the  conveyance  of 
goods  to  any  customers  who  ap- 
plied to  him.  Each  voyage  was 
made  under  a  separate  agreement 
and  a  barge  was  not  let  to  more 
than  one  person.  The  defendant 
did  not  ply  between  any  fixed  ter- 
mini, but  the  customer  fixed  in 
each  particular  case  the  points  of 
arrival  and  departure;  and  it  was 
held,  affirming  the  judgment  of 
the  Court  of  Exchequer  (L.  R.  7 
Exch.  267),  that  the  defendant 
had  incurred  the  liability  of  a 
common   carrier   and    was    liable 


though  the  goods  were  lost  with- 
out any  fault  on  his  part. 

65.  Schooner  Reeside,  2  Sum- 
ner, 567;  Crosby  v.  Fitch,  12  Conn. 
410;  McClure  v.  Hammond,  1  Bay. 
99;  Sch'r  Emma  Johnson,  1 
Sprague,  527;  Oakey  v.  Russell, 
18  Mar.  (La.)  58;  Parker  v. 
Flagg,  26  Me.  181;  The  Propeller 
Commerce,  1  Black,  582;  The  Ni- 
agara V.  Cordes,  21  How.  26;  Clark 
V.  Barnwell,  12  id.  272;  The  Com- 
mander-in-Chief, 1  Wall.  51;  Hast- 
ings V.  Pepper,  11  Pick.  41. 

66.  Citizens'  Bank  v.  The  Nan- 
tucket S.  B.  Co.,  3  Story,  16; 
Jencks  v.  Coleman,  2  Sumner,  221; 
Gilmore  v.  Carman,  1  Sm.  &  M. 
279;  McGregor  v.  Kilgore,  6  Ohio, 
358;  Bowman  v.  Hilton,  11  id. 
303;  McArthur  v.  Sears,  21  Wend. 
190;  Dunseth  v.  Wade,  2  Scam. 
285;  Hart  v.  Allen,  2  Watts,  114; 
Harrington  v.  M'Shane,  id.  443; 
Warden  v.  Greer,  6  id.  424;  Par- 
dee V.  Drew,  25  Wend.  459;  Por- 
terfield  v.  Humphreys,  8  Humph. 
497;  Kirtland  v.  Montgomery,  1 
Swan,  452;  Swindler  v.  Hilliard, 
2  Rich.  286;   Hollister  v.  Nowlen, 


§76. 


WHO  IS  A  COMMON  CARRIER. 


73 


rule,  if  they  carry  for  all  persons,  indifferently,  for  liire,^^  but 
they  may  show  that  they  were  merely  private  carriers.^s 

Sec.  76.    (§  67.)    Railroad  companies  are  common  carriers. 

Railroad  companies  are,  by  their  very  nature  and  organic 
character,  common  carriers,  whether  made  so  by  the  general 
statute  or  by  their  charters,  or  not;  and  whenever  they  are 
made  so  by  the  express  provisions  of  a  law,  such  provisions 
will  be  considered  as  merely  declaratory  of  the  law  as  it 
already  existed,'^^  and  will  neither  increase  their  duties  and 
obligations  nor  in  any  respect  qualify  their  liability.  They 
have  sometimes  attempted  to  defend  themselves  from  liability 
by  disputing  the  proposition  that  they  were  common  carriers, 
but  the  contention  has  received  no  countenance  from  the  cojirts, 
and  it  has  been  held  in  many  cases,  for  reasons  peculiarly 
applicable  to  them,  that,  as  carriers  of  both  passengers  and 
freight,  the  rules  as  to  the  responsibility  of  common  carriers 
and  of  passenger  carriers  should  be  applied  to  them  with  full 


19  Wend.  234;  Cole  v.  Goodwin,  id. 
251;  Hale  v.  The  N.  J.  Nav.  Co., 
15  Conn.  539;  Jones  v.  Pitcher,  3 
Stew.  &  P.  136;  Sprowl  v.  Kellar, 
4  id.  382;  Powell  v.  Myers,  26 
Wend.  591;  Reed  v.  Steamboat 
Co.,  1  Marr  (Del.),  193,  40  Atl. 
Rep.  955. 

67.  Hyde  v.  The  Trent  Nav 
Co.,  5  T.  R.  389;  The  Trent  Nav. 
Co.  V.  Wood,  3  Esp.  127;  Harring- 
ton V.  Lyles,  2  Nott  &  McCord,  88; 
Williams  v.  Branson,  1  Murph. 
417;  Fuller  v.  Bradley,  25  Pa.  St. 
120;  Spencer  v.  Daggett,  2  Vt.  92; 
De  Mott  V.  Laraway,  14  Wend. 
225;  Arnold  v.  Hallenbake,  5  id. 
33;  Parsons  v.  Hardy,  14  id.  215; 
Bowman  v.  Teal,  23  id.  306; 
Humphreys  v.  Reed,  6  Whart. 
435;   Fish  v.  Clark,  49  N.  Y.  122. 

68.  See  post,  §  89. 

69.  Thompson,  etc..  Electric 
Co.  V.  Simon,  20  Or.  60,  25  Pac. 
Rep.  147,  23  Am.  St.  Rep.  86,  10  L. 


R.   A.   251,  citing  Hutchinson    on 
Carr. 

In  the  case  of  the  Chicago,  etc., 
R.  R.  V.  Thompson,  19  111.  578,  in 
which  the  defendant  was  sued  for 
the  loss  of  bank  bills  delivered  to 
it  for  carriage,  it  was  contended 
that  neither  the  charter  of  the 
road  nor  any  other  law  of  the 
state  made  it  a  common  carrier 
for  any  purpose,  and  certainly 
not  one  for  the  carriage  of  bank 
bills.  But  the  court  said  in  reply 
to  this  objection,  "We  suppose  it 
is  not  necessary  that  the  charter 
should  provide  in  so  many  words 
that  the  railroad  created  by  it 
shall  be  a  common  carrier.  The 
authorities  are  numerous  to  the 
point  that  such  companies,  using 
cars  for  the  purpose  of  carrying 
goods  for  all  persons  indifferently 
for  hire,  and  whose  custom  and 
uniform  practice  is  to  do  so,  are 
common   carriers    and    liable    as 


74  THE  LAW   OF   CARRIERS.  [§76. 

force.  Being  recognized  as  public  utilities  as  well  as  private 
enterprises,  extensive  rights  and  franchises  have  been  con- 
ferred upon  them  which  are  not  enjoyed  by  other  carriers, 
among  these  being  the  right  to  invoke  the  power  of  eminent 
domain.  Not  only  have  they  been  fostered  by  the  government, 
but  by  reason  of  aggregation  of  capital  and  the  great  facili- 
ties which  they  control  for  the  transportation  of  all  the  com- 
modities of  commerce,  they  have  practically  monopolized  the 
laud  carriage  of  the  country.  It  is  but  just,  therefore,  that  in 
their  dealings  with  the  public,  whether  as  carriers  of  goods  or 
of  passengers,  they  should  be  held  to  that  strict  accountability 
which  the  public  safety  and  policy  require.  As  said  by  Shaw, 
C.  J.,  in  Norway  Plains  Company  v.  The  Railroad,'^^'  "that  rail- 
road companies  are  authorized  by  law  to  make  roads  as  public 
highways,  to  lay  down  tracks,  place  cars  upon  them  and  carry 
goods  for  hire,  are  circumstances  which  bring  them  within  all 
the  rules  of  the  common  law  and  make  them  eminently  com- 
mon carriers.  Their  iron  roads,  though  built  in  the  first  in- 
stance by  individual  capital,  are  yet  regarded  as  public  roads, 
required  by  common  convenience  and  necessity,  and  their 
allowance  by  public  authority  can  only  be  justified  on  that 
ground.  .  .  .  Being  liable  as  common  carriers  the  rule  of 
the  common  law  attaches  to  them,  that  they  are  liable  for 
losses  occurring  from  any  accident  which  may  befall  the  goods 
during  the  transit,  except  those  arising  from  the  act  of  God 
or  a  public  enemy."  And  thus  the  law  has  been  everywhere 
held  with  the  most  perfect  unanimity.'^i 

such.     There  can  be  no  doubt  on  Y.   524;    Contra  Costa,  etc.,  R.  R. 

this  point."  v.    Moss,    23    Cal.    323;    Elkins    v. 

70.  1  Gray,  263,  The  Railroad,  3  Foster,  275;  East 

71.  Thomas  v.  The  Boston,  Tennessee,  etc.,  R.  R.  v.  Nelson, 
etc.,  R.  R.,  10  Met.  472;  Rogers  1  Cold.  272;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Queen 
Locomotive  Works  v.  The  Rail-  City  Coal  Co.,  13  Ken.  Law  Rep. 
road,  5  C.  E.  Green  (N.  J.),  379;  832;  Memphis  News  Publishing 
Fuller  V.  The  Railway,  21  Conn.  Co.  v.  Railway  Co.,  110  Tenn.  396, 
570;  Jones  v.  The  Railroad,  27  Vt.  75  S.  W.  Rep.  941,  63  L.  R.  A. 
399;  Noyes  v.  The  Railroad,  id.  150,  citing  Hutchinson  on  Carr. 
110;  Root  V.  The  Railroad,  45  N. 


§  77.]  WHO  IS  A  COMMON  CARRIER.  75 

The  fact  that  the  road  is  not  yet  fully  completed  and  for- 
mally opened  for  business  will  not  relieve  the  company,  where 
it  has  actually  undertaken  to  carry  in  the  usual  way  J  2  ^\jni  a 
private  individual  operating  the  road  is  a  common  carrier,  the 
same  as  a  corporation  would  beJ^  But,  as  has  been  seen,  a 
railroad  company  is  not  liable  as  a  common  carrier  where,  by 
special  agreement,  it  undertakes  to  carry  something  which  it 
is  not  its  business  to  carry,'-*  or  where  it  departs  from  the 
usual  method  of  doing  business  J  ^ 

Sec.  77.  (§  67a.)  Railroad  receivers,  trustees,  etc.,  are  com- 
mon carriers. — So  where  the  railroad  has  passed  out  of  the 
control  of  the  company  and  has  come  under  the  custody  and 
management  of  some  official  representative,  as  a  receiver,  or 
a  trustee  for  bondholders,  who  operates  and  controls  it,  such 
receiver'''^  or  trustee'''"  is  liable  as  a  common  carrier. 

Sec.  78.     (§  67b.)     Street  railways  are  common  carriers. — 

Street  railways  are  common  carriers  of  passengers.'^**  They  are 
also  chargeable  as  common  carriers  of  goods  and  merchandise 
where  they  have  also  assumed  the  business  of '  transporting 
goods  for  hireJ^ 

Sec.  79.  (§  67c.)  Sleeping  and  parlor-car  companies  not 
common  carriers. — As  will  be  seen  in  later  sections,  sleeping 

72.  Little  Rock,  etc..  R.  R.  v.  77.  Faulkner  v.  Hart,  44  N.  Y. 
Glidewell,  39  Ark.  487,  A  belt  Superior  Ct.  471;  Sprague  v. 
line,  engaged  in  switching  trains  Smith,  29  Vt.  421;  Rogers  v.  Whee- 
on  its  own  road  from  a  station  to  ler,  2  Lans.  486;  43  N.  Y.  598. 
neighboring  stockyai'ds,  held  to  78.  Citizens  Ry.  Co.  v.  Twi- 
be  doing  more  than  a  mere  switch-  name.  111  Ind.  587;  Spellman  v. 
ing  business,  and  to  be  a  common  Transit  Co.,  36  Neb.  890,  55  N.  W. 
carrier.  Fleming  v.  Railroad  Co.,  Rep.  270,  38  Am.  St.  Rep.  753,  20 
89  Mo.  App.  129.  L.  R.  A.  316;  Pray  v.  Railroad  Co., 

73.  Davis  v.  Button,  78  Cal.  44  Neb.  167,  62  N.  W.  Rep.  447,  48 
247.  Am.  St.  Rep.  717;   Railway  Co.  v. 

74.  See  ante,  §  59.  Godola,  50  Neb.  906,  70  N.  W.  Rep. 

75.  See  ante,  §  60.  491. 

76.  Blumenthal  v.  Brainerd,  38  79.  Levi  v.  Railroad  Co.,  11 
Vt.  402;   Paige  v.  Smith,  99  Mass.  Allen,  300. 

395;    Nichols  V.   Smith,   115  Mass. 
332. 


76  THE  LAW  OF   CARRIERS.  [§  80. 

and  parlor-car  companies  are  not  liable  as  common  carriers  or 
as  inn-keepers.^" 

For  the  purpose,  however,  of  the  Interstate  Commerce  Act, 
as  amended  June  29,  1906,  sleeping  and  parlor-car  companies 
are  defined  as  common  carriers. 

Sec,  80.    (§68.)    Express  companies  are  common  carriers. — 

With  equal  unanimity,  it  has  been  held  that  express  companies 
are  common  carriers  of  such  goods  and  parcels  as  they,  in  their 
line  of  business,  undertake  to  carry.  "There  are  considera- 
tions," said  the  court  in  Stadhecker  v.  Combs,^!  justifying  a 
strict  application  of  the  law  of  common  carriers  to  express 
companies.  They  profess  to  employ  trusty  agents,  who  are 
charged  with  the  safe  custody  and  speedy  transit  and  delivery 
of  all  packages  put  in  their  charge.  The  effect  of  these  in- 
ducements is  in  some  measure  to  supersede  the  forwarding 
merchant,  and  to  limit  the  liability  of  railroad  and  steamboat 
companies,  who  may  be  as  faithful,  and  are  certainly  as  re- 
sponsible, agents.  If  they  shall,  by  the  promise  of  decided 
advantages  over  the  usual  modes  of  transportation,  secure 
most  of  the  business  generally  intrusted  to  common  carriers, 
the  public  is  concerned  that  they  should  be  held  to  a  rigid 
fulfillment  of  the  promise.  They  cannot  attain  a  greater  speed 
than  the  railro8.d  or  steamboat  which  conveys  them,  and  there 
is  no  proof  that  they  are,  in  other  respects,  more  trustworthy. 
The  only  advantage  which  in  truth  they  can  offer  is  the  safer 
custody  and  more  certain  delivery  of  goods  to  the  consignee 
without  storage.  These  temptations  may  induce  the  public  to 
employ  them  at  an  increased  rate,  and  they  have  no  reason 
to  complain  of  an  exact  application  of  the  rule  of  law  which 
enforces  the  responsibility  which  they  voluntarily  assume. 
We  should  be  regardless  of  the  great  interests  daily  com- 
mitted by  the  public  to  the  express  companies,  with  a  confi- 
dence induced  by  their  tempting  offers,  if  their  liability  for 
the  safe  carriage  and  delivery  is  not  rigorously  enforced.  "^- 

80.  See  post,  §  1130,  et  seg.  82.     And  see  to  the  same  effect, 

81.  9  Rich.  (L.  R.)   193.  Southern  Express  Co.  v.  Crook,  44 


§  81.]  WHO  IS  A  COMMON  CARRIER.  77 

Sec.  81.  (§  69.)  Same  subject — Peculiarities  of  their  busi- 
ness.— Express  companies,  however,  conduct  their  business  in 
a  manner  somewhat  different  from  that  pursued  by  other  car- 
riers. Instead  of  providing  their  own  conveyances,  they,  ex- 
cept for  the  purpose  of  local  delivery,  employ  the  conveyances 
of  other  carriers,  such  as  steamboats  and  railroads,  for  the  car- 
riage of  their  freight,  and,  when  they  employ  the  agency  of 
railways  in  their  traffic,  they  forward  their  parcels,  not  by  the 
ordinary  freight  trains  of  such  roads,  but  by  those  used  for 
more  expeditious  transit,  which  constitutes  one  of  the  principal 
advantages  offered  by  them.  Expedition,  promptness,  and  the 
greater  security  they  are  thought  to  afford,  from  the  fact  that 
the  goods  intrusted  to  them  are  supposed  to  be  under  the 
watchful  care  and  direct  supervision  of  their  agents  from  the 
moment  of  their  reception  until  their  final  delivery,  are  the 
great  inducements  to  their  employment.  They  are,  moreover, 
as  we  shall  hereafter  see,  bound  to  a  personal  delivery  of  the 
goods  intrusted  to.  them  for  carriage,  a  requirement  which  is 
not  now  exacted  of  any  of  the  other  principal  carriers  of 
goods. 

Sec.  82.  (§70.)  Same  subject — Attempts  to  secure  exemp- 
tion.— Because  of  this  peculiarity  in  the  employment  of  the 
means  of  conveyance  afforded  by  others,  the  contention  has 
been  made  by  these  companies  that  they  were  not  common  car- 
riers, but  transacted  their  business  in  the  character  of  for- 

Ala.   468;    Gulliver  v.  The  Adams  Tex.  639;   Gait  v.  Adams  Ex.  Co., 

Ex.  Co.,  38  111.  503;   Southern  Ex.  4  MacA.   124;    Bernstine  v.  Union 

Co.  V.  Newby,  36  Ga.  635;   South-  Ex.  Co.,  40  Ohio  St.  451;  Wells  v. 

ern  Ex.  Co.  v.  Womack,  1  Heisk.  American   Ex.    Co.,    55     Wis.     23; 

256;  U.  S.  Ex.  Co.  v.  Backman,  28  United    States  v.   Pacific   Ex.   Co., 

Ohio    St.    144;    Grogan   v.   Adams  15    Fed.   Rep.   867;    United   States 

Ex.  Co.,  114  Pa.  St.  523;  Southern  Ex.    Co.    v.    Root,    47    Mich.    231; 

Ex.    Co.   V.   Glenn,     16     Lea,    472;  Adams    Ex.    Co.   v.    McConnell,    27 

Bardwell  v.  American  Ex.  Co.,  35  Kans.  238;  Hadd  v.  United  States 

Minn.   344;    Bennett    v.    Northern  Ex.  Co.,  52  Vt.  335;   Southern  Ex. 

Ex.  Co.,  12  Ore.  49;  Overland  Ex.  Co.    v.    Van    Meter,    17    Fla.    783; 

Co.  V.  Carroll,  7  Col.  43;   Mather  Boscowitz  v.  Adams  Ex.  Co.,  93  111. 

V.    American    Ex.    Co.,    138    Mass.  523;    American  Ex.  Co.  v.  Smith, 

55;   Pacific  Ex.  Co.  v.  Darnell,  02  33   Ohio   St.   511. 


THE  LAW  OF   CARRIERS. 


[§  82. 


warders  and  were  not  therefore  liable  for  losses  occurring  from 
the  negligence  of  those  whom  they  thus  employed.  But  this 
claim  to  exemption  from  the  ordinary  liabilities  of  common 
carriers  has  not  been  sustained  by  the  courts.  These  subsidiary 
means  of  transportation  are  held  to  be  the  mere  agencies  em- 
ployed by  such  companies,  for  whose  acts  they  are  strictly 
responsible;^  and  the  carrier  whose  vehicle  is  thus  used  be- 


1.  This  argument  was  thus  dis- 
posed of  in  Buckland  v.  The 
Adams  Ex.  Co.,  97  Mass.  124: 
"The  name  or  style  under  which 
they  assume  to  carry  is  wholly 
immaterial.  The  real  nature  of 
their  occupation  and  of  the  legal 
duties  and  obligations  which  it 
Imposes  on  them  is  to  be  ascer- 
tained from  a  consideration  of 
the  kind  of  service  which  they 
hold  themselves  out  to  the  pub- 
lic as  ready  to  render  to  those 
who  may  have  occasion  to  employ 
them.  Upon  this  point  there  is 
no  room  for  doubt.  They  exercise 
the  employment  of  receiving,  car- 
rying and  delivering  goods,  wares 
and  merchandise  for  hire  on  be- 
half of  all  persons  who  may  see 
fit  to  require  their  services.  In 
this  capacity  they  take  property 
from  the  custody  of  the  owner, 
assume  entire  control  of  it,  trans- 
port it  from  place  to  place,  and 
deliver  it  at  a  point  of  destination 
to  some  consignee  or  agent  there 
authorized   to   receive   it.     .    .     . 

"But  it  is  urged  on  behalf  of 
the  defendants  that  they  ought 
not  to  be  held  to  the  strict  lia- 
bility of  a  common  carrier,  for 
the  reason  that  the  contract  of 
carriage  is  essentially  modified  by 
the  peculiar  mode  in  which  de- 
fendants undertake  the  perform- 
ance of  the  service.  The  main 
ground   on  which    this    argument 


rests  is  that  persons  exercising 
the  employment  of  express  car- 
riers or  messengers  over  railroads 
and  by  steamboats  cannot,  from 
the  very  nature  of  the  case,  exer- 
cise any  care  or  control  over  the 
means  of  transportation  which 
they  are  obliged  to  adopt;  that 
the  carriages  and  boats  in  which 
the  merchandise  intrusted  to  them 
is  placed,  and  the  agents  or  ser- 
vants by  whom  they  are  selected, 
are  not  managed  by  them  nor 
subject  to  their  direction  or  super- 
vision; and  that  the  rules  of  the 
common  law  regulating  the  du- 
ties and  liabilities  of  carriers, 
having  been  adapted  to  a  different 
mode  of  conducting  business,  by 
which  the  carrier  was  enabled  to 
select  his  own  servants  and  ve- 
hicles and  to  exercise  a  personal 
care  and  oversight  over  them,  are 
wholly  inapplicable  to  a  contract 
of  carriage  by  which  it  is  under- 
stood between  the  parties  that  the 
service  is  to  be  performed  in  part, 
at  least,  by  means  of  agencies 
over  which  the  carrier  can  exer- 
cise no  management  or  control 
whatever.  But  this  argument, 
though  specious,  is  unsound.  Its 
fallacy  consists  in  the  assumption 
that,  at  common  law,  in  the  ab- 
sence of  express  stipulation,  the 
contract  with  an  owner  or  con- 
signor of  goods  delivered  to  a  car- 
rier for  transportation  necessarily 


§82.] 


WHO  IS  A  COMMON  CARRIER, 


7a 


implies  that  they  are  to  be  car- 
ried by  the  party  with  whom  the 
contract  is  made,  or  by  the  ser- 
vants or  agents  under  his  imme- 
diate direction  and  control.  But 
such  is  not  the  undertaking  of 
the  carrier.  The  essence  of  the 
contract  is  that  the  goods  are  to 
be  carried  to  their  destination,  un- 
less the  fulfillment  of  this  under- 
taking is  prevented  by  the  act  of 
God  or  the  public  enemy.  This, 
indeed,  is  the  whole  contract, 
whether  the  goods  are  to  be  car- 
ried by  land  or  water,  by  the  car- 
rier himself  or  by  agents  em- 
ployed by  him.  The  contract  does 
not  imply  a  personal  trust  which 
can  be  executed  only  by  the  con- 
tracting party  himself,  or  under 
his  supervision  by  agents  and 
means  of  transportation  directly 
and  absolutely  within  his  control. 
Long  before  the  discovery  of 
steam  power,  a  carrier  who  un- 
dertook to  convey  merchandise 
from  one  point  to  another  was 
authorized  to  perform  the  service 
through  agents  exercising  an  inde- 
pendent employment,  which  they 
carried  on  by  the  use  of  their  own 
vehicles  and  under  the  exclusive 
care  of  their  own  servants.  It 
certainly  never  was  supposed  that  a 
person  who  agreed  to  carry  goods 
from  one  place  to  another,  by 
means  of  wagons  or  stages,  could 
escape  liability  for  the  safe  car- 
riage of  the  property  over  any 
part  of  the  designated  route  by 
•showing  that  the  loss  had  hap- 
pened at  a  time  when  the  goods 
were  placed  by  him  in  vehicles 
which  he  did  not  own,  or  which 
were  under  the  charge  of  agents 
whom  he  did  not  select  or  control. 
The  truth  is  that  the  particular 
mode  or  agency  by  which  the  serv- 


ice is  to  be  performed  does  not 
enter  into  the  contract  of  car- 
riage with  the  owner  or  con- 
signor." 

The  same  question  was  involved 
and  settled  in  the  same  way  in 
the  case  of  The  Bank  of  Ken- 
tucky V.  The  Adams  Express  Co., 
3  Otto  (93  U.  S.  R.),  174.  In  this 
case,  however,  the  question  was 
decided  the  other  way  in  the  cir- 
cuit court  by  Ballard,  J.  (Cen. 
Law  Journal  1874,  p.  436).  But 
his  judgment  was  reversed  on  er- 
ror. So  in  Hersfield  v.  Adams,  l<.) 
Barb.  577,  this  argument  for  the 
express  carrier  prevailed  with  the 
court,  and  it  was  held  that,  hav- 
ing no  vehicles  of  his  own  by 
which  the  transportation  could  be 
effected,  and  this  being  known  to 
the  sender  of  the  goods,  the  em- 
ployment of  the  means  of  other 
carriers  relieved  the  carrier  who 
had  undertaken  the  forwarding  of 
the  goods  from  responsibility  as 
a  common  carrier  to  their  owner. 
But  this  is  inconsistent  with  the 
holding  of  the  same  court  in  Rus- 
sell V.  Livingston,  19  Barb.  346, 
and  was  rightly  denied  to  be  the 
law  in  Place  v.  The  Union  Express 
Co.,  2  Hilton,  27.  And  see  U.  S. 
Express  Co.  v.  Backman,  supra; 
Transportation  Co.  v.  Bloch,  86 
Tenn.  392. 

An  express  company,  undertak- 
ing to  carry  live  stock  in  cars  fur- 
nished by  it,  and  which  employs 
a  railroad  company  for  the  pur- 
pose of  transporting  the  cars,  be- 
comes responsible  for  the  negli- 
gence of  the  subsidiary  agencies 
employed.  American  Express  Co. 
V.  Ogles  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  81  S. 
W.  Rep.  1023,  citing  Hutchinson 
on  Carr. 


go  THE  LAW   OF    CARRIERS.  [§  83. 

comes  likewise  liable,  upon  the  principles  of  agency,  to  the 
owner  of  the  goods,  according  to  the  terms  of  his  contract 
with  his  employer.2 

Sec.  83.  (§71.)  Same  subject. — Cannot  escape  liability  by 
assuming  name  of  "forwarders." — These  carriers  have  also 
attempted  to  escape  from  their  liability  as  common  carriers  by 
assuming  the  name  of  forwarders,  and  by  contracting  to  convey 
the  goods  in  that  character.  But  in  this  attempt  they  have 
likewise  failed;  and  it  has  been  held  that,  when  they 
undertake  the  carriage  of  parcels,  it  will  make  no  difference 
under  what  name  or  assumed  title  they  may  have  done  so. 
The  law,  regardless  of  forms  or  names,  will  look  a,t  the  real 
transaction,  and  if  the  contract  be  in  fact  one  for  the  trans- 
portation and  delivery  of  the  goods  to  a  consignee,  no  matter 
through  what  agencies  it  is  to  be  effected,  the  undertaking  will 
be  construed  as  that  of  a  common  carrier.^ 

Sec.  84.  (§  72.)  Same  subject — Nor  by  assuming  name  of 
"dispatch  company,"  "fast  freight  line,"  etc. — Other  carriers 
under  the  names  of  dispatch  companies/  fast  freight  lines^  and 
the  like,  have  also  come  into  existence,  which  conduct  their 
business  upon  the  same  principle  as  express  companies,  that  is, 
by  the  employment  of  the  means  of  transportation  furnished  to 
them  by  others,  and  to  which,  for  the  same  reasons^  the  same 
rigid  rule  of  responsibility  as  common  carriers  is  applied.  "We 
cannot  close  our  eyes,"  says  the  court  in  The  Bank  of  Ken- 

2.  New  Jersey  S.  Nav.  Co.  v.  Disp.  Co.,  45  Iowa,  470;  Stewart 
Merchants'  Bank,  6  How.  344.  v.  Merchants'  Disp.  Co.,  47   Iowa, 

3.  Christenson  v.  The  Am.  Ex.  229;  Wilde  v.  Merchants'  Disp. 
Co.,  15  Minn.  270;  Read  v.  Spald-  Co.,  47  Iowa,  247;  Bancroft  v. 
ing,  5  Bosw.  404;  Southern  Ex.  Merchants'  Disp.  Co.,  47  Iowa, 
Co.  V.  McVeigh,  20  Gratt.  264;  262;  Merchants'  Disp.  Co.  v. 
Bank  of  Kentucky  v.  Adams  Ex.  Bolles,  80  111.  473;  Merchants' 
Co.,  93  U.  S.  174.  Disp.    Co.    v.   Leysor,    89     111.     43; 

4.  Dispatch  companies  are  Merchants'  Disp.  Co.  v.  Joesting, 
common  carriers.     Transportation  89  111.  152. 

Co.  V.  Bloch,  86  Tenn.  392;  Mer-  5.  Fast  freight  lines  are  com- 
chants'  Disp.  Co.  r.  Cornforth,  3  mon  carriers.  Read  v.  Spaulding, 
Col.   280;   Robinson  v.  Merchants'     5  Bosw.  395. 


§85.]  WHO  IS  A  COMMON  CARRIER.  81 

cucky  V.  The  Adams  Express  Conipany,^  "to  the  well-known 
course  of  business  in  the  country.  Over  many  of  our  railroads, 
the  contracts  for  the  transportation  of  goods  are  made,  not 
with  the  owners  of  the  roads,  nor  with  the  railroad  companies 
themselves,  but  with  transportation  agencies  or  companies 
which  have  arrangements  with  the  railroad  companies  for  the 
carriage.  In  this  manner,  some  of  the  responsibilities  of  com- 
mon carriage  are  often  sought  to  be  evaded;  but  in  vain. 
Public  policy  demands  that  the  right  of  the  owners  to  absolute 
security  against  the  negligence  of  the  carrier  and  of  all  per- 
sons engaged  in  performing  the  carrier's  duty  shall  not  be 
taken  away  by  any  reservation  in  the  carrier's  receipt,  or  by 
any  arrangement  between  him  and  the  performing  company.'' 
And  in  the  case  of  J.  H.  Cowie  Glove  Co.  v.  Merchants'  Dis- 
patch Transportation  Co.^  it  is  said:  "To  constitute  a  common 
carrier,  it  is  not  essential  that  the  person  or  corporation  under- 
taking such  service  own  the  means  of  transportation.  If  the 
contract  is  that  the  goods  will  be  carried  and  delivered,  it 
makes  the  one  so  contracting  a  common  carrier,  regardless  of 
the  name  or  the  ownership  of  the  line  or  lines  over  which  the 
service  extends." 

Sec.  85.  (§73.)  Special  circumstances  under  which  carrier 
not  deemed  to  be  common  carrier. — But  it  is  not  to  be  assumed 
that  in  all  these  cases  the  ship,  the  steamboat  or  other  kind  of 
carrier  mentroned  is  necessarily  and  at  all  events  to  be  held 
liable  as  a  common  carrier  for  a  failure  safely  to  transport  and 
deliver  whatever  may  be  intrusted  to  it.  Many  of  them  will 
be  presumed  to  be  common  carriers.  Courts  will  take  notice 
judicially  of  the  fact  that  the  owners  of  ships,  railroads,  steam- 
boats, and  all  others  whose  business  it  is  universally  known  is 
to  carry  goods  for  hire,  are  common  carriers  of  certain  classes 
of  goods,  and  no  proof  will  be  required  to  establish  such  fact.** 
But  it  will  not  be  presumed  that  the  owners  of  a  stage  line  are 

6.  93  U.  S.  174.  tice   that   railway   companies    are 

7.  — Iowa,  —  106  N.  W.  Rep.  common  carriers.  Boyle  v.  Rail- 
749.  way    Co.,    13    Wash.    383,    43    Pac. 

8.  Courts  will  take  judicial  no-    Rep.   344. 
6 


82  THE  LAW   OF    CARRIERS,  [§86. 

common  carriers  as  to  goods  generally,  because  it  is  well 
Imowu  that  such  lines  are  intended  generally  for  the  carriage 
of  passengers  and  not  of  goods.  In  order,  therefore,  to  fix 
upon  them  the  liability  of  common  carriers  for  anything  ex- 
cept the  baggage  of  their  passengers,  it  must  be  shown  that 
by  usage,  or  by  their  holding  themselves  out  as  such,  the  pub- 
lic is  justified  in  so  regarding  them.  And  even  as  to  such  car- 
riers as  are  prima  facie  public  or  common  carriers,  it  may  be 
shown  that,  in  the  particular  instance  or  under  the  circum- 
stances of  the  case,  they  did  not  undertake  to  transport  and 
are  not  liable  as  common  carriers.^  It  may  be  shown,  for  in- 
stance, that  the  goods  were  carried  by  the  ship  under  a  char- 
ter-party giving  to  the  hirer  its  whole  capacity ;  in  which  event 
the  owner  would  not  be  a  common  carrier,  but  a  bailee  to 
transport  as  a  private  carrier  for  hire.^"  Or  if  the  owner  em- 
ploy his  vessel  in  his  own  business  and  exclusively  on  his  own 
private  account,  and  for  accommodation  takes  goods  on  board 
to  be  carried,  although  it  may  be  for  hire,  he  will  not  be 
deemed  a  common  carrier.^  ^ 

Sec.  86.  (§74.)  Same  subject — Illustrations. — Where  an 
attempt  was  made  to  hold  the  owners  of  a  steamboat  liable  for 
money  or  bank  bills  delivered  to  the  clerk  of  the  boat  to  be 
carried  to  another  point  on  the  river,  it  was  said  that  they 
could  not  be  held  liable.  It  was  conceded  that  they  were  com- 
mon carriers  as  to  goods  and  passengers,  and  while  money  and 
bank  bills  were  admitted  to  be  goods  in  a  certain  sense  and  for 
certain  purposes,  they  were  not  ordinarily  so  considered,  it  was 
said,  and  the  ordinary  carrier  of  goods  could  not  be  presumed 
to  be  a  carrier  as  to  them.  And  the  question  was  asked.  Would 
the  owners  have  been  liable  to  an  action  if  the  clerk  had  re- 
fused to  take  the  money.^^  And,  in  several  cases  in  which  it 
appeared  that  steamboat  companies  had  been  incorporated  for 

9.  Railroad  Co.  v.  Wallace,  66  10.  Lamb  v.  Parkman,  1 
Fed.    .506,    14    C.    C.    A.   257,    24   U.      Sprague,   343. 

S.  App.  589,  30  L.  R.  A.  161,  citing         11.     Allen    v.    Sackrider,    37    N. 
Hutchinson  on  Carr.  Y.  341;  Story  on  Bail.  §  501. 

12.    Lee  v.  Burgess,  9  Bush,  652. 


86.] 


WHO  IS  A  COilMON  CARRIER. 


83 


the  transportation  of  "goods,  wares  and  merchandise,"  it  lias 
been  held  that  the  companies  were  not  liable  for  packages  of 
money  or  bank  bills,  they  not  being  goods,  wares  or  merchan- 
dise, unless  the  liability  could  be  imposed  by  showing  that,  by 
usage  and  custom,  the  carriage  of  such  packages  had  grown  to 
be  a  part  of  their  business.^^  But  where  such  usage  is  shown, 
the  owners  of  the  boat  may  be  held  liable.^  ^ 


13.  Sewall  r.  Allen,  6  Wend. 
346;  Citizens'  Bank  v.  The  Nan- 
tucket S.  B.  Co.,  2  Story,  33. 

14.  Kirtland  v.  Montgomery,  1 
Swan  452;  Hosea  v.  McCrory,  12 
Ala.  349. 

In  Cincinnati,  etc..  Mail  Co.  v. 
Boal,  15  Ind.  345,  it  was  shown 
to  have  been  long  a  custom  for 
the  clerks  of  the  boats  of  the  line 
to  carry  packages  of  money  from 
one  port  to  another,  without  com- 
pensation, further  than  the  expec 
tation  that  for  the  favor  thus  con- 
ferred the  boat  would  be  pre- 
ferred for  freight,  in  case  the 
package  was  accompanied  by  an 
order  for  goods;  but  it  was  held 
that  the  boat  owners  were  not 
liable  for  the  loss  of  such  pack- 
ages because  there  was  no  fixed 
or  certain  remuneration,  nor  that 
any  could  be  recovered;  and  be- 
cause it  did  not  appear  that  the 
custom  of  carrying  such  packages 
had  grown  up  with  the  knowledge 
of  the  owners,  or  was  other  than 
a  mere  accommodation  usage. 

This  question  as  to  the  liability 
of  the  owners  of  steamboats  for 
money  packages  intrusted  to  of 
ficers  of  the  boat  for  carriage  has 
been  several  times  before  the  su 
preme  court  of  Missouri,  which 
has  uniformly  declined  to  hold 
such  owners  liable,  because  no 
well-known  or  established  usage 
for  such  boats  to  carry  money  or 


bank-notes  for  compensation  as 
was  necessary  to  fix  the  liability 
upon  the  owners  was  proven.  In 
Whitemore  v.  The  S.  B.  Caroline, 
20  Mo.  513,  the  language  used  was 
that  the  evidence  showed  "what 
usually  appears  in  actions  of  this 
sort — that  persons  are  willing  to 
have  their  money  carried  as  a 
favor,  and  at  the  same  time  to 
hold  the  boat  liable  for  its  loss. 
Freight  or  money  must  be  propor- 
tioned to  the  risk  assumed.  No 
owner  of  a  boat  would  permit  her 
to  carry  money  without  a  reward 
compensating  for  the  risk  if  he 
was  aware  that  he  would  be  liable 
in  the  event  of  loss.  Persons  use 
the  captains  or  clerks  of  steam- 
boats to  carry  money  gratuitously, 
and  hire  is  never  heard  of  until 
the  money  is  lost,  and  then  some 
person  is  hunted  up  to  prove  that 
some  time  in  the  course  of  his 
life  he  carried  money  on  a  steam- 
boat for  hire,  and  this  is  showing 
a  usage.  If  boats  would  invari- 
ably charge  a  compensating  hire 
for  carrying  money,  and  this  was 
universally  known,  the  business 
of  carrying  money  by  boats  would 
soon  be  at  an  end.  Persons  can- 
not trust  money  with  clerks,  to  be 
carried  as  a  favor,  and  afterwards, 
when  the  money  is  lost,  be  per- 
mitted to  show  that  it  was  to  be 
transported  for  hire.  This  thing 
of  hire  is  scarcely  ever  heard    of 


84  THE  LAW  OF   CARRIERS.  [§  87. 

Sec.  87.  (§  75.)  Whether  raibroad  transporting-  cars  by 
contract  is  common  carrier. — And  it  has  been  held  that  if  the 
owner  of  the  goods,  by  contract  with  a  railroad,  hire  from  it 
cars  for  the  loading  and  transportation  of  the  goods,  the  road 
agreeing  to  furnish  the  motive  power  and  the  use  of  its  road 
only  in  the  transportation,  it  will  not  be  considered  that  the 
company,  in  thus  transporting  the  goods,  does  so  in  the  ca- 
pacity of  common  carrier,  and  that  it  will  not  be  held  liable 
for  any  loss  or  damage  to  the  goods,  under  such  circumstances, 
not  occasioned  by  its  negligence.^^  This,  however,  has  been 
disputed,  and  it  has  been  elsewhere  held  that  under  such  cir- 
cumstances the  railroad  company  is  still  liable,  as  a  common 
carrier,  for  the  safety  of  the  goods.^^ 

Sec.  88.  (§  75a.)  Same  subject — How,  when  railroad  com- 
pany does  not  own  cars — Circus  train. — A  similar  question  is 
raised  where  the  railroad  company  does  not  own  or  furnish  the 
cars,  but  agrees  to  furnish  the  track  and  motive  power  for  the 
transportation  of  loaded  cars  owned  or  furnished  by  the  other 
party.  Cases  of  this  character,  in  which  railroad  companies 
have  by  contract,  undertaken  to  transport  circus  cars,  owned 
and  regulated  by  circus  companies,  have  several  times  come  be- 
fore the  courts,  and  the  views  taken  were  that  the  railroad 
companies  did  not,  by  such  contracts,  assume  the  duties  and 
obligations  of  common  carriers.^ '^    Thus  in  the  case  of  Coup  v. 

but  in  the  case  of  loss;  and  then  Dunbar,    20    111.    623;    Kimball    v. 

to  make  the  boat  or  owner  liable  The  Railroad,  26  Vt.  247. 

would   be   great   injustice.     There  16.    Mallory  v.  The  Railroad,  39 

is  no  reciprocity  in  it."     And  see,  Barb.    488;    Hannibal,   etc.,   R.   R. 

to    the    same    effect,    Chouteau    v.  v.  Swift,  12  Wall.  262. 

The   S.   B.    St.   Anthony,     16    Mo.  17.     Robertson  v.  The  Railroad, 

216,  and  20  id.  519.  156  Mass.  525,  31  N.  E.  Rep.  650, 

The  question  was  no  doubt  for-  32  Am.  St.  Rep.  482;  Railroad  Co. 

merly  of  much  greater  importance  v.  Wallace,  66  Fed.  506,  14  C.  C.  A. 

than    now,    when    so    many    other  257;    24  U.   S.   App.   589,  30  L.  R. 

and    safer   modes    of   making     re-  A.    161;    Forepaugh   v.    The   Rail- 

mittances  of  money  than  by  steam-  road,    128    Penn.    St.    217,    18    Atl. 

boats  as  carriers  can  be  employed.  Rep.   503,   15  Am.   St.  Rep.   672,  5 

15.  E.  Tenn.,  etc.,  R.  R.  v.  L.  R.  A.  508;  Wilson  v.  The  Rail- 
Whittle,   27   Ga.   535;    Railroad   v.  road,    129    Fed.    774,   affirmed,   133 

Fed.  1022,  66  C.  C.  A.  486. 


^88.]  WHO  IS  A   COMMON   CARRIER.  85 

Wabash  Railway  Company/ «  the  railway  company,  by  virtue 
of  a  special  contract,  undertook  to  transport  a  circus  and 
menagerie  with  all  its  horses,  wild  animals,  tents  and  other 
paraphernalia,  upon  cars  owned  and  specially  fitted  for  the 
purpose  by  the  circus  proprietors,  and  which  were  loaded  and 
regulated  by  the  proprietors'  employees.  The  contract  ex- 
pressly stipulated  that  the  undertaking  was  not  made  by  the 
company  as  a  common  carrier,  and  that  the  company  should 
not  be  responsible  for  damages  arising  from  want  of  care  in 
running  of  cars  or  otherwise.  The  cars  were  made  up  into  two 
trains,  which  collided  and  caused  injury.  In  an  action  against 
the  company  it  was  urged  that  the  undertaking  was  that  of  a 
common  carrier  and  that  the  provisions  for  exemption  from 
liability  were  therefore  inoperative. 

Said  Campbell,  J.:  "Unless  this  undertaking  was  one  en- 
tered into  by  the  defendant  as  a  common  carrier,  there  is  very 
little  room  for  controversy.  The  price  was  shown  to  be  only 
ten  per  cent,  of  the  rates  charged  for  carriage,  and  the  whole 
arrangement  was  peculiar.  If  it  was  not  a  contract  of  com- 
mon carriage,  we  need  not  consider  how  far  in  that  character 
contracts  of  exemption  from  liability  may  extend.  In  our 
view,  it  was  in  no  sense  a  common  carrier's  contract,  if  it 
involved  any  principle  of  the  law  of  carriers  at  all. 

The  business  of  common  carriage,  while  it  prevents  any 
right  to  refuse  carriage  of  property  such  as  is  generally 
carried,  implies,  especially  on  railroads,  that  the  business  will 
be  done  on  trains  made  up  by  the  carrier  and  running  on 
their  own  time.  It  is  never  the  duty  of  a  carrier,  as  such,  to 
make  up  special  trains  on  demand,  or  to  drive  such  trains 
made  up  entirely  by  other  persons  or  by  their  cars.  It  is  not 
important  now  to  consider  how  far,  except  as  to  owners  of 
goods  in  the  cars  forwarded,  the  reception  of  cars  loaded  or 
unloaded  involves  the  responsibility  of  carriers  as  to  the  own- 
ers of  the  cars  as  such.  The  duty  to  receive  cars  of  other  per- 
sons, when  existing,  is  usually  fixed  by  the  railroad  laws  and 
not  by  the  common  law.     But  it  is  not  incumbent  on  com- 

18.    56  Mich.  111. 


86  THE  LAW  OF   CARRIERS.  [§  89. 

panies  in  their  duty  as  common  carriers  to  move  such  cars  ex- 
cept in  their  own  routine.  They  are  not  obliged  to  accept 
and  run  them  at  all  times  and  seasons  and  not  in  the  ordinary 
course  of  business." 

Sec.  89.  (§76.)  Owners  of  canal  and  ferry-boats  may  show 
that  they  are  not  common  carriers. — So,  as  we  have  seen,'''^ 
the  owner  of  a  canal-boat  may  show,  when  he  is  sued  for  the 
loss  of  the  goods,  that  he  is  not  a  common  carrier,  but  was  em- 
ployed as  a  private  carrier  for  hire  and  that  he  is  not  therefore 
liable  for  the  loss.^"  And  the  ferry-man  may  show  that  his 
ferry  was  not  intended  or  used  for  public  accommodation,  but 
merely  for  convenience  of  access  to  his  mill,  and  that  he  re- 
ceived no  compensation  for  the  ferriage  except  in  the  increase 
of  his  business  as  a  miller,  which,  though  a  benefit  incidentally 
accruing,  does  not  constitute  hire  for  the  service  nor  give  rise 
to  an  obligation  to  pay  for  it. 

Sec.  90.  (§77.)  No  carrier  required  to  carry  every  kind  of 
goods. — Innumerable  kinds  of  goods  may  be  intrusted  to  car- 
riers; and  no  carrier  can  adapt  his  means  of  conveyance  to 
every  kind  whion  may  be  offered.  No  one  is,  therefore,  to  be 
understood  to  be  engaged  in  the  business  universally,  in  this 
sense.2i  The  demands  of  commerce  and  business  have  in  this, 
as  in  all  other  vocations,  required  a  division  of  labor,  and  the 
character  and  particular  nature  of  the  business  of  the  common 
carrier  sometimes  become  of  the  greatest  importance  in  decid- 
ing upon  the  question  of  his  liability.  The  heaviest  and  bulk- 
iest freights  as  well  as  the  lightest  parcels,  from  the  product 
of  the  stone-quarry  to  the  most  delicate  fabric  of  the  factory, 
seek  transportation  by  the  common  carrier;  and  the  different 
degrees  of  care,  labor  and  watchfulness,  as  well  as  the  different 
modes  of  conveyance  required  for  them,  make  it  impossible 
for  him  to  adapt  his  business  to  them  all.  And  hence,  it  by 
no  means  follows,  from  the  fact  that  the  carrier  is  a  common 

19.  See  ante,  §  65.  21.     See  ante,  §  59. 

20.  Fisk  V.  Clark,  49  N.  Y.  122; 
Beckwith  r.  Frisbie,  32  Vt.  559. 


§  91.]  WHO  IS  A  COMMON  CARRIER.  87 

carrier,  that  he  can  be  required  to  carry  all  kinds  of  goods. 
The  word  "goods,"  when  used  in  defining  his  business,  must 
be  interpreted  to  mean  such  things  as,  from  usage  and  cus- 
tom, his  mode  of  conveyance,  his  public  professions,  the  char- 
acter of  his  particular  trade  or  the  manner  of  conducting  it, 
he  is  to  be  fairly  understood  as  holding  himself  out  to  the 
public  as  ready  to  carry  for  hire. 

Sec.  91.  (§78.)  Same  subject — Illustrations. — A  ferry- 
man, whose  ordinary  employment  is  merely  to  carry  passengers 
and  their  baggage  across  streams,  would  not  be  liable  for  the 
loss  of  money  intrusted  to  his  servants  for  carriage  without  his 
knowledge.  And  so  of  the  owners  of  stage-coaches,  whose  busi- 
ness is  limited  to  the  transportation  of  passengers  and  their 
baggage ;  and  of  the  owners  of  wagons,  engaged  as  carriers 
of  such  goods  as  they  are  in  the  habit  of  carrying ;  or  of  steam- 
boats, employed  in  the  business  of  carrying  passengers  and 
merchandise;  unless  it  be  shown  that  the  usage  of  such  car- 
riers has  been  to  accept  money  or  the  like  for  carriage.  "In 
all  these  cases  the  nature  and  extent  of  the  employment  or 
business  which  is  authorized  by  the  owners,  on  their  own  ac- 
count and  at  their  own  risk,  and  which,  either  expressly  or 
impliedly,  they  hold  themselves  out  as  undertaking,  furnish 
the  true  limits  of  their  rights,  obligations,  duties  and  liabili- 
ties. The  question,  therefore,  in  all  cases  of  this  sort,  is.  What 
are  the  true  nature  and  extent  of  the  employment  and  busi- 
ness in  which  the  owners  hold  themselves  out  to  the  public  as 
engaged?"  22 

So  a  railroad  company  which  does  not  undertake  to  carry 
dogs  cannot  be  held  liable  as  a  common  carrier  to  one  whose 
dog  was  carried  in  violation  of  the  rule  and  by  virtue  of  a 
special  agreement  with  the  baggage-master.23  And  a  railroad 
company  is  not  liable  as  a  common  carrier  to  a  person  whose 

22.  Per  Story,  J.,  in  Citizens'  where  dogs  are  permitted  to  be 
Bank  v.  The  Nantucliet  S.  B.  Co.,  carried  as  "baggageman's  per- 
fJ  Story,  33.  quisites."      Cantling    r.     Railroa-l 

23.  Honeyman    v.    Railroad,    13  Co.,  54  Mo.  385. 
Oreg.  353.     But  company  is  liable 


88  THE  LAW  OF   Ci\JlRIERS.  [§92. 

letter  has  been  lost  in  the  mail  which  the  company  had  under- 
taken to  carry  by  contract  with  the  government.^-* 

Sec.  92.  (§79.)  How  when  possession  of  goods  not  taken 
— Towing  boats. — The  goods  must  also  be  delivered  into  the 
actual  custody  of  the  carrier;  and  if  they  be  of  such  a  char- 
acter that  the  service  which  he  is  employed  to  perform  in  re- 
spect to  them  does  not  require  their  actual  possession  and  no 
such  actual  possession  is  taken,  there  is  no  such  bailment  as  is 
necessary  to  make  him  a  common  carrier.  Thus,  the  owners 
of  a  steamboat  employed  in  the  towing  of  other  boats  or  ves- 
sels do  not  incur  the  responsibility  of  common  carriers  as  to 
the  tow.  The  exercise  of  reasonable  care  and  skill  in  conduct- 
ing the  business  of  the  towage  to  its  destination  is  the  extent 
of  their  obligation.^^  "It  is  a  misnomer,"  said  Bronson,  J.,  in 
Wells  V.  The  Steam  Navigation  Company,^^  "to  call  the  de- 
fendants common  carriers,  or  carriers  of  any  kind,  in  relation 
to  the  business  of  towing  boats.  Nor  are  they  bailees  of  any 
description;  for  the  property  towed  is  not  delivered  to  them, 
nor  placed  within  their  exclusive  custody  or  control.  It  re- 
mains in  the  possession,  and,  for  most  purposes,  in  the  exclu- 
sive care,  of  the  owners  or  their  servants.  There  is  no  bail- 
ment within  any  definition  of  that  term  to  be  found  in  the 
books.  But,  whether  a  bailment  or  not,  it  is  clear  that  those 
who  tow  boats  and  vessels  are  not  common  carriers  of  the 
things  towed.  "2T     g^t  if  the  proprietor  of  a  towboat,  on  cer- 

24.  Central  Railroad  v.  Lamp-  numerous  and  uniform  to  the  ef- 
ley,   76   Ala.   357.  feet   that   towing   vessels   are   not 

25.  The  Mayor,  Aldermen  and  common  carriers  as  to  the  tow, 
Burgesses  of  the  Borough  of  Pres-  but  incur  only  the  responsibility 
ton  V.  Biornstad  et  ah,  L.  R.  (1898)  of  ordinary  bailees  for  hire.  Hayes 
App.  Cas.  513.  r.  Millar,  77  Penn.  St.  238;  Brown 

26.  2  Coms.  208.  v.   Clegg,   63   id.    51;     Leonard    v. 

27.  The  weight  of  authority  is  Henrickson,  18  id.  40;  Hayes  v. 
very  decidedly  in  favor  of  the  law  Paul,  51  id.  134;  Merrick  v.  Braiu- 
as  thus  stated.  There  are,  how-  ard,  38  Barb.  574;  The  Arctic  Fire 
ever,  cases  in  which  a  different  Ins.  Co.  v.  Austin,  54  id.  559; 
view  is  taken  of  the  character  of  Alexander  v.  Green,  3  Hill,  9;  7 
the  towing  vessel.  In  Pennsyl-  id.  533;  Caton  v.  Rumney,  13 
vania  and  New  York,  the  cases  are  Wend.   387;    Wells  v.   Steam  Nav. 


§93.] 


WHO  IS  A  COMMON  CARRIER. 


89 


tain  trips  when  he  has  no  towing  to  do,  holds  himself  out  as 
bemg  ready  and  willing  to  carry  for  all  who  apply,  he  will  be 
considered  for  the  time  being  as  acting  in  the  capacity  of  a 
common  carrier.-^ 

Sec.  93.     (§  80.)     Passenger  carriers  not  common  carriers  of 
persons.— For  obvious  reasons  which  will  be  hereafter  stated, 


Co.,  2  Com,  204;  4  Seld.  375; 
Emilivsen  v.  Railroad  Co.,  51  N. 
Y.  Supp.  606,  30  App.  Div.  203. 

This  position  is  sustained  by 
many  authorities  elsewhere.  Var- 
ble  V.  Bigley,  14  Bush,  698;  Trans- 
portation Line  v.  Hope,  95  U.  S. 
297;  The  Steamer  New  Philadel- 
phia, 1  Black,  62;  The  Steamer 
Webb,  14  "Wall.  406;  The  Lyon,  1 
Brown's  Adm.  59;  The  Stranger, 
id.  281;  The  Oconto,  5  Biss.  460; 
The  Merrimac,  2  Sawyer,  586; 
Sproul  V.  Hemmingway,  14  Pick. 
1 ;  The  Pennsylvania,  etc.,  Nav.  Co. 
V  Dandridge,  8  Gill  &  J.  248;  The 
Steamboat  Angelina  Corning,  1 
Ben.  109;  The  Princeton,  3  Blatch. 
54;  Abbey  v.  Str.  Stephens,  22 
How.  Pr.  78;  The  Neaffie,  1  Abb. 
U.  S.  Rep.  465;  Brawley  v.  "Watson, 
2  Bond.  356;  Story  on  Bail.  §  496; 
The  Quickstep,  9  Wall.  665;  Wood- 
en V.  Austin,  51  Barb.  9;  The  Mar- 
garet, 94  U.  S.  494;  The  Nettie 
Quill,  124  Fed.  667;  Knapp,  Stout 
&  Co.  V.  McCaffery,  178  111.  107,  52 
N.  E.  Rep.  898,  69  Am.  St.  Rep. 
290,  affirming  s.  c.  74  HI.  App.  80. 

This  is  also  the  law  of  the  Eng- 
lish courts.  Symonds  v.  Pain,  6 
Hurl.  &  N.  709;  The  Minnehaha,  1 
Lush.  335;  The  Julia,  14  Moore  P. 
C.  210;  The  Mayor,  Aldermen  and 
Burgesses  of  the  Borough  of  Pres- 
ton V.  Biornstad  et  ah,  L.  R. 
(1898),  App.  Cas.  513,  affirming  s. 
C.    (1897)   P.  118. 

But  the  question  has  been  set- 
tled the  other  way  in  Louisiana. 


Bussey  v.  The  Trans.  Co.,  24  La. 
Ann.  165;  Clapp  v.  Stanton,  20  La. 
Ann.  495;  Smith  v.  Pierce,  1  La. 
350.  And  opinions  favorable  to 
this  view  of  it  have  been  ex- 
pressed in  White  v.  Mary,  6  Cal. 
462;  Walston  v.  Myers,  5  Jones, 
N.  C.  174;  and  by  Chancellor  Kent 
in  2  Com.  599. 

In  Ashmore  v.  The  Steam  Tow- 
ing Co.,  4  Butcher,  180,  the  court 
was  divided  upon  the  question. 

Where  the  employment  consists 
in  towing  for  short  distances  with- 
out taking  the  exclusive  control 
or  possession  of  the  tow,  it  would 
seem  to  be  plain  that  it  could  not 
have  entered  into  the  contempla- 
tion of  the  parties  that  such  an 
extraordinary  liability  as  that  of 
the  common  carrier  should  attach 
to  the  towing  vessel.  But  where 
the  absolute  control  and  manage- 
ment of  the  tow  is  given  to  it  es- 
pecially if  for  a  long  voyage,  as  is 
frequently  the  case  with  barges 
and  other  river  craft  upon  our 
western  rivers,  the  towing  steamer 
being  in  such  a  case  solely  respon- 
sible for  the  management  of  its 
tow,  it  would  seem  to  be  a  ques- 
tion of  considerable  doubt  whether 
the  towing  vessel  should  not  be 
held  liable  as  a  common  carrier. 
This  distinction  was  noticed  in 
Bussey  v.  The  Trans.  Co.,  and  in 
Ashmore  v.  The  Trans.  Co.,  supra. 

28.  Bassett  &  Stone  v.  Mining 
Co.,  —  Ky.  — ,  88  S.  W.  Rep.  318. 


90  THE  LAW   OF    CARRIERS.  [§  94. 

carriers  of  passengers  are  not  common  carriers  as  to  t"he  per- 
sons of  those  whom  they  carry.  But  the  two  employments  of 
carrying  passengers  and  goods  are  almost  universally  combined 
or  engaged  in  by  the  same  carriers;  and,  as  we  have  already 
seen,  carriers  of  passengers  become  common  carriers  as  to  the 
baggage  of  their  passengers.  So  that  it  may  be  said  that 
no  carrier  is  exclusively  a  carrier  of  passengers,  the  carriage 
of  the  passenger  necessarily  implying  the  carriage  of  his  bag- 
gage, as  to  which  the  carrier  incurs  the  liability  of  the  com- 
mon carricr.29 

Sec.  94.  (^  81.)  Postmasters,  mail  contractors  and  carriers 
not  common  carriers. — Postmasters,  mail  contractors  and  mail 
carriers,  as  has  been  often  decided,  are  not  common  carriers  as 
to  such  things  as  may  be  sent  and  carried  through  the  mails, 
and  they  owe  no  duty  either  to  the  sender  or  addressee  of  such 
matter.  They  are  made  the  instruments  of  government  for  the 
performance  of  acts  in  execution  of  functions  assumed  and 
controlled  by  it,  and  their  contracts  are  with  the  government 
and  not  with  the  individuals  who  derive  the  benefit  of  their 
services.  They  receive  their  compensation  from  the  govern- 
ment, and,  at  most,  are  public  agents  discharging  public  duties, 
and  therefore  owe  no  duty  as  common  carriers  to  those  who 
receive  the  benefit  of  their  services.^*^  So  a  railroad  company 
carrying  mail  in  pursuance  of  a  contract  with  the  government 
is  neither  a  private  nor  a  common  carrier  as  to  such  mail.^^ 

Sec.  95.  (§  81a.)  Telegraph  and  telephone  companies  not 
common  carriers. — Nor  by  the  weight  of  authority  can  tele- 
graph and  telephone  companies  be  considered  as  common  car- 
riers, although  the  attempt  has  been  repeatedly  made  to  put 

29.  See  ante,  §  69.  Railway  Co.,  118  Iowa,  423,  92  N. 

30.  Story  on  Bail.  §  463;  Schroy-  W.  Rep.  88,  59  L.  R.  A.  796;  Ger- 
er  V.  Lynch,  8  Watts,  453;  Dunlop  man  State  Bank  v.  Railway  Co., 
V.  Munroe,  7  Cranch.  242;  Con-  113  Fed.  414;  Bankers'  Mut.  Cas- 
well V.  Voorhees,  13  Ohio,  523;  ualty  Co.  v.  Railroad,  117  Fed. 
Wiggins  V.  Hathaway,  6  Barb.  632;  434,  54  C.  C.  A.  608,  65  L.  R.  A. 
Lane  v.  Cotton,  1  Ld.  Raym.  646.  397;  petition  for  writ  of  certiorari 

31.  Central  Railroad  v.  Lampley,  denied,  187  U.  S.  648. 
76   Ala.    357;    Boston    Ins.    Co.    v. 


95.1 


WHO  IS  A  COMMON  CARRIER. 


91 


them  upon  the  same  footing  as  to  liability  for  miscarriage.^'^ 
Some  courts  have,  however,  termed  them  common  carriers  of 
messages  and  common  carriers  of  intelligencers  And  in  the 
case  of  Telegraph  Co.  v.  Texas,34  in  the  United  States  supreme 
court,  Chief  Justice  Waite  said:  "A  telegraph  company  oc- 
cupies the  same  relation  to  commerce  as  a  carrier  of  messa"-es 
that  a  railroad  company  does  as  a  carrier  of  goods."     And, 


32.  Leonard  v.  The  Telegraph 
Co.,  41  N.  Y.  544;  Tyler  v.  The 
West.  U.  Tel.  Co.,  60  111.  421; 
Breese  v.  The  U.  S.  Tel.  Co.,  48 
N.  Y.  132;  Western  Union  Tel.  Co. 
V.  Carew,  15  Mich.  525;  Telegraph 
Co.  V.  Griswold,  37  Ohio  St.  301; 
Hibbard  t\  Telegraph  Co.,  33  Wis. 
558;  Western  U.  Tel.  Co.  v.  Rey- 
nolds, 77  Va.  173;  Kiley  v.  Tele- 
graph Co.,  109  N.  Y.  231;  Grinnell 
V.  Telegraph  Co.,  113  Mass.  299; 
Western  U.  Tel.  Co.  v.  Munford, 
87  Tenn.  190;  Marr  v.  Telegraph 
Co.,  85  Tenn.,  529;  Gillis  v.  Tele- 
graph Co.,  61  Vt.  461;  Fowler  v. 
Telegraph  Co.,  80  Me.  381.  Tele- 
graph messenger  company  is  not 
a  common  carrier.  Feiber  v.  Tel. 
Co.,  21  Abb.  N.  C.  11. 

Telegraph  companies,  in  the  ab- 
sence of  statute,  are  not  common 
carriers,  and  may  limit  their  lia- 
bility except  for  gross  or  willful 
negligence.  Birkett  v.  Telegraph 
Co.,  103  Mich.  361,  61  N.  W.  Rep. 
645,  50  Am.  St.  Rep.  374. 

33.  Central  Telephone  Co.  v. 
Bradbury,  106  Ind.  1;  State  v.  Tel- 
ephone Co.,  17  Neb.  126;  Chesa- 
peake, etc.,  Tel.  Co.  v.  Telegraph 
Co.,  66  Md.  399;  Louisville,  etc., 
Co.  V.  Telegraph  Co.,  24  Am.  L. 
Reg.  579;  Shearman  &  Redfield  on 
Negligence,  sees.  534,  535;  Gwynn 
V.  Telephone  Co.,  69  S.  Car.  434, 
48  S.  E.  Rep.  460;  Pacific  Tele- 
graph Co.  V.  Underwood,  37  Neb. 


315,  55  N.  W.  Rep.  1057,  40  Am.  St. 
Rep.  490;  State  v.  Telephone  Co., 
114  Tenn.  194,  86  S.  W.  Rep.  390. 

Telegraph  companies  which 
make  an  offer  to  the  public  to  car- 
ry telegraphic  messages,  are  by 
statute,  common  carriers.  Kirby 
r.  Telegraph  Co.,  4  S.  D.  105,  55  N. 
W.  Rep.  759,  46  Am.  St.  Rep.  765, 
30  L.  R.  A.  612. 

A  private  corporation,  engaged 
in  operating  a  telephone  plant,  is 
a  common  carrier  of  news  and  in- 
telligence, and  is  therefore  amen- 
able to  the  provisions  of  the  state 
statute  which  provides  that  all 
charges  made  for  any  service  ren- 
dered, or  to  be  rendered,  by  com- 
mon carriers,  shall  be  reasonable 
and  just.  Such  a  public  service 
corporation  is  charged  with  cer- 
tain public  duties,  among  which 
are  to  furnish  for  a  reasonable 
compensation  to  any  citizen  a  tel- 
ephone and  telephonic  service,  and 
to  charge  each  patron  for  the  serv- 
ice rendered  the  same  price  '  it 
charges  every  other  patron  for  the 
same  service  under  substantially 
the  same  or  similar  conditions. 
The  legislature  has  the  power  to 
say  what  compensation  such  a 
public  service  corporation  may  ex- 
act. Nebraska  Telephone  Co.  v. 
State,  55  Neb.  627,  76  N.  W.  Rep. 
171,  45  L.  R.  A.  113. 

34.  105  U.  S.  460. 


92  THE  LAW   OF   CARRIERS.  [§96. 

certainly,  though  they  cannot  be  regarded  strictly  as  common 
carriers  in  the  sense  which  the  phrase  ''common  carrier"  had 
previously  juridically  acquired,  yet  in  their  relations  to  the 
public,  in  their  duty  to  serve  all  impartially,  in  their  duty  to 
avoid  discrimination,  if  not  in  their  responsibility  for  accurate 
transmission  of  messages  they  occupy  a  position  very  closely 
analogous  to  that  of  common  carriers. 

Sec.  96.     Livery  stable  keepers  are  not  common  carriers. — 

Ordinarily,  livery  stable  keepers,  engaged  in  the  business  of- 
letting  for  hire  teams  and  vehicles,  either  with  or  without 
drivers,  are  not  carriers  of  passengers  within  the  legal  meaning 
of  that  term.  They  do  not  hold  themselves  out  as  undertaking 
for  hire  to  carry  indiscriminately  any  person  who  may  apply. 
Those  who  hire  their  vehieles  are  not  necessarily  restricted  to 
vehicles  or  drivers  designated  by  the  proprietor,  but  may,  in  a 
measure,  protect  themselves  by  selecting  the  particular  horse 
or  driver  they  wish  to  hire.  The  duties  and  obligations  of  car- 
riers of  passengers  are,  therefore,  not  applicable  to  mere  livery 
stable  keepers.2^. 

Sec.  97.  Messenger  companies. — To  the  extent  that  a  tele- 
graph company  offered  its  services  to  the  public  as  a  carrier 
of  packages,  such  packages  being  carried  by  messenger  boys 
furnished  by  the  company,  it  was  held  that  the  company  was  a 

35.  Stanley   v.    Steele,    77   Conn,  carrier  for  hire,   and   is   required 

688,  60  Atl.  640,  69  L.  R.  A.  561;  to   exercise  the   same   measure    of 

Copeland  v.  Draper,  157  Mass.  558.  skill  and  care  which  is  applied  to 

?>2  N.  E.  Rep.  944,  34  Am.  St.  Rep.  a   person   engaged    in   any   special 

314,  19  L.  R.  A.  283;   Erickson  v.  pursuit  in  which  he  undertakes  to 

Barber  Bros.,  83  Iowa,  367,  49  N.  perform    services    for    others    for 

W.  Rep.  838;  Siegrist  v.  Arnot,  86  compensation.     Such  a  person  un- 

Mo.  200,  56  Am.  Rep.  424.  dertakes  to  possess  the  skill  ade- 

A  livery  stable  keeper  who  lets  quate    to    the    undertaking,     and 

his  team  and  vehicle,  accompanied  promises  to  exercise  due  diligence 

by  a  driver  of  his  own  selection,  and  care  in  its  performance.     But 

for  hire,  to  go  upon  a  particular  ordinary  skill,  diligence  and  pru- 

journey,  is  not   a  carrier  of  pas-  dence  is  all  that  the  law  exacts; 

sengers  and  does  not  assume  the  that  Is,  the  exercise  of  such  care 

duties   and   obligations  of  such  a  and  skill  as  prudent  men,  experi- 

carrier.     He  is,  at  most,  a  private  enced   in   the  business,  are  accus- 


§98.]  WHO  IS  A  COMMON  CARRIER.  93 

common  carrier.^^  But  where  a  company  engaged  in  the  busi- 
ness of  furnishing  messengers  for  hire,  such  messengers  for  the 
time  being  being  under  the  control  and  direction  of  the  persons 
engaging  their  services,  it  was  held  that  the  messenger  com- 
pany was  not,  as  to  the  articles  carried,  a  common  carrier.^^ 

Sec.  98.  (§  81b.)  Log-driving  companies  not  common  car- 
riers.— So  log-driving  and  booming  companies  organized  for 
the  purpose  of  driving,  running,  rafting  and  booming  logs  are 
not  common  carriers  of  the  logs  delivered  to  them  for  that 
purpose.^^ 

Sec.  99.  (§81c.)  Drovers  and  agisters  not  common  car- 
riers. — For  like  reasons,  drovers  and  agisters  employed  to  drive 
cattle  and  other  animals  are  held  not  to  be  common  carriers.^^ 

Sec.  100.  (§  81d.)  Owners  and  managers  of  passenger  ele- 
vators.— The  owners  and  managers  of  passenger  elevators,  al- 
though spoken  of  by  some  courts  as  common  carriers  of 
passengers,  cannot  properly  be  so  classed.  The  public  carrier 
of  passengers,  on  accoimt  of  the  nature  of  his  employment,  is 
charged  in  law  with  certain  duties  owed  to  the  public  among 
which  is  that  of  receiving  upon  his  vehicles  all  who  may  offer 
themselves  for  transportation,  and  who  stand  ready  to  pay  the 
legal  fare  and  comply  with  his  reasonable  rules  and  regula- 
tions. When  the  nature  of  the  business  of  operating  a  pas- 
senger elevator  is  considered,  it  is  clear  that  the  proprietor 
owes  no  such  duty  to  the  public  and  is  therefore  not  a 
carrier  of  passengers  in  the  full  sense  of  the  term  as 
legally  understood.^^  Nevertheless,  with  reference  to  the 
safety   of  their  passengers,   the   law  has  imposed  upon  the 

tomed   to   use   under    similar   cir-  senger  Co.,  —  Mass.  — ,  76  N.  E. 

cumstances.      Payne    v.    Halstead,  Rep.  215. 

44  111.  App.  97.  38.  Mann   v.   White   River,   etc., 

36.  Oilman  v.  Telegraph  Co.,  95  Co.,  46  Mich.  38. 

N.  Y.  Supp.  564,  48  Misc.  372.    But  39.  Angell  on  Carriers,  §§  24,  52; 

see,   contra,   Hirsch    v.    Telegraph  Story  on  Bailments,  §  443. 

Co.,  98  .N.  Y.  Supp.  371.  40.  Seaver  v.  Bradley,  179  Mass. 

37.  Haskell  v.  Boston,  etc.,  Mes-  329,  60  N.  E.  Rep.  795,  88  Am.  St. 

Rep.  384. 


94 


THE  LAW   OF   CARRIERS. 


[§100. 


proprietors  of  passenger  elevators  duties  precisely  similar  to 
those  exacted  of  passenger  carriers  by  railroad.  The  safety 
and  lives  of  those  who  avail  themselves  of  this  means  of  car- 
riage must  of  necessity  be  intrusted  in  a  great  measure  to  the 
care  of  those  who  control  and  operate  the  cars.  The  law, 
therefore,  justly  holds  that  while  the  owners  of  passenger  ele- 
vators are  not  insurers  of  the  safety  of  their  passengers,  they 
are  bound  to  exercise  in  their  behalf  the  highest  degree  of 
skill  and  foresight,  or,  as  some  courts  have  expressed  it,  the 
utmost  human  care  and  foresight  consistent  with  the  efficient 
use  and  operation  of  the  means  of  conveyance  employed."*^ 


41.  Goodsell  v.  Taylor,  41  Minn. 
207;  Bullock  v.  Butler  Exchange 
Co.,  22  R.  I.  108,  46  Atl.  Rep.  273; 
Treadwell  v.  Whittier,  80  Cal.  575, 
22  Pac.  Rep.  266,  13  Am.  St.  Rep, 
175;  Hartford  Deposit  Co.  v.  Sol- 
litt,  172  111.  222,  50  N.  E.  Rep.  178, 
64  Am.  St.  Rep.  35,  affirming  70 
111.  App.  166;  Springer  v.  Ford,  189 
111.  430,  59  N.  E.  Rep.  953,  82  Am. 
St.  Rep.  464,  52  L.  R.  A.  930;  Chi- 
cago Exchange  Bldg.  Co.  v.  Nelson, 
197  111.  334,  64  N.  E.  Rep.  369; 
Springer  v.  Schultz,  205  111.  144, 
68  N.  E.  Rep.  753,  affirming  105  111. 
App.  544;  Field  v.  French,  80  111. 
App.  78;  Western  Union  Telegraph 
Co.  V.  Woods,  88  111.  App.  375; 
Winheim  v.  Field,  107  111.  App. 
145;  Morgan  v.  Saks,  —  Ala.  — , 
38  So.  Rep.  848;  Lee  v.  Knapp  & 
Co.,  155  Mo.  610,  56  S.  W.  Rep. 
458;  Becker  v.  Lincoln  Real  Estate 
&  Bid.  Co.,  174  Mo.  246,  73  S.  W. 
Rep.  581;  Luckel  v.  Century  Bid. 
Co.,  177  Mo.  608,  76  S.  W.  Rep. 
1035;  Goldsmith  v.  Bid.  Co.  —Mo. 
App.  — ,  83  S.  W.  Rep.  1112;  Mc- 
Greil  v.  Buffalo  Office  Bid.  Co.,  153 
N.  Y.  265,  47  N.  E.  Rep.  305;  Russo 
V.  Morris,  etc..  Imp.  Assn.,  104  La. 
426,    29    So.    Rep.    46;    Phillips    v. 


Pruitt,  26  Ky.  Law  Rep.  831,  82 
S.  W.  Rep.  628;  Burgess  v.  Stowe, 
134  Mich.  204,  96  N.  W.  Rep.  29; 
Edwards  v.  Burke,  36  Wash.  107, 
78  Pac.  Rep.  610;  Bremer  v.  Pie;?.-;, 
121  Wis.  61,  98  N.  W.  Rep.  945; 
Oberndorfer  v.  Pabst,  100  Wis.  505, 
76  N.  W.  Rep.  338;  Fox  v.  City  of 
Philadelphia,  208  Penn.  St.  127,  57 
Atl.  Rep.  356,  65  L.  R.  A.  214;  Fox 
V  Philadelphia,  208  Penn.  St.  127, 
57  Atl.  Rep.  356,  65  L.  R.  A.  214; 
Stix,  —  Mo.  — ,  88  S.  W.  Rep. 
108;  Shellaberger  v.  Fisher,  —  C. 
C.  A.  — ,   143  Fed.  937. 

The  liability  of  the  owner  or 
manager  of  a  freight  elevator  as 
a  carrier  of  passengers  is  meas- 
ured by  the  same  rules,  and  he  is 
held  to  the  same  degree  of  dili- 
gence as  persons  owning  and  op- 
erating passenger  elevators. 
Springer  v.  Ford,  189  111.  430,  59 
N.  E.  Rep.  953,  82  Am.  St.  Rep. 
464,  52  L.  R.  A.  930. 

But  see,  Edwards  v.  Bid.  Co.,  — 
R.  I.  — ,  61  Atl.  Rep.  646,  and 
Griffen  v.  Manice,  166  N.  Y.  188, 
59  N.  E.  Rep.  925,  82  Am.  St.  Rep. 
630,  52  L.  R.  A.  922,  reversing  62 
N.  Y.  Supp.  364,  47  App.  Div.  70, 
where  it  is  said  that  the  owners 


§ior 


WHO  IS  A  COMMON   CARRIER. 


And  this  measure  of  care  applies  as  well  to  the  selection  of 
competent  operators  as  to  the  operation  of  the  machinery  and 
cars.^- 

Sec.  101.  Same  subject — Must  allow  passengers  reasonable 
time  to  enter  or  leave  car. — The  rules  regulating  the  care  to  be 
exercised  by  railroads  in  allowing  their  passengers  a  reason- 
able time  to  enter  or  leave  their  cars  in  safety  apply  with 
equal,  if  not  more  reason  and  force,  to  the  operation  of  pas- 
senger elevators,  since  the  danger  of  starting  before  the  pas- 
senger has  boarded  or  left  an  elevator  car  is  even  greater  than 
the  danger  of  starting  a  train  under  similar  circumstances.  The 


of  elevators  are  not  common  car- 
riers and  bound  to  use  the  utmost 
human  care  and  foresight,  but  are 
required  only  to  use  reasonable 
care  in  the  character  of  the  appli- 
ance they  provide,  and  in  its  main- 
tenance and  operation. 

Evidence  that  an  elevator 
stopped  at  a  floor  where  a  pas- 
senger was  killed,  without  the  floor 
being  called,  and  that  it  was 
started  before  the  door  was  closed, 
is  sufficient  to  justify  the  submis- 
sion of  the  question  of  the  de- 
fendant's negligence  to  the  jury. 
Masonic,  etc.,  Assn.  v.  Collins,  210 
III.  482,  71  N.  E.  Rep.  396. 

Leaving  the  door  of  a  passenger 
elevator  shaft  open  and  unguard- 
ed, so  that  persons  taking  the  usu- 
al course  to  enter  the  elevator  car 
are  liable  to  fall  down  the  shaft, 
is  negligence.  Haymarket  The- 
atre Co.  V.  Rosenberg,  77  111.  App. 
183. 

But  it  is  not  negligence  to  per- 
mit a  movable  stool  to  remain  in 
the  elevator  for  the  use  of  the  op- 
erator. Gibson  v.  International 
Trust  Co.,  186  Mass.  454,  72  N.  E. 
Rep.  70. 


Nor  is  it  actionable  negligence 
on  the  part  of  the  owner  of  an 
elevator  where,  on  account  of 
someone  having  moved  the  stool  of 
the  operator,  the  operator,  in  at- 
tempting to  sit  down,  loses  his 
balance,  catches  the  apparatus  that 
moves  the  elevator  and  sends  it 
down,  thereby  injuring  a  passen- 
ger. Gibson  v.  International  Trust 
Co.,  177  Mass.  100,  58  N.  E.  Rep. 
278,  52  L.  R.  A.  928. 

If  the  passenger  be  chargeable 
with  contributory  negligence,  he 
will  be  barred  from  a  recovery. 
Blackman  v.  O'Gorman  Co.,  22  R, 
I.  638,  49  Atl.  Rep.  28;  Green  v. 
Y    M.  C.  A.,  65  111.  App.  459. 

In  an  action  by  a  newsboy  for 
injuries  sustained  on  a  passenger 
elevator,  it  is  competent  to  show 
that  he  had  been  warned  to  keep 
off  the  elevator  before  the  happen 
ing  of  the  injury;  if  such  were 
proven,  he  would  be  entitled  only 
to  the  degree  of  care  due  a  tres- 
passer. Springer  v.  Byram,  137 
Ind.  15,  36  N.  E.  Rep.  361,  45  Am. 
St.  Rep.  159,  23  L.  R.  A.  244. 

42.  Fox  V.  City  of  Philadelphia, 
208  Penn.  St.  127,  57  Atl.  Rep.  356, 
65  L.  R.  A.  214. 


96  THE  LAW   OF    CARRIERS.  [§  102. 

operator,  therefore,  must  exercise  a  high  degree  of  care  in  al- 
lowing passengers  a  reasonable  time  to  enter  or  leave  the  car 
before  putting  it  in  motion,  and  when  a  passenger  is  leaving  it 
at  any  particular  floor,  to  hold  it  there  a  reasonable  time,  not 
only  for  him,  but  for  any  other  passenger  in  the  act  of  alight- 
ing, to  do  so  in  safety.'*^ 

Sec.  102.  Same  subject — When  negligence  will  be  presumed. 
— As  a  general  rule,  the  mere  happening  of  an  accident  result- 
ing in  injury  to  the  passenger  while  riding  in  a  passenger  ele- 
vator is  not,  of  itself,  prima  facie  evidence  that  the  owner  or 
his  agent  has  been  at  fault,  and  the  plaintiff  must  allege  and 
prove  the  facts  upon  which  he  relies  to  establish  negligence.^^ 
But  where  the  accident  is  caused  by  the  breaking  or  giving 
way  of  the  machinery  or  appliances  by  which  the  elevator  is 
operated,  the  very  nature  of  such  an  occurrence  raises  a  pre- 
sumption of  negligence  which  can  only  be  overcome  by  proof 
that  the  requisite  care  and  caution  was  exercised.*^  And  al- 
though the  operation  of  an  automatic  push-button,  electrical 
passenger  elevator  may  not  be  negligence  in  respect  io  persons 
of  sufficient  maturity  and  discretion  to  appreciate  the  danger 
and  risk  of  contact  with  the  door  or  side  of  the  shaft  when  the 
car  is  moving,  yet  it  may  be  actionable  negligence  towards  a 

43.  Becker  v.    Lincoln  Real    Es-  44.  Specs  v.  Boggs,  198  Penn.  St. 

tate  &  Bid.  Co.,  174  Mo.  246,  73  S.  112,  47   Atl.  Rep.  875,  82  Am.   St. 

W.   Rep.    581;    Luckel   v.   Century  Rep.  792. 

Bid.  Co.,  177  Mo.  608,  76  S.  W.  Rep.  45.  Griffen  v.  Manice,  166  N.  Y. 

1035;    Becker   v.   Building   Co.,   —  188,  59  N.  E.  Rep.  925,  82  Am.  St. 

Mo.  App.  — ,  93  S.  W.  Rep.  291.  Rep.  630,  52  L.  R.  A.  922;  Hartford 

Starting   an  elevator   while  the  Deposit  Co  v.  Sollitt,  173  111.  222, 

door  is  open,  and  while  a  passen-  50  N.  E.  Rep.  178,  64  Am.  St.  Rep. 

ger  is  entering  the  car,   is  negli-  35;   Franklin  Printing  &  Publish- 

gence.    Blackwell  v.  O'Gorman  Co.,  ing  Co.  r.  Behrens,  181  111.  340,  54 

22  R.  I.  638,  49  Atl.  Rep.  28.  N.  E.  Rep.  896;    Springer  v.  Ford, 

If  an  elevator  car  be  started  at  189  111.  430,  59  N.  E.  Rep.  953,  82 

full  speed  before  a  passenger  has  Am.  St.  Rep.  464,  52  L.  R.  A.  930; 

had  time  to  place  himself  secure-  Springer  v.   Schultz,   205   111.   144, 

ly  on  his  feet,  and  he  is  thereby  68    N.    E.    Rep.    753;    Winheim    v, 

injured,  the  proprietor  will    be  li-  Field   107  111.  App.   145;   Edwards 

able.     Russo  v.  Morris,  etc..  Imp.  v.    Bid.   Co.,  —  R.   I.  — ,   61   Atl. 

Assn.,  104  La.  426,  29  So.  Rep.  46.  Rep.  646. 


§  103.]  WHO  IS  A  COMMON  CARRIER.  97 

child  of  tender  years  who  cannot  appreciate  his  danger,  and 
the  mere  happening  of  an  accident  to  such  a  child  on  an  ele- 
vator of  that  description  where  no  operator  is  employed  con- 
stitutes rebuttable  evidence  of  negligence. '♦^^ 

Sec.  103.     (§  81e.)     Bridge,  canal  and  turnpike  companies. 

— Bridge,^^  canal,'*^  and  turnpike^-'  companies  organized 
merely  for  the  purpose  of  furnishing  a  thoroughfare  over  which 
others  may  transport  goods,  but  not  engaged  in  such  trans- 
portation themselves,  are  not  common  carriers. 

46.  ShelMberger    v.    Fisher,    —  48.  Exchange   Ins.   Co.   v.   Canal 
C.  C.  A.  — ,  143  Fed.  937.  Co.,  10  Bosw.  180. 

47.  Kentucky,  etc..  Bridge  Co.  v.  49.  Lake  Superior,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v. 
Railroad    Co.,    37    Fed.    Rep.    616;  United  States,  93  U.  S.  444. 
Grigsby  v.  Chappell,  5  Rich.  443. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

OF  THE  DELIVERY  TO  THE  CARRIER,  AND  THE  EVI- 
DENCE THEREOF. 


§  104.  In  general. 

I.      OF  DELIVERY  TO  THE  CArfRIEB. 

105.  The  delivery  must  be  com- 

plete. 

106.  Delivery   may   be   made   to 

carrier's  agent. 

107.  Not  sufficient  when  made  to 

agent  not  authorized  to 
receive  it. 

108.  Delivery  to  carrier  by  agent 

of  shipper. 

109.  No  delivery  when  owner  re- 

tains custody — Passenger 
retaining  custody  of  bag- 
gage. 

110.  Same  subject. 

111.  Place     at     which     delivery 

must  be  made. 
113.  Must     be     for     immediate 
transportation. 

113.  Same  subject — When  liabil- 

ity begins. 

114.  Same     subject — Live    stock 

placed  in  yards  provided 
by  carrier. 

115.  Constructive        delivery  — 

Place  fixed  by  agreement 
or  usage. 

116.  Same  subject. 

117.  Same     subject — Limitations 

on  rule. 

118.  Same  subject — Rule    to    be 

applied  with  caution. 

119.  When  the  delivery  becomes 

complete. 

120.  Same    subject — Delivery   to 

ships  and  vessels. 

121.  Same   subject — Delivery    to 

railroads  and  express 
companies. 


§  122.  Carriers  not  required  to 
stop  for  goods  except  at 
regular  stations. 

123.  Same      subject  —  Express 

companies. 

124.  When     carrier     deemed    to 

have  accepted  goods. 

125.  Same    subject — How    when 

goods  are  loaded  by  owner. 

126.  Same   subject — Implied    ac- 

ceptance. 

127.  Checking,   memorandum   or 

entrj'  on  way-bill  not 
necessary  to  complete  de- 
livery. 

128.  Delivery  to  ferrymen,  when 

complete. 

129.  Delivery  to  connecting  car- 

riers to  complete  the 
transportation. 

130.  Duty  of  first  carrier  to  ef- 

fect delivery  to  succeeding 
carrier. 

131.  When  liability  of  first  car- 

rier terminates. 

132.  Same   subject — Duty    when 

succeeding  carrier  neg- 
lects or  refuses  to  receive 
the  goods. 

133.  How  duty  to  make  delivery 

to  a  succeeding  carrier  af- 
fected by  usage. 

134.  Agreements     between     car- 

riers not  binding  on 
owner. 

135.  Same  subject — Illustrations. 

136.  Same  subject. 

137.  Same    subject — Cases    hold- 

ing delivery  complete. 

138.  Owner     may     recover     for 

goods  constructively  de- 
livered. 


98 


DELIVERY  TO  THE  CARRIER. 


99 


§  139.  First  carrier  as  forwarding 
agent  for  owner. 

140.  Same  subject — Duty  of  first 

carrier  to  forward  ship- 
ping directions. 

141.  Carrier       cannot       become 

warehouseman  of  the 
goods  while  they  are  in 
transit. 

142.  Same  subject. 

143.  Of  the  carrier's  duty  to  ac- 

cept and  carry  the  goods. 

144.  Same   subject — Not   obliged 

to  accept  goods  of  a  kind 
he  does  not  profess  to 
carry. 

145.  Reasons  which  will  justify 

refusal  to  accept. 

146.  Same       subject — Press      of 

business  may  justify  re- 
fusal. 

147.  Same     subject — Other     rea- 

sons. 

148.  Same   subject — Not   obliged 

to  accept  from  one  not  au- 
thorized to  deliver — Lia- 
bility where  he  does. 

149.  Remedy    for    wrongful    re- 

fusal. 

150.  Carrier    may    demand    pre- 

payment of  the  freight. 

151.  Actual       acceptance       may 

waive  reasons  for  refusal. 

II.      THE   BILL   OF   LADING. 

152.  No  receipt,  bill  of  lading  or 

other  writing  necessary. 

153.  Liability  of  carrier  usually 

limited  by  contract. 

154.  Contracts  vary  in  form  and 

name. 

155.  Variance     in      duplicates — 

Shipper's  controls. 

156.  Variance    between     charter 

party  and  bill  of  lading. 

157.  Bills  of  lading  are  both  re- 

ceipts and  contracts  to 
carry. 


§  158. 
159. 
160. 

161. 
162. 
163. 
164. 

165. 


166. 
167. 


168. 


169. 
170. 


171. 


172. 


173. 
174. 


175. 
176. 


Same  subject — As  receipts, 
not  conclusive. 

Authority  of  agent  to  sign 
bills  of  lading. 

Liability  of  carrier  when 
goods  pot  received,  but  re- 
ceipt given. 

Same  subject— How  in  case 
of  bona  fide  holder. 

Same  subject— The  contrary 
view. 

Recitals  as  to  condition  of 
goods,  how  far  conclusive. 

Effect  of  recitals  as  to 
amount  or  quantity  of 
goods  received. 

Same  subject — Effect  of 
clauses  in  receipt  that 
weight,  contents,  or  value 
of  goods  are  unknown. 

Same  subject. 

Terms  of  bill  of  lading  can-  ^ 
not  be  varied  by  parol. 

Same  subject — Implied  obli- 
gations cannot  be  varied 
by  parol. 

Same  subject. 

Same  subject — Effect  of  sub- 
sequent parol  agreement. 

Effect  of  delivery  of  bill  of 
lading  after  oral  contract 
of  shipment  made  but  be- 
fore shipment  has  begun. 

Same  subject — How  when 
goods  shipped  under  parol 
contract  before  bill  of 
lading  delivered. 

Same  subject — Effect  of  cus- 
tom— Temporary  receipts. 

Same  subject — Acceptance 
of  bill  of  lading  after  oral 
agreement  made  to  fur- 
nish cars  at  certain  time. 

Bills  of  lading  are  assign- 
able, but  not  negotiable. 

Same  subject  —  Statutes 
making  them  negotiable. 


100 


THE  LAW  OF   CARRIERS. 


§  177.  Goods  must  be  delivered 
onlj'  in  accordance  with 
bill  of  lading  and  its  in- 
dorsements. 

178.  Same      subject— If      person 

claiming  goods  fails  to 
present  proper  bill  of  lad- 
ing, carrier  must  base  re- 
fusal to  deliver  on  that 
ground. 

179.  Carrier  must  respect  trans- 

fers. 

180.  Same     subject  —  Carrier's 

duty  to  ascertain  if  bill 
of  lading  issued. 

181.  Same    subject — Where    bill 

of  lading  not  presented, 
carrier  protected  if  deliv- 
ery is  made  to  proper 
party. 

182.  Same      subject — Effect      of 

transfer  of  bill  of  lading 
after  delivery  of  the 
goods. 

183.  Same   subject — Bill   of   lad- 

ing to  shipper's  order — 
Draft  attached. 

184.  Same     subject — Pledge      of 

bill  of  lading  to  shipper's 
order  to  secure  advances 
— Draft  attached. 

185.  Same     subject — Pledge     of 

bill  of  lading  to  shipper's 
order — Time  draft  at- 
tached. 

186.  Same       subject  —  Invoice 

alone  not  evidence  of 
title. 

187.  Same  subject — Direction  to 

notify  certain  person  does 
not  dispense  with  produc- 
tion of  bill  of  lading. 

188.  Same    subject  —  Duplicate 

bills  of  lading  to  consign- 
or— Possession  of  one  du- 
plicate not  indorsed. 


§  189.  Same  subject — Possession  of 
indorsed  duplicate  ob- 
tained by  fraud. 

190.  Same     subject  —  Duplicate 

receipts — Goods  delivered 
only  on  production  of  du- 
plicate. 

191.  Same  subject — Protection  of 

third  person  paying  draft 
for  consignee's  accommo- 
dation. 

192.  Effect   of   custom    on   deliv- 

ery  without  surrender   of 
bill  of  lading. 
19.'}.  When  consignment  may  be 
changed  by  shipper. 

194.  Same  subject — Consignment 

cannot  be  changed  by 
shipper  when  goods  be- 
come property  of  con- 
signee on  delivery  to  car- 
rier. 

195.  Same  subject — Illustrations. 

196.  Same      subject — Effect      of 

custom. 

197.  Who  may  sue  for  breach  of 

the  contract. 

198.  Same       subject  —  Statutes 

controlling. 

199.  By  what  law  the  effect  of  a 

contract  is  to  be  deter- 
mined. 

200.  The    rights    arising   out    of 

the  contract  must  be  cre- 
ated by  law. 

201.  Lex  loci  contractus  will  gov- 

ern in  the  great  majority 
of  cases. 

202.  When    performance   wholly 

within  one  state,  the  law 
of  that  state  governs. 

203.  Matters    relating    solely    to 

delivery  may  be  deter- 
mined by  law  of  place  of 
delivery. 


§  104.] 


DELIVERY   TO   THE  CARRIER. 


101 


204.  In   actions   against  carriers 

of  goods,  same  law  gov- 
erns whether  the  form  of 
action  is  assumpsit  or 
tort. 

205.  In  actions  for  personal   in- 

juries against  carriers  of 
passengers,  lex  loci  delicti 
governs  —  Contributory 
negligence  governed  by 
same  law — Proof  of  lev 
loci  delicti  must  be  made. 

206.  Rights    created    by    foreign 

law  should  be  enforced 
elsewhere  —  Exceptional 
rule  in  federal  and  New 
York  courts. 

207.  Proof    should    be    made    in 

court  of  forum  of  what 
the  foreign  law  is. 

208.  Matters  relating  to  remedy 

are  governed  by  law  of 
forum. 

209.  A   state  may    require    care 

and  diligence  of  carrier 
although  contract  is  one 
for  interstate  carriage. 

210.  Better  rule  is  that  perform- 

ance of  contract  of  car- 
riage is  indivisible. 

211.  Some   states   hold   perform- 

ance of  contract  of  car- 
riage divisible — Rights  of 
parties  to  be  construed  by 
law  of  place  where  negli- 
gent breach  occurs. 

212.  Lex    loci    contractus   gener- 

ally governs  val-idity  of 
limitations  of  carrier's  li- 
ability. 

213.  Presumption      exists      that 

that  law  applies  which  is 
most  favorable  to  the 
validity  of  the  contract. 


§  214.  Facts  extrinsic  of  pre- 
sumptive evidence  may  be 
considered  by  the  court  to 
determine  what  law  gov- 
erns. 

215.  Enforcement  of  limitation, 
valid  in  one  state,  by 
courts  of  another  state. 

210.  Enforcement  of  limitation 
valid  at  place  of  contract, 
valid  at  destination  and 
valid  at  forum. 

217.  Enforcement    of    limitation 

valid  at  place  of  contract, 
invalid  at  destination  and 
valid  at  forum. 

218.  Enforcement    of    limitation 

valid  at  place  of  contract, 
invalid  at  destination,  and 
invalid   at  forum. 

219.  Enforcement    of    limitation 

valid  at  place  of  contract, 
valid  at  destination  and 
invalid  at  forum. 

220.  Enforcement    of    limitation 

invalid  at  place  of  con- 
tract, valid  at  destination 
and  valid  at  forum. 

221.  Enforcement    of    limitation 

invalid  at  place  of  con- 
tract, invalid  at  destina- 
tion and  valid  at  forum. 

222.  Enforcement    of    limitation 

invalid  at  place  of  con- 
tract, valid  at  destination 
and  invalid  at  forum. 

223.  Enforcement    of    limitation 

invalid  at  place  of  con- 
tract, invalid  at  destina- 
tion and  invalid  at  forum. 

224.  Proof  must  be  made  of  what 

foreign  law  is. 


Sec.  104.  (§  81f.)  In  general. — In  considering  the  question 
of  the  carrier's  liability  in  relation  to  the  goods,  two  (inestions 
become  important  at  the  outset:     (1)  Have  the  goods  been  de- 


102  THE  LAW  OP   CARRIERS.  [§  105. 

livered  to  the  carrier  for  transportation;  and  (2)  What  evi- 
dence, receipt  or  contract  exists  or  is  necessary  in  regard  to 
such  delivery.  These  two  questions  form  the  subject  of  the 
present  chapter  and  will  be  separately  considered. 

I.  OF  DELIVERY  TO  THE  CARRIER. 

Sec.    105.     (§82.)     The   delivery  must   be   complete.— The 

duties  and  obligations  of  the  common  carrier  with  respect  to 
the  goods  commence  with  their  delivery  to  him;  and  this  de- 
livery must  be  complete,  so  as  to  put  upon  him  the  exclusive 
duty  of  seeing  to  their  safety.  The  law  will  not  divide  the  duty 
or  the  obligation  between  the  carrier  and  the  owner  of  the 
goods.^  It  must  rest  entirely  upon  the  one  or  the  other;  and 
until  it  has  become  imposed  upon  the  carrier  by  a  delivery  and 
acceptance,  he  cannot  be  held  responsible  for  them.  They  must 
be  delivered  to  the  carrier  himself,  or  to  some  agent  of  his, 
authorized  to  receive  them  on  his  behalf.  The  mere  deposit  of 
them  in  the  yard  of  an  inn  from  which  the  carrier  starts,  with- 
out leaving  them  in  charge  of  some  servant  of  the  carrier,  is  not 
sufficient. 2  Nor  will  it  be  enough  for  the  owner  to  put  them 
into  the  carrier's  vehicle  without  his  knowledge.^  They  must 
be  put  into  the  actual  custody  of  the  carrier  or  of  his  servants. 
Thus,  where  the  owner  of  the  goods,  having  previously  given 
notice  to  a  railroad  agent  of  his  intention  to  send  the  goods 
and  having  paid  him  the  freight,  sent  them  by  his  servant  to 
the  depot,  where  they  were  put  upon  the  railroad  platform 
and  the  attention  of  the  baggageman  called  to  them,  but  no 
notice  given  to  the  freight  agent,  it  was  held  that  there  had 
been  no  delivery,  and  that  the  railroad  company  was  not  liable 
for  damage  done  to  them  by  a  passing  train.^    So  where  a  per- 

1.  Brind    v.   Dale,   8    Car.    &   P.  2.  Selway    v.    Holloway,    1    Ld. 

207;    Railway   Co.   v.   Murphy,    60  Raym.   46;    Buckman    v.    Levi,    3 

Ark.    333,    30    S.    W.    Rep.    419,    46  Camp.  414. 

Am.  St.  Rep.  202,  citing  Hutchin-  3.  Leigh  v.  Smith,   1   Car.   &  P. 

son  on  Carr.;   Railway  Co.  v.  Mc-  638. 

Fadden,  154  U.  S.  155,  14  Sup.  Ct.  4.  Grosvenor  v.  The  Railroad,  39 

!>90,  38  L.  Ed.  944,  citing  Hutchin-  N.  Y.  34. 
son  on  Carr. 


§  106.]  DELIVERY  TO   THE  CARRIER.  103 

son  intending  to  take  the  train,  if  certain  funds  arrived  in  time, 
went  to  the  depot  and  deposited  her  trunk  and  box  on  the 
platform,  but,  when  the  train  arrived,  instructed  the  company's 
servants  not  to  put  them  on  the  train  as  she  did  not  intend 
to  take  it,  and  went  away  after  asking  permission  to  leave 
the  things  there  till  she  got  ready  to  go,  it  was  held  that  the 
trunk  and  box  had  not  been  delivered  to  the  railroad  company 
for  carriage,  and  that  the  company  was  therefore  not  liable  as 
a  common  carrier  for  their  loss.^  So  where  hogs  which  the 
owner  desired  to  have  transported  were,  when  the  train  ar- 
rived by  which  he  wished  them  to  go,  still  in  a  private  yard 
and  had  yet  to  be  loaded,  counted  and  receipted  for,  they  were 
held  not  to  be  so  far  delivered  to  the  railroad  company  as  to 
make  it  liable  for  delay  in  shipping.'^  So  goods  stored  along 
the  line  awaiting  shipment,  where  the  owner  is  to  load  them' 
when  he  can  get  the  necessary  cars,  are  not  completely  de- 
livered to  the  railroad  company  until  they  are  so  loaded  and 
ready  for  shipment.'^  And  cotton,  still  in  the  possession  of  a 
compress  company,  for  which  the  railroad  company  has  as  yet 
given  no  bill  of  lading,  and  of  which  it  has  neither  the  actual 
or  constructive  possession  nor  the  custody  or  control,  is  not 
yet  delivered  to  the  railroad  company  for  carriage,  and  the 
latter  is  not  liable  as  a  carrier  to  the  owner  for  its  loss,  though 
it  has  not  furnished  cars  for  its  transportation  as  rapidly  as 
it  had  agreed  with  the  compress  company  to  do.^ 

Sec.  106.     (§83.)     Delivery  may  be  made  to  carrier's  agent. 

— Where  the  carrier  places  a  person  in  charge  of  the  business 
at  a  certain  depot,  and  holds  him  out  to  the  public  as  being 
qualified  with  the  requisite  authority  to  receive  goods  for  ship- 
ment, a  delivery  to,  and  an  acceptance  by  him  of  the  goods, 

5.  Little   Rock,    etc.,   R'y   Co.   v.  Ct.   Rep.   554;    Arthur  v.  Railway 
Hunter,  42  Ark.  300.  Co.,  139  Fed.   127,  citing  Edwards 

6.  Frazier  v.    Railroad    Co.,    48  &  Co.  v.  Railroad  Co.    (Tex.  Civ. 
Iowa,  571.  App.),  81   S.  W.    800;     Martin    v. 

7.  Wilson  V.  Railroad  Co.,  82  Ga.  Railway  Co.,  55  Ark.  510,  19  S.  W. 
386.  Rep.  314.     See,  also,  Atlantic  Natl. 

8.  St.  Louis,  etc.,  R'y  Co.  r.  In-  Bank  v.  Railway,  106  Fed.  623. 
surance  Co.,  139  U.  S.  223,  11  Sup. 


104  THE  LAW    OP   CARRIERS.  [§  107. 

will  be  a  delivery  to  the  carrier.  In  the  case  of  Rogers  v.  The 
Railroad,^  the  oAvner  of  a  trunk  sent  it  to  the  defendants' 
depot  by  an  expressman,  who  placed  it  within  the  inclosure  of 
the  depot  beside  the  baggage  crate,  which  was  locked,  and 
then  w'cnt  into  the  ticket-office  and  informed  the  ticket  agent 
of  the  fact,  who  replied  "all  right;"  and  it  was  held  that  the 
case  should  have  gone  to  the  jury  upon  the  question  of  de- 
livery, the  court  saying  that  it  was  enough  to  establish  a  de- 
livery, in  the  first  instance,  to  prove  that  a  person  acting  as  the 
agent  of  the  company,  received  and  accepted  the  property  for 
transportation,  even  if  there  should  be,  in  fact,  another  person 
having  charge  of  the  business  of  receiving  freight.  ''The  ticket 
agent,"  said  the  court,  "was  apparently  in  charge  of  the  depot. 
The  company  which  sanctions  his  employment  and  thus  holds 
him  out  to  the  world  as  its  agent  is  not  at  liberty  to  repudiate 
his  acts.  "10 

Sec.  107.  (§84.)  Not  sufficient  when  made  to  agent  not 
authorized  to  receive  it. — A  delivery,  however,  to  an  employe 
whose  employment  is  such  as  to  negative  a  reasonable  belief 
in  the  owner's  mind  that  he  has  authority  to  receive  goods  for 
shipment  will  not  be  a  delivery  to  the  carrier,  unless  it  can  be 
shown  that  such  an  employe  was,  in  fact,  authorized  to  receive 
the  goods.  Thus,  delivery  to  one  of  the  crew  or  deck  hands  of 
a  steamboat  is  not  good  delivery  although  made  upon  the  boat, 
and  will  not  bind  the  owner  of  the  boat  as  a  carrier.  Where 
the  goods  were  taken  on  board  and  put  down  by  a  porter  in  a 
certain  spot  by  direction  of  one  who  was  a  deck  hand  em- 
ployed to  sweep  the  deck,  and  it  was  proven  that  the  clerk  of 
the  boat  was  the  only  authorized  person  to  receive  freight  and 
give  receipts  for  it,  a  majority  of  the  court  were  of  the  opinion 

9.  2  Lans.  269.  35  Vt.  605.    So  a  delivery  to  a  per- 

10.  A  passenger  upon  a  railroad  son  apparently  employed  in  a 
train  is  justified  in  regarding  the  freight  office,  who  receives  and 
man  whom  he  sees  handling  the  receipts  for  the  goods  in  the  pres- 
baggage  as  the  agent  of  the  com-  ence  and  with  the  knowledge  of 
pany  and  in  giving  him  directions  the  agent,  who  does  not  object,  is 
as  to  the  disposition  to  be  made  of  a  good  delivery  to  the  carrier, 
his  baggage.    Ouimit  v.  Henshaw,  Harrell  v.  Railroad,  106  N.  C.  258. 


§  108.]  DELIVERY   TO   THE   CARRIER.  105 

that,  as  the  deck  hand  was  not  the  agent  of  the  boat  for  the 
purpose  of  receiving  freight,  the  owners  had  incurred  no  lia- 
bility. But  some  of  the  judges  were  of  a  different  opinion, 
upon  the  ground  that  the  porter  had  a  right  to  presume  that 
the  deck  hand  had  been  left  in  charge  by  the  proper  officers 
of  the  boat.ii  And,  in  another  case,  it  was  held  that  to  make 
a  delivery  to  a  deck  hand  good  as  against  the  owners  of  a 
boat,  it  must  be  shown  that  he  was  authorized  to  receive 
freight,  or  that  it  was  delivered  to  him  in  pursuance  of  some 
special  contract  or  usage.^2 

Sec.  108,     (§  84a.)     Delivery  to  carrier  by  agent  of  shipper. 

— The  delivery  to  the  carrier  or  his  agent  may  be  made  not 
only  by  the  shipper  in  person,  but  also  by  his  authorized  agent. 
Where  the  owner  of  goods  places  them  in  the  hands  of  an  agent 
to  secure  their  transportation  by  a  carrier,  the  latter,  in  the 
absence  of  a  known  limitation  upon  the  agent's  authorit}-,  is 
justified  in  considering  the  agent  authorized  to  exercise  all  the 
powers  necessary  to  effect  the  purpose  of  the  agency,^ '^  and 
the  acts  of  the  agent  in  that  respect  will  be  binding  upon  the 
principal,  as  in  giving  directions  as  to  the  time  or  manner  of 
shipment  or  the  terms  and  conditions  upon  which  the  trans- 
portation is  to  be  undertaken.i^ 

Sec.  109.  (§85.)  No  delivery  when  owner  retains  custody 
— Passenger  retaining  custody  of  baggage. — If  the  owner, 
traveling  as  the  carrier's  passenger,  retain  the  custody  of  his 
baggage  instead  of  delivering  it  to  the  carrier  or  his  servant, 
he  thereby  assumes  the  responsibility  and  cannot  hold  the  car- 
rier liable  for  the  loss  of  it,  unless  the  loss  should  occur  from 

11.  Trowbridge  v.  Chapin,  23  Railway,  5  H.  &  N.  867;  Squire  v. 
Conn.  595.  Railroad,  98  Mass.  239;  York  Co.  i;. 

12.  Ford  V.  Mitchell,  21  Ind.  54.  Railroad,  3  Wall.  113;  Jennings  v. 
And  see  Leigh  v.  Smith,  1  Car.  &  Railway,   52  Hun.  227. 

P  638,  and  post,  §§  115-118.  In   Hayes   v.   Campbell,    63   Cal. 

13.  See  Mechem  on  Agency,  §  143,  it  is  held  that  knowledge  on 
311.  the   part   of  the  carrier   that  the 

14.  See  post,  §  457;  Nelson  v.  person  effecting  the  carriage  was 
Railroad,  48  N.  Y.  498;  London  v.  but  an  agent  for  others  was  suffl- 
Railway,  7  H.  &  N.  600;  Lewis  v.  cient  to  put  the  carrier  on  inquiry 


106  THE  LAW  OF   CARRIERS.  [§  110. 

the  negligence  or  fault  of  the  carrier;  in  which  event  he  would 
be  liable,  not  as  a  common  carrier,  but  as  an  ordinary  bailee 
for  hire.  As  where  the  passenger  placed  his  overcoat  upon  his 
seat  in  the  cars  instead  of  delivering  it  to  a  servant  of  the  com- 
pany, and  forgot  to  take  it  with  him  when  he  left  the  car,  and  it 
was  stolen,  it  was  held  that  the  railway  company  was  not  liable 
for  the  loss.i^  Or  if,  being  a  passenger  upon  a  steamboat,  he 
retain  the  possession  of  his  baggage,  the  carrier  cannot  be  made 
responsible  for  the  loss.^^ 

Sec.  110.  (j?  86.)  Same  subject. — In  such  cases  the  owner 
so  far  from  having  made  delivery  to  the  carrier,  has  purposely 
withheld  it.  He  has  not  trusted  the  carrier;  and  where  there 
has  been  no  trust  reposed  there  can  be  no  liability,  for  trust  is 
the  very  basis  of  the  liability;  and  it  has  been  expressly  held 
that  if  the  owner  of  goods  especially  undertake  to  watch  them, 
and,  refusing  to  place  confidence  in  the  carrier,  send  his  own 
servant  along  in  charge  of  them,  and  the  carrier  is  thereby 
induced  to  neglect  his  usual  precaution,  this  negatives  a  bail- 
ment and  no  liability  will  exist.^'^  But  the  owner  may  accom- 
pany the  goods  and  have  an  eye  upon  them,  or  he  may  send 
his  servant  with  them  to  look  after  them;  but  the  carrier  must 
have  the  entire  custody  and  control  of  them.  Otherwise  he 
will  not  be  liable  for  their  safety.^^ 

Sec.  111.  (§87.)  Place  at  which  delivery  must  be  made, — 
But  it  is  not  necessary  in  all  cases  to  make  the  delivery  to  the 
carrier  at  the  place  appointed  by  him,  or  at  his  office  or  place 
of  business,  provided  the  delivery  be  made  to  a  person  who  is 
authorized  to  receive  the  goods.     Delivery  to  the  agent  of  a 

in  ascertaining  the  extent  of  the  treated     of     hereafter.       Chapter 

agent's  powers,  and  that  the  own-  XIII. 

ers  could  not  be  bound  by  a  rate         17.  East  India  Company  v.  Pul- 

a greed  upon  with  the  agent  in  ex-  len,  2  Strange,  690. 

cess  of  his  authority.  18.  Robinson  v.  Dunmore,  2  Bos. 

15.  Tower  v.  Railroad,  7  Hill,  47.  &  P.  416;    Hollister  v.  Nowlen,  19 

16.  Cohen  v.  Frost,  2  Duer,  335.  Wend.    234;    Willoughby     v.     Hor- 
This  subject  of  the  liability  of  ridge,  74  Eng.  C.  L.  R.  742;  Brind 

the  carrier  for  the  passenger's  bag-  v.  Dale,  8  Car.  &  P.  207;  Cohen  v. 
gage    will    be    more    particularly     Frost,  2  Duer,  335. 


§112.]  DELIVERY  TO   THE  CARRIER.  107 

stage  company  has,  consequently,  been  held  good  although  not 
made  at  the  office  of  the  company.^  ^  But  delivery  to  the  driver, 
not  at  the  company's  office  and  without  notice  to  it  and  with- 
out its  assent,  has  been  held  not  to  be  a  good  delivery,  the 
driver  not  being  the  authorized  servant  of  the  company  for 
that  purpose.2o  It  may  be  shown,  however,  that  such  was  the 
usage  known  to  the  company  and  recognized  by  it.^i  And  the 
driver  of  a  coach  may  make  the  company  liable  as  a  common 
carrier  for  the  baggage  of  a  passenger  taken  on  anywhere  upon 
the  route.  And  where  the  company  is  a  carrier  of  goods  as 
well  as  of  passengers,  he  may  receive  such  goods  for  carriage 
at  any  point  upon  the  route  at  which  there  is  no  office  or  agent ; 
for,  in  the  absence  of  express  directions  to  the  contrary  known 
to  the  owner  of  the  goods,  the  law  will  imply  the  authority. 
But  the  delivery,  if  made  away  from  the  office  or  place  of 
business  of  an  express  company,  must  be  made  to  an  agent  and 
not  to  an  agent's  assistant  or  derk  temporarily  appointed  by 
him.  Such  an  assistant,  it  is  said,  may  officiate  for  the  agent  at 
his  office,  and  his  receipt  will  be  valid  even  in  the  absence  of 
the  agent,  because  that  would  be  a  delivery  at  the  office  or  at 
the  appointed  place  of  business  of  the  principal;  but  such  a 
delivery  out  of  the  office  or  away  from  it  would  be  unauthor- 
ized and  would  not  bind  the  principal.^^ 

Sec.  112.     (§88.)     Must  be  for  immediate  transportation. — 

The  delivery  must  be  to  the  carrier  or  his  agent  for  immediate 

19.  Phillips  V.  Earle,  8  Pick.  182.  contracts  for  freight,  and  although 

20.  Blanchard  v.  Isaacs,  3  Barb,  it  was  shown  that  the  captain  was 
388.  only  to  navigate  the  boat,  it  not 

21.  See  post,  §  115.  appearing    that    the    shipper    had 

22.  Cronkite  v.  Wells,  32  N.  Y.  knowledge  of  such  an  arrange- 
247.  And  see  Southern  Ex.  Co.  v.  ment;  and  the  decision  was  put 
Newby,  36  Ga.  635.  upon  the  ground  that  the  principal 

But  in  Witbeck  v.  Schuyler,  44  should  be  held  responsible  for  the 

Barb.  469,  delivery  of  a  trunk  to  acts  of  his  agent  performed  with- 

the   captain    of   a    steamboat   was  in  the  scope  of  the  apparent  au- 

held  sufficient,  although  the  com-  thority  which  the  principal  allows 

pany  to  which  the  boat  belonged  him  to  assume, 

had  an  agent  in   the  same  place,  Where,  however,  a  shipment  wag 

whose   business   it  was    to    make  made  upon  a  steamboat  to  be  car- 


108 


THE  LAW   OF   CARRIERS. 


[§112. 


transportation;  for,  if  the  goods  are  delivered  to  him  to  be 
stored  by  him  for  a  certain  time,  or  until  the  happening  of  a 
certain  event,  or  until  something  further  is  done  to  prepare 
them  for  transportation,  or  until  further  orders  are  received 
from  the  owner,  the  carrier  becomes  a  mere  depositary  or 
bailee  until  the  appointed  time  has  expired  or  the  other  con- 
tingency happened  upon  which  the  carriage  is  to  commence, 
or  until  further  orders  have  been  given,  as  the  case  may  be; 
for  nothing  could  be  more  unjust  than  to  permit  the  owner  of 
the  goods  to  impose  upon  a  mere  depositary  or  warehouseman, 
whether  he  has  yet  become  related  to  the  goods  as  carrier  or 
not,  the  extremely  hazardous  responsibility  of  the  common 
carrier  so  long  as  it  might  suit  his  interest  or  convenience  to 
do  S0.23     But  the  moment  such  orders  are  given,  or  such  other 


ried  to  the  terminus  of  a  distant 
railroad  for  further  transporta- 
tion, and  it  was  lost  by  the  steam- 
boat, it  was  held  in  a  suit  against 
the  road  that  the  claim  that  the 
boat  was  the  agent  of  the  road 
must  be  distinctly  proven,  and  it 
was  intimated  that  it  was  doubtful 
whether  the  road  could  constitute 
an  agency  so  foreign  to  the  pur- 
poses of  its  incorporation.  Mis- 
souri Coal  Co.  V.  The  Han.,  etc., 
R.  R.,  35  Mo.  84. 

23.  Mt.  Vernon  Co.  v.  Railroad 
Co.,  29  Ala.  296,  8  So.  Rep.  687; 
Barron  v.  Eldredge,  100  Mass.  455; 
O'Neill  V.  Railroad  Co.,  60  N.  Y. 
138;  Basnight  v.  Railroad  Co.,  Ill 
N.  Car.  592,  16  S.  E.  Rep.  323; 
Dixon  V.  Railway  Co.,  110  Ga.  173, 
35  S.  E.  Rep.  369;  Schmidt  v.  Rail- 
way Co.,  90  Wis.  504,  63  N.  W. 
Rep.  1057;  Railway  Co.  v.  Bank, 
112  Fed.  861,  50  C.  C.  A.  558,  56 
L.  R.  A.  546;  Railway  Co.  v.  Riggs, 
10  Kan.  App.  578,  62  Pac.  Rep.  712. 

Thus  where  an  initial  carrier 
places  a  loaded  car  on  the  side- 
track of  a  connecting  carrier,  with- 


out notice  to  the  latter,  and  with- 
out any  mark  of  the  name  and 
address  of  the  consignee,  or  any 
way-bill  or  shipping  directions,  the 
connecting  carrier  is  only  a  bailee 
of  the  car,  and  its  stringent  liabil- 
ity as  a  common  carrier  does  not 
attach  until  such  way-bill  or  direc- 
tions are  given,  or  until  it  is  in- 
formed to  what  place  the  car  is  to 
be  forwarded  and  to  whom  deliv- 
ered. Mt.  Vernon  Co.  v.  Railroad 
Co.,  supra. 

So  where  the  goods  are  yet  to 
be  graded,  classified,  marked  or  set 
apart  from  others  by  the  shipper, 
before  they  are  ready  for  ship- 
ment, they  cannot  be  deemed  to 
be  delivered  to  the  carrier  for  car- 
riage. Iron  Mt.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Knight, 
122  U.   S.  79. 

A  common  carrier  is  only  liable 
as  such  for  a  passenger's  baggage 
when  delivered  to  it  for  immediate 
transportation.  If  it  is  brought  to 
the  depot  for  a  certain  train  and 
on  finding  that  it  cannot  go  until 
a  later  train,  the  passenger  leaves 
it  at  the  depot  for  such  later  train, 


113.] 


DELIVERY  TO  THE  CARRIER. 


109 


conditions  are  fulfilled,  the  carrier  having  accepted  them  with 
that  understanding,  his  duties  and  responsibilities  as  carrier 
begin.2^ 

Sec.  113.  (§  89.)  Same  subject — When  liability  begins.— 
But  if  the  delivery  be  made  at  the  warehouse  or  other  place  of 
business  of  the  carrier  for  as  early  transportation  as  can  be 
made  in  the  course  of  the  carrier's  business,  and  subject  only 
to  such  delays  as  may  necessarily  occur  in  awaiting  the  de- 
parture of  trains,  vessels,  or  other  vehicles  of  transportation,  or 
from  the  performance  of  prior  engagements  by  him,  he  be- 
comes, the  moment  the  delivery  is  made^  a  carrier  as  to  the 
goods,  and  his  responsibility  as  such  at  once  attaches.^^  And 
although  there  be  considerable  delay  and  long  storage  of  the 
goods  until  the  carrier  can  secure  cars  in  which  to  make  the 
shipment,  if  he  receives  them  solely  for  transportation,  he  at 
once  assumes  the  liability  of  a  common  carrier;    and  it  makes 


the  railroad  company  is  liable  in 
the  interim  as  a  warehouseman 
only.  Goodbar  v.  Railway  Co.,  53 
Mo.  App.  434. 

Where  baggage  which  cannot  be 
checked  until  a  ticket  is  presented 
is  given  to  the  carrier  on  Satur- 
day, and  no  ticket  is  presented  un- 
til the  following  Monday,  the  car- 
rier in  the  meantime  is  liable  only 
as  a  warehouseman.  Murray  v. 
Steamship  Co.,  170  Mass.  166,  48 
N.  E.  Rep.  1093,  64  Am.  St.  Rep. 
290. 

24.  Railway  Co.  v.  Murphy,  60 
Ark.  333,  30  S.  W,  Rep.  419,  46  Am. 
St.  Rep.  202,  citing  Hutchinson  on 
Carr.    See  ante,  §  72. 

25.  Clark  v.  Needles,  25  Pa.  St. 
338;  Blossom  v.  Griffin,  3  Kern. 
569;  Wade  v.  Wheeler,  47  N.  Y. 
658;  Michigan  R.  R.  v.  Shurtz,  7 
Mich.  515;  Gregory  v.  Railway  Co., 
46  Mo.  App.  574,  citing  Hutchin- 
son on  Carr.;  Railway  Co.  v.  Mur- 
phy,  60   Ark.    333,    30    S.   W.   Rep. 


419,  46  Am.  St.  Rep.  202,  citing 
Hutchinson  on  Carr. 

Thus,  where  goods  are  delivered 
to  a  railroad  company  for  trans- 
portation at  its  earliest  conveni- 
ence, nothing  further  remaining  to 
be  done  in  reference  to  them  by 
the  owner,  the  company  is  liable 
as  a  common  carrier  if  the  goods 
are  burned  before  shipment. 
Grand  Tower,  etc.,  Co.  v.  Ullman, 
89  111.  244. 

Where  goods  are  properly 
marked  for  shipment  and  placed 
inside  the  carrier's  freight  house 
with  the  agreement  on  the  part 
of  the  carrier's  agent  to  ship  them 
on  the  following  morning,  ship- 
ment being  delayed  until  that  time 
because  no  car  is  available,  the 
company  will  be  liable  as  a  com- 
mon carrier  while  the  goods  are 
so  awaiting  shipment.  Meloche  v. 
Railway  Co.,  116  Mich.  69,  74  N. 
W.  Rep.  301. 


110  THE  LAW  OF   CARRIERS.  [§  113. 

no  difference,  it  has  been  said,  whether  the  loading  is  to  be  per- 
formed by  the  shipper  himself  or  by  the  carrier.^^  And  the 
general  and  well-settled  rule  is,  that  the  liability  of  the  com- 
mon carrier  commences  whenever  and  as  soon  as  the  goods 
have  been  delivered  to  and  accepted  by  him  solely  for  trans- 
l)ortation,  although  they  may  not  be  put  immediately  in  itinere, 
but  are,  at  first,  for  his  own  convenience  and  preparatory  to  the 
voyage  or  journey  for  which  they  are  intended,  temporarily 
deposited  in  his  wharf  or  store  room.  In  such  cases,  the  deposit 
is  a  mere  accessary  to  the  carriage,  and  does  not  postpone  his 
liability  as  common  carrier  to  the  time  when  they  shall  be 
actually  put  in  motion  towards  their  place  of  destination.^'^ 
And  a  delivery  to  the  carrier  with  the  name  and  address  of 
the  consignee  marked  upon  the  goods  is,  in  the  absence  of 
some  directions  or  agreement  otherwise,  equivalent  to  an  ex- 
press direction  to  transport  them  to  such  consignee  at  once; 
and  the  reception  of  the  goods  under  such  circumstances  im- 
poses upon  him,  immediately,  the  obligation  to  forward  forth- 
with, and  the  responsibility  of  a  common  carrier,-^  unless  the 
habitual  course  of  dealing  between  the  parties  has  been  other- 
wise. And  so,  after  the  relation  of  carrier  to  the  goods  has 
become  established  by  their  delivery  to  him  for  immediate 
transportation,  it  may  be  changed  to  that  of  warehouseman 
by  subsequent  orders  by  the  owner  to  delay  the  forwarding  of 
them.  Thus,  where  the  goods  had  been  delivered  to  the  rail- 
road company  for  shipment,  and  they  were  loaded  upon  its 
cars  for  that  purpose  and  were  about  to  be  started,  but  the 

26.  But  when  the  cars  or  ve-  na,  6  Gray,  539;  Story  on  Bail.  §§ 
hides  are  furnished,  and  a  delay  534,  536;  Rogers  v.  Wheeler,  52  N. 
in  loading  them  is  occasioned  by  Y.  262;  North  German  Lloyd  S.  S. 
the  act  of  the  shipper,  and  in  the  Co.  v.  BuUen,  111  111.  App.  426; 
meantime  the  goods  are  destroyed  Cooke  v.  Railroad  Co.,  57  Mo.  App. 
through  no  fault  of  the  carrier,  the  471,  citing  Hutchinson  on  Carr. 
carrier  will  not  be  liable.  London  28.  Witbeck  v.  Holland,  45  N.  Y. 
&  L.  Insurance  Co.  v.  Railroad  Co,  13;  Shelton  v.  Merchants'  Des. 
144  N.  Y.  200,  39  N.  E.  Rep.  79,  43  Trans.  Co.,  36  N.  Y.  S.  C.  527; 
Am.  St.  Rep.  752.  s.   c,    59   N.   Y.   258;     Gregory   v. 

27.  Fitchburg,  etc.,  R.  R.  v.  Han-  Railway  Co.,  stipra. 


§  114.]  DELIVERY  TO  TUE  CARRIER.  HI 

company  was  then  requested  by  the  owner  to  wait  until  he 
could  see  the  party  to  whom  he  had  sold  them,  which  request 
was  complied  with;  and  the  next  day  the  goods,  while  be- 
ing so  detained,  caught  fire  and  were  damaged,  it  was  held 
that  from  the  moment  the  request  was  made  to  detain  the 
goods  the  liability  of  the  company  was  as  warehouseman 
only.29 

Sec.  114.  Same  subject — Live  stock  placed  in  yards  pro- 
vided by  carrier. — Where  the  carrier  has  constructed  pens  or 
yards  in  order  to  facilitate  the  loading  of  live  stock,  the  mere 
placing  of  the  stock  in  such  pens  will  not  be  sufficient  to  im- 
pose upon  him  the  duties  and  liabilities  of  a  common  carrier  of 
live  stock.30  If,  however,  he  receives  the  stock  into  the  pens 
or  yards  thus  provided,  for  the  purpose  solely  of  being  loaded 
for  transportation,  he  will  thereby  assume  the  obligation  of 
forwarding  the  stock  in  the  usual  way,  and  his  liability  as  a 
common  carrier  will  attach  at  the  time  the  stock  is  so  re- 
ceived.31  But  if  the  stock,  while  in  the  carrier's  pens  or  yards 
awaiting  transportation,  is  subject  to  the  right  of  the  shipper 
to  remove  it  when  necessary  for  food  and  water,  it  has  been 
held  that  the  carrier's  liability  will  be  no  greater  than  that  of 
an  ordinary  bailee,  and  that  he  will  be  liable  only  where  he 
has  failed  to  exercise  ordinary  care.32 

Sec.  115.  (§  90.)  Constructive  delivery — Place  fixed  by- 
agreement  or  usage. — But,    while  it  is  the  undoubted  general 

29.  St.  Louis,  etc.,  R.  R.  v.  Mont-  31.  Lackland  v.  Railway  Co., 
gomery,  39  III.  335.  101   Mo.   App.   420,   74  S.   W.  Rep. 

Wood  piled  up  along  a  railroad  505,   citing   Hutchinson   on   Carr; 

track,  to  be  loaded  by  the  owner  Cooke  v.  Railroad  Co.,  57  Mo.  App. 

when  he  could  get  the  cars,  is  not  471. 

completely   delivered   to   the   com-  Where  cattle  have  been  put  into 

pany.     Wilson  v.  Railway  Co.,  82  the    carrier's    pen    for    immediate 

Ga.   386,  citing  Wells  v.  Railroad  shipment,    and   their   loading   has 

Co.,    6    Jones'    L.    47,    and    distin-  begun,    the    carrier    is    liable     as 

guishing   Central   R.   R.   v.   Hines,  such.     Gulf,  etc.,  R'y.  Co.   i\   Tra- 

19  Ga.  203;  Fleming  v.  Hammond,  wick,  80  Tex.  270;   McCullough  v. 

19  Ga.  145.  Ry.  Co.,  34  Mo.  App.  23. 

30.  Railway  Co.  v.  Byrne,  100  32.  Railroad  Co.  v.  Powers,  — 
Fed.  359,   40  C.  C.  A.  402.  Neb.  — ,  103  N.  W.  Rep.  678. 


112  THE  LAW   OF    CARRIERS.  [§115. 

rule  that  the  delivery,  to  bind  the  carrier,  must  be  made  either 
to  him  or  to  some  one  with  authority  from  him,  or  who  may  be 
rightfully  presumed  to  have  such  authority,  it  is  not  to  be  un- 
derstood that  it  is  not  subject  to  such  conventional  arrange- 
ments between  the  parties  as  they  may  choose  to  make  in  re- 
gard to  the  mode  of  delivery,  or  that  it  may  not  be  varied  by 
usage,  or  by  a  particular  course  of  dealing  between  them. 
They  may  make  such  stipulations  upon  the  subject  as  they  see 
fit,  and  when  such  stipulations  are  made,  they,  and  not  the 
general  law,  are  to  govern.  If,  therefore,  the  parties  agree 
that  the  goods  may  be  deposited  for  transportation  at  any 
particular  place  and  without  an  express  notice  to  the  carrier, 
such  deposit  will  be  a  sufficient  delivery;  and  proof  of  a  con- 
stant and  habitual  practice  and  usage  of  the  carrier  to  receive 
the  goods  when  they  are  deposited  for  him  in  a  particular 
place,  without  special  notice  of  such  deposit,  is  sufficient  to 
show  a  public  offer  by  the  carrier  to  receive  goods  in  that  mode, 
and  to  constitute  an  agreement  between  the  parties,  by  which 
the  goods,  when  so  deposited,  shall  be  considered  as  delivered 
to  him,  without  any  further  notice.  Such  a  practice  and  usage 
are  tantamount  to  an  open  declaration,  a  public  advertisement 
by  the  carrier,  that  such  a  delivery  should,  of  itself,  be  deemed 
an  acceptance  by  him;  and  to  permit  him  to  set  up,  against 
those  who  had  been  thereby  induced  to  omit  it,  the  want  of 
the  formality  of  an  express  notice,  which  had  been  thus  waived, 
would  be  sanctioning  injustice  and  fraud.  As  where,  for  in- 
stance, the  delivery  was  upon  a  private  wharf  or  dock,  used 
exclusively  by  the  carrier,  and  upon  which  it  had  been  its 
custom  and  constant  usage  to  receive  goods  left  there  for  trans- 
portation by  it,  such  a  deposit,  in  the  usual  and  accustomed 
manner,  would  be  constructive  notice,  and  would  be  regarded 
as  sufficient  delivery,  though  the  goods  were  not  left  in  charge 
of  any  of  its  servants.^^ 

33.  Merriam    v.     The     Railroad,  180  Mass.  252,  62  N.  E.  Rep.  590; 

20  Conn.   354;   Converse  r.  Trans.  Truax   v.    Railroad    Co.,    3    Houst. 

Co.,  33  Conn.  166.    See  also,  Wash-  233,  251. 

burn-Crosby   Co.    v.   Railroad   Co.,  Where  a  railroad  company  erects 


,<  116.] 


DELIVERY  TO   THE  CARRIER. 


113 


Sec.  116.  (§  91.)  Same  subject.— And  so,  where  the  plain- 
tiff sent  her  trunk,  properly  labeled  with  her  name  and  desti- 
nation, to  the  depot  of  the  company,  during  business  hours  in 
the  evening,  intending  to  take  passage  on  its  train  the  next 
morning,  and  the  company's  employees  being  at  supper,  the 
drayman  put  the  trunk  down  in  the  waiting-room  without  no- 
tice to  any  of  them,  as  he  had  often  done  before,  which  was 
proven  to  have  been  a  custom  with  passengers  intending  to 
leave  by  the  morning  trains,  it  was  held  that  when  the  trimk 
was  thus  deposited  it  was  at  the  risk  of  the  company,  and,  it 
having  been  burned  during  the  night,  the  company  was  held 
liable.  ' '  That  the  delivery  may  be  made  at  the  proper  place 
of  receiving  such  baggage,  under  the  express  assent  or  author- 
ity of  the  carrier,  without  notice  to  its  employees,  will  not,  we 
presume,  be  disputed,"  said  the  court.  "It  is  equally  clear, 
upon  principle,  that  this  assent  may  be  presumed  from  the 
course  of  business  or  the  custom  of  the  carrier.  Upon  evidence 
of  this  character,  contracts  based  upon   business  transactions 


a  platform  for  the  purpose  of 
shipping  cotton,  and  its  course  of 
business  is  such  as  to  induce  par- 
ties to  store  cotton  on  it  for  ship- 
ment by  next  freight  train,  and  a 
party  does  so  store  it  there  for 
shipment,  but  the  train  passes  and 
neglects  to  take  it  on,  and  it  is 
destroyed  during  the  delay  by  fire 
caught  from  sparks  from  the  com- 
pany's engines,  the  company  is 
liable  for  the  loss.  Meyer  v. 
Vicksburg  R.  R.  Co.,  41  La.  Ann. 
639. 

A  deposit  of  cotton  in  the  street 
along  side  of  the  railroad  platform 
or  in  the  railroad  cotton-yard,  in 
pursuance  of  a  custom  to  deposit 
it  there  for  shipment,  is  sufficient. 
Montgomery,  etc.,  Ry.  Co.  v.  Kolb, 
73  Ala.  396,  approving  text. 

A  shipper  having  freight  to  be 
transported  by  railroad  cannot 
8 


make  a  good  delivery  to  the  rail- 
road company  by  simply  deposit- 
ing the  goods  anywhere  along  the 
line.  But  where,  by  agreement, 
freight  is  deposited  at  a  given 
point  on  the  line  of  railroad  for 
the  purpose  of  immediate  trans- 
portation, such  deposit  will  con- 
stitute a  delivery  to  the  company, 
and  its  liability  as  a  common  car- 
rier will  commence  at  the  time 
the  goods  are  so  placed.  Railway 
Co.  V.  Marchman,  121  Ga.  235,  48 
S.  E.  Rep.  961. 

A  deposit  of  hay  for  immediate 
shipment  at  the  usual  place  of 
loading  hay  at  the  carrier's  depot, 
in  pursuance  of  the  usage  of  the 
parties,  makes  the  carrier  liable 
therefore  as  a  common  carrier. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Keith,  8  Ind.  App. 
57,  35  N.  E.  Rep.  296. 


114  THE  LAW  OF  CARRIERS.  [§  117. 

are  constantly  established.  .  .  .  There  was  evidence  tending 
to  show  a  course  of  business  on  the  part  of  the  defendant,  a 
custom  to  receive  baggage  left  at  the  station-house,  as  in  this 
case,  without  notice  to  defendants '  servants.  Upon  evidence  of 
this  character,  it  was  proper  that  the  facts  should  have  been 
left  to  the  determination  of  the  jury,  whether  there  had  been 
a  delivery  of  the  property  within  the  rules  above  announced,— 
whether  a  course  of  business,  a  custom,  had  been  established, 
to  the  effect  that  a  delivery  of  baggage  at  the  station-house, 
without  notice,  was  regarded  by  defendant  as  a  delivery  to  its 
servants,  and  whether  plaintiff's  trunk  was  received  under  this 
custom.  "S'*  And  upon  a  second  appeal  to  the  same  court,  in 
the  same  case,  from  a  verdict  and  judgment  in  the  inferior 
court  in  favor  of  the  plaintiff  for  the  value  of  her  trunk,  after 
the  case  had  been  sent  back  for  a  retrial  upon  this  view  of  the 
law,  the  court  held  that  the  jury  was  fully  justified  in  finding 
that  there  was  a  delivery  of  the  trunk  to  the  company  and  an 
acceptance  by  it,  and  the  judgment  was  afiirmed.^^ 

Sec.  117.  (§92.)  Same  subject — Limitations  on  rule. — But 
where  the  proof  was  of  delivery  upon  a  boat  of  his  trunk  by  one 
intending  to  become  a  passenger,  and  it  was  shown  that  this 
was  the  customary  mode  for  the  delivery  of  the  baggage  of 
passengers,  but  that  this  usage  existed  only  as  to  baggage  and 
not  as  to  ordinary  freight,  it  was  held  that  the  plaintiff  could 
not  recover  for  the  loss  of  his  trunk  from  the  owners  of  the 
boat,  inasmuch  as  he  had  not  accompanied  it  upon  the  boat  as 
a  passenger  and  had  not  become  under  the  circumstances  the 
boat's  passenger  at  all.  And  while  it  was  admitted  that  a 
constructive  delivery  without  notice  might  bind  the  carrier  as 
to  both  baggage  and  freight  when  the  usage  was  clearly 
proven,  no  such  usage  being  shown  in  this  case  as  to  freight, 
which  the  trunk  without  its  owner  was  to  be  considered,  there 
had  been  no  delivery  and  the  owners  of  the  boat  were  conse- 

34.  Green  v.  The  Railroad,  38  35.  Green  v.  The  Railroad,  41 
Iowa,  100.  Iowa,    410. 


I 


§  118.]  DELIVERY   TO   THE   CARRIER.  115 

quently  not  responsible.^''  But  it  was  decided  in  a  leading 
case  upon  this  branch  of  the  law,  that  although,  according  to 
the  usual  custom  and  understanding  of  the  parties,  delivery 
on  the  dock  by  or  near  the  boat  might  be  sufficient,  it  must, 
in  order  to  bind  the  carrier  and  make  him  responsible  for  them, 
be  accompanied  by  express  notice  to  him;  and  the  defendant 
being  informed  that  there  were  four  boxes  only,  which  he  took 
on  board,  could  not  be  held  responsible  for  more,  although  five 
boxes  had  been  really  deposited  on  the  dock  for  his  boat,  he 
having  been  informed  that  there  were  only  four.^^ 

Sec.  118.  (§93.)  Same  subject— Rule  to  be  apglied  with 
caution. — And  it  must  be  admitted  that  the  doctrine  of  con- 
structive delivery  without  notice  to  the  carrier  is  one  which 
should  be  applied  with  great  caution.  It  is  undoubtedly  com- 
petent for  him  to  bind  himself  by  such  a  delivery  either  by  his 
express  agreement  that  a  deposit  of  goods  at  a  particular  place 
shall  be  a  valid  delivery  to  him,  or  by  so  advertising  it  to  the 
public,  or  by  a  well  known  and  established  custom  to  receive 
the  goods  in  that  way,  which  would  perhaps  be  as  binding  upon 
him  as  to  persons  who  have  acted  upon  the  notice  or  the  usage 
as  an  express  agreement;  and  cases  may  arise  in  which  the 
usage  and  course  of  dealing  between  the  parties  should  un- 
doubtedly have  that  effect.  But,  certainly,  to  do  so  they  should 
be  shown  to  have  existed  and  to  have  been  uniformly  acted 
upon  by  the  parties,  by  the  most  satisfactory  proof  and  for  a 
sufficient  length  of  time  to  have  become  an  established  usage, 
tantamount  to  an  agreement  to  that  effect,  or  to  a  declaration 
to  the  public  that  a  delivery  in  accordance  with  the  usage  will 
be  deemed  an  acceptance  by  him  for  the  purpose  of  the  trans- 
portation ;  and  perhaps  it  should  be  shown  that  a  reliance  upon 
the  previous  course  of  dealing  or  the  usage  or  the  notice  had 
controlled  the  action  of  the  shipper  in  the  particular  instance. 
But  few  cases  are  to  be  found  in  which  the  rule  has  been  ap- 

36.  Wright  v.  Caldwell,  3  Mich.  The    Southern   Express   Company. 
51.  51  Ala.   481;    Buckman  v.  Levi,  3 

37.  Packard  v.  Getman,  6  Cowen,  Camp.  414. 
757.      And    see   also    O'Bannon    v. 


116  THE  LAW   OP    CARRIEBS.       ,  [§  119. 

plied,  and  it  is  to  be  presumed  that  such  instances  will  not  be 
of  frequent  occurrence. 

Sec.  119.     (§94.)     When  the  delivery  becomes  complete. — 

The  entire  responsibility  for  the  safety  of  the  goods  being 
shifted  from  the  owner  to  the  common  carrier  as  soon  as  the 
delivery  is  made,  it  frequently  becomes  a  question  of  the  great- 
est importance  and  of  great  nicety  to  determine  at  what  instant 
of  time  such  delivery  becomes  complete ;  for,  as  we  have  seen, 
until  the  entire  exclusive  custody  of  them  has  been  given  to 
the  carrier,  no  responsibility  rests  upon  him  in  that  character. 
The  most  that  can  be  said  generally  upon  this  subject  is,  that 
a  tender  of  the  goods  being  made  to  the  carrier,  his  liability 
for  their  safety  as  carrier  arises  eo  instanti  with  his  acceptance 
of  them.^  The  difficulty  lies  in  applying  the  law  in  such  cases 
and  not  in  its  statement ;  that  is,  in  determining  in  the  particu- 
lar instance  exactly  at  what  time  the  circumstances  show  the 
acceptance  to  have  taken  place.  To  effect  a  delivery  to  the 
carrier  there  must  be,  either  actually  or  in  legal  effect,  a  com- 
plete surrender  to  him  of  possession  and  custody,  and,  as  a  con- 
sequence, all  control  over  the  goods  must  be  abandoned  by  the 
owner  until  the  purpose  of  the  bailment  has  been  accomplished ; 
and  until  this  has  been  done  it  cannot  be  said  that  the  carrier 
has  assumed  any  responsibility  for  them  as  carrier. 

Sec.  120.  (§95.)  Same  subject — Delivery  to  ships  and  ves- 
sels.— Delivery  to  a  ship  or  vessel  is  complete  as  soon  as  the 

1.  The  delivery  is  complete  before  they  are  shipped,  and  has 
when  the  goods  are  accepted  for  notified  the  carrier's  agent  that 
carriage,  and  though  the  statute  they  are  upon  the  platform  and 
provides  that  transportation  shall  ready  for  shipment,  and  the  agent 
be  deemed  to  have  commenced  agrees  to  forward  them,  there  is  a 
when  the  bill  of  lading  is  signed,  sufficient  delivery  to  make  the 
the  carrier  may  become  liable  be-  company  liable  as  a  common  car- 
fore  if  the  goods  have  been  ac-  rier.  Stapleton  v.  Railway  Co., 
lually  delivered  and  accepted  by  133  Mich.  739,  10  Det.  L.  N.  133, 
him.  East,  etc.,  Ry.  Co.  v.  Hall,  94  N.  W.  Rep.  739,  citing  Hutchin- 
64  Tex.  615.  son   on   Carr.      See   also.   Railway 

Where  the  shipper  of  goods  has  Co.  r.  Murphy,  60  Ark.  333,  30  S. 

done  all  he  intends  to  do  to  them  W.  Rep.  419,  46  Am.  St.  Rep.  202. 


§  120.]  DELIVERY  TO   THE  CARRIEB,  117 

master,  mate  or  any  other  agent  of  the  owner  receives  the 
goods ;  and  they  may  be  received  upon  the  ship,  on  the  wharf, 
on  the  beach  or  at  a  warehouse,  or  at  any  other  place  at  which 
an  agent  duly  authorized  may  agree  to  receive  them ;  and  in  all 
such  cases  the  liability  of  the  master  and  owners  as  carriers 
commences  at  the  moment  of  such  acceptance.^  It  has  been 
decided  in  a  great  number  of  cases  that  it  is  not  necessary  that 
the  goods  should  be  taken  on  board  in  order  to  fix  the  liability 
of  common  carriers  upon  the  owners.  Where  a  receipt  had 
been  given,  and,  before  the  goods  had  been  put  on  board,  a 
violent  storm  arose  causing  the  tide  to  rise  to  an  unusual 
height  so  as  to  flood  the  warehouse  in  which  they  had  been 
placed,  whereby  they  were  damaged,  and  it  was  held  that,  "af- 
ter the  defendants  had  receipted  for  the  merchandise,  it  was 
as  much  at  their  risk  as  if  it  had  been  on  board  the  vessel.  "^ 
And  taking  them  upon  a  barge  or  lighter  by  direction  of  the 
ship's  agent  to  be  conveyed  to  the  ship  constitutes  a  good  de- 
livery to  the  ship.  Where  a  vessel  drawing  so  much  water 
that  it  could  not  come  to  the  wharf  to  take  on  cotton  which  it 
had  Qontracted  to  carry  was  obliged  to  employ  a  lighterman  to 
convey  the  cotton  to  her,  who  gave  his  own  receipt  for  it,  it 
was  held  that  the  liability  of  the  ship  and  owners  attached  as 
soon  as  the  cotton  was  loaded  upon  the  lighter.^  And  where 
an  ocean  steamer  could  not  reach  the  port  to  take  passengers 
and  freight  on  board,  and  her  agent  at  the  port  employed  a 
steamboat  to  take  them  down  the  river  to  the  steamer,  it  was 
held  that  the  freight  was  delivered  to  the  steamer  as  soon  as 
it  was  put  on  board  the  steamboat  or  delivered  to  its  agents 
for  the  purpose  of  being  conveyed  to  the  steamer.-^  And  the 
ship  and  owners  become  responsible  for  the  freight  from  tlie 

2.  Story  on  Bail.  §  534;   Abbott  477;  Insurance  Co.  of  North  Amer- 
on  Shipping,  ch.  3,  §  3.  ica   v.    North    German   Lloyd    Co., 

3.  Greenwood  v.  Cooper,   10  La.  106    Fed.    973;    affirmed   in    Nord- 
Ann.  796.  Deutscher  Lloyd  v.  President,  etc., 

4.  Bulkley    v.     The     Naunkeag,  of  Insurance  Co.,  110  Fed.  420,  49 
etc.,  Company,  24  How.   386;   The  C   C.  A.  1. 

Bark   Edwin,     1     Sprague's    Dec.        5.  The  Oregon,  Deady  R.  179. 


118  THE  LAW  OF  CARRIERS.  [§  121. 

time  of  its  delivery,  although  no  receipt  or  bill  of  lading  be 
made  out  or  signed  for  it  until  -after  the  loss  has  occurred.^ 

But  to  constitute  a  delivery  of  goods  which  the  owner  places 
upon  the  carrier's  wharf,  it  must  appear,  in  the  absence  of  any 
custom  to  the  contrary,  that  a  duly  authorized  agent  received 
them  for  transportation ;  for  if  no  acceptance  be  shown  it  can- 
not be  said  that  the  shipowner  assumed  the  custody  or  control 
of  them  so  as  to  impose  upon  him  the  responsibility  of  a  com- 
mon carrier.  Thus,  if  the  owner  of  baggage  merely  leaves  it 
upon  the  carrier's  pier  with  no  directions  as  to  its  destination 
or  the  time  of  shipment,  it  is  in  no  sense  within  the  custody 
or  control  of  the  carrier  so  as  to  give  the  owner  a  maritime 
lien  on  the  vessel  for  its  loss;  and  the  fact  that  he  later  pur- 
chases a  ticket  for  passage  on  the  vessel  can  make  no  differ- 
ence.''' 

Sec.  121.  (§96.)  Same  subject — Delivery  to  railroad  and 
express  companies. — Delivery  of  freight  is  usually  made  to  rail- 
roads and  express  companies  at  offices,  warehouses  or  stations 
which  they  have  established  for  that  purpose.  And  except  in 
rare  cases,  resting  upon  peculiar  and  exceptional  grounds  as 
we  have  seen,  notice  must  be  given  to  the  proper  servant  or 
agent  of  the  company  before  the  delivery  will  be  complete.  But 
if  such  agent  become  informed  of  the  fact  in  any  way,  such 
knowledge  will  be  as  effectual  to  bind  the  company  as  express 
notice  to  him.  Nor  is  it  always  essential,  as  has  been  shown, 
that  the  notice  should  be  given  to  one  who  is  an  actual  agent 
for  the  purpose  of  accepting  the  goods.  For  if  the  notice  is 
given  to  one  who  is  placed  by  the  carrier  in  such  a  situation 
that  those  who  eome*to  deliver  their  goods  for  carriage  have 
a  right  to  presume  that  he  is  such  an  agent  or  has  authority 
to  accept  them  on  behalf  of  the  carrier,  it  is  sufficient.     Nor, 

6.  Snow  V.  Caruth,  1  Sprague's  senger  to  show  a  delivery,  and  un- 
Dec.  324.  til  he  does  so  the  carrier  cannot 

7.  The  Pricilla,  114  Fed.  836,  52  be  made  responsible  for  his  bag- 
C.    C.   A.   470,  reversing   106   Fed.  gage. 

739.  Lustig  V.  Navigation  Co.,  78  N. 

The  burden  of  proof  is  on  a  pas-    Y.   Supp.  885,  38  Misc.  802. 


§122.]  DELIVERY  TO   THE  CARRIER.  119 

as  we  have  also  seen,^  is  it  always  necessary  that  the  delivery 
should  be  made  at  the  office,  warehouse,  station  or  other  place 
appointed  or  designed  for  the  delivery  of  goods  and  generally 
used  for  that  purpose ;  but  it  may  be  made  wherever  the  proper 
agent  may  agree  to  accept  it.  The  agent  may,  however,  refuse 
to  accept  the  goods  at  unusual  places  or  away  from  the  office 
or  station  appointed  for  the  purpose ;  but  if  he  do  accept,  no 
matter  where,  his  company  will  become  liable  unless  it  be  done 
under  such  circumstances  as  would  implicate  the  shipper  in  an 
attempt  to  defraud  it.^  And  such  acceptance  away  from  the 
usual  place  for  receiving  goods  for  carriage,  or  at  any  unusual 
place,  must  be  by  some  agent  whose  business  it  is  to  receive 
the  goods  for  that  purpose,  and  not  by  one  who  is  employed 
for  an  entirely  different  object  ;i'^  and  must  be  consistent  with 
the  general  objects  and  business  of  the  company. ii 

Sec.  122.  (§97.)  Carriers  not  required  to  stop  for  goods 
except  at  regular  stations. — Nor  can  the  owner  of  the  goods 
require  such  carriers  to  stop  anywhere  except  at  their  regular 
offices  or  stations^  2  or  other  usual  or  designated  place^^  to 

8.  See  ante,  §  115  and  note.  A  house  and   platform  on    the 

9.  Cronkite  v.  Wells,  33  N.  Y.  side  of  a  track  at  which  freight 
247.  is   occasionally   received   and    dis- 

10.  Blanchard  v.  Isaacs,  3  Barb,  charged,  but  at  which  no  agent's 
388;  Fisher  v.  Geddes,  15  La.  Ann.  oflSce  or  books  are  kept  or  bills 
14;  Dwight  V.  Brewster,  1  Pick,  of  lading  or  receipts  given,  is  not 
50.  a  "regular  depot  or  station"  within 

11.  Missouri,  etc.,  Co.  v.  The  the  meaning  of  a  statute  imposing 
Railroad,  35  Mo.  84.  a  penalty  for  refusing  to   receive 

12.  A  carrier  is  not  liable  for  freight  at  such  depots  or  stations, 
not  accepting  goods  unless  they  are  Kellogg  v.  Railroad  Co.,  100  N. 
offered  at  a  regular  depot  or  other  C.  158.  See,  also.  Land  v.  Rail- 
usual   or  designated  place  for  re-  road  Co.,  104  N.  C.  48. 

ceiving  freight;  but  when  the  A  mere  switch  at  which  there 
goods  are  placed  at  a  station  upon  is  neither  agent,  station  nor  plat- 
the  line  of  the  road  to  be  trans-  form  is  not  a  depot  at  which  de- 
ported, the  refusal  of  the  carrier  livery  may  be  made  to  the  carrier, 
upon  demand  to  furnish  cars  for  Kansas  City,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Lilly 
the  transportation  of  the  property  (Miss.),  8  S.  Rep.  644. 
relieves  the  owner  from  making  13.  As  to  what  will  constitute  a 
any  further  delivery  or  offer  to  stopping  place  by  usage,  see  ante, 
deliver.  Louisville,  etc.,  Ry.  Co.  §  115. 
V.  Flanagan,  113  Ind,  488. 


120  THE  LAW  OF   CARRIERS.  [§  122. 

take  on  his  goods.  Nor  can  they  be  required  to  receive  goods 
on  or  along  a  private  switch.  Their  duties  in  this  regard  are 
confined  and  limited  to  their  depots,  or  regular  shipping  or 
receiving  points.^*  Where  the  conductor  of  a  freight  train 
had  promised  to  stop  his  train  and  take  on  the  plaintiff's  goods, 
relying  on  which  promise  he  had  deposited  them  upon  the 
roadside  and  they  were  lost  in  consequence  of  the  failure  to 
stop  the  train  as  had  been  promised,  it  was  held  that  the  com- 
pany was  not  liable  ;^  ^  and  it  was  said  that  if  goods  be  put  upon 
the  platform  at  a  regular  station  or  depot,  with  the  knowledge 
of  the  agent,  it  would  be  a  good  delivery  and  acceptance,  and 
it  would  not  be  necessary  that  they  should  be  entered  on  a 
way-bill  or  that  any  written  memorandum  should  be  made;^^ 
for  the  liability  commences  whenever  the  owner  relinquishes 
his  control  over  the  goods  and  they  are  received  for  the  pur- 
pose of  being  carried,  and  exists  to  the  same  extent  as  when 
they  are  put  upon  the  train ;  but  that  all  ' '  way-side  deposits ' ' 
made  for  the  purpose  of  saving  the  trouble  of  hauling  to  the 
regular  depot  are  at  the  risk  of  the  owner  until  the  goods  are 
put  upon  the  cars.^'''  So  where  the  goods  were  stored  in  the 
warehouse  or  upon  the  platform  of  a  railroad  company  with 
the  permission  of  its  agent,  with  the  understanding  that  they 
should  be  shipped  as  soon  as  cars  could  be  had  to  transport 
them  and  the  permission  of  the  military  authorities  which 
then  had  control  of  the  road  could  be  obtained,  it  was  held 
that  this  did  not  constitute  such  a  delivery  to  the  road  as  a 
carrier  as  to  make  the  company  responsible  in  that  character 
for  the  loss  of  the  goods,  but  that  they  had  incurred  liability 
only  as  warehousemen.     It  would  have  been  different,  how- 

14.  Bedford-Bowling  Green  Stone  cepted  for  carriage,  and  the  car- 
Co.  V.  Oman,  134  Fed.  441;  s.  c,  rier  may  become  liable  then  with- 
115  Ky.  369,  73  S.  W.  Rep.  1038.  out   giving  a  bill  of  lading,  even 

15.  Wells  V.  Railroad  Co.,  6  though  a  statute  provides  that 
Jones'  L.  47.  See  Meyer  v.  Vicks-  transportation  shall  be  deemed  to 
burg  R.  R.  Co.,  41  La.  Ann.  639,  have  commenced  when  the  bill  of 
cited   in  note  to   §  115.  lading  is  signed.     East  Line,  etc., 

16.  The     delivery     is     complete  Ry.  Co.  t\  Hall,  04  Tex.  615. 
when  the  goods  are  actually    ac-  17.  See  ante,  §  115  and  note. 


§  123.]  DELIVERY  TO   THE  CARRIER.  121 

ever,  it  was  said,  had  the  agent  given  a  shipping  receipt  or 
entered  into  an  express  contract  to  transport  the  goods  un- 
conditionally.^^ 

Sec.  123.  Same  subject — Express  companies. — In  the  absence 

of  a  custom  of  receiving  goods  at  other  places,  express  com- 
panies cannot  be  required  to  accept  goods  for  carriage  at  other 
than  their  regular  places  of  business  or  lines  of  travel.  And 
where  an  express  company,  in  the  collection  of  express  matter 
establishes  limits  in  a  city  beyond  which  it  will  not  go  for  the 
collection  of  such  matter,  it  is  not  obliged  to  go  beyond  the 
limits  so  established,  although  they  include  points  in  one  part 
of  the  city  which  are  a  greater  distance  from  its  place  of  busi- 
ness than  points  in  another  part  not  within  such  limits.^  ^ 

Sec.  124.  (§98.)  When  carrier  deemed  to  have  accepted 
goods. — The  long-established  and  familiar  rule^o  as  to  the 
warehouseman,  that  his  liability  commences  as  soon  as  the 
goods  arrive  at  his  warehouse  and  the  crane  of  the  warehouse 
has  been  applied  to  them  to  raise  them  into  the  warehouse,  has 
been  applied  to  the  common  carrier  under  similar  circum- 
stances, and  the  delivery  to  him  and  his  acceptance  of  the 
goods  held  to  commence  from  the  moment  he  or  his  servants 
undertake  to  load  them  from  the  conveyance  of  another  carrier 
upon  his  own  and  for  that  purpose  have  attached  his  tackle 
to  them.  And  where  an  engine  was  sent  by  a  truckman  to  the 
depot  of  a  railroad  company  for  shipment,  the  delivery  to  the 
road  was  held  to  be  complete  and  its  liability  to  have  com- 
menced as  soon  as  the  work  of  transferring  the  engine  from  the 
truck  to  the  company's  car  had  been  commenced  by  means  of  a 
derrick,  the  agent  of  the  company  being  present,  superintend- 
ing and  directing  the  work,  and  the  case  was  said  to  be  the 
same  in  principle  as  that  of  the  warehouseman.  As  soon,  there- 
fore, as  the  work  of  transferring  the  engine  was  commenced 

18.  111.  Cen.   R.  R.  v.  Ashmead,  19.  Bullard  v.  Express   Co.,   107 

58  111.  4S7;   Same  v.  McClellan,  54  Mich.  695,  65  N.  W.  Rep.  551,  ci- 

id.    58;    Same    v.    Hornberger,    77  ting  Hutchinson  on  Carr. 

id.  457.  20.  Thomas  v.  Day,  4  Esp.  262. 


122  THE  LAW   OF   CARRIERS.  [§  125. 

under  the  superintendence  of  the  road,  the  liability  of  the 
truckman  as  carrier  ceased  and  that  of  the  company  com- 
menced.^^ 

Sec.  125.  (§99.)  Same  subject — How  when  goods  are 
loaded  by  owner. — When  the  owner  of  the  goods  has  done  all 
in  his  power  and  all  that  he  is  required  to  do  by  his  under- 
standing with  the  carrier  or  the  usage  of  the  business  to  fur- 
ther the  shipment,  and  it  becomes  then  the  duty  of  the  carrier 
to  do  whatever  else  is  necessary  to  put  them  in  transitu,  the 
delivery  and  acceptance  will  be  considered  as  complete  from 
the  time  the  carrier  is  informed  that  they  are  ready  for  him< 
The  mere  fact,  therefore,  that  the  owner  of  the  goods  has 
loaded  them  on  a  car,  even  though  the  carrier  by  the  owner's 
directions  has  placed  the  car  in  a  position  convenient  for  such 
purpose,  will  not  of  itself  be  sufficient  to  constitute  a  delivery. 
Before  the  delivery  will  be  deemed  complete  the  owner  must 
not  only  have  relinquished  his  control  over  the  car,  but  notice 
that  it  was  ready  for  shipment  must  have  been  given  the  car- 
rier. Thus  where  it  was  the  course  of  business  for  a  railroad 
company,  when  required  to  do  so,  to  send  its  cars  upon  a  side 
track  at  the  place  of  shipment  to  receive  cotton  for  transporta- 
tion, and  for  the  shipper  there  to  load  upon  them  the  freight, 
make  out  a  manifest  and  leave  it  with  the  agent  of  the  com- 
pany, who  then  had  the  bales  counted,  signed  bills  of  lading, 
and  sent  locomotives  to  remove  the  cars  thus  loaded  and  place 
them  in  the  train  destined  to  the  point  to  which  the  shipments 
were  to  be  made,  it  was  held  that  the  delivery  was  complete 
as  soon  as  the  cotton  was  put  upon  the  company's  cars  in  this 
manner  by  the  shipper  and  the  company's  agent  informed  of 
the  fact.22  And  where  the  owner  of  lumber  ordered  a  car  in 
which  to  load  lumber  for  the  purpose  of  shipment,  and  the 
carrier,  in  pursuance  of  such  order,  placed  a  car  on  one  of  its 
side  tracks  for  such  purpose,  and  after  the  car  was  loaded,  but 
before  the  carrier  had  been  notified  that  it  was  ready  for  ship- 

21.  Merritt  v.  The  Railroad,  11        22.  111.  Cent.  R.  R.  v.  Smyser,  38 
Allen,   80.  111.  354. 


§  125.]  DELIVERY   TO   THE  CARRIER.  123 

ment,  or  had  been  apprised  of  the  name  of  the  consignee  it 
caught  fire  and  the  lumber  was  destroyed,  it  was  held  that  as 
the  carrier  had  not  been  notified  that  the  car  was  ready  for 
shipment,  nor  the  name  of  the  consignee  given  him,  there  was 
not  such  a  delivery  of  the  goods  as  to  render  him  liable  as  a 
common  carrier.23  ^j^j  jq  another  case,  it  appeared  that  on 
account  of  there  being  no  station  agent  located  at  the  place 
of  shipment,  it  was  the  custom  between  the  plaintiff,  a  shipper 
of  cotton,  and  the  defendant  carrier,  for  the  plaintiff  when  he 
wished  to  make  a  shipment  to  notify  the  conductor  of  a  local 
freight  train  to  leave  a  car  on  a  track  adjoining  the  main  track. 
The  plaintiff,  when  the  car  was  thus  placed,  would  load  it, 
and  when  the  same  was  ready  for  shipment,  he  would  flag 
the  train  to  which  he  desired  the  car  to  be  attached  and  the 
conductor  of  the  flagged  train  would  give  him  a  bill  of  lading. 
In  accordance  with  this  custom,  a  car  was  placed  upon  the 
adjoining  track  which  the  plaintiff  loaded  with  cotton.  Shortly 
after  the  car  was  loaded,  but  before  the  passing  of  the  next 
train,  the  car  and  its  contents  were  destroyed  by  fire.  It  was 
held  that  while  the  ear  and  the  track  upon  which  it  was  stand- 
ing belonged  to  the  defendant,  yet  not  having  been  notified 
that  the  car  was  loaded  and  ready  for  shipment,  there  was  no 
delivery  and  acceptance  shown  such  as  to  render  him  responsi- 
ble as  a  common  carrier  for  the  loss.^^  But  where  the  owner 
of  the  goods  has  placed  them  in  the  car,  and  has  given  notice 
to  the  carrier  that  they  are  ready  for  shipment,  or  where, 
according  to  the  course  of  dealing  between  himself  and  the 
carrier,  he  has  done  all  that  is  required  of  him,  of  which  fact 
the  carrier  has  notice,  so  that  whatever  remains  to  be  done  is 
exclusively  the  work  of  the  carrier,  the  delivery  will  be  deemed 

23.  Basnight    v.     Railroad     Co.,  clines  to  ship  the  goods.    Yoakum 

111  N.  Car.  592,  16  S.  E.  Rep.  323.  v.    Dryden     (Tex.    Civ.    App.),    26 

The  mere  loading  of  goods  into  a  S.  W.  Rep.  312. 

car  standing  on  a  side  track  does  24.  Tate     v.     Railroad     Co.,     78 

not  constitute   a   delivery    to    the  Miss.  842,  29  So.  Rep.  392,  84  Am. 

carrier,   where   the   station   agent,  St.  Rep.  649,  citing  Hutchinson  on 

on  being  notified  of  the  fact,  do-  Carr. 


124  THE  LAW   OF    CARRIERS.  [§  126. 

complete,  and  the  liability  of  the  common  carrier  as  such  will 
at  once  commence.^^ 

Sec.  126.     (v5  99a.)     Same  subject — Implied  acceptance. — So 

where  the  carrier  has  actually  accepted  the  goods  and  under- 
taken their  carriage,  evidence  of  a  formal  or  express  accept- 
ance is  unnecessary.  Thus  where  property  was  placed  by  the 
owner  in  a  car  for  transportation  without  express  authority 
from  any  authorized  agent,  but  an  agent  having  authority  to 
receive  the  property  for  transportation  knew  that  it  was  so 
placed  there,  and  for  what  purpose,  and  did  not  object  but 
permitted  it  to  go  forward,  it  was  held  that  there  was  an 
implied  undertaking  on  the  part  of  the  company  to  carry,  and 
on  the  part  of  the  owner  to  pay  a  reasonable  compensation 
therefor.  26 

Sec.  127.  (i;  100.)  Checking,  memorandum  or  entry  on  way- 
bill not  necessary  to  complete  delivery. — It  has  been  often 
determined  that  no  checking,  written  memorandum  or  entry 
upon  a  way-bill  is  necessary  to  complete  the  delivery.  All  that 
is  necessary  is  a  deposit  of  the  goods  with  the  carrier  for  the 
purpose  of  transportation ;  and  if  they  be  accepted  by  him  to 
be  sent  forward  in  the  ordinary  course  of  his  business,  whether 
they  are  to  be  accompanied  by  their  owner  or  not,  the  full 
responsibility  of  the  carrier  at  once  begins.  Thus  where  the 
plaintiff,  who  intended  to  leave  upon  an  afternoon  train, 
carried  his  trunk  to  the  depot  in  the  forenoon,  but  was  told 
by  the  agent  of  the  road  that  it  did  not  check  baggage  until 
within  a  few  minutes  before  the  train  was  to  start,  whereupon 
the  plaintiff  left  his  trunk  in  the  care  of  the  agent,  and  during 
the  day,  and  after  its  delivery  to  the  agent,  it  was  broken 
open  and  rifled,  it  was  held  that  the  custom  of  checking  could 
have  no  effect  upon  the  character  of  the  delivery,  and  that  the 
company  held  the  trunk  from  the  first  as  a  common  carrier.^^ 

25.  Railway   Co.   v.   Murphy,    60  26.  Aiken   v.    Railway    Co.,     68 

Ark.    333,    30   S.   W.   Rep.    419,    46  Iowa,  363. 

Am.  St.  Rep.  202,  citing  Hutchin-  27.  Hickox    v.    The     R.     R.,     31 

son  on  Carr.    See  ante,  §  115  and  Conn.  281. 
cases  cited. 


§  128.  J  DELIVERY  TO  THE  CARRIER.  125 

And  it  may  be  stated  generally  that  the  baggage  of  a  pas- 
senger deposited  with  the  carrier  or  left  with  his  agent  at 
the  usual  place  for  delivering  baggage,  the  passenger  intend- 
ing to  proceed  with  it  in  the  next  train,  boat  or  other  convey- 
ance, is  in  the  custody  of  the  carrier  as  carrier  and  not  as 
warehouseman  or  ordinary  bailee.^s  And  where  the  owner  of 
a  carpet-bag,  who  had  engaged  but  had  not  paid  for  his  pas- 
sage upon  a  boat,  left  it  on  the  boat  and  temporarily  absented 
himself,  during  w^iich  time  it  was  stolen,  in  consequence  of 
which  he  did  not  proceed  upon  his  intended  trip,  it  was  held 
that  he  was  entitled  to  recover  for  his  loss.^^  But  where  the 
owner  of  a  trunk  deposited  it  on  the  boat  in  the  usual  place 
for  baggage  and  then  left  the  boat  without  giving  any  notice 
of  his  intention  to  become  a  passenger,  it  was  held  that  he 
could  not  recover  for  its  loss  during  his  absence,  upon  the 
ground  that  not  having  engaged  his  passage  or  given  any 
notice  of  his  intention  to  do  so,  the  boat  was  not  bound  to 
treat  his  trunk  as  the  baggage  of  a  passenger  but  merely  as 
ordinary  freight ;  and  that  as  he  had  given  no  notice  to  any  of 
the  officers  of  the  boat,  there  had  been  no  valid  delivery,  though 
it  had  been  deposited  in  the  usual  place  for  baggage.^"^  As  has 
been  seen,  the  carrier  is  not  liable  until  there  has  been  a  com- 
plete delivery  .31 

Sec.  128.    (§  101.)    Delivery  to  ferry-men,  when  complete. — 

Ferry-men,  it  has  been  held,  become  responsible  for  the  prop- 
erty which  they  transport  as  common  carriers  as  soon  as  it  has 
been  brought  upon  the  drop  or  slip  of  the  boat,^^  ^nd  even 
before  it  has  been  completely  put  upon  the  ferry-boat  and 
before  it  is  put  actually  into  the  charge  of  the  ferry-man.^^ 
But  the  better  opinion  would  seem  to  be  that  the  property  should 
have    been    put    into    the    custody    of    the    ferry-man  before 

28.  Camden   T.    Co.   v.   Belknap,  32.  Cohen   v.   Hume,    1   McCord, 
21   Wend.  354.  439;  Miles  v.  James,  id.  157;  Cook 

29.  Woods  V.  Devin,  13  111.  746.  v.  Gourdin,  2  Nott  &  McCord,   19. 

30.  Wright  v.  Caldwell,  3  Mich.  33.  Blakely  v.  Le  Due,  19  Minn. 
51.  187. 

31.  See  ante,  §  105. 


126 


TUE  LAW   OF   CARRIERS, 


[§  128. 


the  absolute  liability  of  the  common  carrier  of  goods  should 
be  imposed  upon  him.  When  the  owner  of  the  property  retains 
its  custody  and  keeps  it  under  his  own  control,  there  has  not 
been,  it  is  said,  such  a  delivery  as  is  necessary  to  subject  the 
ferry-man  to  the  rigorous  liability  of  an  insurer,  and  he  should 
be  considered  in  such  cases  as  undertaking  for  its  safe"ty  only 
against  defects  in  his  boat  and  other  appliances  for  the  per- 
formance of  the  service,  and  for  the  neglect  or  want  of  skill 
of  himself  or  his  servants.^ ^ 


34.  Wyckoff  v.  The  Ferry  Co., 
52  N.  Y.  32;  White  v.  The  Winnis- 
simmett  Co.,  7  Cush.  155. 

The  opinion  of  the  court  in  this 
case,  not  only  as  it  respects  the 
liability  of  ferry-men,  but  of  car- 
riers generally,  is  so  appropriate 
and  instructive  that  we  append  so 
much  of  it  as  relates  to  this  sub- 
ject. 

Dewey,  J.:  "To  a  certain  ex- 
tent, persons  keeping  and  main- 
taining a  ferry  are  common  car- 
riers. It  would  be  so  if  a  bale 
of  goods  or  an  article  of  merchan- 
dise was  delivered  by  the  owner 
to  the  agent  of  a  ferry  company 
to  be  carried  from  one  place  to 
another  for  hire.  Upon  receiving 
such  goods  for  transportation  the 
ferry  company  stipulate  to  carry 
them  safely,  and  subject  them- 
selves to  a  strict  liability  for  the 
safe  carriage  and  delivery  of  such 
goods,  being  only  exempted  for 
losses  occasioned  by  those  acts 
v/hich  are  denominated  'acts  of 
God  or  of  a  public  enemy.'  The 
principle  above  stated  would  em- 
brace the  case  of  a  horse  and 
wagon  received  by  a  ferry-man  to 
be  transported  by  him  on  a 
ferry-boat,  the  ferry-man  accept- 
ing the  exclusive  custody  of 
the  same  for  such  purpose,  and 
the   owner   having,   for   the   time 


being,   surrendered  the  possession 
to  the  ferry-man. 

"But  if  the  traveler  uses  the 
ferry-boat  as  he  would  a  toll- 
bridge,  personally  driving  his 
horse  upon  the  boat,  selecting  his 
position  on  the  same,  and  himself 
remaining  on  the  boat,  neither 
putting  his  horse  into  the  care 
and  custody  of  the  ferry-man,  nor 
signifying  to  him  or  his  servants 
any  wish  or  purpose  to  do  so; 
and  the  only  possession  and  cus- 
tody by  the  ferry-man  of  the 
horse  and  vehicle  to  which  he  is 
attached,  is  that  which  necessarily 
results  from  the  traveler's  driv- 
ing his  horse  and  wagon  or  other 
vehicle  on  board  the  boat  and  pay- 
ing the  ordinary  toll  for  a  pass- 
age; in  such  case  the  ferry  coia- 
pany  would  not  be  chargeable  with 
the  full  liabilities  of  common  car- 
riers of  merchandise.  The  liabil- 
ity in  this  case  would  be  one  of  a 
different  character;  and  if  the 
proprietors  of  the  ferry  were 
chargeable  for  loss  or  damage  to 
the  property,  it  would  be  upon 
different  principles.  In  reference 
to  persons  thus  using  the  ferry, 
the  company  have  responsible  du- 
ties to  perform,  the  neglect  of 
which  may  charge  them  for  the 
loss  of  goods  and  property  placed 
on    board    their    boat,     when     the 


§129.] 


DELIVERY   TO   THE  CARRIER. 


127 


Sec.  129.  (§  102.)  Delivery  to  connecting  carriers  to  com- 
plete the  transportation. — The  question  as  to  whether,  under 
the  circumstances,  a  delivery  has  been  made  by  one  of  several 
connecting  lines  of  carriers  to  another  to  which  a  delivery  was 


loss  has  been  occasioned  by  their 
default.  It  is  the  duty  of  a  ferry 
company  to  provide  a  good  and 
safe  boat,  suitable  for  the  busi- 
ness in  which  they  are  engaged, 
and  they  are  required  to  have  all 
suitable  and  requisite  accommoda- 
tions for  the  entry  upon,  the  safe 
transportation  while  on  board, 
and  tl;ie  departure  from,  the  boat, 
of  all  horses  and  vehicles  passing 
over  such  ferry.  They  are  re- 
quired to  be  provided  with  all 
proper  and  necessary  servants 
and  agents  requisite  for  the  safe 
and  proper  conducting  of  the  busi- 
ness of  the  ferry,  and  with  all 
proper  and  suitable  guards  and 
barriers  on  the  boat,  and  to  pre- 
vent damage  from  such  casualties 
as  it  would  naturally  be  exposed 
to,  though  there  was  ordinary  care 
on  the  part  of  the  traveler.  For 
neglect  of  duty  in  these  respects 
they  may  be  charged,  but  the  lia- 
bility is  different  from  that  of 
common  carriers.  The  case  of  such 
a  traveler,  though  not  entirely 
similar,  much  more  resembles  that 
of  a  traveler  upon  a  toll-bridge  or 
turnpike  road,  who,  while  he  uses 
the  easement  of  another,  yet  re- 
tains the  possession  and  custody 
of  his  horse  and  wagon.  The 
party  thus  driving  his  own  horse 
upon  the  boat,  and  retaining  the 
custody  of  him,  is  bound,  like  the 
traveler  on  the  toll-bridge  or  turn- 
pike road,  to  use  ordinary  care 
and  oversight  in  respect  to  his 
horse  while  on  the  boat,  and  if  he 
does   not  use   such  ordinary   care 


and  oversight  in  respect  to  him, 
and  for  the  want  thereof  the 
horse  leaps  overboard,  or  receives 
on  the  boat  some  injury,  all  of 
which  might  and  would  have  been 
avoided  if  the  party  had  used 
proper  care  and  diligence,  such 
party  would  himself  bear  the  loss 
which  has  thus  been  occasioned 
by  his  own  neglect. 

"In  deciding  upon  the  nature 
and  extent  of  the  liability  of  fer- 
ry-men, and  how  far  they  are  to 
be  charged  as  common  carriers, 
regard  is  to  be  had  to  the  nature 
of  the  employment,  and  especially 
to  the  thing  to  be  transported. 
This  principle  is  practically  ap- 
plied in  the  well-known  distinc- 
tion relating  to  the  liability  of 
the  proprietors  of  stage-coaches 
and  other  vehicles,  as  to  the  car- 
riage of  persons.  No  person  thus 
carried  in  a  public  vehicle  can 
recover  damages  for  an  injury  to 
his  person  if  his  want  of  ordinary 
care  contributed  to  the  injury. 
Such  carriers  are  not  common  car- 
riers, with  all  the  liabilities  as 
such.  One  reason  for  the  distinc- 
tion is,  that  the  persons  thus  car- 
ried are  not,  and  cannot  be 
placed,  under  the  same  custody 
and  control  as  bales  of  goods. 
Being  intelligent  beings,  and  hav- 
ing the  power  of  locomotion,  and 
having  the  opportunity  on  the  one 
hand,  by  their  own  voluntary  acts, 
of  exposing  themselves  to  greater 
hazard,  and  on  the  other  of  guard- 
ing, to  some  extent,  against  perils, 
the  law  properly  requires  a  person 


128 


THE  LAW    OF   CARRIERS. 


[§  129. 


necessary  in  order  to  complete  the  transportation  of  the  goods, 
becomes  frequently  one  of  very  great  importance  not  only  to 
the  owner  of  the  goods  but  to  the  connecting  carriers  them- 
selves;  for  in  many  such  cases  the  liability  of  the  one  or  the 


thus  carried  to  exercise  the  ordi- 
nary care  and  vigilance  to  avoid 
exposure  to  danger,  and  if  this  is 
not  exercised,  and  an  injury  is 
sustained,  the  carrier  is  not  liable 
therefor. 

"The  same  principle  is  further 
illustrated  in  the  various  deci 
sions  of  the  courts  in  cases  of  ac- 
tions instituted  for  the  purpose 
of  charging  the  carriers  of  slaves 
as  common  carriers  of  merchan- 
dise. It  was  successfully  and  cer- 
tainly most  properly  contended  as 
to  the  carriage  of  slaves,  that  in 
those  states  where  slavery  is  al- 
lowed by  law,  and  where  slaves 
are  to  some  purposes  treated  as 
chattels,  yet  as  they  are  human 
beings  and  cannot  and  ought  not 
to  be  stowed  away  and  confined 
like  bales  of  goods,  and  placed  un- 
der the  absolute  control  of  the 
carrier,  the  principle  of  the  com- 
mon law  applicable  to  common 
carriers  of  merchandise  could  not 
be  applied  to  the  carriers  of 
slaves.  This  was  so  held  in  Boyce 
V.  Anderson,  2  Pet.  150;  Clark  v. 
McDonald,  4  McCord,  223. 

"As  having  some  bearing  also 
on  this  question,  we  may  allude 
to  the  modification  of  the  princi- 
ple of  general  liability  as  common 
carriers,  in  those  cases  where  the 
owner  of  the  goods  accompanies 
them  in  their  transit,  retaining  a 
certain  control  over  them,  as  in 
Brind  v.  Dale,  8  Car.  &  P.  207, 
where  it  was  held  that  if  the 
owner  of  the  goods  accompanies 
them,  to  take  care   of  them,  and 


is  himself  guilty  of  negligence,  he 
is  not  entitled  to  recover.  This 
case  also  affirms  as  a  rule  of  law 
a  principle  often  found  elsewhere, 
and  which  bears  directly,  as  we 
think,  upon  the  case  before  us, 
'that  a  party  cannot  recover  if 
his  own  negligence  was  as  much 
the  cause  of  the  loss  as  that  of  the 
defendant.' 

"Thus  we  perceive  that  a  modi- 
fication of  the  liability  attached 
to  common  carriers  occurs,  as  the 
nature  of  the  thing  to  be  carried, 
and  the  extent  of  the  custody  and 
control  over  it  by  the  carrier,  va- 
ries. We  think  that  the  propriety 
of  such  modification  of  what  is 
certainly  a  very  stringent  rule  of 
liability,  in  reference  to  cases 
where  the  entire  custody  and  con- 
trol of  the  property  is  not  with 
the  carrier,  is  quite  obvious. 

"The  case  of  a  traveler  con- 
veyed by  means  of  a  ferryboat, 
where  the  traveler  enters  upon 
the  boat  driving  his  horse,  at- 
tached to  a  wagon  or  other  ve- 
hicle, selecting  his  own  place  up- 
on the  boat,  and  continuing  to  re- 
tain under  his  own  custody  his 
horse  and  wagon,  neither  commit- 
ting it  to  the  care  of  the  ferry- 
man or  his  servants,  nor  signify- 
ing any  wish  or  purpose  so  to  do, 
presents  another  instance  where 
the  liability  of  the  carrier  must 
be  considered  as  of  a  restricted 
character;  and  as  in  the  case  of 
the  carrier  of  persons,  duties  de- 
volve upon  the  traveler,  and  he 
is  bound  to  use  ordinary  care  and 


§  130.]  DELIVERY  TO  THE  CARRIER.  129 

Other  will  depend  entirely  upon  the  question  of  delivery ;  and 
without  determining  this  question  the  owner  cannot  know 
against  which  of  them  to  seek  his  remedy  in  case  of  loss  when 
there  is  no  partnership  or  joint  liability,  the  rule  being  well 
settled  that  the  obligation  of  the  first  or  any  preceding  car- 
rier is  discharged  when  he  has  safely  delivered  the  goods  to 
the  next  succeeding  carrier  to  whom  such  delivery  is  required 
in  order  to  complete  the  transportation,  whenever  he  has  not 
bound  himself  to  carry  to  destination,  or  has  not  assumed 
responsibility  for  those  who  connect  with  him.^ 

Sec.  130.  (§  102a.)  Duty  of  first  carrier  to  effect  delivery 
to  succeeding  carrier — Perishable  goods. — It  is  the  duty  of 
the  first  of  two  connecting  carriers,  upon  the  arrival  of  the 
goods  at  the  point  of  connection  with  the  succeeding  carrier, 
if  he  knows  where  and  to  whom  they  are  to  be  delivered,  to 
use  reasonable  diligence  to  deliver  the  goods  to  the  succeed- 
ing carrier,  and,  at  all  events,  to  make  a  tender  of  delivery, 
and  to  stand  ready  to  deliver  them  in  accordance  with  the 
tender.2    And  although  the  first  carrier  consults  with  the  suc- 

diligence   in   respect  to   his   horse  and    attention   of   the   driver   this 

and   vehicle,  in   order  to  prevent,  casualty   would   in   all   reasonable 

as  far  as  he  can  by  such  care,  any  probability     have     been     avoided, 

injury    occurring    from    fright    or  the  loss  must  fall  upon  the  trav- 

from  other  cause,  immediately  re-  eler." 

suiting    from    the    movements     of  A  different  conclusion  has,  how- 

the   horse.     When   such    horse   or  ever,    as     we     have     seen,     been 

other  animal   is   surrendered   into  reached  in  other  cases,  and  some 

the  custody  of  the  ferry-man,  the  of  them  have  even  gone  so  far  as 

driver  is  bound  to  do  all  that  can  to   hold   that   the   custody   of   the 

be  effected  by  reasonable  diligence  owner  is  the  custody  of  the  ferry- 

and  supervision  to  prevent  a  loss  man,    the    former    becoming    the 

of  his  property  occasioned  by  his  agent  of  the  latter  for  taking  care 

horse    becoming     restless     or     af-  of  the  property.     Ante,  §§  65  &  66 

frighted.     If   the   traveler   wholly  notes. 

neglects  his  duty  in  this  respect,  1.  This  subject  is  fully  discussed 

leaving    his     horse     without     any  in  the  following  chapter,  where  a 

oversight,  and  the  horse,  without  full  citation  of  authorities  will  be 

fault   of   the   ferryman,     becomes  found. 

affrighted  and  throws  himself  and  2.  Regan  v.  Railway  Co.,  61  N 

the  vehicle  to  which  he  is  attached  H.  579;  McKay  v.  Railroad  Co.,  50 

overboard,    when    by    proper   care  Hun,   563;    Insurance  Co.   r.  Rail- 


130  THE  LAW  OF   CARRIERS.  [§  130. 

ceeding  carrier  about  receiving  tlie  goods,  and  thereupon  is 
informed  that  a  delivery  will  be  refused,  if  no  actual  tender 
is  in  fact  made,  the  liability  of  the  first  carrier,  as  such,  will 
still  remain.3  The  question  whether  or  not  the  first  of  such 
carriers  has  used  reasonable  diligence  to  effect  a  delivery  must, 
of  course,  be  determined  in  view  of  all  the  circumstances  of 
the  ease,  for  conduct  which  might  show  that  the  carrier  had 
used  reasonable  diligence  in  making  a  delivery  to  the  suc- 
ceeding carrier  of  goods  of  one  description  might,  as  to  goods 
of  another  description,  constitute  the  grossest  negligence."* 
And  if  any  particular  carrier  has  been  designated  as  the  suc- 
ceeding carrier,  the  goods  must  be  delivered  to  him  if  he  will 
accept  them,^  and  for  a  failure  so  to  deliver  them  the  first 
carrier  will  be  liable  as  for  a  conversion.^  So  if  the  first  car- 
rier, by  mistake  or  otherwise,  deliver  the  goods  to  another 
than  the  carrier  so  named,  such  wrongful  act  will  render  him 
an  insurer  of  their  safe  delivery  at  destination.'^  If  there  is 
but  one  connecting  carrier,  it  will  be  presumed  that  he  was 
intended;  if  there  be  more  than  one  but  none  designated, 
then  the  first  carrier  will  perform  his  duty  if  he  delivers  them 
to  be  forwarded  in  the  usual  and  customary  way.*  Where  the 
succeeding  carrier  has  been  designated,  but,  for  any  reason^ 

road  Co.,  8  Baxt.  268;   Whitworth  any  particular  market,   held,  that 

V.  Railroad,  87  N.  Y.  413;  Rawson  he  was  not  liable  for  a  failure  to 

V.    Holland,    59    N.    Y.    611;     Bur-  tranship  the  goods  on  the  night  of 

roughs  V.  Railroad  Co.,  100  Mass.  their   arrival    in   port.     The   Nut- 

26;    Dunham   v.   Railroad   Co.,   70  meg  State,   103  Fed.   797. 

Me,  164;   Railroad  Co.  v.  Diether,  3.  Railroad    Co.    v.   Diether,   su- 

10   Ind.   App.    206,   37   N.   E.  Rep.  pra. 

1069,  53  Am.   St.  Rep.  385,  citing  4.  Railroad  Co.  v.  Potter,  36  111. 

Hutchinson    on    Carr;    Palmer    v.  App.  590. 

Railroad  Co.,  101  Cal.  187,  35  Pac.  5.  Rawson  v.  Holland,  59  N.  Y. 

Rep.    630,    citing     Hutchinson     on  611. 

Carr;  Pelton  v.  Live  Stock  Co.,  22  6.  Georgia  R.  Co.  v.  Cole,  68  Ga. 

Ky.  Law  Rep.  1058,  59  S.  W.  Rep.  623. 

744.  7.  Brown    &     Haywood     Co.     v. 

Where  there  was  an  express  pro-  Railroad  Co.,  63  Minn.  546,  65  N. 

vision  in   a  contract  of  shipment  W.  Rep.  961. 

that  the  carrier  was  not  bound  to  8.  Rawson  v.  Holland,  59  N.  Y. 

transport   the   goods   in  time   for  611;   Lamb  v.  Railroad,  46  N.  Y. 


§130.] 


DELIVERY  TO   THE  C.UlRIER. 


131 


as  the  sudden  cessation  of  his  operations,  he  cannot  take  the 
goods,  the  first  carrier  will  perform  his  duty,  where  the  goods 
are  perishable,  if  he  forward  them  by  the  best  means  reason- 
ably to  be  had,9  and  he  is  not  liable  if  they  perish  without  his 


271;  Van  Santvoord  v.  St.  John, 
6  Hill,  160;  Railway  v.  Woodward, 
164  Ind.  360,  72  N.  E.  Rep.  558; 
s.  c.  73  N.  E.  Rep.  810.  See  also. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Callender,  183  U. 
S.  632;  Railway  Co.  i'.  Clayton,  173 
U.  S.  348,  19  Sup.  Ct.  R.  421,  43 
L.  Ed.  725;  Southern  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Goldstein  Bros.,  —  Ala.  — ,  41  So. 
Rep.  173. 

"A  shipper,  who  receives  a  bill 
of  lading  for  goods  consigned  to 
a  point  beyond  the  terminus  of 
the  initial  carrier's  line,  author- 
izes the  initial  carriers  to  select 
any  usual  or  reasonably  direct  and 
safe  route  by  which  to  forward 
after  the  goods  reach  the  end  of 
his  line,  unless  the  particular  line 
by  which  the  goods  consigned  are 
to  be  forwarded  is  designated  in 
the  bill  of  lading.  In  such  a  case, 
the  bill  of  lading  being  silent  in 
respect  to  the  line  by  which  the 
goods  are  to  be  forwarded,  its  ef- 
fect is  the  same  as  if  a  provision 
were  therein  inserted  that  the  car- 
rier should  have  the  right  to  se- 
lect at  his  discretion  any  custom- 
ary or  usual  route  which  was  re- 
garded as  safe  and  reasonable." 
Snow  V.  Railway  Co.,  109  Ind.  422. 

9.  In  Regan  v.  Railway  Co.,  61 
N.  H.  579,  perishable  goods  had 
been  shipped  by  defendants'  rail- 
way to  its  terminus  at  Portland, 
whence  they  were  to  be  shipped 
by  boat  to  Boston.  The  goods 
reached  Portland,  in  due  course 
on  Saturday  after  the  boat  had 
gone.  Sunday  no  boat  ran,  and 
on   Monday    the   boat   agent   noti- 


fied defendants'  agent  that  on  ac- 
count of  a  severe  storm  raging  no 
boat  would  run  that  day,  and  that 
he  did  not  know  when  it  would 
run  again  as  it  looked  like  a  long 
storm.  Defendants'  agent  there- 
fore sent  the  goods  on  that  day  to 
Boston  by  railroad,  but  did  not 
notify  consignee  of  the  change. 
The  train  got  off  the  track  owing 
to  the  storm  and  was  delayed,  so 
that  when  the  goods  reached  Bos- 
ton they  were  damaged.  Said 
the  court:  "The  defendants'  un- 
dertaking was  to  carry  the  plain- 
tiff's goods  from  Groveton  to  Port- 
land, and  deliver  them  to  the  boat 
for  transportation  to  the  con- 
signee at  Boston.  When  they  had 
carried  the  goods  to  the  terminus 
of  their  line  in  Portland,  and  had 
notified  the  agent  of  the  boat  line 
that  they  were  ready  to  deliver  the 
goods  for  further  conveyance,  they 
had  done  all  that  was  required  by 
the  terms  of  their  contract;  and 
if  the  ordinary  running  of  the 
boat  had  not  been  interrupted, 
they  would  have  been  relieved 
from  further  liability.  Gray  v. 
Jackson,  51  N.  H.  9;  Insurance 
Co.  V.  Railroad,  104  U.  S.  146.  By 
an  unforeseen  event,  for  which 
the  defendants  were  not  responsi- 
ble, it  was  impossible  to  forward 
the  goods  by  the  conveyance  speci- 
fied. The  failure  of  the  boat  to 
run  as  usual  did  not  impose  upon 
them  the  duty  of  transporting  the 
goods  from  Portland  to  Boston. 
That  duty  they  had  never  as- 
sumed, and  no  change  of  circum- 


132 


THE  LAW   OF    CARRIERS, 


:§  130. 


I 


fault  before  he  can  forward  Ihem.^'^  But  if  the  connecting 
carrier  designated  cannot  receive  the  goods  and  the  goods, 
although  perishable,  are  such  as  can  properly  be  cared  for 
until  the  shipper  can  be  communicated  with  and  orders  for 
disposition  secured,  the  carrier  will  not  be  justified  in  select- 
ing another  route  without  instructions  to  do  so  from  the  ship- 
per, and  the  fact  that  the  bill  of  lading  contains  a  clause  that 


stances  could  subject  them  to  the 
extraordinary  responsibilities  of 
carriers  beyond  the  termination  of 
their  route.  But,  although  they 
owed  no  duty  of  further  transpor- 
tation, the  defendants  were  bound 
to  the  exercise  of  reasonable  care, 
and  to  so  conduct  in  relation  to 
the  plaintiff's  goods  that  he  should 
suffer  no  unnecessary  loss  or  dam- 
age. Though  no  longer  liable  as 
common  carriers,  they  were  liable 
as  depositaries,  and  required  to  ex- 
ercise ordinary  care  in  the  cus- 
tody of  the  goods.  In  cases  of  ac- 
cident or  emergency,  it  sometimes 
happens,  although  the  transit  is 
at  an  end,  that  the  duty  is  cast 
on  the  carrier  of  taking  such  rea- 
sonable care  of  the  property  as  a 
reasonable  owner  would  take  of 
his  own  goods.  Railway  Co.  v. 
Swaffield,  L.  R.  9  Ex.  132.  And  a 
carrier  is  bound  to  use  all  reason- 
able means,  such  as  a  prudent 
owner  being  present  would  take, 
to  save  the  property  from  loss  by 
natural  causes.  Edward's  Bail., 
sec.  598;  Peck  v.  Weeks,  34  Conn. 
145;  American  Express  Co.  v. 
Smith,  33  Ohio  St.  511;  S.  C,  31 
Am.  Rep.  561,  and  notes,  567;  Em- 
pire Transportation  Co.  v.  Wallace, 
68  Pa.  St.  302;  N.  &  C.  R.  R.  Co. 
V.  David,  6  Heisk.  261.  What  con- 
stitutes such  reasonable  care  and 
diligence  is  a  question  of  fact  to 
be  determined   with  reference   to 


all  circumstances  of  the  case. 
Cass  V.  B.  &  L.  R.  R.,  14  Allen, 
448,  450.  The  defendants'  agent 
learning  that  the  boat  would  be 
prevented  from  running  on  ac- 
count of  the  storm,  and  knowing 
the  perishable  character  of  the 
goods,  forwarded  them  the  same 
afternoon  by  the  Eastern  Railroad; 
and  the  referee  finds  that  in  so 
doing  he  exercised  due  care  and 
prudence,  but  that  he  was  negli- 
gent in  not  notifying  the  con- 
signee of  the  change  of  route.  He 
also  finds  that  such  notice  would 
not  have  avoided  the  loss,  and 
that  the  plaintiff  suffered  no  in- 
jury by  reason  of  the  negligence 
of  the  defendants'  agent.  Upon 
these  facts  the  plaintiff's  action 
cannot  be  maintained.  After  the 
termination  of  the  defendants'  lia- 
bility as  common  carrier,  they 
were  answerable  only  for  injuries 
happening  in  consequence  of  their 
own  negligence.  They  were  not 
responsible  for  losses  which  they 
could  not  have  prevented  by  the 
exercise  of  due  care.  Sh.  &  Red. 
Neg.,  sec.  8." 

10.  As  where  goods  are  to  be  for- 
warded by  steamboat  but  boats 
cannot  run  because  of  low  water, 
and  before  goods  can  be  forwarded 
they  are  burned  in  the  warehouse 
by  accidental  fire.  Hornthal  v. 
Steamboat  Co.,  107  N.  C.  76. 


131. 


DELIVERY   TO   THE   CARRIER. 


133 


any  carrier  shall  have  the  right  in  case  of  necessity  to  forward 
property  by  any  route  can  make  no  difference.^i  If  the  goods 
have  come  into  the  hands  of  the  first  carrier  with  instructions 
or  conditions  as  to  their  ultimate  delivery  or  disposition,  it  is 
the  duty  of  the  first  carrier  to  see  that  the  same  instructions 
and  conditions  are  transmitted  to  the  succeeding  carrier,  and 
if  he  fails  to  do  so  and  the  goods  are  thereby  lost  he  will  be 
liable.i2 

Sec.  131.  (§103.)  When  liability  of  first  carrier  termi- 
nates.— But  the  responsibility  for  the  safety  of  the  goods  can 
only  be  shifted  when  there  has  been  such  a  change  in  the  pos- 
session of  them  from  the  one  to  the  other  as  will  be  tantamount 
to  a  delivery  to  the  latter  or  succeeding  carrier  ;i3  or,  in  case 
the  succeeding  carrier  neglects  or  refuses,  after  notice  of  their 
arrival  and  a  tender  of  delivery,  to  receive  the  goods,  then,  when 
the  first  carrier,  after  notice  of  all  these  facts  to  the  consignor 
or  consignee,  has  used  reasonable  diligence  to  store  and  care 


11.  Fisher  v.  Railroad  Co.,  99 
Me.  338,  59  All.  Rep.  532,  105  Am. 
St.  Rep.  283,  68  L.  R.  A.  390.  If 
the  shipment  consists  of  perish- 
able goods,  and  the  succeeding 
carrier  refuses  to  accept  them,  the 
first  carrier  must  make  a  reason- 
able effort  to  secure  instructions 
as  to  their  care  and  disposition; 
and  if  he  fails  to  do  so  and  the 
goods  are  allowed  to  spoil,  his 
omission  will  amount  to  such  a 
breach  of  duty  as  will  make  him 
responsible  for  the  injury.  Shea 
V.  The  Railway,  66  Minn.  102,  68 
N.   W.   Rep.    608. 

12.  North  V.  Transportation  Co., 
146  Mass.  315;  Richer  v.  Fargo,  78 
N.  Y.  Supp.  1007,  77  App.  Div. 
550.     See  post,   §  139. 

13.  Reynolds  v.  Railroad  Co., 
121  Mass.  291;  Insurance  Co.  v. 
Railroad  Co.,  8  Baxt.  268;  Lesin- 
sky  V.  Great  Western  Dispatch,  10 


Mo.  App.  134;  Gray  v.  Jackson,  51 
N  H.  9;  Insurance  Company  v. 
Railroad  Co.,  104  U.  S.  146;  Regan 
V.  Railway,  61  N.  H.  579;  McKay 
V.  Railroad  Co.,  50  Hun,  563;  Da- 
vis V.  Transportation  Co.,  106  Mo. 
App.  487,  81  S.  W.  Rep.  226;  Hunt- 
ting  Elevator  Co.  v.  Bosworth,  179 
U.  S.  415,  45  L.  Ed.  256,  21  Sup. 
Co.  R.  183,  reversing  Bosworth  v. 
Railroad  Co.,  87  Fed.  72,  30  C.  C. 
A.    541. 

Where  cotton  shipped  by  one 
railroad  arrived  at  the  point  of 
connection  with  the  succeeding 
railroad  in  the  evening,  and  next 
morning  the  car  was  placed  on 
the  switch  or  "Y"  which  connect- 
ed the  two  tracks,  but  the  car 
had  not  been  hauled  to  the  trans- 
fer platform  of  the  second  road, 
nor  had  the  cotton  been  examined 
or  checked  off  the  bill  of  lading, 
and  the  cotton  was  burned  after 


134 


THE  LAW  OF   CARRIERS. 


[§  131. 


for  the  goods,  and  has  renounced  his  relation  of  carrier  to 
them.^'*    So  long,  therefore,  as  the  first  or  any  succeeding  car- 


standing  for  three  hours  on  the 
switch,  it  was  held  that  the  deliv- 
ery was  not  complete,  and  that 
the  first  company  was  still  liable. 
Insurance  Co.  v.  Railroad  Co.,  8 
Baxt.  268.  For  a  similar  case,  see, 
also,  Alabama,  etc.,  R.  R.  v.  Mt. 
Vernon  Co.,  84  Ala.  173. 

And  to  constitute  a  delivery, 
either  actual  or  constructive,  even 
as  between  the  connecting  carriers 
themselves,  the  goods  must  have 
been  at  least  removed  from  the 
conveyance  on  which  they  have 
been  transported  to  the  point  of 
connection    for   further   shipment. 

Where  a  steamboat  and  a  rail- 
road formed  by  agreement  a  con- 
tinuous line,  and  the  steamboat 
arrived  at  a  wharf  owned  by  the 
railroad  company,  upon  which  the 
goods  had  to  be  unloaded  for  the 
railroad,  whereupon  the  employees 
of  both  the  boat  and  the  railroad 
commenced  unloading  the  goods 
by  hand  and  in  trucks,  and  car- 
rying them  across  the  wharf  to 
the  cars,  no  account  being  kept 
of  the  goods  taken  from  the  boat 
or  to  the  railroad  or  put  upon  the 
wharf,  and  while  they  were  thus 
engaged,  and  before  the  goods  had 
been  removed  from  the  boat,  the 
wharf,  boat  and  goods  took  fire 
and  were  burned,  it  was  held  that 
the  railroad  was  not  liable  for  the 
goods  which  had  not  been  removed 
from  the  boat,  having  neither  ac- 
tual nor  constructive  possession 
of  them,  and  that  there  had  been 
no  delivery  even  of  the  goods 
which  had  been  taken  in  charge 
for  the  purpose  of  removal  by  its 
own  servants  or  employees  if  not 


actually  removed  from  the  boat. 
Gass  V.  N.  Y.,  etc..  Railroad,  99 
Mass.  220. 

Delivery  of  baggage  to  a  con- 
necting carrier,  sufficient  to  re- 
lieve the  first  carrier  of  liability, 
is  not  shown  by  the  common  agent 
of  both  carriers  taking  it  in 
charge  and  placing  it  in  a  baggage 
room  used  by  both  carriers  in 
common.  Hyman  v.  Railroad  Co., 
66   Hun,   202,  21   N.   Y.   Supp.    119. 

14.  Lesinsky  v.  Great  Western 
Dispatch,  10  Mo.  App.  134;  Regan 
V.  Railway,  61  N.  H.  579;  McKay 
V.  Railroad  Co.,  50  Hun,  563; 
Whitworth  v.  Railroad,  87  N.  Y. 
413;  Condon  v.  Railroad  Co.,  55 
Mich.  218. 

In  Whitworth  v.  Railroad,  su- 
pra, plaintiff  had  shipped  cotton 
from  Memphis  for  Liverpool.  It 
was  contracted  to  be  carried  to 
New  York  by  a  dispatch  company 
which  conducted  its  operations 
over  a  number  of  successive  rail- 
roads of  which  the  defendant  was 
the  last,  its  terminus  being  in 
Jersey  City.  Defendant  carried 
the  cotton  to  Jersey  City,  where 
a  portion  of  it,  then  in  defend- 
ant's warehouse,  was  destroyed  by 
fire,  without  any  negligence  on 
defendant's  part.  It  appeared  that 
the  way-bills  of  the  dispatch  com- 
pany consigned  the  property  to 
its  agents  in  New  York.  The  uni- 
form course  of  business  between 
defendant  and  the  dispatch  com- 
pany had  been  for  defendant,  on 
arrival  of  property,  to  give  notice 
thereof  to  the  agent  named  in  the 
way-bill,  whose  duty  it  then  was 
to  obtain  a  permit  from  the  steam- 


§131.] 


DELIVERY  TO   THE  CARRIER. 


135 


rier  permits  the  goods  to  remain  upon  his  vehicle  awaiting  the 
convenience  or  necessities  of  a  succeeding  carrier  who  neglects 
or  unreasonably  delays  to  receive  them,  he  will  hold  them  sub- 
ject to  the  liabilities  of  a  common  carrier  until  by  warehousino- 
them  or  otherwise,  he  does  some  unequivocal  act  indicative  of 
a  purpose  to  change  his  office  from  that  of  carrier  for  trans- 
portation to  that  of  a  mere  custodian  for  safe  keeping.^^  if 
the  goods  consist  of  live  stock,  and  for  any  reason  they  are 
refused  transportation  by  the  succeeding  carrier,  the  carrier 
in  whose  custody  the  stock  is  may  place  it  in  suitable  pens 
and,  after  giving  notice  to  the  proper  party,  he  will  be  bound 
to  the  exercise  of  reasonable  care  only.^^  But  the  first  carrier 
cannot  relieve  himself  from  his  liability  as  an  insurer  of  the 
goods  by  simply  unloading  them  at  the  end  of  his  route  and 
storing  them  without  having  made  an  attempt  to  deliver  them 
to  the  connecting  carrier  in  the  route.^''^  And  a  mere  notice  to 
the  connecting  carrier  to  remove  the  goods,  unaccompanied  by 


ship  company  for  delivery  to  tlie 
latter  and  to  give  the  permit  to 
defendant;  and  on  receipt  of  It 
the  defendant  would  deliver  the 
goods  on  lighters  to  the  proper 
vessel.  On  arrival  of  the  cotton 
in  question,  prompt  notice  was 
given  to  the  proper  agent,  but  per- 
mits were  not  obtained,  and  de- 
fendant, although  persistently  urg- 
ing said  agent  to  obtain  the  per- 
mits, was  unable  to  get  rid  of  the 
cotton.  Held  that,  assuming  that 
there  was  unreasonable  detention 
of  the  cotton,  defendant  was  not 
responsible  for  the  delay  in  deliv- 
ery; that  it  had  fully  discharged 
its  duty  when  it  gave  prompt  no- 
tice of  the  arrival  and  held  itself 
ready  to  deliver  as  soon  as  the 
permits  were  obtained. 

15.  Bennitt  v.   Railway,   46   Mo. 
App.    656. 


16.  Larimore  v.  Railroad,  65  Mo. 
App.    167. 

17.  Railroad  Co.  v.  Manufactur- 
ing Co.,  16  Wall.  318;  Irish  v. 
The  Railway,  19  Minn.  376;  Gass 
V.  The  Railroad,  99  Mass.  220; 
West.  Trans.  Co.  v.  Newhall,  24 
111.  477;  Mer.  Des.  Co.  v.  Kahn,  76 
id.  520;  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  v.  Campbell, 
7  Heisk.  253;  Brintnall  v.  The 
Railroad,  32  Vt.  665;  Blossom  f. 
Griffin,  3  Kern.  569;  Mills  v.  The 
Railroad,  45  N.  Y.  622;  Root  v. 
The  Railroad,  id.  524;  Michaels  v. 
The  Railroad,  30  id.  564;  Condict 
V.  Railway  Co.,  54  id.  500;  McDon- 
ald V.  Railroad,  34  id.  497;  Ayres 
V.  Railroad,  14  Blatchf.  9;  Rail- 
way Co.  V.  Reiss,  183  U.  S.  621,  22 
Sup.  Ct.  R.  253,  affirming,  s.  c.  99 
Fed.  1006,  39  C.  C.  A.  679,  and  98 
Fed.  533,  39  C.  C.  A.  149. 


136  THE  LAW  OF   CARRIERS.  [§  132. 

a  tender  of  delivery,  will  be  ineffectual  in  divesting  the  first 
carrier  of  his  liability  as  an  insurer.^s 

Sec.  132.  (§  103a.)  Same  subject — Duty  when  succeeding 
carrier  neglects  or  refuses  to  receive  the  goods. — Where  the  suc- 
ceeding carrier  neglects  or  refuses  for  any  reason  or  is  unable  to 
receive  the  goods,  the  first  carrier  must  use  reasonable  diligence 
to  notify  the  consignor  or  consignee,  and  to  take  reasonable  care 
to  preserve  the  goods  from  injury  while  awaiting  instructions 
as  to  their  disposition.  If  he  fails  to  use  reasonable  diligence 
to  notify  the  consignor  or  consignee,i^  or  if  he  leaves  the  goods 
exposed  to  danger,2o  j^g  ^jn  j^g  liable  for  their  loss  or  injury. 
In  either  case  his  liability  as  carrier  is  not  terminated.  And 
if  the  first  carrier,  when  the  goods  are  refused  by  the  suc- 
ceeding carrier,  should  undertake  to  send  them  forward  over 
the  route  of  some  other  carrier,  it  would  be  his  duty,  as  the 
forwarding  agent  of  the  owner,  to  exercise  the  same  care  in 
selecting  a  carrier  or  succession  of  carriers  for  the  purpose  as 
the  owner,  being  a  man  of  ordinary  prudence,  would  have  exer- 
cised had  he  been  present  and  as  fully  acquainted  with  all  the 
lines  and  connections  as  the  first  carrier.^i  But  where  the 
succeeding  carrier  neglects  or  refuses  to  receive  the  goods  after 

18.  Railway  Co.  v.  Clayton,  173  transportation  by  tendering  them 
U.  S.  348.  to  the  connecting  line,  and,  if  ac- 

19.  Petersen  v.  Case,  21  Fed.  ceptance  be  refused,  to  notify  the 
885;  Lesinsky  v.  Great  Western  consignor  or  consignee,  without 
Dispatch,  10  Mo.  App.  134;  Rail-  unreasonable  delay,  and  store,  or 
road  Co.  v.  Diether,  10  Ind.  App.  otherwise  take  care  of  them  while 
206,  37  N.  E.  Rep.  1069,  53  Am.  awaiting  instructions.  Having 
St.  Rep.  385,  citing  Hutchinson  on  done  this,  his  liability  as  a  carrier 
Carr;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Odill,  96  will  cease  and  the  liability  of  a 
Tenn.  61,  33  S.  W.  Rep.  611,  54  warehouseman  will  be  substituted. 
Am.  St.  Rep.  820;  Bird  v.  Railway  Buston  v.  The  Railroad,  119  Fed. 
Co.,  99  Tenn.  719,  42  S.  W.  Rep.  808,  56  C.  C.  A.  320,  affirming,  116 
451,  63  Am.  St.  Rep.  856.  Fed.  235. 

The  general  rule  of  law  is,  that  20.  Goold  v.   Chapin,   20    N.    Y. 

an   intermediate   carrier,    who   re-  259;    Miller  v.  Navigation  Co.,  10 

ceives    goods   to   be   carried   to    a  N.  Y.  431. 

point  short  of  their  final  destina-  21.  Railroad    Co.    v.    Duncan    & 

tioH,  is  bound  only  to  use  reason-  Orr,  137  Ala.  446,  34  So.  Rep.  988. 
able    diligence   to   secure    further 


§  132.  ]  DELIVERY  TO   THE  CARRIER.  137 

a  proper  tender  of  them  has  been  made,  a  failure  to  give  notice 
of  such  refusal  to  the  consignor  or  consignee  will  not  be  ground 
for  the  recovery  of  damages  when  notice  would  not  have 
averted  the  loss,  and  the  parties  have  consequently  suffered 
no  injury  by  reason  of  the  failure  to  give  it  ;22  nor  should  notice 
be  required  where  because  of  the  perishable  nature  of  the 
goods,  to  give  it  would  not  be  practicable  on  account  of  the 
fact  that  a  delay  might  cause  their  injury  or  destruction. ^3 
"Where  a  succeeding  carrier  refused  to  accept  goods  intended 
for  him,  and  the  first  carrier  stored  them  in  his  warehouse, 
but  did  not  give  either  the  consignor  or  the  consignee  notice 
of  the  second  carrier's  refusal  of  them  until  about  three  months 
after  they  were  shipped  and  six  weeks  after  their  non-arrival 
had  been  reported  to  him,  after  which  time  the  consignee 
refused  to  accept  them  as  the  season  for  their  salability  had 
passed,  and  they  had  greatly  declined  in  value,  it  was  held 
that  the  first  carrier  was  liable  for  the  injury  so  occasioned.^* 
So  where  goods  were  delivered  to  a  carrier  by  water  to  be 
forwarded  over  several  connecting  lines,  and  at  the  end  of  its 
own  route  it  deposited  them  upon  a  float  of  its  own,  lying  in 
a  basin,  which  was  prepared  and  kept  by  it  for  the  purpose  of 
delivering  freight  to  the  connecting  carrier,  and"  though  it 
gave  notice  to  such  connecting  carrier  on  three  successive  days 
that  the  goods  were  on  the  float  for  it,  accompanied  by  a 
request  to  come  and  take  them  away,  yet  permitted  the  goods 
to  remain  for  three  days  on  the  float,  and  on  the  afternoon 
of  the  third  day  the  float  and  goods  were  destroyed  by  fire 
not  attributable  to  the  negligence  of  the  carrier,  it  was  held 
that  his  liability  as  common  carrier  still  continued  when  the 
goods  were  burned.^^ 


22.  Regan    v.    The   Railway,  61     259;   Miller  v.  Navigation  Co.,    10 
N.  H.   579.  N.  Y.  431. 

23.  Railroad    Co.    v.    Duncan  &        In    Lesinsky    v.    Western    Dis- 
Orr,  supra.  patch,    10   Mo.    App,     134,    supra, 

24.  Lesinsky     v.     Western     Dis-     Thompson,   J.,  said:     "By  accept- 
patch,  10  Mo.  App.   134.  ing  the   plaintiff's  goods,   directed 

25.  Goold   V.   Chapin,    20    N.  Y.     to  a  point  beyond  the  termination 


138 


THE  LAW  OF   CARRIERS. 


[§  133. 


Sec.  133.  (§  103b.)  How  duty  to  make  delivery  to  a  suc- 
ceeding carrier  affected  by  usage. — The  general  obligation 
created  by  law  in  respect  to  the  mode  of  making  delivery  to 
a  connecting  carrier  may  be  controlled  by  a  generally  estab- 


of  its  own  line,  and  consigned  to 
the  care  of  a  carrier  whose  line 
connected  with  its  line,  the  de- 
fendant assumed  the  duty  of  de- 
livering them  to  such  connecting 
carrier.  Rawson  v.  Holland,  59  N 
Y.  611.  Delivery  to  the  connect- 
ing carrier  in  this  case  being  im- 
possible by  reason  of  the  fact  that 
such  carrier  refused  to  receive 
the  goods,  did  the  defendant  incur 
liability  to  the  plaintiff  for  failing 
to  give  notice  of  that  fact? 

"It  is  familiar  law  that  the  lia- 
bility of  a  carrier  does  not  cease 
till  he  has  delivered  the  goods  to 
the  consignee,  or  made  a  reason- 
able attempt  to  deliver  them. 

"Where  his  own  route  extends 
to  the  place  of  ultimate  destina- 
tion of  the  goods,  and  the  con- 
signee refuses  to  receive  the 
goods,  he  ordinarily  discharges 
himself  from  liability  by  storing 
the  goods  safely  without  giving 
notice  to  the  consignor,  although 
there  are  some  cases  which  hold 
that  such  notice  must  be  given. 
The  reason  why  such  notice  is 
not  ordinarily  required  seems  to 
be  that  the  consignee  is  presump- 
tively the  owner  of  the  goods,  the 
consignor  the  agent  of  the  owner 
for  the  purpose  of  shipment,  and 
the  carrier,  in  like  manner,  the 
agent  of  the  owner.  Hutch,  on 
Car.  §  108;  Briggs  v.  Railroad  Co., 
6  Allen,  246.  It  is,  therefore,  a 
case  where  an  agent  tenders  per- 
formance of  his  contract  to  his 
principal,  and  the  latter  refuses, 
in  which  case  there  seems  to  be 


no  good  reason  why  the  agent 
should  be  held  bound  to  notify  a 
third  person  of  that  fact.  But  the 
reason  of  this  rule  does  jiot  apply 
to  the  case  where  the  carrier  un- 
dertakes to  transport  goods  over 
his  own  line  and  deliver  them  to 
a  connecting  carrier  to  complete 
the  transit.  Here,  the  goods  hav- 
ing passed  wholly  out  of  sight  of 
both  the  consignor  and  consignee, 
if,  from  any  circumstance,  deliv- 
ery to  the  succeeding  carrier  be- 
comes impossible,  the  former  car- 
rier is  under  an  obvious  duty  to 
notify  either  the  consignor  or  the 
consignee,  unless  it  is  imprac- 
ticable to  do  so.  Where  notice 
may  be  readily  sent  by  letter  or 
by  telegram,  he  is,  on  principle, 
guilty  of  a  clear  breach  of  duty  if 
he  neglects  to  send  it,  and  there 
are  cases  which  so  hold.  Con- 
voy's Wheat,  3  Wall.  225;  Rail- 
road Co.  V.  Campbell,  7  Heisk. 
253,  261. 

"In  all  of  these  cases  the  carrier 
is  bound  to  do  what,  under  the 
circumstances,  is  reasonable.  Hud- 
son V.  Baxendale,  2  Hurl.  &  N.  575. 
Where,  as  in  this  case,  the  goods 
have  passed  out  of  the  hands  and 
out  of  the  sight  both  of  the  con- 
signor and  the  consignee,  and  are 
interrupted  in  their  transit  by  a 
circumstance  unknown  to  either, 
but  known  to  the  carrier,  it  cannot 
for  a  moment  be  argued  that  the 
carrier  does  what  is  reasonable  by 
housing  the  goods,  giving  notice 
to  no  one,  and  losing  all  knowl- 
edge of  them  himself.     No  more 


§  133.]  DELIVERY   TO   THE  CARRIER.  139 

lislied  and  uniform  usage.^c  In  Rawson  r.  Holland,27  Andrews, 
J.,  said:  "It  is  said  in  Van  Santvoord  v.  St.  John,-^  that  a 
cai:rier  who  receives  a  box  marked  in  a  particular  way,  with- 
out any  directions  except  such  as  may  be  inferred  from  the 
marks  themselves,  has  a  right  to  presume  that  the  consignor 
intends  that  he  shall  transport  and  dispose  of  them  in  the  usual 
and  customary  way.  That  was  the  case  of  a  carrier  by  tow- 
boats  on  the  Hudson  river  who  received  a  package  marked 
'J.  Petrie,  Little  Falls,  Herkimer  county,'  and  it  was  held  that 
the  first  carrier  was  justified  in  delivering  it  at  the  end  of  his 
route  to  a  succeeding  carrier  by  canal,  and  was  discharged 
thereby  from  further  responsibility ;  it  being  shown  that  there 
was  a  general,  established  and  uniform  usage  in  .the  business 
that  such  delivery  might  be  made ;  and  it  was  also  held  that 
the  consignor  was  bound  by  it  whether  he  knew  it  or  not." 
But  if  a  usage  or  custom  be  relied  on  to  afi'ect  or  control  the 
general  obligation  created  by  laAv,  and  it  appears  that  such 
usage  or  custom  lacks  the  essential  elements  of  a  valid  usage, 
namely,  that  it  was  not  so  general,  established  and  uniform 
that  the  parties  could  reasonably  be  presumed  to  have  con- 
tracted with  reference  to  it,  the  general  obligation  created  hy 
law  and  not  the  usage  will  control.  Thus  a  custom  of  a  par- 
ticular road  that  goods  destined  to  points  on  another  which 

convincing  argument  against  such  for  this  reason,  greatly  depreciated 

a    conclusion    could    be    suggested  in  value.    This  seems  to  make  out 

than    the    circumstances     of     this  a   clear   case   for  the   recovery  of 

case.    Here  were  goods  of  the  value  damages.     But   if,   in  addition   to 

of  several   hundred  dollars,   inter-  this,  the  circumstances  which  ob- 

rupted  in  their  transit  at  a  point  structed  the  goods  in  their  transit 

remote   from    consignor    and    con-  existed  for  six  days  only  after  they 

signee.     A   postal   card   costing  a  arrived  at  the  end  of  its  line,  and 

cent,  and  a  few  scratches  of  a  pen  the  defendant  knew  oi  the  fact  of 

by   a  clerk,  would    have    notified  the     obstruction     being    removed, 

either    of    this    fact.     For    nearly  then  the  failure  of  duty  on  its  part 

three  months  a  knowledge  of  their  is  still  more  clear." 

whereabouts    was    completely   lost  26.  Gibson  v.  Culver,   17  "Wend, 

to  the  consignor,  the  consignee  and  305. 

the  defendant.      In   the   meantime  27.  59  N.  Y.  618. 

the  season  during  which  they  were  28.  6  Hill,  160. 
salable  had  passed,  and  they  were. 


140  THE  LAW   OF   CARRIERS.  [§  134. 

connected  with  it  should  be  detained  until  notice  was  given  to 
the  consignees  and  their  direction  taken  as  to  sending  them 
by  that  road  will  not  relieve  the  first  road  from  its  obligation 
to  deliver,  and  it  will  be  liable  if  the  goods  are  lost  during  the 
delay.  "The  proof,"  says  Andrews,  J.,^^  "falls  far  short  of 
establishing  a  custom  superseding  the  general  obligation  of  the 
defendant  to  make  delivery  of  the  goods  to  the  next  carrier. 
At  most  it  was  a  usage  recently  established  and  confined  to 
the  particular  business  of  the  defendant  at  a  particular  place, 
not  known  to  the  plaintiffs,  and  which  they  were  not  bound  to 
ascertain.  The  usage  relied  upon  in  this  case  lacks  the  essen- 
tial elements  of  a  valid  usage.  It  is  neither  general,  estab- 
lished, uniform  or  continuous.  It  would  be  unreasonable  to 
give  it  effect  in  this  case  to  defeat  a  recovery  by  the  plaintiffs. 
The  parties  did  not  make  their  contract  in  reference  to  it,  and 
cannot  be  presumed  to  have  done  so.  It  is  the  general  rule 
that  a  local  usage  must  be  shown  to  have  been  known  to  a 
party  before  he  will  be  held  to  be  bound  by  it."3o  ^^d  in 
The  Railway  Co.  v.  Hassell,^!  where  a  custom  was  observed 
between  two  carriers  of  holding  goods  in  transit  whenever  a 
controversy  arose  between  them  over  the  proper  amount  of 
freight  charges  tendered  by  one  to  the  other  until  the  charges 
were  adjusted  or  corrected,  it  was  held  that  such  a  private 
understanding  between  the  two  companies,  not  amounting  to 
a  general,  established  and  uniform  custom  in  the  business, 
could  not  operate  to  relieve  the  carrier  whose  neglect  to 
promptly  forward  the  goods  had  occasioned  damage,  from 
the  obligation  imposed  by  law  to  exercise  reasonable  diligence 
in  sending  the  goods  forward,  and  that  he  was  liable  for  any 
damage  arising  from  a  delay  thus  caused. 

Sec.  134.  (§  104.)  Agreements  between  carriers  not  bind- 
ing on  owner. — As  between  the  connecting  carriers  themselves 
it  is  undoubtedly  true  that  by  express  agreement,  by  usage 

29.  Rawson  v.  Holland,  59  N.  Y.  31.  23  Tex.  Civ.  App.  681,  58  S. 
618  W.  Rep.  54,  citing  Hutchinson  on 

30   See    also,   Dunham  v.   Rail-     Carr. 
road   70  Me.  164. 


§  134.]  DELIVERY  TO   THE   CARRIER.  141 

and  custom  in  a  particular  trade,  or  from  the  course  of  dealing 
between  the  particular  carriers,  the  responsibility  may  be 
changed  from  one  to  another  by  what  is  known  as  constructive 
delivery,  which  implies  no  actual  or  manual  transfer  of  the 
possession  of  the  goods.  But  as  to  the  owner  of  the  goods  the 
doctrine  of  constructive  delivery  can  have  no  application,  and 
he  can  be  required  to  look  for  the  reparation  of  his  loss  only  to 
the  carrier  in  the  actual  possession  when  it  occurred;  and  the 
carrier  whose  duty  it  was  to  make  the  delivery  to  the  succeed- 
ing one  will  be  presumed  to  have  still  had  the  possession  until 
it  be  shown  that  it  had  been  actually  transferred  to  another. 
In  Conkey  v.  The  Railway,32  the  defendant  carried  the  goods  to 
the  end  of  its  own  route  and  deposited  them  in  a  part  of  its 
warehouse  appropriated  to  freight  going  to  the  point  to  which 
the  goods  in  question  were  consigned,  and  it  was  proven  to 
have  been  the  course  of  business  between  the  defendant  and 
the  connecting  line  that  w^hen  goods  were  so  deposited  they 
were  taken  by  the  latter  without  further  notice,  and  that  it 
had  had  in  this  instance  ample  time  and  opportunity  to  re- 
move the  goods  after  they  had  been  so  deposited.  The  con- 
tention, therefore,  was  that  the  plaintiff's  recourse  was  upon 
the  connecting  carrier  which  was  thus  shown  to  have  been  in 
fault,  and  not  upon  the  defendant.  But  the  court,  in  an  able 
opinion  by  Dixon,  C.  J.,  held  that  the  rights  of  the  owner  of 
the  goods  could  not  be  affected  by  a  delivery  by  usage  and 
notice,  as  was  claimed,  when  it  was  to  be  made  by  one  carrier 
to  another  for  the  purpose  of  continuing  the  transportation; 
and  that  in  an  action  to  recover  for  the  loss  in  such  cases, 
proof  of  the  actual  possession  by  the  defendant  is  conclusive 
against  him.  But  it  was  said  that  as  between  the  carriers 
themselves  the  loss  should  be  borne  by  the  one  in  fault,  and 
that  there  could  be  no  doubt  that  if  the  one  not  in  fault  be 
compelled  to  account  to  the  owner  for  the  loss,  he  could  com- 
pel an  adjustment  by  the  other  by  the  proper  legal  remedy. 
The  owner  can  never  know  where  the  fault  lay;   nor  is  it  in 

32.  31  Wis.  619. 


142 


THE  LAW  OF  C.VRRIERS. 


:§i35. 


his  power  in  many  eases  to  ascertain  whether  a  delivery  from 
one  to  the  other  has  been  made  or  not,  if  such  delivery  is  made 
to  depend  upon  circumstances  other  than  an  actual  change  of 
possession.  As  between  the  carriers  themselves,  however,  it 
would  of  course  be  generally  knowTi  who  was  in  fault;  and 
whether  known  or  not,  it  would  be  more  consistent  with  jus- 
tice that  they  should  settle  between  themselves  upon  whom 
the  loss  should  fall,  than  that  the  owner  who  had  sustained 
the  loss  should  be  put  to  the  difficult  task  of  finding  out  the 
truth,  at  the  risk  of  being  defeated  in  his  suit.  He  is  there- 
fore required  to  look  no  further  than  the  actual  possession  at 
the  time  of  the  loss;  otherwise  he  might  be  the  victim  of  a 
usage  or  a  notice  of  which  he  had  never  heard.^^ 

Sec.  135.     (§  105.)     Same  subject — Illustrations. — So  in  the 
case  of  McDonald  v.  The  Railroad  Corporation,^^  the  carrier 


33.  This  case  overruled  the  pre- 
vious case  of  Wood  v.  The  Rail- 
way, in  the  same  court,  27  Wis. 
541,  in  which  it  had  been  held, 
under  the  same  facts,  that  the  car- 
rier had  exonerated  himself  from 
liability  to  the  owner  by  the  con- 
structive delivery,  by  usage  and 
notice,  upon  the  ground  that  the 
shipper  was  bound  to  know  the 
usages  and  general  course  of  busi- 
ness between  the  carrier  to  whom 
he  Intrusted  his  goods  and  the 
succeeding  carrier,  as  to  the  man- 
ner of  delivery  for  further  car- 
riage from  one  to  the  other,  and 
was,  therefore,  bound  by  them. 
That  the  owner  of  the  goods  is 
bound  to  take  notice  of  such  cus- 
tomary courses  of  dealing  between 
connecting  lines  of  carriers  seems 
also  to  be  the  rule  of  the  New 
York  courts,  and  he  is  there  con- 
sidered, it  seems,  as  contracting  in 
reference  to  them,  and  will  be  held 
to  have  agreed  with  the  carrier, 
where  there  is  no  express  contract. 


for  the  transportation  and  disposal 
of  his  goods  in  the  way  usual  and 
customary  with  him.  Van  Sant- 
voord  V.  St.  John  6  Hill,  157;  Mills 
V.  The  Railroad,  45  N.  Y.  622.  Still, 
in  that  state,  no  case  has  been 
found,  out  of  the  many  decided 
upon  the  subject,  in  which  the  car- 
rier whose  duty  it  was  to  deliver 
the  goods  to  the  connecting  carrier 
has  been  exonerated  from  liability 
to  the  owner  upon  the  ground  of 
a  delivery  to  such  connecting  car- 
rier constructively,  although  it 
might  have  been  the  customary 
mode  of  delivery  between  the  two 
carriers. 

But  see  the  case  of  Elliott  v. 
Railway  Co.,  58  Mo.  App.  80,  where 
a  delivery  was  made  to  a  joint 
agent  by  the  initial  carrier  and 
the  question  of  liability  was  held 
to  depend  upon  the  usage  and 
course  of  dealing  between  the  in- 
itial and  connecting  carrier. 

34.  34  N.  Y.  497. 


§135.]  DELIVERY  TO  THE  CARRIER.  143 

took  the  goods  to  the  end  of  its  own  route  and  there  deposited 
them  in  its  own  warehouse,  from  which  it  was  proven  the  suc- 
ceeding carrier  was  accustomed  to  take  them  without  further 
notice,  but  that  in  this  instance  he  neglected  to  do  so  for  some 
two  weeks,  at  the  end  of  which  time  they  were  destroyed  by 
an  accidental  fire  while  they  still  remained  in  the  defendant's 
warehouse.  In  the  meantime  the  defendant  had  made  no  request 
of  the  succeeding  carrier  to  take  the  goods,  nor  had  it  in 
any  way  attempted  to  divest  itself  of  the  liability  of  a  com- 
mon carrier  by  renouncing  that  relation,  as,  it  was  said,  it 
perhaps  might  have  done.  It  was  contended  that  under  these 
circumstances  the  defendant  had  done  all  that  it  could  be 
required  to  do  as  carrier,  and  that  its  liability  at  the  time  of 
the  loss  was,  at  most,  only  that  of  warehouseman;  but  it  was 
held  that  it  had  done  nothing  which  changed  its  responsibility 
as  carrier  to  the  owner  of  the  goods,  and  that  it  was  therefore 
liable  to  him  for  the  loss.  So  in  Condon  v.  Railroad  Company ,^5 
the  defendant  had  received  from  the  preceding  carrier  goods 
which  had  come  over  a  number  of  lines  from  New  York. 
Defendant  carried  them  to  the  end  of  its  line  and  deposited 
them  in  its  warehouse.  From  its  terminus  the  goods  were  to 
be  forwarded  by  an  overland  transportation  company  to  their 
destination.  It  appeared  that  it  was  the  customary  mode  of 
business  for  the  receipts  of  goods  to  be  entered  at  the  ware- 
house upon  books  of  the  defendant  which  were  open  to  inspec- 
tion by  the  transportation  company  and  which  were  regularly 
inspected  by  the  agent  of  that  company  to  ascertain  what  goods 
were  to  be  taken  by  it.  The  transportation  company  was  then 
accustomed  to  take  all  goods  found  consigned  to  places  on  its 
line,  load  them  at  the  warehouse  on  its  vehicles  and  receipt 
for  them  to  the  defendant.  When  the  goods  in  question 
arrived  no  notice  was  given  to  the  transportation  company 
nor  was  the  attention  of  the  agent  called  to  them,  or  any 
request  made  for  their  removal.  They  simply  remained  in  the 
warehouse,  where  they  were  destroyed  by  accidental  fire  a 

35.  55  Mich.  218. 


144  THE  LAW  OF   CARRIERS.  [§  136. 

week  after  their  arrival.  The  action  was  brought  to  charge 
defendant  as  a  common  carrier,  and  it  was  resisted  upon  the 
ground  that  defendant's  liability  as  a  carrier  had  terminated. 
The  court,  however,  held  otherwise.  "The  connecting  carriers 
in  this  case,"  said  Cooley,  C.  J.,  "appear  to  have  established 
a  custom  of  their  own,  under  which  actual  delivery  of  the 
goods  or  notice  to  take  them  was  dispensed  with,  and  the  one 
was  to  ascertain  from  the  books  of  the  other  what  goods  were 
ready  for  reception  and  further  carriage.  This,  as  between 
themselves,  was  well  enough  while  it  worked  well;  but  it  was 
an  arrangement  to  which  the  plaintiff  was  not  a  party,  and  the 
defendant  could  not  by  means  of  it  relieve  itself  of  any  liability 
which  duty  to  the  plaintiff  imposed.  And  it  was  clearly  its 
duty  to  the  plaintiff,  as  we  think,  to  relieve  itself  of  the  re- 
sponsibility of  the  goods  remaining  for  an  unreasonable  time 
in  its  warehouse;  and  to  do  this,  it  was  necessary  that  the 
responsibility  be  transferred  to  the  carrier  next  in  line.  But 
the  mere  permission  to  inspect  its  books  and  take  whatever 
was  ready  for  carriage  would  not  do  this;  there  should  have 
been  distinct  notice  which  would  apprise  the  other  carrier  that 
defendant  expected  the  removal  of  the  goods.  In  this  case 
there  were  no  facts  indicating  a  renunciation,  as  to  these  goods, 
of  the  liability  of  common  carrier  by  the  defendant,  or  that  it 
was  supposed  by  the  agents  of  the  defendant  that  that  char- 
acter had  been  exchanged  for  any  other.  If  it  ever  was,  it 
must  have  been  at  the  moment  the  goods  were  received;  for 
nothing  took  place  afterwards  to  change  the  relation  of  the 
defendant  to  the  goods  until  the  fire  took  place.  But  we  are 
not  ready  to  assent  to  the  doctrine  that  a  railroad  company, 
as  to  goods  transported  by  it,  ceases  to  be  carrier  the  moment 
the  goods  are  received  at  its  warehouse.  We  do  not  think  that 
is  law  or  that  it  ought  to  be." 

Sec.  136.  Same  subject, — In  the  case  of  The  Eailroad  Com- 
pany V.  Farmers'  &  Drovers',  etc.,  Firm,^^  it  appeared  that 
several  railroad  companies,  whose  lines  centered  in  a  certain 

36.  107  Ky.   53,   53   S.  W.  Rep.    972,  citing  Hutchinson  on  Carr. 


§  137.]  DELIVERY   TO   THE  CARRIER.  145 

city,  agreed  among  themselves  that  whenever  any  of  the  com- 
panies should  have  a  shipment  of  live  stock  to  be  transferred 
to  any  of  the  other  lines  for  further  transportation,  delivery 
of  the  stock  should  be  made  to  a  stockyards  company  for  the 
purpose  of  making  the  transfer.  A  shipment  of  stock  was 
received  by  one  company  for  the  transportation  over  its  own 
and  one  of  such  other  lines.  The  stock,  on  arrival  at  the  city, 
was  delivered  to  the  stockyards  company  for  transfer  to  the 
connecting  line.  On  account  of  the  inability  of  the  connecting 
line  to  furnish  cars  for  the  purpose  of  forwarding  the  stock,  a 
delay  occurred  and  the  stock  was  damaged.  No  notice  was 
given  by  the  first  carrier  to  the  shipper  of  such  delay.  In  an 
action  against  the  first  carrier  for  the  damage  thus  caused  the 
defense  relied  on  was  that  the  stock  had  been  seasonably  de- 
livered to  the  stockyards  company,  and  that  its  obligation  to 
the  shipper  had  therefore  been  performed.  But  it  was  held 
that  although  the  stock  at  the  time  of  the  delay  had  been 
placed  in  the  hands  of  the  stock  yards  company  in  accordance 
with  the  agreement  between  the  railroad  companies,  there  had 
been  no  delivery  by  the  initial  company  to  the  succeeding  com- 
pany such  as  to  relieve  the  former  company  of  the  duty  of 
notifying  the  shipper  of  the  delay,  and  that  it  was  therefore 
liable  for  the  damage  suffered. 

Sec.  137.  (§  106.)  Same  subject — Cases  holding  delivery 
complete. — But  in  Converse  v.  The  Transportation  Company,^' 
where  it  appeared  that  the  carrier  by  whom  the  transportation 
was  to  be  continued  and  the  incoming  carrier  used  the  same 
depot,  and  that  w^hen  the  latter  brought  in  freight  for  further 
transportation  by  the  former,  it  was,  by  usage  and  the  mutual 
understanding  of  the  carriers,  deposited  upon  a  particular  plat- 
form in  the  depot  at  the  side  of  the  track  of  the  connecting 
carrier,  which  was  considered  and  treated  as  a  delivery  to  it, 
and  that  this  was  done  in  this  instance  by  the  defendant  as 
soon  as  it  arrived  with  the  freight,  it  was  held  that  this  was 
such  a  delivery  as  to  shift  the  liability  for  the  further  safety 

37.  33  Conn.  166. 

10 


146  THE  LAW   OP   CARRIERS.  [§  138. 

of  the  goods  from  the  defeildant  which  had  thus  deposited  the 
goods,  and  that  it  could  not  therefore  be  made  to  account  to 
the  owner  for  their  subsequent  loss  by  fire.  And  in  Pratt  v. 
The  Railway  Company ,2*  in  which  the  facts  were  similar,  the 
same  conclusion  was  reached  by  the  supreme  court  of  the 
United  States.  But  in  both  these  cases  the  circumstances 
seemed  to  be  regarded  as  constituting  an  actual  delivery  to 
the  succeeding  carrier,  the  agent  of  such  carrier  in  the  latter 
case  having  actual  knowledge  of  the  arrival  of  goods  and  of 
their  having  been  deposited  in  the  depot  for  further  carriage 
by  his  road.  To  the  same  effect  is  the  case  of  Washburn  Crosby 
Co.  V.  The  Railroad.^^  It  there  appeared  that  a  railroad  com- 
pany had  a  pier  at  the  end  of  its  line,  and  that  a  steamship 
company  which  formed  a  connection  with  the  railroad  company 
at  that  point  used  and  occupied  a  portion  of  the  pier  for  the 
purpose  of  receiving  freight  deposited  upon  it  by  the  railroad 
company  and  intended  for  further  transportation  on  the  steam- 
ship company's  vessels.  It  also  appeared  that  unloading 
freight  in  such  manner  was  regarded  by  both  companies  as  a 
delivery  to  the  steamship  company.  A  quantity  of  flour  which 
the  railroad  company  had  unloaded  on  the  pier  to  await  trans- 
portation by  the  steamship  company  was  destroyed  by  fire. 
Suit  was  brought  against  the  railroad  company  for  its  value, 
and  the  question  was  whether  the  facts  showed  a  delivery.  In 
deciding  the  question.  Holmes,  C.  J.,  said:  ''If  it  was  under- 
stood in  advance  that  as  soon  as  goods  were  left  on  the  wharf 
by  the  railroad  company,  the  steamship  company  was  free  to 
take  them  at  its  pleasure,  and  that  it  was  expected  to  take 
notice  of  their  presence  and  to  assume  responsibility  for  them 
without  more  notification,  the  deposit  of  the  flour  on  the  wharf 
was  an  actual  delivery  without  more. ' '  It  was  held,  therefore, 
that  a  delivery  had  been  shown,  and  that  the  railroad  com- 
pany was  not  liable. 

Sec.  138.    (§  107.)    Owner  may  recover  for  good&  construct- 
ively delivered. — But  it  by  no  means  follows  that  the  owner  of 

38.  95  U.  S.  43.  590.     Sep  also,  Truax  v.  Railroad 

39.  180  Mass.  252,  62  N.  E.  Rep.     Co.,  3  Houst.  233,  251. 


§  139.]  DELIV-ERY  TO   THE  CARRIER.  147 

tlie  goods  may  not  recover  for  the  loss  from  the  connectiut' 
carrier  to  whom  they  have  been  only  constructively  delivered. 
He  is  not  obliged  to  look  to  him,  and  may  pursue  another  in 
whom  was  the  last  actual  possession.  But  if,  as  between 
the  carriers  themselves,  the  one  to  whom  delivery  has  been 
constructively  made  for  further  carriage  is  the  responsible 
party,  there  is  no  reason  why  he  should  not  be  liable  also  to 
the  owner  of  the  goods.  Thus  where  goods  were  carried  to 
the  end  of  the  first  carrier's  route  and  there  placed  in  a 
warehouse  to  be  farther  transported  by  the  defendants,  to 
whom  notice  was  given  of  the  arrival  of  the  goods  and  by 
whom  they  were  entered  upon  their  books  for  transportation, 
it  being  the  course  of  business  for  the  defendants  to  take  goods 
deposited  in  the  warehouse  for  them  with  notice  without  fur- 
ther delivery,  it  was  held  that  they  had  become  liable  for  the 
loss  of  the  goods  by  an  accidental  fire  after  they  had  remained 
in  the  warehouse  eight  days  aAvaiting  removal.  "In  the  pres- 
ent case,"  said  the  court,  "the  flour  was  not  only  deposited 
in  the  usual  place,  but  notice  was  given  to  the  defendants,  who 
entered  it  upon  their  books.  From  this  time  it  must  be  held 
to  have  been  in  the  possession  of  the  defendants  as  common 
carriers. '  '"^^ 

Sec.  139.  (§  108.)  First  carrier  as  forwarding  agent  for 
owner. — When  goods  are  delivered  to  the  carrier  for  the  pur- 
pose of  being  carried  to  a  point  beyond  the  terminus  of  its 
route,  and  for  that  purpose  to  be  delivered  by  him  to  a  con- 
necting carrier  in  order  to  continue  the  carriage,  or  where  it 
becomes  necessary  for  that  purpose  to  make  successive  deliv- 
eries from  one  to  another  upon  a  continuous  line  or  succession 
of  carriers,  the  first  and  each  succeeding  carrier  becomes  the 
agent  of  the  owner  of  the  goods  to  make  delivery  to  the  next 
carrier;  and  it  is  incumbent  upon  him  to  do  so  not  only  to 
relieve  himself  from  further  liability,  but  because  it  is  a  duty 
which  he  owes  to  the  owner,  and  which  he  has  assumed  with 
the  acceptance  of  the  goods.     He  is  the  party  in  charge  of 

40.  ^tna  Ins.  Co.  v.  Wheeler,  49     N.  Y.  616, 


148  THE  LAW  OF  CARRIERS.  [§  140. 

them,  and  the  only  one  with  whom  the  succeeding  carrier  can 
make  the  necessary  arrangements,  and  stands  towards  them 
for  this  purpose  in  the  position  of  an  owner.^i  Therefore, 
where  there  was  a  failure  to  deliver  to  such  succeeding  carrier, 
because  one  of  his  rules  was  that  he  would  not  receive  goods 
for  carriage  without  a  written  contract  restricting  his  liability, 
which  the  carrier  having  the  goods  in  possession  did  not  feel 
authorized  to  accept,  and  therefore  kept  them  in  his  ware- 
house for  twenty  days  without  offering  them  to  the  next  car- 
rier, or  giving  him  notice  of  their  arrival,  and  whilst  he  awaited 
directions  from  the  consignee  who  had  been  informed  of  the 
fact,  the  goods  were  destroyed  by  fire,  it  was  held  that  he 
should  have  tendered  them  to  the  next  succeeding  carrier,  and 
that  he  would  have  been  justified  in  delivering  the  goods  and 
accepting  on  behalf  of  their  owners  the  usual  terms  required 
by  the  succeeding  carrier;  and  that  not  having  done  so,  he 
continued  to  hold  the  goods  as  a  carrier,  and  was  liable  for 
their  loss.^^  in  such  cases,  it  is  said  that  the  owner  constitutes 
the  carrier  his  forwarding  agent  to  deliver  to  the  succeeding 
carrier,  and  becomes  himself  responsible  for  his  acts  in  the 
execution  of  the  agency.^^ 

Sec.  140.  Same  subject — Duty  of  first  carrier  to  forward 
shipping  directions. — If  the  first  carrier  receives  the  goods 
from  the   owner  with  instructions  or   directions  as  to  their 

41.  Nelson  v.  The  Railroad,  48  of  the  owner;  each  exercises  an  in- 
N.  Y.  507;  Squire  v.  The  Railroad,  dependent  employment  as  a  con- 
98  Mass.  240;  York  Co.  v.  Central  tractor  with  the  owner,  and  is  re- 
R.  R.,  3  Wall.  113;  Railroad  Co.  v.  sponsible  for  its  own  negligence, 
Foulks,  191  111.  57,  60  N.  E.  Rep.  but  it  cannot  make  the  owner  re- 
890,  affirming  92  111.  App.  391,  cit-  sponsible  for  the  negligence  of  a 
ing  Hutchinson  on  Carr. ;  Taylor  v.  connecting  road.  To  like  effect. 
Railroad  Co.,  87  Me.  299,  32  Atl.  see  Dunham  v.  Boston,  etc.,  R.  Co., 
Rep.  905.  ''O   Me.    164.      A    carrier    acts    as 

42.  Rawson  v.  Holland,  59  N.  Y.  agent  of  the  owner  in  turning  the 
611.  goods  over  to  the  connecting  car- 

43.  Briggs  v.  The  Railroad,  6  rier,  and  not  as  agent  of  the  lat- 
Allen,  246.  In  Sherman  v.  Hudson  ter.  Marquette  R.  R.  v.  Kirkwood, 
R.  R.  Co.,  64  N.  Y.  255,  it  is  said  45  Mich.  51. 

that  neither  company  is  an  agent 


§141.]  DELIVERY  TO   TPIE  CARRIER.  149 

ultimate  delivery  or  disposition,  or  relative  to  their  safe  and 
seasonable  delivery  at  destination,  it  is  his  duty  as  the  for- 
warding agent  of  the  owner  to  see  that  such  instructions  are 
given  to  the  succeeding  carrier  to  whom  he  delivers  the  goods 
for  further  transportation.^*  Thus  if  the  first  carrier  directs 
the  goods  to  a  destination  other  than  the  one  requested  by 
the  owner,  and  in  consequence  the  shipment  is  delayed,  he  will 
be  liable  although  he  has  provided  in  his  contract  that  he  will 
assume  no  liability  for  loss  or  damage  beyond  the  terminus 
of  his  own  linc*^  So  if  he  misdirects  the  goods,  and  they 
are  forwarded  to  a  wrong  destination  and  thereby  lost,  or  if, 
without  sufficient  cause,  he  selects  an  unusual  or  circuitous 
route  whereby  the  freight  charges  are  greater  than  they  would 
have  been  had  he  selected  the  ordinary  and  more  direct  route, 
he,  and  not  the  succeeding  carrier  will  be  responsible.  And 
under  such  circumstances,  the  connecting  carrier  is  not  re- 
quired to  delay  the  reception  or  forwarding  of  the  goods  until 
he  can  ascertain  whether  or  not  the  owner  and  the  first  carrier 
have  stipulated  the  terms  of  shipment,  and  if  so,  what  those 
terms  are  and  whether  the  preceding  carrier  has  complied  with 
them;  or,  if  no  terms  are  stipulated,  whether  the  preceding 
carrier  has  in  all  things  faithfully  and  honestly  discharged  his 
duty  as  the  owner's  forwarding  agent.*^  And  it  has  been  held 
that  if  the  first  carrier  by  his  contract  undertakes  to  forward 
the  goods  over  several  connecting  lines,  it  is  his  duty,  although 
he  has  expressly  limited  his  liability  as  a  common  carrier  to 
his  own  route,  to  see  that  each  successive  carrier  is  notified  of 
the  conditions  under  which  the  shipment  is  made.*" 

Sec.  141.    (§  109.)    Carrier  cannot  become  warehouseman  of 
the  goods  while  they  are  in  transit. — No  higher  degree  of  re- 

44.  North  V.  Transportation  Co.,     568,  58  S.  W.  Rep.  303,  78  Am.  St. 
146   Mass.    315;    Colfax   Mountain     Rep.  933,  50  L.  R.  A.  729. 

Fruit    Co.    V.    The    Railroad,    118  46.  Glover   v.   The   Railroad,   95 

Cal.  648,  46  Pac.  Rep.  668;  s.  c.  50  Mo.  App.   369,   69   S.  W.  Rep.   599, 

Pac.  Rep.  775.  citing  Hutchinson  on  Carr. 

45.  Railroad     Co.     v.     Southern  47.  Colfax  Mountain  Fruit  Co.  v. 
Seating  &  Cabinet  Co.,  104  Tenn.  The  Railroad,  supra. 


150  THE  LAW   OF   CARKIERS.  [§  141 

sponsibility,  of  course,  rests  upon  the  carrier  while  the  goods 
are  en  route  than  when  they  have  arrived  at  destination,  so 
long  as  he  stands  to  them  in  the  relation  of  carrier.  But  when 
the  question  occurs  whether  by  his  course  of  dealing  with 
them  he  has  divested  himself  of  that  responsible  relation,  some- 
what different  considerations  arise  and  somewhat  different 
rules  are  to  be  applied  when  the  goods  are  in  itinere,  from 
those  which  govern  when  the  transit  is  brought  to  an  end  by 
their  arrival  at  destination.  As  has  been  said,  "the  owner 
loses  sight  of  his  goods  when  he  delivers  them  to  the  first 
carrier  and  has  no  means  of  learning  their  whereabouts  till 
he  or  the  consignee  is  informed  of  their  arrival  at  destination. 
At  each  successive  point  of  transfer  from  one  carrier  to  another 
they  are  liable  to  be  placed  in  warehouses,  there  perhaps  to  be 
delayed  by  the  accumulation  of  freight  or  other  causes  and 
exposed  to  loss  by  fire  or  theft,  without  fault  on  the  part  of 
the  carrier  or  his  agent.  Superadded  to  these  risks  are  the 
dangers  of  loss  by  collusion,  quite  as  imminent  while  the 
goods  are  thus  stored  at  some,  point  unknown  to  the  owner 
as  while  they  are  in  actual  transit.  As  a  general  rule  the 
storing  of  the  goods  under  such  circumstances  should  be  held 
to  be  a  mere  accessory  to  the  transportation,  and  they  should 
be  under  the  protection  of  the  rule  which  makes  the  carrier 
liable  as  an  insurer  from  the  time  the  owner  transfers  their 
possession  to  the  first  carrier  until  they  are  delivered  to  him  at 
the  end  of  the  route.  "^^  But  when  they  have  reached  their 
destination    nothing  more   generally  remains  to  be   done  by 

48.  McDonald    v.    The   Railroad,  contract  is  for  carriage,  and  until 

34  N.  Y.  497.     See  also,  Lewis  v.  the  goods  reach  their  final  destina- 

The  Railway,  47  W.  Va.  656,  35  S.  tion,  he   has  a  right  to  a  contin- 

E.  Rep.  908,  81  Am.  St.  Rep.  816;  uous   carrier's  duty  and   responsi- 

Southard  v.  The  Railway,  60  Minn,  bility    which   cannot,   without   his 

382,  62  N.  W.  Rep.  442.  consent,    be   changed   to   the   duty 

The  owner  of  goods  who  deliv-  and  responsibility  of  a  warehouse- 

ers  them  under  a  contract  of  ship-  man   however   convenient  such    a 

ment  to  a  carrier  for  transporta-  course   may   be    for    the    carrier, 

tion  over  two  or  more  connecting  Wehman  v.  The  Railway,  58  Minn, 

lines     does     not    contemplate     or  22,  59  N.  W.  Rep.  546. 
make  a  contract  for  storage.    His 


§  142.] 


DELIVERY  TO  THE  CARRIER. 


151 


the  carrier  after  storing  them  and  giving  notice  of  their  arrival 
to  the  consignee,  and  after  allowing  a  reasonable  time  for  their 
removal  he  becomes  a  mere  warehouseman ;  and  if  after  that 
they  are  destroyed  without  his  carelessness  or  negligence,  the 
loss  must  be  borne,  as  in  equity  it  should  be,  by  the^'owner. 

Sec.  142.    (§  110.)    Same  subject.-This  distinction  has  been 
expressly  recognized  and  asserted  by  the  supreme  court  of 
the  United  States  in  the  case  of  The  Railroad  Company  v.  The 
Manufacturing  Co.,49  in  which  it  is  said  that  "there  is  a  clear 
distinction,  in  our  opinion,  between  property  in  a  situation  to 
be  delivered  over  to  the  consignee  on  demand  and  property 
on  its  way  to  a  distant  point  to  be  taken  thence  by  a  con- 
necting carrier.    In  the  former  case  it  may  be  said  to  be  await- 
ing  delivery;    in  the  latter  to  be  awaiting  transportation." 
And  the  same  principle  may  be  said  to  be  indirectly  recognized 
in  most  of  the  cases  in  which  the  duty  of  delivery  to  the  con- 
necting carriers  has  been  discussed.^*^ 


49.  16  Wall.  327. 

50.  The  case  of  Ouimit  v.  Hen. 
Shaw,  35  Vt.  605,  is  an  instructive 
case  upon  the  subject  of  the  duties 
of  carriers  in  making  delivery  of 
goods   to   connecting   carriers   for 
further   carriage;    and  though    in 
relation  to  the  baggage  of  a  pas- 
senger,   the    same    reasons     apply 
more   forcibly    to     goods    in    the 
hands  of  the  comm«n  carrier.     In 
this  case  it  was  known  to  the  in- 
coming road  that  the  baggage  was 
to    be    forwarded    upon    another, 
which  did  not  immediately  connect 
with   it,    however,   either   in   time 
or  place.     The  baggage  was  there- 
fore  stored    by   the   agent   of   the 
first  road  until  the  next  morning, 
the   time  for  the   starting  of  the 
connecting  train,  according  to  the 
custom    of    the    road    and    at   the 
request  of  the  passenger,  who  was 
assured  that  it  would  be  safe.     In 
the  morning  the  baggage  could  not 


be  found  and  the  road  was  held  li- 
able.    It   was   said   by   the   court 
that  in  such  cases   whenever  the 
two  roads  connected  in  the    same 
depot    and    the    departure    of   the 
succeeding  train  was  contempora- 
neous with  the  arrival  of  the  in- 
coming one,  it  was  the  duty  of  the 
latter  to  transfer  the  baggage  to 
the  outgoing  train  if  so  directed 
by  the  owner,  or  if  it  were  known 
to  its  agent  that  the  transportation 
was   to   be    continued    upon    that 
train;   and  that  if  there  was  not 
a  close  connection  between  them, 
and   a   necessary   detention   for   a 
short  time,  the  custody  of  the  first 
road  must  be  held  to  continue,  un- 
less  otherwise  desired  by  the  pas- 
senger, until  the  time  for  the  de- 
parture of  the  second;   nor  would 
the  relation  of  the  carrier,  it  was 
said,  be  changed  by  the  fact  that 
the  baggage  was  stored  by  it  in  its 
store-i'oom  while  awai^ng  the  de* 


152  THE  LAW  OF   CARRIERS.  [§  143. 

Sec.  143.  (§  111.)  Of  the  carrier's  duty  to  accept  and  carry 
the  goods. — It  has  been  already  stated  in  giving  the  definition 
of  a  common  carrier  that  the  obligation  to  accept  the  goods 
when  they  are  tendered  to  him  for  carriage  is  an  essential 
element  of  his  character,  and  that  if  there  be  no  such  obliga- 
tion he  is  not  a  common  carrier  although  he  may  carry  for  hire. 
But  this  is  only  a  general  statement  of  the  law.  There  are 
goods  which  he  is  not  bound  to  carry  at  all,  and  there  may 
be  circumstances  which  will  excuse  him  from  carrying  goods 
even  of  the  kind  which  he  is  engaged  generally  in  carrying 
and  which  generally  he  is  bound  to  carry.  He  may  therefore 
sometimes  lawfully  refuse  to  accept  the  goods;  and  as  the 
delivery  to  him  necessarily  implies  his  acceptance,  it  involves 
the  inquiry  when  such  acceptance  may  be  refused  by  him  with- 
out subjecting  himself  to  an  action  for  so  doing. 

Sec.  144.  (§112.)  Same  subject — Not  obliged  to  accept 
goods  of  a  kind  he  does  not  profess  to  carry. — It  has  been 
already  observed  that  no  common  carrier  is  a  carrier  of  all 
kinds  or  classes  of  goods.^  This  would  be  impossible.  There- 
fore before  he  can  be  made  liable  to  damages  for  a  refusal  to 
carry  such  as  are  offered  to  him  for  that  purpose,  it  must  be 

parture  of  another  train.  And  it  inasmuch  as  there,  what  is  known 
was  stated  as  one  of  the  reasons  as  the  rule  of  Muschamp's  Case, 
for  this  conclusion  that  what  which  makes  the  first  or  contract- 
would  constitute  a  delivery  when  ing  carrier  solely  responsible  for 
the  goods  had  arrived  at  destina-  the  goods  to  the  end  of  the  transit, 
tion  would  not  necessarily  do  so  and  which  will  be  hereafter  ex- 
when  the  baggage  was  still  in  tran-  plained,  prevails, 
sit,  and  that  although  the  circum-  1.  See  ante,  §§  59,  90. 
stances  might  have  been  held  to  But  a  railroad  company  cannot 
amount  to  a  delivery  and  to  have  refuse  to  transport  coal  on  the 
changed  the  relation  of  the  road  ground  that  it  is  of  an  inferior 
to  that  of  warehouseman,  if  it  had  quality,  and  its  introduction  into 
not  been  known  that  the  baggage  the  market  would  injuriously  af- 
was  to  be  forwarded,  it  did  not  do  feet  the  reputation  of  the  coal  mar- 
so  when  this  fact  was  known  to  ket  from  that  section,  and  so  in- 
the  agent  of  the  road.  jure  and  decrease  the  carrying 
It  should  be  observed  in  refer-  business  of  the  road.  Olanta  Coal 
ence  to  this  subject  that  the  Eng-  Min.  Co.  v.  Railroad  Co.,  144  Fed. 
lish  cases  throw  no  light  upon  it,  150. 


§145.]  DELIVERY  TO  THE  CARRIER.  153 

made  to  appear  that  they  were  of  the  kind  which  he  usually 
carried,  or  which,  by  his  public  profession,  he  was  bound  to 
accept  for  that  purpose.  The  law  will  only  impose  the  obliga- 
tion upon  him  in  this  respect  co-extensive  with  the  public  ex- 
pectations which  he  has  created  by  his  course  of  business  or 
the  invitations  he  has  publicly  held  out  to  those  who  may 
solicit  his  services.  But  it  being  a  matter  of  universal  knowl- 
edge that  certain  classes  of  carriers  engaged  generally  in  the 
carriage  of  certain  kinds  of  goods,  when  the  kind  of  carrier 
and  the  nature  of  the  goods  are  designated,  notice  will  in  most 
cases  be  judicially  taken  whether  the  particular  goods  are  of 
the  kind  which  those  of  the  class  to  which  the  carrier  belongs 
usually  carry;  and  if  they  be,  the  presumption  at  once  arises 
that  he  was  under  a  legal  obligation  to  accept  and  carry  them. 
But  still  there  may  be  many  cases  in  which  it  cannot  be  known 
from  common  experience  nor  from  the  character  of  the  business 
in  which  the  carrier  is  engaged  whether  the  particular  goods 
are  such  that  he,  as  a  common  carrier,  is  under  a  legal  obliga- 
tion to  accept  them  for  carriage,  and  in  such  cases  it  would 
devolve  upon  the  party  who  insisted  upon  his  liability  for 
the  refusal,  to  show  from  the  nature  of  the  employment,  or 
from  the  usage  of  others  similarly  engaged,  or  from  the  pre- 
vious practice  or  course  of  business  of  the  particular  carrier 
himself,  that  the  duty  to  accept  was  incumbent  upon  him. 
And  even  when  from  public  notoriety  or  from  the  evidence 
which  may  be  adduced,  the  presumption  arises  that  the  carrier 
has  unlawfully  refused  to  accept  or  to  carry  the  goods,  it  is 
still  competent  for  him  to  show  that  although  the  goods  are 
of  the  kind  which  carriers  like  himself  are  usually  bound  to 
carry,  he  has  exonerated  himself  from  the  obligation  to  do  so 
by  public  notice  or  by  his  previous  conduct  in  his  business. 

Sec.  145.  (§  113.)  Reasons  which  will  justify  refusal  to 
accept. — So  he  may  show  other  reasons  for  his  refusal  which 
will  legally  excuse  him.  He  may,  for  instance,  lawfully  refuse 
to  receive  them  if  they  are  improperly  packed,  or  if  they  are 


154  THE  LAW  OF   CARRIERS.  [§  146. 

otherwise  in  an  unfit  condition  for  carriage.^  Or  he  may  show 
that  the  goods  offered  were  of  a  dangerous  character,  which 
might  subject  him  or  his  vehicle,  or  strangers  or  his  pas- 
sengers, or  his  other  freight,  to  the  risk  of  injury.^  And  he 
may  even  refuse  packages  offered  to  him  without  being  made 
acquainted  with  their  contents,  when  there  is  good  ground  for 
believing  that  they  are  of  a  dangerous  character.^  But  he 
would  have  no  right,  unless  from  the  appearance  of  the  pack- 
age or  from  other  circumstances  his  suspicions  are  reasonably 
aroused  as  to  its  contents,  to  require  the  owner  who  offered  it 
for  carriage  to  disclose  their  nature.  But  when  such  is  the 
case,  it  would  not  only  be  his  right  but  his  duty  to  ascertain 
the  truth,  and  if  they  proved  to  be  of  such  a  dangerous  char- 
acter, to  refuse  them.^ 

Sec.  146.  (§  114.)  Same  subject — Press  of  business  may 
justify  refusal.  He  may  also  legally  refuse  to  carry  the  goods 
or  to  accept  them  for  carriage,  if  having  provided  himself  with 
equipments  and  facilities  for  doing  such  an  amount  of  busi- 
ness as,  from  previous  experience,  he  might  reasonably  expect, 
he  finds  that,  from  unexpected  temporary  causes,  its  great 
accumulation,  or  the  press  of  business  as  it  is  called,  has  made 
it  impossible  for  him  to  carry  the  goods;  or  if,  as  it  is  ex- 
pressed in  some  of  the  old  cases,  his  coach  be  full,  he  may  refuse 
to  receive  them  and  thereby  subject  himself  to  the  responsi- 

2.  Union  Ex.  Co.  v.  Graham,  26  Rep.  691,  36  L.  R.  A.  648,  citing 
Ohio  St.  595;  Railway  Co.  v.  A.  B.     Hutchinson  on  Carr. 

Frank    Co.    (Tex.    Civ.    App.),    48  A  railroad  company  is  not  liable 

S.  W.  Rep.  210,  citing  Hutchinson  in  damages  for  refusing  to  trans- 

on  Carr.  port  a  dead  body  where  the  tran- 

3.  The  carrier  is  not  bound  to  sit  permit  is  not  in  accordance 
accept  for  carriage  goods  which  with  the  rules  and  requirements 
are  likely  to  injure  goods  already  of  the  state  board  of  health.  Rail- 
received  for  carriage.  The  Nith,  road  Co.  v.  James,  10  Ind.  App.  550, 
36  Fed.  Rep.  86;  2  Pars.  Cont.  174.  35  N.  E.  Rep.  395;  s.  c.  38  N.  E. 
Nor  is  he  bound  to  accept  such  ar-  Rep.  192. 

tides  as  nitroglycerine,  dynamite,  4.  The   Nitro-glycerine  Case,   15 

gunpowder,  oil   of  vitriol  and  the  Wall.  524. 

like.     California  Powder  Works  v.  5.  The  Nitro-glycerine  Case,   15 

The  Railroad,  113  Cal.  329,  45  Pac.  Wall.  524. 


§  147.]       ■  DELIVERY  TO  THE  CARRIER.  155 

bility  of  their  safe  custody,  until  he  may  be  in  a  condition  to 
transport  them.^ 

Sec.  147.  (§115.)  Same  subject— Other  reasons.— So  he 
may  of  course  refuse  to  take  the  goods  if  he  does  not  carry 
to  the  place  to  which  the  owner  wishes  to  send  them/  unless, 
as  has  been  held,  such  place  is  upon  the  line  of  a  connecting 
carrier  with  whom  he  has  an  established  method  of  doing 
business.  Under  such  circumstances,  he  would  be  bound  to 
accept  the  goods  for  carriage  to  the  point  of  transfer  and 
make  delivery  according  to  the  usual  course  of  business  be- 
tween them.8  But  if  the  goods  are  brought  to  him  at  an  unrea- 
sonable hour,  or  at  a  place  other  than  that  which  he  has 
appointed  for  their  delivery  to  him,  as  if  they  be  offered  to 
the  agent  of  a  steamboat,  railroad  or  express  company  upon 
the  street  or  at  any  place  other  than  the  boat  or  office  where 
it  is  advertised  and  known  that  such  business  is  transacted,  or  if 
they  are  offered  at  a  time  unreasonably  long  before  the  accus- 
tomed or  appointed  time  for  his  departure,  he  will  be  excused 
for  refusing  to  receive  them.^  So  it  will  be  a  good  excuse  for 
refusing  them  if  at  the  particular  time  when  they  are  offered 

6.  Peet  V.  The  Railway,  20  Wis.  road  Co.   v.   Queen  City  Coal  Co., 

594;    Lovett   v.   Hobbs,   2    Shower,  13  Ky.  Law  Rep.  832. 

127;  Riley  v.  Home,  5  Bing.  217.  7.  Pitlock  v.  Wells,  Fargo  &  Co., 

Where   a   railroad   company,   by  109  Mass.  452. 

reason  of  a  strike  of  the  miners  8.  Inman  v.  Railroad  Co.,  14  Tex. 

at  the  coal  mines  from  which  it  Civ.   App.   39,   37   S.   W.   Rep.   37; 

had  been  accustomed  to  obtain  a  Seasongood  v.  Transportation  Co., 

large  part  of  the  coal  which  it  used  21   Ky.   Law  Rep.   1142,  54   S.   W. 

in  the  operation  of  its  road,  was  Rep.  193,  49  L.  R.  A.  270. 

compelled  to  send  to  more  distant  9.  Pickford  v.   The  Railway,   12 

fields   for   a  supply,    thus   making  M.  &  W.  766 ;  Lane  v.  Cotton,  1  Ld. 

it  necessary  for  it  to  withdraw  its  Raym.  652;  Story  on  Bail.  §  508; 

coal   engines  and   cars   from  that  Cronkite  v.  Wells,  32  N.  Y.  247. 

line    of    road    and    use    them    In  The  carrier    has    the    right    to 

freighting   coal    for   its   own   con-  make    reasonable    regulations,   ap- 

sumption,   such   facts   will   consti-  plicable  alike  to  all  shippers,  as  to 

tute  a  sufficient  excuse  for  its  re-  the  manner  in  which  a  commodity 

fusal  to  furnish  the  owners  of  a  such  as  coal  will   be  received  for 

coal  mine  on  that  line  of  its  road  transportation.       This     power     to 

with    engines    and    cars    for    the  make  reasonable  regulations  as  to 

transportation  of  their  coal.    Rail-  the  manner  and   place  where  he 


156  THE  LAW   OF    CARRIERS.  [§  148. 

the  way  is  exposed  to  extraordinary  danger,  or  if  the  goods 
are  of  such  a  character  that  they  would  be  exposed  to  the  fury 
of  a  mob  or  to  destruction  by  any  kind  of  popular  outbreak ; 
for  while  the  destruction  or  loss  of  the  goods  from  any  of 
these  causes  would  be  no  defense  against  the  liability  of  the 
common  carrier,  the  law  will  not  require  him  against  his  will 
to  expos©  himself  to  the  risk.^^ 

Sec.  148.  (!^  115a.)  Same  subject — Not  obliged  to  accept 
from  one  not  authorized  to  deliver — Liability  where  he  does. — 
Before  accepting  the  goods  for  carriage  the  carrier  may  also 
insist  upon  evidence  that  the  person  offering  them  has  authority 
to  do  so,  for  he  is  bound  to  receive  and  carry  goods  only  when 
offered  for  carriage  by  their  owner  or  his  authorized  agent.^^ 
And  if  he  does  accept  goods  for  carriage  in  good  faith  from 
a  person,  not  the  owner,  but  in  apparent  control  of  them  and 
able  immediately  to  assume  the  actual  custody  of  them,  and, 
after  carriage  to  the  destination,  delivers  them  again  to  such 
person,  he  is  not  liable  to  the  true  owner  as  for  a  conversion.!'-^ 

will  receive  such  commodities  for  12.  Gurley     v.     Armstead,     148 

shipment    implies    the    power    to  Mass.  267.    Said  Devens,  J.:     "The 

change    and    modify    the    regula-  defendant,  who  was  a  job-teamster, 

tions  thus  made  upon   reasonable  removed  the  goods  alleged  to  have 

notice  to  the  public.     Harp  v.  The  been   by   him   converted,    from    a 

Railroad,  125  Fed.  445,  61  C.  C.  A.  room  in  the  dwelling-house  of  one 

405,  affirming,  s.  c.  118  Fed.  169;  Whittier  to  the  store  of  one  Davis, 

Robinson  v.  Railroad  Co.,  129  Fed.  and  there  delivered  them  to  Whit- 

758,  64  C.  C.  A.  281.  tier,    by    whose    direction   he    had 

10.  Edwards  v.  Sherratt,  1  East,  acted.  Although  the  goods  were 
604.  Thus  it  was  held  that  where  in  the  house  of  Whittier,  they  were 
during  the  late  war  and  on  ac-  in  a  room  hired  by  the  plaintiff 
count  thereof  it  was  not  safe  for  from  him.  The  contract  between 
a  railroad  company  to  undertake  them  was  one  for  rent,  and  not 
the  carriage  of  goods,  it  was  not  for  storage,  Whittier  reserving  no 
liable  for  refusing  to  carry.  Phelps  control  over  the  room.  It  was, 
V.  Railroad  Co.,  94  111.  548;  Illinois  however,  neither  locked  nor  fast- 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  McClellan,  54  111.  58;  ened,  although  no  goods  were  in  it 
Same  v.  Ashmead,  58  111.  487;  except  those  of  the  plaintiff.  In 
Same  v.  Cobb,  64  111.  128;  Same  v.  all  that  he  did,  the  defendant  acted 
Hornberger,  77  111.  457.  in  good  faith,  without  any  inten- 

11.  Fitch  V.  Newberry,  1  Doug,  tion  of  depriving  the  rightful 
(Mich.)  1.  owner  of  her  property,  and  in  ig- 


§148.j 


DELIVERY  TO  THE   CARRIER. 


157 


But  if  he  be  directed  by  the  owner  to  call  at  a  certain  place 
to  obtain  the  goods  for  the  purpose  of  being  forwarded  over  his 
line,  and  in  so  doing  he  takes  by  mistake  the  goods  of  another, 
there  is  neither  a  delivery  by  the  owner  nor  one  having  appar- 


norance  of  the  fact  that  the  plain- 
tiff was  such  owner,  neither  assert- 
ing title  in  himself  nor  denying 
title  to  any  other,  nor  exercising 
any  act  of  ownership  except  by  the 
removal  above  stated. 

"The  legal  possession  of  the 
goods  was,  under  these  circum- 
stances, undoubtedly  in  the  plain- 
tiff, and  as  they  were  in  the  room 
hired  by  her,  the  actual  posses- 
sion was  also  hers.  The  apparent 
control  of  them  was,  however,  in 
Whittier,  as  they  were  in  his 
house,  and  he  had  further  the 
present  capacity  to  take  actual 
physical  possession,  as  the  room 
in  which  they  were  was  neither 
locked  nor  fastened. 

"It  is  conceded  that  whoever  re- 
ceives goods  from  one  in  actual, 
although  illegal,  possession  there- 
of, and  restores  the  goods  to  such 
person,  is  not  liable  for  a  conver- 
sion by  reason  of  having  trans- 
ported them.  Strickland  v.  Bar- 
rett, 20  Pick.  415;  Leonard  v. 
Tidd,  3  Met.  6.  And  this  would 
be  so,  apparently,  even  if  the  goods 
thus  received  were  restored  to  the 
wrongful  possessor,  after  notice  of 
the  claim  of  the  true  owner.  Lor- 
ing  V.  Mulcahy,  3  Allen,  575;  Met- 
calf  V.  McLaughlin,  122  Mass.  84. 

"Upon  the  precise  question 
raised,  we  have  found  no  direct 
authority,  nor  was  any  cited  in 
the  argument;  but  the  principle 
on  which  the  decisions  above  cited 
rest  is  not  unreasonably  extended 
when  it  is  applied  to  the  circum- 
stances of  the  case  at  bar.    The  act 


of  removing  goods  by  direction  of 
the  wrongful  possessor  of  them  is 
an  act  in  derogation  of  the  title  of 
the  rightful  owner;  but  the  party 
doing  this  honestly  is  protected 
because  from  such  actual  posses- 
sion he  is  justified  in  believing  the 
possessor  to  be  the  true  owner.  He 
does  no  more  than  such  possessor 
might  himelf  have  done  by  virtue 
of  his  wrongful  possession. 

"The  defendant  was  a  job-team- 
ster, and  thus  in  a  small  way  a 
common  carrier  of  such  wares  and 
merchandise  as  could  appropriate- 
ly be  transported  in  his  team  or 
wagon.  He  exercised  an  employ- 
ment of  such  a  character  that  he 
could  not  legally  refuse  to  trans- 
port property  such  as  he  usually 
carried,  which  was  tendered  to  him 
at  a  suitable  time  and  place  with 
the  offer  of  a  reasonable  compen- 
sation. If  he  holds  himself  out 
as  a  common  carrier,  he  must  ex- 
ercise his  calling  upon  proper  re- 
quest and  under  proper  circum- 
stances. Buckland  v.  Adams  Ex- 
press Co.,  97  Mass.  124;  Judson  v. 
Western  Railroad,  6  Allen,  426. 
His  means  of  ascertaining  the  true 
title  of  the  freight  confided  to  him 
are  of  necessity  limited.  He  must 
judge  of  this  as  it  is  fairly  made 
to  appear.  If  Whittier  had  actu- 
ally gone  into  the  room,  as  he 
might  readily  have  done,  and 
taken  physical  possession  of  the 
goods,  the  defendant,  upon  well  es- 
tablished authority,  would  have 
been  justified  in  obeying  the  order, 
and     transporting    the    goods    to 


158  TUE  LAW   OF   CARRIERS.  [§  149. 

ent  possession  or  control  over  them,  and  he  will  be  liable  to 
the  owner  for  the  conversion.^  ^ 

Sec.  149.     (i^  115b.)     Remedy  for  wrongful  refusal. — If  the 

carrier  refuses  without  lawful  reason  to  accept  and  carry  the 
goods,  the  owner  may  maintain  an  action  against  the  carrier 
for  the  damages  sustained  by  such  wrongful  refusal.'^  This 
remedy  by  action  is  usually  adequate  to  secure  the  plaintiff's 
rights,  and,  therefore,  in  accordance  with  well  settled  princi- 
ples, mandamus  will  not  lie  to  enforce  the  performance  of  the 
duty.^^  Where,  however,  the  duty  was  expressly  imposed  by 
statute,  and  the  refusal  was  continuing  and  the  injury  irre- 
parable, a  mandatory  injunction  was  granted  to  secure  per- 
formance.i^  And  in  Blumenthal  v.  Railway  Company  it  was 
held  that  where  the  goods  were  in  reasonable  and  proper  con- 
dition for  shipment  a  mandatory  injunction  would  be  granted 
enjoining  the  carrier  from  refusing  to  carry  the  goods.^" 

Sec.   150.      (§  116.)      Carrier  may  demand  prepayment   of 
freight. — The  carrier  may  also  require  a  prepayment  of  his 

Whittier  at  another  place;  and  he  actual    physical    possession,    must 

should    not    be    the    less    justified  be  equivalent  to  illegal  possession 

where  Whittier,   in  apparent  con-  in  protecting  a  carrier  who  obeys 

trol  of  the  goods  in  his  own  house,  the  order  of  one  having  such  con- 

and  capable  of  immediately  taking  trol." 

them  into  his  actual  custody  by  See  also.  White  Live  Stock  Corn- 
entering  the  room  through  the  un-  mission  Co.  v.  Railroad  Co.,  87  Mo. 
locked   door,  has   directed  the  re-  App.   330. 

moval.  13.  Edwards  v.  Express  Co.,  121 

"If  a  person  standing  near  and  Iowa,  744,  96  N.  W.  Rep.  740,  63 

in  sight  of  a  bale  of  goods  lying  L.  R.  A.  467,  citing  Hutchinson  on 

on  the  sidewalk  belonging  to  an-  Carr. 

other,  and  thus  in  the  legal   pos-  14.  See   ante,    §  62. 

session   of  such  other,   is  able  at  15.  People    v.    Railroad   Co.,   22 

once  to  possess  himself  of  it  actu-  Hun,   533;    People  v.   Babcock,   16 

ally,  although  illegally,  and  directs  Hun,  313. 

a  carrier  to  remove  it  and  deliver  16.  Chicago,  etc.,  R'y  Co.  v.  Bur- 
it  to  him  at  another  place,  com-  lington  R'y  Co.,  34  Fed.  481;  South- 
pliance  with  this  order  in  good  ern  Ex.  Co.  v.  R.  M.  Rose,  —  Ga. 
faith  cannot  be  treated  as  a  con-  — ,  53  S.  E.  Rep.  185,  citing  Hutch- 
version;  and  apparent  control,  ac-  Inson  on  Carr. 
companied  with  the  then  present  17.  84  Fed.  920. 
capacity  of  investing  himself  with 


§151.]  DELIVERY  TO  THE  CARRIER.  159 

freight,  and  may  refuse  to  carry  the  goods  unless  it  is  paid. 
While  the  law  compels  him  from  motives  of  public  policy  to 
deal  with  all  persons,  and  leaves  him  no  choice  as  to  his  cus- 
tomers, it  does  not  bind  him  to  deal  on  credit,  and  he  may 
demand  the  price  of  his  labor  before  it  is  performed.  But,  in 
a  declaration  against  him  for  his  refusal,  it  is  not  necessary 
to  aver  a  tender  of  the  money  for  the  freight.  It  is  sufficient 
to  aver  a  readiness  and  willingness  to  pay.^^  A  demurrer  does 
not  lie  to  such  a  declaration  because  it  does  not  appear  there- 
from that  the  payment  was  demanded  in  advance  and  the  car- 
rier might  have  been  willing  to  trust  the  owner  of  the  goods ; 
and  therefore  it  is  enough  to  say  that  he  was  ready  and  will- 
ing, which  means  that  he  would  have  paid  had  the  carrier 
demanded  the  freight.  As  said  by  Baron  Parke:  "Whenever 
a  duty  is  cast  upon  a  party  in  consequence  of  a  contemporane- 
ous act  of  payment  to  be  done  by  another,  it  is  sufficient  if  the 
latter  pay,  or  be  ready  to  pay  the  money,  when  the  other  is 
ready  to  undertake  the  duty.  The  money  is  not  required  to  be 
paid  down  until  the  carrier  receives  the  goods  which  he  is 
bound  to  carry."  It  would  seem,  therefore,  that  in  order  to 
show  his  readiness  to  undertake  the  duty,  the  carrier  must 
accept  the  goods  before  he  demands  his  freight,  but  may 
refuse  to  carry  until  such  payment;  and  if  the  owner  refuse 
to  pay,  the  carrier  would  hold  them  until  returned  to  the 
owner  merely  as  a  depositary,  because  something  would  re- 
main yet  to  be  done  to  put  him  in  the  relation  of  carrier  to 
them.  If  not  demanded  and  not  required  by  any  rule  or 
regulation  of  the  carrier  known  to  the  owner  of  the  goods, 
no  tender  need  be  made  of  the  carrier's  charges,  and  he  may 
be  sued  for  his  refusal  without  such  tender. 

Sec.  151.  (§117.)  Actual  acceptance  may  waive  reasons 
for  refusal.— Although,  however,  the  carrier  may  in  these  cases 
refuse  to  accept  the  goods,  if  he  take  them  into  his  possession 

18.  Pickford  v.  The  Railway,   S     show  &  Newman,  Gl  111.  App.  179. 
M.  &  W.  372;   Bastard  v.  Bastard,     See  also,  post,  §1344. 
2  Shower,  81;  Railway  Co.  v.  Peri- 


160 


THE  LAW   OF    CARRIERS. 


[§151 


for  the  purpose  of  carriage  without  insisting  upon  his  right  to 
refuse  them,  he  will  be  considered  as  waiving  it  and  consenting 
to  accept  the  goods  upon  the  usual  terms  as  to  liability,  and 
will  become  responsible  as  an  insurer  as  in  other  cases.^^  But 
to  impose  upon  him  such  extraordinary  liability  for  goods 
which  from  the  nature  of  his  business  he  was  not  bound  to 
carry,  or  which  were  in  an  unfit  condition  to  be  carried,  or 
which  for  any  reason  it  would  be  unfair  to  require  him  to 
carry,  an  actual  acceptance  for  the  purpose  of  the  carriage 
must  be  shown;  and  it  will  not  be  done  where  the  delivery 
is  merely  constructive. 

II.    THE  BILL  OF  LADING. 

Sec.  152.  (§  118.)  No  receipt,  bill  of  lading  or  other  writing 
necessary. — No  receipt,  bill  of  lading  or  writing  of  any  kind 
is  required  to  subject  the  carrier  to  the  duties  and  responsibili- 
ties of  an  insurer  of  the  goods.^o    As  soon  as  they  are  deliv- 


19.  The  David,  5  Blatch.  266; 
Hannibal,  etc.,  R.  R.  v.  Swift,  12 
Wall.  262;  Pickford  v.  The  Rail- 
way, 12  M.  &  W.  766;  Porcher  v. 
The  Railroad,  14  Rich.  (Law), 
181;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Keith,  8  Ind. 
App.  57,  35  N.  E.  Rep.  296;  Rail- 
road Co.  V.  Allgood,  113  Ala.  163, 
20  So.  Rep.  986;  Express  Co.  v.  U. 
S.  Express  Co.,  88  Fed.  659;  v<f.  c. 
92  Fed.  1022,  35  C.  C.  A.  172;  Ev- 
ans V.  The  Railroad  Co.,  —  Ky.  — , 
90  S.  W.  Rep.  588. 

Thus  in  the  case  of  Railway  Co. 
V.  Webb,  103  Ky.  705,  46  S.  W. 
Rep.  11,  it  appeared  that  a  carrier 
accepted  for  transportation  a  ship- 
ment of  live  stock  at  a  time  of  un- 
usual drought  and  water  failure. 
Owing  to  the  inability  of  the  car- 
rier to  supply  the  stock  with  suf- 
ficient water  it  depreciated  in 
value.  It  further  appeared  that 
the  carrier  accepted  the  stock  with 


full  knowledge  of  the  weather  con- 
ditions then  prevailing.  In  an  ac- 
tion by  the  owner  to  recover 
damages,  it  was  contended  by  the 
carrier  that  the  water  failure  was 
an  act  of  God  for  which  it  should 
not  be  held  responsible.  Tln^ 
court,  however,  held  that,  while 
the  carrier  under  such  circum- 
stances might  have  been  justified 
in  refusing  to  accept  the  stock  lor 
transportation,  yet,  having  done 
so,  with  full  knowledge  of  the  dif- 
ficulties to  be  encountered,  it  was 
liable  for  the  injury. 

20.  A  parol  contract  is  sufficient. 
Texas  Pac.  R'y  Co.  v.  Nicholson, 
61  Tex.  491.    See  also,  post,  §  1313. 

Where  a  common  carrier  has 
orally  agi'eed  to  ship  goods,  it  is 
not  necessary  to  have  a  shipping 
bill  or  contract  in  writing  in  order 
to  make  his  liability,  as  such,  com- 
plete.   Meloche  v.  Railway  Co.,  116 


§153.]  THE  BILL  OF  LADING.  161 

ered  to  him  for  present  carriage  and  nothing  necessary  to 
their  being  forwarded  remains  to  be  done  by  the  owner,  the 
law  imposes  upon  him  all  the  risk  of  their  safe  custody  as  well 
as  the  duty  to  carry  as  directed.  He  is  regarded  as  exercising 
in  some  sort  the  fimctions  of  a  public  office,  and  the  law  is  said 
to  impose  upon  him  his  duties  and  obligations  upon  this  ground 
as  well  as  upon  the  ground  of  the  contract,  and  as  soon  as  the 
delivery  to  him  and  his  acceptance  are  shown,  the  law  imposes 
the  duty  and  responsibility  in  virtue  of  his  public  employ- 
ment. In  other  words,  his  liability  does  not  rest  exclusively 
upon  contract,  however  much  it  may  be  qualified  or  limited 
by  express  agreement. 

Sec.  153.  (§119.)  Liability  of  carrier  usually  limited  by 
contract. — He  was  always  allow^ed,  however,  if  a  carrier  by 
water,  to  enter  into  contracts  by  which  he  might  exempt  him- 
self from  the  risks  of  certain  perils.  But  carriers  by  land  had 
formerly  no  such  privilege  in  this  country;  and  such  was  the 
jealousy  with  which  they  were  regarded,  that  it  was  held 
impossible  for  them  to  guard  themselves  by  any  stipulations 
whatever  against  liability  from  loss  arising  from  any  other 
cause  than  the  act  of  God  or  the  public  enemy.  This  harsh 
condition  has,  however,  been  greatly  changed  in  the  carrier's 
favor,  as  we  shall  hereafter  see  f^  and  now,  not  only  is  he 
permitted  to  contract  so  as  to  change  the  extent  of  his  liability 
as  fixed  by  the  common  law,  but  such  contracts  when  made 
with  his  employers  become  almost  entirely  the  measure  of  his 
responsibility.  And  this  custom  has  become  so  universal  in 
transactions  with  carriers  that  his  liability  may  now  be  said  to 
depend  almost  exclusively  upon  contract.  He  still  stands, 
how^ever,  in  the  relation  of  common  carrier  to  the  goods  in- 
trusted to  him,  notwithstanding  his  contract,  however  much 

Mich.  69,  74  N.  W.  Rep.  301.     See  v.  Beard    (Tex.   Civ.  App.),  78   S. 

also,  Berry  v.  Railway  Co.,  122  N.  W.  Rep.  253;  Railway  Co.  v.  Darby, 

Car.  1002,  30  S.  E.  Rep.  14;  Martin  119  Ala.  531,  24  So.  Rep.  713,  citing 

V.   Railway  Co.,   3   Tex.   Civ.   App.  Hutchinson  on  Carr. 
556,    22    S.    W.    Rep.    1007,    citing        21.  See  post,  chapter  VII. 
Hutchinson  on  Carr.;  Railway  Co. 

11 


162  THE  LAW  OF   CARRIERS.  [§  154. 

it  may  lessen  his  common-law  liability,  and  he  cannot,  even 
by  the  most  express  contract,  divest  himself  of  that  character 
and  change  it  to  that  of  a  mere  private  carrier  or  ordinary 
bailee.22 

Sec.  154.  (§  120.)  Contracts  vary  in  form  and  name. — 
These  contracts  assume  somewhat  different  forms  and  are 
known  by  different  names  according  as  they  may  be  with 
carriers  by  water  or  carriers  by  land.  Those  with  the  former 
are  called  bills  of  lading,  while  those  with  land  carriers  are 
commonly  called  receipts.  They  are,  however,  the  same  in 
effect,  and  are  intended  merely  to  evidence  the  true  intent  of 
the  transaction  between  the  parties.  In  both  cases  they  con- 
tain a  description  of  the  goods,  an  acknowledgment  that  they 
have  been  received  by  the  carrier,  the  names  of  the  shipper 
and  consignee,  the  place  of  consignment,  that  they  are  in  good 
condition,  the  terms  of  the  carriage  and  such  qualifications  of 
the  liability  of  the  carrier  as  he  and  the  shipper  may  have 
agreed  upon,  and  the  contract  to  carry  to  destination  and 
there  deliver  to  the  consignee.  They  must  be  signed  by  the 
carrier  or  his  authorized  agent 'to  bind  him,^^  and  must  be 
accepted  by  the  shipper.  And  any  contract  with  the  carrier 
having  these  characteristics  is  entitled  to  the  effect  of  a  bill 
of  lading,  no  matter  how  informally  it  may  be  drawn. 

Sec.  155.  (§121.)  Variance  in  duplicates — Shipper's  con- 
trols.— A  ship's  bill  of  lading  is  usually  made  out  in  triplicate, 
one  being  retained  by  the  shipper,  another  sent  by  him  to  his 
consignee  and  the  third  retained  by  the  master  of  the  vessel. 
In  case  of  difference  between  these  parts,  the  one  retained  by 
the  master  is  of  inferior  weight,  as  evidence  of  what  the  con- 

22.  See  ante,  §  44.  way  Co.  v.  Patrick,  —  C.  C.  A.  — , 
Also   Ballou   V.   Barle,   17   R.    I.     144  Fed.  632.     Though  the  receipt 

441,  22  Atl.  1113,  33  Am.  St.  Rep.  given  is  signed  by  the  carrier  only, 

881,  14  L.  R.  A.  433,  citing  Hutch-  the    shipper,    when    he   accepts   it, 

inson  on  Carr.  becomes  a  party  to  it  and  bound 

23.  The  Brittannia,  87  Fed.  495;  by  its  terms.  Express  Co.  v.  Ful- 
Patrick  v.  Railway  Co.,  —  Ind.  ler,  4  Tex.  Civ.  App.  213,  23  S.  W. 
Terr.  — ,  88  S.  W.  Rep.  330,  re-  Rep.  412,  citing  Hutchinson  on 
versed  on  another  point  in  Rail-  Carr. 


§156]  THE  BILL  OF  LADING.  163 

tract  was,  to  those  delivered  to  the  shipper,  that  retained  by 
the  master  being  designed,  it  is  said,  only  for  information  and 
convenience  and  not  as  evidence  between  the  parties  of  what 
their  contract  was.  If  it  differs  from  the  others  they  must  be 
considered  as  the  true  and  only  evidence  of  the  contract.-' 
And  the  same  rule  applies  to  duplicates  issued  by  other  car- 
riers,— in  case  of  variance  that  delivered  to  the  shipper  con- 
trols.25 

Sec.  156.  Variance  between  charter  party  and  bill  of 
lading. — As  between  the  shipowner  and  one  who  charters  the 
ship,  the  charter  party,  although  in  parol,  will  con- 
trol a  bill  of  lading  which  is  inconsistent  with  it  and 
which  contains  no  reference  to  the  charter  party.  In 
such  a  case,  the  bill  of  lading  will  neither  operate  as  a  new 
contract,  nor  as  a  modification  of  the  terms  of  the  charter 
party.^"  But  as  between  the  shipowner  and  a  shipper  other 
than  the  charterer,  if  it  appear  that  such  shipper  had  no 
notice  of  the  terms  of  the  charter  party  until  after  his  contract 
with  the  ship  had  been  made,  he  will  not  be  bound  by  the  terms 
of  the  charter  party,  and  his  contract  will  be  controlled  by 
the  bill  of  lading  issued  to  him.^^ 

Sec.  157.  (§  122.)  Bills  of  lading  are  both  receipts  and 
contracts  to  carry. — Such  instruments  are  both  receipts  and 
contracts.-^  So  far  as  they  acknowledge  the  delivery  and 
acceptance  of  the  goods,  they  are  mere  receipts.  As  to  the 
rest,  they  are  contracts  and  are  binding  as  such  on  the  parties 
to  them.  In  both  characters  they  are  of  great  importance  to 
both  shipper  and  carrier. 

24.  The  Thames,  14  Wall.  105.  7;   Planters',  etc.,  Mfg.  Co.  v.  El- 

25.  Ontario  Bank  v.  Hanlon,  23  der,  101  Fed.  1001,  42  C.  C.  A.  130; 
Hun,  283.  The  Tongoy,  55  Fed.  329;  Railway 

26.  The  Iowa,  80  Fed.  933;  Co.  v.  Moline  Plow  Co.,  13  Ind. 
Huron  Barge  Co.  v.  Turney,  71  App.  225,  41  N.  E.  Rep.  480;  Hears 
Fed.  972  and  79  Fed.  109.  v.  Railroad  Co.,   75   Conn.   171,   52 

27.  The  Titania,  131  Fed.  229,  65  Atl.  Rep.  610,  96  Am.  St.  Rep.  192, 
C.  C.  A.  215,  affirming  124  Fed.  56  L.  R.  A.  884;  Railroad  Co.  v. 
975.  Simon,  160  111.  648,  43  N.  E.  Rep. 

28.  Pollard  v.  Vinton,  105  U.  S.  596,  citing  Hutchinson  on  Carr. 


164 


THE  LAW  OP   CARRIERS. 


;§  158. 


Sec.  158.  Same  subject — As  receipts,  not  conclusive. — In 
so  far  as  bills  of  lading  acknowledge  that  the  carrier  has 
received  the  goods,  or  that  he  has  received  the  quantity  named, 
they  are  like  all  other  receipts  and  may  be  shown  to  have 
been  given  by  mistake  and  not  to  speak  the  truth.--'  For  it  has 
been  repeatedly  held  that  all  receipts  and  admissions  are  open 
as  between  the  parties  to  explanation,  .and  are  impeachable 
for  any  mistake,  error  or  false  statement  contained  in  them, 
and  may  be  contradicted,  varied  or  explained  by  parol  testi- 
mony ;  and  that  so  much  of  the  bill  of  lading  as  relates  only 
to  the  receipt  of  the  goods,  the  quality,  condition  and  quan- 
tity, which  is  treated  as  distinct  from  the  contract,  comes  within 
this  rule.  But  it  is  said  to  be  very  high  and  authentic 
evidence  of  both  the  quantity  and  condition  of  the  goods 
when  they  were  received,  though  not  an  estoppel  to  show  the 
truth.3o 


29.  Elm  Staves'  Case,  21  Fed. 
Rep.  590;  Abbe  v.  Eaton,  51  N,  Y. 
410;  Hazard  v.  Railway  Co.,  67 
Miss.  32,  7  S.  Rep.  280;  Railway 
Co.  V.  Molin«  Plow  Co.,  supra;  The 
Titania,  65  C.  C.  A.  215,  131  Fed. 
229,  afflrming  124  Fed.  975;  Plant- 
ers' Fertilizer  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Elder, 
supra;  Cunard  S.  S.  Co.  v.  Kelley, 
115  Fed.  678,  53  C.  C.  A.  310,  s.  c. 
126  Fed.  610,  61  C.  C.  A.  532,  re- 
versing Kelley  v.  Cunard  S.  S.  Co., 
120  Fed.  536. 

A  statute  making  the  specifica- 
tion of  weights  in  bills  of  lading 
issued  by  railroad  companies  for 
hay,  grain,  etc.,  shipped  over  their 
lines,  conclusive  evidence  of  the 
correctness  of  such  weights,  is  un- 
constitutional because  denying  to 
the  railroad  companies  due  process 
of  law,  and  because  depriving  the 
courts  of  their  judicial  power  to 
determine  the  weight  and  suffi- 
ciency of  evidence.  Railway  Co. 
V.  Simonson,  64  Kan.  802,  68  Pac. 


Rep.  653,  91  Am.  St.  Rep.  248,  57 
L.  R.  A.  765,  citing  Hutchinson  on 
Carr. 

30.  Ellis  V.  Willard,  5  Seld.  529; 
Meyer  v.  Peck,  28  N.  Y.  590;  The 
Delaware,  14  Wall.  601;  The  Lady 
Franklin,  8  id.  325;  Abbe  v.  Eaton, 
5]  N.  Y.  410;  Dean  v.  King,  23 
Ohio  St.  118;  The  Loon,  7  Blatch. 
244;  Fellows  v.  Str.  Powell,  16  La. 
Ann.  316;  Sears  v.  Wingate,  3 
Allen,  103;  Hunt  &  Macauley  v. 
The  Railroad,  29  La.  Ann.  446; 
Baltimore,  etc..  Railroad  v.  Wil- 
kins,  44  Md.  11;  National  Bank  v. 
Walbridge,  19  Ohio  St.  425;  Lou- 
isiana Bank  i\  Laveille,  52  Mo.  380; 
Fasy  V.  Navigation  Co.,  79  N.  Y. 
Supp.  1103,  77  App.  Div.  469;  af- 
firmed without  opinion,  177  N.  Y. 
591,  70  N.  E.  Rep.  1098;  Davis  v. 
Railroad  Co.,  66  Vt.  290,  29  Atl. 
313,  44  Am.  St.  Rep.  852;  Railway 
Co.  V.  McFadden,  J54  U.  S.  155,  14 
Sup.  Ct.  R.  990,  38  L.  Ed.  944, 
citing  Hutchinson  on  Carr. 


§  159,]  THE   BILL   OF   LADING.  165 

Sec.  159.  Authority  of  agent  to  sign  bills  of  lading. — The 
agent  of  the  carrier  can  sign  such  contracts  only  when  he  has 
authority  to  do  so,  and  he  has  no  such  authority  when  the 
goods  are  not  actually  delivered  to  him.  In  an  early  case^i 
it  was  said  that  "owners  can  never  be  liable  but  in  respect  of 
the  delivery  of  goods  to  a  ship  trading  for  hire  where  the 
delivery  to  the  master  is  a  delivery  to  the  owners,  and  where 
the  owners  can,  in  respect  of  such  delivery,  have  an  action  for 
freight;  for  you  must  show  a  benefit  accruing  to  the  person 
against  w^hom  you  bring  your  action,  or  else  a  special  under- 
taking." And  in  an  action  against  the  owners  of  a  ship  it  was 
argued  before  the  court  of  king's  bench  that  none  of  the 
defendants  were  entitled  to  disprove  the  shipment  because  the 
bill  of  lading,  signed  by  the  master,  asserted  the  shipment. 
But  the  court  held  the  evidence  showing  that  the  goods  were 
not  shipped  on  board  the  vessel  at  all,  admissible,  and  that 
there  was  no  ground  for  saying  that  the  defendants  were 
estopped  by  the  bill  of  lading  from  showing  this  to  be  the 
fact.^-  In  another  case  it  was  said  that  "the  general  usage 
gives  notice  to  all  people  that  the  authority  of  the  captain  to 
give  bills  of  lading  is  limited  to  such  goods  as  have  been  put 
on  board ;  and  a  party  taking  a  bill  of  lading,  either  originally 
or  by  indorsement,  for  goods  which  have  never  been  put  on 
board,  is  bound  to  show  some  particular  authority  given  to 
the  master  to  sign  it.  "^^  And  the  English  courts  have  had 
occasion  to  affirm  the  doctrine  in  a  number  of  subsequent 
cases.^^ 

31.  Boucher  v.  Lawson,  Cas.  T.  Todd,  1  Moo.  &  R.  106;  Meyer  v. 
Hardw.  200.  Dresser,   16  Com.  B.    (N.  S.)    646; 

32.  Berkley  v.  Watling,  7  Ad.  &  Berkley  v.  Watling,  7  Ad.  &  El.  29; 
El.  29.  Jessel  v.  Bath,  L.  R.  2  Exch.  267. 

33.  Grant  v.  Norway,  10  Com.  B.  The  master  of  a  ship  has  no  q,u- 
665.  thority  to  grant  bills  of  lading  for 

34.  Hubbersty  v.  Ward,  8  Exch.  goods  which  are  not  put  on  board 
330;  Coleman  v.  Riches,  16  Com.  his  vessel.  But  when  he  signs  a 
B.  104;  Brown  v.  Coal  Co.,  L.  R.  bill  of  lading  acknowledging  the 
10  C.  P.  562;  McLean  v.  Fleming,  receipt  of  a  specific  quantity  of 
L.  R.  2  H.  L.  Sc.  128;  Cox  v.  goods,  the  ship-owner  is  bound  to 
Bruce,  18  Q.  B.  Div.  147;  Bates  v.  deliver   the   whole   amount   speci- 


166  THE  LAW   OF   CARRIERS.  [§  160. 

Sec,  160.  (§  123.)  Liability  of  carrier  when  goods  not 
received,  but  receipt  given. — The  principle  that  the  agent  of 
a  common  carrier  has  no  authority  to  sign  bills  of  lading  unless 
the  goods  have  been  actually  delivered  to  him  is  also  well 
settled  in  this  country.  Where,  therefore,  a  bill  of  lading  is 
signed  by  the  agent  when  no  goods  are  in  fact  received,  evi- 
dence showing  that  the  goods  described  were  not  delivered 
to  the  carrier  as  well  as  the  circumstances  under  which  the 
bill  of  lading  was  issued  will  be  admissible.  The  leading  case 
is  that  of  The  Schooner  Freeman  v.  Buckingham,^^  in  which 
the  attempt  was  made  in  a  court  of  admiralty  to  hold  the 
vessel  upon  a  bill  of  lading  under  the  maritime  rule  that 
the  ship  is  bound  to  the  cargo.  It  appeared  that  the  goods 
were  never  delivered  on  board  the  schooner  as  recited  in  the 
bill  of  lading,  but  that  the  master  of  the  vessel  had  been 
induced  by  fraud  and  misrepresentation  to  sign  it.  It  was  held 
that  the  responsibility  of  the  owner  and  the  liability  of  the 
ship  itself  were  convertible  terms,  the  vessel  not  being  liable 
if  the  owners  were  not;  and  that  the  master  having  signed 
the  bill  of  lading  without  having  received  the  goods,  there 
having  been  in  fact  no  such  goods,  had  acted  without  author- 
ity, and  that  therefore  neither  the  ship  nor  the  owner  could  be 
held  liable,  although  the  libelant  had  advanced  his  money 
upon  the  faith  of  the  bill  of  lading  without  any  knowledge 
of  the  fraud,  and  was  therefore  ai  hona-fide  holder  for  a 
valuable  consideration.  In  a  later  case^^  in  the  same  court, 
Mr.  Justice  Miller,  speaking  of  the  nature  and  effect  of  a  bill 
of  lading,  said:  ''It  is  an  instrument  of  a  twofold  character. 
It  is  at  once  a  receipt  and  a  contract.  In  the  former  character 
it  is  an  acknowledgment  of  the  receipt  of  property  on  board 
his  vessel  by  the  owner  of  the  vessel.     In  the  latter  it  is  a 

fied,  unless  he  can  show  that  the  wise  attach  to  him  under  the  bill 

whole  amount,  or  some  part  of  it  of    lading.      Smith    v.    Navigation 

was   in   fact  not  shipped.     If  the  Co.   (1896),  App.  Cas.  70,  65  L.  J. 

owner  is  able  to  make  such  proof,  P.  C.  8. 

he  is,  to  that  extent,  relieved  from  35.  18  How.  182. 

the  obligation  which  would  other-  36.  Pollard  v.  Vinton,  105  U.  S.  7. 


§161.] 


THE   BILL   OP   LADING. 


167 


contract  to  carry  safely  and  deliver.  The  receipt  of  the  goods 
lies  at  the  foundation  of  the  contract  to  carry  and  deliver.  If 
no  goods  are  actually  received,  there  can  be  no  valid  contract 
to  carry  or  to  deliver.  "^^ 

Sec.  161.  (§  124.)  Same  subject — How  in  case  of  bona  fide 
holder. — By  the  weight  of  authority  in  the  United  States,  it 
is  held  that  bills  of  lading  and  other  similar  contracts  of 
affreightment  which  are  signed  by  the  carrier's  agent  when  no 
goods  are  in  fact  delivered  to  him  are  void  even  as  to  innocent 
and  bona  fide  holdei*s;  and  the  reason  for  the  rule  is  said  to 
be  that,  the  master  or  agent  having  no  authority  to  sign  them 
until  the  goods  are  actually  delivered,  they  are  nullities  as  to 
the  party  who  has  obtained  them,  and,  bills  of  lading  not 
being  negotiable  instruments,  the  assignor  can  confer  no 
greater  right  than  he  himself  has;  and  for  the  further  reason 
that    the    holder    having    advanced    upon     them     innocently, 


37.  See,  Iron  Mt.  R'y  Co.  v. 
Knight,  122  U.  S.  79;  Baltimore, 
etc.,  R.  Co.  r.  Wilkens,  44  Md.  11; 
Miller  i\  The  Railroad,  90  N.  Y. 
430;  American  Sugar  Refining  Co. 
V.  Maddock,  93  Fed.  Rep.  980,  36 
C.  C.  A.  42;  The  Willie  D.  Sand- 
hoval,  92  Fed.  Rep.  286;  Lazard  v. 
Merchants'  &  Miners'  Transporta- 
tion Co.,  78  Md.  1,  26  Atl.  Rep. 
897;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Nat'l  Live 
Stock  Bank,  178  111.  506,  53  N.  E. 
Rep.  326,  reversing  59  111.  App. 
451;  Steamship  Co.  v.  Kelley,  126 
Fed.  Rep.  610,  61  C.  C.  A.  532,  re- 
versing Kelley  v.  Steamship  Co., 
120  Fed.  Rep.  536,  where  bills  of 
lading  for  goatskins  were  issued 
by  the  agent  of  the  vessel  while 
the  goods  were  in  the  warehouse, 
and  sheepskins  were  fraudulently 
substituted  in  a  number  of  bales. 

Sec.  4  of  the  Harter  Act  (27 
Stat.  L.  445),  provides  that  it 
shall   be   the   duty   of   the   owner, 


master  or  agent  of  any  vessel 
transporting  merchandise  to  issue 
a  bill  of  lading  stating,  among 
other  things,  the  quantity  of  goods 
received,  and  that  the  same  shall 
be  prima  facie  evidence  of  the  re- 
ceipt of  the  merchandise  described 
in  it.  Held,  that  the  construction 
of  this  section  did  not  alter  the 
rule  previously  existing  in  the  fed- 
eral courts,  and  that  a  false  bill  of 
lading  was  not  binding  on  the 
owner  or  the  ship.  The  Isola  di 
Procida,  124  Fed.  Rep.  942.  See 
also,  Campania  Naviera  Vascon- 
gada  V.  Churchill  &  Sim  (1906), 
75   L.   J.   K.   B.   94. 

But  the  carrier  may  cure  the  in- 
validity of  the  bill  of  lading  by 
subsequently  receiving  the  goods 
described  in  it.  The  Idaho,  93  U. 
S.  575,  23  L.  Ed.  978;  Robinson  v. 
Railway  Co.,  16  Fed.  57;  The  Far- 
well,  8  Biss.  64,  Fed.  Gas.  No.  8, 
426. 


168  THE  LAW   OF   CARRIERS.  [§  162. 

being  misled  by  the  act  of  the  master  or  agent,  he  must  be  the 
sufferer,  upon  the  principle  that  when  two  parties  are  equally 
innocent,  he  who  has  reposed  confidence  and  thus  brought  loss 
upon  himself  must  bear  it.^s  But,  as  will  be  seen  in  the  fol- 
lowing section,  this  rule  has  not  been  uniformly  followed,  and 
is  opposed  by  courts  of  eminence  and  by  reasons  of  great 
cogency. 

Sec.  162.  Same  subject — The  contrary  view. — Other  courts, 
however,  have  refused  to  sanction  the  rule  as  followed  by  the 
supreme  court  of  the  United  States,  and  hold  that  where  the 
carrier's  agent  signs  a  bill  of  lading  which  recites  that  goods 
have  been  received,  when  no  goods  have  in  fact  been  delivered 
to  him,  the  statement  as  to  the  receipt  of  the  goods  amounts 
to  a  representation  by  the  carrier  of  a  fact  which  was,  or,  in 
the  ordinary  course  of  business,  ought  to  have  been  within  his 
knowledge,  and  that  as  to  an  innocent  and  bona  fide  holder  of 
.the  bill  of  lading,  the  carrier  will  be  estopped  from  claiming 
that  he  did  not  receive  the  goods.  A  leading  case  taking  this 
view  is  that  of  Armour  v.  The  Railroad,^''  decided  by  the 
court  of  appeals  of  New  York.  In  that  case,  the  party  having 
produced  to  the  agent  of  the  railroad  forged  warehouse  receipts 

38.  Friedlander  v.  Railway  Co.,  Wash.  — ,  85  Pac.  Rep.  53;  Hen- 
130  U.  S.  416;  Pollard  v.  Vinton,  derson  v.  Railroad  Co.,  116  La.  — , 
105  U.  S.  7;  Iron  Mountain  R'y  v.  41  So.  Rep.  253. 
Knight,  122  U.  S.  79;  Williams  v.  Bills  of  lading  are  not  by  the 
Railroad,  93  N.  C.  42;  Freeman  v.  commercial  law  negotiable  in  the 
Buckingham,  18  How.  182;  The  same  sense  as  bills  of  exchange 
Lady  Franklin,  8  Wall.  325;  Na-  and  promissory  notes.  They  are 
tional  Bank  of  Commerce  v.  Rail-  merely  the  evidence  of  ownership, 
way  Co.,  44  Minn.  224,  46  N.  W.  general  or  special,  of  the  property 
Rep.  342,  560,  20  Am.  St.  Rep.  566,  mentioned  in  them  and  of  the  right 
9  L.  R.  A.  263;  Swedish  American  to  receive  the  property  at  the  place 
Natl.  Bank  v.  Railway  Co.,  —  of  delivery,  and  one  making  ad- 
Minn.  — ,  105  N.  W.  Rep.  69;  The  vances  of  money  on  them  does  so 
Asphodel,  53  Fed.  835;  American,  at  his  own  risk  and  with  notice  of 
etc.,  Co.  V.  Maddock,  93  Fed.  980,  the  limitation  as  to  the  power  or 
36  C.  C.  A.  42;  The  Isola  Di  Pro-  right  of  the  master  or  agent  to 
cida,  124  Fed.  942;  Bank  v.  La-  sign  the  same.  Lazard  v.  Mer- 
velle,  52  Mo.  380.  But  see.  Smith  chants'  &  Miners'  Transportation 
V.  Railway  Co.,  74  Mo.  App.  48;  Co.,  78  Md.  1,  26  Atl.  Rep.  897. 
Roy    &    Roy    v.    Railway    Co.,    —  39.  65  N.  Y.  111. 


§  163.]  THE   BILL   OF   LADING.  169 

for  certain  goods,  and  having  thereby  obtained  from  the  agent 
receipts  or  bills  of  lading  for  them,  making  the  pretended 
freight  deliverable  to  the  plaintiff  as  consignee,  and  having 
thereupon  drawn  upon  the  plaintiff  attaching  the  railroad 
receipts  to  his  draft  which  the  plaintiff  paid,  it  was  held  that 
the  railroad  was  bound  to  make  good  to  the  plaintiff,  the 
defrauded  party,  his  loss.  The  case  was  said,  however,  to 
differ  from  the  cases  referred  to,  in  the  fact  that  by  the  rail- 
road receipts  or  bills  of  lading,  the  goods  were  made  deliver- 
able directly  to  the  plaintiff,  and  that  no  assignment  to  him 
by  the  party  practicing  the  fraud  had  been  necessary  or  had 
been  resorted  to.  The  receipts  were  therefore  equivalent  to 
direct  representations  to  the  plaintiff  that  the  goods  had  been 
delivered  to  the  road  on  his  account,  which  it  was  estopped 
from  denying.  The  case  might  have  admitted  of  an  argument, 
said  the  court,  had  the  plaintiff  been  compelled  to  derive  his 
title  through  the  indorsement  of  another  who,  it  was  conceded, 
had  none.  In  later  cases,  however,  this  distinction  is  deemed 
to  be  of  no  importance,  and  the  carrier  is  held  liable  to  the 
assignee.'**^ 

Sec,  163.    (§  125.)    Recitals  as  to  condition  of  goods,  how  far 

conclusive. — It  has  likewise  been  determined  tiiat  the  usual 

40.  Batavia    Bank     r.     Railroad  ing  Star,  62  Fed.  Rep.  407,  10  C.  C. 

Co.,  lOG  N.  Y.  195.     Following  the  A.  454,  22  U.  S.  App.  344. 
New  York  rule  are  Brooke  v.  Rail-         But  if  a  person   surreptitiously 

road   Co.,    108   Pa.    St.    529;    Sioux  procures  bills  of  lading  from   the 

City  Railroad  Co.  v.  Bank,  10  Neb.  carrier  for  goods  not  shipped,  and 

556;    Savings    Bank    \\    The    Rail-  forwards  the  bills  of  lading  with 

road,  20  Kan.  519;  Railway  Co.  v.  drafts    attached    to    the    consignee 

Adams,  4  Kan.   App.  305,  45   Pac.  who  pays  the  amount  of  the  drafts. 

Rep.  920;   Railroad  Co.  v.  Larned,  the   carrier   will    not   be   liable   to 

103   111.  293;   Dean  v.  Driggs,   137  such  consignee  where  the  person 

N.  Y.   274,   33   N,  E.  Rep.    326,  33  who    has   thus   procured    the   bills 

Am.  St.  Rep.  721.  of  lading  later  ships  goods  of  like 

In  Mississippi  it  is  provided  by  amount  and  kind  to  those  called 
statute  that  the  acknowledgment  for  by  the  previous  bills  of  lad- 
of  the  receipt  of  the  goods  by  the  ing,  and  the  consignee  accepts 
carrier  will  be  conclusive  if  the  such  goods  in  substitution.  Rail- 
bill  of  lading  reaches  the  hands  of  road  Co.  v.  Milmine,  57  111.  App. 
a  hona  fide  holder.    See  The  Quid  291. 


170  THE  LAW   OF    CARRIERS.  [§  163. 

recital  in  such  instruments  that  the  goods  are  in  good  order  has 
reference  only  to  the  external  appearance,  either  of  the  goods 
themselves  or  of  the  packages  into  which  they  are  put.  Hence, 
it  is  always  competent  for  the  carrier  to  show,  notwithstanding 
such  an  admission,  that  the  loss  or  damage  was  caused  by  the 
spoiling  of  the  goods  from  natural  decay  before  they  could  be 
delivered,  or  that  they  had  wasted  from  defects  in  the  vessels 
in  which  they  were  contained,  or  that  it  arose  from  the  unskil- 
ful or  improper  manner  in  which  they  were  packed,  or  that 
they  had  deteriorated  or  were  damaged  at  the  time  they  were 
delivered  to  him.'*!  jje  is  not  presumed  to  know  the  quality 
of  the  goods,  nor  can  he  refuse  to  carry  them,  whatever  it  may 
be,  if  they  are  fit  to  carry  and  are  of  the  kind  he  usually  car- 
ries, nor  can  he,  ordinarily,  know  the  condition  of  the  con- 
tents of  the  packages  or  vessels  brought  to  him  for  transporta- 
tion. It  cannot  be  supposed,  therefore,  that  he  intends  by  such 
a  recital  to  admit  more  than  that  the  goods  are  in  an  apparently 
fit  condition  for  shipment.  And  such  is  the  construction  which 
these  words  have  received.  If  the  damage  has  proceeded  from 
any  such    hidden    cause,    whether    naturally  inherent    in    the 

41.  Nelson  v.  Woodruff,  1  Black,  bilt,  75  Fed.  422,  21  C.  C.  A.  422, 

156;    Clark   v.   Barnwell,    12   How.  .38  U.  S.  App.  693;  Argo  S.  S.  Co. 

272;    Hastings  v.   Pepper,  11  Pick.  v.  Seago,  101  Fed.  999,  42  C,  C.  A. 

41;  Bradstreet  r.  Heran,  2  Blatch.  128;    Mears    v.    Railroad    Co.,    75 

116;  Keith  r.  Amende,  1  Bush,  455;  Conn.  171,  52  All.  Rep.  610,  96  Am. 

Richards   v.   Doe,    100    Mass.    524;  St.  Rep.  192,  56  L.  R.  A.  884;  Rail- 

The  Olbers,   3  Ben.   148;   The  Ori-  way  Co.  v.  Neel,  56  Ark.  279,  19  S. 

flamme,   1   Sawyer,   176;   Arend  v.  W.  Rep.  963,  citing  Hutchinson  on 

The  Liverpool,  etc.,  Co.,  64  Barb.  Carr. ;    Foley   v.   Railroad   Co.,   96 

118;    Hazard   v.   Railroad    Co.,   67  N.  Y.  Supp.  182. 
Miss.  32,  7  So.  Rep.  280;  Missouri,         The   same    rule   applies    to    the 

etc.,   R'y    Co.   v.    Fennell,    79    Tex.  recitals  made  in  way-bills  and  the 

448,   15   S.  W.   Rep.   693;   Railway  various    reports    made    along    the 

Co.  V.   Holder,    10   Tex.   Civ.    App.  road.      Missouri,    etc.,    R'y    Co.    v. 

223,    30    S.    W.    Rep.    383;    Bath   V.  Ivy,  79  Tex.  444,  15  S.  W.  Rep.  692. 
Railway  Co.    (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  78         A  fortiori  is  there  no  warranty 

S.  W.  Rep.  993,  citing  Hutchinson  of  quality  where  the  bill  of  lading 

on  Carr.;   Roth  v.  Packet  Co.,   12  states  that    the    contents    of    the 

N.  Y.  Supp.  460;  Jean  Garrison  &  package   are   unknown.     Iron   Mt. 

Co.  V.  Flagg,  90   N.  Y.   Supp.   289,  R'y  Co.  v.  Knight,  122  U.  S.  70. 
45  Misc.  421;  Whitman  v.  Vander- 


§  164.]  THE   BILL   OF   LADING. 


171 


commodity  itself  or  arising  from  the  carelessness  of  the 
shipper,  the  loss  must  be  borne  by  him.  The  carrier  is  not 
then  in  fault,  nor  is  his  acknowledgment  that  they  have  been 
received  in  good  order  or  condition  a  warranty  or  insurance 
against  such  an  event.  But  if  it  can  be  shown  that  the  loss 
might  have  been  avoided  by  the  use  of  the  proper  precaution- 
ary measures,  and  that  the  usual  and  customary  methods  for 
this  purpose  have  been  neglected,  he  will  still  be  liable.-i2 

Sec.  164.  Eif  ect  of  recitals  as  to  amount  or  quantity  of  goods 
received.— While,  ordinarily,  recitals  in  bills  of  lading  as  to 
the  amount  or  quantity  of  goods  received  are  not  conclusive 
between  the  parties,  and  the  carrier  is  not  estopped  from 
showing  that  the  amount  or  quantity  stated  was  never  in  fact 
delivered  to  him  for  transportation,  yet  he  may,  by  express 
language  to  that  effect,  agree  that  he  will  be  bound  to  a 
delivery  of  the  quantity  specified,  or  that  the  bill  of  lading 
shall  furnish  the  only  evidence  of  the  quantity  received,  and 
when  he  has  so  bound  himself,  he  will  be  liable  for  any  short- 
age in  delivery,  although  such  shortage  may  have  resulted 
from  his  never  having  received  the  amount  or  quantity  speci- 
fied.^^ It  is  sometimes  provided  in  bills  of  lading  that  any 
deficiency  in  the  cargo  on  arrival  at  destination  shall  be  paid 
for  by  the  carrier  and  deducted  from  the  freight  charges,  and 
that  any  excess  ,shall  be  paid  for  to  the  carrier  by  the  con- 
signee. In  such  cases  it  is  held  that  the  words,  "deficiency  in 
cargo,"  refer  to  the  amount  or  quantity  to  be  delivered  b}^  the 
carrier  at  destination,  and  that,  the  obligations  being  mutual 
and  incurred  for  the  purpose  of  avoiding  disputes  over  the 
amount  actually  received  by  the  carrier,  he  is  thereby  estopped 
from  disputing  the  correctness  of  his  acknowledgment  and  is 
bound  to  account  for  any  deficiency  in  the  cargo.''^    The  same 

42.  Clark  v.  Barnwell,  supra.  297,  72  L.  J.  K.  B.  147;   The  Ton- 

43.  Sawyer    v.     Cleveland     Iron     goy,  55  Fed.  329. 

Min.  Co.,  69  Fed.  211,  16  C.  C.  A.  44.  Rhodes  v.  Newhall,  126  N.  Y. 
191,  35  U.  S.  App.  427;  Steamship  74,  27  N.  E.  Rep.  947,  22  Am.  St. 
Co.  V.  Mackay  (1903),  1  K.  B.  Div.    'Rep.   859,  affirming  s.  c.   12  N.  Y. 

Supp.  669. 


172 


THE  LAW   OF    CARRIERS. 


§  165. 


rule  will  apply  with  equal  force  to  a  case  where  the  consignor 
and  consignee  are  the  same  person  and  the  deficiency  has  not 
been  brought  about  by  any  mistake  or  bad  faith  on  his  part."^-'' 

Sec.  165.  (§  125a.)  Same  subject — Effect  of  clauses  in  re- 
ceipt that  weight,  contents,  or  value  of  goods  are  unknown. — 
"While  it  is  undoubtedly  competent  for  the  carrier  by  an  express 
representation  to  bind  himself  as  to  the  actual  weight,  contents 
or  value  of  the  goods  purporting  to  have  been  received  by  him, 
yet  he  may  exclude  any  such  construction  by  words  limiting 
his  undertaking,  as  by  inserting  a  provision  that  the  weight, 
contents  or  value  of  the  goods  are  unknown  to  him.  Thus, 
receipts  in  bills  of  lading  qualified  by  the  statement  "weight 
unknown,"  "weight  and  contents  unknown,"  "number  un- 
known," are  common  and  are  given  eifect.^*^  When  such 
language  is  used,  the  carrier  will  not  be  responsible  for  the 
stated  amount,  number,  weight  or  kind  where  he  is  ready  to 


45.  Sawyer  v.  Cleveland  Iron 
Min.  Co.,  supra. 

46.  The  Ismeale,  14  Fed.  Rep. 
491;  22  id.  559;  Matthlessen  v. 
Gusi,  29  Fed.  Rep.  794;  Jessel  v. 
Bath,  L.  R.  2  Exch.  267;  Lebeau 
V.  Navigation  Co.,  L.  R.  8  C.  P.  88; 
The  Peter  der  Grosse,  L.  R.  1  Prob. 
Div.  414;  The  Asphodel,  53  Fed. 
Rep.  835;  American  Sugar  Refin- 
ing Co.  V.  Maddock,  93  Fed.  Rep. 
980,  36  C.  C.  A.  42;  The  Seefahrer, 
133  Fed.  Rep.  793;  The  La  Kroma, 
138  Fed.  Rep.  936. 

The  words,  "contents  and  value 
unknown,"  used  on  a  general 
blank  form  for  shipping  all  kinds 
of  freight,  apply  only  to  packages 
therein  mentioned  the  contents  of 
which  are  concealed  from  view. 
They  cannot,  therefore,  apply  to 
corn  in  bulk  loaded  into  a  car 
from  an  elevator.  Tibbits  &  Son  v. 
The  Railroad,  49  111.  App.  567. 

The  words  "weight  and  quantity 
unknown"  used  in  a  bill  of  lading 


are  open  to  explanation  in  regard 
to  the  exact  amount  of  goods  de- 
livered to  the  ship.  Planters'  Fer- 
tilizer Mfg.  Co.  V.  Elder,  101  Fed. 
1001,  42  C.  C.  A.  130. 

So  far  as  a  provision  in  the  bill 
of  lading,  "weight  is  subject  to 
correction,"  is  concerned,  a  rea- 
sonable interpretation  must  be 
given  to  it  such  as  both  parties 
would  naturally  give  when  the 
shipment  was  made.  Errors  and 
mistakes  are  liable  to  occur  in 
weighing  all  commodities,  and  the 
right  to  correct  such  errors  may 
be  reserved  in  the  contract  of  ship- 
ment. If  the  shippers  have  either 
actual  or  constructive  notice  of  the 
provision,  anything  attributable  to 
ordinary  differences  in  weighing, 
such  as  might  reasonably  be  ex- 
pected to  occur,  may  be  corrected. 
But  the  right  must  be  kept  within 
the  reasonable  limits  of  such  er- 
rors. The  carrier,  therefore,  would 
have  no  right,  under  cover  of  the 


§  165.  J  THE  BILL  OF  LADING.  173 

deliver  the  quantity  or  kind  of  goods  actually  received.^" 
Thus  in  the  case  of  Miller  v.  The  Railroad  Compauy/s  it 
appeared  that  fifty-five  Barrels  purporting  to  contain  eggs 
but  actually  containing  nothing  but  sawdust  had  been  delivered 
to  the  carrier  in  Kansas  City  for  transportation  to  New  York. 
The  receipts  in  their  printed  form  acknowledged  that  "the  fol- 
lowmg  described  packages,  in  apparent  good  order  (contents 
and  value  unknown),"  had  been  received  for  transportation, 
and  the  property  was  described  in  writing  as  "30  bbls.  eggs" 
and  "25  bbls.  eggs,"  respectively.  Drafts  were  drawn  which 
were  paid  by  the  plaintiffs  in  good  faith  relying  upon  the  bills 
of  lading,  and  they  brought  their  action  against  the  receipting 
carrier.  The  court  below  held  the  carrier  liable,  deeming  the 
case  to  be  one  of  first  impression,  and  that  the  cases^">  there- 
tofore arising  did  not  embrace  a  case  where  no  goods  what- 
ever of  the  kind  recited  had  been  delivered.  The  written 
description  was  held  to  prevail  over  the  printed  words  of  lim- 
itation, ' '  contents  and  value  unknown. '  '^^  This  decision,  how- 
ever, was  reversed  by  the  court  of  appeal.^i 

"The  sole  question,"  said  Andrews,  C.  J.,  "is  whether  the 
description  in  the  bill  of  lading  was  a  representation  by  the 
carrier  that  the  barrels  contained  eggs,  because,  if  this  is 
the  true  construction  of  the  instrument,  the  right  of  the  plaint- 
iff to   recover   is   unquestionable.^^     But   we   are   of  opinion 

provision,  to  account  for  such  a  2  Exch.  267;  In  re  The  Columbo,  3 
difference  as  would  arise  only  from  Blatch.  521;  Shepherd  v.  Naylor,  5 
the  gross  negligence  of  the  agent.  Gray,  591;  West  v.  Steamboat  Ber- 
Tibbits  &  Son,  v.  The  Railroad,  lin,  3  Iowa,  532;  Clark  v.  Bam- 
supra,  well,  12  How.  (U.  S.)  272;  Barrett 

47.  Under  the  clause,  "weight  v  Rogers,  7  Mass.  299;  Grant  v. 
unknown,"  the  statement,  "three  Norway,  10  C.  B.  665;  Meyer  v. 
hundred  tons"  in  the  bill  of  lading  Peck,  28  N.  Y.  598;  Sears  v.  Win- 
was  held  to  be  not  even  prima  gate,  3  Allen,  103;  Byrne  v.  Weeks, 
facie    evidence   as   to    the    weight  7  Bosw.  372. 

against  the  ship  when  it  appeared  50.  Citing    Leeds    v.    Mechanics' 

that  all  of  the  commodity  received  Ins.   Co.,   8    N.    Y.   351;    Harper  v. 

was  delivered.     Henderson  v.  Iron  Albany  Ins.  Co.,  17  N.  Y.  198. 

Ore,  38  Fed.  Rep.  36.  51.  90  N.  Y.  430. 

48.  24  Hun,  607;  90  N.  Y.  430.  52.  Citing  Meyer  v.  Peck,  28  N. 

49.  Citing  Jessel   v.  Bath,  L.  R  Y.  598. 


174  THE  LAW  OF   CARRIERS.  [§  165. 

that  this  construction  is  inadmissible.  Taking  the  whole  in- 
strument together,  it  imports  only  that  the  defendant  had 
received  thirty  packages  described  as  containing  or  purporting 
to  contain  eggs,  but  the  actual  contents  of  which  were  to  the 
defendant  unknown.  The  opposite  view  proceeds  upon  the 
theory  that  there  is  an  irreconcilable  repugnancy  between  the 
written  and  printed  parts  of  the  instrument,  or  that  the  words 
'contents  unknown'  relate  simply  to  the  kind  of  eggs  in  the 
packages.  It  is  no  doubt  a  principle  of  construction  that  in 
case  of  repugnancy  between  written  and  printed  clauses  of 
an  instrument,  the  written  clauses  will  prevail  over  the 
printed.^^  But  this  is  a  rule  which  is  only  resorted  to  from 
necessity,  when  the  printed  and  written  clauses  cannot  be  rec- 
onciled, and  in  that  respect  is  like  the  rule  applied  in  the 
construction  of  wills  where  two  clauses  are  repugnant  and 
irreconcilable,  in  which  case  the  first  will  be  rejected  and  the 
subsequent  clause  will  be  regarded  as  indicating  the  final  in- 
tention, in  the  absence  of  any  other  clue  to  the  interpreta- 
tion.^^ But  it  is  the  imperative  duty  of  courts  to  give  effect  if 
possible  to  all  the  terms  of  an  agreement.  The  construction 
is  to  be  made  upon  a  consideration  of  the  whole  instrument, 
and  not  upon  one  or  more  clauses  detached  from  the  others; 
and  this  principle  applies  as  well  to  instruments  partly  printed 
and  partly  written  as  to  those  wholly  printed  or  wholly 
written.^^  Where  two  clauses,  apparently  repugnant,  may  be 
reconciled  by  any  reasonable  construction,  as  by  regarding  one  as 
a  qualification  of  the  other,  that  construction  must  be  given,  be- 
cause it  cannot  be  assumed  that  the  parties  intended  to  insert 
inconsistent  provisions.  Applying  these  settled  rules  to  the  in- 
strument in  question,  it  is,  we  think,  reasonably  clear  that  the  de- 
fendant did  not  make  any  representation  as  to  the  contents  of  the 
packages.  Its  agent  simply  certified,  in  effect,  that  they  were 
described  as  containing  eggs,  accompanying  this  with  the  state- 

53.  Citing   Harper    r.    Insurance        55.  Citing   Barhydt   v.   Ellis,   45 
Co.,  17  N.  Y.  194.  N.  Y.   107. 

54.  Citing     Van     Nostrand      v. 
Moore,  52  N.  Y.  12. 


§165.]  THE   BILL   OP   LADING.  175 

ment  that  the  contents  were  not  in  fact  known.  The  plaintiffs 
in  making  the  advances  were  chargeable  with  knowledge  of  the 
contents  of  the  bill  of  lading,  and  must  be  deemed  to  have  relied 
upon  the  assurance  of  the  shipper  as  to  the  contents  of  the  pack- 
ages. The  claim  that  the  word  'contents  unknown'  referred 
simply  to  the  kind  of  eggs  is  manifestly  untenable. 

"The  question  involved  in  this  case  has  been  substantially 
adjudicated.  In  Haddow  v.  Parry ^o  the  bill  of  lading  acknowl- 
edged, 'as  shipped  in  good  order,  six  boxes  containing  $12,000, 
being  marked  and  numbered  as  in  the  margin,'  etc.  In  the  mar- 
gin were  copied  the  marks  of  the  several  chests,  their  number 
and  contents,  describing  them  as  containing  $12,000  each.  The 
words  'contents  unknown'  were  inserted  before  the  signature  of 
the  master.  Lord  Mansfield  said:  'If  the  master  qualifies  his 
acknowledgment  by  the  words  contents  unknown,  he  acknowl- 
edges nothing.'  In  Shepherd  v.  Naylor,^^  the  weight  in  tons, 
hundreds  and  pounds  of  iron  shipped  was  mentioned  in  the  body 
of  the  bill,  but  the  words  '  weight  unknown  to '  were  added  before 
the  master's  signature,  and  the  court  held  that  the  carriers  were 
not  concluded  by  the  statement  of  weight,  Shaw,  C.  J.,  saying: 
'The  words  weigJit  unknown  are  significant.  It  is  said,  however, 
that  they  are  repugnant,  and  therefore  to  be  rejected.  But  that 
is  not  the  necessary  construction;  they  may  be  used  to  modify 
and  control  the  admission  of  weight.'  In  Jessel  v.  Bath,^^  the 
plaintiff  was  assignee  for  value  of  a  bill  of  lading  for  goods 
shipped  on  defendant's  vessel.  The  bill  acknowledged  'as 
shipped  in  good  order,  etc.,  thirty-four  thousand  four  hundred 
and  sixty  kilogrammes  mineral  in  bulk,  being  marked  and  num- 
bered as  per  margin,  and  to  be  delivered, '  etc.,  and  printed  before 
the  signature  were  the  words  'weight,  contents  and  value  un- 
known.' The  vessel  delivered  seven  tons  twelve  hundred  weight 
less  than  the  amount  stated  in  the  bill,  and  the  suit  was  for  the 
non-delivery  of  the  residue.  The  case  was  decided  on  the  con- 
struction of  an  English  statute;  but  Kelley,  C.  B,,  said:    'The 

56.  3  Taunt.  303.  58.  L.  R.  2  Exch.  267. 

57.  5  Gray,  591. 


176  THE   LAW   OF   CARRIERS.  [§  166. 

written  part  of  the  bill  is  not  entirely  inconsistent  with  the 
printed.  The  whole  may  be  reasonably  and  fairly  read  as  mean- 
ing that  a  quantity  of  manganese  had  been  received  on  board 
appearing  to  amount  to  thirty-three  tons,  but  that  the  person 
signing  the  bill  would  not  be  liable  for  any  deficiency,  inasmuch 
as  he  had  not  in  fact  ascertained  and  therefore  did  not  know  the 
true  Aveight."'^ 

' '  The  question  in  this  case,  relating  as  it  does  to  the  construc- 
tion of  a  commercial  instrument  in  general  use,  is  of  consider- 
able practical  importance.  It  seems  to  us  that  the  decision  below 
does  not  give  due  weight  to  the  rule  which  requires  the  construc- 
tion of  a  contract  to  be  made  upon  a  consideration  of  all  its  parts 
and  that  if  possible  no  clause  shall  be  rejected.  The  volume  and 
methods  of  the  business  of  transportation  by  railroads  and  trans- 
portation lines  render  it  practically  impossible  in  most  cases  for 
the  carrier  to  ascertain  by  examination  the  contents  of  packages 
received  for  carriage,  and  when  he  qualifies  his  receipt,  as  in  this 
case,  we  know  of  no  reason  why  parties  dealing  upon  bills  of 
lading  so  qualified  shall  not  be  held  to  notice  of  the  qualifica- 
tion." 

Sec.  166.  (§125b.)  Same  subject— So  in  Cox  v.  Bruce,^^ 
Lord  Esher  said :  "  It  is  said  that,  because  the  plaintiffs  are  in- 
dorsees for  value  of  the  bill  of  lading  without  notice,  they  have 
another  right — that  they  are  entitled  to  rely  on  a  representation 
made  in  the  bill  of  lading  that  the  bales  bore  such  and  such 
marks,  and  that  there  is  consequently  an  estoppel  against  the  de- 
fendants. That  raises  a  question  as  to  the  true  meaning  of  the 
doctrine  in  Grant  v.  Norway.^^  It  is  clearly  impossible,  consist- 
'ently  with  that  decision,  to  assert  that  the  mere  fact  of  a  state- 
ment being  made  in  the  bill  of  lading  estops  the  ship-owner  and 
gives  a  right  of  action  against  him  if  untrue,  because  it  was  there 
held  that  a  bill  of  lading  signed  in  respect  of  goods  not  on  board 
the  vessel  did  not  bind  the  ship-owner.     The  ground  of  that  de- 

59.  Citing,  also,  Vauglm  v.  Casks        60.  L.  R.  18  Q.  B.  Div.  147. 
of  Wine,  7  Ben.  506;  Clark  v.  Barn-        61.  10  C.  B.  665. 
well,  12  How.  282;  The  Columbo,  3 
Blatchf.  521. 


§  166.]  THE  BILL  OF  LADING.  177 

cision,  according  to  my  view,  was  not  merely  that  the  captain 
has  no  authority  to  sign  a  bill  of  lading  in  respect  of  goods  not 
on  board,  but  that  the  nature  and  limitations  of  the  captain's 
authority  are  well  known  among  mercantile  pei-sons,  and  that  he 
is  only  authorized  to  perform  all  things  usual  in  the  line  of  busi- 
ness in  which  he  is  employed.  Therefore  the  doctrine  of  that 
case  is  not  confined  to  the  case  where  the  goods  are  not  put  on 
board  the  ship.  That  the  captain  has  authority  to  bind  his  own- 
ers with  regard  to  the  weight,  condition  and  value  of  the  goods 
under  certain  circumstances  may  be  true;  but  it  appears  to  me 
absurd  to  contend  that  persons  are  entitled  to  assume  that  he  has 
authority,  though  his  owners  really  gave  him  no  such  authority, 
to  estimate  and  determine  and  state  on  the  bill  of  lading,  so  as  to 
bind  his  owners,  the  particular  mercantile  quality  of  the  goods 
before  they  are  put  on  board ;  as,  for  instance,  that  they  are  goods 
containing  such  and  such  a  percentage  of  good  or  bad  material 
or  of  such  and  such  a  season's  growth.  To  ascertain  such  mat- 
ters is  obviously  quite  outside  the  scope  of  the  functions  and  ca- 
pacities of  a  ship's  captain  and  of  the  contract  of  carriage  with 
which  he  has  to  do." 

This  rule  was  applied  in  an  interesting  case^^  jn  the  supreme 
court  of  the  United  States.  It  appeared  that  one  P.  was  engaged 
in  buying  and  shipping  to  Texarkana,  Arkansas,  from  different 
points  in  the  south,  large  quantities  of  cotton.  There,  under  P.  's 
direction,  it  was  put  into  a  compress  house  controlled  by  the 
carrier  and  compressed  for  shipment.  P.  superintended  the 
weighing,  classing  and  marking  of  it  and  selected  for  shipment 
the  particular  bales  to  be  set  forward  by  the  carrier  to  fill  orders 
for  it.  The  carrier  was  in  the  habit  of  issuing  bills  of  lading 
for  this  cotton,  often  in  advance  of  the  separation  of  the  particu- 
lar bales  described.  Such  a  bill  of  lading,  reciting  the  receipt  of 
a  large  number  of  bales  described  as  "contents  unknown," 
"marked  and  numbered  as  per  margin,"  w^as  sent  forward  with 
draft  attached,  and  the  draft  was  paid  by  the  consignee  before 
the  receipt  of  the  cotton.    When  the  cotton  arrived  it  did  not  cor- 

62.  Iron  Mt.  R'y  Co.  v.  Knight,    122  U.  S.  78. 
12 


178 


THE  LAW   OF    CARRIERS. 


[§  167. 


respond  with  the  marks  and  quality  indicated  on  the  bill  of  lad- 
ing, and  the  consignee  refused  to  accept  it,  sold  it  on  account  of 
the  carrier,  and  brought  his  action  to  recover  the  difference.  The 
court  held  that  the  bill  of  lading  did  not  bind  the  carrier  as  by  a 
warranty  of  quality  and  that  the  consignee  could  not  recover. 

Sec.  167.  Terms  of  bill  of  lading  cannot  be  varied  by  parol. 
— But  bills  of  lading,  except  as  to  the  recital  or  acknowledgment 
of  the  receipt  of  the  goods  and  of  their  quality  and  condition 
when  received,  are  strictly  written  contracts  between  the  parties 
and  come  within  the  general  rule  which  prohibits  the  introduction 
of  parol  evidence  to  contradict  or  vary  such  contracts.^^^  If, 
therefore,  no  fraud  or  mistake  enter  into  their  execution,  they 
will  be  taken  as  the  sole  evidence  of  the  final  agreement  between 
the  parties,  and  parol  evidence  of  all  prior  negotiations  respect- 
ing the  terms  upon  which  the  goods  were  received  will  be  inadmis- 
sible.^^ Where,  however,  a  bill  of  lading  is  ambiguous,  the  ambi- 
guity may  be  removed  by  the  aid  of  parol  evidence.^^ 


63.  Clark  v.  Barnwell,  12  How. 
272;  Ellis  v.  Willard,  5  Seld.  529; 
The  Delaware,  14  Wall.  579;  Snow 
V.  Railway  Co.,  109  Ind.  422;  In- 
dianapolis R.  R.  V.  Remmy,  13 
Ind.  518;  Hall  v.  Pennsylvania 
Co.,  90  Ind.  459;  Bartlett  v.  Rail- 
way Co.,  94  Ind.  281;  Hostetter  v. 
Railroad  Co.  (Penn.),  11  Atl.  Rep. 
609;  The  Caledonia,  43  Fed.  Rep. 
681;  Hewett  v.  Railway  Co.,  63 
Iowa,  611;  Louisville,  etc.,  R'y  Co. 
V.  Fulgham,  91  Ala.  555,  8  So.  Rep. 
803;  Railway  Co.  v.  Moline  Plow 
Co.,  13  Ind.  App.  225,  41  N.  E.  Rep. 
480;  Railway  Co.  v.  Silegman 
(Tex.  Civ.  App.),  23  S.  W.  Rep. 
298,  citing  Hutchinson  on  Carr. ; 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Richardson,  19  Ky. 
Law  Rep.  1495,  43  S.  W.  Rep.  465; 
Davis  V.  Railroad  Co.,  66  Vt.  290, 
29  Atl.  Rep.  313,  44  Am.  St.  Rep. 
852;  Kellerman  r.  Railroad  Co.,  136 
Mo.  177,  34  S.  W.  Rep.  41;  Sonia 
Cotton  Oil  Co.   r.  The  Red  River, 


106  La.  42,  30  So.  Rep.  303,  87  Am. 
St.  Rep.  293,  citing  Hutchinson  on 
Carr.;  Portland  Flouring  Mills  Co. 
/;.  Insurance  Co.,  130  Fed.  860,  65 
C   C.  A.  'm,,affirming  124  Fed.  855. 

64.  St.  Louis,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v. 
Cieary,  77  Mo.  634;  Long  v.  Rail- 
road Co.,  50  N.  Y.  76;  Belger  v. 
Dinsmore,  51  N.  Y.  166;  Collender 
V.  Dinsmore,  55  N.  Y.  200;  Hinck- 
ley r.  Railroad  Co.,  56  N.  Y.  429; 
Turner  v.  Railroad  Co.,  20  Mo. 
App.  632. 

In  the  absence  of  fraud  or  mis- 
take, it  must  be  conclusively  pre- 
sumed that  the  oral  negotiations 
respecting  the  terms  and  condi- 
tions upon  which  the  goods  were 
received,  and  the  route  by  which 
they  are  to  be  forwarded,  are 
merged  in  the  bill  of  lading.  This 
must  be  taken  as  the  final  re- 
pository and  sole  evidence  of  the 
agreement  between  the  parties. 
Snow    V.    Railway    Co.,    109    Ind. 


§168.]  THE  BILL   OF   LADING.  170 

Sec.  168.  Same  subject — Implied  obligations  cannot  be  va- 
ried by  parol. — And  not  only  is  such  evidence  inadmissible  to 
change  or  vary  in  any  particular  the  express  terms  of  the  con- 
tract, but  in  these  instruments,  as  in  all  other  written  contracts, 
there  may  be  implied  obligations  as  to  which  the  contract  may  be 
entirely  silent  but  which  result  by  legal  implication  or  by  con- 
struction from  the  very  nature  of  the  contract  itself;  and  such 
implied  obligations  can  no  more  be  varied  by  verbal  evidence 
than  the  express  written  stipulations  of  the  parties.  Thus,  if 
goods  are  delivered  to  a  carrier  for  transportation  to  a  point  be- 
yond his  terminus,  and  there  is  more  than  one  route  by  which 
such  point  is  reached,  but  the  bill  of  lading  is  silent  as  to  which 
shall  be  employed,  he  is  impliedly  authorized  to  select  any  usual 
or  reasonably  direct  and  safe  route  by  which  to  forward  them, 
and  parol  evidence  cannot  be  resorted  to  for  the  purpose  of  show- 
ing that  another  was  intended.^^  So,  also,  if  the  bill  of  lading 
is  silent  as  to  the  time  within  which  the  goods  are  to  be  delivered, 
the  law  will  presume  that  a  reasonable  time  was  contemplated 
and  parol  evidence  will  be  inadmissible  to  negative  the  presump- 
tion thus  created.*^" 

422.  See,  also,  Railroad  Co.  v.  Canal  Co.  v.  Coal  Co..  8  "Wall.  276. 
Shomo,  90  Ga.  496,  16  S.  E.  Rep.  The  bill  of  lading,  being  silent 
220,  citing  Hutchinson  on  Carr.;  in  respect  to  the  line  by  which  the 
Bedell  r.  Railroad  Co.,  94  Ga.  22,  goods  are  to  be  forwarded,  its  ef- 
20  S.  E.  Rep.  262;  McEwen  v.  Rail-  feet  is  the  same  as  if  a  provision 
way  Co.,  109  Ga.  249,  34  S.  E.  Rep.  was  therein  inserted  that  the  car- 
281,  77  Am.  St.  Rep.  371,  citing  rier  should  have  the  right  to  se- 
Hutchinson  on  Carr.;  Holten  v.  lect  at  his  discretion  any  custom- 
Railroad  Co.,  61  Mo.  App.  204;  Tal-  ary  or  usual  route  which  was  re- 
lahassee  Falls  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Railway  garded  as  safe  and  reasonable. 
Co.,  117  Ala.  520,  23  So.  Rep.  139,  This  provision,  being  thus  import- 
67  Am.  St.  Rep.  179;  Burgher  v.  ed  into  the  contract  by  law,  is  as 
Railroad  Co.,  105  Iowa  335,  75  N.  unassailable  by  parol  as  any  of 
W.  Rep.  192;  Helm  v.  Railroad  Co.,  the  express  terms  of  the  contract. 
98  Mo.  App.  419,  72  S.  W.  Rep.  148.  Snow  v.  Railway  Co.,  supra.     See 

65.  The  Wanderer,  29  Fed.  Rep.  also.  Express  Co.  v.  Fuller,  4  Tex. 
260.  Civ.  App.  213,  23  S.  W.  Rep.  412. 

66.  Snow  V.  Railway  Co.,  109  67.  Railway  Co.  v.  Baugh  (Tex. 
Ind.  422,  citing  White  v.  Ashton,  Civ.  App.),  42  S.  W.  Rep.  245; 
51  N.  Y.  280;  Hinckley  v.  Railroad,  Railroad  Co.  v.  Hasselkus,  91  Ga. 
56  N.  Y.  429;  Simkins  v.  Steam-  382,  17  S.  E.  Rep.  838,  44  Am.  St. 
boat  Co.,   11  Cush.    102;     Hudson  Rep.  37. 


180  THE  LAW   OP    CARRIERS.  [§169. 

Sec.  169.  Same  subject. — Where  an  attempt  was  made  to 
show  a  parol  contract  made  before  the  shipment  of  the  goods  or 
the  signing  of  the  bill  of  lading,  that  the  goods  might  be  stowed 
on  deck,  from  which  they  had  been  lost  by  being  jettisoned  in  a 
storm,  it  was  said  that ' '  unless  the  bill  of  lading  contains  a  special 
stipulation  to  that  effect,  the  master  is  not  authorized  to  stow  the 
goods  sent  on  board  as  cargo  on  deck,  as  when  he  signs  the  bill  of 
lading,  if  in  common  form,  he  contracts  to  convey  the  mer- 
chandise safely  in  the  usual  mode  of  conveyance,  which,  in  the 
absence  of  proof  of  a  contrary  usage  in  the  particular  trade,  re- 
quires that  the  goods  shall  be  safely  stowed  under  deck ;  and  when 
the  master  departs  from  that  rule  and  stows  them  on  deck,  he 
cannot  exempt  either  himself  or  the  vessel  from  liability  in  ease 
of  loss  by  virtue  of  the  exception  of  the  dangers  of  the  seas,  unless 
the  dangers  were  such  as  would  have  occasioned  the  loss  even  if 
the  goods  had  been  stowed  as  required  by  the  contract  of 
affreightment.  Contracts  of  the  master  within  the  scope  of  his 
authority  as  such  bind  the  vessel;  and  the  master  is  responsible 
for  the  safe  stowage  of  the  cargo  under  deck,  and  if  he  fails  to 
fulfill  that  duty  he  is  responsible  for  the  safety  of  the  goods;  and 
if  they  are  sacrificed  for  the  common  safety,  the  goods  stowed 
under  deck  do  not  contribute  to  the  loss.  Ship-owners  in  a  con- 
tract by  bill  of  lading  for  the  transportation  of  merchandise 
take  upon  themselves  the  responsibilities  of  common  carriers,  and 
the  master  as  the  agent  of  such  owners  is  bound  to  have  the  cargo 
safely  secured  under  deck  unless  he  is  authorized  to  carry  the 
goods  on  deck  by  the  usage  of  the  particular  trade  or  by  the  con- 
sent of  the  shipper;  and  if  he  would  rely  upon  the  latter,  he 
must  take  care  to  require  that  the  consent  shall  be  expressed  in  a 
form  to  be  available  as  evidence  under  the  general  rules  of  law. '  'i 
And  even  where  it  appeared  that  the  shipper  or  his  agent 
who  delivered  the  goods  to  the  carrier  repeatedly  saw  them  as 
they  were  being  stowed  in  that  way  and  made  no  objection,  it  was 

1.  The  Delaware,  14  Wall.  579;  nould  on  Ins.  776;  Lenox  v.  The 
Creery  v.  Holly,  14  "Wend.  28;  The  Ins.  Co.,  3  Johns.  Cas.  178;  Shack- 
Waldo,  Daveis,  162;  Blacket  v.  Ex-  leford  v.  Wilcox,  9  La.  33;  Barber 
change  Co.,  2  Cromp.  &  J.  250;  Ar-  v.  Brace,  3  Conn.  14, 


THE   BILL   OP   LADING.  181 

held  that  the  evidence  was  not  admissible  to  vary  the  legal  import 
of  the  contract  of  shipment,  and  that  the  bill  of  lading  being  a 
clean  bill,  that  is,  being  silent  upon  the  subject,  bound  the  owners 
of  the  vessel  to  carry  the  goods  under  deck.2 

Sec  170.  Same  subject— Effect  of  subsequent  paxol  agree- 
ment.— But  while  the  rule  as  we  have  seen  is,  that  neither  the 
express  terms  nor  the  implied  rights  and  obligations  of  the  con- 
tract embodied  in  the  bill  of  lading  can  be  contradicted  or  varied 
by  oral  evidence  of  prior  parol  negotiations,  it  does  not  follow 
that  a  parol  agreement  subsequently  entered  into  and  to  which 
the  parties  have  mutually  assented  will  not  be  binding  on  them, 
although  it  operates  to  change  or  modify  the  terms  of  the  bill  of 
lading.3  In  such  a  case,  it  is  said,  the  rule  that  written  contracts 
not  falling  within  the  statute  of  frauds  may  be  changed  or  modi- 
fied by  a  subsequent  parol  agreement  which  is  founded  "J.pon  a 
sufficient  consideration  will  apply,  and  parol  evidence  will  be 
admissible  to  prove  its  terms,  although  such  evidence  tends  to 
change  or  modify  the  provisions  of  the  written  contract.*  Thus, 
while  the  carrier  has  the  right  in  a  case  where  there  are  two 
routes  over  which  he  may  forward  goods,  and  the  bill  of  lading 
is  silent  as  to  the  route  to  be  employed,  to  select  the  usual  and 
customary  route,  such  right  is  not  inalienable  and  may  be  modi- 
fied by  a  subsequent  parol  agreement  to  forward  the  goods  over  a 
particular  route.^ 

Sec.  171.    Effect  of  delivery  of  bill  of  lading  after  oral  con- 
tract of  shipment  made  but  before  shipment  has  begun. — If  the 

shipper  and  the  carrier  have  entered  into  an  oral  contract  for 
the  shipment  of  goods,  but  before  such  contract  is  acted  upon  the 
shipper  accepts  from  the  carrier,  with  knowledge  of  its  contents, 
a  bill  of  lading  which  contains  provisions  at  variance  with  the 
conditions  of  the  oral  contract,  the  ordinary  rule  that  a  bill  of 
lading  is  the  sole  evidence  of  the  final  agreement  of  the  parties 

2.  Sproat  v.  Donnell,  26  Maine,     203,  39   N.  E.  Rep.    523;    Railroad 
187.  Co.  V.  Levy,  127  Ind.  168,  26  N.  E. 

3.  Steidl     V.    Railroad     Co.,    —    Rep.  773. 

Minn.  — ,  102  N.  W.  Rep.  701;  Rail-         4.  Steidl  v.  Railroad  Co.,  supra. 
way  Co.  V.  Craycraft,  13  Ind.  App.        5.  Steidl  v.  Railroad  Co.,  supra. 


182 


THE  LAW  OF   CARRIERS. 


[§  172. 


will  apply,  and  the  bill  of  lading  will  be  held  to  control  the  ship- 
ment.^ It  has  been  held,  however,  by  the  Court  of  Civil  Appeals 
of  Texas  that  a  bill  of  lading  thus  delivered,  although  signed  by 
the  shipper,  will  not  control  the  shipment  when  no  affirmative 
evidence  appears  that,  at  the  time  he  made  the  verbal  contract,  ho 
knew  he  would  be  required  to  sign  the  written  contract  or  that  he 
knew  the  contents  of  such  written  contract/ 

Sec.  172.  Same  subject — How  when  goods  shipped  under 
parol  contract  before  bill  of  lading  delivered. — But  if  the  car- 
rier has,  in  pursuance  of  an  oral  contract,  already  shipped  the 
goods,  the  mere  acceptance  and  retention  by  the  shippers  of  a  bill 
of  lading  the  conditions  of  which  are  unlike  those  of  the  oral  con- 
tract will  not  preclude  him  from  showing  what  the  actual  agree- 
ment Avas  under  which  the  goods  were  shipped ;  and  the  oral  con- 
tract alone  will  be  looked  to  in  determining  the  contract  rights 
and  duties  of  the  parties.^    But  the  rule  as  thus  stated  must  not 


6.  Railway  Co.  v.  Batte  (Tex. 
Civ.  App.),  94  S.  W.  Rep.  345. 

7.  Gulf,  etc.,  R'y  Co.  t'.  Funk,  — 
Tex.  Civ.  App.  — ,  92  S.  W.  Rep. 
1032. 

8.  Bostwick  V.  The  Railroad,  45 
N.  Y.  712;  Wilde  v.  Transporta- 
tion Co.,  47  Iowa,  247;  Stoner  v. 
Railv/ay  Co.,  109  Iowa,  551,  80  N. 
W.  Rep.  569;  Hendrick  v.  Railroad 
Co.,  170  Mass.  44,  48  N.  E.  Rep. 
835;  Rudell  v.  Transit  Co.,  117 
Mich.  568,  76  N.  W.  Rep.  380,  44 
L.  R.  A.  415;  Transportation  Co. 
v.  Furthmann,  149  111.  66,  36  N.  E. 
Rep.  624,  41  Am.  St.  Rep.  265; 
Railway  Co.  v.  Elgin,  etc.,  Co.,  175 
111.  557,  51  N.  E.  Rep.  911,  67  Am. 
St.  Rep.  238;  Railway  Co.  v.  Hull, 
76  111.  App.  408;  Waldron  r.  Fargo, 
170  N.  Y.  130,  62  N.  E.  Rep.  1077, 
reversing  64  N.  Y.  Supp.  798; 
Burns  v.  Burns,  131  Fed.  238,  65 
C.  C.  A.  224;  Railway  Co.  v.  Wood 
(Tex.  Civ.  App.),  30  S.  W.  Rep. 
715;  Railway  Co.  v.  Botts,  22  Tex. 


Civ.  App.  609,  55  S.  W.  Rep.  514; 
Railway  Co.  v.  Grant,  6  Tex.  Civ. 
App.  674,  26  S.  W.  Rep.  286,  cit- 
ing Hutchinson  on  Carr.;  Railway 
Co.  V.  Wright,  20  Tex.  Civ.  App. 
137,  49  S.  W.  Rep.  147;  McCulloUgh 
V.  Railway  Co.,  34  Mo.  App.  23; 
Transportation  Co.  v.  McKenzie 
(Can.),  25  S.  C.  R.  38;  Olds  v. 
Railroad  Co.,  94  N.  Y.  Supp.  924. 

The  leading  case  on  this  subject 
is  Bostwick  v.  The  Railroad,  45 
N.  Y.  712.  It  was  there  held  that 
where  the  goods  had  already  been 
shipped  under  a  verbal  agree- 
ment, the  delivery  afterwards  to 
the  shipper  of  a  bill  of  lading,  his 
attention  not  being  called  to  its 
terms  or  conditions,  did  not  con- 
clude him  from  showing  what  the 
actual  agreement  was  under  which 
the  shipment  had  been  made.  The 
verbal  contract  was,  as  proven,  to 
transport  by  rail;  but  in  the  bill 
of  lading  there  were  printed  con- 
ditions which  authorized  the  car- 


§172. 


THE   BILL  OF   LADING. 


183 


be  understood  as  denying  to  the  parties,  after  the  goods  have  been 
accepted  for  transportation,  the  right  to  alter  or  modify  the  con- 
ditions of  the  oral  contract  by  a  bill  of  lading  subsequently  de- 
livered. If,  therefore,  the  shipper,  wli-en  accepting  the  bill  of 
lading,  has  his  attention  called  to  its  terms,  or  if  he  otherwise  has 
notice  of  its  conditions  and  he  either  expressly  or  impliedly  as- 
sents to  them,  there  is  no  reason  why  the  bill  of  lading  should  not 
control  the  shipment,  although  its  terms  are  inconsistent  with  the 
oral  contract.''  But  to  have  this  effect,  the  assent  of  the  shipper 
to  the  terms  expressed  in  the  bill  of  lading  must  have  been  fairly 
procured,  and  if  it  should  appear  that  an  unfair  advantage  was 
taken  of  him,  or  any  means  or  devices  resorted  to  to  keep  him 
from  fully  understanding  its  terms,  the  carrier  would  not  be  per- 
mitted to  avail  himself  of  them.io     If,  however,  at  the  time  the 


riage  by  rail  and  water.  The  car- 
rier at  the  terminus  of  his  own 
line  forwarded  a  portion  of  the 
goods  by  water,  and  the  vessel  hav- 
ing been  wrecked  and  the  goods 
lost  he  was  held  liable  under  the 
verbal  agreement.  And  it  was 
said  in  the  same  case  to  have 
been  previously  determined  by  the 
court  that  the  conditions  contained 
in  a  bill  of  lading  not  delivered 
until  after  the  shipment  and  the 
loss  of  the  goods,  though  before 
the  loss  was  known,  did  not  con- 
trol the  rights  of  the  shipper. 

This  case  was  followed  in  Swift 
'v.  Steamship  Co.,  106  N.  Y.  206. 
There  oil  had  been  shipped  from 
Panama  to  New  York  under  a  spe- 
cial contract,  partly  in  parol  and 
partly  in  writing.  Afterwards  the 
carriers  sent  to  the  shippers  billo 
of  lading  containing  limitations 
not  agreed  upon.  "The  defend- 
ants," said  the  court,  "could  not 
abrogate  or  alter  that  contract  by 
merely  signing  and  mailing  bills 
of  lading  which  did  not  reach  the 
plaintiffs  until  after   the  oil   had 


left  Aspinwall,  and  much,  if  not 
all,  the  loss  had  occurred.  There 
certainly  was  no  conclusive  evi- 
dence that  the  plaintiffs  consented 
to  accept  the  bills  of  lading  in 
place  of  the  prior  contract,  and 
that  contract  must,  therefore,  con- 
trol." Bostwick  V.  The  Railroad, 
supra;  Guillaume  v.  Transporta- 
tion Co.,  100  N.  Y.  491,  and 
Wheeler  v.  Railroad  Co.,  115  U.  S. 
29  were  cited. 

"Where  a  passenger  ticket  con- 
taining a  limitation  as  to  baggage 
was  not  delivered  until  long  after 
fare  had  been  paid  and  the  bag- 
gage received,  it  was  held  to  be  a 
question  for  the  jury  whether 
there  was  a  valid  contract.  Lu- 
nansky  v.  Packet  Co.,  99  N.  Y. 
Supp.  810. 

9.  The  Arctic  Bird,  109  Fed.  167; 
The  Railway  Co.  v.  American,  etc., 
Co.,  193  XT.  S.  439,  affirming  Farm- 
er's, etc.,  Co.  V.  Railroad  Co.,  120 
Fed.  873,  57  C.  C.  A.  553,  which 
case  reverses  112  Fed.  829. 

10.  A  written  contract  present- 
ed by  the  carrier's  agent  to  the 


184  THE  LAW   OF    CARRIERS.  [§  173. 

bill  of  lading  is  issued,  damages  have  accrued  under  the  oral 
contract,  the  shipper  will  not,  by  accepting  the  bill  of  lading  and 
assenting  to  its  terms,  waive  his  right  to  sue  for  the  breach.  But 
if  the  bill  of  lading  should  expressly  provide  that  any  breach  of 
the  oral  agreement  relating  to  the  shipment  should  be  waived, 
and  the  shipper  assents  to  such  condition,  thereby  evincing  an 
intention  to  regard  the  writing  as  covering  the  entire  shipment, 
his  assent  will  amount  to  a  disclaimer  of  the  breach  and  a  waiver 
of  his  right  to  claim  damages  therefor.^i 

Sec.  173.  Same  subject — Effect  of  custom — Temporary  re- 
ceipts.— If  a  custom  has  become  well  established  between  the 
shipper  and  carrier  for  the  latter  to  issue  his  receipts  after  the 
goods  have  been  shipped,  and  a  receipt  is  issued  by  the  carrier 
in  accordance  with  such  custom  for  goods  after  they  have  been 
shipped,  its  terms  will  control  the  rights  of  the  parties.^  2  gQ  jf 
the  shipper  has  notice  from  a  previous  course  of  dealing  that,  in 
order  to  secure  a  reduced  freight  rate,  he  must  agree  to  certain 
conditions  in  the  carrier's  bill  of  lading,  and  he  delivers  goods 
to  the  carrier  to  be  transported  at  such  reduced  rate,  a  mere  delay 
by  the  carrier  in  executing  the  bill  of  lading  until  the  service  has 
been  partly  performed  will  not  operate  to  relieve  the  shipper 
from  the  effect  of  such  conditions.^^  j^^^j  [f  ^t  the  time  the  goods 
are  accepted  by  the  carrier  for  transportation  a  temporary  re- 
ceipt is  issued,  and  it  is  mutually  contemplated  by  the  parties 

shipper  after  the  goods  have  been  11.  Hoover  v.  The  Railroad,  — 
delivered,  which  the  shipper  is  in-  Mo.  App.  — ,  88  S.  W.  Rep.  769. 
duced  to  sign  by  a  misrepresenta-  Where  a  special  written  contract 
tion,  will  not  bind  him  to  its  limiting  the  carrier's  liability  was 
terms.  Railway  Co.  v.  Anderson,  not  signed  by  the  shipper  until 
26  Tex.  Civ.  App.  518,  63  S.  W.  after  the  property  had  been  in- 
Rep.  1023.  Where,  in  order  to  se-  jured,  it  was  held  that  the  ship- 
cure  a  right  given  him  under  an  per  was  not  bound  by  it  where  it 
oral  contract,  the  shipper  is  was  understood  that  it  would  not 
obliged  to  sign  a  new  contract  be  prejudicial  to  his  claim.  Frasier 
while  the  goods  are  in  transit,  and  r.  The  Railway  Co.,  —  S.  Car.  — , 
he  does  so  under  protest,  he  will  52  S.  E.  Rep.  9C4. 
not  be  concluded  by  the  terms  of  12.  Shelton  r.  The  Mer.  D.  T.  Co., 
the  second  contract.    Railroad  Co.  r.9  N.  Y.  2.58. 

V.  Lannum,  71  111.  App.  84.  13.  Railway  Co.  t\  Patterson,  69 

111.  App.  438. 


§  174.]  THE   BILL   OF   LADING.  185 

that  a  bill  of  lading  shall  later  be  substituted  for  the  receipt,  the 
latter  will  be  considered  as  representing  the  first  and  only  con- 
tract between  the  parties.^*  But  the  mere  acceptance  by  the 
shipper  of  a  receipt  which  provides  that  the  goods  are  received 
subject  to  the  terms  of  a  bill  of  lading  to  be  subsequently  issued 
will  not  operate  to  bind  him  to  such  terms,  and  unless  his  assent 
to  them  has  been  fairly  secured,  the  carrier  cannot  avail  himself 
of  them.15  The  receipt  in  such  a  case  is  not  considered  as  rep- 
resenting the  contract  of  shipment,  and  any  conditions  inserted 
in  it  are  therefore  regarded  as  mere  notices,  not  binding  on  the 
shipper  unless  he  has  assented  to  them.  It  was  held,  however,  in 
the  case  of  Dunbar  v.  The  Railway  Company ,i«  that  where  the 
receipt  delivered  to  the  shipper  expressly  stated  that  the  goods 
were  received  subject  to  the  terms  and  conditions  of  the  com- 
pany's bill  of  lading,  for  while  it  was  provided  the  receipt  should 
be  exchanged,  the  shipper  would  be  deemed  to  have  had  such 
notice  as  to  put  him  on  inquiry  and  would  be  bound  by  the  terms 
and  conditions  of  the  bill  of  lading. 

Sec.  174.  Same  subject — Acceptance  of  bill  of  lading  after 
oral  agreement  made  to  furnish  cars  at  certain  time. — If  the 

shipper  enters  into  an  oral  agreement  with  the  carrier  to  furnish 
cars  at  a  certain  time,  and  before  that  time  arrives  a  written  con- 
tract is  executed  which  provides  that  the  goods  are  not  to  be 
transported  within  any  specified  time  nor  delivered  at  destina- 

14.  Washburn  Crosby  Co.  v.  Rail-  75  N.  E.  Rep.  829.  A  provision  in 
road  Co.,  180  Mass.  252,  62  N.  E.  a  shipping  receipt  that  goods  are 
Rep.  590.  to  be  shipped  "as  per  conditions  in 

15.  Merchant's,  etc.,  Co.  v.  Furth-  company's  bill  of  lading,"  will  not 
mann,  149  111.  66,  36  N.  E.  Rep.  render  binding  on  the  shipper  con- 
624,  41  Am.  St.  Rep.  265.  ditions  written  into  the  bill  of  lad- 

Where  a  mere  receipt  is  deliv-  ing  not  assented  to  or  authorized 

ered  to  the  shipper  which  recites  by  him.     Railway  Co.  v.   Potts  & 

that  the   goods    are    received    sub-  Co.,    33    Ind.    App.    564,    71    N.    E. 

ject  to  the  company's  bill  of  lading,  Rep.  685.    See  also,  Stewart  v.  The 

no    bill    of    lading    ever   being    is-  Railway,   21   Ind.   App.   218,  52  N. 

sued,   the   bill   of  lading  does  not  E.  Rep.  89. 

thereby  become  a  part  of  the  ship-  16.  62  S.  Car.  414,  40  S.  E.  Rep. 

ping    contract.       Pittsburgh,     etc.,  884. 
Ry.  Co.  V.  Bryant,  —  Ind.  App.  — , 


186  THE  LAW   OF   CARRIERS.  [§  175.* 

tion  at  any  particular  hour,  the  carrier  will  not  be  liable  in  dam. 
ages  if  he  fails  to  furnish  the  cars  at  the  time  stated  in  the  oral 
agreement.  The  oral  agreement  in  such  a  case  is  merged  in  the 
written  contract  and  the  latter  will  furnish  the  only  evidence  of 
the  rights  of  the  parties.^  ^  But  after  a  breach  by  the  carrier  of 
the  oral  agreement,  the  fact  that  the  shipper  sends  his  goods  for- 
w^ard  in  cars  subsequently  furnished  and  takes  a  bill  of  lading 
covering  the  shipment  will  not  preclude  him  from  the  right  to  re- 
cover damages  unless  he  has  expressly  agreed  upon  a  sufficient 
consideration  to  waive  such  right.^^ 

Sec.  175.  (§  129.)  Bills  of  lading  are  assignable,  but  not 
negotiable. — In  commercial  transactions  bills  of  lading  are  re- 
garded as  the  representatives  of  the  goods,  and  when  properly 
indorsed  and  delivered,  with  the  intention  of  passing  the  title  to 
them,  it  is  a  symbolic  or  constructive  delivery  of  the  goods  them- 
selves. And  while  a  delivery  without  indorsement  cannot  operate 
as  a  transfer  of  the  legal  title  to  the  goods,  it  will  have  the  effect 
of  giving  to  the  transferee  an  equitable  title  in  and  to  the  goods 
represented  by  the  bill  of  lading,  although,  in  the  absence  of 
statute,  it  will  afford  him  no  right  to  maintain  an  action  thereon 
in  his  own  name.^^    Bills  of  lading  are  not,  however,  negotiable 

17.  Helm  v.  Railroad,  98  Mo.  19.  Turner  v.  Israel,  64  Ark.  244. 
App.  419,  72  S.  W.  Rep.  148.  See  also.  First  Nat'l  Bank  v.  Dear- 

18.  McAbsher  v.  Railroad,  108  N.  born,  115  Mass.  219;  Railroad  Co. 
Car.  344,  12  S.  E.  Rep.  892;  Ham-  v.  Wilkens,  44  Md.  11;  Nathan  v. 
ilton  V.  Railroad,  96  N.  Car.  398;  Giles,  5  Taunt.  558;  Merchants' 
Railway  r.  Racer,  10  Ind.  App.  50'3,  Bank  v.  Railroad  Co.,  69  N.  Y.  373; 
37  N.  E.  Rep.  280;  Gulf,  etc.,  R'y  First  Nat'l  Bank  v.  Railroad  Co., 
Co.  V.  House  &  Watkins  (Tex.  Civ.  85  Hun,  160,  32  N.  Y.  Supp.  604; 
App.),   88    S.  W.   Rep.    1110.  Railroad  Co.  v.  Irwin,  46  Ind.  180; 

Where  the  carrier's  agent  orally  Railroad  Co.  v.  Phillips,  60  111.  190; 

agrees  with  a  shipper  of  live  stock  Dodge     v.    Meyer,     61     Cal.     405; 

to  furnish  cars  on  a  certain  day,  a  Scharff  v.  Meyer,  133  Mo.   428,  34 

written    contract    which    is    subse-  S.   W.  Rep.    858,    54  Am.    St.  Rep. 

quently    issued    in    which   the   au-  672;  American,  etc.,  Co.  v.  Markle, 

thority   of   the   agent   to   agree  to  102  Mo.  App.   158,   76   S.   W.  Rep. 

furnish  cars  on  such  day  is  limit-  668. 

ed   will   not   merge   the   oral   con-        But  the  holder  may  show  that  it 

tract.    Railway    Co.    v.    Combes    &  was  not  his  intention  to  transfer 

Rector   (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  80  S.  W.  the  title   to   the   goods.     Railroad 

Rep.  1045.  Co.  V.  Mt.  Vernon  Co.,  84  Ala.  173, 


175.] 


THE   BILL   OF   LADING. 


187 


in  a  strictly  mercantile  sense  like  bills  of  exchange,  but  are  said 
to  be  qimsi  negotiable.^o  They  are  assignable,  and  possess  one 
additional  quality  which  is  not  possessed  by  contracts  generally 
which  are  merely  assignable.  They  stand  as  a  substitute  for  the 
goods  they  represent,  and  when  properly  indorsed  and  delivered 
with  the  intention  of  passing  their  title,  it  is  equivalent  to  an 
actual  delivery  of  the  goods  themselves,-^  though  the  assignee  gets 


4  So.  Rep.  356;  Railroad  Co.  v. 
Barkhouse,  100  Ala.  543,  13  So. 
Rep.  534;  Capehart  v.  Granite 
Mills,  97  Ala.  353,  12  So.  Rep.  44. 

20.  Stollenwerck  v.  Thatcher,  115 
Mass.  224;  Am.  Notes  to  Lickbar- 
row  V.  Mason,  1  Smith's  Ld.  Cas. 
896. 

The  characteristics  of  the  bill  of 
lading  are  well  described  by  Chief 
Justice  Fuller  in  Friedlander  n. 
Railway  Co.,  130  U.  S.  416,  as  fol 
lows:  "Bills  of  exchange  and 
promissory  notes  are  representa- 
tives of  money,  circulating  in  the 
commercial  world  as  such,  and  it 
is  essential,  to  enable  them  to  per- 
form their  peculiar  functions,  that 
he  who  purchases  them  should  not 
be  bound  to  look  beyond  the  in- 
strument, and  that  his  right  to 
enforce  them  should  not  be  de- 
feated by  anything  short  of  bad 
faith  on  his  part.  But  bills  of 
lading  answer  a  different  purpose 
and  perform  different  functions. 
They  are  regarded  as  so  much  cot- 
ton, grain,  iron  or  other  articles 
of  merchandise,  in  that  they  are 
symbols  of  ownership  of  the  goods 
they  cover.  And  as  no  sale  of 
goods  lost  or  stolen,  though  to  a 
^ona  fide  purchaser  for  value,  can 
divest  the  ownership  of  the  per- 
son who  lost  them  or  from  whom 
they  were  stolen,  so  the  sale  of 
the  symbol  or  mere  representative 
of  the  goods  can  have  no  such  ef- 


fect although  it  sometimes  hap- 
pens that  the  true  owner,  by  neg- 
ligence, has  so  put  it  into  the 
power  of  another  to  occupy  his  po- 
sition, ostensibly,  as  to  estop  him 
from  asserting  his  right  as  against 
a  purchaser  who  has  been  misled 
to  his  hurt  by  reason  of  such  neg- 
ligence. Shaw  V.  Railroad  Co.,  101 
U.  S.  557;  Pollard  v.  Vinton,  105 
U.  S.  7,  8;  Gurney  v.  Behrend,  3 
El.  &  Bl.  622,  633,  634,  It  is  true 
that,  while  not  negotiable  as  com- 
mercial paper  is,  bills  of  lading 
are  commonly  used  as  security  for 
loans  and  advances;  but  it  is  only 
as  evidence  of  ownership,  special 
or  general,  of  the  property  men- 
tioned in  them,  and  of  the  right  to 
receive  such  property  at  the  place 
of  delivery." 

21.  United  States:  The  Carlos 
F.  Ross,  177  U.  S.  655,  44  L.  Ed. 
929. 

California:  Dodge  v.  Meyer,  61 
Cal.  405. 

Georgia:  Railroad  Co.  v.  Lowe, 
101   Ga.  320,  28   S.  E.  Rep.  867. 

Illinois:  Michigan  Cent.  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Phillips,  60  111.  198;  Burton 
V.  Curyea,  40  111.  320. 

Iowa:  Ay  res,  etc.,  Co.  v.  Prod- 
uce Co.,  101  Iowa,  141,  70  N.  W. 
Rep.  Ill,  63  Am.  St.  Rep.  376. 

Kentucky:  Railroad  Co.  v.  Hart- 
well,  99  Ky.  436,  36  S.  W.  Rep.  183, 
citing  Hutchinson  on  Carr.;   Bank 


188 


THE  LAW   OF   CAERIERS. 


[§175. 


no  greater  or  other  rights  than  the  assignor  had.-^  And  this 
restricted  common  law  negotiability  which  attaches  to  them  may 
be  further  qualified  by  the  insertion  of  appropriate  terms  which 
will  wholly  destro}^  all  negotiability.  They  will  still,  however,  be 
assignable  and,  when  thus  dealt  with,  the  assignee  will  take  a 
valid  title  to  the  goods,  subject,  of  course,  to  all  the  equities  be- 


V.  Cotton  Oil  Co.,  26  Ky.  Law  Rep. 
518,  82  S.  W.  Rep.  253. 

Maine:  McKee  v.  Garcelon,  60 
Me.  167;  Robinson  v.  Stewart,  68 
Me.  61. 

Massachusetts:  Stone  v.  Swift, 
4  Pick.  389. 

Maryland:  Nat'l  Bank  of  Bris- 
tol V.  Railroad  Co.,  99  Md.  661,  59 
Atl.  Rep.  134,  105  Am.  St.  Rep.  321. 

Minnesota:  Ryan  v.  Railway 
Co.,  90  Minn.  12,  95  N.  W.  Rep. 
758;  Ratzer  v.  Railway  Co.,  64 
Minn.  245,  66  N.  W.  Rep.  988,  58 
Am.   St.   Rep.    530. 

Missouri:  Midland,  etc..  Bank 
V.  Railway  Co.,  62  Mo.  App.  531; 
Dickson  v.  Elevator  Co.,  44  Mo. 
App.  498. 

NeJ)raska:  Railway  Co.  v.  Johns- 
ton, 45  Neb.  57,  63  N.  W.  Rep.  144, 
50  Am.  St.  Rep.  540,  citing  Hutch- 
inson on  Carr. 

New  York:  Hazard  v.  Fiske,  83 
N.  Y.  287. 

Oregon:  Wadhams  &  Co.  v.  Bal- 
four, 32  Or.  313,  51  Pac.  Rep.  642. 

Texas:  Campbell  v.  Alford,  57 
Tex.  159. 

Vermont:  Davis  v.  Bradley,  28 
Vt.  118;  Til  den  v.  Minor,  45  Vt. 
196;  Joslyn  v.  Railway  Co.,  51  Vt. 
92. 

"Bills  of  lading,  by  the  law  mer 
chant,  are  representatives  of  the 
property  for  which  they  have  been 
given;  and  the  indorsement  and 
delivery  of  a  bill  of  lading  trans- 
fers the  property  from  the  vendor 


to  the  vendee;  is  a  complete  legal 
delivery  of  the  goods;  divests  the 
vendor's  lien."  Benjamin  on  Sales, 
§  813. 

"While  the  goods  are  afloat,  it 
is  common  knowledge,  and  I  should 
not  think  of  citing  authorities  to 
prove  it,  that  the  bill  of  lading 
represents  them,  and  the  indorse- 
ment and  delivery  of  the  bill  of 
lading,  while  the  ship  is  at  sea, 
operate  exactly  the  same  as  the 
delivery  of  the  goods  themselves 
to  the  assignee  after  the  ship's 
arrival  would  do."  Per  Erie,  C.  J., 
in  Meyerstein  v.  Barber,  L.  R.  2 
C.  P.  42. 

A  purchaser  who  has  reason  to 
believe  that  his  vendor  is  not  the 
owner  of  the  bill,  or  that  it  was 
given  to  secure  an  outstanding 
draft,  is  not  a  bona  fide  holder 
(Shaw  V.  Railroad  Co.,  101  U.  S. 
557) ;  nor  a  purchaser  on  consid- 
eration of  an  antecedent  indebted- 
ness. Skilling  V.  BoUman,  73  Mo. 
665;  Loeb  t'.  Peters,  63  Ala.  243; 
Harris  v.  Pratt,  17  N.  Y.  249; 
O'Brien  v.  Norris,  16  Md.  122;  Nay- 
lor  V.  Dennie,  8  Pick.  199.  Contra, 
in  Maryland,  by  statute.  Tiede- 
man  v.  Knox,  53  Md.  612. 

22.  J.   C.    Hass   &   Co.    v.   Bank, 

Ala.  ,  39  So.  Rep.  129,  1 

L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  242;  Haas  v. 
Railroad  Co.,  81  Ga.  792;  Tison  v. 
Howard,  57  Ga.  410;  Shaw  r.  Rail- 
road Co.,  101  U.  S.  557;  Grayson 
County  Nat'l  Bank  v.  Railway  Co. 


§175.; 


THE   BILL   OF   LADING. 


189 


tween  the  original  parties.-^  But  if  their  indorsement  and  de- 
livery have  been  procured  by  fraud  or  mistake,  they  pass  no  title 
as  against  the  true  owner,  even  to  the  bona  fide  holder.  Unless, 
therefore,  the  real  owner  has  parted  with  his  bill  of  lading  volun- 
tarily and  with  the  intention  of  parting  at  the  same  time  with  his 
title  to  the  goods,  even  the  innocent  holder  of  it,  although  he  may 
have  acquired  it  for  a  valuable  consideration,  can  claim  no  rights 
under  it,  and  the  presumption  of  ownership  arising  from  its  pos- 
session will  be  open  to  explanation  or  rebuttal  by  other  evidence 
tending  to  disclose  the  identity  of  the  true  owner.  A  delivery  of 
the  goods  to  such  bona  fide  holder  would,  therefore,  be  a  delivery 
to  the  wrong  person,^^  and  the  carrier  would  be  liable  to  the  real 
owner  for  their  value,  no  matter  how  innocently  or  how  excusably 
he  may  have  acted  in  making  the  delivery .^^ 


(Tex.  Civ.  App).),  79  S.  W.  Rep. 
1094;  Alabama  Nat'l  Bank  v.  Rail- 
way Co.,  42  Mo.  App.  284;  Anchor 
Mill  Co.  V.  Railroad  Co.,  102  Iowa 
262,   71    N.   W.   Rep.    255. 

23.  Nat'l  Bank  of  Bristol  v. 
Railroad  Co.,  99  Md.  661,  59  Atl. 
Rep.  134,  105  Am.  St.  Rep.  321; 
Merchants',  etc.,  Bank  v.  Steam- 
boat  Co.,    Md.   ,    63    Atl. 

Rep.    108. 

24.  "A  bill  of  lading  is  not,  like 
a  bill  of  exchange  or  promissory 
note,  a  negotiable  instrument  which 
passes  by  mere  delivery  to  a  bona 
fide  transferee  for  valuable  consid- 
eration without  regard  to  the  title 
of  the  parties  who  make  the  trans- 
fer. Although  the  shipper  may 
have  indorsed  in  blank  a  bill  of 
lading  deliverable  to  his  assigns, 
his  right  is  not  affected  by  an  ap- 
propriation of  it  without  his  au- 
thority. If  it  be  stolen  from  him 
or  transferred  wthout  his  author- 
ity, a  subsequent  bona  fide  trans- 
feree for  value  cannot  make  title 
under  it  as  against  the  shipper  of 
the  goods.    The  bill  of  lading  only 


represents  the  goods;  and  in  this 
instance  the  transfer  of  the  sym- 
bol does  not  operate  more  than  a 
transfer  of  what  is  represented." 
Per  Lord  Campbell,  in  Gurney  v. 
Behrend,  3  El.  &  Bl.  633.  See,  also, 
Shaw  V.  Railroad  Co.,  101  U.  S. 
557. 

But  if  the  assignment  and  trans- 
fer of  the  bill  of  lading  has  been 
procured  from  the  owner  of  the 
goods  by  fraud,  the  bona  fide  hold- 
er by  purchase  from  the  fraudulent 
vendee  will  acquire  an  indefeasi- 
ble title  to  the  goods  (Dows  v. 
Greene,  24  N.  Y.  638),  upon  the 
well-settled  principle  that  a  sale 
consummated  by  delivery  cannot 
be  set  aside  on  the  ground  of 
fraud,  after  the  goods  have  been 
resold  to  a  bona  fide  purchaser. 
See,  also,  Nat'l  Bank  of  Bristol  r. 
Railroad  Co.,  99  Md.  661,  59  Atl. 
Rep.   134,  105  Am,  St.  Rep.  321. 

25.  B  rower  v.  Peabody,  3  Ker- 
nan,  121;  Decan  v.  Shipper,  11 
Casey,  239;  Dows  v.  Perrin,  16  N. 
Y.  325;  Gurney  r.  Behrend,  3  Ellis 
&  B.  622;  Dows  v.  Greene,  24  N. 
Y.  638. 


190  THE  LAW   OF   CARRIERS.  [§176. 

Sec.  176.  (§  129a.)  Same  subject — Statutes  making  them 
negotiable. — It  has  been  attempted  in  some  states  to  confer 
upon  bills  of  lading  the  quality  of  negotiability  by  statute.  Stat- 
utes of  this  nature,  however,  operating  to  make  innovations  upon 
the  common  law,  will  not  be  construed  as  making  any  changes 
which  the  words  used  do  not  import.  Thus  in  a  case^*^  before  the 
supreme  court  of  the  United  States,  such  statutes  in  Missouri  and 
Pennsylvania  were  involved.  The  statute  in  Pennsylvania  de- 
clared that  bills  of  lading  should  "be  negotiable,  and  may  be 
transferred  by  indorsement  and  delivery ; ' '  while  that  of  Missouri 
enacted  that  "they  shall  be  negotiable  by  written  indorsement 
thereon  and  delivery,  in  the  same  manner  as  bills  of  exchange 
and  promissory  notes."  These  statutes  were  held  to  be  substan- 
tially alike,  both  prescribing  the  manner  of  negotiation,  i.  e.,  by 
indorsement  and  delivery,  and  neither  undertaking  to  define  the 
effect  of  such  a  transfer. 

"Bills  of  lading,"  said  the  court,  "are  regarded  as  so  much 
cotton,  corn,  iron  or  other  articles  of  merchandise.  The  mer- 
chandise is  very  often  sold  or  pledged  by  the  transfer  of  the  bills 
which  cover  it.  They  are,  in  commerce,  a  very  different  thing 
from  bills  of  exchange  and  promissory  notes,  answering  a  different 
purpose  and  performing  different  functions.  It  cannot  be,  there- 
fore, that  the  statute  which  made  them  negotiable  by  indorsement 
and  delivery,  or  negotiable  in  the  same  manner  as  bills  of  ex- 
change and  promissory  notes  are  negotiable,  intended  to  change 
totally  their  character,  put  them  in  all  respects  on  the  footing  of 
instruments  which  are  the  representatives  of  money,  and  charge 
the  negotiation  of  them  with  all  the  consequences  which  usually 
attend  or  follow  the  negotiation  of  bills  and  notes.  Some  of  these 
consequences  would  be  very  strange  if  not  impossible;  such  as 
the  liability  of  indorsers,  the  duty  of  demand  ad  diem,  notice  of 
non-delivery  by  the  carrier,  etc.,  or  the  loss  of  the  owner's  prop- 
erty by  the  fraudulent  assignment  of  a  thief.  If  these  were  in- 
tended, surely  the  statute  would  have  said  something  more  than 
merely  make  them  negotiable  by  indorsement."     It  was  held, 

26.  Shaw   V.    Railroad    Co.,    101    U.  S.  557. 


§  176.]  THE  BILL  OF  LADING.  191 

therefore,  that  the  rule  which  protects  a  bona  fide  purchaser  of  a 
bill  or  note,  though  it  has  been  lost  by  or  stolen  from  the  true 
owner,2'i'  ^[^  ^gt  apply  to  protect  one  who  had  purchased  a  bill 
of  lading  from  a  thief  who  had  stolen  it  from  the  true  owner. 
And  in  another  case,^^  before  the  supreme  court  of  Iowa,  the 
court,  in  construing  the  Missouri  statute  above  quoted,  said : 
"What  is  meant  by  this,  as  we  understand  it,  is  to  give  to  such 
document  negotiability  and  assignability  by  indorsement  and 
delivery,  so  that  the  indorsee  may  sue  thereon  in  his  own  name. 
It  does  not  necessarily  follow  that  because  a  statute  has  made 
bills  of  lading  negotiable,  all  the  consequences  of  an  indorse- 
ment and  delivery  of  bills  and  notes  before  maturity  ensue,  or  are 
intended  to  result  from  such  negotiation.  Bills  of  lading  rep- 
resent property,  and,  when  indorsed  or  assigned,  operate  as  a 
symbolic  delivery  to  the  indorsee  or  assignee  of  the  property 
covered  thereby.  Such  a  transfer  is  quite  different  from  the 
negotiation  of  a  bill  of  exchange  or  promissory  note  which  cir- 
culates in  the  commercial  world  as  an  evidence  of  money."  It 
was,  therefore,  decided  that  where  the  consignor  of  goods  had 
transferred  to  a  bank  a  bill  of  lading  with  draft  attached  which 
he  had  drawn  upon  the  consignee  for  the  price  of  the  goods,  and 
the  bank  had  given  him  credit  therefor,  the  rule  of  commercial 
paper  that  a  mere  discount  and  credit  does  not,  of  itself,  amount 
to  a  bona  fide  purchase  for  value,  did  not  apply,  and  that  the 
bank,  by  such  an  assignment,  secured  a  better  title  to  the  goods 
than  an  attaching  creditor  of  the  consignor  who  had  attached 
the  goods  while  in  transit.  Where,  however,  a  state  court  had 
held  that  the  law  does  not  regard  bills  of  lading  "as  negotiable 

27.  As  applied  in  Goodman  v.  stamped  on  the  face  of  a  bill  of 
Harvey,  4  Ad.  &  E.  870;  Goodman  lading  executed  in  Missouri,  do 
r.  Simonds,  20  How.  343;  Mur-  not  destroy  its  assignability.  The 
ray  v.  Lardner,  2  Wall.  110;  Mat-  sole  effect  of  such  words  is  to  ex- 
thews  V.  Poythress,  4  Ga.  287;  Mil-  empt  it  from  the  provisions  of  the 
ler  V.  Race^  1  Burr,  452;  Peacock  Missouri  statute.  Midland  NaL'l 
V.  Rhodes,  2  Doug.  633;  Phelan  r.  Bank  v.  Railway,  62  Mo.  App.  531. 
Moss,  67  Pa.  St.  59,  cited  by  the  28.  First  Nat'l  Bank  v.  Mt. 
court.  See,  also,  Munroe  v.  Ware-  Pleasant  Milling  Co.,  103  Iowa, 
house  Co.,  75  Fed.  545.  518,   72   N.   W.   Rep.   689. 

The    words,     "non    negotiable," 


192 


THE   LAW   OF    CARRIERS. 


[§  177. 


in  the  same  sense  in  which  a  bill  of  exchange  and  promissory  note 
is  "  and  the  legislature  immediately  afterwards  declared  that 
they  shall  be  negotiable  instruments  and  securities  "in  the  same 
sense  as  bills  of  exchange  and  promissory  notes,"  and  in  explicit 
terms  provided  that  the  effect  of  their  negotiation  or  transfer 
shall  be  to  vest  the  title  to  the  property  mentioned  in  them  in 
every  successive  bona  fide  holder  for  value  wholly  unaffected  by 
any  rights  or  equities  between  the  original  or  any  other  prior 
holder  of  which  he  had  not  actual  notice  at  the  time  he  received 
them,  the  rule  in  the  cases  quoted  from  cannot  apply.^^ 

Sec.  177.  (§  130.)  Goods  must  be  delivered  only  in  accord- 
ance with  bill  of  lading  and  its  indorsements. — The  carrier 
takes  the  risk  of  a  delivery  to  the  person  entitled  to  the  goods  by 
the  bill  of  lading  and  its  indorsements.^^    The  consignee  named 


29.  Tiedeman  v.  Knox,  53  Md. 
612.  Where  a  statute  in  terms 
makes  bills  of  lading  executed  in 
the  state,  or  being  executed  else- 
where for  the  delivery  of  goods 
within  the  state,  negotiable  instru- 
ments, and  conclusive  in  the 
hands  of  bona  fide  holders  of 
actual  delivery  to  the  carrier, 
held,  to  apply  only  to  goods,  the 
final  destination  of  which  was  a 
point  within  the  state,  and  not  to 
goods  delivered  by  one  carrier  to 
another  in  transit  through  the 
state.  Lazard  v.  Merchants  & 
Miners'  Transportation  Co.,  78  Md. 
1,    26   Atl.   Rep.   897. 

30.  McEntee  v.  The  Steamboat 
Co.,  45  N.  Y.  34;  Hawkins  v.  Hoff 
man,  6  Hill,  586;  Devereux  v. 
Barclay,  2  B.  &  Aid.  702;  Guil- 
laume  v.  The  Packet  Co.,  42  N.  Y. 
212;  Duff  V.  Budd,  3  B.  &  Bing. 
177;  Railway  Co.  v.  Johnston,  45 
Neb.  57,  63  N.  W.  Rep.  144,  50 
Am.  St.  Rep.  540;  Clegg  v.  Rail- 
way Co.,  135  N.  Car.  148,  47  S.  E. 
Rep.  667,  65  L.  R.  A.  717;   Ratzer 


V.  Railway  Co.,  64  Minn.  245,  66  N. 
W.  Rep.  988,  58  Am.  St.  Rep.  530; 
The  Sangerties,  44  Fed.  625;  Ull- 
man  v.  Railway  Co.,  93  N.  Y.  Supp. 
480;  Grayson,  etc.  Bank  v.  Rail- 
way Co.,  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  79  S. 
W.    Rep.    1094. 

Where  bill  of  lading  recites  that 
goods  are  to  be  carried  "to  Louis- 
ville depot  only,"  the  carrier  is 
liable  if  he  delivers  to  an  unau- 
thorized person.  Merchants'  Disp. 
V.  Merriam,   111  Ind.  5. 

"We  have  found  an  expression 
in  the  opinions  of  some  of  the 
courts  to  the  effect  that,  if  a  de- 
livery be  made  in  the  absence  of 
the  bill  of  lading,  the  carrier  takes 
the  risk;  but  we  apprehend  that 
it  is  merely  meant  that  he  takes 
the  risk  of  the  bill  being  such  as 
authorizes  a  delivery  to  the  per- 
son to  whom  he  may  deliver." 
Nashville,  etc.  Ry  Co.  v.  Grayson 

Co.    Nat'l    Bank,   Tex.    , 

93    S.    W.    Rep.    431,    reversing, — 

Tex.  Civ.  App.  ,  91  S.  W.  Rep. 

1106. 


§177. 


THE  BILL  OF  L.U)ING. 


193 


in  the  bill  of  lading  is  presumptively  the  owner  of  the  goods  and 
must  be  treated  by  the  carrier  as  the  absolute  owner  until  he  has 
had  notice  to  the  contrary;  and  a  delivery  to  him  without  such 
notice  will  discharge  the  carrier.^i  Thus,  if  the  consignor  would 
for  any  reason  retain  the  ownership  or  control  of  the  goods,  he 
must  notif}^  the  carrier  of  such  fact;  for  otherwise  the  presump- 
tion that  the  consignee  named  is  the  rightful  owner  and  entitled 
to  their  possession  will  prevail  as  against  any  undisclosed  inten- 
tion which  the  consignor  may  have  had  to  the  contrary.32  But  if 
the  party  who  claims  the  goods  is  not  the  consignee,  he  should  be 
required  to  produce  the  bill  of  lading  with  the  indorsement  of 
the  consignee  where  the  goods  are  deliverable  to  him  or  to  his 
assigns,  or  of  the  shipper  himself  when  the  goods  are  shipped  on 
his  account  and  are  deliverable  to  his  order.  And  where  goods 
are  shipped  deliverable  to  the  order  of  the  consignor  for  and  on 
account  of  the  consignee,  the  carrier  should  not  deliver  to  such 
consignee,  except  upon  the  production  of  the  bill  of  lading  prop- 
erly indorsed  by  the  consignor;  for  this  is  notice  to  the  carrier 


31.  O'Dougherty  v.  The  Railroad, 
1  Thomp.  &  C.  477;  Sweet  v.  Bar- 
ney, 23  N.  Y.  335;  Lawrence  v. 
Minturn,  17  How.  100;  Railway 
Co.  V.  Moline  Plow  Co.,  13  Ind. 
App.  225,  41  N.  E.  Rep.  480;  Hart- 
well  V.  Railroad  Co.,  15  Ky.  Law 
Rep.  778,  citing  Hutchinson  on 
Carr. ;  Schlesinger  v.  Railroad  Co., 
68  111.  App.  273;  Orange  County 
Fruit  Exchange  v.  Hubbell,  10  N. 
Mex.  47,  61  Pac.  Rep.  121;  Sonia 
Cotton  Oil  Co.  V.  The  Red  River, 
106  La.  42,  30  So.  Rep.  303,  87  Am. 
St.  Rep.  293,  citing  Hutchinson 
on  Carr.;  Nebraska  Meal  Mills  v. 
Railway  Co.,  64  Ark  169,  41  S.  W. 
Rep.  810,  62  Am.  St.  Rep.  183,  38 
L.  R.  A.  358,  citing  Hutchinson 
on  Carr.;  Weisman  v.  Railroad 
Co.,  22  R.  I.  128,  47  Atl.  Rep.  318. 

If  the  shipper  gives  express  in- 
structions to  the  carrier's  agent 
not  to  deliver  the  goods  to  the  con- 


signee named  without  the  bill  of 
lading  being  produced,  a  violation 
of  such  notice  by  the  carrier  will 
make  him  liable  to  the  shipper  for 
any  loss  thereby  sustained.  Fag- 
gan  V.  Railway  Co.,  61  Hun.  623, 
16    N.   Y.    Supp.   25. 

Where  no  bill  of  lading  is  is- 
sued, the  carrier  will  be  justified 
in  making  delivery  to  the  con- 
signee without  the  production  of 
receipts  or  other  evidence  of  own- 
ership issued  to  the  consignor.  In 
such  a  case  the  carrier  will  be 
justified  in  assuming  that  title  to 
the  goods  passed  to  the  consignee 
when  it  received  them  for  trans- 
portation. Schlichting  v.  Railway 
Co.,  121  Iowa  502,  96  N.  W.  Rep. 
959. 

32.  Nebraska  Meal  Mills  r.  Rail- 
way Co.,  64  Ark.  169,  41  S.  W.  Rep. 
810,  62  Am,  St.  Rep.  183,  38  L.  R. 
A.    358. 


13 


194 


THE  LAW   OF    CARRIERS. 


:§  177. 


that  the  shipper  intends  to  retain  in  his  power  the  ultimate  dis- 
position of  the  goods.33  go  if  another  than  the  consignee  claims 
the  goods  and  presents  the  bill  of  lading  without  a  proper  in- 
dorsement, the  carrier  should  refuse  delivery  unless  such  person 
is  in  fact  the  rightful  holder,  and  the  carrier  will  be  allowed  a 
reasonable  time  to  ascertain  if  such  is  the  case.  And  if  goods  are 
shipped  over  several  connecting  lines  of  road,  and  the  initial  car- 
rier has  issued  a  bill  of  lading  to  cover  the  shipment,  it  will  be 
the  duty  of  the  carrier  undertaking  final  delivery  to  ascertain 
the  consignee  and  deliver  only  to  him  or  to  his  order.  Thus  if  a 
preceding  carrier,  by  mistake  or  otherwise,  directs  the  final  car- 
rier to  deliver  the  goods  to  another  than  the  one  entitled  to  them 
under  the  bill  of  lading,  and  delivery  is  made  in  accordance  with 
such  direction,  the  final  carrier  will  not  be  permitted  to  avail 
himself  of  the  preceding  carrier's  mistake  as  an  excuse  for  de- 
livering the  goods  to  the  wrong  person.^^  Too  great  caution  can- 
not, therefore,  be  exercised  in  respect  to  the  right  of  the  person  to 


33.  The  fact  of  making  the  bill 
of  lading  deliverable  to  the  order 
of  the  shipper  is,  when  not  rebut- 
ted by  evidence  to  the  contrary, 
decisive  to  show  his  intention  to 
reserve  the  jus  disponendi  and 
to  prevent  the  property  from 
passing  to  the  vendee.  See  the 
learned  chapter  of  Mr.  Benjamin 
(ch.  6,  Bk.  2),  in  his  work  on 
Sales,  upon  this  subject  of  the  res- 
ervation of  the  jus  disponendi  by 
the  shipper  in  the  bill  of  lading, 
where  the  leading  cases  upon  the 
subject  are  stated.  See,  also,  to 
the  same  effect:  Pennsylvania  R. 
R.  Co.  V.  Stern,  119  Pa.  St.  24; 
North  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Com- 
mercial Bank,  123  U.  S.  727; 
Watson  V.  Hoosac  Tunnel  Line, 
13  Mo.  App.  263;  Libby  v. 
Ingalls,  124  Mass.  503;  Furman  v. 
Railroad  Co.,  106  N.  Y.  579;  Joslyn 
V.  Grand  Trunk  R'y,  51  Vt.  92; 
Peoria   Bank    v.   Railroad   Co.,    58 


N.  H.  203;  Thompson  v.  Railroad 
Co.,  122  Ala.  378,  24  So.  Rep.  931, 
citing  Hutchinson  on  Carr. ;  The 
Adella  S.  Hills,  47  Fed.  76;  Gregg 
V.  Railroad  Co.,  147  111.  550,  35  N. 
E.  Rep.  343,  37  Am.  St.  Rep.  238; 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Hartwell,  99  Ky. 
436,  36  S.  W.  Rep.  183,  citing  Hut- 
chinson on  Carr.;  Ryan  v.  Rail- 
way Co.,  90  Minn.  12,  95  N.  W. 
Rep.  758;  Midland  Nat'l  Bank  v. 
Railway  Co.,  132  Mo.  492,  33  S. 
W.  Rep.  521,  53  Am.  St.  Rep.  505; 
Union  Stock  Yards  Co.  v.  Westcott, 
47  Neb.  419,  66  N.  W.  419;  Rail- 
way Co.  V.  Lau,  57  Neb.  559,  78 
N.  W.  Rep.  291;  McSwegen  v.  Rail- 
road Co.,  40  N.  Y.  Supp.  51,  7  App. 
Div.  301;  Stone  v.  Railway  Co.,  8 
S.  Dak.  1,  65  N.  W.  Rep.  29. 

34.  Foy  V.  Railway  Co.,  63 
Minn.  255,  65  N.  W.  Rep.  627.  See, 
also.  Sellers  v.  Railway  Co.,  123 
Ga.  386,  51  S.  E.  Rep.  398. 


§  178.]  THE  BILL  OP  L.VDING.  195 

whom  the  delivery  is  madc^^  No  obligation  of  the  carrier  is 
more  rigorously  enforced  than  that  which  requires  delivery  to  the 
proper  person,  and  the  law  will  allow  in  fact  of  no  excuse  for  a 
wrong  delivery  except  the  fault  of  the  shipper  himself;  and 
where  there  is  any  doubt,  and  it  can  be  determined  by  document- 
ary evidence,  its  production  should  be  required.  Instances  of 
great  hardship  to  the  carrier  frequently  occur  from  neglecting 
these  precautions. 

Sec.  178.  Same  subject — If  person  claiming  goods  fails  to 
present  proper  bill  of  lading,  carrier  must  base  refusal  to  de- 
liver on  that  ground. — If  the  person  demanding  the  goods  of 
the  carrier  fails  to  present  a  proper  bill  of  lading,  the  carrier 
may  refuse  delivery  to  him.  But  if  such  person  is  in  fact  entitled 
to  possession  of  the  goods,  the  carrier,  to  avail  himself  of  the  ex- 
cuse that  a  proper  bill  of  lading  was  not  presented,  must  assert 
it  when  demand  is  made  and  base  his  refusal  to  deliver  on  that 
ground.  And  if  he  fails  to  do  so  and  refuses  delivery  upon  some 
other  ground  which  later  proves  erroneous,  he  will  be  estopped 
from  alleging  as  a  defense  to  an  action  against  him  for  the  refusal 
that  the  person  demanding  the  goods  failed  to  present  a  proper 
bill  of  lading.^^ 

Sec.  179.  (§  130a.)  Same  subject — Carrier  must  respect  trans- 
fers.— In  the  absence  of  other  directions,  goods  are  deliverable 
to  the  consignee.  But  bills  of  lading  are  transferrable  to  third 
persons  in  the  ordinary  course  of  business,  and  the  carrier  must 
recognize  such  transfers.  It  is  also  a  matter  of  every-day  prac- 
tice to  make  consignments  to  factors  and  agents.     Unless  pro- 

35.  In  Nashville,  etc.,  Ry  Co.  v.  pearing   elsewhere   upon  the   face 

Grayson  Co.  Nat'l  Bank, Tex.  of  the  paper,  and  that  the  railway 

,  93  S.  W.  Rep.  431,  reversing  company,    being   under    obligation 

(Tex.   Civ.   App.)    91   S.  W.   1106,  to  deliver  to  such  consignee,  was 

the  blanks  in  the  body  of  the  bill  discharged   from   further   liability 

of  lading,  which  were  left  for  the  by  such  delivery, 
name  of  the   place  of  destination        36.  Railroad  Co.  v.  Seitz,  214  111. 

and  for  that  of  the  consignee,  had  350,  105  Am.  St.  Rep.  108,  73  N.  E. 

not   been    filled.      The   court   held  Rep.  585.  affirming.  S.  C.   105  111. 

that  the  omission  was  immaterial,  App.  89;  Clegg  v.  Railroad  Co.,  135 

the    name    of   the    consignee    and  N.  Car.  148,  47  S.  E.  Rep.  667,  65 

the   place   of   delivery   clearly   ap-  L    R.  A.   717. 


196  THE  LAW  OF   CARRIERS.  [§  180. 

tected  by  proper  vouchers  a  carrier  cannot  assume  t9  deal  with 
consignments  as  in  all  cases  actually  and  beneficially  belonging 
to  the  consignee.3'^ 

Sec.  180.  (§  130b.)  Same  subject — Carrier's  duty  to  ascer- 
tain if  bill  of  lading  issued. — The  carrier,  being  thus  bound  to 
deliver  the  goods  in  accordance  with  the  bill  of  lading,  is,  it  is 
said,  under  obligation  to  ascertain  whether  or  not  a  bill  of  lading 
was  delivered  to  the  shipper,  and,  if  delivered,  he  must  retain 
the  property  until  it  is  demanded  by  one  claiming  under  that 
title.38 

Sec.  181.  Same  subject — Where  bill  of  lading  not  presented, 
carrier  protected  if  delivery  is  made  to  proper  party. — But 

while  the  carrier  takes  the  risk  of  making  delivery  to  the  person 
entitled  to  the  goods  by  the  bill  of  lading  and  its  indorsements, 
and  should,  therefore,  be  careful  to  require  the  person  demanding 
the  goods,  when  such  person  is  another  than  the  consignee,  to  pro- 
duce the  bill  of  lading  properly  indorsed,  he  will  fully  discharge 
his  duty  in  making  a  delivery  without  requiring  the  bill  of  lading 
to  be  presented  if  delivery  is  made  to  the  person  who  is  lawfully 
entitled  to  the  goods.  The  right  of  the  carrier  to  demand  the 
presentation  of  the  bill  of  lading  is  a  precaution  of  w^hich  he  may 
avail  himself  for  the  purpose  of  avoiding  delivery  to  the  wrong 
person,  but  which,  if  he  sees  fit,  he  may  dispense  with;  and  if 
delivery  is  made  to  the  person  vested  with  the  right  to  receive  the 
goods,  the  carrier  will  have  performed  his  duty.  If,  therefore, 
the  consignee  should  direct  the  carrier  to  make  delivery  to  a 
third  person  to  whom  he  has  transferred  title,  and  delivery  is 
made  in  accordance  with  such  directions  without  requiring  the 
bill  of  lading  to  be  produced,  the  failure  of  the  carrier  to  require 
its  production  will  place  him  under  no  responsibility  to  a  bona 
fide  holder  who,  after  such  delivery,  has  taken  the  bill  of  lading 
from  the  consignee.^^     And  although  a  bill  of  lading  providing 

37.  Walker  v.  Railroad  Co.,  49  Co.,  106  N.  Y.  579;  Isham  v.  Erie 
Mich.  446;  Colgate  v.  Pennsylvania    R.  Co.,  98  N.  Y.  Supp.   609. 

Co.,  102  N.  Y.  120.  39.  Anchor  Mill  Co.  v.  Railroad 

38.  City  Bank  v.  Railroad  Co.,  Co.,  102  Iowa  262,  71  N.  "W.  Rep. 
44  N.  Y.  136;   Furman  v.  Railroad     255.     See,  also,  Nashville,  etc.,  Ry. 


182.] 


THE  BILL   OF   LADING. 


197 


for  a  delivery  to  the  consignor  or  his  order  contains  an  express 
provision  that  the  carrier  shall  require  its  surrender  or  produc- 
tion before  making  a  delivery  of  the  goods,  such  requirement,  it 
is  said,  will  be  considered  as  having  been  inserted  for  the  benefit 
of  the  carrier,  and,  as  between  himself  and  the  consignor,  cannot 
subject  the  carrier  to  liability  for  failing  to  require  the  produc- 
tion of  the  bill  of  lading  on  making  delivery  to  one  to  whom  the 
consignor  has  ordered  that  the  goods  shall  be  delivered.-*"^ 

Sec.  182.  Same  subject— Effect  of  transfer  of  bill  of  lading 
after  delivery  of  goods.— Since  the  bill  of  lading  is  quasi  nego- 
tiable only,  and  represents  the  property  only  while  in  course  of 
transportation,  it  follows  that,  if  the  carrier,  iwthout  requiring 


Co.  V.  Grayson  County  Nat'l  Bank, 

Tex.  ,  93  S.  W.  Rep.  431, 

reversing    (Tex.   Civ.   App.)    91   S. 
W.  Rep.  1106. 

40.  Chicago  Packing  &  Provision 
Co.  V.  Railway  Co.,  103  Ga.  140,  29 
S.  E.  Rep.  698,  40  L.  R.  A.  367,  10 
Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  (N.  S.)  391. 
The  court,  in  Its  opinion,  said: 
"If  a  natural  person  consigned 
goods  to  his  own  order  under  a 
bill  of  lading  which  provided  that 
it  should  be  surrendered  before  a 
delivery  could  be  made,  and  called 
in  person  upon  the  carrier's  agent 
at  the  point  of  destination,  and 
demanded  a  delivery  of  the  goods, 
and  thereupon  received  the  same, 
it  certainly  could  not  be  ques- 
tioned as  between  him  and  the  car- 
rier, that  such  delivery  would  be 
good,  and  would  free  the  carrier 
from  further  liability  to  him,  al- 
though the  bill  of  lading  may  not 
have  been  produced  and  surren- 
dered in  accordance  with  the  stip- 
ulations therein  contained.  While 
in  such  a  case  the  carrier  might 
not,  as  against  one  who  had  in 
good  faith  and  in  due  course  of 
business  obtained  the  bill  of  lad- 


ing properly  indorsed,  be  protect- 
ed by  a  delivery  to  the  original 
consi^r,  surely  the  latter  would 
have  no  cause  of  complaint  against 
the  carrier.  if  such  consignor 
could  thus  obtain  a  delivery  of  the 
goods  to  himself  in  person,  what 
difference  in  principle  would  it 
make  if,  instead  of  doing  this,  he, 
by  a  written  order  directed  deliv- 
ery to  another  who  obtained  the 
goods  upon  such  order  without 
producing  and  surrendering  the 
bill  of  lading.  In  either  case,  look- 
ing at  the  transaction  with  refer- 
ence only  to  the  consignor  and  the 
carrier,  the  latter  would  have  done 
all  that  the  former  had  any  right 
to  require  of  it." 

Where  a  shipper  of  goods  con- 
signs them  to  his  agent  and  the 
carrier  delivers  them  in  accord- 
ance with  the  agent's  directions  to 
a  third  person  to  whom  the  agent 
has  sold  them,  the  carrier  will  not 
be  liable  to  the  shipper  for  their 
value  because  delivery  is  made 
witnout  compelling  the  production 
of  the  bill  of  lading.  Gates  r. 
Railroad  Co.,  42  Neb.  379,  60  N.  W. 
Rep.  583. 


198  THE  LAW   OF   CARRIEBS.  [§  182, 

the  surrender  or  cancellation  of  the  bill  of  lading,  makes  a  de- 
livery of  the  goods  to  the  person  entitled  to  their  possession,  the 
bill  of  lading  will  cease  to  be  of  value  and  cannot  thereafter,  by 
being  transferred,  even  to  a  hontia  fide  transferee,  vest  the  trans- 
feree with  title  to  the  goods  nor  give  him  any  rights  as  against 
the  carrier  for  failing  to  require  its  surrender  or  cancellation 
at  the  time  of  making  delivery.^  But  where  the  bill  of  lading 
expressly  provides  that  the  carrier  shall  require  its  surrender  be- 
fore making  a  delivery,  the  carrier  must  heed  such  provision, 
and,  for  a  failure  to  do  so,  whereby  an  innocent  person  dealing 
with  the  goods  sustains  injury,  he  will  be  liable.^  It  is  held,  how- 
ever, by  some  courts  that,  although  the  bill  of  lading  contains 
no  such  provision  that  the  carrier  shall  require  its  surrender  on 
delivery  of  the  goods,  it  is,  nevertheless,  negotiable  to  the  extent 
of  conferring  upon  an  innocent  transferee  for  value  rights  su- 
perior to  those  possessed  by  the  transferor,  and  that,  as  to  such  a 
holder  who  has  taken  it  in  the  regular  course  of  business  without 
notice  that  a  delivery  has  been  made,  the  carrier  will  be  liable 
for  having  made  delivery  without  requiring  its  production  or 
cancellation.^  The  reasons  advanced  in  support  of  this  rule  are 
declared  to  rest  on  commercial  necessity.  It  has  become  a  well- 
established  custom,  as  we  shall  see,  in  the  transactions  of  com- 
merce and  commercial  credit,  for  bills  of  lading  to  be  taken,  on 
the  faith  of  their  representing  the  goods,  as  security  for  money 
advanced.  The  effect  of  this  custom,  it  is  said,  is  to  make  them  to 
some  extent  and  for  some  purposes  negotiable,  and  to  give  su- 
perior rights  to  innocent  transferees  for  value  who  take  in  the 
usual  course  of  business.    The  carrier  must,  therefore,  to  protect 

1.  See,  Anchor  Mill  Co.  v.  Rail-  Midland  Nat'l  Bank  v.  Railway 
road  Co.,  102  Iowa,  262,  71  N.  W.  Co.,  132  Mo.  492,  33  S.  W.  Rep. 
Rep.  255;  National,  etc.,  Bank  v.  521,  33  Am.  St.  Rep.  505. 
Transportation  Co.,  69  N.  Y.  Supp.  3.  Ratzer  v.  Railway  Co.,  64 
396,  59  App.  Div.  270;  affirmed  172  Minn.  245,  66  N.  W.  Rep.  988,  58 
N.  Y.  596,  64  N.  E.  Rep.  1123.  Am.    St.   Rep.    530;    Midland   Nat'l 

2.  Merchant's,      etc.,     Bank     v.  Bank  v.  Railway  Co.,  supra;  Rail- 
Steamboat  Co.,  Md.  ,  63  way  Co.  v.  Johnston,   45   Neb.  57, 

Atl.    Rep.    108 ;    Chesapeake,    etc.,  63  N.  W.  Rep.  144,  50  Am.  St.  Rep. 

Steamboat  Co.  v.  Merchant's,  etc.,  540. 

Bank,  Md.  ,  63  Atl.  113; 


§  183.]  THE   BILL   OP   LADING.  199 

himself  under  this  rule  against  a  possible  transfer  of  the  bill  of 
lading  after  a  delivery  of  the  goods,  require  its  production  and 
cancellation ;  and  if  he  fails  to  do  so,  he  will  be  held  responsible 
to  an  innocent  transferee  for  value  on  the  principle  that  where 
one  of  two  innocent  persons  must  suffer  by  reason  of  the  fraud  of 
a  third  party,  he,  by  whose  negligent  act  or  omission  such  third 
party  was  enabled  to  commit  the  fraud,  ought  to  bear  the  loss. 

Sec.  183.  Same  subject — Bill  of  lading  to  shipper's  order — 
Draft  attached. — For  the  purpose  of  obtaining  payment  for 
the  goods  before  delivery  to  the  person  for  whom  they  are  in- 
tended, it  is  frequently  the  custom  for  the  shipper,  on  delivering 
his  goods  to  the  carrier,  to  take  a  bill  of  lading  calling  for  a  de- 
livery to  his  own  order  and,  after  attaching  a  draft  drawn  upon 
the  person  for  whom  the  goods  are  intended,  to  forward  the  same 
to  a  bank  at  the  point  of  delivery  where  the  drawee,  on  payment 
of  the  draft,  may  secure  the  bill  of  lading.  When  such  a  course 
is  taken  the  carrier  will  be  liable  to  the  consignor  if  loss  ensue 
through  a  delivery  of  the  goods  to  the  drawee  before  he  has  paid 
the  draft  and  obtained  possession  of  the  bill  of  lading  from  the 
bank.*  But  if  the  consignor,  after  receiving  information  that 
the  carrier  has  made  delivery  of  the  goods  without  requiring  the 
production  of  the  bill  of  lading  and  with  knowledge  that  payment 
of  the  draft  has  not  been  made,  proceeds  to  draw  another  draft 
on  the  same  party,  payable  a  certain  number  of  days  after  date, 
and  takes  in  acceptance  thereof,  he  will  be  deemed  to  have 
abandoned  the  original  purpose  of  requiring  payment  on  delivery 
and  to  have  ratified  the  delivery  as  made.^  In  such  a  case  the 
carrier  will  be  relieved  from  further  liability  to  the  consignor, 
although,  on  maturity  of  the  second  draft,  payment  is  not  made. 
So,  too,  if  the  carrier,  before  the  drawee  has  paid  the  draft  and 
secured  the  bill  of  lading,  makes  delivery  without  requiring  the 
production  of  the  bill  of  lading,  the  carrier  will  thereby  incur 
no  liability  if  the  drawee  later  pays  the  draft ;  and  the  subsequent 
insolvency  of  the  bank,  before  the  amount  collected  has  been 

4.  See  cases  cited  in  following  5.  Railway  Co.  v.  Kinchen,  103 
section.  Ga.   186,  29   S.  E.  Rep.  816. 


200  THE   LAW   OF   CARRIERS.  [§  184. 

remitted  to  the  consignor,  cannot  operate  to  make  the  carrier 
liable  to  him  for  the  loss.^ 

Sec.  184.  Same  subject — Pledge  of  bill  of  lading  to  shipper's 
order  to  secure  advances — Draft  attached. — The  practice  is 
also  common  in  commercial  circles  for  the  shipper  of  goods  to 
take  from  the  carrier  a  bill  of  lading  providing  for  a  delivery  to 
his  own  order,  and  pledge  it  as  collateral  security  for  money  ad- 
vanced upon  the  faith  of  its  representing  the  goods.  The  usual 
custom  in  such  a  case  is  for  the  shipper  to  draw  a  draft  upon  the 
person  for  whom  the  goods  are  intended,  attach  it  to  the  bill  of 
lading,  and  secure  a  discount  of  the  draft  by  indorsing  the  bill 
of  lading  to  a  bank.  The  bank  thus  becomes  the  lawful  holder  of 
the  bill  of  lading  as  pledgee  and  may  retain  the  same  in  its  pos- 
session until  payment  of  the  draft  is  made;  and  if  the  carrier 
makes  delivery  of  the  goods  to  the  drawee  of  the  draft  before 
he  has  obtained  possession  of  the  bill  of  lading  from  the  bank, 
such  delivery  will  be  wrongful  and  the  carrier  will  be  liable  to 
the  bank  as  for  a  conversion.'^  The  title,  however,  acquired  by 
the  bank  is  not  absolute  and  may  be  terminated  by  the  payment 
of  the  draft.  Where,  therefore,  the  drawee  pays  the  draft,  he 
will  at  once  become  entitled  to  possession  of  the  goods,  and  the 
fact  that  he  may  have  failed  to  obtain  the  bill  of  lading  from  the 
bank  cannot  subject  the  carrier  to  liability  for  making  delivery 
to  him  without  calling  for  its  production.  In  an  illustrative  case 
in  which  the  carrier  was  held  liable  for  making  delivery  before 
payment  of  the  draft  had  been  made  and  possession  of  the  bill  of 
lading  secured,  the  facts  were  as  follows:  The  purchaser  of 
cotton  at  Savannah  delivered  it  there  to  a  vessel  to  be  carried  to 

6.  Witt  V.  Railroad  Co.,  99  Tenn.  ed  on  the  faith  of  the  undertaking, 
442,  41  S.  W.  Rep.  1064.  the   carrier   will    be    liable    if   de- 

7.  A  written  undertaking  which  livery  is  made  to  a  purchaser  of 
the  carrier  issues  in  exchange  for  the  goods  before  he  has  obtained 
the  bill  of  lading  by  which  it  possession  of  it  from  the  bank.  Na- 
agrees  to  make  delivery  only  on  tional,  etc.,  Banking  Co.  v.  Rail- 
presentation  of  such  undertaking  road  Co.,  70  N.  J.  Law  774,  58 
will  serve  the  same  purpose  as  the  Atl.  Rep.  311,  103  Am.  St.  Rep. 
bill  of  lading  and  when  pledged  825,  66  L.  R.  A.  595.  See,  also, 
as  security  for  the  payment  of  a  cases  cited  in  note  9. 

draft  which  a  bank  has  discount- 


§  184.]  THE  BIUL   OP   LADING.  201 

New  York,  taking  from  it  bills  of  lading  in  which  the  vessel 
undertook  to  deliver  it  there  to  his  order.  For  the  purpose  of 
obtaining  money  to  pay  for  the  cotton,  the  purchaser  made  his 
draft  upon  his  firm  in  New  York  on  whose  account  the  cotton 
had  been  bought,  and  attached  the  bills  of  lading  to  it.  The 
draft  with  the  bills  of  lading  attached  was  discounted  by  a 
Georgia  bank,  and  the  bills  of  lading  were  indorsed  to  the 
order  of  the  bank's  agent  in  New  York  to  secure  the  ptiyment 
of  the  draft.  The  draft  and  bills  of  lading  were  at  once  for- 
warded to  the  New  York  agent,  who  procured  the  acceptance 
of  the  former  by  the  firm.  Before  the  draft  became  due  the 
vessel  arrived  at  New  York  and  gave  notice  to  the  firm  there 
of  the  arrival  of  the  cotton.  It  had  before  regularly  brought 
cotton  in  the  same  way  to  the  firm,  which  was  considered 
solvent,  and  the  master  knowing  that  they  were  the  parties  for 
whom  the  cotton  was  intended,  and  having  no  information  or 
knowledge  from  the  bank's  agent  or  from  any  other  source  of 
any  other  consignee  or  claimant,  delivered  the  cotton  to  them, 
taking  their  receipt  for  it.  Some  two  weeks  or  more  afterwards, 
the  draft  falling  due  and  not  being  paid,  the  cotton  was  de- 
manded of  the  owners  of  the  vessel  by  the  bank's  agent.  It  was 
claimed  that  the  delivery  thus  made  was  justifiable  under  the 
circumstances  and  that  the  vessel  had  thereby  discharged  its 
obligation;  but  it  was  held  that  though  it  had  been  made  in 
good  faith  and  in  total  ignorance  of  any  outstanding  claim  to 
the  cotton,  the  delivery  was  nevertheless  in  breach  of  the  con- 
tract of  affreightment,  and  that  the  agent  of  the  bank  as  libel- 
ant could  subject  the  vessel  which  was  bound  for  its  proper  de- 
livery at  all  events.  "It  is  no  excuse,"  say  the  court,  "for  a 
delivery  to  the  wrong  person  that  the  indorsee  of  the  bills  of 
lading  was  unknown,  if  indeed  he  was,  and  that  notice  of  the  ar- 
rival of  the  cotton  could  not  be  given.  Diligent  inquiry  for  the 
consignee  at  least  was  a  duty,  and  no  inquiry  was  made.  Want 
of  notice  is  excused  when  a  consignee  is  unknown  or  is  absent 
or  cannot  be  found  after  diligent  search.  And  if,  after  inquiry, 
the  consignee  or  indorsees  of  a  bill  of  lading  for  delivery  to  order 
cannot  be  found,  the  duty  of  the  carrier  is  to  retain  the  goods 


202  THE  LAW   OF   CARRIERS.  [§  185. 

until  they  are  claimed,  or  store  them  prudently  for  and  on  ac- 
count of  the  owner.  He  may  thus  relieve  himself  from  a  car- 
rier's responsibility.  He  has  no  right  under  any  circumstances 
to  deliver  to  a  stranger,"^  This  decision  has  been  followed  in 
many  cases.^ 

Sec.  185.  Same  subject — Pledge  of  bill  of  lading  to  shipper's 
order — Time  draft  attached. — If  the  draft  attached  to  the  bill 
of  lading  which  has  been  indorsed  to  a  bank  as  collateral  secu- 
rity for  an  advance  of  money  be  a  time  draft,  the  very  nature 
of  such  a  transaction,  it  is  said,  suggests  that  the  consignor  con- 
templated an  executory  contract  of  sale,  to  become  complete  on 
an  acceptance  of  the  draft  by  the  drawee.  Unless,  therefore,  it  is 
expressly  stipulated  that  the  bill  of  lading  is  intended  to  secure 
payment  of  the  draft,  it  is  held  that  the  title  of  the  bank  as 
pledgee  will  become  extinguished  on  the  acceptance  of  the  draft 
by  the  drawee,  and  that  the  drawee  will  at  once  become  entitled 
to  the  goods.  And  if,  after  an  acceptance  of  such  a  draft  by  the 
drawee,  the  bank  should  continue  to  hold  the  bill  of  lading  pend- 
ing payment  of  the  draft,  the  carrier  will  nevertheless  be  justi- 
fied in  making  delivery  to  the  drawee,  and  cannot  thereafter,  be- 
cause of  the  drawee's  failure  to  pay  the  draft  at  maturity,  be 
subjected  to  liability  for  having  made  delivery  without  requiring 
the  drawee  to  produce  the  bill  of  lading.^*^ 

8.  The  Thames,  14  Wall.  98.  408;  First  Natl.  Bank  v.  Railroad 
,  9.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.  v.  Stern,  Co.,  85  Hun  160,  32  N.  Y.  Supp. 
119  Penn.  St.  24;  North  Penn.  R.  604;  Grayson,  etc.  Bank  v.  Rail- 
Co.  V.  Commercial  Bank,  123  U.  S.  way  Co.,  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  79  S. 
727;  Boatmen's  Bank  v.  Railroad  W.  Rep.  1094,  citing  Hutchinson 
Co.,  81  Ga.  221;  Bass  v.  Glover,  on  Carr.;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Bank, 
63  Ga.  745;  Furman  v.  Railroad  41  111.  App.  287;  Vaughn  v.  Rail- 
Co.,     106    N.     Y.     579;     Joslyn    v.  road   Co.,  R.  I.  ,  61  Atl. 

Grand  Trunk  R'y,  51  Vt.  92;  Lib-  Rep.    695;    Tishomingo   Sav.    Inst. 

by     V.     Ingalls,     124     Mass.     503;  v.    Johnson,    Nesbitt    &    Co.,    

Holmes    v.    Bailey,    92    Penn.    St.  Ala.  ,  40  So.  Rep.   503. 

57;    Halsey    v.    Warden,    25    Kan.        10.  The     Commercial     Bank    of 

128;   Commercial  Bank  v.  Pfeiffer,  Manitoba  v.  Railway   Co.,   160  111. 

22  Hun.  327;   Walters  v.  Railroad  401,  43  N.  E.   Rep.   756;    National 

Co.,  66  Fed.  862,  14  C.  C.  A.  267,  Bank   v.   Merchant's   Bank,   91   U. 

30    U.    S.    App.    25;    The    Ravens-  S.   92. 
dale,   75   Fed.   413;    s.   c.    75   Fed. 


§186.]  THE   BILL   OF   LADING.  203 

Sec.  186.  (§  131a.)  Same  subject — Invoice  alone  not  evi- 
dence of  title. — So  S.  &  S.  shipped  goods  consigned  to  them- 
selves. At  the  same  time  they  wrote  a  letter  to  the  purchaser 
stating  that  they  had  shipped  the  goods  and  drawn  on  him  "as 
per  arrangements"  and  requested  that  the  draft  be  protected. 
Inclosed  in  the  letter  was  an  invoice  of  the  goods  which  stated 
on  its  face  that  the  goods  were  "shipped  from  Bay  City,  Mich., 
via  F.  &  P.  M.  R.  R.  to  B.  L.  with  draft."  They  also  drew  on 
the  purchaser  for  the  price,  attached  the  bill  of  lading  to  the 
draft,  and  sent  the  draft  on  for  collection.  The  purchaser  ex- 
hibited the  invoice  and  letter  to  the  agent  of  the  carrier  and  re- 
ceived the  goods.  He  failed  before  paying  the  draft  and  the  car- 
rier was  held  liable.^ ^ 

"The  title  to  the  property,"  said  Paxson,  J.,  "remained  in 
the  consignors  until  delivery  in  accordance  with  the  conditions. 
Bills  of  lading  are  symbols  of  property,  and  when  properly 
indorsed  operate  as  a  delivery  of  the  property  itself,  investing 
the  indorsees  with  a  constructive  custody  which  serves  all  the 
purposes  of  an  actual  possession,  and  so  continues  until  there  is 
a  valid  and  complete  delivery  of  the  property  under  and  in  pur- 
suance of  the  bill  of  lading  and  to  the  persons  entitled  to  receive 
the  same.^2  There  could  be  no  delivery  except  in  accordance 
with  the  bill  of  lading.^  3  Tjjg  invoice  alone  furnishes  no  proof 
of  title.  "14 

Sec.  187.  (§  131b.)  Same  subject — Direction  to  notify  cer- 
tain person  does  not  dispense  with  production  of  bill  of  lading. 

— It  is  a  common  practice,  where  the  bill  of  lading  provides  for 
delivery  to  the  consignor's  order  and  has  gone  forward  attached 
to  a  draft  on  the  purchaser  or  other  person  by  whom  payment  is 
to  be  made,  to  give  directions  that  such  person  be  notified  of  the 
arrival  of  the  goods  in  order  that  he  may  pay  the  draft  and 

11.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.  v.  Bank,  91  U.  S.  618;  Stollenwerk 
Stern,   119   Pa.   St.   24.  v.  Thatcher,  115  Mass.  224. 

12.  Citing  Hieskell  v.  National  14.  Citing  Benj.  on  Sales,  §332; 
Bank,   89   Pa.   St.   155.  Dows   v.    Bank,   supra:    See   also, 

13.  Citing    Dows    v.    Milwaukee  Delta  Bag  Co.  v.  Kearns,   112   111. 

App.   269. 


204 


THE  LAW  OF   CARRIERS. 


[§  187. 


procure  the  goods.  Such  a  direction  to  notify,  however,  does  not 
dispense  with  the  production  of  the  bill  of  lading  as  in  other 
cases,  and  if  the  carrier  delivers  the  goods  to  the  person  so  to  be 
notified  without  requiring  him  to  produce  the  bill  of  lading,  he 
will  be  liable  for  any  loss  thereby  incurred.!^  The  very  presence 
of  the  word  notify  in  such  a  ease,  it  is  said,  shows  that  the  person 
named  is  not  intended  as  the  consignee.^^  And  although  it  has 
been  the  custom  for  the  carrier  to  permit  the  person  to  be  noti- 
fied to  stop  the  goods  at  a  point  short  of  their  destination  and 
there  receive  them  without  producing  the  bill  of  lading,  such 
custom,  as  against  a  bona  fide  transferee  of  the  bill  of  lading,  will 


15.  Furman  v.  Railroad  Co.,  106 
N.  Y.  579;  North  Penn.  R.  Co.  v. 
Commercial  Bank,  123  U.  S.  727; 
Joslyn  V.  Grand  Trunk  R'y,  51 
Vt.  92;  Libby  v.  Ingalls,  124  Mass. 
503;  National  Bank  v.  Railway 
Co.,  25  S.  C.  216;  Myrick  v.  Rail- 
road Co.,  107  U.  S.  102;  Railroad 
Co.  V.  Southern  Bank,  41  111.  App. 
287;  Walters  v.  Railroad  Co.,  63 
Fed.  391,  s.  c.  56  Fed.  369,  affirmed, 
66  Fed.  862,  14  C.  C.  A.  267;  Rail- 
road Co.  V.  Berry,  116  Ga.  19,  42 
S.  E.  Rep.  371,  citing  Hutchinson 
on  Carr.;  Union  Stock  Yards  Co. 
V.  Westcott,  47  Neb.  300,  66  N. 
W.  Rep.  419,  citing  Hutchinson 
on  Carr.;  Wright,  etc.  Co.  v.  War- 
ren, 177  Mass.  283,  58  N.  E.  Rep. 
1082;  General  Electric  Co.  v.  Rail- 
way Co.,  S.   Car.  ,  51   S. 

E.  Rep.  695;  Isham  v.  Erie  R.  Co., 
98   N.   Y.    Supp.    609. 

16.  Furman  v.  Railroad  Co., 
aupra;  Atlantic  Nat'l.  Bank  v. 
Railway  Co.,  106  Fed.  623;  Rail- 
road Co.  V.  Lowe,  101  Ga.  320,  28 
S.  E.  Rep.  867,  citing  Hutchinson 
on  Carr. 

In  Furman  v.  Railroad  Co.,  su- 
pra, goods  had  been  delivered  for 
transportation,  over  a  long  line 
of  steamships  and  railroads,  from 


Norfolk,  Va.,  to  Denver,  Col.  The 
goods  were  marked  "Y,"  and  the 
bill  of  lading  given  by  the  initial 
carrier  recited  the  receipt  of  the 
goods  "marked  Y — order  notify 
Zucca  Bros,  to  be  transported  to 
Denver,  Col."  The  goods  finally 
came  into  the  hands  of  the  de- 
fendant, the  last  carrier  in  the 
line.  With  the  goods  the  defend- 
a.nt  received  what  was  known  as 
a  "transfer  sheet,"  in  which  the 
consignee  was  named  as  follows: 
"Consignee,  'Y,'  order  Hup,  Zuc- 
ca Bros.,  Denver,  Col.,"  the  word 
notify  having,  through  the  care- 
lessness of  some  previous  carrier, 
been  changed  to  Hup.  When  the 
goods  reached  Denver  they  were 
delivered  to  Zucca  Bros.,  upon 
their  order,  without  the  produc- 
tion of  the  bill  of  lading.  The 
consignors  meantime  had  drawn 
on  Zucca  Bros.,  attaching  the  bill 
of  lading  indorsed  by  them,  and 
the  draft  had  gone  forward  for 
collection.  The  goods  not  being 
paid  for,  the  consignors  brought 
this  action  against  the  defendant 
to  recover  their  value,  and  were 
successful.  The  court  of  appeals 
of  New  York  held  that  the  per- 
sons entitled  to  receive  the  goods 


i  188.]  THE  BILL  OF  LADING.  205 

furuish  the  carrier  with  no  excuse  for  making  delivery  at  an 
intermediate  point  to  the  person  to  be  notified  without  requiring' 
him  to  produce  the  bill  of  lading.^'^ 

Sec.  188.    (§  131c.)    Same  subject— Duplicate  bills  of  lading 
to  consignor— Possession  of  one  duplicate  not  indorsed.— The 

practice  also  prevails  of  taking  in  the  name  of  the  consignor  bills 
of  lading  in  duplicate,  one  of  which  is  to  be  indorsed  and  at- 
tached to  a  draft  for  the  payment  of  the  price,  while  the  other, 
not  indorsed,  is  sent  forward  to  the  person  who  is  to  receive  and 
pay  for  the  goods,  as  notice  of  their  shipment.  Such  a  delivery 
of  the  unindorsed  duplicate,  where  the  intention  is  not  thereby 
to  part  with  the  title  to  the  goods,  does  not  justify  a  delivery 
without  the  indorsement  or  order  of  the  consignor.  Thus  in  a 
easels  decided  by  the  supreme  court  of  Iowa,  it  appeared  that 
the  Elgin,  Iowa,  Canning  Company  had  received  an  order  for 
goods  from  one  Evans,  residing  in  Pueblo,  Colorado.  Not  being 
acquainted  with  Evans,  and  not  wishing  to  sell  the  goods  to  him 
on  credit,  the  company  delivered  the  goods  to  the  first  of  two 
connecting  carriers,  consigned  to  itself  at  Pueblo,  and  took  two 
receipts  or  bills  of  lading,  which  were  in  fact  duplicates,  but 
neither  of  which  showed  that  the  other  had  been  issued.  The 
canning  company  drew  a  draft  on  Evans,  through  a  bank  in 
Pueblo,  for  the  price  of  the  goods  and  sent  the  draft  to  the  bank 
with  an  order  for  the  delivery  of  the  goods  to  Evans  upon  pay- 
ment of  the  draft.  At  the  same  time  the  company  sent  to  Evans 
one  of  the  bills  of  lading,  not  signed  or  indorsed  by  the  canning 
company,  instructing  him  that  the  goods  had  been  shipped  and 
that  he  was  to  pay  the  draft  and  obtain  the  order.  When  the 
goods  reached  Pueblo,  Evans,  without  paying  the  draft  or  obtain- 
ing the  order,  presented  the  duplicate  bill  of  lading  to  the  final 
carrier  and  the  goods  were  delivered  to  him  without  any  other 

were   at   least   so   doubtful    under  Banking  &  Trust  Co.,  107  Ga.  512, 

the   terms    of   the    transfer   sheet  3.3   S.   E.  Rep.   821. 

that    it    was    most    negligent    in  18.  Weyland  v.  Railway  Co.,  75 

the  defendant  to  deliver  the  goods  Iowa,    573,    39    N.    W.    Rep.    899, 

without   further   evidence.  reversing   the  former  decision  in 

17.  Railroad  Co.   v.  Ohio  Valley  33   N.   W.   Rep.   133. 


206  THE  LAW  OF   CARRIERS.  [§188. 

authority.  At  that  time  Evans  was  insolvent,  but  the  carrier 
had  no  knowledge  of  that  fact,  or  that  the  goods  had  not  been 
paid  for,  or  that  a  draft  had  been  sent  or  instructions  given  as  to 
the  delivery  of  the  goods,  but  it  delivered  them  in  good  faith. 
The  canning  company  brought  its  action  against  the  final  carrier 
for  the  value  of  the  goods,  and  it  was  held  entitled  to  recover. 
"The  fact  that  Evans  presented  the  bill  of  lading  in  this  case," 
said  the  court,  "was  not  sufficient  to  overcome  the  presumption 
which  the  terms  of  the  bill  raised  that  the  consignee  [who  was 
also  the  consignor]  was  the  owner  of  the  goods.  That  such  is 
the  presumption  is  well  established.^^  The  contract  with  the 
canning  company  required  the  defendant  to  deliver  the  goods 
to  the  consignor.  The  unindorsed  bill  of  lading  presented  by 
Evans  was  evidence  that  the  contract  was  still  in  force  and  that 
the  canning  company  was  then  the  owner  of  the  goods.  The  de- 
livery to  Evans  was  not  authorized,  and  was  made  by  defendant 
at  its  own  risk.-^  But  it  is  said  that  the  canning  company 
clothed  Evans  with  the  apparent  right  to  demand  the  goods,  and 
that  since  'one  of  two  innocent  parties  must  suffer  a  loss  from 
the  wrong  of  another,  the  loss  should  fall  upon  the  party  who  put 
it  in  the  power  of  that  other  to  perpetrate  the  wrong. '  This  case 
does  not  fall  within  that  rule,  for,  as  we  have  seen,  the  possession 
of  the  bill  of  lading,  without  indorsement  or  other  evidence  of 
assignment,  did  not  vest  Evans  with  any  apparent  right  to  the 
property.  The  loss  resulted  from  the  negligence  of  defendant  in 
not  insisting  upon  proper  evidence  of  an  assignment  before  it 
surrendered  the  goods,  "^i 

And  where  the  carrier  issues  original  and  duplicate  bills  of 
lading  made  out  to  the  shipper  or  his  order,  and  such  bills  of 
lading  provide  that  delivery  shall  be  made  only  on  presentation 
of  the  originals,  the  carrier  will  be  liable  if  he  makes  delivery 

19.  Citing  Congar  v.  Railroad  21.  Bank  v.  Transportation  Co., 
Co.,  17  Wis.  485;  Krulder  v.  Elli-  69  N.  Y.  374;  Lickbarrow  v.  Ma- 
son, 47  N.  Y.  37;  Lawrence  v.  son,  1  Smith's  Lead.  Cas.  *838, 
Minturn,  17  How.  100;  Alderman  with  annotations;  Dows  v.  Greene, 
V.  Railroad  Co.,  115  Mass.  234.  24   N.   Y,   638;    Allen  v.   Williams, 

20.  Citing  Hutchinson  on  Carr.,  12  Pick.  297,  were  cited  and  dis- 
1st  Ed.,  §§  129,  130,  344.  tinguished. 


§  189.]  THE  BILL  OP  LADING.  207 

to  the  shipper  on  his  presenting  the  duplicates  where  the  shipper, 
prior  to  receiving  the  goods,  has  transferred  the  originals  to 
another. 22 

Sec.  189.  (§  131d.)  Same  subject— Possession  of  indorsed 
duplicate  obtained  by  fraud.— In  a  leading  and  important 
ease23  in  which  this  method  was  pursued,  it  appeared  that  the 
consignors  had  taken  to  themselves  duplicate  bills  of  lading,  one 
of  which,  unindorsed,  they  sent  forward  to  the  purchaser  by 
way  of  notice,  and  the  other  of  which  they  had  indorsed  in  blank, 
attached  it  to  a  draft  on  the  purchaser  and  discounted  the  draft 
at  a  bank.  When  the  draft  was  presented  for  acceptance  the 
purchaser  accepted  it,  but,  at  the  same  time,  without  detection, 
and  also,  as  the  jury  found,  without  negligence  on  the  part  of 
the  bank,  substituted  the  unindorsed  duplicate  for  the  indorsed 
one  attached  to  the  draft.  Before  the  fraud  was  discovered,  the 
purchaser  indorsed  the  latter  duplicate  to  a  third  person  and 
received  from  him  large  advances  in  money.  In  an  action  to  de- 
termine the  rights  of  the  parties,  it  was  held  by  the  supreme 
court  of  the  United  States  that  the  bank's  title  had  not  been  di- 
vested. It  was  urged  that  the  same  rule  which  protects  a  bona 
fide  purchaser  of  negotiable  paper  should  govern  in  the  case. 
But  the  court,  per  Strong,  J.,  held  otherwise,  saying:  "The 
reason  can  have  no  application  to  the  case  of  a  lost  or  stolen  bill 
of  lading.  The  function  of  that  instrument  is  entirely  different 
from  that  of  a  bill  or  note.  It  is  not  representative  of  money, 
used  for  transmission  of  money,  or  for  the  pajonent  of  debts  or 
for  purchases.  It  does  not  pass  from  hand  to  hand  as  bank  notes 
or  coin.  It  is  a  contract  for  the  performance  of  a  certain  duty. 
True,  it  is  a  symbol  of  ownership  of  the  goods  covered  by  it, — 
a  representative  of  those  goods.  But  if  the  goods  themselves  be 
lost  or  stolen,  no  sale  of  them  by  the  finder  or  thief,  though  to  a 
bona  fide  purchaser  for  value,  will  divest  the  ownership  of  the 
person  who  lost  them  or  from  whom  they  were  stolen.  Why  then 
should  the  sale  of  the  symbol  or  mere  representative  of  the  goods 

22.  Midland  Nat'l  Bank  v.  Rail-        23.  Shaw   v.    Railroad    Co.,    101 
way    Co.,    132    Mo.    492,    33    S.    W.     U.   S.   557. 
Rep.   521,   33  Am.   St.   Rep.   505. 


208  THE   LAW   OF    CARRIERS.  [§  190. 

have  such  an  effect?  It  may  be  that  tlie  true  owner,  by  his 
negligence  or  carelessness,  may  estop  himself  "from  asserting  his 
right  against  a  purchaser  who  has  been  misled  to  his  hurt  by 
that  carelessness.  But  the  present  is  no  such  case.  It  is  estab- 
lished by  the  verdict  of  the  jury  that  the  bank  did  not  lose  its 
possession  of  the  bill  of  lading  negligently.  There  is  no  estoppel, 
therefore,  against  the  bank's  right." 

Sec.  190.  (§132.)  Same  subject — Duplicate  receipts — Goods 
deliverable  only  on  production  of  duplicate. — So,  in  another 
ease,  goods  were  delivered  for  carriage  to  a  railroad  company 
with  an  express  provision  in  its  receipt  that  they  should  be  deliv- 
ered to  the  consignee  only  upon  the  production  of  a  duplicate 
of  the  receipt,  and  a  duplicate  of  the  receipt  with  this  condi- 
tion indorsed  across  the  face  of  it  was  given  to  the  shipper,  to 
be  iised  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining  the  possession  of  the 
goods  according  to  this  arrangement.  After  obtaining  this  dupli- 
cate, the  shipper  drew  upon  the  consignee  and  attached  the 
duplicate  to  the  draft,  which  was  then  discounted  by  the  plain- 
tiff, who  forwarded  it  for  collection  with  the  attached  duplicate 
to  the  residence  of  the  consignee.  After  accepting  the  draft, 
the  consignee  demanded  the  goods  of  the  railroad,  and  they 
were  delivered  to  him  without  the  production  or  surrender  of  the 
duplicate  receipt.  When  the  draft  became  due  and  payment  was 
refused,  the  plaintiff  demanded  the  goods  of  the  railroad,  but 
having  previously  delivered  them  to  the  consignee  it  refused  to 
deliver  or  account  for  them  to  him;  whereupon  he  brought  his 
action  against  it  and  recovered.  It  was  considered  by  the  court 
that  the  condition  in  the  receipt  was  notice  to  the  road  that  the 
goods  were  not  to  be  delivered  without  a  compliance  therewith, 
and  that  the  title  to  the  goods  having  passed  to  the  plaintiff  by 
the  indorsement  to  him  of  the  receipt,  he  was  partly  entitled  to 
sue  for  the  wrong  delivery.^^ 

Sec.  191.  (§  133.)  Same  subject — Protection  of  third  person 
paying  draft  for  consignee's  accommodation. — Goods  were 
shipped  by  railroad  for  and  on  account  of  certain  consignees, 

24.  McEwen  v.  Railroad  Co.,   33     Ind.   368. 


§  191.]  THE  BILL   OP  LADING.  200 

and  drafts  were  drawn  on  them  by  the  consignor  with  the  i-ail- 
road  receipts  attached,  and  sent  for  collection  to  a  bank  at  the 
place  of  consignment.  The  consignees,  being  unnlile  to  mei't 
the  drafts  on  the  day  they  became  due,  applied  to  the  plaintill"  to 
take  them  up  and  take  the  goods,  which  he  agreed  to  do.  Upon 
payment  of  the  drafts  by  him  the  consignees  indorsed  to  him  the 
railroad  receipts.  Afterwards  the  consignees  made  a  bill  of 
sale  of  the  same  goods  to  other  parties,  who  thereby  obtained 
them  from  the  road.  Neither  these  vendees  nor  the  agents  of  the 
road  knew  anything  of  the  previous  dealings  with  the  plaintiff, 
and  had  no  knowledge  or  information  of  any  claim  by  him,  nor 
did  the  plaintiff  know  of  the  sale  to  the  other  parties  until  after 
the  road  had  delivered  the  goods  to  them.  It  was  held  that  the 
indorsement  and  delivery  of  the  receipts  to  the  plaintiff  gave 
him  a  property  in  the  goods,  at  least  to  the  extent  of  the  advances 
made  by  him,  and  that  the  consignees  after  that  could  convey 
no  title  to  the  goods  to  another  vendee,  and  that  he  was  there- 
fore entitled  to  recover  from  the  road.^^ 

So  N.  shipped  corn,  consigned  to  his  own  order,  with  directions 
to  notify  P.,  who  was  the  purchaser,  attaching  the  bill  of  lading 
to  a  draft  on  P.,  which  went  forward  for  collection.  On  arrival 
P.  was  absent  and  draft  was  protested.  P. 's  clerk  requested  J. 
to  pay  the  draft  and  hold  the  bill  of  lading  as  security,  saying 
that  when  P.  came  he  would  pay  it.  Another  came  on  in  the 
same  way  and  J.  paid  that  draft  also.  The  carrier  then  delivered 
the  corn  to  P.  's  teamsters,  who  put  it  in  a  storehouse,  from  which 
they  began  to  draw  it  to  P.'s  warehouse.  After  the  com  had 
been  delivered  to  the  teamsters  and  put  in  the  storehouse,  J. 
learned  of  it  but  made  no  objection  to  P.  or  his  agents  and  gave 
no  notice  to  the  carrier.  Some  days  later  P.  failed,  not  having 
paid  the  drafts,  and  J.  sued  the  carrier  for  the  amounts.  It  was 
held  that  the  carrier  was  liable,  and  that  J.'s  failure  to  notify 
the  carrier  of  his  claim  was  no  defense,  since,  while  it  might  have 
been  a  neighborly  act,  he  was  under  no  legal  obligation  to  do  so, 
as  the  delivery  was  complete  before  he  learned  of  it.-^ 

25.  Newcomb    v.    The    Railroad,        26.  Joslyn  v.  Grand  Trunk  R'y.. 
115  Mass.    230;    Alderman   v.   The     51   Vt.  92. 
Railroad,    id.    223. 

14 


210  THE  LAW   OF   CAERIERS.  [§  192. 

Sec.  192.  (§  133a.)  Effect  of  custom  on  delivery  without 
surrender  of  bill  of  lading. — A  custom  prevailing  at  the  place 
of  delivery,  where  both  the  consignee  and  the  holder  of  a  draft 
with  the  bill  of  lading  attached  reside,  to  deliver  without  the 
production  of  the  bill  of  lading  goods  billed  "straight,"  i.  e., 
consigned  to  the  consignee  direct,  will  exonerate  the  carrier  who 
delivers  in  accordance  with  such  a  custom.^^  But  a  local  custom 
to  such  effect  cannot  avail  against  a  consignor  residing  elsewhere, 
and  who  had  no  knowledge  of  it.^^  And  where,  by  a  long  course 
of  dealing  between  the  consignee  and  the  holder  of  the  draft  with 
the  bill  of  lading  attached,  the  consignee  has  been  permittd  to 
exercise  dominion  over  the  goods  while  in  the  hands  of  the  car- 
rier and  to  direct  their  delivery,  the  carrier,  in  the  absence  of 
notice  that  the  bill  of  lading  is  being  held  as  security  for  the 
purchase  price  of  the  goods,  will  be  justified  in  making  delivery 
without  requiring  the  bill  of  lading  to  be  produced.^^  But  a 
custom  prevailing  at  the  place  of  delivery  to  deliver  without  the 
production  of  the  bill  of  lading  cannot  prevail  in  the  face  of  a 
statute  prohibiting  the  carrier  from  delivery  except  upon  sur- 
render of  the  bill  of  lading,  unless  it  has  the  words  "not  nego- 
tiable ' '  plainly  written  or  stamped  upon  its  f  ace.^** 

Sec.  193.  (§  134.)  When  consignment  may  be  changed  by 
shipper. — When  there  has  been  no  agreement  to  ship  the  goods 
which  will  make  the  delivery  of  them  to  the  carrier  a  delivery  to 
the  consignee,  and  vest  the  property  in  him,  the  shipper  may, 
even  after  the  delivery  to  the  carrier  and  after  the  bill  of  lad- 
ing has  been  signed  and  delivered,  or  after  the  goods  have  passed 
from  the  possession  of  the  initial  carrier  into  that  of  a  succeed- 
ing one,3i  alter  their  destination  and  direct  their  delivery  to 
another  consignee,  unless  the  bill  of  lading  has  been  forwarded 


27.  Forbes   v.  Railroad   Co.,   133  ville    v.    Railroad    Co.,    163    Penn. 
Mass.  154.     See  also,  Bernstein  v.  St.    467,    30   Atl.   Rep.    228. 
Railroad  Co.,  88  N.  Y.  Supp.  971.  30.  Colgate  v.  Pennsylvania  Co., 

28.  Weyland  v.  Railway  Co.,  75  102  N.   Y.   120. 

Iowa.   573.  31.  Sutherland  v.  Bank,  78  Ky. 

29.  National    Bank    of    Phoenix-  250. 


§  194.  j  THE   BILL   OF   LADING.  211 

to  the  consignee  first  named  or  to  some  one  for  his  use.^-  But 
after  the  carrier  or  his  agent  has  given  one  bill  of  lading  or  re- 
ceipt for  the  goods  he  cannot  give  another,  unless  the  first  and 
all  the  duplicates  of  the  same  have  been  returned  to  him.^'J 

Sec.  194,  (§  135.)  Same  subject— Consignment  cannot  be 
changed  by  shipper  when  goods  become  property  of  consignee 
on  delivery  to  carrier. — If,  however,  the  circumstances  are  such 
that  upon  delivery  of  the  goods  to  the  carrier  they  become  the 
property  of  the  consignee,  the  carrier  holds  them  as  the 
agent  of  such  consignee,  and  their  destination  cannot  after- 
wards be  changed  without  his  consent.^^  If,  for  instance,  the 
consignee  is  the  vendee  of  the  goods,  or  if  he  has  made  advances 
upon  them  with  the  agreement  that  they  shall  be  shipped  to  him 
to  be  sold  in  order  that  he  may  retain  the  proceeds  for  his  re- 
imbursement,35  or  if,  being  a  creditor  of  the  consignor,  the  goods 
are  delivered  to  the  carrier  to  be  shipped  to  him  in  satisfaction 
of  his  debt  according  to  a  previous  agreement  to  that  effect,  the 
title  to  the  goods  will  vest  in  him  upon  delivery  to  the  carrier, 
and  if  their  destination  is  afterwards  altered,  except  under  such 
circumstances  as  entitle  a  vendor  to  stop  them  in  transitu,  the 
carrier  will  become  responsible  to  him  for  them.  The  legal 
presumption  is  that  when  goods  are  sent  to  a  consignee,  the 
title  to  them  vests  in  him  as  soon  as  the  shipment  is  made.     It 

32.  Blanchard  v.  Page,  8  Gray,  stop  them  in  transit.  Philadel- 
285;  Mitchel  v.  Ede,  11  Ad.  &  El.  phia,  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Wireman, 
888;  Ruck  V.  Hatfield,  5  Barn.  &  88  Penn.  St.  264.  See  also,  Sonia 
Aid.  632;  Thompson  v.  Trail,  2  Cotton  Oil  Co.  v.  The  Red  River. 
Car.  &  P.  334;  Hartwell  v.  Rail-  106  La.  42,  30  So.  Rep.  303,  87 
road  Co.,  99  Ky.  436,  36  S.  W.  Rep.  Am.  St.  Rep.  293,  citing  Hutchin- 
183,    citing   Hutchinson    on   Carr. ;  son  on  Carr. 

Soper  V.   Tyler,    77   Conn.    104,    58         35.  Destination  may  be  changed 

Atl.  Rep.  699.  where  advances  have   been  made, 

33.  Hubbersty  v.  Ward,  8  Exch.  but  not  upon  the  credit  of  this 
330.  particular     shipment.      Chaffe     v. 

34.  Where  goods  are  left  with  Railroad  Co.,  59  Miss.  182.  As  to 
a  carrier  to  be  forwarded  without  the  right  to  change  destination  in 
any  condition  or  qualification,  the  Mississippi,  see  Bonner  v.  Marsh, 
shipper  cannot  change  their  des-  10  Smedes  &  M.  376;  Dickraan  v. 
tination  except  under  such  cir-  Williams,  50  Miss.  500. 
cumstances  as  entitle  a  vendor  to 


212  THE  LAW   OF   CARRIERS.  [§  195. 

is  solely,  however,  a  question  of  intention  or  of  agreement,  and 
may  be  shown  to  be  otherwise-^** 

Sec.  195.  (§  136.)  Same  subject — Illustrations. — A  firm 
consisting  of  three  partners  was  indebted  to  the  plaintiffs,  who 
did  business  in  New  York,  and,  to  pay  its  indebtedness,  agreed 
to  ship  to  them  certain  goods.  The  goods  were  delivered  to  the 
railway  company  as  a  common  carrier  at  Troy,  consigned  to 
plaintiffs,  and  a  receipt  given  by  its  agents,  in  which  it  was 
agreed  that  the  road  would  transport  and  deliver  the  goods  to 
plaintiffs  at  New  York.  After  the  goods  had  been  thus  delivered 
and  the  receipt  given,  one  of  the  members  of  the  firm,  in  its 
name,  but  without  the  knowledge  of  the  others,  was  permitted 
by  the  agent  of  the  road  to  change  the  destination  of  the  goods, 
and,  in  pursuance  of  his  order,  they  were  delivered  to  other 
consignees  in  New  York,  who  sold  them  and  turned  the  proceeds 
over  to  him.  Plaintiffs  demanded  the  goods  of  the  road,  and 
upon  its  failure  to  deliver  them  brought  their  action  against  it 
and  recovered.  It  was  held  that  the  parol  agreement  to  ship  the 
goods  was  executed  by  the  delivery  to  the  carrier,  and  that  from 
that  time  the  plaintiffs  occupied  the  legal  position  of  vendees, 
and  that  the  indebted  firm  had  no  right  after  the  delivery  to 
the  carrier  to  direct,  nor  could  the  carrier  assent  to,  a  change 
in  the  consignment.  It  was  considered  that  it  was  not  important, 
as  contended  by  the  defendant,  that  the  bill  of  lading  was  not 
forwarded  or  delivered  to  the  plaintiffs,  that  being  mainly 
entitled  to  consideration  as  characterizing  the  act  of  the  shipper, 
and  as  showing  the  purpose  and  intent  of  the  delivery  to  the 
carrier;  but  if  such  intention  was  shown  by  other  acts  of  the 
parties,  the  retention  of  the  bill  of  lading  by  the  shipper  would 
be  unimportant.  It  does  not  appear  that  the  agents  of  the  road 
had  any  knowledge  of  the  arrangement  between  the  shippers  and 

36.  Dawes  v.  Peck,  8  T.  R.  330;  Y.  368;  Stanton  v.  Eager,  16  Pick. 

Button  V.   Solomonson,    3  B.   &  P.  467;    Cross  v.  O'Donnell,  44  N.  Y. 

582;   Holbrook  v.  Wight,  24  Wend.  661;    Anderson    v.    Clark,    2    Bing. 

169;    Covell    v.    Hitchcock,    23    id.  20;  Walley  v.  Montgomery,  3  East, 

611;   Bushel  v.  Wheeler,   15  Q.  B.  585;    Haille  v.   Smith,    1   B.   &  P. 

442;    Waldron   v.  Romaine,   22   N.  563. 


§  196.]  THE  BILL  OF  LADING.  213 

the  plaintiffs,  nor  was  that  matter  alluded  to.  The  ease  was 
rested  upon  the  broad  ground  that  the  defendant  had  receipted 
for  the  property  and  agreed  to  transport  safely  and  deliver  to 
the  plaintiffs,  and  that,  instead  of  complying  with  the  contract, 
it  delivered  the  property  to  another  by  direction  of  one  who 
had  no  more  legal  authority  over  it  than  a  stranger,  without  the 
return  even  of  its  receipt.  The  plaintiffs,  it  was  said,  had  vested 
rights  which  the  defendant  was  bound  to  respect,  and  with  a 
knowledge  of  which  it  was  legally  chargeable.  It  Avas  its  duty  to 
deliver  the  property  to  the  real  owner.^ 

Sec.  196.  (§137.)  Same  subject — Effect  of  custom.— Evi- 
dence, however,  of  previous  deliveries  to  one  who  was  neither 
the  consignee  nor  entitled  to  the  delivery  by  the  terms  of  the 
bill  of  lading  or  by  its  assignment,  with  the  knowledge  of  the 
owner  of  the  goods  and  without  any  objection  having  been  made 
by  him,  has  been  held  to  justify  such  a  delivery.  As  where  the 
goods  were  shipped  to  New  York  to  the  order  of  the  Ontario 
Bank,  the  plaintiff,  and  were  delivered  by  the  carrier,  without 
the  order  of  the  bank,  to  a  person  to  whom  a  number  of  previous 
similar  shipments  had  been  delivered  with  its  knowledge  and 
without  any  objection  by  it,  the  delivery  was  held  to  be  justified 
by  this  previous  course  of  dealing,  the  carrier  having  a  right  to 
presume  that  the  party  to  whom  the  delivery  was  made  was  the 
agent  of  the  bank,  a  delivery  to  an  agent  being  equivalent  to  a 
delivery  to  the  owner.^ 

Sec.  197.    (§  138.)    Who  may  sue  for  breach  of  the  contract. 

— By  the  common  law  the  bill  of  lading  conferred  upon  the 
assignee  only  the  title  to  the  property  in  the  shipment  of  which 
it  was  the  evidence;  but  all  rights  growing  out  of  the  contract 
continued  in  the  original  shipper  with  whom  it  was  made;  and 
so  the  law  yet  remains  except  where  it  has  been  changed  by 
statute.  And  for  this  reason  it  has  been  held  that  the  shipper 
may  always  sue  the  carrier  for  any  damage  to  the  goods,  whether 
he  has  any  property,  general  or  special,  in  them  or  not.     By 

1.  Bailey  v.  The  Railroad,  49  2.  Ontario  Bank  v.  The  Steam- 
N.  Y.  70.  boat  Co.,  59  N.  Y.  510. 


214  THE  LAW   OF   CARRIERS.  [§  198. 

the  assignment  of  the  bill  of  lading  he  parts  with  no  right  which 
he  originally  possessed  except  that  to  the  possession  of  the  goods, 
otherwise  retaining  all  his  rights  under  the  contract;  and  if  he 
shipped  them  as  the  mere  agent  of  the  owner,  he  may  have  his 
action  on  the  contract  because  it  is  directly  with  him.^  The 
assignee  could  therefore  bring  no  action  against  the  carrier  upon 
the  contract  of  affreightment.*  But  the  title  to  the  goods  hav- 
ing passed  to  him  by  the  assignment,  he  might  bring  trover  for 
a  refusal  to  deliver  the  goods  to  him  or  for  their  conversion; 
or  detinue  or  replevin  for  their  possession.^  But  this  common- 
law  rule  has  been  changed  in  England  by  statute,*'  which  has 
given  to  bills  of  lading  more  of  the  negotiable  quality  than  they 
formerly  possessed,  by  conferring  upon  the  assignee  all  the 
rights  of  suit  upon  the  contract  created  by  the  bill  of  lading 
as  if  it  had  been  made  to  the  assignee  himself."^ 

Sec.  198.  (§  139.)  Same  subject — Statutes  controlling. — 
The  provisions  of  this  statute  have  not  been  generally  adopted 
in  this  country,  nor  is  any  such  legislation  required  to  confer 
upon  the  assignee  the  right  to  sue  upon  the  assigned  bill  of  lad- 
ing in  those  states  in  which  the  assignment  of  contracts,  not 
strictly  negotiable  but  simply  assignable,  confers  upon  the 
assignee  the  right  to  sue  upon  them  in  his  own  name.  The 
ground  upon  which  it  was  held  that  he  could  not  sue  upon  them 
was  that,  by  the  common  law,  contracts  of  the  kind  were  not 
assignable  so  as  to  confer  the  right  of  action  for  their  breach 
upon  the  assignee,  and  that  there  was  no  law  or  custom  of  mer- 
chants which  made  bills  of  lading  an  exception  to  that  rule. 
Wherever,  therefore,  such  contracts  are  made  assignable  so  as 
to  confer  upon  the  assignee  the  right  of  action  in  his  own  name, 
it  would  seem  to  follow  that  the  law  as  laid  down  in  the  Eng- 
lish cases  no  longer  exists ;   for  bills  of  lading  possess  no  peculiar 

3.  Blanchard    v.    Page,    8    Gray,        6.  18  and  19  Vic, 

291.     See  post,  ch.  14.  7.  Smurthwaite    v.    Wilkins,    11 

4.  Thompson  v.  Dominy,  14  M.  Com.  B.  N.  S.  842;  Jessel  v.  Bath, 
&  W.  403;  Howard  v.  Shepherd,  9  L.  R.  2  Exch.  267;  Short  v.  Simp- 
Corn.    B.    297.  son,  L.   R.    1   C.   P.   248. 

5.  Tindall  v.  Taylor,  4  El.  &  B. 
219. 


§  199.]  THE   BILL   OF   LADING.  215 

quality,  either  by  law  or  mercantile  usage,  which  would  make 
them  an  exception  to  the  law  conferring  the  right  upon  the 
assignee  to  sue  in  his  own  name  upon  assignable  as  well  as  upon 
negotiable  instruments. 

Sec.  199.  By  what  law  the  effect  of  a  contract  is  to  be  deter- 
mined.— Questions  of  the  conflict  of  laws  in  respect  of  contracts 
between  common  carriers  and  shippers  depend  for  their  solu- 
tion on  the  same  principles  which  govern  questions  of  the  con- 
flict of  laws  in  respect  of  ordinary  contracts.  The  difficulty  does 
not  lie  in  the  determination  of  those  principles,  but  it  arises  in 
their  application  to  any  given  set  of  facts,  owing  to  the  many 
exceptions  which  exist  to  every  general  rule  in  the  law  of  com- 
mon carriers.  The  application  of  those  principles  is  also  com- 
plicated by  the  existence  of  statutes  and  constitutional  provi- 
sions in  many  states  which  influence  the  courts  of  those  states 
to  render  decisions  which  are  at  variance  with  what  they  would 
otherwise  announce  as  the  rule  of  applicatory  law.  It  seems 
wise,  therefore,  to  preface  an  exposition  of  that  subject  with  the 
statement  of  some  basic  principles  which  should  be  accepted 
generally  as  true. 

Sec.  200.  The  rights  arising  out  of  the  contract  must  be 
created  by  law. — In  a  legal  sense,  any  right  arising  out  of  a 
contract  of  carriage  must  be  created  by  some  law.  No  legal  right 
exists  by  nature,  or  by  the  will  of  the  parties.  A  right  is  artificial, 
not  a  mere  natural  fact.  It  does  not  become  a  fact  until  it  has 
been  created  by  some  law,  but,  having  been  created  by  some 
law,  its  existence  may  be  a  factor  in  an  event  which  the  same 
or  some  other  law  makes  the  condition  of  a  new  right.  An 
existing  right  should  everywhere  be  recognized  unless  changed 
by  the  law  that  created  it  or  by  some  other  law  having  power 
over  it;  since  to  do  so  is  merely  to  recognize  the  existence  of  a 
fact.  Questions  of  the  conflict  of  laws  in  respect  of  contracts 
of  carriage,  therefore,  require  for  their  solution  a  consideration 
of  three  things :  1.  Whether  a  right  has  been  created  by  some 
law  and  by  what  law.  2.  How  far  a  right  created  abroad  will 
be  given  effect.    3.  What  remedy  will  be  granted  for  making  it 


216  THE  LAW  OF   CARRIERS.  [§  201, 

effective.^  A  consideration  of  those  three  things  in  reference 
to  contracts  of  carriage  containing  only  ordinary  provisions  for 
the  carriage  of  the  goods  should  be  had  separate  from  contracts 
in  which  the  carrier's  liability  for  negligence  is  sought  to  be 
limited,  since  the  first  do  not  contravene  the  public  policy  of  a 
state,  and  the  latter  may. 

Sec.  201.  Lex  loci  contractus  will  govern  in  the  great  ma- 
jority of  cases. — Taking  up  for  consideration,  then,  those  con- 
tracts in  which  no  right  of  the  carrier  to  limit  his  common-law 
liability  is  sought  to  be  enforced,  the  general  rule  is  that  any 
obligation  arising  out  of  a  contract  is  created  by  the  law  of  the 
place  where  the  acts  are  done  out  of  which  the  obligation  arises. 
This  does  not  mean  in  respect  of  a  written  contract  that  the 
creation  or  non-creation  of  a  right  arising  out  of  that  contract 
must  necessarily  be  determined  by  the  law  of  the  place  where 
the  signatures  are  actually  affixed  to  the  paper,  for  in  the  case 
of  parties  traveling  on  a  railroad  train  through  several  states 
and  consummating  a  contract  thereon,  it  would  be  folly  to  hold 
that  the  law  of  that  state  necessarily  would  govern  through 
which  the  parties  happened  to  be  passing  at  the  time  the  con- 
tract was  signed.  It  merely  means  that  the  acts  of  the  parties 
and  the  surrounding  circumstances  in  each  particular  case  will 
be  closely  scrutinized,  and,  from  those  acts  and  circumstances, 
the  court  will  infer  that  the  law  of  some  one  state  governed  in 
the  creation  of  rights  arising  out  of  that  contract.  In  the  great 
majorit}^  of  cases,  however,  the  acts  of  the  parties  and  the  sur- 
rounding circumstances  are  such  that  it  would  be  difficult,  if  not 
impossible,  to  determine  what  law  governed.  A  court,  therefore, 
must  resort  to  a  legal  fiction  for  its  guidance,  and  the  legal  fiction 
that  has  been  settled  upon  by  almost  all  courts  is  that  the  law 
of  the  place  where  the  contract  is  made  must,  in  the  absence  of 
proof  of  the  intention  of  the  parties  to  the  contrary  at  the  time 
of  making  the  contract,  be  looked  to  for  the  creation  of,  obliga- 


8.  See    the    excellent    summary     Laws,  Vol.  III.,  for  the  foregoing 
in    Beale's    Cases    on    Conflict    of     principles. 


§202.1 


THE   BILL   OF   LADING. 


217 


tions  imposed  by,  and  interpretation  of  any  rights  arising  out 
of  it.9 

Sec.  202.    When  performance  wholly  within  one  state,  the 
law  of  that  state  governs.— The  foregoing  rule  being  merely 


9.  United  States. — Railway  Co. 
V.  Kavanaugh,  92  Fed.  56,  34  C. 
C.  A.  203. 

California. — Palmer  v.  Railroad, 
101  Cal.    187,  35   Pac.   Rep.   630. 

Connecticut. — "The  rule  upon 
that  subject  is  well  settled,  and 
has  often  been  recognized  by  this 
court,  that  contracts  are  to  be 
construed  acording  to  the  law  of 
the  state  where  made,  unless  it  is 
presumed  from  their  tenor,  that 
they  are  entered  into  with  a  view 
to  the  law  of  some  other  state." 
Hale  V.  New  Jersey  Steam  Navi- 
gation  Co.,   15   Conn.   539. 

Illinois. — Railroad  Co.  v.  Jagger- 
man,  115  111.  407,  4  N.  E.  Rep.  641; 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Boyd,  91  111.  268; 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Smith,  74  111.  197; 
Merchants'  Dispatch  Transp.  Co. 
V.  Furthmann,  149  111.  66,  36  N. 
E.  624,  41  Am.  St.  Rep.  265,  affirm- 
ing 47  111.  App.  561;  Fortier  v. 
Pennsylvania  Co.,  18  111.  App.  260. 

Iowa. — McMillan  v.  American 
Express  Co.,  123  Iowa  236,  98  N. 
W.  Rep.  629;  Beard  v.  Railway 
Co.,  79   Iowa  527. 

Minnesota. — Powers  Mercantile 
Co.  V.  Wells,  Fargo  &  Co.,  93  Minn. 
143,    100   N.   W.   Rep.    735. 

Missouri. — Hartmann  v.  Rail- 
road Co.,  39  Mo.  App.  88;  Nenno 
V.  Railroad,  '105  Mo.  App.  540,  80 
S.  W.  Rep.  24. 

New  York. — The  obligation  of 
the  shippers  of  the  cargo  is  to  be 
determined  by  the  law  of  the  place 
where  the  contract  was  made,  not 
.by  the  "law  of  the  flag."  Insur- 
ance Co.   V.  Force,   142   N.   Y.   90, 


36  N.  E.  Rep.  874,  40  Am.  St.  Rep. 
576,  affirming  20  N.  Y.  Supp.  796. 
In  First  National  Bank  v.  Shaw, 
61  N.  Y.  283,  grain  was  purchased 
at  Toledo,  Ohio,  and  shipped 
thence  to  certain  consignees  in 
New  York.  The  bills  of  lading 
were  assigned  to  the  bank  to  se- 
cure advances  made  by  it  for  the 
purpose  of  paying  for  the  pur- 
chase, and  it  became  important  in 
the  litigation  which  grew  out  of 
the  transaction  to  show  the  mean- 
ing of  certain  words  or  notations 
written  upon  the  face  of  the  bills, 
and  evidence  was  olfered  of  their 
commercial  meaning  at  Toledo,  to 
which  objection  was  made  upon 
the  ground  that  the  contracts  of 
affreightment  were  New  York  and 
not  Ohio  contracts.  But  the  ob- 
jection was  not  sustained.  "The 
advance  of  the  money,"  said  the 
court,  "was  made  in  Ohio,  the 
transfer  of  the  grain  took  place 
there, .  and  the  bank,  as  between 
itself  and  the  persons  with  whom 
it  dealt,  were  entitled  to  repay- 
ment there.  ...  In  the  more 
general  case,  where  a  contract  is 
made  in  one  country  and  to  be 
performed  in  another,  it  is  not  al- 
ways easy  to  determine  according 
to  the  authorities  whether  the  in- 
terpretation of  the  words  is  to  be 
governed  by  the  law  of  the  place 
where  the  contract  is  made  or  by 
that  where  it  is  to  be  performed. 
The  general  principle  Is,  that  the 
law  of  the  place  where  the  con- 
tract is  made  is  to  govern,  unless 
it    is   positively   to   be    performed 


218 


THE  LAW   OF   CARRIERS. 


[§202. 


a  lej?al  fiction  for  the  better  gruidance  of  the  court  it  seems  rea- 
sonable that  where  the  performance  of  a  contract  is  to  be  had 
wholly  within  one  state,  the  creation  of  the  rights  arising  out 
of  it  should  be  governed  by  the  laws  of  that  State.  And  in 
Brown  v.  The  Camden,  etc.  R.  R.,^^  where  the  contract  was  made 
with  the  railroad  company  at  its  wharf  in  Philadelphia  to  trans- 
port the  plaintiff  and  his  baggage  from  that  point  to  Atlantic 
City,  it  was  held  that,  as  the  contract  was  with  a  New  Jersey 
company  to  be  performed  in  that  state,  although  its  perform- 


elsewhere.  The  fact  that  acts  are 
to  be  done  abroad  under  a  con- 
tract does  not  necessarily  make 
it  a  contract  to  be  performed 
there,  in  a  legal  sense.  Thus,  it 
has  been  said  that  a  policy  of  in- 
surance executed  in  England  on 
a  French  ship  for  a  French  own- 
er, on  a  voyage  from  one  French 
port  to  another,  is  to  be  inter- 
preted as  an  English  contract. 
Don  V.  Lippmann,  5  CI.  &  F.  1. 
The  true  inquiry  is,  what  was 
the  intent  of  the  parties?  It 
would  seem  that  in  a  case  like 
the  present,  where  the  contract 
was  made  in  Ohio,  by  Toledo  par- 
ties, the  money  being  advanced 
there  and  the  security  there,  that 
they  had  in  view,  in  employing 
words,  their  own  usages,  even 
though  the  goods  were  to  be  sent 
to  another  state  and  ultimately 
sold  there  if  the  advances  were 
not   repaid." 

Pennsylvania. — Fairchild  v.  Rail- 
road, 148  Pa.  St.  527,  24  Atl.  Rep. 
79. 

South  Carolina. — Frasier  v.  Ry. 

Co.,   S.    Car.    ,    52    S.    E. 

Rep.   964. 

Texas. — In  Cantu  v.  Bennett, 
39  Tex.  303,  where  the  contract 
was  to  carry  a  large  amount  of 
coin  from  Pieras  Negras  in  Mexi- 


co to  San  Antonio  in  Texas,  the 
bill  of  lading  having  been  given  in 
Mexico  and  in  the  Spanish  lan- 
guage, it  was  held  that  the  car- 
rier could  not  be  made  responsible 
for  its  loss  by  robbery  by  an 
armed  force  on  the  route  and  after 
he  had  entered  the  state  of  Texas, 
because  it  was  said  that  the  civil 
law  in  force  in  Mexico  did  not 
hold  the  carrier  responsible  where 
the  subject  of  the  bailment  had 
been  taken  from  him  or  destroyed 
by  a  vis  major  or  robbery  when 
perpetrated  by  irresistible  force; 
1  Domat.  484:  Story  on  Bail.,  §§ 
26,  458,  and  this  being  the  law 
by  which  the  obligation  of  the 
carrier  was  to  be  measured,  he 
was  excusable.  See  also,  National 
Bank  of  Bristol  v.  Railroad  Co.,  99 
Md.  661,  59  Atl.  Rep.  134,  105  Am. 
St.  Rep.   321. 

In  Railway  v.  Kavanaugh,  su- 
pra. Palmer  v.  Railroad,  supra, 
Railroad  v.  Jaggermann,  supra. 
Railroad  v.  Smith,  supra,  Fortier 
V.  Pennsylvania  Co.,  supra,  and 
Nenno  v.  Railroad,  supra,  the  ques- 
tion was  whether  the  carrier  as- 
sumed any  liability  beyond  its 
own  line  by  accepting  goods  di- 
rected to  a  point  beyond  its  own 
line. 

10.  83    Pa.    St.    316. 


§  203.]  THE  BILL   OF   LADING.  219 

ance  required  the  transportation  of  the  plaintiff  and  his  bajj^gage 
across  the  Delaware  river,  its  validity  and  effect  were  to  be 
determined  by  the  law  of  New  Jersey  and  not  by  that  of  Penn- 
sylvania. But  the  court  made  it  very  clear  that  in  its  opinion 
the  contract  was  to  be  performed  wholly  within  the  State  of 
New  Jersey.  That  fact  has  been  entirely  lost  sight  of  in  other 
cases  which  have  tried  to  use  Brown  v.  The  Camden,  etc.,  R.  R. 
as  enunciating  the  erroneous  doctrine  that  it  is  the  law  of  the 
place  where  the  breach  of  a  contract  occurs  by  which  the  mode 
of  its  fulfillment  and  the  measure  of  liability  for  its  breach 
must  be  determined.^  ^ 

Sec.  203.  Matters  relating  solely  to  delivery  may  be  deter- 
mined by  law  of  place  of  delivery.— So  matters  relating  solely 
to  the  delivery  may  be  determined  by  the  law  of  the  place  of 
delivery  while  the  creation  of  the  rights  relating  to  the  carriage 
itself  are  governed  by  the  law  of  the  place  of  contract.  The 
decisive  question  in  each  case  is  whether  a  particular  stipula- 
tion in  the  contract  refers  to  matters  which  affect  the  duty  of 
the  carrier  as  to  the  mode  and  manner  of  transportation  at  any 
and  every  point  in  the  journey,  or  whether  it  refers  only  to  the 
carrier's  duty  as  to  the  mode  and  manner  of  actual  delivery  at 
the  place  of  destination.^^ 

11.  See  Hughes  v.  Pensylvania  terial  and  important  part  of  the 
R.  R.  Co.,  202  Pa.  222,  51  Atl.  Rep.  contract,  and  until  such  delivery, 
990,  63  L.  R.  A.  513,  97  Am.  St.  the  same  was  not  completed  and 
Rep.  713.  fulfilled.     Upon    a   failure    to    de- 

12.  Herf  &  Frerichs  Chemical  liver  the  baggage  to  the  plaintiff, 
Co.  V.  Railroad,  70  Mo.  App.  274,  in  the  city  of  New  York,  there 
100  Mo.  App.  164,  73  S.  W.  Rep.  was  a  breach  of  the  contract;  and 
346;  Springs  v.  Railroad  Co.,  46  as  the  final  place  of  performance 
S.  C.  104,  24  S.  E.  Rep.  166.  was  in  that  city,  it  would  seem  to 

"One  of  the  rules  applicable  to  follow  that,  within  the  rule  laid 
the  subject  is  that  the  lex  loci  con-  down,  the  contract  was  to  be  per- 
tractus  is  to  govern,  unless  it  ap-  formed,  at  least  so  far  as  a  de- 
pears  upon  the  face  of  the  con-  livery  is  concerned,  by  the  laws 
tract  that  it  was  to  be  performed  of  New  York.  This  certainly  was 
In  some  other  place,  and  then  the  to  be  done  in  a  different  place 
rule  of  interpretation  is  governed  from  where  the  contract  was 
by  the  law  of  that  place.  *  *  *  made,  and  it  is  a  reasonable  in- 
The  place  of  delivery  was  a  ma-  ference   that   it  was   in   the   con- 


220  THE  LAW  OF   CARRIERS.  [§  204. 

Sec.  204.  In  actions  against  carriers  of  goods,  same  law  gov- 
erns whether  the  form  of  action  is  assumpsit  or  tort. — In 
actions  against  common  carriers,  whether  the  actions  are  actions 
of  assumpsit  upon  the  contract  or  actions  upon  the  case  for 
negligence  the  rights  and  liabilities  of  the  parties  must  be  judged 
by  the  same  standard.  The  form  of  the  action  concerns  the 
remedy,  but  does  not  affect  the  legal  obligations  of  the  parties. 
In  either  form  of  action  the  liability  of  the  carrier  and  the  rights 
of  the  shipper  are  based  upon  the  contract.  The  carrier  owes 
no  duty  to  shippers  except  in  virtue  of  the  contracts,  and  the 
obligations  for  the  violation  and  breach  of  which  an  action  may 
be  brought  are  only  coextensive  Avith  the  contracts  made.  When 
a  shipper  makes  a  contract  with  a  common  carrier,  therefore, 
and  the  appropriate  law  has  created  certain  rights  and  obliga- 
tions, those  rights  and  obligations  cannot  be  increased  or  de- 
creased by  a  mere  change  of  the  form  of  action  from  assumpsit 
to  tort.13 

Sec.  205.  In  actions  for  personal  injuries  against  carriers 
of  passengers,  lex  loci  delicti  governs — Contributory  negligence 
governed  by  same  law — Proof  of  lex  loci  delicti  must  be  made. 

— In  actions  against  carriers  of  passengers  for  personal  injuries 
the  rules  cited  in  the  preceding  section  do  not  apply.  The  law 
of  all  the  states  imposes  more  or  less  varying  duties  and  obliga- 
tions on  carriers  of  passengers,  irrespective  of  the  contracts 
which  may  have  been  entered  into  by  the  carrier  with  the  pas- 
sengers. A  passenger  may,  therefore,  elect  to  disregard  the  con- 
tract and  the  rights  arising  out  of  it,  and  sue  upon  the  common- 
law  or  statutory  breach  of  duty  by  the  carrier.  In  such  case 
the  law  of  the  place  where  the  injury  occurs  must  always  gov- 
ern, for  that  law  only  can  impose  common-law  or  statutory 
duties  within  its  territory.  The  carrier,  of  course,  may  plead 
his  contract  as  a  defense,  but  the  question  as  to  whether  any 
rights  were  created  by  such  contract  sufficient  to  stand  as  a 

templation    of   the   parties   at  the  ered."     Curtis   v.   Railroad,   74   N. 

time,  and  that  it  was  entered  into  Y.  116. 

with  reference  to  the  laws  of  the  13.  Dyke  r.  Railroad,   45    N.   Y. 

place   where   it  was   to   be   deliv-  113,  6  Am.  Rep.  43. 


§206.]  THE   BILL   OP   LADING.  221 

shield  for  the  consequences  of  his  breach  of  a  common-hiw  or 
statutory  duty  mnst  be  governed  entirely  by  the  law  of  the 
same  place  which  created  that  duty.  The  rights  given  l)y  the 
lex  loci  delicti  can  only  be  defeated  by  defenses  which  are  good 
under  the  lex  loci  delicti}^  By  parity  of  reasoning,  what  con- 
stitutes, and  the  effect  of,  contributory  negligence  of  passen^^ers 
is  governed  by  the  lex  loci  delicti.-^' 

Proof  of  the  lex  loci  delicti  must  be  made  on  the  trial  of  the 
ease,  and  in  the  absence  of  such  proof  the  law  of  the  forum 
will  be  applied  on  the  presumption  that  the  lex  loci  delicti  was 
the  same.i^ 

Sec.  206.  Rights  created  by  foreign  law  should  be  enforced 
elsewhere — Exceptional  rule  in  federal  and  New  York  courts. 

When  a  right,  connected  with  a  contract  of  carriage,  has  once 
been  created  by  the  appropriate  law,  it  should  be  enforced  every- 
where, even  where  it  would  not  originally  have  been  created 
upon  the  same  facts.  This  doctrine  has  been  recognized  as  a 
matter  of  comity  in  numerous  state  court  decisions,  and  the 
rights  created  by  foreign  law  have  been  recognized  as  foreign 
facts  which  would  be  enforced.!'^  In  one  case  in  New  York, 
however,  it  has  been  held  that  "where  a  great  principle  of  com- 

14.  Railroad  Co.  v.  Brown,  62  711,  41  L.  R.  A.  614;  Bridger  v. 
Ark.  254,  35  S.  W.  225;  Railroad  Railroad  Co.,  27  S.  C.  456,  3  S.  B. 
Co.  V.  Masterson,  16  Ind.  App.  323,  Rep.  860,  13  Am.  St.  Rep.  653; 
44  N.  E.  1004;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Railroad  Co.  t\  Lewis,  89  Tenn. 
Miller,    19    Mich.    305;     Davis    v.  235,   14  S.  W.  Rep.  603.     But  see. 

Railway  Co.,  Ky.  L.  R.  ,  Johnson  v.  Railroad  Co.,  91  Iowa 

92   S.  W.  Rep.   339;    Pullman  Pal-  248,   59  N.  W.  66. 

ace  Car  Co.  v.  Lawrence,  74  Miss.  16.  Railroad  Co.  v.   Gondola,   50 

782,  22  So.  Rep.  53;   Railroad  Co.  Neb.  906,  70  N.  W.  Rep.  491. 

V.  Sprayberry,  9  Heisk.  852,  8  Baxt.  17.  Palmer  v.  Railroad  Co.,  101 

341,    35    Am.    Rep.    705;    Railroad  Cal.    187,   35   Pac.  Rep.    630;    Hale 

Co.  V.  Eakin,  6  Coldw.  582;   Lake  v.   New  Jersey   Steam   Navigation 

Shore,    etc.,    Ry.    Co.    v.    Teeters,  Co.,    15    Conn.    539;    Railroad   Co. 

■ Ind.  ,  77  N.  E.  Rep.  599,  v.  Boyd,  91  111.  268;   Railroad  Co. 

affirming  Ind.  App.  ,  74  v.  Smith,  74  111.  197;   McMillan  v. 

N.  E.  Rep.   1014.  American    Express    Co.,    123    Iowa 

15.  Clark  v.  Russell,  97  Fed.  900,  236,  98  N.  W.  Rep.  629;  Beard  v. 
38  C.  C.  A.  541;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Railway  Co..  79  Iowa  527;  Powers 
"Wliitlovr,  105  Ky.  1,  43  S.  W.  Rep.  Mercantile  Co.  v.  Wells,  Fargo  & 


222  THE  LAW   OF    CARRIERS.  [§  207. 

mercial  laAV  has  been  established^  which  is  universally  acknowl- 
edged and  acquiesced  in,  the  law  announced  by  the  courts  of  aj 
single  state  can  not  overturn  that  principle  and  control  the  deci- 
sions of  the  courts  of  another  and  a  distant  state.  "^^  The 
difficulty  with  that  case  is  that  no  principle  of  commercial  law 
can  be  deemed  unimportant,  for  every  one  may  be  all-important 
in  its  own  particular  set  of  facts;  hence  if  the  doctrine  an- 
nounced by  the  New  York  court  were  accepted  as  correct,  all 
questions  of  the  Conflict  of  Laws  would  be  eliminated,  since 
every  court  of  the  forum  would  be  prone  to  follow  its  own 
decisions  as  to  the  "universally  acknowledged  and  acquiesced 
in"  principle  of  commercial  law.  That  is,  however,  the  firmly 
established  rule  in  the  United  States  courts,  especially,  as  we 
shall  hereafter  see,  with  reference  to  limitations  of  the  carrier's 
liability,^  ^  although  once  in  a  great  while  a  Federal  court  has 
been  known  to  follow  the  general  rule  stated  at  the  beginning 
of  this  section. 20  The  attitude  of  the  United  States  courts  has 
been  severely  criticized  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  Pennsylvania.^! 

Sec.  207.  Proof  should  be  made  in  court  of  forum  of  what 
the  foreign  law  is. — In  order  to  ascertain  whether  a  right  has 
been  created  by  the  foreign  law,  proof  should  be  made  in  the 
court  of  the  forum  of  what  the  foreign  law  is.  In  the  absence 
of  such  proof  of  the  foreign  law,  it  will  be  presumed  in  the 
majority  of  states  to  be  the  same  as  the  law  of  the  forum,  even 
though  the  law  of  the  forum  is  statutory.22  ijj  Missouri,  how- 
Co.,  93  Minn.  143,  100  N.  W.  Rep.  22.  Palmer  v.  Railroad  Co.,  101 
735;  Hartmann  v.  Railroad,  39  Mo.  Cal.  187,  35  Pac.  Rep.  630;  Pierce 
App.  88;  First  National  Bank  v.  v.  Railroad  Co.,  120  Cal.  156,  40 
Shaw,  61  N.  Y.  283;  Cantu  v.  Ben-  L.  R.  A.  350,  47  Pac.  Rep.  874,  52 
nett,  39   Texas  303.  Pac.   Rep.    302;    Davis  v.   Railway 

18.  Faulkner  v.  Hart,  82  N.  Y.  Co.,  83  Iowa  744,  49  N.  W.  Rep. 
413,   37    Am.   Rep.    574.  77;    Hudson    v.    Railroad    Co.,    93 

19.  See  post,   sec.  215.  Iowa  231,    60   N.   W.   Rep.   608,   54 

20.  Railway  Co.  v.  Kavanaugh,  Am.  St.  Rep.  550;  Meuer  v.  Rail- 
92  Fed.  56,  34  C.  C.  A.  203.  road,  5  S.  Dak.  568,  59  N.  W.  Rep. 

21.  Forepaugh  v.  Railroad  Co.,  945,  25  L.  R.  A.  81,  49  Am.  St. 
128  Pa.  St.  217,  18  Atl.  Rep.  503,  Rep.  898;  s.  c.  11  S.  Dak.  94,  75  N. 
5  L.  R.  A.  508,  15  Am.  St.  Rep.  W.  Rep.  823,  74  Am.  St.  Rep.  774; 
672.  Railroad  v.  Naive,  112  Tenn.  239, 


§  208.]  THE   BILL   OP   LADING.  223 

ever,  it  has  been  held  that,  iu  the  absence  of  the  proof  of  a 
foreign  statute,  that  court  will  not  presume  that  a  statute  exists 
in  a  sister  state  similar  to  a  statute  in  Missouri.  The  common 
law  will  be  presumed  to  prevail.^s 

Sec.  208.  Matters  relating  to  remedy  are  governed  by  law 
of  the  forum. — The  remedy  afforded  for  the  enforcement  of 
a  foreign  right  in  such  only  as  a  state  may  choose  to  allow,  and 
all  matters  relating  merely  to  the  remedy  are  determined  by  the 
law  of  the  forum.  Thus  a  limitation  of  the  time  within  which 
suit  shall  be  brought  is  governed  by  the  law  of  the  forum.^^ 
It  would  also  seem,  on  the  authority  of  other  than  carrier  cases, 
that,  if  the  defense  of  the  statute  of  limitations  is  set  up,  it  is 
the  statute  of  the  forum  which  governs,^^  unless  the  right  has 
previously  been  extinguished  by  some  statute  having  power  to 
do  S0.26 

In  Massachusetts  the  question  of  assent  on  the  part  of  the 
shipper  to  the  terms  of  a  bill  of  lading  has  been  held  to  be  one 
of  evidence,  to  be  determined  by  the  law  of  the  forum.^"  But 
the  case  so  holding  has  been  expressly  disapproved,  and  rightly, 
in  Missouri  on  the  ground  that  the  sufficiency  of  the  assent  of 
the  shipper  to  the  contract  is  a  matter  appertaining  to  the 
creation  of  rights  arising  out  of  the  contract,  and  is  to  be 
adjudged  in  a  foreign  tribunal  in  accordance  with  the  law  which 
creates  the  contract  rights,  and  not  the  law  of  the  forum. ^s 

Sec.  209.    A  state  may  require  care  and  diligence  of  carrier, 

79   N.   W.    Rep.    124,   64   L.   R.   A.  ing  whatever   relates   to   the  limi- 

443;    National  Bank  of   Bristol  v.  tation    of    actions,    etc.,    must    be 

Railroad  Co.,  99   Md.   661,   59   Atl.  determined      by     the     lex     fori." 

Rep.   134,  105  Am.   St.  Rep.   321.  Brooke    v.    Railroad,    108    Pa.    St. 

23.  Nenno   v.   Railroad,    105   Mo.  529. 

App.  540,  80  S.  W.  Rep-.  24.  25.  Townsend     v.     Jennison,     9 

24.  Express    Co.    v.    Walker,    26     How.   407. 

Ky.   L.   Rep.    1025,   83   S.  W.  Rep.  26.  The    Harrisburg,    119    U.    S. 

106.  199. 

"It  is  well  settled  that  whatever  27.  Hoadley     v.     Transportation 

concerns  the  rights  of  parties,  es-  Co.,   115   Mass.   304,    15   Am.   Rep. 

pecially  in  matters  of  contract,  is  306. 

governed     by     the     lex     loci     con-  28.  Hartmann  r.  Railroad,  39  Mo. 

tractus,  while  the  remedy,  includ-  App.    88;    See    also    Powers    Mer- 


224  THE  LAW   OF   CARRIERS.  [§  210. 

although  contract  is  one  for  interstate  carriage. — Thus  far  we 
have  dealt  only  with  contracts  in  which  no  question  of  public 
policy  arises,  and  we  must  now  take  up  those  contracts  contain- 
ing limitations  of  liability  which  may  be  against  the  public  policy 
of  a  state.  A  state,  nothwithstanding  express  provisions  of  the 
contract  to  the  contrary,  may  require  a  common  carrier,  although 
in  the  execution  of  a  contract  for  interstate  carriage,  to  use 
great  care  and  diligence  in  the  carrying  of  passengers  and  trans- 
portation of  goods,  and  to  be  liable  for  the  whole  loss  resulting 
from  negligence  in  the  discharge  of  its  duties.  There  is  no 
difference  in  the  application  of  the  principle  based,  upon  the 
manner  in  which  the  state  requires  this  degree  of  care  and 
responsibility,  whether  enacted  into  a  statute  or  resulting  from 
the  rules  of  law  enforced  in  the  state  courts.-^  But  it  should 
be  remembered  that  the  public  policy  of  any  one  of  three  states 
may  be  against  limitation  of  the  carrier's  liability,  namely,  the 
state  where  the  contract  is  made,  the  state  where  it  is  to  be 
performed,  and  the  state  where  it  is  sought  to  be  enforced. 
Some  courts  have  attempted  to  add  a  fourth — the  state  where 
the  breach  of  the  contract  of  carriage  occurs — and  this  leads  to 
the  question  whether  a  contract  of  affreightment  is,  as  to  per- 
formance, divisible  or  indivisible. 

Sec.  210.  Better  rule  is  that  performance  of  contract  of  car- 
riage is  indivisible. — On  principle  it  would  seem  that  the  car- 
rier's contract  does  not  vary  with  each  jurisdiction  in  which  it 
may  be  partly  performed,  for  the  service  rendered  is  single; 
the  transportation  performed  and  the  liability  assumed  being 
the  measure  on  the  one  side  by  which  the  compensation  to  be 

paid  on  the   other  side   is  determined.     Whatever  is  done  in 

• 

cantile  Co.  v.  Wells,  Fargo  &  Co.,  W,  Rep.  16,  1132,  33  L.  R.  A.  654, 

93    Minn.    143,    100  N.   W.   735,   in  57  Am.  St.  Rep.  935;   Railroad  Co. 

which   the  court  applied   the  Mis-  v.    Patterson    Tobacco    Co.,   92   Va. 

souri    rule    without    expressly    so  670,  24  S.  E.  Rep.  261,  41  L.  R.  A. 

holding.  511;   affirmed  in  169  U.  S.  311,  43 

29.  Pennsylvania       R.       Co.      v.  L.    Ed.    759,    18    Sup.    Ct.    R.    335; 

Hughes,   191  U.   S.  477,  48  L.  Ed.  Railroad  Co.  v.  Taber,  98  Ky.  503, 

268,  24   Sup.  Ct.  R.   132;   Davis  v.  32  S.  W.  Rep.   168,  36  S.  W.  Rep. 

Railroad  Co.,   93   Wis.   470,    67   N.  18,  34  L.  R.  A.  685. 


§210.] 


I'HE  BILL  OF  LADING. 


225 


intermediate  states  is  a  part  of  the  single  act  of  transportation 
from  the  place  of  departure  to  the  place  of  destination  in  per- 
formance of  an  obligation  assumed  and  undertaken  in  some  one 
state,  and  which  is  indivisible.  The  obligations  arising  out  of 
a  contract  can  only  be  created  by  the  laws  of  one  state,  and 
force  and  effect  should  be  given  them  in  conformity  with  the 
law  of  the  state  which  created  them.  These  obligations  should 
not  vary  from  time  to  time  as  goods  pass  from  state  to  state. 
Having  been  created  by  the  laws  of  one  state,  those  obligations 
are  facts  which  should  be  recognized  as  such  in  other  states. 
It  is  a  totally  different  question  whether  the  courts  of  other 
states  will  lend  their  aid  to  enforce  those  facts.^" 


30.  Liverpool,  etc.,  Steam  Co.  v. 
Insurance  Co.,  129  U.  S.  397,  9 
Sup.  Ct.  R.  469,  32  L.  Ed.  788;  The 
Henry  B.  Hyde,  82  Fed.  681,  af- 
firmed in  90  Fed.  115,  32  C.  C.  A. 
534,  61  U.  S.  App.  147;  Railroad 
Co.  V.  Beebe,  174  111.  13,  50  N.  E. 
Rep.  1019,  43  L.  R.  A.  210,  66  Am. 
St.  Rep.  253;  McDaniel  v.  Railway 
Co.,  24  Iowa  412;  Meuer  v.  Rail- 
way Co.,  5  S.  Dak.  568,  59  N.  W. 
Rep.  945,  25  L.  R.  A.  81,  49  Am. 
St.  Rep.  898;  s.  c.  11  S.  Dak.  94, 
74  Am.  St.  Rep.  774,  75  N.  W. 
Rep.  823, 

In  Dyke  v.  Erie  Railway  Co.,  45 
N.  Y.  113,  the  court  said:  "The 
contracts  before  us  were  made  in 
the  State  of  New  York,  and  be- 
tween citizens  of  that  State.  The 
plaintiffs  were  actual  inhabitants, 
and  the  defendant  was  a  corpora- 
tion existing  by  the  laws  of  that 
State.  The  contracts  were  for  the 
carriage  and  conveyance  of  the 
plaintiffs  over  the  road  of  the  de- 
fendant, between  two  places  in 
the  same  State,  to-wit,  from  sta- 
tions on  the  line  of  the  road,  in 
the  western  part  of  the  State  to 
the  city  of  New  York.  Although 
the  route  and  line  of  the  defend- 


ant's road  between  the  places  at 
which  the  plaintiffs  took  their 
passage  and  their  destination, 
passed  through  portions  of  the 
States  of  Pennsylvania  and  New 
Jersey,  by  the  consent  of  those 
States  respectively,  the  parties 
cannot  be  presumed  to  have  con- 
tracted in  view  of  the  laws  of 
those  States.  The  contracts  were 
single  and  the  performance  one 
continuous  act.  The  defendant 
did  not  undertake  for  one  specific 
act,  in  part  performance  in  one 
State,  and  another  specific  and 
distinct  act  in  another  of  the 
States  named,  as  to  which 
the  parties  could  be  presumed 
to  have  had  in  view  the  laws 
and  usages  of  distinct  places. 
Whatever  was  done  in  Pennsyl- 
vania, was  a  part  of  the  single 
act  of  transportation  from  Attica 
or  Waverly,  in  the  State  of  New 
York,  and  in  performance  of  an 
obligation  assumed  and  under- 
taken in  this  State,  and  which 
was  indivisible.  The  obligation 
was  created  here,  and  by  force  of 
the  laws  of  this  State,  and  force 
and  effect  must  be  given  to  it,  in 
conformity    to    the    laws    of    New 


15 


226 


THE   LAW   OF   CARRIERS. 


[§  211. 


Sec.  211.  Some  states  hold  performance  of  contract  of  car- 
riage divisible — Rights  of  parties  to  be  construed  by  law  of 
place  where  negligent  breach  occurs. — All  the  cases  holding 
that  a  contract  of  carriage  is  divisible  are  early  ones  with  the 
exception  of  a  few  cases  in  Pennsylvania  and  Kentucky.  The 
early  cases  were  based  on  a  strained  construction  of  one  of 
Judge  Story's  opinions.^^  The  Pennsylvania  court32  cites  as 
authority  for  its  position  several  prior  Pennsylvania  decisions 
and  an  Ohio  decision  which  was  based  upon  an  entirely  different 
principle,^^  and  the  Kentucky  court  was  evidently  trying  to 
limit  the  scope  of  the  constitutional  provision  in  Kentucky  which 
renders  void  limitations  of  the  carrier's  liability.^^  The  rule 
cannot  be  sustained  on  principle  and  leads  to  absurdities.^^ 

Sec.  212.  Lex  loci  contractus  generally  governs  validity  of 
limitations  of  carrier's  liability. — By  the  weight  of  authority, 


York.  *  *  *  The  performance 
was  to  commence  in  New  York, 
and  to  be  fully  completed  in  the 
same  State,  but  liable  to  breach, 
partial  or  entire  in  the  States  of 
Pennsylvania  and  New  Jersey, 
through  which  the  road  of  the  de- 
fendant passed,  but  whether  the 
contract  was  broken,  and  if  brok- 
en, the  consequences  of  the 
breach  should  be  determined  by 
the  laws  of  this  State.  It  cannot 
be  assumed  that  the  parties  in- 
tended to  subject  the  contract  to 
the  laws  of  the  other  States,  or 
that  their  rights  and  liabilities 
should  be  qualified  or  varied  by 
any  diversities  that  might  exist 
between  the  laws  of  those  States 
and   the  lex  loci  contractus." 

In  Pittman  v.  Express  Co.,  24 
Tex.  Civ.  App.  595,  59  S.  W.  Rep. 
949,  id.  30  Tex.  Civ.  App.  626,  71 
S.  W.  Rep.  312,  the  court  said: 
"The  carrier's  contract  does  not 
vary  with  each  jurisdiction  in 
which  it  may  be  partly  performed 
for  the  service  rendered  is  single; 


the  transportation  performed  and 
the  liability  assumed  being  the 
measure  on  the  one  side  by  which 
the  compensation  to  be  paid  on 
the   other   side   is    determined." 

31.  Pope  V.  Nickerson,  3  Story 
465,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  11,274. 

32.  Hughes  v.  Pennsylvania  R. 
Co.,  202  Pa.  222,  51  Atl.  Rep.  990, 
63  L.  R.  A.  513,  97  Am.  St.  Rep. 
713. 

33.  Railroad  Co.  v.  Sheppard,  56 
Ohio  St.  68,  46  N.  E.  Rep.  61,  60 
Am.  St.  Rep.   732. 

34.  Railway  Co.  v.  Druien,  26 
Ky.  L.  Rep.  103,  80  S.  W.  Rep. 
778,   66   L.   R.    A.   275. 

35.  The  following  cases  uphold 
the  view  that  the  performance  of 
a  contract  of  carriage  is  divisible: 
Carpenter  v.  Railroad  Co.,  72  Me. 
388,  39  Am.  Rep.  340;  Barter  v. 
Wheeler,  49  N.  H.  9,  6  Am.  Rep. 
434;  Gray  v.  Jackson,  51  N.  H.  9, 
12  Am.  Rep.  1:  Rixford  v.  Smith, 
52  N.  H.  355,  13  Am.  Rep.  42; 
Burnett  V.  Railroad,  176  Pa.  St. 
45,  34  Atl.  Rep.  972.     (This  case 


§212.] 


THE  BILL  OF  LADING. 


227 


then,  the  performance  of  a  contract  of  affreightment  must  be 
regarded  as  indivisible.  Being  indivisible  the  rights  arising  out 
of  the  contract  are  created  by  but  one  law,  but  the  question 
remains,  "What  law  creates  those  rights?"  The  same  rules 
which  we  have  noticed  in  respect  of  contracts  of  affreightment 
in  general,  also  apply  to  contracts  containing  limitations  of  the 
carrier's  liability.  If  the  acts  of  the  partiv^s  were  such  that  it 
is  impossible  to  determine  what  law  governed  in  the  creation 
of  the  rights  arising  out  of  the  contract,  a  court  will  resort  to 
the  legal  fiction  that  the  law  of  the  place  where  a  contract  of 
carriage  was  made,  must,  in  the  absence  of  proof  of  the  inten- 
tion of  the  parties  to  the  contrary  at  the  time  of  making  the 
contract,  be  looked  to  for  the  validity  (i.  e.,  the  creation)  of  any 
rights  arising  out  of  it.^® 


is  cited  in  the  Hughes  case,  but 
can  easily  be  distinguished). 
Cappel  V.  Weir,  92  N.  Y.  Supp. 
365,  s.  c.  90  N.  Y.  Supp.  394.  (Not 
holding  the  Pennsylvania  rule  to 
be  correct,  but  enforcing  it  on  the 
principle  of  comity.) 

In  Hughes  v.  Pennsylvania  R. 
Co.,  202  Pa.  222,  51  Atl.  Rep.  990, 
63  L.  R.  A.  513,  97  Am.  St.  Rep. 
713,  Potter,  J.,  in  delivering  the 
court's  opinion,  said:  "Where  a 
contract  containing  a  stipulation 
limiting  liability  for  negligence  is 
made  in  one  state,  but  with  a 
view  to  its  performance  by  trans- 
portation through  or  into  one  or 
more  other  states,  we  see  no  rea- 
son why  it  should  not  be  con- 
strued in  accordance  with  the  law 
of  the  state  where  its  negligent 
breach,  causing  injury,  occurs." 

In  Railway  Co.  v.  Druien,  26 
Ky.  L.  Rep.  103,  80  S.  W.  Rep. 
778,  66  L.  R.  A.  275,  the  court 
said:  "Where  a  contract  of  ship- 
ment is  made  to  be  partly  per- 
formed in  another  state  where 
made  and  partly  in  this  state,  the 


agreement  of  the  parties,  if  valid 
where  made,  ought  to  bind  them 
as  to  all  rights  and  defenses  ac- 
cruing under  the  contract  in  that 
state,  although  the  provision  could 
not  be  binding  if  made  here.  But 
as  to  that  part  of  the  contract 
that  is  to  be  performed  in  Ken- 
tucky, it  will  be  read  in  the  light 
of  the  laws  and  Constitution  of 
this  state,  and  be  construed  and 
applied  accordingly.  *  *  *  * 
That  contracts  to  be  performed 
partly  in  two  states  will  be  con- 
strued according  to  the  laws  of 
each  of  the  states  relating  to  the 
portions  to  be  performed  there 
respectively  is  sustained  in  Bish- 
op on  Contracts,  sec.   1394." 

36.  In  re  Missouri  Steamship 
Co.,  42  Ch.  D.  321,  58  L.  J.  Ch. 
(N.  S.)  721,  61  L.  T.  N.  S.  316; 
McDonald  v.  Railway  Co.,  31  Ont. 
R.  663;  Western  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Ex- 
position Cotton  Mills,  81  Ga.  522 
7.  S.  E.  Rep.  916,  2  L.  R.  A.  102; 
Railroad  Co.  r.  Beebe,  174  111.  1.3, 
.50  N.  E.  Rep.  1019,  43  L.  R.  A.  210, 
66  Am.  St.  Rep.  253,  affirming  69 


228 


THE  LAW  OF   CARRIERS. 


[§213. 


Sec.  213.  Presumption  exists  that  that  law  applies  which  is 
most  favorable  to  the  validity  of  the  contract. — What,  then,  is 
sufficient  evidence  to  rebut  this  prima  facie  presumption  that 
the  lex  loci  contractus  will  govern  the  creation  of  the  rights 
arising  under  a  contract?  In  the  first  place,  it  must  be  pre- 
sumed that  the  parties  to  a  contract  do  not  deliberately  execute 
an  agreement  knowing  that  it  is  invalid.  The  carrier  must 
intend  to  secure  to  himself  some  real  protection  from  responsi- 
bilitj  in  the  cases  excepted  in  the  bill  of  lading,  and  the  shipper 
that  he  shall  have  this  protection.  "When  there  are  several 
possible   local   laws  applicable   to  the   case,   that   law  is  to  be 


111.  App.  363;  McDaniels  v.  Rail- 
way Co.,  24  Iowa  412;  Talbott  v. 
Merchants'  Dispatch  Transp.  Co., 
41  Iowa  247,  20  Am.  Rep.  589; 
Hazel  V,  Railroad  Co.,  82  Iowa 
477,  48  N.  W.  Rep.  926;  Hudson 
V.  Railroad  Co.,  92  Iowa  231,  60 
N.  W.  Rep.  608,  54  Am.  St.  Rep. 
550;  Fonseca  v.  Cunard  Steam- 
ship Co.,  153  Mass.  553,  27  N.  E. 
Rep.  665;  O'Regan  v.  Steamship 
Co.,  160  Mass.  356,  35  N.  E.  Rep. 
1070,  39  Am.  St.  Rep.  484;  Brock- 
way  V.  gxpress  Co.,  171  Mass.  158, 
50  N.  E.  Rep.  626;  s.  c.  168  Mass. 
257,  47  N.  E.  Rep.  87;  Otis  v.  Rail- 
way, 112  Mo.  622,  20  S.  W.  Rep. 
676;  Herf  &  Frerichs  Chemical  Co. 
V.  Railroad,  100  Mo.  App.  164,  73 
S.  W.  346;  s.  C.  70  Mo.  App.  274; 
Barnes  v.  Railroad  Co.,  93  N.  Y. 
Supp.  616;  Grand  v.  Livingston, 
38  N.  Y.  Supp.  490,  4  App.  Div. 
584;  affirmed  158  N.  Y.  688,  53  N. 
E.  Rep.  1125;  Robertson  v.  Na- 
tional Steamship  Co.,  37  N.  Y. 
Supp.  65,  1  App.  Div.  61,  72  N.  Y. 
St.  223;  Knowlton  v.  Railroad  Co., 
19  Ohio  St.  260,  2  Am.  Rep.  395; 
Meuer  v.  Railway  Co.,  5  S,  Dak. 
568,  59  N.  W.  Rep.  945,  25  L.  R. 
A.  81,  49  Am.  St.  Rep.  898;  s.  c, 
11  S.  Dak.  94,  75  N.  W.  Rep.  .823, 
74   Am.    St.    Rep.    774;    Ryan    v. 


Railroad  Co.,  65  Texas  13,  57  Am. 
Rep.  583;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Ware, 
(Tex.  Civ.  App.)  60  S.  W.  Rep, 
343;  Davis  v.  Railroad  Co.,  93 
Wis.  470,  67  N.  W.  Rep.  16,  33  L. 
R.   A.   654,   57   Am.   St.  Rep.   935. 

See  contra  Railroad  Co.  v.  Shep- 
pard,  56  Ohio  St.  68,  46  N.  E.  Rep. 
61,  60  Am.  St,  Rep.  732,  resting 
on  the  principle  that  the  obliga- 
tion is  to  deliver  the  goods  at 
destination,  and  hence  the  law  of 
the  destination  should  govern  in 
the  creation  of  the  rights  arising 
out  of  it. 

See  also  Williams  v.  Railroad 
Co.,  88  N.  Y.  Supp.  434,  93  App. 
Div.  582,  where  a  passenger  going 
from  New  York  to  New  Jersey 
failed  to  find  her  trunk  at  the 
station  of  departure  so  she  could 
check  it.  She  accepted  a  check 
from  the  baggage  master  on  his 
promise  to  forward  the  trunk.  On 
presentation  of  the  check  at  her 
destination  she  failed  to  receive 
the  trunk,  the  trunk  having  been 
stolen  from  the  carrier  prior  to 
the  reception  of  the  check.  The 
court  held  that  the  loss  occurred 
in  New  Jersey  (?)  and  the  rights 
of  the  parties  were  governed  by 
New   Jersey   law. 


§21-4.]  THE   BILL   OF   LADING.  229 

applied  which  is  most  favorable  to  the  contract ;  or,  to  state  the 
rule  in  other  phraseology,  when  there  is  a  conflict  of  applicatory 
laws,  the  parties  are  presumed  to  have  made  part  of  their  agree- 
ment that  law  which  is  most  favorable  to  its  validity  and  per- 
formance.3"  There  are,  therefore,  two  presumptions  to  apply 
to  every  question  of  what  law  governs  the  creation  of  rights 
arising  out  of  a  contract  of  carriage  containing  limitations  of 
the  carrier's  liability  for  negligence:  First,  that  the  lex  loci  con- 
tractus will  govern  in  the  great  majority  of  eases.  Second,  that 
the  parties  intended  that  law  to  govern  which  would  give  effect 
to  all  the  provisions  of  the  contract.  When  those  two  presump- 
tions point  to  the  same  place,  it  is  almost  conclusive  that  the  law 
of  that  place  should  govern.  When  they  neutralize  each  other  by 
pointing  in  opposite  directions,  the  court  must  then  rest  its  deci- 
sion entirely  on  evidence  extrinsic  of  either  presumption. 

Sec.  214.  Facts  extrinsic  of  presumptive  evidence  may  be 
considered  by  the  court  to  determine  what  law  governs. — The 

extrinsic  evidence  on  which  the  court  will  rest  its  decision  when 
the  two  presumptions  are  in  conflict,  will  vary  with  every  given 
set  of  facts.  Some  inference,  however,  may  be  drawn  frcm  any 
combination  of  the  following  facts  or  other  facts  along  the  same 
line: 

1.  When  the  state  where  the  contract  is  to  be  performed  is 
the  legal  residence  of  the  carrier  and  the  actual  residence  of  the 
shipper.38 

37.  Talbott  v.  Merchants'  Dis-  Y.  Supp.  490,  4  App.  Div.  584; 
patch  Transp  Co.,  41  Iowa  247,  aflirvied,  158  N.  Y.  6S8,  53  N.  E. 
20  Am.  Rep.  589;  Hazel  v.  Rail-  Rep.  1125;  In  re  Missouri  Steam- 
road  Co.,  82  Iowa  477,  48  N.  W.  ship  Co.,  42  Ch.  D.  321,  58  L.  J. 
Rep.  926;  Grand  v.  Livingston,  38  Ch.  N.  S.  721,  61  L.  T.  N.  S.  316; 
N.  Y.  Supp.  490,  4  App.  Div.  584;  Herf  &  Frerichs  Chemical  Co.  v. 
affirmed,  158  N.  Y.  688,  53  N.  E.  Railroad,  100  Mo.  App.  164,  73 
Rep.  1125;  Ryan  v.  Railroad  Co.,  S.  W.  Rep.  346;  s.  c,  70  Mo.  App. 
65  Tex,  13,  57  Am.  Rep.  583.  274;  Dyke  v.  Erie  Railway  Co..  45 

Contra,    Brockway    v.     Express  N.   Y.   113;    Liverpool,  etc.,   Steam 

Co.,  171  Mass.  158,  50  N.  E.  Rep.  Co.    v.    Insurance    Co.,    129    U.    S. 

626;   s.  c.   168  Mass.   257,  47  N.   E,  397,  9   Sup.    Ct.  R.   469,   32   L.   Ed. 

Rep.   87.  788. 

38.  Grand   v.   Livingston,   38   N.  Contra.    Brockway    r.    Express 


230  THE  LAW  OF    CARRIERS.  [§  214, 

2.  That  the  performance  was  to  be  had  entirely  in  another 
state.3» 

3.  That  the  forms  of  the  contract  or  bills  of  lading  were  those 
used  in  a  particular  state  or  country.*^ 

4.  That  the  parties  stipulated  in  their  contract  that  the  rights 
arising  under  it  should  be  governed  by  the  laws  of  a  certain  state 
or  country.  Some  courts  would  probably  hold  such  a  stipula- 
tion conclusive,  but  it  would  seem  to  be  more  reasonable  to 
regard  such  a  stipulation  merely  as  evidence,  the  weight  of 
which  should  be  determined  by  the  court. 

Thus  a  case  may  be  supposed  where  parties  both  residing  in 
A  desire  to  enter  into  a  contract  for  the  carriage  of  goods  from 
A  to  B,  the  contract  to  contain  stipulations  which  would  be 
void  under  the  laws  of  both  A  and  B.  They  thereupon  cross 
over  the  line  from  A  to  C,  and  sign  the  contract  at  C  for  the 
carriage  of  goods  from  A  to  B.  It  seems  clear  that  in  such  a 
case  a  stipulation  that  the  rights  of  the  parties  should  be  gov- 
erned by  the  laws  of  C  should  not  be  taken  as  conclusive,  but 
merely  regarded  as  evidence,  the  cogency  of  which  should  be 
passed  upon  in  connection  with  all  the  other  acts  of  the  parties 
and  circumstances  surrounding  the  transaction. 

The  Federal  courts,  of  course,  and  probably  the  courts  of 
Nebraska,  always  will  refuse  to  recognize  the  validity  of  such 
a  stipulation  as  to  a  limitation  which  is  opposed  to  their  public 
policy.^i 

The  inference  from  the  first  two  facts  could  be  overcome  by 
showing  that  in  another  and  supplemental  contract,  the  parties 
were  careful  to  provide  that  the  contract  should  be  governed  by 

Co.,  171  Mass.   158,  50  N.  E.  Rep.  Contra.    Brockway     v.    Express 

fsSG;  s.  c,  168  Mass.  257,  47  N.  E.  Co.,  supra. 

Rep.   87.  41.  The    Kensington,    183    U.    S. 

39.  Brown  v.  The  Camden,  etc.,  263,  46  L.  Ed.  190,  22  Sup.  Ct.  R. 
R.  R.,  83  Pa.  St.  316;  Grand  v.  102;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Gardiner,  51 
Livingston,  supra;  In  re  Missouri  Neb.  70,  70  N.  W.  508;  Railroad 
Steamship   Co.,   supra.  Co.  r.  Kennard,  etc.,  Co.,  59   Neb. 

Contra.     Brockway    v.     Express  435,  81  N.  W.  372;  Wabash  R.  Co. 

Co.,   supra.  v.  Sharpe,  Neb.  ,  107  N. 

40.  In   re    Missouri     Steamship  W.  Rep.  758. 
Co.,  supra. 


§  215.]  THE   BILL   OP  LADING.  231 

the  law  of  the  state  of  performance,  thus  justifying  the  conclu- 
sion that  the  parties  were  aware  of  the  importance  of  bringing 
the  contract  within  the  law  of  a  particular  state  and  making 
the  omission  in  the  original  contract  possess  a  significance  which 
cannot  be  disregarded,  and  when  the  contract,  if  construed  by 
other  than  the  law  of  the  place  of  execution  would  be  most 
unreasonable  and  would  leave  the  shipper  at  the  mercy  of  the 
carrier,*^ 

The  fact  that  a  carrier  is  organized  under  the  laws  of  a  state 
where  no  carrier  is  permitted  to  contract  for  relief  from  its 
common  law  liability  does  not  deprive  it  of  the  right  to  specially 
contract  against  its  common  law  liability  in  another  state,  the 
same  not  being  in  violation  of  the  laws  of  such  state,  the  goods 
being  there  and  the  contract  not  even  providing  that  the  goods 
should  pass  through  the  first  state.^^ 

Sec.  215.  Enforcement  of  limitation,  valid  in  one  state,  by- 
courts  of  another  state. — The  state  which  creates  the  rights 
arising  out  of  a  particular  contract  having  been  ascertained, 
full  force  and  effect  should  be  given  by  sister  states  on  the 
ground  of  comity  to  the  foreign  facts  thus  created,  even  though 
the  same  rights  would  not  have  been  created  by  the  law  of  the 
forum.-*^  The  United  States  courts  and  a  few  state  courts  refuse 
to  recognize  that  principle  on  the  ground  of  public  policy. 

The  United  States  courts  by  a  long  line  of  decisions  extend- 
ing through  many  years,  and  in  cases  wherein  was  involved  the 

42.  Grand   v.    Livingston,   supra.  13,   50  N.  E.  Rep.   1019,  43   L.  R. 

43.  Tecumseli  Mills  v.  Railroad,  A.  210,  66  Am.  St.  Rep.  253,  af- 
22  Ky.  L.  Rep.  264,  108  Ky.  572,  firming,  69  111.  App.  .'563;  O'Regan 
57  S.  W.  Rep.  9,  49  L.  R.  A.  557;  t'.  Steamship  Co.,  160  Mass.  356, 
Thomas  v.  Lancaster  Mills,  63  Fed.  35  N.  E.  Rep.  1070,  39  Am.  St. 
200,  affirmed,  71  Fed.  481,  19  C.  Rep.  484;  Brockway  v.  Express 
C   A.  88,  34  U.  S.  App.  404.  Co.,  171  Mass.  158,  50  N.  E.  Rep. 

44.  See  the  many  cases  cited  in  626;  s.  c.  168  Mass.  257,  47  N.  E. 
preceding  sections  in  which  the  Rep.  87;  Grand  v.  Livingston,  4 
courts  have  enforced  a  foreign  App.  Div.  589,  38  N.  Y.  Supp.  490- 
fact  founded  on  a  law  differing  affirmed,  158  N.  Y.  688,  53  N.  E 
from  their  own,  also  the  following  Rep.  1125;  Barnes  v.  Railroad  Co., 
cases:  93   N.  Y.   Supp.  616;    Knowlton   v. 

Railroad   Co.   v.   Beebe,   174    111.     Railroad   Co.,   19   Ohio   St.   260,   2 

Am.    Rep.    395. 


232  THE  LAW  OF  CARRIERS.  [§  215, 

liability  of  a  common  carrier,  have  established  the  rule  that  the 
right  of  a  carrier  of  goods  or  passengers,  by  land  or  water,  to 
stipulate  for  exemption  from  liability  for  his  own  negligence,  is 
not  a  local  question  upon  which  the  decision  of  a  state  court  must 
control;  but  that  such  question  is  a  matter  of  general  law  upon 
which  the  courts  of  the  United  States  will  exercise  their  own 
judgment,  even  where  their  jurisdiction  attaches  only  by  reason 
of  the  citizenship  of  the  parties,  in  an  action  at  law,  of  which  the 
courts  of  the  state  have  concurrent  jurisdiction,  and  upon  a 
contract  made  and  to  be  performed  within  the  state.  In  other 
words,  a  limitation  of  the  carrier's  liability,  when  opposed  to 
the  public  policy  of  the  United  States,  will  never  be  upheld  in 
the  United  States  courts,  no  matter  what  law  governed  in  the 
creation  of  the  rights  arising  out  of  such  a  contract.^^  And  if 
a  suit  is  brought  in  a  state  court  where  the  plaintiff  is  entitled 
to  the  benefit  of  a  state  prohibition  against  a  stipulation  or 
condition  in  the  contract  limiting  the  time  within  which  plaintiff 
might  enforce  his  right  by  legal  proceedings,  the  defendant 
cannot,  by  removing  the  case  to  the  Federal  court  on  the  ground 
that  it  is  a  citizen  of  another  state,  deprive  the  plaintiff  of  such 
a  substantive  right.^^ 

The  same  rule  which  obtains  in  the  United  States  courts  also 
obtains  in  Nebraska,  where  a  constitutional  provision  exists  ex- 
pressly prohibiting  carriers  from  limiting  their  common  law 
liability.  The  courts  of  that  state  therefore  will  not  recognize 
or  enforce  such  a  stipulation,  wherever  made.^''' 

A  decision  of  the  Court  of  Civil  Appeals  in  Texas  lays  down 

45.  The    Kensington,    183    U.    S.  de  Flecha  v.  Brauer,  168  U.  S.  104, 

263,  22  Sup.  Ct.  R,   102,  46  L.  Ed.  18    Sup.    Ct,    12,    42    L.    Ed.    398; 

390;   reversing,  94  Fed.  885,  36  C.  Lewisohn    v.    Steamship    Co.,    56 

C.  A.   553  and  88  Fed.  331;   Rail-  Fed.    602;    Eells   v.    Railroad    Co., 

way  Co.  V.  Kempton,  138  Fed.  792,  52    Fed.    903;    The   Iowa,    50    Fed. 

(C.  C.  A.);  The  New  England,  110  561;    The   Trinacria,    42   Fed.    863. 

Fed.  415;   The  Glenmavis,  69  Fed.  But   see   The    Oranmore,    92    Fed. 

472;    The  Hugo,   57  Fed.   403   and  396,  affirming  24  Fed.  922. 

61    Fed.    860;    affirmed,   Brauer   v.  46.  Railway  Co.  v.  Kempton,  138 

Compania       de      Navigacion      de  Fed.  792,    (C.  C.  A.). 

Flecha,  66  Fed.  777,  35  U.  S.  App.  47.  Railroad  Co.  v.  Gardiner,  51 

44    and   Compania    de   Navigacion  Neb.  70,  70  N.  W.  Rep.  508;  Rail- 


§  216.]  THE   BILL   OF   LADING.  233 

the  rule  that  when  the  contract  contravenes  the  settled  policy  of 
the  laws  of  the  state  where  it  is  sought  to  be  enforced,  its  terms 
I  will  not  be  upheld  even  though  valid  where  made.*^  It  is  doubt- 
ful whether  that  position  can  be  sustained  in  view  of  an  earlier 
well-reasoned  decision  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  Texas."**  It  is 
to  be  hoped  that  the  latter  court  will  adhere  to  its  own  position 
which  rests  upon  the  true  principles  of  Conflict  of  Laws. 

In  Kentucky  and  Pennsylvania,  as  we  have  seen,  the  erroneous 
doctrine  prevails  that  the  creation  of  the  rights  of  the  parties  is 
governed  by  the  law  of  the  place  where  the  breach  occurs.-''^^ 
But  the  law  of  the  place  where  the  breach  occurs  will  be  enforced 
in  those  states  even  when  a  stipulation  as  to  the  carrier's  liability 
is  invalid  by  their  own  laws,  if  it  is  valid  by  the  laws  of  the 
place  where  the  breach  occurs. 

From  this  resume,  it  will  be  seen  that  decisions  of  the  United 
States  courts,  the  courts  of  Nebraska,  Kentucky  and  Pennsyl- 
vania and  the  Texas  Court  of  Civil  Appeals  rest  on  such  ex- 
ceptional principles  that  they  should  not  be  taken  as  conclusive 
authority  by  other  courts  in  the  determination  of  questions  of 
the  Conflict  of  Laws  in  respect  of  contracts  of  affreightment 
containing  limitations  of  the  carrier's  liability.  The  remaining 
cases  in  the  various  state  courts  can  easily  be  classified  under 
the  principles  contained  in  the  following  eight  sections,  having 
regard  to  the  fact  that  although  the  forum  may  be  the  same  as 
the  place  of  contract  or  destination,  the  principles  remain  the 
same  as  if  it  were  separate  and  distinct. 

Sec.  216.  Enforcement  of  limitation  valid  at  place  of  con- 
tract, valid  at  destination  and  valid  at  forum. — Where  a  stipu- 
lation as  to  limitation  of  the  carrier's  liability  would  be  valid 
by  the  law  of  the  place  of  contract,  valid  by  the  law  of  the 

road  Co.  v.  Kennard  Glass  &  Paint  49.  Ryan     v.     Railroad    Co.,    65 

Co.,    59    Neb.    435,    81    N.   W.   Rep.  Tex.   13,  57  Am.  Rep.  583. 

372;    Wabash    R.    Co.    v.    Sharpe,  50.  Huglies    v.    Pennsylvania   R. 

Neb.    ,    107    N.   W.    Rep.  Co.,  202  Pa.  222,  51  Atl.  Rep.  990. 

758.  97  Am.   St.  Rep.  713,  63  L.  R.   A. 

48.  Railway     Co.     v.     Mclntyre,  513;    Railway    Co.    v.    Druien,    26 

(Tex.   Civ.   App.)    82   S.   W.   Rep.  Ky.   L.   Rep.    103,   80    S.   W.   Rep. 

346.  778,  66  L.  R.  A.  275. 


234  THE   LAW   OP   CARRIERS.  f  §  217. 

place  of  destination,  and  valid  by  the  law  of  the  forum,  the 
ordinary  presumption  that  the  law  of  the  place  of  contract 
applies  will  govern,  and  the  rights  created  by  that  law  will  be 
enforced  by  the  courts  of  the  forum,  unless  a  clear  intention  of 
the  parties  is  shown  to  the  contrary .^ 

Sec.  217.  Enforcement  of  limitation  valid  at  place  of  con- 
tract, invalid  at  destination  and  valid  at  forum. — Where  a 
stipulation  as  to  limitation  of  the  carrier's  liability  would  be 
valid  by  the  law  of  the  place  of  contract,  invalid  by  the  law  of 
the  place  of  destination,  and  valid  by  the  law  of  the  forum, 
the  law  of  the  place  of  contract  should  apply  in  the  absence  of 
overwhelming  evidence  to  the  contrary.  Two  legal  presumptions 
are  applicable  here :  first,  that  the  law  of  the  place  of  contract 
should  apply  in  the  absence  of  evidence  of  the  intention  of  the 
parties  to  the  contrary,  and  second,  that  the  parties  intended  to 
make  a  valid  contract.  Both  presumptions  favor  the  law  of  the 
place  of  contract.  Evidence  to  overcome  them  should  be  clear 
and  convincing.- 

Sec.  218.  Enforcement  of  limitation  valid  at  place  of  con- 
tract, invalid  at  destination,  and  invalid  at  forum. — Where  a 

1.  In  Robertson  v.  National  622,  20  S.  W.  Rep.  676,  the  stipu- 
Steamship  Co.,  1  App.  Div.  61,  37  lation  in  the  contract  was  valid 
N.  Y.  Supp.  69,  72  N.  Y.  St.  Rep.  by  the  laws  of  Texas,  since  the 
223,  the  provisions  of  the  contract  Texas  statute  prohibiting  limita- 
were  valid  by  the  laws  of  France,  tions  of  liability  does  not  apply 
the  place  of  contract,  and  valid  to  interstate  shipments.  The 
by  the  laws  of  New  York,  the  stipulation  was  also  valid  under 
place  of  destination  and  the  for-  the  laws  of  Massachusetts,  the 
um.  The  bill  of  lading,  made  in  place  of  destination,  and  of  Mis- 
France,  provided  for  the  transpor-  souri,  the  forum.  The  court  held 
tation  of  goods  from  Havre,  that  the  laws  of  Texas  would  ap- 
France,  to  London,  and  from  Lon-  ply,  and  being  an  interstate  ship- 
don  to  New  York.  The  goods  ment,  the  stipulation  was  valid 
were  injured  between  Havre  and  and  enforceable. 
I/ondon.  The  court  held  that  the  See  also  Railroad  v.  Ware,  (Tex. 
contract  was  not  governed  by  the  Civ.  App.)  60  S.  W.  Rep.  343. 
law  of  England,  as  it  was  made  2.  See  cases  cited  under  suc- 
and  to  be  performed  outside  of  ceeding  section.  If  the  holdings 
England.  in    them    are    correct,    this    view 

In    Otis    V.    Railway,    112    Mo.  must  necessarily  be  correct. 


I 


§219.: 


THE   BILL   OF  LADING. 


23,1 


stipulation  as  to  limitation  of  the  carrier's  liability  would  be 
valid  by  the  law  of  the  place  of  contract,  invalid  by  the  law 
of  the  place  of  destination  and  invalid  by  the  law  of  the  forum, 
the  law  of  the  place  of  contract  should  apply  in  the  absence  of 
overwhelming  evidence  to  the  contrary  and  the  stipulation 
should  be  enforced  by  the  courts  of  the  forum.  Both  presump- 
tions mentioned  in  the  preceeding  sections  also  apply  here  with 
equal  force.^ 

Sec.  219.  Enforcement  of  limitation  valid  at  place  of  con- 
tract, valid  at  destination,  and  invalid  at  forum. — Where  a 
stipulation  as  to  limitation  of  the  carrier's  liability  is  valid  by 


3.  In  Western  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Ex- 
position Cotton  Mills,  81  Ga.  522, 
7  S.  E.  Rep.  916,  2  L.  R.  A.  102, 
a  stipulation  was  valid  by  the  law 
of  Massachusetts,  the  place  of 
contract,  and  invalid  by  the  law 
of  Georgia,  the  place  of  destina- 
tion and  the  forum.  The  law  of 
Massachusetts  was  applied,  and 
the  stipulation  forced. 

In  Talbott  v.  Merchants'  Dis- 
patch Transp.  Co.,  41  Iowa  247. 
20  Am.  Rep.  589,  a  stipulation  was 
valid  by  the  laws  of  Connecticut, 
the  place  of  contract,  and  invalid 
by  the  law  of  Iowa,  the  place  of 
destination  and  the  forum.  The 
stipulation   was   upheld. 

In  Hazel  v.  Railroad  Co.,  82 
Iowa  477,  48  N,  W.  Rep.  926,  a 
stipulation  was  valid  by  the  law 
of  the  then  territory  of  Dakota, 
and  invalid  by  the  law  of  Iowa, 
the  place  of  destination  and  the 
forum.  The  stipulation  was  held 
enforceable. 

In  O'Regan  v.  Steamship  Co., 
160  Mass.  356,  35  N.  E.  Rep.  1070, 
39  Am.  St.  Rep.  484,  a  stipulation 
was  valid  by  the  law  of  Ireland, 
the  place  of  contract,  and  invalid 
by  the  law  of  Massachusetts,  the 


place  of  destination  and  the  for- 
um. The  stipulation  was  held  en 
forceable. 

In  Fonseca  v.  Cunard  Steamship 
Co.,  153  Mass.  553,  27  N.  E.  Rep. 
665,  a  stipulation  was  valid  by  the 
law  of  England,  the  place  of  con- 
tract, and  invalid  by  the  law  of 
Massachusetts,  the  place  of  des- 
tination and  the  forum.  The  stip- 
ulation was  held  enforceable. 

In  Ryan  v.  Railroad  Co.,  65  Tex. 
13,  57  Am.  Rep.  583,  a  stipulation 
was  valid  by  the  law  of  Missouri, 
the  place  of  contract  and  invalid 
by  the  law  of  Texas,  the  place  of 
destination  and  the  forum.  The 
stipulation  was  held  enforceable. 
But  see  Railway  v.  Mclntyre  (Tex. 
Civ,    App),   82   S.   W.   Rep.    346. 

Under  the  peculiar  views  of  the 
courts  of  Nebraska  and  Kentucky, 
such  stipulations,  of  course,  have 
been  held  unenforceable.  Railroad 
Co.  V.  Gardiner,  51  Neb.  70,  70  N. 
W.  Rep.  508;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Ken- 
nard  Glass  &  Paint  Co.,  81  N.  W. 
Rep.  372,  59  Neb.  435;  Express  Co. 
V  Walker,  26  Ky.  L.  Rep.  1025.  83 
S.  W.  Rep.  106;  Wabash  R.  Co.  v. 

Sharpe, Neb.  ,  107  N.  W. 

Rep.  758. 


236 


THE  LAW   OF   CARRIERS. 


§220. 


the  law  of  the  place  of  contract,  valid  by  the  law  of  the  place 
of  destination,  and  invalid  by  the  law  of  the  forum,  the  ordinary 
presumption  that  the  law  of  the  place  of  contract  applies  would 
govern,  and  that  law  will  be  enforced  unless  a  clear  intention  of 
the  parties  is  shown  to  the  contrary.^ 

Sec.  220.  Enforcement  of  limitation  invalid  at  place  of  con- 
tract, valid  at  destination,  and  valid  at  forum. — Where  a  stipu- 
lation as  to  limitation  of  liability  would  be  invalid  by  the  law  of 
the  place  of  contract,  valid  by  the  law  of  the  place  of  destina- 
tion and  valid  by  the  law  of  the  forum,  the  two  presumptions 
that  the  law  of  the  place  of  contract  should  apply  in  the  absence 
of  evidence  of  the  intention  of  the  parties  to  the  contrary  and 
that  the  parties  intended  to  make  a  valid  contract  counterbalance 
each  other.  The  court  should  rest  its  decision,  therefore,  entirely 
on  extrinsic  evidence  such  as  has  already  been  suggested,^  and 
such  a  stipulation  would  necessarily  be  held  invalid  in  some 
cases  and  valid  in  others,  depending  on  the  evidence.^ 


4.  In  Knowlton  v.  Railroad,  19 
Ohio  St.  260,  2  Am.  Rep.  395,  a 
stipulation  was  valid  by  the  law 
of  New  York,  the  place  of  con- 
tract and  also  destination,  and 
invalid  by  the  law  of  Ohio,  the 
forum.  The  stipulation  was  held 
enforceable. 

This  rule  would  also  govern  in 
Kentucky.  Tecumseh  Mills  v. 
Railroad,  108  Ky.  572,  22  Ky.  L. 
Rep.  264,  57  S.  W.  Rep.  9,  49  L. 
R.    A.    557. 

5.  See  ante,  sec.  214. 

6.  Extrinsic  evidence  was  re- 
sorted to  in  In  re  Missouri  Steam- 
ship Co.,  42  Ch.  D.  321.  In  that 
case  the  stipulation  in  question 
was  invalid  by  the  law  of  Massa- 
chusetts, the  place  of  contract,  and 
valid  by  the  law  of  England,  the 
place  of  destination  and  the  for- 
um. The  stipulation  was  held  en- 
forceable. The  court  unanimous- 
ly found  in  the  facts  that  the  ship 


was  English,  that  her  owners 
were  English,  that  England  was 
the  destination  of  the  goods,  that 
the  bill  of  lading  was  in  the  Eng- 
lish form,  and  that  the  contract 
was  such  as  the  English  law  ap- 
proved, conclusive  evidence  that 
the  parties  had  the  English  law 
in  view. 

Extrinsic  evidence  was  also  re 
sorted  to  in  Grand  v.  Livingston, 
4  App.  Div.  589,  38  N.  Y.  Supp. 
490,  affirmed,  158  N.  Y.  688,  53  N. 
E.  Rep.  1125.  In  that  case,  a  stipu- 
lation was  invalid  by  the  law  of 
Massachusetts,  the  place  of  con- 
tract, and  valid  by  the  law  of  New 
York,  the  place  of  destination  and 
the  forum.  The  stipulation  was 
held   invalid. 

See  also  Railroad  v.  Beebe,  174 
111.  13,  50  N.  E.  Rep.  1019,  43  L.  R. 
A.  210,  66  Am.  St.  Rep.  253,  affirm- 
ing 69  111.  App.  363.  (Stipulation 
held  invalid  according  to  Iowa  law 


§221.]  THE  BILL   OF  LADING.  237 

Sec.  221.  Enforcement  of  limitation  invalid  at  place  of  con- 
tract, invalid  at  destination  and  valid  at  forum. Whore  a 

stipulation  as  to  limitation  of  the  carrier's  liability  would  be 
invalid  by  the  law  of  the  place  of  contract,  invalid  by  the  law 
of  the  place  of  destination,  and  valid  by  the  law  of  the  forum, 
there  can  be  no  question  about  its  enforcement.  The  court  of 
the  forum  would  always  hold  the  stipulation  invalid  and  un- 
enforceable. 

Sec.  222.  Enforcement  of  limitation  invalid  at  place  of  con- 
tract, valid  at  destination,  and  invalid  at  forum. — Where  a 
stipulation  as  to  limitation  of  the  carrier's  liability  would  be 
invalid  by  the  law  of  the  place  of  contract,  valid  by  the  law  of 
the  place  of  destination,  and  invalid  by  the  law  of  the  forum, 
the  two  presumptions  that  the  law  of  the  place  of  contract  should 
apply  in  the  absence  of  evidence  of  the  intention  of  the  parties 
to  the  contrary  and  that  the  parties  intended  to  make  a  valid  con- 
tract, counterbalance  each  other.  The  court  of  the  forum  should 
rest  its  decision,  therefore,  entirely  on  extrinsic  evidence  such 
as  has  already  been  suggested,'^  and  such  a  stipulation  would 
necessarily  be  held  invalid  in  some  cases  and  valid  in  others, 
depending  on  the  evidence.^ 

Sec.  223.  Enforcement  of  limitation  invalid  at  place  of  con- 
tract, invalid  at  destination  and  invalid  at  forum. — Where  a 

which  governed);   Barnes  v.  Rail-  of     destination,     and     invalid     in 

road    Co.,    93    N.    Y.    Supp.    616.  Iowa,  the  forum.     The  stipulation 

(Kentucky  law  held  applicable  and  was  held   invalid, 
stipulation     void);     Brockway    v.        See  also  Davis  v.  Railroad  Co., 

Express  Co.,  171  Mass.   158,  50  N.  93  Wis.  470,  67  N.  W.  Rep.   16,  33 

E.  Rep.   626;   s.   c.   168  Mass.   257,  L.  R.  A.  654,  57  Am.  St.  Rep.  935, 

47  N.  E.  Rep.  87.      (Place  of  con-  (Held  invalid.) 
tract,    Illinois,    where    stipulation        In  Kentucky,  as  the  courts  held 

would  be  invalid,  destination  New  the   contract   divisible,    if   any   of 

York,    where    it    would    be    valid,  the   performance  is  to  be  had  in 

forum      Massachusetts.         Illinois  Kentucky,     and    the    coatract    is 

law  applied.)  made  in  Kentucky,  the  stipulation 

7.  See  ante,  sec.   214.  against  the  carrier's  liability  will 

8.  In  McDaniel  v.  Railway  Co.,  be  held  invalid.  Railroad  Co.  r. 
24  Iowa  412,  a  stipulation  was  in-  Taber,  98  Ky.  503,  36  S.  W.  Rep. 
valid   in    Iowa,   the   place   of   con-  18,  34  L.  R.  A.  685. 

tract,   valid   in   Illinois,   the   place 


238  THE  LAW  OF   CARRIERS.  [§  224. 

stipulation  as  to  limitation  of  the  carrier's  liability  would  be 
invalid  by  the  law  of  the  place  of  contract,  invalid  by  the  law  of 
the  place  of  destination  and  invalid  by  the  law  of  the  forum, 
it  certainly  could  not  be  enforced. 

Sec.  224.    Proof  must  be  made  of  what  foreign  law  is. — In 

all  the  cases  above-mentioned  proof  must  be  made  in  the  court 
of  the  forum  of  what  the  foreign  law  is.  In  the  absence  of 
such  proof  of  the  foreign  law  the  same  rule  governs  as  in  the 
case  of  stipulations  other  than  those  limiting  the  carrier's 
liability.9 

9.  See  ante,  sec.  207. 


CHAPTER  V. 
OF  CONNECTING  CARRIERS. 


I  225.  In  general. 

226.  Carrier    not    bound    to    as- 

sume liability  beyond  ter- 
minus of  his  own  line. 

227.  What    circumstances    neces- 

sary to  show  contract  by 
carrier  to  assume  liability 
beyond  his  own  line. 

228.  The     rule     of     Muschamp's 

Case. 

229.  This     rule    well    settled    in 

England. 

230.  English     rule     prevails     in 

many  states. 

231.  English   rule  denied  in  ma- 

jority of  states. 

232.  Further   of  this   rule. 

233.  Liability     beyond     terminus 

may  be  excluded  by  con- 
tract. 

234.  Same    subject — Even    when 

liability   fixed   by   statute. 

235.  Same    subject — Other    statu- 

tory  provisions. 

236.  Even     under     contract     for 

through  carriage  inter- 
mediate carrier  who 
causes  injury  may  be  held 
liable. 

237.  Carrier     may     contract    for 

the   entire   transportation. 

238.  What     constitutes     such     a 

contract. 

239.  Same  subject. 

240.  Extent     to     which     carrier 

may  limit  his  liability  un- 
der contract  for  through 
carriage. 

239 


§  241 


242, 


243, 


244. 


245. 
246. 
247. 

248. 


249. 

250. 
251. 

252. 

25.3. 
254. 
255. 
256. 


257. 
258. 
259. 
260. 


Implied  power  of  agents  to 
make  contracts  for 
through    carriage. 

No  distinction  between  cor- 
porations and  other  car- 
riers in  respect  to  power 
to  enter  into  contracts  for 
through    carriage. 

No  liability  for  loss  beyond 
his  own  line  under  con- 
tract to  carry  to  end  of 
line  and  there  to  deliver 
to  next  cart-ier. 

Same  subject — Meaning  of 
the  term  "to  forward"  or 
"to  be  forwarded." 

Same    subject. 

Same   subject. 

Who  is  a  connecting  car- 
rier— Transfer  company. 

Authority  of  contracting 
carrier  to  bind  connect- 
ing carrier  by  contract. 

Partnerships  and  associa- 
tions  between   carriers. 

Same  subject. 

Same  subject — Actual  part- 
nership  not  necessary. 

Same  subject — Cases  hold- 
ing carriers  jointly  liable. 

Same  subject. 

Same  subject. 

Same   subject. 

Same  subject — Cases  hold- 
ing carriers  not  jointly 
liable. 

Same  subject. 

Same  subject. 

Same  subject. 

Same  subject. 


240 


THE  LAW   OF   CARRIERS. 


§225. 


§  261.  Same   subject. 
262.  Same   subject — Effect   of  es- 
tablishing joint  or  through 
rates. 


§  263.  Same     subject  —  The    rule 
stated. 
264.  Partnerships     between     cor- 
porations as  carriers. 


Sec.  225.  (§  145.)  In  general. — Carriers  may  frequently 
become  merely  forwarders  when  the  goods  are  consigned  to 
points  beyond  the  termini  of  their  own  lines;  and  it  frequently 
becomes  difficult  to  determine  whether,  under  the  particular 
circumstances  of  the  case,  they  should  be  held  liable  for  the 
safety  of  the  goods  throughout  the  whole  line  of  transit  to  desti- 
nation, though  extending  beyond  the  termination  of  their  routes ; 
or  whether  having  transported  them  as  far  as  their  routes  ex- 
tend and  there  having  safely  delivered  them  to  another  connect- 
ing carrier  to  complete  the  transportation  they  are  not  to  be 
considered  as  having  acted  as  forwarding  agents  merely  as  to 
such  further  carriage  and  therefore  no  longer  responsible. 

Sec.  226.  Carrier  not  bound  to  assume  liability  beyond  ter- 
minus of  his  own  line. — While  the  carrier  cannot  refuse  to  ac- 
cept and  carry  the  goods  to  the  terminus  of  his  own  line  and 
there  deliver  them  to  a  connecting  carrier  with  whom  he  has  an 
established  connection,^  he  is  not  bound  by  law  to  assume  respon- 
sibility for  their  safe  carriage  further  than  the  terminus  of  his 
own  line,  and  if  in  any  case,  therefore,  he  is  to  become  liable  as 
a  common  carrier  beyond  such  terminus,  his  liability  must  be 
based  upon  some  further  obligation  than  that  created  by  law.2 
It  is  well  settled,  however,  that  the  carrier  may  contract  to  carry 
to  a  point  beyond  the  terminus  of  his  own  line  so  as  to  be  liable 
for  the  delivery  at  such  point,  and  that  the  liability  thus  attach- 
ing at  the  commencement  will  continue  throughout  the  whole 
transit.^    And  when  he  has  thus  undertaken  for  the  transporta- 


1.  Inman  v.  Railroad  Co.,  14 
Tex.  Civ.  App.  39,  37  S.  W.  Rep. 
37;  Seasongood  v.  Transportation 
Co.,  21  Ky.  Law  Rep.  1142,  54  S. 
W.  Rep.    103,   49   L.  R.  A.  270. 

2.  See  Miller,  etc..  Elevator  Co. 
V.  Railway  Co.,  138  Mo.  658,  40  S. 
W.  Rep.  894,  citing  Hutchinson  on 


Carr;  Post  v.  Railway  Co.,  103 
Tenn.  184,  52  S.  W.  Rep.  301,  55 
L.  R.  A.  481,  16  Am.  &  Eng.  Rd. 
Cas.  (N.  S.)  201;  Griffith  v.  Rail- 
way  Co.,  Mo.   App.   ,   90 

S.  W.  Rep.   408. 

3.  Railway  Co.  v.  Reiss,   183  U. 
S.  621;   s.  C.  98  Fed.  533,  39  C.  C. 


§227.] 


CONNECTING  CARRIERS. 


241 


tion  of  the  goods  throughout  to  destination,  all  connecting  lines 
of  carriers  employed  in  furthering  and  completing  such  trans- 
portation become  his  agents,  for  whose  defaults  he  becomes  re- 
sponsible to  the  owner  of  the  goods.'* 

Sec.  227.     (§  145a.)     What  circumstances  necessary  to  show 
contract  by  carrier  to  assume  liability  beyond  his  own  line.— 

The  liability  of  the  carrier  beyond  the  terminus  of  hi.s  own 
line  being  thus  based  upon  contract,  it  is  evident  that  a  contract 
to  that  effect,  either  express  or  implied,  must  be  shown  to  exist.s 
But  what  shall  be  considered  sufficient  to  constitute  a  contract  on 
the  part  of  the  carrier  to  carry  the  goods  to  the  destination  to 


A.  149;  s.  c.  99  Fed.  1006,  39  C. 
C.  A.  679;  Railway  Co.  v.  Wood- 
ward, 164  Ind.  360,  72  N.  E.  Rep 
558;  s.  c.  73  N.  E.  Rep.  810;  Hoff- 
man V.  Railroad  Co.,  85  Md.  391,  37 
Atl.  Rep.  214;  Hubbard  v.  Rail- 
road Co.,  112  Mo.  App.  459,  87  S. 
W.  Rep.  52,  citing  Hutchinson  on 
Carr;  Palmer  v.  Railroad  Co.,  101 
Cal.  187,  35  Pac.  Rep.  630,  citing 
Hutchinson  on  Carr;  Germania 
Fruit  Co.  V.  Railroad  Co.,  133  Cal. 
426,  65  Pac.  Rep.  948;  Railroad 
Co.  V.  Georgia,  etc..  Exchange,  91 
Ga.  389,  17  S.  E.  Rep.  904;  Rail- 
way Co.  V.  Sharp,  64  Ark.  115.  40 
S.  W.  Rep.  781,  citing  Hutchinson 
on  Carr;  Page  v.  Railway  Co.,  7 
S.  Dak.  297,  64  N.  W.  Rep.  137; 
Nichols  t\  Railroad  Co.,  24  Utah, 
83,  66  Pac.  Rep.  768,  91  Am  St. 
Rep.  778;  Saltsman  v.  Railroad 
Co.,  65  Hun,  448,  20  N.  Y.  Supp. 
361;  Thompson  v.  Railway  Co., 
11  Tex.  Civ.  App.  145,  32  S.  W. 
Rep.  427;  Railway  Co.  v.  Lealher- 
wood,  29  Tex.  Civ.  App.  507,  1,9 
S.  W.  Rep.  119;  Railway  Co.  v.  Uc- 
Carthy,  29  Tex.  Civ.  App.  61G,  69 
S.  W.  Rep.  229;  Merchants,  etc., 
Co.  V.  Hately,  (Canada)  14  S.  C. 
R.  572;   Railway  Co.  v.  McMillan, 

16 


(Canada)  16  S.  C.  R.  543;  E. 
Tenn.,  etc.,  R.  R.  v.  Nelson,  1  Cold. 
276;  Steamboat  Co.  v.  Brown  54 
Penn.  St.  77;  Noyes  v.  The  R.  R. 
Co..  27  Vt.  110;  Peet  v.  Tho.  Rail- 
way, 19  Wis.  118;  Wahl  v.  Holt, 
26  id.  703;  Root  v.  G.  W.  R.  R., 
45  N.  Y.  524;  Condict  v.  G.  T. 
Railway,  4  Lans.  106;  Bryan  v. 
M.  &  P.  R.  R.,  11  Bush,  597; 
Southern  Express  Co.  v.  Shea,  38 
Ga.  519;  Penn.  R.  R.  v.  Berry,  68 
Penn.  St.  272;  111.  Cen.  R.  R.  v. 
Copeland,  24  HI.  332;  HI.  Cen.  R. 
R.  V.  Johnson,  34  id.  389;  St.  Louis, 
etc.,  R.  R.  V.  Piper,  13  Kan.  505; 
Quimby  v.  Vanderbilt,  17  N.  Y. 
306;  Williams  v.  Vanderbilt,  28 
id.  217;  Roberts  v.  Van  Buskirk, 
31  N.  Y.  661;  Newell  v.  Smith,  49 
Vt.    255. 

4.  See,  Virginia  Coal  &  Iron  Co. 
V.  Railroad  Co.,  98  Va.  776,  37  S. 
E.  Rep.  310,  citing  Hutchinson  on 
Carr. 

5.  See  Gray  v.  Jackson,  51  N. 
H.  9;  Piedmont  Mfg.  Co.  r.  Rail- 
road Co.,  19  S.  C.  353;  Railroad  Co. 

V.  Washington,  Ark.  ,  69 

L     R.    A.    65,    85    S.    W.    Rep.    406, 
citing  Hutchinson  on  Carr. 


242  THE  LAW   OF    CARRIERS.  [§  228. 

which  they  may  be  directed  beyond  his  own  route  is  a  question 
which  has  been  differently  determined  by  different  courts  upon 
two  distinct  theories  as  to  the  obligation  of  the  carrier  in  this 
regard. 

Sec.  228.  (§146.)  The  rule  of  Muschamp 's  Case.— It  has 
long  been  the  established  law  of  England  that  when  the  carrier 
accepts  for  carriage  goods  directed  to  a  destination  beyond  his 
own  route,  he  assumes,  by  the  very  act  of  acceptance,  in  the  ab- 
sence of  any  express  contract  upon  the  subject,  the  obligation 
to  transport  them  to  the  place  to  which  they  may  be  directed. 
This  was  first  decided  there  in  the  noted  case  of  Muschamp  v. 
The  Lancaster  &  Preston  Junction  Railway.*^  A  box  was  deliv- 
ered to  the  carrier  and  booked  by  his  agent  for  a  point  not  on 
his  line  and  which  could  only  be  reached  by  another  connecting 
company,  which  fact  was  known  to  the  shipper.  The  freight 
was  not  paid  in  advance,  the  agent  saying  that  it  would  better 
be  left  to  be  paid  by  the  consignee  on  its  arrival  at  its  destina- 
tion. There  was  no  further  contract  and  no  proof  of  any  part- 
nership between  the  connecting  companies.  The  box  having  been 
lost  after  it  had  been  forwarded  by  the  defendant  upon  the  con- 
necting line,  the  question  was  whether  the  defendant  was  liable. 
The  case  was  tried  by  a  jury,  and  Baron  Rolfe,  in  summing  up, 
stated  that  where  a  common  carrier  takes  into  his  care  a  parcel 
directed  to  a  particular  place,  and  does  not  by  positive  agree- 
ment limit  his  responsibility  to  a  part  only  of  the  distance,  that 
is  prima  facie  evidence'^  of  an  undertaking  on  his  part  to  carry 
the  parcel  to  the  place  to  which  it  is  directed ;  and  that  the  same 
rule  applied  although  that  place  were  beyond  the  limits  within 
which  he  in  general  professed  to  carry  on  his  trade  of  a  carrier. 
The  jury  found  for  the  plaintiff*.  A  motion  was  made  for  a  new 
trial  on  the  ground  of  misdirection,  and  the  motion  was  denied. 
The  whole  matter,  said  the  court,  was  a  question  for  the  jury,  to 
determine  what  the  contract  was  on  the  evidence  before  them; 

6.  8.   M.   &   W.   421.  judges,  in  Gray  v.  Jackson,  51  N. 

7.  See  the  learned  exposition  of  H.  9,  14,  where  all  the  English  and 
Doe,  J.,  upon  the  meaning  of  this  American  cases  to  1871  are  cited 
phrase     when     used     by     English  and  collated. 


§  229.]  CONNECTING  CARRIERS.  243 

and  it  Avas  held  that  there  had  been  no  misdirection,  as  the  facts 
shoAvn  constituted  evidence  from  which  the  jury  might  infer  that 
the  carrier  had  undertaken  to  carry  the  goods  safely  to  their 
destination.  In  connection  with  this  case  it  is  to  be  noted  that 
there  was  no  written  contract  to  be  construed  by  the  court ;  that 
the  contract  was  to  be  gathered  from  the  circumstances,  and 
that  it  was  a  question  for  the  jury  to  determine  from  these  cir- 
cumstances what  the  contract  was.  The  court  went  no  further 
than  to  affirm  that  from  such  circumstances  as  those  there  exist- 
ing a  contract  for  through  carriage  might  be  inferred,  or,  as  the 
learned  judge  expressed  it,  that  these  facts  constituted  prima 
facie  evidence  of  such  a  contract. 

Sec.  229.     (§  147.)     This  rule  well  settled  in  England.— This 

rule  that  such  a  contract  is  to  be  inferred  from  these  circum- 
stances has  been  ever  since  adhered  to  without  question  or  dispute 
by  the  English  courts,  and  no  principle  is  better  settled  in  that 
country  than  that  which  obliges  the  carrier,  who  so  accepts  goods 
for  transportation  the  destination  of  which  is  one  to  which  he 
himself  does  not  carry  because  off  or  beyond  his  own  route,  to 
nevertheless  take  upon  himself  the  responsibility  for  both  the 
carriage  and  the  safety  of  the  goods  to  destination ;  and  if  they 
be  lost  upon  the  route,  no  matter  by  whom,  he  becomes  liable  to 
the  owner  for  the  loss,  unless  he  has  protected  himself  against 
such  liability  by  contract.^  And  not  only  does  the  first  or  con- 
tracting carrier  become  liable,  no  matter  by  whom  the  goods  may 
be  lost,  but  it  becom.es  exclusively  responsible  and  can  alone  be 
sued  by  the  aggrieved  party ;  and  any  attempt  to  hold  the  sub- 
sequent or  connecting  carrier  liable  for  the  loss,  although  it  may 
have  occured  from  its  negligence  or  fault,  must  fail  for  the  want 
of  privity  of  contract  between  such  carrier  and  the  injured 
party.^ 

8.  Scothorn   v.    The    Railway,    8  9.  Collins    v.    The    Railway,    11 

Exch.  341;  Crouch  v.  The  Railway,  Exch.  790;  Coxon  r.  The  Railway, 

2  Hurl.  &  N.  491;  3  id.  383;  Wilby  5  Hurl.  &  N.   274;    Mytton  r.  The 

V.  The  Railway,  2  id.  703;  Watson  Railway,  4  id.  615. 
V.  Railway,    15   Jur.   448;    Webber 
V.  Railway,  3  H.  &  C.  771. 


244 


THE  LAW  OF   CARRIERS. 


[§  230. 


Sec.  230.     (§  148.)     English  rule  prevails  in  many  states. — 

Upon  the  question  of  the  justice  and  policy  of  this  rule  the  Amer- 
ican courts  are  divided.  A  number  of  them  have  emphatically 
approved  and  adopted  it,  and  hold  that  the  acceptance  of  the 
goods,  in  the  absence  of  express  contract,  implies  an  under- 
taking on  the  part  of  the  carrier  to  transport  them  as  consigned 
or  directed,  although  it  may  be  to  a  place  to  which  the  carrier 
himself  does  not  carry,  and  puts  upon  him  the  responsibility  to 
the  end  of  the  transit,  no  matter  how  many  subsidiary  lines  it 
may  be  necessary  to  employ  to  complete  it.^^ 


10.  Alabama:  Mobile,  etc.,  R.  Co. 
V.  Copeland,  63  Ala.  219;  Louis- 
ville, etc.,  R.  Co.  V.  Meyer,  78  Ala. 
597;     Southern,    etc.,    R'y-    Co.    v. 

Levy,  Ala.  ,  39  So.  Rep. 

95. 

Arkansas:        Railroad      Co.     v. 

Washington,  Ark.  ,  85  S. 

W.  Rep.  406;  Railway  Co.  v.  Rec- 
ord,   Ark.  ,  85  S.  W.  Rep. 

421. 

Georgia:  Falvey  v.  Railroad 
Co.,  76  Ga.  597;  Atlanta,  etc.,  R. 
Co.  V.  Texas  Grate  Co.,  81  Ga.  602; 
Mosher  v.  The  So.  Ex.  Co.,  38  Ga. 
37;  Southern  Ex.  Co.  v.  Shea,  38 
Ga.    519. 

Illinois:  Ohio,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Emrich,  24  111.  App.  245;  Wabash, 
etc.  R'y  Co.  v.  Jaggerman,  115  111. 
407;  111.  Cen.  R.  R.  v.  Copeland, 
24  111.  332;  111.  Cen.  R.  R.  v.  John- 
son, 34  id.  389;  111.  Cen.  R.  R.  v. 
Frankenberg,  54  id.  88;  U.  S.  Ex- 
press Co.  V.  Haines,  67  id.  137; 
Chicago,  etc.  R.  R.  v.  The  People, 
56  id.  365;  Erie  R.  R.  v.  Wilcox, 
111.  Sup.  Ct,  Chicago  L.  News,  9, 
178;  Adams  Ex.  Co.  v.  Wilson,  81 
111.  339;  Wabash  R.  Co.  v.  Harris, 
55  111.  App.  159;  Transportation 
Co.  V.  Flour  Mills  Co.,  92  111.  App. 
628;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Simon,  160 
111.    648,    43    N.    E.    Rep.    596,    af- 


firming 57  111.  App.  502;  Railroad 
Co.  V.  Carter,  165  111.  570,  46  N.  E. 
Rep.  374,  36  L.  R.  A.  527,  reversing 
62  111.  App.  618;  Railway  Co.  v. 
Elgin  Condensed  Milk  Co.,  175  111. 
557,  51  N.  E.  Rep.  911,  67  Am.  St. 
Rep.  238,  affirming  74  111.  App. 
619;  Elgin,  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Bates 
Machine  Co.,  200  111.  636,  66  N.  E. 
Rep.  326,  93  Am.  St.  Rep.  218, 
affirming  98  111.  App.  311. 

Missouri:  Halliday  v.  Railway 
Co.,  74  Mo.  159;  Marshall  v.  Rail- 
way Co.,  74  Mo.  App.  81.  See 
also  Crouch  v.  Railroad  Co.,  42  Mo. 
App.  248. 

New  York:  Weed  v.  The  Rail- 
road,   19    Wend.    534. 

Ohio:  Baltimore,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Campbell,  36  Ohio,  647. 

8.  Carolina:  Bradford  v.  The 
Railroad,  7  Rich.  201;  Kyle  v.  The 
Railroad,  10  id.  382. 

Tennessee:  Carter  v.  Peck,  4 
Sneed,  203;  Western  &  At.  R.  R.  v. 
McElwee,  6  Heisk.  208;  E.  Tenn. 
&  Va.  R.  R.  V.  Rogers,  6  id.  143; 
Louisville,  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Camp- 
bell, 7  id.  253. 

Washington:    Allen   v.    Railway 

Co.,  Wash.  84  Pac.  Rep. 

620. 

Wisconsin:  Hansen  v.  Railroad 
Co.,    73   Wis.    346.       In   many   of 


[  231.] 


CONNECTING  CARRIERS. 


245 


Sec.  231.     (§  149.)     English  rule  denied  in  majority  of  states. 

—On  the  other  hand,  the  majority  of  our  courts  have  pronounced 
with  equal  emphasis  against  the  rule  as  unjust  to  the  carrier  and 


these  cases,  however,  the  contract 
creating  the  liability  was  express. 
See  post,  232. 

The  case  of  Lock  Company  v. 
The  Railroad,  48  N.  H.  339,  rec- 
ognizes and  indorses  Muschamp's 
Case  to  the  fullest  extent  (though 
it  might  have  been  put  on  other 
grounds,  as  there  was  practically 
a  partnership  between  the  con- 
necting lines),  and  arguendo  the 
court  said:  "The  use  of  steam  in 
carrying  goods  and  passengers  has 
produced  a  great  revolution  in  the 
whole  business.  The  amount  and 
importance  of  it  have  of  late 
vastly  increased  and  are  every  day 
increasing.  The  large  business 
between  the  different  parts  of  the 
country  is  done  by  parties  who 
are  associated  in  long  continuous 
lines,  receiving  one  fare  through 
and  dividing  it  among  themselves 
by  mutual  agreement.  They  act 
together  for  all  practical  purposes, 
so  far  as  their  own  interests  are 
concerned,  as  one  united  and  joint 
association.  In  managing  and 
controlling  the  business  on  their 
lines,  they  have  all  the  advantages 
that  could  be  derived  from  a  legal 
partnership.  They  make  such  ar- 
rangements among  themselves  as 
they  see  fit  for  sharing  the  losses 
as  they  do  the  profits  that  happen 
on  any  part  of  their  route.  If  by 
their  agreement  each  party  to 
their  connected  line  is  to  make 
good  the  losses  that  happen  on 
his  part  of  the  route,  the  asso- 
ciated carriers  and  not  the  owner 
of  the  goods  have  the  means  of 
ascertaining  where  the  losses  have 


happened.  And  if  this  cannot  be 
known,  there  is  nothing  unreason- 
able or  inconsistent  in  their  shar- 
ing the  losses,  as  in  the  case  of  a 
legal  partnership,  in  proportion  to 
their  respective  interests  in  the 
whole  route.  What  then  is  the 
situation  of  the  owner  whose  goods 
have  been  damaged  or  lost  on  a 
continuous  line  of  three  or  any 
larger  number  of  associated  car- 
riers, if  he  can  look  only  to  the 
carrier  on  whose  part  of  the  route 
the  damages  have  happened?  In 
the  first  place,  he  must  set  about 
learning  where  his  loss  happened. 
This  would  be  difficult  and  often 
impossible.  ...  He  would  have 
no  means  of  learning  himself;  and 
he  would  not,  unless  of  a  very 
confiding  disposition,  rely  on  any 
very  zealous  aid  in  his  search 
from  the  different  carriers  asso- 
ciated in  the  connected  line.  And 
if  he  should  have  the  luck  to 
make  the  discovery,  he  might  be 
obliged  to  assert  his  claim  for 
compensation  against  a  distant 
party,  among  strangers,  in  cir- 
cumstances such  as  would  dis- 
courage a  prudent  man  and  induce 
him  to  sit  down  patiently  under 
his  loss  rather  than  incur  the 
expense  and  risk  of  pursuing  his 
legal  remedy  under  the  rule  set 
up  by  these  defendants." 

In  The  Illinois  Central  Railroad 
V  Frankenberg,  54  111.  88,  the  su- 
preme court  of  Illinois,  by  C.  J. 
Breese,  made  use  of  the  following 
language  upon  the  subject  of  the 
adoption  of  the  rule  in  Mus- 
champ's Case: 


246 


THE  LAW  OF   CARREERS. 


[§231. 


as  unnecessary  upon  any  grounds  of  public  policy,  and  have  held 
that,  in  the  absence  of  any  other  contract  than  such  as  is  gener- 
ally to  be  implied  from  the  acceptance  of  the  goods  for  carriage, 
the  obligation  of  the  carrier  extends  only  to  the  transportation  to 
the  end  of  his  route  and  a  delivery  there  to  the  next  succeeding 


"So  long  ago  as  I860  this  court, 
in  the  case  of  this  same  company 
against  Copeland,  24  III.  332,  ex- 
pressed a  decided  partiality  for 
the  rule  in  Muschamp's  Case,  8 
Mees.  &  Wels.  421,  so  much  relied 
on  by  the  appellee,  and  in  which 
case  all  the  authorities,  both 
English  and  American,  were  fully 
examined,  and  we  said,  though 
this  point  was  not  in  the  case,  we 
were  inclined  to  yield  to  the  force 
of  the  reasoning  of  the  English 
courts  on  principles  of  public  con- 
venience, if  no  other,  and  to  hold 
when  a  carrier  receives  goods  to 
carry,  marked  to  a  particular 
place,  he  is  prima  facie  bound  to 
carry  and  deliver  at  that  place. 
By  accepting  the  goods  so  marked 
he  impliedly  agrees  so  to  do,  and 
he  ought  to  be  answerable  for  the 
loss. 

"Again,  in  the  case  of  the  same 
company  against  Johnson,  34  id. 
389,  there  was  an  express  under- 
standing to  transport  the  goods 
to  Wheeling,  but  the  court,  refer- 
ring to  Copeland's  Case,  supra, 
considered  that  case  as  holding 
that  a  carrier  who  receives  goods 
to  carry,  marked  to  a  particular 
place,  was  bound  to  carry  to  and 
deliver  at  that  place — that  it  was 
on  an  agreement  implied  from  the 
mark  or  direction  on  the  goods, 
and  accepting  them  so  marked 
that    the    liability    arose. 

"Now,  on  the  point  of  public 
convenience,  which  consideration 
had   great  weight  with  us  in   de- 


termining which  rule  should  be 
adopted,  it  seems  to  us  that  con- 
signors of  the  productions  of  our 
country  or  other  property  by  rail- 
road should  not  be  required  in 
case  of  loss  or  damage,  to  look 
for  remuneration  to  any  other 
party  than  the  one  to  which  they 
delivered  the  goods.  It  would  be 
a  great  hardship,  indeed,  to  com- 
pel the  consignor  of  a  few  barrels 
of  flour  delivered  to  a  railroad  in 
this  state,  marked  to  New  York 
city,  and  which  are  lost  in  the 
transit,  to  go  to  New  York,  or  to 
the  intermediate  lines  of  road,  and 
spend  days  and  weeks,  perhaps,  in 
endeavors  to  find  out  on  what 
particular  road  the  loss  happened, 
and,  having  ascertained  it,  in  the 
event  of  a  refusal  to  adjust  the 
loss,  to  bring  a  suit  in  the  court 
of  New  York  for  his  damages.  Far 
more  just  would  it  be  to  hold  the 
company  who  received  the  goods 
in  the  first  instance  as  the  re- 
sponsible party,  and  the  interme- 
diate roads  its  agents  to  carry  and 
deliver;  and  it  is  the  most  reason- 
able and  just,  for  all  railroads 
have  facilities  not  possessed  by  a 
consignor  of  tracing  losses  of 
property  conveyed  by  them,  and 
all  have,  or  can  have,  running 
connections  with  each  other. 
Above  all,  when  it  is  considered 
the  receiving  company  can,  at  the 
cutset,  relieve  itself  from  its  com- 
mon-law liability  by  a  special  and 
definite  agreement,  such  a  rule 
cannot  prejudice  them.     The  rule 


231.] 


CONNECTING  CARRIERS. 


247 


carrier  to  further  or  complete  the  transportation.  In  order  to  be 
bound  further  there  must  be  a  positive  agreement,  either  express 
or  implied,  extending  the  liabilit^V^  and  the  burden  of  proof  will 


being  known,  all  parties  can  read- 
ily accommodate  their  business  to 
it,  and  no  inconvenience  can  re- 
sult to  any  one  from  its  opera- 
tion." A  contract  exempting  the 
carrier  from  liability  was,  how- 
ever, enforced. 

11.  See  United  States:  Railroad 
Co.  V.  The  Manuf.  Co.,  16  Wall. 
318;  Railroad  Co.  r.  Pratt,  22  id. 
123;  Myrick  v.  Railroad  Co.,  107 
U.  S.  102;  Stewart  v.  Railroad  Co., 
1  McCrary,  312;  Railway  v.  Fair- 
banks &  Co.,  90  Fed.  467,  33  C.  C. 
A.  611;  Railroad  Co.,  v.  Jones, 
155  U.   S.   333,   15   Sup.  Ct.  R.   136. 

California:  Cavallaro  v.  Railway 
Co.,  110  Cal.  348,  42  Pac.  Rep. 
918,  52  Am.  St.  Rep.  918,  citing 
Hutchinson  on  Carr.  See  also, 
Pereira  v.  Railroad  Co.,  66  Cal.  92. 

Connecticut:  Hood  v.  The  Rail- 
road, 22  Conn.  502;  Elmore  v.  The 
Railroad,  23  Conn.  457. 

Florida:  Savannah,  etc.  R'y  Co. 
V.  Harris,  26  Fla.  148,  7  So.  Rep. 
544.  See  also,  Bennett  v.  Filyaw, 
1  Fla.  403. 

Indiana:  Railway  Co.  v.  Bryant, 

Ind.  App.  — ,  75  N.  E.  Rep. 

829. 

loioa:  Hill  v.  Railroad  Co.,  60 
Iowa,  196;  Hartley  v.  Railroad  Co., 
115  Iowa,  612,  89  N.  W.  88;  Angle 
V.  Railroad  Co.,  9  Iowa,  487;  Mul- 
ligan r.  Railway  Co.,  36  Iowa,  181. 

Kansas:  Berg  v.  Railroad  Co.,  30 
Kan.  561. 

Kentucky:  Railroad  Co.  v.  Cro- 
zier,  13  Ky.  Law  Rep.  175;  Rail- 
way Co.  V.  Foster,  13  id.  637; 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Cooper,  19  Ky. 
Law    Rep.    1152,    43    S.    W.    Rep. 


1134;  Thomas  v.  Railway  Co.,  25 
Ky.  Law  Rep.  1051,  76  S.  W.  Rep. 
1093. 

Louisiana:  Vincent  &  Hayae, 
114  La.   1021,  38  So.  Rep.  816. 

Maryland:  Bait.  &  O.  R.  R.  v. 
Schumaker,  29  Md.  176;  Hoffman 
V.  Railroad  Co.,  85  Md.  391,  37 
Atl.  Rep.   214. 

Maine:  Perkins  v.  The  Railroad, 
47  Me.  589;  Skinner  r.  Hall,  GO 
id.  477;  Plantation  v.  Hall,  61  id. 
517. 

Massachusetts:  Nutting  v.  The 
Railroad,  1  Gray,  502;  Darling  v. 
The  Railroad,  11  Allen,  295;  Bur- 
roughs V.  The  Railroad,  100  Mass. 
26. 

Michigan:  McMillan  v.  The  Rail- 
road, 16  Mich.  120;  Detroit,  etc. 
R'y  V.  McKenzie,  43  Mich.  609; 
Rickerson,  etc.  Co.  v.  Railroad  Co., 
67  Mich.  110;  Smith  v.  Express 
Co.,  108  Mich.  572,  66  N.  W.  Rep. 
479. 

Minnesota:  Irish  v.  The  Rail- 
road, 19  Minn.  376. 

Mississippi:  Crawford  v.  The  R. 
R.  Association,  51  Miss.  222. 

New  Hampshire:  Gray  v.  Jack- 
son,  51   N.   H.   9. 

New  York:  Van  Santvoord  v. 
St.  John,  6  Hill,  158;  Condict  v. 
The  Railroad,  54  N.  Y.  502;  Root 
V.  The  Railroad,  45  id.  524;  Klein 
V.  Dunlop,  16  Misc.  Rep.  34,  37  N. 
Y.  Supp.  947;  Bishawaiti  v.  Rail- 
road Co.,  92  N.  Y.  Supp.  783;  So- 
viero  v.  Express  Co.,  94  N.  Y. 
Supp.   375. 

North  Carolina:  Phillips  r.  The 
Railroad.  78  N.  C.  294;  Knott  r. 
Railroad  Co.,  98  N.  Car.  73;  Mere- 


248 


THE  LAW   OP   CiVRRIERS. 


[§  231. 


dith  V.  Railway,  137  N.  Car.  478, 
50  S.  E.  Rep.  1,  citing  Hutchinson 
en  Carr. 

Oklahoma:     Church  v.  Railroad 
Co.,  1  Okl.  44,  29  Pac.  Rep.   530. 


only  part  of  the  distance,  and  that 
it  was  necessary  for  it  to  trans- 
fer its  freight  for  New  York  to 
another  line,  which  it  did  in  this 
instance,    taking   a   receipt  for   it 


Oregon:   Taffee  v.  Railroad  Co.,     from    the    connecting   carrier.      It 


41  Or.  64,  67  Pac.  Rep.  1015,  58 
L.  R.  A.  187,  citing  Hutchinson 
on  Carr. 

Pennsylvania:  Camden,  etc.  R. 
R.  V.  Forsyth,  61  Penn.  St.  81; 
Clyde  V.  Hubbard,  88  Penn.  St. 
358;  Kellar  v.  Railway  Co.,  196 
Pa.   St.  57,  46  Atl.  Rep.  261. 

Rhode  Island:  Harris  v.  Railway 
Co.,  15  R.  I.  371;  Knight  v.  Rail- 
road Co.,  13  R.  I.  572. 

Texas:  Hunter  v.  Railway  Co., 
76  Tex.  195;  Railway  Co.  v.  Galla- 
gher, (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  64  S.  W. 
Rep.  809,  citing  Hutchinson  on 
Carr.;  Gulf,  etc.  R'y  Co.  v.  Jack- 
son   &    Edwards,   Tex.    , 

89  S.  W.  Rep.  968,  reversing  (Tex. 
Civ.  App.)    86   S.  W.  Rep.  47. 

Vermont:  Farmers  &  M.  Bank 
V.  The  Trans.  Co.,  23  Vt.  186; 
Brintnall  v.  The  Railroad,  32  Vt. 
665;  Hadd  v.  Express  Co.,  52  Vt. 
335. 

Virginia:  McConnell  v.  Rail- 
road Co.,  86  Va.  248,  9  S.  E.  Rep. 
3  006. 

In  a  number  of  these  cases, 
however,  the  point  was  not  in- 
volved or  there  was  an  express 
exemption  from  liability.  See  § 
232. 

Nutting  V.  The  Connecticut  River 
Railroad  may,  perhaps,  be  consid- 
ered as  the  leading  case  in  opposi- 
tion to  the  English  rule.  The 
receipt  for  the  goods,  so  far  as 
material  to  the  question  of  lia- 
bility, was,  "Received  of  E.  Nut- 
ting for  transportation  to  New 
York."  The  proof  was  that  the 
defendant  company's  line  extended 


was  further  admitted  that  the  de- 
fendant company  was  paid  for  the 
carriage  only  to  the  end  of  its 
own  line  and  that  there  was  no 
connection  in  business  between 
the  two  lines.  In  giving  the  judg- 
ment of  the  court,  Metcalf,  J., 
said:  "In  our  judgment  the  ob- 
ligation is  nothing  more  than  to 
transport  the  goods  safely  to  the 
end  of  their  road  and  there  de- 
liver them  to  the  proper  carriers 
to  be  forwarded  towards  their  ul- 
timate destination.  .  .  .  But 
the  plaintiff  seeks  to  charge  the 
defendant  on  the  receipt  given  by 
Clarke,  their  agent,  as  on  a  spe- 
cial contract  that  the  boxes  should 
be  safely  carried  the  whole  dis- 
tance between  Northampton  and 
New  York.  We  cannot  so  construe 
the  receipt.  It  merely  states  the 
fact  that  the  boxes  had  been  re- 
ceived for  transportation  to  New 
York;  and  the  plaintiff  might  have 
proved  that  fact,  with  the  same 
legal  consequences  to  the  defend- 
ant, by  oral  testimony,  if  he  had 
not  taken  the  receipt.  The  receipt 
in  our  opinion  imposed  on  defend- 
ant no  further  obligation  than  the 
law  imposed  without  it."  And  in 
reference  to  the  rule  as  laid  down 
in  Muschamp  v.  The  Railway, 
which  was  urged  upon  the  court, 
he  went  on  to  say:  "We  cannot 
concur  in  that  view  of  the  law, 
and  we  are  sustained  in  our  dis- 
sent from  it  by  the  court  of  errors 
of  New  York  and  by  the  supreme 
courts  of  Vermont  and  Connecti- 
cut." 


§232.] 


CONNECTING   CARRIERS. 


249 


be  upon  the  shipper  to  prove  that  such  an  agreement  was  made.*  2 
'And  this  is  frequently  called  the  American  rule,  in  distinction  to 
that  of  the  English  courts. 

Sec.  232.  (§149a.)  Further  of  this  rule.— This  conflict  in 
the  cases  respecting  the  rule  of  Muschamp's  Case  seems,  however, 
to  be  more  apparent  than  real,  and  to  be  based  in  many  instances 
upon  an  entire  misapprehension  of  the  true  effect  of  the  de- 
cision in  that  case.^"^  In  many  of  the  American  cases  in  which 
it  is  referred  to,  it  was  wholly  foreign  to  the  issue,  inasmuch  as 
the  contract  involved  in  those  cases,  whether  imposing  or  exclud- 
ing the  liability,  was  in  writing  and  clearly  express,  while  in 
Muschamp's  Case  the  contract  was  neither  in  writing  nor  ex- 
press, but  was  wholly  implied  from  circumstances.^^     Cases  of 


12.  Taylor  v.  Railroad  Co.,  87 
Me.    299,    32    Atl.    Rep.    905. 

13.  In  Gray  v.  Jackson,  51  N.  H. 
9,  34,  Doe,  J.,  after  reviewing  sub- 
stantially all  of  the  English  and 
American  cases  down  to  that  date 
(1871),  says:  "These  are  some  of 
the  principal  American  cases 
usually  cited  on  the  question  of 
the  liability  of  a  carrier  beyond 
his  own  route,  in  the  absence  of 
an  express  written  contract.  Some 
of  them  are  not  in  point.  Many 
contain  nothing  but  dicta  on  the 
subject.  Some  turn  on  writings 
held  to  be^  or  treated  as,  express 
contracts,  the  construction  of 
which  by  the  court  show  the  un- 
derstanding of  the  parties,  with- 
out the  finding  of  a  jury  on  parol 
or  circumstantial  evidence.  Some 
are  based  on  the  mistake  of  sup- 
posing that  in  Muschamp's  Case 
the  defendants  were  held  liable  by 
the  court  as  a  matter  of  law. 
Some  are  controlled  or  influenced 
by  the  mistake  of  supposing  that 
in  Muschamp's  Case  the  opinions 
of  the  judges  on  the  prima  facie 
weight  of  the  evidence  were  opin- 


ions on  the  law.  It  would  seem 
that  in  no  one  of  them  has  the 
question  been  to  be,  or  been  treat- 
ed as,  a  question  of  law,  where 
it  was  claimed  to  be  a  question 
of  fact  or  where  the  attention  of 
the  court  was  called  to  the  dis- 
tinction between  law  and  fact, — a 
distinction  which  has  been  cloud- 
ed by  misapprehensions  of  Mus- 
champ's Case.  In  nearly  all  of 
them,  when  there  is  no  decisive 
contract  in  writing,  it  is  held  to 
be,  or  practically  treated  as,  a 
question  of  fact.  There  is  much 
in  the  American  authorities  going 
strongly  to  show  that  Lord  Abin- 
ger  was  right,  and  there  is  noth- 
ing in  them  having  any  consid- 
erable tendency  to  show  that  he 
was  wrong  when  he  said,  in  Mus- 
champ's Case,  'The  whole  matter 
is  therefore  a  question  for  the 
jury,  to  determine  what  the  con- 
tract was,  on  the  evidence  before 
them.' " 

14.  How  true  this  is  can  be  best 
determined  by  a  careful  examina- 
tion of  the  cases  cited  in  the  two 
preceding    sections,    but     of    the 


250  THE  LAW   OF    CARRIERS.  [§  232. 

this  nature  should  and  doubtless  would  have  been  decided  in  the 
same  way  in  any  of  the  states. 

The  rule  in  Sluschamp  's  Case  has  also  been  regarded  in  many 
of  the  American  cases  as  constituting  a  part  of  the  common  law 
in  the  same  manner  as  the  rule  fixing  the  carrier 's  liability  as  an 
insurer,  and,  like  that  liability,  placed  beyond  the  reach  of  con- 
tracts limiting  the  responsibility  for  negligence.i^  But  this  it 
clearly  is  not.  The  whole  liability  of  the  carrier  beyond  his  own 
line  is  based  upon  contract,  express  or  implied,  and  unless  such 
a  contract  appears  there  is  no  liability^^  A  fortiori  is  there  no 
such  liability  where  there  is  not  only  no  implied  contract  creating 
it  but  an  express  contract  excluding  it.^'^ 

"There  is  really  no  great  difference,"  said  the  court  in  the 
case  of  Piedmont  Manufacturing  Company  v.  The  Railroad,^ ^ 
between  the  English  and  American  doctrine  on  this  subject.  The 
one  holds  that  to  exempt  a  carrier  from  liability  beyond  its  ter- 
minus there  must  be  a  special  contract  to  that  end.  The  other, 
that  to  make  the  first  carrier  responsible  there  must  be  a  special 
contract  to  that  end.  Both  admit  that  the  carrier  is  not  bound 
to  go  beyond  the  terminus,  but  that  he  may  do  so;  and  if  he 
undertakes  to  do  so  he  is  bound  by  his  undertaking.    In  the  one 

cases  in  which  there  was   an  ex-  Kan.    561;    Cincinnati,   etc.   R.   R. 

press     exemption,     the     cases     of  Co.   v.   Pontius,   19   Ohio   St.    221; 

Hunter    v.    Railway    Co.,    76    Tex.  Detroit,  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Bank,  20 

195;    McConnell    v.    Railroad    Co.,  Wis.   122;   Gray  v.  Jackson,  51  N. 

86  Va.  248,  9  S.  E.  Rep.  1006;  Ortt  H.  9;    Piedmont  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Rail- 

V.  Railway  Co.,  36  Minn.  396;  Berg  road^   19   S.   C.   353;    Marmonstein 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  30  Kan.  561;  Har-  v.  Railroad  Co.,  13  Misc.  Rep.  32; 

ris  V.   Railway  Co.,   15  R.    I.   371;  34   N.    Y.    Supp.    97,    reversing    11 

Myrick  v.  Railroad  Co.,  107  U.  S.  Misc.    Rep.    725,    32    N.    Y.    Supp. 

102,     will     furnish     illustrations,  1146;  Railway  Co.  v.  Viers,  24  Ky. 

while  of  the  other  class  such  cases  Law  Rep.  356,  68  S.  W.  Rep.  469; 

as  Falvey  v.  Railroad  Co.,  76  Ga.  Pennsylvania    Co.    v.    Dickson,    3] 

597;    Hansen    r.    Railroad    Co.,    73  Ind.  App.  451,  67  N.  E.  Rep.  538, 

"Wis.  346;  Mobile,  etc.  Railroad  Co.  citing  Hutchinson  on  Carr. 
V.   Copeland,   63   Ala.   219,  are  ex-         17.  See  cases  cited  in  following 

amples.  section. 

15.  See  Condict  v.  Railroad  Co.,  18.  Piedmont  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Rail- 
54   N.   Y.    501.  road,    19    S.    C.    353. 

16.  See  Berg  v.  Railroad  Co.,  30 


§233. 


CONNECTING  CAKRIERS. 


251 


case,  if  the  contract  contains  no  exemption  it  is  absolute  •  in  the 
other,  if  conditions  are  specified  they  must  govern.  This  is 
nothing  more  than  saying  that  the  whole  thing  is  per  contract 

and  that  whatever  the  contract  is,  that  must  be  enforced the 

legal  construction  being  that  in  the  one  case,  in  the  absence  of  ex- 
emptions, the  carrier  has  contracted  unconditionally  to  deliver; 
the  other,  with  conditions  inserted,  they  must  control." 

Sec.  233.  (§  149b.)  Liability  beyond  terminus  may  be  ex- 
cluded by  contract.— The  liability  of  the  carrier  beyond  tlie 
terminus  of  his  own  route  being  thus  a  matter  of  contract,  it  is 
clear  that  he  may  prevent  all  questions  as  to  his  liability  by  an 
express  contract  excluding  it,  and  that  such  a  contract  will  be 
enforcedly  even  in  those  states  where  the  rule  of  Muschamp's 


19.  United  States:  Myrick  v. 
Railroad  Co.,  107  U.  S.  102;  Rail- 
road Co.  V.  Pearce,  192  U.  S.  179. 

Alabama:    Jones  v.  Railway  Co., 

89  Ala.   376. 

Arkansas:  Railway  Co.  v.  Odom, 
63   Ark.    326,    38    S.    W.    Rep.    339; 

Railroad  Co.   v.  Washington,  

Ark.   ,   69   L.   R.   A.    65,   85    S. 

W.  Rep.  406,  citing  Hutchinson  on 
Carr. 

Canada:  Neil  v.  Express  Co.,  20 
Quebec  R.  S.  C.  253,  2  Canadian 
Ry.  Cases   111. 

Georgia:  Railroad  Co.  v.  Shomo, 

90  Ga.  496,  16  S.  E.  Rep.  220,  cit- 
ing Hutchinson  on  Carr.;  Railway 
Co.  V.  White,  108  Ga.  201,  33  S.  E. 
Rep.  952. 

Kansas:  Berg  v.  Railroad  Co., 
30  Kan.  561;  Hoffman  v.  Railway 
Co.,  8  Kan.  App.  379,  56  Pac.  Rep. 
331;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Richardson, 
53  Kan.  157,  35  Pac.  Rep.  1114, 
citing  Hutchinson  on  Carr. 

Kentucky:  Railroad  Co.  v. 
Bourne  et.  al.,  15  Ky.  Law  Rep. 
445;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Tarter,  19 
Ky.  Law  Rep.  229,  39  S.  W.  Rep. 
()98;    Railroad  Co.   v.   Chestnut  & 


Bros.,  24  Ky.  Law  Rep.  1840,  72 
S.  W.  Rep.  351, 

Michigan:  Detroit,  etc.  R'y.  Co. 
V.  McKenzie,   43   Mich.  609. 

Minnesota:  Ortt  v.  Railway  Co., 
36  Minn.   396. 

Nebraska:  Fremont,  etc.  Rail- 
road Co.  V.  N.  Y.,  etc.  Railroad 
Co.,  66  Neb.  159,  92  N.  W.  Rep. 
131,   59   L.  R.  A.   939. 

New  York:  Harris  v.  Railroad 
Co.,  36  Misc.  R.  181,  73  N.  Y. 
Supp.  159;  Mills  V.  Weir,  82  App. 
Div.  396,  81  N.  Y.  Supp.  801; 
American  Hay  Co.  v.  Railroad,  85 
N.  Y.  Supp.  341;  Bishawaiti  v. 
Railroad  Co.,  92  N.  Y.  Supp.  783. 

Pennsylvania:  Keller  v.  Rail- 
road Co.,  174  Penn.  St.  62,  34  Atl. 
Rep.  455;  See  also,  196  Penn.  St, 
57,   46  Atl.  Rep.   261. 

Rhode  Island:  Harris  v.  Rail- 
way Co.,  15  R.  L  371;  Knight  V. 
Railroad  Co.,  13  R.  I.  572. 

Tennessee:  Bird  v.  Railway  Co., 
99  Tenn.  719,  42  S.  W.  Rep.  451, 
63  Am.  St.  Rep.  856;  Post  v.  Rail- 
way Co.,  103  Tenn.  184,  52  S.  W. 
Rep.  301,  55  L.  R.  A.  481,  16  Am. 
&  Eng.  Rd.  Cas.  (N.  S.)  201;  Rail- 


252 


THE   LAW   OF    CiVKRIERS. 


[§  233. 


Case  prevails.2o  Such  a  contract  is  not  opposed  to  public  policy 
nor  void  as  an  effort  to  relieve  the  carrier  of  his  common-law 
liability  for  negiigence.21 

Limitations  of  this  nature  are  found  in  nearly  all  of  the  mod- 
ern contracts  of  carriers,  and  will  prevail  under  the  same  circum- 
stances that  any  other  contract  would  be  enforced.  Questions 
of  conflict  between  printed  conditions  and  written  undertakings, 
and  of  the  sufficiency  of  a  mere  notice  to  effect  an  exemption, 
must  be  settled  by  the  same  rule  applicable  to  other  cases.22    And 


way  Co.  V.  Stone  &  Haslett,  112 
Tenn.  348,  105  Am.  St.  Rep.  955, 
79  S.  W.  Rep.  1031,  citing  Hutchin- 
son on  Carr. 

Texas:  Hunter  v.  Railroad  Co., 
76  Tex.  195;  Texas  etc.  R'y.  Co.  v. 
Adams,  78  Tex.  372,  14  S.  W.  Rep. 
666;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Mahula,  1 
Tex.  Civ.  App.  182,  20  S.  W.  Rep. 
1002;  Railway  Co.  v.  Short,  (Tex. 
Civ.  App.)  25  S.  W.  Rep.  142; 
Railway  Co.  v.  Thompson,  (Tex. 
Civ.  App.)  21  S.  W.  Rep.  186; 
Railway  Co.  v.  Houston,  (Tex.  Civ. 
App.)  40  S.  W.  Rep.  842;  Rail- 
way Co.  V.  Byers  Bros.,  7  Tex.  Ct. 
Rep.  244,  73  S.  W.  Rep.  427;  Rail- 
way Co.  V.  Campbell,  (Tex.  Civ. 
App.)  85  S.  W.  Rep.  1158;  McCarn 
V.  Railway  Co.,  84  Tex.  352,  19  S. 
W.  Rep.  547,  31  Am.  St.  Rep.  51, 
16  L.  R.  A.  39;  International,  etc. 

R.  Co.  V.  Heittner,  Tex.  Civ. 

App.  ,  94   S.  W.  Rep.   189. 

Virginia:  McConnell  v.  Railroad 
Co.,  86  Va.  248,  9  S.  E.  Rep.  1006. 

Wisconsin:  Tolman  v.  Abbot, 
78  Wis.    192,  47  N.  W.  Rep.  264. 

20.  111.  Cent.  R.  R.  v.  Franken- 
berg,  54  111.  88;  "Wabash  Railroad 
Co.  V.  Harris,  55  111.  App.  159; 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Smith,  81  111.  App. 
364;  Lehigh,  etc.  Transp.  Co.  v. 
Pillsbury,  etc.  Co.,  92  111.  App.  628. 
But  where  the  provision  excluding 


liability  beyond  the  carrier's  own 
line  is  somewhat  obscured  by  the 
use  of  stamps,  it  will  not  be  bind- 
ing on  the  shipper.     Allen  v.  Rail-' 

way  Co.,  Wash.  ,  84  Pac. 

Rep.   620. 

21.  Berg  v.  Railroad  Co.,  30  Kan. 
561;  Hartley  v.  Railroad  Co.,  115 
Iowa,  612,  89  N.  W.  Rep.  88;  Rail- 
road Co.  V.  Earnest  &  Bost,  (Tex. 
Civ.  App)  77  S.  W.  Rep.  29.  A 
contract  providing  that  the  car- 
rier shall  not  be  liable  for  injuries 
arising  beyond  its  own  line  is  not 
contrary  to  a  section  of  a  state 
constitution  which  provides  that 
no  common  carrier  shall  be  per- 
mitted to  contract  for  relief  from 
its  common  law  liability.  Rail- 
way Co.  V.  Viers,  23  Ky.  Law  Rep. 
356,  68  S.  W.  Rep.  469.  But  if 
the  initial  carrier,  although  limit- 
ing its  liability  to  its  own  line, 
runs  its  train  over  the  track  of  a 
connecting  carrier  and  uses  its 
own  engine  and  trainmen,  it  is 
nevertheless  liable  for  the  negli- 
gence of  its  servants  while  operat- 
ing the  train  over  such  connect- 
ing line.  Leonard  v.  Railroad  Co., 
54  Mo.  App.  293;  s.  c.  57  Mo.  App. 
366. 

22.  See  Illinois  Cent.  R.  R.  v. 
Frankenberg,  supra. 


§233.] 


CONNECTING  CARRIERS. 


253 


the  same  is  true  in  determining  the  effect  of  the  acceptance  of  a 
receipt  containing  such  an  exemption.-^ 


23.  See  post,  §  408. 

A  written  contract  for  shipment 
beyond  the  first  carrier's  line  will 
control  a  printed  clause  of  a  bill 
of  lading  issued  after  the  ship- 
ment has  begun,  which  clause  pro- 
vides that  the  responsibilty  of  the 
carrier  issuing  the  bill  of  lading 
shall  cease  at  the  terminus  of  its 
own  line.  Railway  Co.  v.  Ameri- 
can   Trading    Co.,    195    U.    S.    439. 

In  Jones  v.  Railway  Co.,  89  Ala. 
376,  the  court  say:  "It  has  come  to 
be  customary  for  railroads,  when 
goods  are  received  for  transporta- 
tion which  must  pass  over  two  or 
more  connecting  roads  before 
reaching  the  place  to  which  they 
are  consigned,  to  insert  a  clause 
similar  to  the  one  found  in  the  bill 
of  lading  before  us,  that  is,  a 
clause  which  limits  the  liability 
of  each  connecting  road  to  loss  or 
injury  suffered  while  on  its  line, 
and  until  the  goods  are  safely  de- 
livered to  the  next  connecting  line. 
And  we  have  held  that,  when  a 
bill  of  lading  containing  such  a 
clause  is  tendered  to  the  shipper 
at  the  time  he  offers  his  goods  for 
shipment,  and  is  accepted  by  him 
and  the  goods  shipped,  this  is  a 
legitimate  limitation  on  the  meas- 
ure of  the  carrier's  liability  and 
becomes  a  part  of  the  contract, 
binding  on  each  of  the  contracting 
parties.  Railroad  Co.  v.  Thomas, 
83  Ala,  343.  And  the  following 
authorities  assert  a  similar  prin- 
ciple: Steele  v.  Townsend,  37  Ala. 
247;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Moore,  51  Ala. 
394;  Railway  Co.  v.  Culver,  75  Ala. 
587;  Alabama,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Mt. 
Vernon  Co.,  84  Ala.  173;  Railroad 


Co.  V.  Sherrod,  84  Ala.  178;  Bank- 
ing Co.  V.  Smitha,  85  Ala.  47.  The 
principle  announced  in  Railroad 
Co.  V.  Copeland,  63  Ala.  219,  to- 
gether with  the  right  to  limit  the 
liability  as  declared  in  Railroad 
Co.  V.  Thomas,  stipra,  may  be  de- 
clared to  be  the  general  doctrine 
in  the  United  States,  except  in  the 
few  states  which  prohibit  the  limi- 
tation by  statute.  Hutch.  Carr.,  §§ 
151-154;  note  to  Cole  v.  Goodwin, 
32  Am.  Dec.  495-507;  note  to  Farm- 
ers', etc.  Bank  v.  Champlain 
Transp.  Co.,  56  Am.  Dec.  84;  Rail- 
road Co.  V.  Lockwood,  17  Wall. 
357;  Nutting  v.  Railroad  Co.,  1 
Gray,  502;  Darling  v.  Railroad  Co., 
11  Allen,  295;  Packard  v.  Taylor, 
35  Ark.  402;  Earnest  v.  Express 
Co.,  1  Woods,  573;  Stjewart  v. 
Railroad  Co.,  1  McCrary,  312,  3 
Fed.  Rep.  768.  It  is  contended  for 
appellant  that  the  principle  de- 
clared in  Thomas'  Case  should  not 
be  applied  to  this,  because  he  could 
not  read,  and,  therefore,  did  not 
know  the  limiting  clause  was  in 
the  bill  of  lading.  ...  If  plain- 
tiff could  not  read,  he  should  have 
informed  the  agent,  and  asked  an 
explanation  of  the  terms  of  the 
bill  of  lading.  Better  that  he 
should  suffer  an  individual  loss 
than  to  declare  a  rule  the  evil 
consequences  of  which  cannot  be 
well  foreseen.  Goetter  v.  Pickett, 
61  Ala.  387;  Dawson  v.  Burrus,  73 
Ala.  .111;  Grace  v.  Adams,  100 
Mass.  505;  Wheel.  Carr.,  222,  223. 
The  case  of  Railroad  Co.  v.  Meyer, 
78  Ala.  597,  stands  on  its  own  pe- 
culiar principles  and  is  distin- 
guishable from  this." 


254  THE  LAW   OF    CAERIERS.  [§  234. 

I 

Sec.  234.  Same  subject — Even  when  liability  fixed  by  stat- 
ute.— Where  a  state  statute  provided  that  common  carriers 
issuing  bills  of  lading  for  property  received  for  transportation 
should  be  liable  for  any  loss,  damage  or  injury  to  the  property 
caused  by  the  negligence  of  any  other  carrier  over  whose  line 
the  same  should  pass  to  reach  its  destination,  it  was  held  that  the 
general  effect  of  the  statute  was  to  apply  to  common  carriers 
the  English  rule  of  duty  and  liability,  as  distinguished  from  the 
American  rule,  in  respect  to  the  carriage  of  goods  beyond  their 
own  routes;^  that  the  mere  aceptance  of  goods  by  the  carrier 
destined  to  a  point  beyond  his  own  route  was  sufficient  to  estab- 
lish a  prima  facie  liability  on  his  part  to  be  responsible  for  their 
safety  until  delivered  at  destination,  but  that  he  was  still  at 
liberty  to  limit  his  liability  to  his  own  route  by  a  specific  agree- 
ment to  that  effect.- 

Sec.  235.  Same  subject — Other  statutory  provisions — Inter- 
state commerce. — Under  the  new  Interstate  Commerce  Act 
common  carriers  who  are  subject  thereto  and  receive  property 
for  transportation  from  a  point  in  one  state  to  a  point  in 
another  state  are  made  liable  for  any  loss,  damage,  or  injury 
to  such  property  caused  by  connecting  carriers  and  cannot  re- 
strict their  liability  to  their  own  line.^ 

1.  McCann  v.  Eddy,  133  Mo.  59,  dy,  supra;  Marshall,  etc.  Grain  Co. 
33  S.  W.  Rep.  71,  35  L.  R.  A.  110,  v.  Railroad  Co.,  176  Mo.  480,  75  S. 
citing  Hutchinson  on  Carr.;  af-  W.  Rep  638,  98  Am.  St.  Rep.  508; 
firmed  in  Railway  Co.  v.  McCann,  Western  Sash  &  Door  Co.  t\  Rail- 
174  U.  S.  580,  19  Sup.  Ct.  R.  775,  road  Co.,  177  Mo.  641,  76  S.  W. 
43  L.  Ed.  1093.  Rep.  998.     But  see  earlier  cases  of 

2.  Dimmitt  v.  Railroad  Co.,  103  Baker  v.  Railway  Co.,  34  Mo.  App. 
Mo.  440,  15  S.  W.  Rep.  761;  Drew  98;  Heil  i\  Railroad  Co.,  16  Mo. 
Glass  Co.  V.  Railway,  44  Mo.  App.  App.  363;  Orr  v.  Railroad  Co.,  21 
416;    Hill   V.   Railway   Co.,   46  Mo.  Mo.  App.  333. 

App.  517;  Hance  v.  Railway  Co.,  "Where  a  receipt  is  required  by 
56  Mo.  App.  476;  id.  62  Mo.  App.  statute  of  a  connecting  carrier,  no 
60;  State  Nat'l  Bank  v.  Railway  particular  form  is  necessary.  Mil- 
Co.,  72  Mo.  App.  82;  Marshall  v.  lev  r.  Railway  Co.,  33  S.  Car.  359, 
Railway  Co.,  74  Mo.  App.  81;  11  S.  E.  Rep.  1093. 
Nines  i\  Railway  Co.,  107  Mo.  475,  3.  See  post,  p.  600. 
18  S.  W.  Rep.  26;   McCann  v.  Ed- 


§236.]  CONNECTING  CARRIERS.  255 

And  where  a  statute  required  that  every  contract  limiting  the 
liability  of  an  initial  carrier  on  an  interstate  shipment  to  its  own 
line  should  be  signed  by  the  shipper,  or  otherwise  be  invalid,  it 
was  held  that  the  statute  was  reasonable  and  was  aimed  to  protect 
the  shipper  by  having  it  clearly  manifested  by  his  signature  that 
his  attention  had  been  called  to  the  limitation  in  the  contract.^ 

Sec  236.  (§  150.)  Even  under  contract  for  through  car- 
riage intermediate  carrier  who  causes  injury  may  be  held  liable. 
— None  of  the  cases  in  this  country,  however,  outside  of  the  state 
of  Georgia,  has  gone  the  length  of  holding  in  accordance  with 
the  English  rule,  that  the  owner  of  the  goods  which  have  been 
lost  or  damaged  whilst  in  the  custody  of  the  carrier  must  seek 
his  remedy  exclusively  from  the  carrier  to  whom  the  goods  were 
in  the  first  place  intrusted  and  with  whom  the  contract  for  their 
carriage  was  in  the  first  place  made ;  but  even  where  the  English 
rule  as  to  the  extent  of  the  obligation  to  carry  has  been  adopted, 
the  right  of  the  owner  to  proceed  against  the  carrier  in  fault  in 
causing  the  loss  or  damage  has  been  fully  recognized  and  is  every 
day  acted  upon.  The  supreme  court  of  Georgia,  however,  con- 
sistently adhered  to  the  theory  of  the  English  courts  throughout, 
and  long  denied  the  right  of  action  against  any  of  the  connecting 
or  subsidiary  carriers,  and  confined  the  injured  party  to  his 
remedy  against  the  carrier  to  whom  the  bailment  was  in  the  first 
instance  made,^  though  a  different  rule  has  since  been  established 
in  that  state  by  statute.®  But  the  rule  which  allows  the  action 
against  the  carrier  in  fault  as  well  as  against  the  one  who  is 
primarily  responsible  certainly  commends  itself  upon  grounds 
of  both  justice  and  convenience,  and,  with  the  above  exception, 
is  the  universal  law  of  this  country.'^     And  while  it  has  been 

4.  Railroad  Co.  v.  Patterson  To-  32  111.  116;  Anchor  Line  v.  Dater, 
bacco  Co.,  169  U.  S.  311,  42  L.  Ed.  68  id.  369;  C.  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
759,  18  Sup.  Ct.  R.  335.  The  Packet  Co.,  70  id.  218;  Barter 

5.  Mosher  v.  The  So.  Ex.  Co.,  38  v.  Wheeler,  49  N.  H.  9;  Southern 
Ga.  37;  Southern  Ex.  Co.  v.  Shea,  Ex.  Co.  v.  Hess,  53  Ala.  19;  Halli- 
id.  519.  day  v.   Railway   Co.,   74  Mo.    159; 

6.  Code,  §2084;  Western,  etc.  R.  Packard  v.  Taylor,  35  Ark.  402; 
Co.  V.  Cotton  Mills,  81  Ga.  522.  International,    etc.    R.    Co.    v.    Tis- 

7.  111.  Cen.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Cowles,  dale,   74   Tex.    8;    Chesapeake,   etc. 


256  THE  Lx\.\V  OF   CARRIERS.  [§  237, 

frequently  urged  that  the  fact  that  the  auxiliary  carrier  acts  in 
the  transportation  as  the  agent  of  the  contracting  carrier,  and 
that  there  is  no  privity  of  contract  between  him  and  the  owner 
of  the  goods,  should  relieve  him  from  answering  to  the  owner  for 
any  loss  or  injury  to  the  goods  while  in  his  custody,  the  courts 
have  consistently  held  that  the  public  character  of  his  employ- 
ment is  such  as  to  impose  upon  him  the  duty  of  safely  transport- 
ing all  goods  of  the  kind  he  professes  to  carry,  whether  received 
from  the  owner  himself  or  from  another  carrier  with  whom  the 
owner  has  contracted,  and  that  for  any  loss  which  may  arise 
either  from  his  negligence  or  misfeasance  he  can  be  held  respon- 
sible. 

Sec.  237.  (§  151.)  Carrier  may  contract  for  the  entire 
transportation. — And  as  the  carrier  may  thus  exempt  himself 
from  liability  by  express  contract,  so  it  is  universally  conceded 
that  he  may  bind  himself  by  an  express  contract  to  carry  to  any 
distance  or  to  any  destination,  whether  the  carriage  can  be  ac- 
complished by  his  own  means  of  conveyance  upon  his  own  route 
or  will  require  the  employment  of  agents  or  subsidiary  carriers 
beyond  it.^  In  this  respect  he  may  bind  himself  to  the  same  ex- 
tent as  other  contracting  parties,  even  to  the  performance  of 
impossibilities  if  he  wall.  The  contract,  however,  according  to 
the  prevailing  opinion,  must  be  express.  It  will  not  be  inferred 
from  doubtful  expressions  or  1  lose  language,  but  only  from  clear 
and  satisfactory  evidence.^ 

R'y.  Co.  V.  Radbourne,  52  111.  App.  way  Co.  v.  Viers,  24  Ky.  Law  Rep. 

203;  Railway  Co.  v.  Twiss,  35  Neb.  356,    68    S.    W.    Rep.    469,    citing 

267,  53  N.  W.  Rep.  76,  37  Am.  St.  Hutchinson   on   Carr. 

Rep.  437;  Railway  Co.  v.  Render-  8.  See  ante,   §  225. 

son,   57   Ark.    402,   21    S.   W.    Rep.  9.  Myrick  v.  Railroad  Co.,  107  U. 

878,   citing   Hutchinson   on   Carr.;  S.  102;  Taylor  v.  The  Railroad,  87 

Cavalarro  v.  Railway  Co.,  110  Cal.  Me.  299,  32  Atl.  Rep.  905;  Hoffman 

348,  42  Pac.  Rep.  918,  52  Am.  St.  v.  Railroad  Co.,  85  Md.  391,  37  Atl. 

Rep.     94,     citing     Hutchinson    on  Rep.  214;  Hoffman  v.  Railway  Co., 

Carr.;  United  States  Mail  Line  Co.  8  Kan.  App.  379,  56  Pac.  Rep.  331; 

V.  Mfg.  Co.,  101  Ky.  658,  42  S.  W.  Railway  Co.  v.  Swenson,  (Tex.  Civ. 

Rep.    342,    citing    Hutchinson    on  App.)  25  S.  W.  Rep.  47. 

Carr.;  Johnson  v.  Railway  Co.,  90  Where   a   drayman,   engaged   in 

Ga.  810,  17  S.  E.  Rep.   121;   Rail-  the    business    of    carrying    goods 


§238. 


CONNECTING  CARRIERS. 


257 


Sec.  238.     (§  152.)     What  constitutes  such  a  contract. — But 

while  it  is  thus  true  that  the  carrier  may  contract  for  through 
carriage,  the  important  and  difficult  question  is,  what  constitutes 
such  a  contract.  Where  the  undertaking  is  express,  there  can, 
of  course,  be  no  difficulty,  but  where  it  is  to  be  implied  from  the 
surrounding  circumstances,  difficulties  present  themselves.  Much 
depends,  also,  upon  the  general  view  which  prevails  in  the  state 
in  Avhich  the  question  arises  respecting  the  rule  of  Muschamp's 
Case,  for  it  is  obvious  that  in  the  states  in  which  that  rule  ob- 
tains, much  less  evidence  will  establish  a  contract  for  through 
carriage  than  in  those  states  in  which  it  does  not  prevail.  Thus 
in  the  former  states  the  mere  aceptance  of  the  goods  for  carriage 
when  consigned  to  a  point  beyond  the  carrier's  terminus  is  suf- 
ficient to  imply  a  contract  for  through  carriage,^''  while  in  the 
latter  states,  this  alone,^^  or  the  payment  of  a  through  rate,^^ 
is  not  conclusive. 

Where  the  contract  is  express,  no  resort  need,  of  course,  be 
had  to  circumstantial  evidence;  but  where  it  is  not  express  and 


within  certain  territorial  limits, 
enters  into  a  contract  to  carry  to  a 
point  beyond  the  limits  of  such 
territory,  his  liability,  on  the  same 
principle  that  a  carrier  by  rail- 
road would  be  liable  under  a  con- 
tract to  carry  beyond  his  own  line, 
will  continue  until  the  contract  is 
performed.  Farley  v.  Lavary,  107 
Ky.  523,  54  S.  W.  Rep.  840,  47 
L.  R,  A.  383. 

But  where  the  carrier  contracts 
to  carry  live  stock  to  a  point  on 
the  line  of  a  connecting  carrier,  he 
will  not  be  liable  for  injury  to 
stock  which  is  loaded  on  the  cars 
at  a  point  on  the  line  of  the  con- 
necting carrier.  Hartley  t'.  Rail- 
road Co.,  115  Iowa,  612,  89  N,  W. 
Rep.  88. 

10.  See   ante,   §  230. 

11.  See  ante,   §  231. 

12.  ^tna    Ins.    Co.    v.    Wheeler, 


49  N.  Y.  616;  Camden  R.  R.  v. 
Forsyth,  61  Pa.  St.  81;  Lamb  v. 
Railroad  Co.,  46  N.  Y.  271;  Pied- 
mont Mfg.  Co.  V.  Railroad  Co.,  19 
S.  C.  353;  Hill  r.  Railroad  Co.,  60 
Iowa,  197;  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  v. 
Kerr,  68  Miss.  14,  8  So.  Rep.  330; 
Gulf,  etc.,  Ry.  Co.  v.  Griffith  (Tex. 
Civ.  App.),  24  S.  W.  Rep.  362; 
Pennsylvania  Co.  t'.  Dickson,  31 
Ind.  App.  451,  67  N.  E.  Rep.  538. 

The  payment  and  receipt  of  one 
entire  compensation  is  not  suffi- 
cient in  itself  to  establish  a 
through  contract  to  carry  beyond 
the  initial  carrier's  own  line,  but 
is  a  fact  to  be  considered  in  con- 
nection with  other  circumstances 
as  going  to  show  the  intent  and 
understanding  of  the  parties  with 
respect  to  such  a  contract.  Page 
V.  Railway  Co.,  7  S.  Dak.  297,  64 
N.  W.  Rep.  137. 


17 


258 


THE  LAW  OF   CiVRRIERS. 


■§  238. 


the  contract  becomes  a  question  of  fact  for  the  jury,  then  all  the 
surrounding  circumstances  become  important.  In  such  a  case  the 
fact  that  the  goods  were  marked  for  through  transportation,  that 
a  through  rate  was  paid,  that  the  goods  were  to  be  carried 
through  in  a  designated  car,  that  there  was  an  usage  for  through 
carriage,  that  the  caption  of  the  bill  of  lading  or  receipt  pur- 
ports a  through  contract,  and  any  other  fact  throwing  light  upon 
the  intention,  may  properly  be  considered.^  ^  And  while  the  ex- 
istence of  any  single  fact  of  this  kind  may  not  be  in  all  cases  suf- 
ficient to  establish  conclusively  that  such  was  the  contract,  it 
may  always  be  shown  to  the  jury  as  conducive  to  that  end.^* 
And  such  a  contract  when  proven  will  be  valid,  though  it  may  re- 


13.  International,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v. 
Tisdale,  74  Tex.  8;  Berg  r.  Steam- 
ship Co.,  5  Daly,  394;  Candee  v. 
Railroad  Co.,  21  Wis.  582;  Evans- 
ville,  etc.,  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Androscog- 
gin Mills,  22  Wall.  594;  Robinson 
V.  Merchants'  Dispatch  Trans.  Co., 
45  Iowa,  470;  Isham  v.  Erie  R.  Co., 
98  N.  Y.  Supp.  609.  The  fact  that 
the  agent  gives  a  through  rate  and 
collects  the  entire  charge  are  cir- 
cumstances strongly  tending  to 
show  a  contract  for  through  car- 
riage.    Pittsburg,   etc.,  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Bryant, Ind.  App.  ,  75  N. 

E.  Rep.  829. 

14.  Root  V.  The  Railroad,  45  N. 
Y.  532;  Hill  Man.  Co.  v.  The  Rail- 
road, 104  Mass.  122;  Gray  v.  Jack- 
son, 51  N.  H.  9;  Woodward  v.  The 
Railroad,  1  Biss.  403.  Quimby  v. 
Vanderbilt,  17  N.  Y.  306,  is  a  lead- 
ing case  and  one  very  often  re- 
ferred to  when  the  question  is, 
what  is  necessary  to  constitute  a 
contract  for  through  transporta- 
tion by  the  carrier?  The  defendant 
was  the  owner  of  a  line  of  steam- 
ships plying  between  New  York 
and  the  Isthmus  of  Nicaragua.  He 
was  also  part  owner  in  several  of 


the  steamships  constituting  anoth- 
er line  running  between  the  Isth- 
mus and  San  Francisco.  He  ad- 
vertised "Vanderbilt's  New  Line" 
as  the  only  through  line  via  Nica- 
ragua to  San  Francisco.  The 
Transit  Company  which  carried 
across  the  Isthmus  was  independ- 
ent of  both  these  ocean  lines,  but 
furnished  tickets  to  the  defendant 
for  which  he  accounted  to  it  as  he 
sold  them  with  the  tickets  of  the 
ocean  lines.  The  defendant  and 
the  company  running  its  line  upon 
the  Pacific  had  a  common  agent  in 
New  York  from  whom  the  plaintiff 
purchased  three  of  these  tickets, 
one  from  New  York  to  the  Isth- 
mus, another  across  the  Isthmus, 
and  another  thence  to  San  Fran- 
cisco in  a  designated  vessel  in 
which  the  defendant,  however,  had 
no  interest,  the  tickets  together 
entitling  the  plaintiff  to  a  passage 
by  these  various  lines  from  New 
York  to  San  Francisco.  He  paid 
for  them  the  round  sum  of  $250 
to  the  common  agent.  The  plain- 
tiff was  carried  to  the  Isthmus  but 
could  find  no  vessel  there  to  take 
him  to  San  Francisco,  and  becom- 


§238.] 


CONNECTING  CARRIERS. 


259 


ing  sick  from  the  effects  of  the 
climate,  he  returned  to  New  York 
and  sued  the  defendant  for  the 
damage  sustained  by  him  in  the 
failure  to  transport  him  to  San 
Francisco  according  to  the  con- 
tract. It  was  insisted  on  behalf 
of  the  defendant  that  there  was 
no  through  contract  on  his  part 
and  that  he  could  not  be  held 
liable  for  the  failure  of  the  Pacific 
line  to  carry  the  plaintiff  accord- 
ing to  the  agreement  imported  by 
its  ticket;  but  the  defense  did 
not  avail,  and  the  defendant  was 
held  liable  upon  the  ground  that 
his  contract  was  for  the  through 
transportation  of  the  plaintiff  to 
San  Francisco.  "But  the  defend- 
ant's counsel  contends,"  said  Denio, 
J.,  "that  the  tickets  which  the 
plaintiff  received  for  the  passage 
over  the  several  routes  are  in 
themselves  written  evidence  of  the 
bargains  by  which  he  engaged  his 
passage,  and  that  he  is  precluded 
from  contradicting  them  by  parol 
testimony  of  an  entire  contract 
with  the  defendant.  We  do  not 
think  this  a  sound  position.  The 
tickets  do  not  purport  to  be  con- 
tracts. They  are  rather  in  the 
nature  of  receipts  for  the  separate 
portions  of  the  passage  money; 
and  their  office  is  to  serve  as 
tokens  to  enable  the  persons  hav- 
ing charge  of  the  vessels  and  car- 
riages of  the  companies  to  recog- 
nize the  bearers  as  parties  who 
were  entitled  to  be  received  on 
board.  They  are  quite  consistent 
with  a  more  special  bargain.  Be- 
ing the  usual  permits  which  were 
issued  for  the  guidance  of  the 
masters  of  the  vessels  and  the 
conductors  of  the  carriages,  they 
would  necessarily  be  given  to  the 
passenger  to  facilitate  the  transac- 


tion of  the  business,  whatever  the 
nature  of  his  arrangement  for  pas- 
sage may  have  been.  Their  char- 
acter as  mere  tokens  is  shown  by 
the  fact  that  the  defendant  re- 
ceived them  in  large  numbers  of 
the  Transit  Company,  not  as  an 
agent  of  that  company  for  the 
purpose  of  making  bargains  in  its 
behalf  with  others,  but  to  furnish 
them  to  persons  with  whom  he 
expected  to  deal  on  his  own  ac- 
count. In  Hart  v.  The  Renssa- 
laer  &  Saratoga  Railroad  Com- 
pany, just  referred  to,  the  plain- 
tiff had  separate  tickets  for  each 
of  the  roads  over  which  she  trav- 
eled, but  she  was  permitted  to 
recover  against  one  of  the  com- 
panies, though  unable  to  show  that 
her  baggage  was  lost  on  the  route 
of  that  company.  We  do  not  say 
that  the  receiving  of  separate 
tickets  for  the  different  lines  is 
not  evidence  of  some  weight  upon 
the  question  whether  the  contract 
was  entire,  but  we  hold  it  does  not 
come  within  the  rule  which  ex- 
cludes parol  testimony  respecting 
a  contract  which  has  been  reduced 
to  writing."  See,  also,  Williams 
V.  Vanderbilt,  supra;  Van  Buskirk 
V.  Roberts,  supra,  in  which  the 
facts  were  similar,  and  were  held 
to  prove  a  contract  for  the  entire 
transportation  from  New  York  to 
San  Francisco. 

There  is  no  doubt,  however,  that 
if  in  these  cases  it  had  only  been 
proven  that  the  tickets  for  the 
different  lines  had  been  sold  by  the 
defendants  the  conclusion  would 
have  been  different.  It  is  now  well 
settled  that  one  passenger  carrier 
may  sell  his  own  and  at  the  same 
time  the  tickets  of  connecting 
lines,  entitling  the  purchaser  to 
through  transportation  to  his  des- 


260 


THE  LAW  OP   CARRIERS. 


[§  238. 


tination    over    all    the    lines,    and 
may  receive  the  fare  for  the  whole 
distance     without     becoming     re- 
sponsible for  the  passenger's  car- 
riage beyond  his  own  line;  and  in 
fact,   where   nothing   else   appears 
in    the    transaction,    this    will    be 
the    legal    construction    put    upon 
it.      The    tickets    for    the    several 
lines    are,    in    such    cases,    known 
as  coupon  tickets,  and  each  ticket 
is  considered  as  the  separate  con- 
tract   of   the    carrier    over   whose 
route  it  entitles  the  holder  to  be 
carried.      The    carrier    who    sells 
them    is    supposed    to    do    so    as 
the  agent  of  the  several  lines,  and 
the     tickets     are     regarded     and 
treated    as    the    contracts    of    the 
respective  carriers  precisely  as  if 
they  had  been  sold  by  the  carriers 
themselves  instead  of  the  common 
agent.      Knight    v.    The    Railroad, 
56   Me.    234;    Milnor  v.   The  Rail- 
road, 53  N.  Y.  363;  Nashville,  etc., 
R.  R.  V.  Sprayberry,  9  Heisk.  852; 
Brooke  v.  The  Railway,   15  Mich. 
232;   Hartan  v.  The  Railroad,   114 
Mass.    44;    Stimson    v.    The    Rail- 
road, 98  id.  83;  Ellsworth  v.  Tart. 
26  Ala.   733;    Kessler  v.  The  Rail- 
road,   7    Lans.    62;    Hood    v.    The 
Railroad,   22   Conn.    1;    Elmore   v. 
The  Railroad,  23  id.  457;  Sprague 
V.  Smith,  29  Vt.  421. 

But  see  Furstenheim  v.  The 
Railroad,  9  Heisk.  238,  in  which  a 
different  view  of  the  subject  was 
taken.  This,  however,  is  clearly 
wrong  according  to  the  authori- 
ties. But  see  to  same  effect.  Can- 
dee  V.  The  Railroad,  21  Wis.  5S2, 
and  111.  Cen.  R.  R.  v.  Copeland,  24 
111.  332.  In  this  respect  a  dis- 
tinction is  made  between  carriers 
of  freight  and  carriers  of  pas- 
sengers and  their  baggage,  the 
receipt     or     bill     of     lading     for 


freight  to  its  destination  and  the 
payment  of  the  price  for   the   en- 
tire transportation  being  generally 
held   to  be  a  through  contract  of 
the  receiving  company.  One  reason 
for  this  distinction  undoubtedly  i? 
that    the    passenger    who    accom- 
panies   his    baggage    can    always 
know   where   and   by   whose    fault 
he  sustained  the  injury  or  the  loss, 
and    by    whom    the    responsibility 
for   it  should   be   borne;    whereas 
in  the  case  of  goods  sent  over  a 
number  of  connecting  lines  it  may 
be    difficult   and    often    impossible 
to    obtain    such    information.      If, 
however,     circumstances     can     be 
shown,   as    in   the   foregoing   case 
of    Quimby    v.    Vandexbilt,    from 
which    it   would    appear    that   the 
intention    of    the    parties    was    to 
enter  into   a  contract  for   the   en- 
tire   transportation,    or   if   a   part- 
nership   existed    between   the    car- 
riers, or  if  the  succeeding  carriers 
were  acting  in  the  carriage  of  the 
passenger    as   agents    of   the    first 
under   its   contract   with   him   for 
through    transportation,    the    pas- 
senger, if  injured,  might  maintain 
his  action  against  either  the  first 
carrier     upon     the     contract     or 
against  any  of  the  succeeding  car- 
riers to  whose  negligence  or  fault 
the    injury    was    imputable.      And 
when  the  contract  in  such  a  case 
imposes  upon  the  first  carrier  the 
liability  for  the  entire  transporta- 
tion, the  coupon  tickets  will  be  re- 
garded merely  as  so  many  tokens 
or   vouchers   entitling   the   holder 
to   be    carried   by   the    succeeding 
carriers  as  agents  of  the  first. 

Whether  the  carrier  under  the 
circumstances  of  the  acceptance  of 
freight  will  be  held  to  be  bound 
to  carry  and  be  responsible  for  it 
throughout  its  transit  to  destina- 


S239. 


CONNECTING   CARRIERS. 


261 


(juire  transportation  and  delivery  in  another  state  or  country 
beyond  the  line  of  the  carrier.i^ 

Sec.  239.  Same  subject — Illustrations. — Where  a  bill  of  lad- 
ing issued  for  the  shipment  of  fruit  over  several  connecting  lines 
provided  that  the  fruit  was  received  subject  to  the  carrier's  lia- 
bility under  the  common  law  and  statutes  in  force  in  the  different 
states  through  which  the  shipment  was  to  pass,  and,  further,  that 
the  car  was  to  be  re-iced  as  often  as  necessary,  it  was  held  that 
the  bill  of  lading  constituted  a  contract  for  through  trans- 
portation.^^ A  similar  conclusion  was  reached  where  the  bill  of 
lading  stated  that  the  goods  were  to  be  transported  by  the  receiv- 
ing carrier  to  his  own  terminus  and  from  such  point  by  connect- 


tion  over  auxiliary  lines  as  well 
as  its  own  will  depend  in  a  great 
measure  upon  the  law  of  the  place 
of  the  making  of  the  contract  or 
of  the  acceptance  of  the  goods,  or 
of  the  performance  of  the  service. 
In  those  states  in  which  the  ap- 
plicatory  law  would  be  that  of  the 
English  courts,  which  would  bind 
the  carrier,  without  an  agreement 
restricting  his  responsibility  to  his 
own  line,  to  carry  throughout  to 
destination,  the  mere  acceptance 
of  the  goods  consigned  to  a  par- 
ticular destination  would  import  a 
contract  for  through  carriage  and 
make  the  carrier  responsible  for 
their  loss  anywhere  upon  the 
route.  But  where  the  English 
rule  has  been  rejected,  a  through 
contract  must  be  either  express  or 
must  arise  from  some  of  the  cir- 
cumstances mentioned  in  the  text. 
In  some  of  the  cases  it  has  been 
held  that  a  receipt  or  bill  of  lading 
for  the  goods  to  be  carried  to  a 
particular  destination,  and  the 
payment  of  the  entire  freight,  will 
be  sufficient,  in  the  absence  of  any 


special  agreement  upon  the  sub- 
ject, to  constitute  such  a  contract; 
while  in  others  this  has  been  de- 
nied. See  cases  infra  in  text  and 
note.  Where  the  subject  is  not 
controlled  by  any  rule  of  law  or  by 
the  express  agreement  of  the  par- 
ties, the  question  will  be  one  of 
intention,  depending  upon  the 
usage  of  the  carrier  and  the  facts 
of  the  case,  which  sometimes 
makes  it  difficult  to  decide  whether 
a.  through  contract  was  meant  or 
not;  and  it  is  an  argument  in 
favor  of  the  English  rule  that, 
when  it  prevails,  such  questions 
cannot  easily  arise.  Knapp  v.  U. 
S.  Ex.  Co.,  55  N.  H.  348;  Grindle 
v.  The  Eastern  Express,  67  Me. 
317. 

15.  Burtis  V.  The  Railroad,  24  N. 
Y.  272;  Bennett  v.  The  Peninsular 
Steamboat  Co.,  6  Com.  B.  775; 
Phillips  V.  The  Railroad,  78  N.  C. 
294. 

16.  Johnson  ?•.  Railway  Co.,  133 
Mich.  596,  10  Det.  Leg.  N.  324,  95 
N.  W.  Rep.  724,  103  Am.  St.  Rep. 
464. 


262  THE  LAW  OF   CARRIERS.  [§  239. 

ing  lines  to  destination.^ '^  So  where  the  contracting  carrier  had 
the  right  under  the  bill  of  lading  to  select  the  connecting  lines 
over  which  the  shipment  was  to  pass,  and  a  through  freight 
charge  was  collected  and  receipted  for,  and  it  further  appeared 
that  the  first  and  all  succeeding  carriers  had  a  traffic  arrange- 
ment whereby  a  through  rate  was  agreed  upon  which  was  shared 
in  common  by  all  of  them,  it  was  decided  that  the  contract  im- 
posed a  through  liability.^  ^  So  where  the  carrier  accepted  goods 
marked  for  delivery  at  a  point  beyond  his  terminus,  and  a 
through  rate  was  quoted  and  accepted  by  the  shipper,  it  was 
held  that  the  carrier  thereby  assumed  responsibility  for  the  safe 
delivery  of  the  goods  at  destination.^^  So  a  bill  of  lading  which 
provided  that  the  goods  were  to  be  forwarded  to  the  end  of  the 
first  carrier's  line  and  there  delivered  to  a  connecting  carrier, 
and  further  on  the  back  thereof  that  the  goods  were  to  be  for- 
warded to  destination,  was  held  to  constitute  a  through  con- 
tract.2^  But  the  fact  that  a  car  containing  live  stock  was  way- 
billed  to  a  particular  place  on  a  connecting  carrier's  line  was 
held  insufficient  to  show  a  contract  for  through  liability.^i  So 
the  words,  "ice  when  needed,"  inserted  in  the  bill  of  lading 
which  further  provided  that  the  receiving  carrier  would  not  be 
liable  for  loss  or  damage  not  occurring  on  its  line  of  road,  were 
held  to  impose  on  the  carrier  no  obligation  to  ice  the  shipment 
while  on  a  connecting  road.22  And  where  the  charge  collected, 
although  for  the  entire  route,  was  made  up  of  distinct  sums 
proportioned  to  the  line  of  each  connecting  carrier,  it  was  held 

17.  Ireland  r.  Railroad  Co.,  20  line  is  not  suflBcient  to  show  a 
Ky.  Law  Rep.  1586,  49  S.  W.  Rep.  through  contract.  Weis  v.  Rail- 
188;  but  see  dissenting  opinion,  49     road  Co.,  97  N.  Y.  Supp.  993. 

S.  W.  Rep.  453.  20.  Colfax  Mt.  Fruit  Co.  v.  Rail- 

18.  Eckles  V.  Railway,  112  Mo.  road  Co.,  118  Cal.  648,  46  Pac.  Rep. 
App.   240,  87  S.  W.   Rep.  99.  668,   50   Pac.  Rep.  775,  40  L.  R.  A. 

19.  Jennings  v.  Railway  Co.,  127  78. 

N.  Y.  438,  28  N.  E.  Rep.   394;   af-  21.  Herring  v.  Railroad  Co.,  101 

firming,  s.  c.  52  Hun,  227,  5  N.  Y.  Va.  778,  45  S.  E.  Rep.  322. 

Supp.    140.     But   the   mere   state-  22.  Farnsworth  v.  Railroad  Co., 

ment  by  the  agent  that  the  goods  84   N.  Y.  Supp.  658,  88  App.  Div. 

will  be  sent  to  a  point  on  another  320. 


§240.]  CONNECTING   CARRIERS.  263 

that  the  centract  was  separable  and  imposed  no  liability  on  the 
contracting  carrier  beyond  the  terminus  of  his  own  route.^^ 

Sec.  240.  Extent  to  which  carrier  may  limit  his  liability 
under  contract  for  through  carriage. — While  the  carrier,  as  has 
been  seen,  may,  by  an  express  contract  that  he  will  assume  no 
liability  for  the  goods  after  he  has  safely  delivered  them  to  a  con- 
necting carrier,  prevent  all  question  as  to  his  liability  for  a  loss 
or  injury  occurring  on  the  connecting  route,  it  remains  to  be 
seen  to  what  extent  he  may  thus  exonerate  himself  from  liability 
where  by  his  contract  he  has  undertaken  to  carry  the  goods 
through  to  destination.  If  the  contract  clearly  provides  for 
through  carriage,  or  the  facts  and  circumstances  disclose  an  un- 
dertaking to  transport  the  goods  to  their  ultimate  destination,  all 
subsidiary  carriers  employed  in  the  transportation  will  become 
the  agents  of  the  contracting  carrier  to  effect  the  performance 
of  the  contract,  and  he  can  no  more  stipulate  for  exemption  from 
liability  for  the  negligent  acts  or  omissions  of  such  agents  than 
he  can  stipulate  for  exemption  from  liability  for  his  own.  He 
may,  however,  by  a  contract  to  that  effect,  relieve  himself  from 
liability  as  an  insurer  of  the  goods  not  only  while  they  are  being 
transported  over  his  own  line  but  over  the  lines  of  the  connecting 
carriers,  but  he  will  still  remain  liable  until  the  goods  have  been 
delivered  at  destination  for  any  loss  or  injury  arising  from  negli- 
gence.24 

23.  Hughes  v.  Railroad  Co.,  202  Rep.  99;  Railway  Co.  v.  Western 
Penn.  St.  222,  51  Atl.  Rep.  990,  97  Hay  &  Grain  Co.,  2  Neb.  (unoffi- 
Am.  St.  Rep.  713,  63  L.  R.  A.  513.  cial)    784;   90  N.  W.  Rep.  205.     But 

24.  Galveston,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  AUi-  see,  Fremont,  etc.  Railroad  Co.  v. 
son,  59  Tex.  193;  Ireland  v.  Rail-  N.  Y.  etc.  Railroad,  66  Neb.  150, 
road  Co.,  20  Ky.  Law  Rep.  1586,  92  N.  W.  Rep.  131,  59  L.  R.  A.  939. 
49  S.  W.  Rep.  188;  Halliday  v.  Where  a  copartnership  or  asso- 
Railroad  Co.,  74  Mo.  159,  41  Am.  elation  exists  between  several  lines 
Rep.  309;  Cincinnati,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  of  carriers,  the  initial  carrier  can- 
Pontius,  19  Ohio  St.  221,  2  Am.  not  limit  his  liability  to  his  own 
Rep.  391;  Condict  v.  Railroad  Co.,  line  for  injuries  to  through  freight. 
54  N.  Y.  500;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Gulf,  etc.  R'y  Co.  v.  Wilbanks,  7 
Vaughn,  4  Tex.  Civ.  App.  281,  16  Tex.  Civ.  App.  489,  27  S.  W.  Rep. 
S.  W.  Rep.  775;  Eckles  v.  Railway  302.     See  post,   §450. 

Co.,    113    Mo.    App.    240,    87    S.    W. 


264 


THE  LAW  OF   CARRIERS. 


[§241. 


Sec.  241.  (§  152a.)  Implied  power  of  agents  to  make  con- 
tracts for  through  carriage. — The  question  whether  a  local 
freight  agent  of  a  carrier  has  implied  authority  to  make  a  con- 
tract for  through  carriage  is  involved  in  the  same  conflict  as  the 
question  whether  the  mere  acceptance  of  the  goods  destined  to  a 
point  beyond  the  carrier's  route  constitutes  a  contract  to  as- 
sume responsibility  for  their  safe  delivery  at  such  point,  and  is 
determined  by  much  the  same  reasons.^^ 

Under  the  English  rule^^  and  the  cases  adopting  it,  it  is  held 
that  the  agent  authorized  to  receive  the  goods  for  carriage  has 
implied  authority  to  bind  his  principal  by  a  contract  for  through 
carriage  ;2"  but  under  the  American  rule,  it  is  held  that,  while 
the  general  freight  agent  of  a  railroad  may  have  such  authority,^^ 
it  will  not  be  implied  in  the  case  of  local  freight  agents  from 
their  general  authority  to  receive  and  receipt  for  goods  offered 
for  transportation  over  the  carrier's  road;-^  and  the  mere  fact 


25.  See  post,  §  460  et  seq. 

26.  See  Watson  v.  Railway  Co., 
15  Jurist,  448;  Sco thorn  v.  Rail- 
way Co.,  8  Exch.  341;  Bristol,  etc. 
R'y  Co.  V.  Collins,  7  H.  L.  Cases, 
194. 

27.  It  was  so  held  in  Hansen  v. 
Railway  Co.,  73  Wis.  346;  Nichols 
V  Railroad  Co.,  24  Utah  83,  66  Pac. 
Rep.  768,  91  Am.  St.  Rep.  778. 

The  freight  clerk  of  an  express 
company  has  implied  authority  to 
give  the  rates  at  which  property 
is  to  be  delivered  at  a  point  on 
the  line  of  another  company.  Ex- 
press Co.  V.  Boullement,  100  Ala. 
275,    13   So.  Rep.   941. 

28.  Grover,  etc.  M.  Co.  v.  Rail- 
way Co.,  70  Mo.  672;  White  v.  Rail- 
road Co.,  19  Mo.  App.  400. 

An  agent  employed  to  solicit 
freight  traffic  has  implied  author- 
ity to  bind  his  principal  for  the 
safe  delivery  of  goods  at  a  point 
beyond  his  own  line  and  to  con- 
tract over  what  road  beyond  such 


line  the  property  shall  be  trans- 
ported. Fremont,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
New  York,  etc.  R.  Co.,  66  Neb.  159, 
92  N.  W.  Rep.  131,  59  L.  R.  A. 
939. 

29.  Burroughs  v.  Railroad  Co., 
100  Mass.  26;  Grover,  etc.  M.  Co. 
V.  Railway  Co.,  supra;  Turner  v. 
Railroad  Co.,  20  Mo.  App.  632; 
Faulkner  v.  Railway  Co.,  99  Mo. 
App.  421,  73  S.  W.  Rep.  927;  Mc- 
Lagan  v.  Railway  Co.,  116  Iowa, 
183,  89  N.  W.  Rep.  233;  Hoffman 
V.  Railroad  Co.,  85  Md.  391,  37  Atl. 
Rep.  214;  Page  v.  Railway  Co.,  7 
S.  Dak.  297,  64  N.  W.  Rep.  137; 
Gulf,    etc.    R'y    Co.    v.    Jackson    & 

Edwards,  Tex.  ,  89  S.  W. 

Rep.  968,  reversing  (Tex.  Civ, 
App.)  86  S.  W.  Rep.  47. 

Strictly  speaking,  the  business 
of  the  carrier  is  confined  to  his 
own  line  and  the  general  scope  of 
the  authority  of  a  subordinate 
must  be  limited  to  the  carrier's 
business.       Pittsburgh,     etc.     Ry. 


§  242.]  CONNECTING  CARRIERS.  265 

that  a  through  rate  of  freight  is  collected  or  that  the  goods  are 
billed  for  through  shipment  will  be  insufficient  to  support  an 
inference  that  he  has  such  authority.^"^  But  although  implied 
authority  is  denied  a  local  freight  agent  to  make  a  contract  for 
through  carriage,  a  usage  or  custom  may  be  shown  for  such 
agent  to  receive  goods  under  a  contract  for  through  carriage,  and 
when  such  usage  or  custom  is  established,  the  principal  will  be 
bound  by  the  act  of  the  agent.^^ 

Sec.  242.  (§  153.)  No  distinction  between  corporations  and 
other  carriers  in  respect  to  power  to  enter  into  contracts  for 
through  carriage. — A  distinction  has,  however,  been  made  in 
some  of  the  cases  between  chartered  or  incorporated  carriers, 
such  as  railway  companies,  which  derive  all  their  power  or  au- 
thority to  engage  in  the  business  and  to  assume  its  obligations 
and  liabilities  from  their  charters,  and  which  by  the  very  terms 
of  their  incorporation  are  limited  to  routes  between  certain  desig- 
nated points,  and  other  carriers  not  so  incorporated;  and  it  has 
been  said  that  such  companies  or  corporations  in  their  business 
as  carriers  could  not,  even  by  express  contract,  bind  themselves 
to  carry  beyond  these  designated  lines,  so  as  to  impose  upon  them- 
selves the  obligations  of  common  carriers,  and  that,  a  fortiori,  no 
such  contract  could  be  implied.  But  this  idea  has  been  in  the 
later  and  best  considered  cases  denied,  and  may  be  now  con- 
sidered as  abandoned.^ ^    The  question  has  also  been  discussed  be- 

Co.  V.  BiTant  —  Ind.  App.  — ,  75  168;   Root  v.  The  Railroad,  45  id. 

N.  E.  Rep.  829.  524;    Burtis   v.    The   Railroad,   24 

30.  Coates  v.  Railway  Co.,  8  id.  269;  Hill  Manuf'g  Co.  v.  The 
S.  Dak.  173,  65  N.  W.  Rep.  1068;  Railroad,  104  Mass.  122;  Feital  v. 
Sutton  V.  Railway  Co.,  14  S.  Dak.  The  Railroad,  109  id.  398;  Noyes 
111,  84  N.  W.  Rep.  396.  v.  The  Railroad,  27  Vt.  110;   Rail- 

31.  Faulkner  v.  Railway  Co.,  99  road  Co.  v.  Pratt,  22  Wall.  123; 
Mo.  App.  421,  73  S.  W.  Rep.  927;  Steamboat  Co.  v.  Brown,  54  Penn. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Cole,  8  Tex.  Civ.  St.  77;  Schroeder  v.  The  Railroad, 
App.   635,   28   S.  W.  Rep.   391.  5  Duer,  55;  West  v.  The  Railroad, 

32.  Swift  V.  Steamship  Co.,  106  4  Seld.  57;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Du- 
N.  Y.  206;  Perkins  v.  The  Rail-  pont,  128  Fed.  840,  64  C.  C.  A. 
road,  47  Me.  573;  Western,  etc.  478;  Railway  Co.  v.  Howard,  178 
R.  R.  V.  McElwee,  6  Heisk.  219;  U.  S.  153,  20  Sup.  Ct.  R.  880,  44 
Buffet  V.   The  Railroad,   40   N.   Y.  L.  Ed.   1015,  affirming  14  App.  D. 


266  THE  LAW   OF   CARRIERS.  [§  243. 

fore  the  English  courts,  which  have  likewise  held  that  such  a 
contract  by  an  incorporated  carrier  was  not  ultra  vires,  but  valid 
and  obligatory  upon  it.^s  The  supreme  court  of  Connecticut 
has,  however,  held  in  a  niunber  of  cases,  and  it  may  be  regarded 
as  the  settled  law  of  that  state,  that  such  incorporated  companies 
are  not  competent  to  bind  themselves  as  carriers  for  the  carriage 
of  goods  beyond  the  limits  of  their  routes  as  fixed  by  their  char- 
ters, and  that  all  such  contracts  are  void,  and  create  no  obligation 
on  the  part  of  the  corporations.^-* 

Sec.  243.  (§  154.)  No  liability  for  loss  beyond  his  own  line 
under  contract  to  carry  to  end  of  line  and  there  to  deliver  to 
next  carrier. — But  where  the  place  of  destination  is  not  upon 
the  carrier 's  route,  and  he  receives  the  goods  under  a  contract  to 
send  or  forward  them  by  his  own  route  to  the  point  most  con- 
venient to  their  destination  reached  by  him,  and  there  to  deliver 
them  to  an  agent  or  to  another  carrier  to  complete  the  trans- 
portation, he  cannot  be  made  liable  for  the  goods  beyond  the  ter- 
minus of  his  own  line,  and  if  he  deliver  safely  to  such  agent  or 
carrier,  he  will  have  complied  with  his  contract  and  will  be  dis- 
charged from  all  further  liability .^^ 

C.    262.     And    see   Bissell   v.    The  limits    of    the    carrier's    business, 

Michigan,  etc.  Railroad,  23  N.   Y.  and  no  written  agreement  between 

2r)8,    where    this    question    is    dis-  it  and  the  other  party,  the  ques- 

cussed   at   great   length   and   with  tion,  what  was  in  fact  the  extent 

great  ability  on  opposing  sides  by  of  the  undertaking,  is  a  question 

Comstock,  C.  J.,  and  Selden,  J.  for  the  jury.     Lowell  Wire  Fence 

In  Massachusetts  it  is  said  that  Co.  v.  Sargent,  8  Allen,  189.     And 

when  a  corporation  is  established  in  Perkins  v.  The  Railroad,  47  Me. 

for  the  purpose,  among  others,  of  573,   it  was   held   that  a  contract 

transporting  goods  over  a  certain  to    bind    such    a    corporation    to 

route,  goods  delivered  to  such  cor-  transport  beyond  its  line  must  be 

poration    directed    to    a    more    dis-  express. 

tant  place  are  presumed  to  be  re-        33.  Wilby     v.     The     Railway,    3 

ceived    for    the    purpose    of    being  Hurl.  &  N.   703. 
carried   by   it   over   its  own   route        34.  Hood    v.    The    Railroad,    23 

only,   and   then   forwarded   by   an-  Conn.   502;     Naugatuck  R.  R.  Co. 

other  carrier  to  their  destination,  v.     The    Button     Co.,    24    id.    468; 

Burroughs    v.    The    Railway,    100  Converse    v.    The    Transportation 

Mass.    26;     Pendergrast  v.   Adams  Co.  33  id.  166. 
Ex.   Co.,    101    id.    123.     But   when        35.  Pendergrast    v.    Adams    Ex. 

there  is  no  charter  to  indicate  the  Co.,  101  Mass.   120;   American  Ex. 


§  244. )  CONNECTING   CARRIERS.  267 

Sec.  244.  (§  155.)  Same  subject— Meaning  of  the  term  "to 
forward"  or  "to  be  forwarded. "—But  if,  notwithstanding  the 
words  used,  the  real  contract  be  to  carry  the  goods  throughout 
the  whole  route,  it  will  be  immaterial  that  in  his  receipt  for  the 
goods  the  carrier  has  made  use  of  any  form  of  expression  which 
would  seem  intended  to  impose  upon  him  only  the  obligation  to 
forward  them  by  another  carrier  at  the  termination  of  his  own 
route.  The  words  "to  forward"  or  "to  be  forwarded"  are  of 
frequent  use  in  the  receipt  of  carriers,  and  it  sometimes  becomes 
important  to  determine  their  meaning  in  the  connection  in  which 
they  are  employed,  as  the  whole  question  of  the  liability  of  the 
carrier  may  depend  upon  their  interpretation. 

Sec.  245.  (§156.)  Same  subject.— In  Reed  v.  The  United 
States  Express  Company^^  a  package  was  delivered  to  the  de- 
fendant as  an  express  carrier  at  Chicago,  to  be  carried  to  Dalton, 
Georgia,  which  it  undertook  by  the  terms  of  its  receipt  "to  for- 
ward to  Dalton. ' '  This  it  could  only  have  done,  as  was  admitted, 
by  transmitting  the  package  from  the  terminus  of  its  own  route 
by  other  carriers,  its  own  line  not  extending  to  the  point  of  desti- 
nation ;  and  under  these  circumstances,  it  was  held,  by  a  divided 
court  however,  that  the  carrier,  by  the  acceptance  of  the  pack- 
age and  the  contract  "to  forward,"  had  bound  itself  as  a  for- 
warder only  beyond  the  terminus  of  its  own  route,  the  words  ' '  to 
forward"  in  the  receipt  being  construed  as  equivalent  to  the 
words  "to  send;"  and  it  being  shown  that  the  defendant  had 
safely  delivered  the  package  to  a  connecting  carrier  for  further 

Co.  V.  Second  Nat.  Bank,  69  Penn.  Rep.  558;  s.  c.  73  N.  E.  Rep.  810; 
St.  394;  U.  S.  Ex.  Co.  V.  Rush,  24  Eckles  v.  Railway,  112  Mo.  App. 
Ind.  403;  Inhabitants,  etc.  v.  Hall,  240,  87  S.  W.  Rep.  99;  Palmer  v. 
61  Me.  517;  Myrick  v.  Railroad,  Railroad  Co.,  101  Cal.  187,  35  Pac. 
107  U.  S.  102;  Rickerson,  etc.  Co.  Rep.  630,  citing  Hutchinson  on 
V.  Railroad  Co.,  67  Mich.  110;  De-  Carr. ;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Waters,  50 
troit,  etc.  R'y  Co.  v.  McKenzie,  43  Neb.  592,  70  N.  W.  Rep.  225;  Dun- 
Mich.  609;  McEacheran  v.  Rail-  bar  v.  Railway  Co.,  62  S.  Car.  414, 
road  Co.,  101  Mich.  264,  59  N.  W.  40  S.  E.  Rep.  884;  Hoffman  v. 
Rep.  612;  Lake  Erie,  etc.  Railroad  Railroad  Co.,  85  Md.  391,  37  AtL 
Co.  V.  Condon,  10  Ind.  App.  536,  Rep.  214. 
38  N.  E.  Rep.  71 ;  Railway  v.  36.  48  N.  Y.  462. 
Woodward,  164  Ind.  360,  72  N.  E. 


268 


THE  LAW   OF   CARRIERS. 


[§  246. 


transportation  towards  its  destination,  it  was  held  that  it  had 
discharged  its  contract  and  was  not  liable  for  its  subsequent 
loss.3'^ 

Sec.  246.  (§157.)  Same  subject. — But  where  there  are  no 
circumstances  which  will  control  the  conclusion  as  to  the  meaning 
of  the  parties  in  the  use  of  these  terms,  the  weight  of  authority 
is  in  favor  of  giving  to  them  the  signification  which  was  con- 
tended for  by  the  dissenting  portion  of  the  court  in  the  forego- 
ing case,  and  they  will  be  construed  as  having  been  intended  to 
mean  to  carry  or  transport  and  not  merely  to  send  as  a  for- 
warder. In  other  words,  they  will^  except  under  special  circum- 
stances which  will  necessarily  show  that  they  were  used  in  a 
different  sense,  bind  the  carrier  for  the  entire  carriage  to  des- 
tination, and  make  him  responsible  for  the  goods  throughout 
the  transit.38 


37.  From  this  decision  Lott, 
Cti.  C,  and  Hunt,  C,  dissented. 
The  latter,  in  his  dissenting  opin- 
ion, called  attention  to  the  fact 
that  no  distinction  was  made  in 
the  contract  between  the  duty  as- 
sumed to  carry  to  New  York,  the 
terminus  of  the  carrier's  line,  and 
to  Dalton,  and  that  the  language 
employed  which  bound  the  carrier 
to  the  two  undertakings  was  the 
same.  "It  is  conceded,"  said  he, 
"by  the  defendant's  counsel  that 
its  liability  to  New  York  is  that 
of  a  carrier,  and  that  it  is  suffi- 
ciently expressed  by  the  engage- 
ment to  'forward'  the  package,  and 
that  it  is  not  qualified  by  the  ex- 
pression that  it  is  to  be  liable  as 
forwarder  only.  There  is  no  pro- 
priety in  giving  to  this  word  two 
different  meanings.  It  is  the  gen- 
eral rule  that  a  word,  when  re- 
peated in  the  same  sentence  or  the 
same  connection,  is  to  bear  the 
same  signification.  It  would  cer- 
tainly be  a  violent  assumption  to 
impute  different  meanings  at  the 


same  time  to  a  word  when  used 
but  once  in  a  sentence.  When  the 
defendant  undertakes  to  forward 
this  package  from  Chicago  to  Dal- 
ton it  is  a  single  contract.  This 
contract  is  denoted  by  a  single 
word,  and  that  is  the  same 
throughout  the  distance.  Al- 
though it  was  in  fact  an  exten- 
sion of  its  liability  beyond  its  own 
line,  I  am  satisfied  that  the  de- 
fendant, by  the  words  made  use 
of,  undertook  and  assumed  to 
carry  and  deliver  this  package  to 
its  destination  in  Georgia." 

38.  E.  Tenn.  &  Va.  R.  R.  v. 
Rogers,  6  Heisk.  143;  Cutts  v. 
Brainerd,  42  Vt.  566;  St.  Louis, 
etc.  Railway  r.  Piper,  13  Kan.  505; 
Mercantile  Mut.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Chase, 
1  E.  D.  Smith,  115;  Lock  v.  The 
Railroad,  48  N.  H.  339;  Wilcox  v. 
Parmelee,  3  Sand.  610;  Schroeder 
V.  The  Railroad,  5  Duer.  55;  Buck- 
land  V.  Adams  Ex.  Co.,  97  Mass. 
124;  Eckles  v.  Railway,  112  Mo. 
App.  240,  87  S.  W.  Rep.  99,  citing 
Hutchinson    on    Carr.;     Davis    v. 


§247.]  CONNECTING  CARRIERS.  269 

Sec.  247.    Who  is  a  connecting  carrier — Transfer  company. 

. — ''A  connecting  carrier,"  it  is  said  in  the  case  of  Nansou  v. 
Jacob,^^  ' '  is  one  whose  route,  not  being  the  first  one,  lies  some- 
where between  the  point  of  shipment  and  the  point  of  destination. 
It  becomes  such  by  virtue  of  the  agreement  between  the  con- 
signor or  shipper  and  the  first  carrier,  whereby  the  latter  un- 
dertakes to  deliver  the  shipment  at  its  ultimate  destination,  and 
thus  makes  the  carrier  beyond  its  own  route  its  agent  for  con- 
tinuing the  transportation,  or  else  undertakes  only  to  deliver 
the  goods  safely  to  the  next  carrier  on  the  route,  who  thus  be- 
comes the  agent  of  the  shipper  for  carrying  them  further." 

Thus  a  railroad  company  which  took  loaded  ears  from  a  pre- 
ceding road  and  transferred  them  by  means  of  a  switch  engine 
over  a  portion  of  its  own  track  to  a  spur  track  where  they  were 
to  be  unloaded  was  held  to  be  a  connecting  carrier  and  liable  as 
such  for  the  safety  of  the  goods  transported  by  it.'*'^  But  a  trans- 
fer company  at  the  point  of  destination  which  undertakes  merely'' 
to  make  delivery  to  consignees  is  not  a  connecting  carrier,  since, 
in  so  transporting  the  goods,  it  is  not  acting  under  and  by  virtue 
of  the  original  contract  of  carriage.'*^  And  where  a  bill  of  lad- 
ing required  delivery  of  the  goods  at  the  mills  of  the  consignee, 
and  the  railroad  company  bringing  the  goods  to  destination  pro- 
cured another  road  to  deliver  them  at  the  mills,  which  were  two 
and  one-half  miles  from  the  depot,  it  was  held  that  the  latter 
road  was  not  a  connecting  carrier,  delivery  to  which  released  the 
former,  but,  like  the  transfer  company  in  the  preceding  case,  was 
a  mere  instrument  to  effect  delivery.'*^     gg  a  local  belt  railway 

Jacksonville,  etc.  Line,  126  Mo.  69,  42.  "Western,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Cot- 

28    S.    W.    Rep.    965;    Colfax    Mt.  ton  Mills,  81  Ga.  522. 

Fruit  Co.  V.  Railroad  Co.,  118  Cal.  Where     the     first     carrier     con- 

648,  46  Pac.  Rep.  668,  50  Pac  Rep.  tracts   to   transport   goods   to   des- 

775,   40   L.  R.   A.    78.  tination  and  engages    a    terminal 

39.  12  Mo.  App.  125.  company    to    complete    the    trans- 

40.  Railway  Co.  v.  Wichita  portation,  the  shipper  will  not  be 
Wholesale  Grocery  Co.,  55  Kan.  liable  for  the  extra  expense  in- 
525,  40  Pac.  Rep.   899.  curred     by     the     former     carrier. 

41.  Nanson  v.  Jacob,  12  Mo.  Hendrix  i\  The  Railroad,  107  Mo. 
App.   125.  App.   127,   80   S.  W.  Rep.  970. 


270  THE  LAW  OF   CARRIERS.  [§  248. 

which  is  used  by  an  initial  carrier  to  make  delivery  of  the  goods 
to  the  next  succeeding  carrier  is  not  a  connecting  carrier.^^ 

Sec.  248.  Authority  of  contracting  carrier  to  bind  connect- 
ing carrier  by  contract. — In  the  absence  of  any  agreement,  cus- 
tom or  course  of  dealing  from  which  authority  may  be  implied, 
the  contracting  carrier  has  no  authority  to  make  a  contract 
with  the  shipper  which  will  be  binding  on  the  connecting  car- 
rier. If  the  line  of  connecting  carrier  is  so  situated  in  rela- 
tion to  the  line  of  the  contracting  carrier  that  the  law  would  re- 
quire the  former  carrier  to  receive  and  carry  the  goods  tend- 
ered to  it,  it  would  be  liable  if  it  should  refuse  to  re- 
ceive them,  or,  if  it  should  accept  them  for  transportation,  if 
they  were  lost  or  injured  through  a  breach  of  its  common  law 
duty;  but  its  liability  in  this  regard  would  not  be  based  upon 
the  unauthorized  contract  made  by  the  first  carrier.**  If,  how- 
ever, the  connecting  carrier  accepts  the  goods  under  the  original 
contract  with  the  first  carrier,  it  will  become  a  party  to  it  by 
adoption  and  ratification  and  may  be  held  responsible  for  any 
breach  of  its  terms.*  ^ 

Sec,  249.  (§  158.)  Partnerships  and  associations  between 
carriers. — Divided  as  opinions  may  be  upon  the  question  of  the 
liability  of  the  carrier  who  undertakes  the  transportation  for 
losses  by  merely  connecting  or  succeeding  carriers  when  it  be- 
comes necessary  to  employ  them  to  further  or  to  complete  the 
carriage,  where  there  is  no  partnership  or  other  arrangement 
creating  a  similar  relation  between  them,  it  is  universally  agreed 
that  if  any  connection  of  that  character  exists  by  which  they  be- 
come participants  in  common  in  the  profits  of  the  business,  any 
one  or  all  of  them  may  be  held  liable  at  the  option  of  the  loser. 
A  partnership  may  undoubtedly  be  formed  as  well  in  the  busi- 
ness of  carriers  as  in  any  other,  and  between  corporations  en- 
gaged in  that  business  as  well  as  between  individuals,  so  as  to 

43.  Texas,  etc.  R'y  Co.  v.  Scog-  761,  reversing  (Tex.  Civ.  App.), 
gin   &   Brown,   —   Tex.    Civ.   App.     86  S.  W.  Rep.   17. 

— ,  90  S.  W.  Rep.   521.  45.  Chicago,      etc.      R.      Co.      v. 

44.  Houston,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Chestnut  Bros.,  —  Ky.  — ,  89  S. 
Everett,  —  Tex.  — ,  89  S.  W.  Rep.    W.  Rep.  298. 


§250.]  CONNECTING  CARRIERS.  271 

make  them  individually  and  jointly  liable;  and  whether  such  a 
partnership  has  been  entered  into  or  exists  between  them  must 
be  decided  upon  the  same  principles  as  govern  in  other  cases; 
and  when  established,  it  must,  of  course,  be  attended  by  the  same 
consequences  to  the  partners ;  as  is  illustrated  by  the  case  which 
has  been  so  often  decided  by  the  courts,  of  the  proprietors  of 
different  portions  of  a  stage  line,  each  of  whom  agrees  to  stock 
and  employ  drivers  for  his  own  particular  portion  of  the  road, 
under  an  agreement  to  share  the  receipts  and  divide  the  ex- 
penses in  proportion  to  the  distance  stocked  by  each.  When  such 
an  arrangement  exists,  it  has  frequently  been  held  that  any  or  all 
of  such  proprietors  can  be  held  liable  for  all  injuries  or  losses 
caused  by  the  misconduct  or  negligence  of  the  persons  employed 
on  any  part  of  the  line,  though  such  person  is  employed  by  the 
proprietor  of  only  a  portion  of  it.^^ 

Sec.  250.  (§159.)  Same  subject.— The  leading  case  upon 
this  subject  of  the  joint  liability  of  carriers  in  this  country  is  that 
of  Champion  v.  Bostwick,  which  was  learnedly  argued  in  both 
the  supreme  court*'^  and  in  the  court  of  errors  of  New  York.^^ 
The  defendants  ran  a  line  of  coaches  between  Utica  and  Roch- 
ester. The  route  was  divided  into  three  sections,  each  of  the  de- 
fendants furnishing  the  coaches,  horses  and  drivers  for  one  of 
the  sections,  and  paying  all  the  expenses  of  his  section  except 
tolls  at  the  turnpike  gates.  By  an  agreement  between  them,  the 
passage  money  received  by  either  for  transportation  over  any 
part  of  the  line  constituted  a  common  fund,  out  of  which  the  tolls 
on  the  whole  route  were  first  to  be  paid,  and  the  residue  was  then 

46.  Weyland  v.   Elkins,  Holt  N.  Where,    however,    no     such     ar- 

P.  227;    1   Starkie,   272;    Laughter  rangement    is    shown    to   exist,    a 

V.  Pointer,  5  B.  &  C.  547;   Carter  connecting    carrier    will     not    be 

V.  Peck,  4  Sneed,  203;  Cobb  v.  Ab-  liable  for  the  default  of  either  the 

hot,    14    Pick.    289;      Fromont     v.  first  or  any  other  connecting  car- 

Coupland,  2  Bing.  170;  Rocky  Mt.  rier.     Railway  Co,  v.  F.  W.  Stock, 

Mills  V.  Railroad  Co.,  119  N.  Car.  —  Va.  — ,  51  S.  E.  Rep.  161,  citing 

693,  25  S.  E.  Rep.  854,  56  Am.  St.  Hutchinson  on  Carr. 

Rep.   682;    Eckles  v.  Railway  Co.,  47.  11  Wend.   571. 

112   Mo.    App.    240,    87    S.   W   Rep.  48.  18  id.   175. 
99,  citing  Hutchinson  on  Carr. 


272  THE  LAW   OF    CARRIERS.  [§  251. 

to  be  divided  among  the  owners  of  the  different  parts  of  the  line 
in  proportion  to  the  distances  run  by  each,  whether  such  money 
was  received  for  the  transportation  over  one  part  of  the  line  or 
another.  This  was  held  in  both  courts  to  be  such  a  division  of 
the  profits  among  the  proprietors  of  the  several  sections  as  to 
make  them  partners,  at  least  as  to  third  persons.  But  it  was 
said  that  the  case  would  have  been  entirely  different  had  the 
agreement  been  that  each  stage  owner  should  receive  and  retain 
the  money  earned  on  his  part  of  the  line  and  sustain  all  its  ex- 
penses, and  should  act  .only  as  the  agent  of  the  others  in  receiv- 
ing the  passage  money  for  them  for  the  transportation  over  their 
parts  of  the  line.  In  such  a  case,  it  was  said,  there  would  have 
been  no  joint  interest  and  no  liability  as  partners  to  third  per- 
sons. And  so  it  was  expressly  decided  in  the  subsequent  case  of 
Pattison  v.  Blanchard,^^  in  which  the  agreement  between  the  pro- 
prietors of  the  different  portions  of  the  line  was,  that  the  money 
received  for  the  transportation  of  passengers  should  be  divided 
in  proportion  to  the  length  of  the  route  over  which  they  had  eacli 
transported  such  passengers,  without  any  allowance  or  deduction 
for  any  expenses  incurred  upon  any  part  of  the  line.  This  being 
merely  a  division  of  the  gross  receipts  without  reference  to 
losses,  expenses  or  profits,  was  held  not  to  constitute  such  a  part- 
nership between  the  carriers  as  to  create  a  joint  liability,  or  as 
to  make  them  separately  liable  for  each  other's  defaults. 

Sec.  251.  (§  160.)  Same  subject — Actual  partnership  not 
necessary. — But  the  existence  of  a  partnership  between  differ- 
ent lines  of  carriers  is  not  essential  to  the  creation  of  a  joint  lia- 
bility, nor  is  it  the  test  by  which  such  liability  is  in  all  cases  to 
be  determined.  The  convenience  of  commerce  makes  it  fre- 
quently necessary  to  send  goods  to  distant  places,  which  can 
only  be  reached  by  several  connecting  but  independent  lines  of 
transportation.  This  is  frequently  effected  by  arrangements  be- 
tween the  proprietors  of  such  lines ;  and  when  such  an  arrange- 
ment is  made,  the  liability  of  each  line  is  to  be  determined  by  a 
fair  construction  of  its  terms.     Sometimes   such    arrangements 

49.  1   Seld.   186. 


§252.]  CONNECTING  CARRIERS.  273 

have  been  held  to  constitute  partnerships ;  as  where  the  different 
lines,  or  portions  of  the  same  continuous  line,  have  agreed  to  put 
their  earnings  into  a  common  fund  for  division  according  to  dis- 
tance, expense  or  amount  of  investment,  or  upon  some  such  basis 
agreed  upon  between  the  parties  as  equitable,  as  in  the  cases  last 
cited.  Sometimes  such  arrangements  constitute  strictly  partner- 
ships, whilst  in  many  cases  the  joint  liability  is  made  to  depend 
upon  the  existence  of  the  relation  of  principal  and  agent;  and  it 
frequently  becomes  a  question  for  the  nicest  discrimination, 
whether,  in  the  particular  case,  the  carrier  who  is  sued  for  the 
loss  or  damage  has,  by  his  contract  or  association  with  another 
in  the  same  business,  assumed  responsibility  for  such  loss  or 
damage  when  occasioned  by  the  fault  of  the  latter ;  and  some  of 
the  cases  upon  the  subject  seem  to  be  decided  upon  no  very 
definite  ground,  and  are  not  always  reconcilable.  Such  liability, 
however,  has  almost  invariably  been  put  either  upon  the  ground 
of  partnership  or  upon  that  of  agency. 

Sec.  252.  (§161.)  Same  subject — Cases  holding  carriers 
jointly  liable. — In  Cobb  v.  Abbott^  a  line  of  stage-coaches  was 
run  from  Barre  to  Worcester,  through  Holden,  one  of  the  de- 
fendants stocking  the  road  with  horses  and  coaches  from  Hol- 
den to  Barre,  being  two-thirds  of  the  distance,  and  receiving  all 
the  money  collected  for  carriage  over  that  portion  of  the  line; 
while  the  other  furnished  and  maintained  horses  and  coaches 
for  the  part  of  the  road  from  Worcester  to  Holden  (the  latter 
being  the  point  at  which  they  connected),  and  received  all  the 
proceeds  of  the  business  on  that  part  of  the  line.  They  employed 
a  driver  for  the  whole  line,  the  proprietors  contributing  to  his 
payment  in  equal  proportions.  A  sum  of  money  having  been  in- 
trusted by  the  plaintiff  at  one  end  of  the  continuous  line  to  this 
driver  to  be  carried  to  the  other,  and  he  having  absconded  with 
it,  it  was  held  that  the  two  proprietors  were  jointly  liable  for  the 
loss.  It  was  said  by  the  court  that  had  the  arrangement  between 
the  defendants  been  to  divide  the  profits  of  the  business  in  pro- 
portion to  the  distance  for  which  each  bore  the  expense  of  the 

1.  14  Pick.  289, 
18 


1274  THE  LAW   OF   C.iRRIEBS.  [§  253. 

line,  there  would  have  been  a  clear  ease  of  partnership.  But  it 
was  thought  that  even  as  it  was,  the  undertaking  seeming  to  have 
been  joint,  especially  as  the  driver  had  been  jointly  employed, 
there  was  enough  in  the  case  to  hold  them  jointly  liable.  "The 
question  is  not  without  difficulty,"  said  Shaw,  C.  J.,  "but  on  the 
whole  we  think  they  must  be  considered  so  far  jointly  concerned 
as  to  be  jointly  liable  for  the  driver's  act  in  this  particular  in- 
stance. They  jointly  hired  him  and  for  a  joint  object;  and  the 
well  managing  of  the  business  at  one  end  of  the  line  was  of  im- 
portance to  the  other." 

Sec.  253.  (§162.)  Same  subject.— In  the  case  of  the  Cin- 
cinnati, Plamilton  &  Dayton  Railroad  and  Dayton  &  Michigan 
Railroad  v.  Spratt,^  a  steamboat  line  and  several  railroad  lines 
associated  themselves  to  form  a  line  for  the  transportation  of 
freight  from  Louisville  to  New  York  via  Cincinnati,  charging 
through  freight  and  giving  through  bills  of  lading.  No  part- 
nership was  created  by  the  arrangement,  though  the  object  was 
the  mutual  benefit  of  all  the  lines.  A  quantity  of  tobacco  was 
delivered  upon  one  of  the  boats  at  Louisville  for  shipment  to 
New  York,  a  through  bill  of  lading  was  given  by  their  com- 
mon agent  and  through  freight  paid.  The  tobacco  was  safely 
carried  to  Cincinnati  and  put  upon  a  wharf -boat  of  one  of  the 
associated  lines  in  charge  of  its  agent,  to  be  sent  to  the  depot  of 
the  next  carrier  of  the  through  line.  Whilst  there  deposited, 
the  tobacco  was  injured  by  the  sinking  of  the  wharf-boat,  and 
it  was  held  that  the  several  lines  thus  connected  were  jointly 
and  severally  liable  for  the  loss.  "In  such  cases  of  associated 
companies,"  said  Robertson,  C.  J.,  "engaged  in  a  common  un- 
dertaking for  transportation  on  a  long  line  of  which  each  asso- 
ciate owns  a  different  link,  public  justice  and  commercial  pol- 
icy require  a  stringent  construction  against  any  intermediate 
irresponsibility  as  a  common  carrier.  We  are  therefore  of 
opinion  that  the  delivery  of  the  tobacco  on  the  wharf-boat  was 
a  constructive  delivery  to  appellants  for  transportation  as 
common  carriers." 

2.  2  Duvall  4. 


§254.]  CONNECTING  CARRIERS.  275 

Sec.  254.  (§162a.)  Same  subject.— In  Block  v.  Fitchburg 
Railroad  Company^  it  appeared  that  the  defendant  and  seven 
other  railroad  companies  had  formed  an  association  under  the 
name  of  the  Erie  and  North  Shore  Despatch  Fast  Freight  Line 
for  the  transportation  of  merchandise  between  Boston  and  Chi- 
cago ;  that  the  association  had  an  agent  in  Boston  who  was  au- 
thorized to  receive  goods  at  Boston  for  transportation  over  the 
line  to  Chicago  and  to  give  bills  of  lading  in  the  name  of  the 
association,  the  names  of  the  several  railroads  not  appearing  on 
it;  that  the  plaintiff  had  delivered  goods  to  such  agent  for 
transportation  to  Chicago,  receiving  such  a  bill  of  lading,  and 
that  part  of  the  goods  were  lost  between  Boston  and  Chicago. 
The  action  was  brought  against  all  of  the  companies  forming 
the  association,  and  they  were  held  liable.  "The  defendants," 
said  Morton,  C.  J.,  "formed  a  company,  and  in  its  name  made 
a  special  contract  to  carry  the  plaintiff's  goods  from  Boston  to 
Chicago.  They  are,  so  far  as  the  plaintiff  is  concerned,  part- 
ners, and  liable  jointly  and  severally  for  any  loss  or  damage  to 
his  goods  between  Boston  and  Chicago,  unless  they  are  ex- 
empted from  liability  by  the  terms  of  the  contract."^ 

Sec.  255.  (§  163.)  Same  subject.— In  Hart  v.  The  Railroad 
Company,^  where  three  separate  companies  owned  distinct  por- 
tions of  a  continuous  railroad  line,  each  company  running  its 
cars  over  the  whole  road  and  each  accounting  to  the  others  in 
proportion  to  the  distance  owned  by  it,  employing  the  same 
agents  to  sell  tickets  for  the  whole  line  and  to  receive  freight 
or  baggage  for  carriage  over  the  entire  route,  an  action  was 
sustained  against  one  of  them  for  the  loss  of  baggage  received 

3.  139  Mass.  308.  -  which   the   shipper    pays    in    one 

4.  Citing  Hill  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Rail-  sum,  and  which  the  carriers  divide 
road,  104  Mass.  122.  See,  also,  among  themselves,  they  are  joint- 
"Wyman  v.  Railroad  Co.,  4  Mo.  App.  ly  and  severally  liable  to  the  ship- 
35.  per    with    whom    they     have     con- 

"It  is  well   settled    that    where  tracted  for  a  loss  taking  place  on 

several     common     carriers,     each  any  part  of  the  whole  line."  White 

having  its  own  line,  associate  and  Live     Stock     Commission     Co.     v. 

form  what  to  the  shipper  is  a  con-  Railroad  Co.,  87  Mo.  App.  330. 

tinuous  line,  and  contract  to  carry  5.  8  N.  Y.  37. 
goods  through  for  an  agreed  price 


276  THE  LAW   OF   CARRIERS.  [§  256. 

at  one  terminus  to  be  carried  over  the  whole  line,  although 
there  were  separate  coupon  tickets  for  each  road,  and  although 
it  was  not  proven  that  the  baggage  ever  came  into  its  posses- 
sion or  went  upon  its  car,  it  being  shown  that  the  general  agent 
of  the  three  companies  received  the  baggage  and  agreed  to 
carry  it  over  the  three  roads. 

Sec.  256.  (§  164.)  Same  subject — Cases  holding  carriers 
not  jointly  liable. — But  in  Converse  v.  Norwich,  etc.  Trans. 
Co.,*''  where  defendants,  common  carriers  by  water,  made  a  con- 
tract with  a  railroad  company  that  their  boats  should  run  daily 
in  connection  with  trains  upon  the  railroad;  that  through 
freight  should  be  received  to  be  carried  at  reduced  rates,  the 
receipts  from  which  were  to  be  divided  between  them  in  cer- 
tain proportions,  and  that  the  railroad  company  should  build  a 
depot  and  wharf  where  both  companies  could  transact  their 
business,  defendants  paying  rent  for  their  use  of  it,  it  was  held 
that  the  defendants  were  only  bound  to  carry  to  the  end  of 
their  line  and  there  deliver  to  the  railroad  company,  and  that 
no  joint  liability  was  created. 

Sec.  257.  (§  165.)  Same  subject. — In  Gass  v.  The  Railroad^ 
the  defendants  Avere  the  proprietors  of  a  railroad,  connecting 
with  a  steamboat  company  at  one  end  of  their  road  and  with 
another  railroad  at  the  other  end,  the  three  forming  a  contin- 
uous line  of  transportation  for  passengers  and  freight  between 
New  York  and  Boston.  A  fixed  price  was  charged  for  the  en- 
tire transportation  betM'^een  the  two  cities,  each  company  re- 
ceiving an  agreed  proportion  for  its  share  of  the  service.  The 
goods  which  were  the  subject  of  the  suit  were  received  in  New 
York  by  the  steamboat  company  to  be  carried  to  Boston,  and 
the  whole  amount  of  the  freight  bill  was  to  be  collected  in  Bos- 
ton. It  was  held  that  there  was  no  partnership  or  joint  lia- 
bility. 

Sec.  258.  (§  166.)  Same  subject. — In  Briggs  v.  Vanderbilt 
and  Drew,^  the  defendant  Vanderbilt  was  the  owner  of  a  line 

6.  33  Conn.  166.  8.  19   Barb.   222. 

7.  99   Mass.   220. 


§258.]  CONNECTING  CARRIERS.  277 

of  steamships  plying  between  New  York  and  the  Isthmus  of 
Nicaragua.  There  was  also  a  steamship  line  from  the  Isthmus 
to  San  Francisco,  in  which  the  defendant  Drew  was  a  partner. 
The  two  steamship  companies  had  a  common  agent  in  New 
York  who  sold  through  tickets  to  San  Francisco,  from  whom 
the  plaintiff  purchased  three  tickets  entitling  him  to  a  passage 
to  and  across  the  Isthmus,  and  thence  upon  a  vessel  of  which 
the  defendant  Drew  was  half  owner  to  San  Francisco.  A  sep- 
arate and  distinct  price  was  charged  for  each  of  these  tickets, 
though  the  three  together  were  equivalent  to  one  ticket,  en- 
titling the  plaintiff  to  a  passage  to  and  across  the  Isthmus  to 
San  Francisco ;  but  there  was  no  evidence  that  the  defendants 
were  jointly  interested  in  the  price  of  a  ticket  for  any  one  of 
the  routes,  and  the  question  being  whether  there  was  a  part- 
nership in  the  transaction.  Strong,  J.,  used  the  following  lan- 
guage: "In  that  respect  this  case  differs  from  Champion  v. 
Bostwick.  In  that  case  the  money  received  on  the  different 
routes  by  the  separate  owners  was  to  be  divided  between  them 
in  proportion  to  the  number  of  miles  run  by  each;  and  it  was 
for  that  reason  held  that  such  owners  were  jointly  liable  as  co- 
partners to  third  persons.  But  Chancellor  Walworth,  who  gave 
the  only  written  opinion  in  the  court  for  the  correction  of 
errors,  said  truly  that  'the  case  would  be  entirely  different  if 
each  stage-owner  was  to  receive  and  retain  the  passage  money 
earned  on  his  part  of  the  line,  and  to  sustain  all  the  expenses 
thereof,  and  was  only  to  act  as  the  agent  of  the  others  in  re- 
ceiving the  passage  money  for  them  for  the  transportation  of 
passengers  over  their  parts  of  the  line.  In  that  case  there  would 
be  no  joint  interest  and  no  liability  to  third  persons  as  part- 
ners.' In  this  case  there  were  three  distinct  concerns — on  the 
Atlantic,  on  the  Isthmus,  and  on  the  Pacific.  There  was  no  joint 
interest  in  the  passage  money;  no  agreement  as  to  its  division 
or  any  proportion  which  each  was  to  receive.  Each  made  its 
own  charge,  not  dependent  in  any  manner  upon  the  others, 
and  there  was  no  agreement  to  share  any  profit  or  loss.  There 
was  not,  therefore,  any  partnership.     .     .     .     They  had,  it  is 


278  THE  LAW   OP   CARRIERS.  [§  259. 

true,  the  same  agent,  but  he  acted  in  his  vicarious  capacity 
separately  for  each."^ 

Sec.  259.  (§  166a.)  Same  subject. — In  Insurance  Company 
V.  Railroad  Company/ ^  it  appeared  that  a  contract  existed  be- 
tween a  corporation  known  as  the  Erie  &  Pacific  Dispatch  Com- 
pany on  the  one  part,  and  the  defendant  railroad  company  on 
the  other  part,  whose  road,  in  connection  with  other  roads, 
formed  a  continuous  line  to  New  York,  that  the  defendant 
should  ''receive,  load  and  unload,  deliver  and  way-bill"  all 
freight  sent  to  it  by  the  dispatch  company  at  such  rates  for 
transportation  as  might  be  established  by  the  railroad  com- 
panies, and  should,  while  assuming  all  the  risks  of  a  common 
carrier,  pay  for  all  damage  or  loss  of  property  while  on  its  line 
of  road  or  in  its  possession.  A  similar  contract  was  entered 
into  by  the  dispatch  company  with  each  of  the  other  railroad 
companies,  between  which  there  was  an  arrangement  that  the 
amount  charged  for  the  through  freight  should  be  divided  be- 
tween them  according  to  the  length  of  their  respective  roads; 
that  each  company  should  pay  for  losses  occurring  on  its  road ; 
and  that  on  such  freight  the  last  carrier  should  collect  the 
charges  from  the  consignee,  deduct  its  share  thereof,  account 
in  the  same  way  to  the  next  company,  and  so  on  to  the  first. 
Settlements  were  to  be  made  by  the  railroad  companies  period- 
ically upon  accountings  between  them,  and  each  settled  sep- 
arately with  the  dispatch  company,  paying  it  a  certain  percent- 
age on  the  business  for  its  compensation.  Upon  this  state  of 
facts  it  was  held  by  the  supreme  court  of  the  United  States 
that  the  defendant  railroad  company,  by  its  agreement  with  the 
dispatch  company,  incurred  neither  an  obligation  to  carry 
freight  beyond  its  own  road  nor  a  liability  for  the  negligence 
of  the  other  companies:  and  that  the  arrangement  between 
the  railroad  companies  did  not  make  them  partners,  either 
inter  sese  or  as  to  third  persons.^ ^ 

9.  In  connection  with  this  case  r.  Kountz  Line,  4  Woods,  268; 
see  Swift  v.  Steamship  Co.,  106  N.  Milne  v.  Douglass,  4  McCrary,  368; 
Y.  206,  12  N.  E.  Rep.  .'iSS.  Deming   r.   Railroad    Co.,    21    Fed. 

10.  104   U.    S.    146.  Rep.    25. 

11.  See,   also,   Citizens'   Ins.   Co. 


§260.]  CONNECTING  CARRIERS.  279 

Sec.  260.  (§167.)  Same  subject.— In  Ellsworth  v.  Tartti2 
plaintiff  purchased  a  through  passenger  ticket  over  two  con- 
necting lines  of  stage-coaches,  in  one  of  which  only  was  the 
defendant  interested,  there  being  no  proof  of  any  community 
of  interest  in  the  property  or  profits  of  the  two  lines.  Each 
proprietor  was,  however,  to  be  paid  out  of  the  money  received 
for  the  through  ticket.  The  plaintiff's  baggage  was  lost,  but 
not,  as  it  appeared,  upon  the  defendant's  part  of  the  line;  and 
it  was  held  that  the  agreement  by  the  defendant  with  the  other 
proprietors  to  receive  fare  for  his  part  of  the  route,  out  of  the 
money  paid  to  a  common  agent  for  selling  thr'ough  tickets, 
would  not,  in  any  sense,  make  him  a  participant  in  the  profits 
of  the  entire  route  nor  liable  to  third  persons  as  a  partner. 
"Suppose,"  said  Goidthwaite,  J.,  "the  different  proprietors 
along  the  route  came  to  the  understanding  to  appoint  a  com- 
mon agent  at  each  end  to  receive  the  fare  of  each  from  pas- 
sengers going  through  and  to  give  a  receipt  or  through  ticket; 
it  Is  very  clear  that  such  an  agreement  would  not  constitute  a 
partnership  inter  se  or  as  to  third  persons,  and  yet  each  pro- 
prietor would  have  the  right  to  receive  his  proportion  of  the 
fare ;  there  would  be  in  such  a  case  no  community  of  interest 
either  in  the  property  or  the  profits.^  ^ 

Sec.  261.     (§  168.)     Same  subject. — But  in  the  case  of  Carter 

&  Hough  'V.  Peck,^^  the  defendants  Carter  &  Hough,  being  the 
owners  of  a  line  of  stage-coaches  from  Nashville  to  Waynes- 
boro, made  an  arrangement  with  the  proprietors  of  another 
line  from  the  latter  place  to  La  Grange,  that  passengers  pur- 
chasing through  tickets  from  Nashville  to  La  Grange  should  be 
carried  the  entire  distance  by  the  two  lines.  The  plaintiff  hav- 
ing purchased  a  through  ticket  was  carried  safely  and  in  due 
time  by  the  defendants  to  the  end  of  their  portion  of  the  route, 

12.  26  Ala.   733.  different  parts  of  a  line  or  route 

13.  And  see,  following  and  ap-  of  transportation,  each  carrier  is 
proving  this  case,  and  stating  the  liable  only  for  a  loss  of,  or  in- 
general  rule  in  this  country  to  be  jury  to,  the  goods  on  his  particu- 
that  in  the  absence  of  a  special  lar  line  or  route,  Montgomery,  etc. 
contract  or  of  some  relation  be-  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Moore,  51  Ala.  394. 
tween   carriers   having  control   of        14.  4  Sneed  203. 


280  THE  LAW   OF   CARRIERS.  [§  261. 

but  the  other  company  with  whom  the  arrangement  for  through 
transportation  had  been  made  failed,  from  the  insufficiency  of 
its  means  of  conveyance,  to  carry  him  forward  as  he  was  en- 
titled to  be  carried  by  his  contract;  whereupon  he  hired  an- 
other conveyance  for  the  prosecution  of  his  journey  and  sued 
the  first  company  which  had  not  been  in  fault,  in  an  action 
for  damages,  and  it  was  held  that  having  assumed  to  carry  the 
plaintiff  to  a  certain  destination,  they  were  responsible  for  the 
undertaking  and  liable  for  the  failure  of  the  connecting  com- 
pany. No  reference  is  made  in  the  case  to  the  manner  in 
which  the  price  of  the  ticket  was  to  be  divided  between  the 
proprietors  of  the  two  lines,  and  it  was  said  to  be  wholly  im- 
material whether  the  plaintiff  knew  or  not  of  the  fact  ©f  the 
existence  of  the  two  lines  and  of  the  arrangements  between 
them.  The  through  ticket  was  a  contract  for  the  entire  trans- 
portation, and  made  the  defendants  responsible  for  its  breach 
no  matter  by  whose  fault  occasioned.  Nothing  was  said  as  to 
the  liability  of  the  defaulting  carrier,  as  he  was  not  sued.  But 
as  the  contract  was  made  by  his  authority,  there  would  seem 
to  be  no  question  but  that  he  would  have  been  held  liable  as 
a  party  to  the  contract.^  ^ 

15.  See,  also,  upon  the  subject  295;  Burroughs  v.  The  Railroad, 
of  the  liability  of  carriers  for  the  100  Mass.  26;  Milnor  v.  The  Rail- 
defaults  of  other  connecting  or  as-  road,  53  N.  Y.  363;  Brooks  v.  The 
sociated  carriers,  Judson  v.  The  Railway,  15  Mich.  332;  Lock  Corn- 
Railroad,  4  Allen,  520;  Straiten  v.  pany  v.  The  Railroad,  48  N.  H. 
The  Railroad,  2  E.  D.  Smith,  184;  339;  Gray  v.  Jackson,  51  id.  9; 
Hood  V.  The  Railroad,  22  Conn.  1;  Fitchburg,  etc.  R.  R.  v.  Hanna, 
Bowman  v.  Hilton,  11  Ohio,  303;  6  Gray,  539;  Lowell  Wire  Fence 
Ricketts  v.  The  Railroad,  4  Lans.  Co.  v.  Sargent,  8  Allen,  189;  Hemp- 
446;  Harp  v.  The  Grand  Era,  1  stead  v.  The  Railroad,  28  Barb. 
Woods'  Ct.  Ct.  R.  184;  Barter  v.  485;  Baltimore,  etc.  R.  R.  v.  Wil- 
Wheeler,  49  N.  H.  9;  Fairchild  v.  kins,  44  Md.  11;  Phifer  v.  Rail- 
Slocum,  19  Wend.  329;  s.  c.  7  Hill,  road  Co.,  89  N.  C.  311;  Lindley 
292;  Hartan  v.  The  Railroad,  114  v.  Railroad  Co.,  88  N.  C.  547; 
Mass.  44;  Washburn  Manufg.  Co.  Phillips  v.  Railroad  Co.,  78  N.  C. 
V.  R.  R.  113  id.  490;  Croft  v.  The  294;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Dupont,  128 
Railroad,  1  MacArthur,  492;  Skin-  Fed.  840,  64  C.  C.  A.  478. 
ner  v.  Hall,  60  Me.  477;  Wilson  v.  In  the  absence  of  any  special 
The  Railroad,  21  Gratt.  654;  Dar-  contract  or  partnership  between 
ling    V.    The    Railroad,    11    Allen,  two  connecting  carriers,  the  mere 


§  262.]  CONNECTING  CARRIERS.  281 

Sec.  262.  Same  subject — Effect  of  establishing  joint  or 
through  rates. — Where  several  connecting  carriers  establish 
and  publish  joint  or  through  rates,  that  fact  alone  will  be  in- 
sufficient to  impose  upon  them  a  joint  liability  or  render  one 
of  them  responsible  for  the  acts  or  omissions  of  the  others.  The 
first  carrier  under  such  an  arrangement  is,  at  most,  the  agent 
of  each  of  the  other  carriers  for  the  purpose  of  contracting  for 
carriage  over  its  route,  and  it  will  be  the  duty  of  each  succeed- 
ing carrier  to  receive  the  goods  at  the  point  where  the  preced- 
ing carrier's  line  ends  and  carry  them  to  its  own  terminus. 
But  neither  the  first  nor  any  succeeding  carrier  will  be  consid- 
ered as  thereby  assuming  responsibility  for  the  goods  after  a 
delivery  has  been  made  to  the  next  carrier  in  the  route.^^ 

Sec.  263.     (§  169.)     Same  subject— The  rule  stated.— From 

these  cases  it  may  be  deduced  :  First.  That  where  carriers  over 
different  routes  have  associated  themselves  under  a  contract 
for  a  division  of  the  profits  of  the  carriage  in  certain  propor- 
tions, or  of  the  receipts  from  it  after  deducting  any  expenses 
of  the  business,  they  become  jointly  liable  as  partners  to  third 
persons ;  but  that,  where  the  agreement  is  that  each  shall  bear 
the  expenses  of  his  own  route  and  of  the  transportation  upon 
it,  and  that  the  gross  receipts  shall  be  divided  in  proportion  to 
distance  or  otherwise,  they  are  partners  neither  inter  se  nor 
as  to  third  persons,  and  incur  no  joint  liability.^'''  Secondly. 
That,  where  they  jointly  employ  a  common  agent  in  the  pros- 
ecution of  a  joint  enterprise  as  carriers,  they  become  jointly 

fact  that  the  first  carrier  sells  a  way   Co.,   80   Iowa,   92,   45   N.   W. 

ticket  to  a  point  on  the  other  car-  Rep.  573.     An  advertisement  by  a 

rier's  line  will  not  make  the  sec-  railroad     company    that    it    runs 

ond  carrier  liable  for  the  loss  of  trains   or  connects  with  trains   of 

a    passenger's    trunk    before    the  other    companies    so    as    to    form 

same    has    been    delivered     to     it.  through    lines    without    breaking 

Romero    v.    McKernan,    88    N.    Y.  bulk    or    transferring    passengers 

Supp.  365.  tends    to    show     no    contract    or 

16.  Wehmann  v.  Railway  Co.,  agreement  between  the  companies 
58  Minn.  22,  59  N.  W.  Rep.  546.  to  share  profits  and  losses.     Rail- 

17.  This  statement  of  the  rule  road  Co.  v.  Jones,  155  U,  S.  333, 
is   approved   in   Peterson   v.   Rail-  15   Sup.   Ct.  R.   136. 


282  THE  LAW   OF   CARRIERS.  [§  263. 

liable  for  his  defaults/^  but  do  not  become  responsible  for  each 
other's  acts  merely  by  reason  of  the  employment  of  such  com- 
mon agent.  Nor  will  a  contract  for  through  transportation 
over  their  several  lines  made  by  him,  although  authorized  by 
an  arrangement  between  them,  create  a  joint  liability  or  a 
liability  for  the  defaults  of  each  other,  it  not  being  shown  that 
such  companies  were  jointly  interested  in  the  expenses  of  the 
transportation.  Thirdly.  That,  in  order  to  hold  one  carrier  re- 
sponsible for  the  defaults  of  another,  a  partnership  between 
them  must  be  shown,  either  express  or  implied,  from  the  circum- 
stances ;  or  it  must  appear  that  the  one  was  acting  in  the  trans- 
portation as  the  agent  of  the  other  against  whom  the  recovery 
is  sought ;  and  that  the  mere  employment  of  a  common  or  joint 
agent  with  authority  to  contract  for  through  transportation  over 
connecting  routes,  under  an  arrangement  for  the  division  of  the 
receipts  for  such  transportation  in  proportion  to  distance  or 
other  service,  will  generally  constitute  neither  such  a  partner- 
ship nor  agency,  each  for  the  other,  as  will  make  them  jointly 
liable  or  liable  for  each  other's  acts  in  the  transportation.^^ 

18.  See,  Kansas  City,  etc.  R'y  nish  transportation  through  other 
Co,  V.  Embrey,  —  Ark.  — ,  90  S.    lines. 

W    Rep.   15.  "In  the  absence  of  proof  of  ex- 

19.  In  Gulf,  etc.  R'y  Co.  v.  press  authority,  ^cts  may  be 
Baird,  75  Tex.  256,  it  is  said:  "If  shown  which  will  be  sufficient  to 
the  Louisville  &  Nashville  Railway  authorize  a  jury  to  find  that  the 
Company    (the   first   carrier)    had  power  actually  existed. 

not  authority,  by  virtue  of  the  "A  railway  company  cannot  be 
existence  of  a  partnership  be-  held  to  have  ratified  a  contract 
tween  itself  and  the  other  lines  from  the  fact  that  it  performed 
over  which  the  cattle  were  to  some  of  the  services  contemplated 
pass,  or  by  virtue  of  an  agency  by  it,  when  it  is  not  at  liberty, 
conferred  on  it  by  the  other  com-  contract  or  no  contract,  to  refuse 
panies  empowering  it  to  make  a  to  render  the  service.  At  the  time 
contract  which  would  bind  them  the  cars  in  which  appellee's  cattle 
jointly,  then  the  contract  was  were  received  by  appellant,  the 
simply  the  contract  of  the  com-  law  provided  that  'every  such 
pany  that  made  it,  by  which  it  company  shall  for  a  reasonable 
was  bound  to  transport  the  cat-  compensation  draw  over  their 
tie  on  its  own  line  as  far  as  that  railroad  without  delay  the  pas- 
extended,  and  beyond  that  to  fur-  sengers,   merchandise  and  cars  of 


§  264.]  CONNECTING  CARRIERS.  283 

Fourthly.  That  carriers,  like  other  persons,  may  become  liable 
for  each  other's  acts  as  partners  to  third  persons  who  may  have 
sustained  injuries  through  their  defaults  or  misfeasances,  when 
as  between  themselves  there  is  no  partnership  nor  mutual  re- 
sponsibility.2o 

Sec.  264.  (§  170.)  Partnerships  between  corporations  as 
carriers. — The  same  rules  in  regard  to  partnerships  and  other 
contracts  and  associations  between  carriers  will  govern,  when 
the  connecting  lines  are  railroad  companies  or  other  incor- 
porated bodies,  whenever  the  rights  of  third  parties  who  have 
contracted  with  them  require  that  such  partnerships  or  associa- 
tions shall  be  upheld,  however  it  may  be  when  the  question  is 
between  the  corporations  themselves.  It  is  true  that  it  has  been 
held  that  two  distinct  and  separate  railroad  corporations  have 
no  right  to  consolidate  and  conduct  their  business  under  the 
same  management  as  a  partnership  pi  but  this  was  a  case  be- 
tween the  assignee  of  certain  promissory  notes,  given  in  the  name 
assumed  by  the  two  companies  after  the  consolidation  and  the 
two  original  contracting  companies,  and  it  is  probable  that  if  the 
contracting  companies  had  confined  themselves  in  their  associa- 
tion strictly  to  the  purposes  for  which  they  had  been  incorpo- 
rated, the  decision  would  have  been  different,  upon  that  general 

every    other    railroad    which   may  through  tickets  and  takes  its  own 

enter  and  connect  with  their  rail-  share  of  the  price  according  to  its 

road.'  mileage  does  not  constitute  thein 

"In  the  face  of  such  legislation,  partners.      Railroad    Co.    v.    Mul- 
the    evidence    should    show    some-  ford,   162   III.   522,   44   N.   E.   Rep. 
thing   more    than   that   a   through  861,  35  L.  R.  A.   599. 
shipment  was  made,  that  a  price  A  mere   traflSc  arrangement  he- 
was  fixed  for  the  entire  transpor-  tween    connecting    carriers    for    a 
tation    and    collected    by   the    last  division  of  receipts  on  the  profits 
carrier,  before  it  ought  to  be  held  of   transportation   will   not   create 
that  this  was  a  joint  contract  for  a  joint  contract  or  partnership  be- 
transportation   that   would    render  tween   them.     Wilson   v.   Railroad 
each   carrier   liable   for   failure   of  Co.,   92   N.    Y.    Supp.    1091. 
duty  on  the  part  of  other  carriers  20.  Champion    v.     Bostwick,     11 
in  the  connected  lines."    This  case  Wend.  571,  18  id.  175;  Pattison  v. 
was  followed  in  Fort  Worth,  etc.  Blanchard,   1  Seld.   186. 
R'y  Co.  V.  Williams,  77  Tex.   121.  21.  Pearce    v.    Railroad    Co.,    21 

The    fact    that    each    road    sells  How.  441. 


284  THE  LAW  OF  CARRIERS.  [§  264. 

principle  in  reference  to  corporations,  that  where  their  charters 
are  silent  as  to  what  contracts  they  may  make,  they  have  power 
to  make  all  such  as  are  necessary  or  usual  in  the  course  of  their 
business  as  means  to  enable  them  to  attain  the  objects  for  which 
they  are  created'.  And  in  those  cases  heretofore  referred  to  in 
which  it  has  been  held  that  a  railroad  or  any  other  incorporated 
carrier  may  contract  to  carry  beyond  the  limits  of  its  line  as 
fixed  by  its  act  of  incorporation,  such  contracts  have  been  mainly 
upheld  upon  the  argument  that,  whether  such  contracts  were 
strictly  ultra  vires  or  not,  as  to  third  persons  so  contracting  with 
the  carrier  they  were  valid.22  Reasoning  by  analogy,  it  would 
be  equally  plain  that  wherever  the  rights  of  parties  employing 
the  carrier  require  the  enforcement  of  a  joint  liability  arising 
from  such  associations,  they  will  be  held  to  have  been  validly 
formed;  and  as  to  the  public,  however  it  may  be  between  the 
companies  themselves,  all  duties  and  obligations  growing  out 
of  them  will  be  enforced.  Such  has  been,  tacitly  at  least,  con- 
ceded to  be  the  law  in  the  great  number  of  cases  which  have 
come  before  the  courts  involving  such  arrangement  between  con- 
necting and  associated  lines  of  carriers.^^ 

22.  See  cases  cited  ante,  §  242.  they  will   be  none  the  less  liable 

23.  In  a  New  York  case  it  is  for  injuries  resulting  through 
said  that  the  power  of  corpora-  their  negligence  in  the  manage- 
tions  to  become  joint  carriers  has  ment  of  the  road.  Railroad  Co. 
never  been  denied  but  has  fre-  v.  Meyers,  62  Fed.  367,  10  C.  C.  A, 
quently  been  recognized.  Swift  r.  485,  18  U.  S.  App.  569. 
Steamship  Co.,  106  N.  Y.  206,  cit-  If  a  corporation  permits  another 
Ing  Aigen  v.  Railroad  Co.,  132  company  to  use  its  corporate  name 
Mass.  423;  Block  v.  Railroad  Co.,  and  hold  itself  out  to  the  general 
139  Mass.  308;  Gass  v.  Railroad  public  as  transacting  the  business 
Co.,  99  Mass.  220;  Hot  Springs  of  a  common  carrier,  it  will  be 
R.  R.  V.  Trippe,  42  Ark.  465;  In-  liable  as  a  common  carrier  to 
surance  Co.  v.  Railroad  Co.,  104  those  who  in  good  faith  deal  with 
U.  S.  146;  Barter  v.  Wheeler,  49  it  as  such.  Reed  v.  Steamboat  Co., 
N.  H.  9;  Wylde  v.  Railroad  Co.,  1  Marr.  (Del.),  193,  40  Atl.  Rep. 
53  N.   Y.   156.  955. 

If  two  railroad  corporations  co-  Although  a  railroad  company 
operate  in  the  management  of  a  may  be  a  legal  entity  separate 
railway  without  authority  of  law,     and   distinct   from   a   second    rail- 


§264.] 


CONNECTING  CARRIERS. 


285 


road  company,  if  it  sustains  to- 
ward the  second  company  the  re- 
lation of  a  dummy  more  nearly 
than  that  of  an  independent,  self- 
governing  company,  and  its  cor- 
porate existence  is  maintained  by 
and  for  the  use  of  the  second  com- 
pany  and    it   is    held    out   to   the 


general  public  as  a  part  of  such 
company's  system,  the  second  com- 
pany will  be  responsible  to  third 
persons  who  are  injured  by  the 
former  company's  acts.  Railroad 
Co.  r.  Anoka  Nat'l  Bank,  108  Fed. 
482,    47   C.   C.   A.    454. 


CHAPTER  VI. 


OF    THE    CARRIER'S    LIABILITY    AND    THE    EXCEP- 
TIONS THERETO  BY  LAW. 


I.       IN     GENERAL. 

§  265.  The  liability   of  the  carrier 
by  law. 

266.  Carrier  may  by  contract  as- 

sume more  than  legal  lia- 
bility. 

267.  Same      subject  —   Contract 

must  be  express. 

268.  Purpose  of  this  chapter. 


II.      GABBIER    NOT    LIABLE    FOR   LOSSES 
ARISING  FROM  THE  ACT  OF  GOD. 

269.  What  is  meant  by  the  "act 

of  God."      • 

270.  Same    subject  —  Conflict    in 

authorities. 

271.  Same   subject. 

272.  The    rule    in     Colt    v.     Mc- 

Mechen. 

273.  Same  subject. 

274.  Act  of   God   must  be   proxi- 

mate cause  of  loss. 

275.  Same       subjeet    —    Human 

agency  must  not  have  in- 
tervened. 

276.  Same  subject. 

277.  Same  subject. 

278.  Same    subject — Prudence    or 

mistaken  judgment  no  ex- 
cuse. 

Loss  by  fire,  explosion  or 
collision. 

Same  subject. 

Same  subject — Same  rule 
applies  to  carriers  using 
steam. 

282.  Loss  by  sudden  inundation. 

283.  Loss  by  earthquake. 

284.  Loss  by  landslide. 

286 


279. 


280. 
281. 


§  285. 
286. 

287. 
288. 


289. 
290. 
291. 
292. 


293. 

294. 

295. 
296. 
297. 


298. 
299. 
300. 
301. 

302. 
303. 
304. 
305. 
306. 


307. 


Loss  by  snowstorm. 

Loss  by  wind. 

Burden  of  proof. 

But  carrier  not  excused  if 
he  negligently  venture 
forth  from  place  of  safety. 

Same  subject. 

Same   subject. 

Same  subject. 

Same  subject — Or  if  he  neg- 
ligently exposes  the  goods 
to  danger. 

So  if  his  vessel  be  unsea- 
worthy. 

Or  if  he  deviate  from  the 
usual  course. 

Same  subject. 

Same  subject. 

Where  the  loss  would  not 
have  occurred  but  for  the 
carrier's  unreasonable  de- 
lay. 

Same  subject. 

Same  subject. 

Same  subject. 

Same  subject — The  contrary 
view. 

Same  subject. 

Same  subject. 

Same  subject. 

Same  subject. 

Same  subject — How  where 
loss,  due  to  cause  excepted 
by  contract,  would  not 
have  occurred  but  for  the 
carrier's  unreasonable  de- 
lay. 

Effect  of  unreasonable  de- 
lay upon  insurance. 


CARRIER  S  LIABILITY   IN  GENERAL. 


287 


§  308.  Carrier     responsible    as     in 
case  of  deviation. 

309.  The   degree   of   diligence   to 

be  exercised  by  the  car- 
rier when  the  goods  have 
been  overtaken  by  disas- 
ter. 

310.  Same  subject. 

311.  Same  subject. 

312.  Burden   of  proof  as  to   car- 

rier's contributory  negli- 
gence. 

313.  Act  of  God  will  not  excuse 

carrier  if  carrier  has 
wrongfully  refused  to  de- 
liver goods. 

III.  CABBIEB  NOT  LIABLE  FOB  LOSSES 
ABISING  FEOM  ACTS  OF  THE 
PUBLIC    ENEMY. 

314.  Exception   of   losses   arising 

from  the  acts  of  the  pub- 
lic enemy. 

315.  Reason  for  this  exception. 

316.  Who  are  public  enemies  — 

Mobs  —  Rioters  —  Strik- 
ers— Thieves — Pirates. 

317.  Same  subject  —  Rebellion — 

Revolution. 

318.  Same    subject  —  Declaration 

of  war  not  necessary  if 
actual  hostilities  exist. 

319.  Carrier  liable  if  loss  by  pub- 

lic enemy  caused  by  his 
negligence  or  deviation. 

320.  Same  subject. 

321.  Same  subject. 

322.  Effect  of  war  on  contract  of 

carriage. 

323.  Same    subject  —  Contraband 

goods. 

IV.  CABBIEB  NOT  LIABLE  FOB  LOSSES 
FEOM  THE  ACTS  OF  THE  PUBLIC 
AUTHOBITY. 

324.  Carrier     protected     if     loss 

caused  by  public  author- 
ity. 


§  325.  Same  subject  —  Destruction 
or  injury  under  police 
power. 

326.  Same    subject  —  Confederate 

authority. 

327.  Same   subject  —  Seizure   un- 

der legal   process. 

V.  CABBIEB  NOT  LIABLE  FOB  LOSSES 
CAUSED  BY  AN  ACT  OF  THE 
OWNEB   OF    THE    GOODS. 

328.  Exception  to  liability  on  the 

ground  of  the  fraud  of 
the  owner  of  the  goods. 

329.  Same  subject. 

330.  Same   subject  —  Neglect   or 

failure  to  disclose  con- 
tents or  value. 

331.  Same     subject  —  Extent     of 

carrier's  liability. 

332.  Same    subject — Illustrations. 

333.  Exception     to     liability     in 

case  of  loss  from  the  in- 
termeddling or  mistake 
of  the  owner  of  the  goods. 

VI.  CABBIEB   NOT   LIABLE   FOB   LOSSES 

CAUSED       BY      THE      INHEBENT 
NATUEE    OF    THE    GOODS. 

334.  Nature  of  the  exception. 

VII.  EXCEPTION     IN      THE     CASE     OF 

LIVE    ANIMALS. 

335.  Live   animals    not   regarded 

as  goods. 

336.  Difference  in  liability  based 

on  inherent  nature. 

337.  Same  subject. 

338.  Same  subject. 

339.  Carrier    liable    as    common 

carrier  of  animals  except 
for  losses  caused  by  their 
peculiar  nature. 

340.  Same    subject — Cases    hold- 

ing contrary   view. 

341.  Carrier   of  animals   is   com- 

mon carrier  and  not  spe- 
cial agent  of  owner. 


288 


THE  LA^V   OF   CARRIERS. 


?  342.  Though  injury  caused  by 
peculiar  nature  of  the 
animals,  carrier  not  ex- 
cused if  he  has  been  neg- 
ligent. 

343.  Duty  of  shipper  to  disclose 

peculiarities  affecting  risk. 

VIII.      EXCEPTIONS   MADE  BY   STATUTE. 

344.  Statutes     limiting    carrier's 

liability. 

345.  Policy     of     United      States 

courts  towards  carriers  by 
water  changed  by  Harter 
Act. 

346.  Statute    similar    to    Harter 

Act  enacted  in  Great 
Britain  in  1900. 

347.  To   what   vessels   and   prop- 

erty   Harter    Act    applies. 

348.  Harter    Act    only    modifies 

relations  between  a  ves- 
sel and  her  cargo. 

349.  Stipulations  in  bills  of  lad- 

ing contrary  to  section 
one  of  Harter  Act  are 
void. 

350.  Meaning  of  word   "loading" 

in  section  one  of  Harter 
Act. 

351.  "Stowage"      used      in      two 

senses  in  section  one  of 
Harter  Act. 

352.  Stowage  with  a  view  to  the 

proper  trim  of  the  vessel. 

353.  Responsibility        for       such 

stowage  rests  on  the  car- 
rier alone. 

354.  Stowage    with    reference    to 

the     natural     characteris- 
tics of  the  cargo  carrier — 
Effect  of  custom. 
555.  Stowage  of  liquid  cargo. 

356.  Duty     of    ship     to     provide 

proper  dunnage. 

357.  Stowage     of     delicate     and 

easily   tainted   goods. 


§  358.  Goods  should  be  secured 
from  possibility  of  shift- 
ing. 
359.  Proper  stowage  at  com- 
mencement of  voyage  may 
be  made  improper  by 
change  of  vessel's  trim 
during  voyage. 
3G0.  Negligence  in  delivery  of 
cargo  within  the  first  sec- 
tion of  the  Harter  Act. 

361.  Vessel  is  liable  for  failure  to 

deliver  at  all  through  mas- 
ter's negligence  in  over- 
looking goods. 

362.  Second     section     of    Harter 

Act  is  the  complement  of 
section  three. 

363.  Effect   of   sections   two   and 

three  on  the  warranty  of 
seaworthiness. 

364.  Same     subject — Latent     de- 

fects. 

365.  Exemption  clauses  in  bills  of 

lading   strictly    construed. 

366.  The    test    of    seaworthiness. 

367.  Burden   of  proof  on  carrier 

to  prove  vessel  was  sea- 
worthy or  due  diligence 
was  used  to  make  her  sea- 
worthy. 

368.  How    far    warranty    of    sea- 

worthiness extends  —  ves- 
sel must  be  seaworthy  at 
each  stage  of  voyage. 

369.  Vessel   liable   for   initial   in- 

stability. 

370.  Presumption        of        unsea- 

worthiness when  leaks 
soon  happen  in  ordinary 
weather. 

371.  Leaking  decks  or  hatches. 

372.  Defective  rivets  or  bolts. 

373.  Unfastened  ports. 

374.  Water  and  steam  pipes,  etc. 

375.  Bulkheads. 

376.  InsuflSiciency    of   coal. 

377.  Defective  fog  horns. 


§265.] 


carrier's  liability  in  general. 


289 


!  378.  Deviations    in   compass. 

379.  Vessel     should     be      cleaned 

and  repaired  often  and 
well. 

380.  What  is  due  diligence — Ves- 

sel owner  should  be  re- 
sponsible for  the  acts  of 
his    agents. 

381.  Due    diligence    in    manning 

vessel. 

382.  Faults  or  errors  in  manage- 

ment. 


§  383.  Faults  or  errors  in  naviga- 
tion. 

384.  Dangers  of  the  sea. 

385.  The  inherent  defect,  quality 

or  vice  of  the  thing  car- 
ried. 

386.  Effect  of  deviation. 

387.  Effect  of  the  Harter  Act  on 

damages     recoverable     by 
cargo  owner  or  on  rights 
,  of  a  general  average  con- 

tribution. 


I.  IN  GENERAL. 

Sec.  265.  (§  170a.)  The  liability  of  the  carrier  by  law.— The 
liability  of  the  common  carrier  by  law  is,  as  has  been  seen,  an 
unusual  and  extraordinary  one,  based  upon  considerations  of 
public  policy  which  have  survived  the  wonderful  change  in  the 
circumstances  under  which  they  first  arose.  By  that  law  the 
common  carrier  is  regarded  as  a  practical  insurer  of  the  goods 
against  all  losses  of  whatever  kind  with  the  exception  of  (1) 
those  arising  from  what  is  known  as  the  act  of  God,  and  (2) 
those  caused  by  the  public  enemy;  to  which  in  modern  times 
have  been  added  (3)  those  arising  from  the  act  of  the  public 
authority,  (4)  those  arising  from  the  act  of  the  shipper,  and 
(5)  those  arising  from  the  inherent  nature  of  the  goods. 

Sec.  266.  (§  171.)  Carrier  may  by  contract  assume  more 
than  legal  liability. — As  a  carrier  may,  as  will  be  hereafter 
seen,  to  some  extent  restrict  his  liability  within  narrower  limits 
than  are  prescribed  by  the  law  in  the  absence  of  express  con- 
tract, so  he  may  enlarge  it  so  as  to  waive  this  limited  protection 
which  the  law  has  always  afforded  him.  But  this  must  be  done 
by  clear  and  precise  language ;  for  the  law  will  not  imply  from 
any  doubtful  language  such  an  intention,  but  will  rather  pre- 
sume, where  the  meaning  of  the  contract  is  doubtful,  that  it 
was  not  his  intention  to  waive  a  protection  so  reasonable  and  so 
important  to  him.  Express  language  will  be  required  to  impose 
upon  a  party  the  responsibility  of  an  insurer  beyond  his  legal 
obligation,  or  to  prevent  the  operation  of  the  customary  rule  in 

19 


290  THE  LAW   OF    CARRIERS.  [§  267. 

cases  where  the  act  of  God  or  inevitable  accident  excuses  the 
non-performance  of  a  contract. 

Sec.  267.     (§  172.)     Same  subject — Contract  must  be  express. 

— In  Price  v.  Hartshorn^  the  contract  of  the  carrier  was  "to  de- 
liver without  delay,  damage  or  deficiency  in  quantity  to  be  de- 
ducted from  charges  by  consignees. ' '  It  was  contended  that  this 
contract,  in  the  absence  of  words  limiting  his  liability  or  reserv- 
ing the  benefit  of  the  exceptions  which  the  law  made  in  his  favor, 
was  a  contract  to  be  liable  at  all  events,  and  that  he  was  there- 
fore liable  even  for  a  loss  which  had  occurred  by  the  act  of 
God;  but  the  court,  while  admitting  that  it  was  competent  for 
him  to  increase  his  legal  obligation,  held  that  it  could  not  be 
concluded  from  this  language  that  he  had  intended  to  do  so,  and 
that  the  contract,  to  have  this  effect,  must  be  in  direct  and  posi- 
tive terms,  and  must  show  a  clear  purpose  to  add  to  his  ordi- 
nary liability.  So  in  Gage  v.  Tirrell,^  the  carrier  gave  a  bill  of 
lading  which  contained  no  exception  to  his  liability  from  any 
cause  except  the  perils  of  the  sea,  and  it  was  contended,  as  in 
the  previous  case,  that  expressio  unius  being  exclusio  alterius, 
this  was  a  contract  to  assume  all  risks,  even  from  the  acts  of 
God  or  the  public  enemy ;  but  this  was  denied  to  be  its  effect  by 
the  court,  and  it  was  said  that  whilst  the  maxim  expressio  unius 
exclusio  alterius  generally  furnished  a  sound  rule  by  which  to 
arrive  at  the  intention  of  the  parties  to  contracts,  it  was  one  to 
be  applied  with  caution,  and  that  it  could  not  be  concluded  from 
such  an  argument  that  the  carrier  intended  to  divest  himself 
of  the  protection  which  the  law  had  given  him.  It  was  said, 
however,  that  had  the  exception  in  the  contract  been  of  one  of 
those  perils  against  which  the  law  protected  the  carrier,  instead 
of  against  the  perils  of  the  sea  against  which  it  did  not  protect 
him,  its  conclusion  might  have  been  different.^ 

Sec.  268.     (§  173.)     Purpose  of  this  chapter. — But  where  the 
carrier  has  not  in  any  way  enlarged  his  legal  responsibility,  he 

1.  44  Barb.   655;    44  N.  Y.  94.        Wis.    126;    Morrison    v.    Davis,    20 

2.  9  Allen,  299.  Penn.  St.  171;  Redpath  v.  Vaughn, 

3.  Seo    Strohn    v.    Railroad,    23     52  Barb.  489. 


§  269.]  WHEN  CARRIER  NOT  LIABLE.  291 

may  always  show  that  the  loss  or  damage  has  been  caused  by  the 
act  of  God  or  the  public  enemy,  aud  thus  escape  from  liability.'* 
It  therefore  becomes  a  matter  of  importance  to  determine  what 
is  meant  by  the  words  ' '  the  acts  of  God ' '  in  this  connection,  and 
who  are  to  be  regarded  as  public  enemies  in  the  sense  in  which 
the  words  are  to  be  understood  when  thus  used.  It  may  be  ob- 
served, however,  that  the  instances  for  the  application  of  these 
exceptions  have  become  much  less  frequent  in  more  recent  times, 
owing  to  the  almost  universal  practice  which  now  prevails  of 
providing  by  contract  the  extent  of  the  responsibility  which  the 
carrier  shall  assume. 

It  is  also  important  to  consider  what  other  limitations,  if  any, 
the  law  attaches  to  the  liability  of  the  carrier  in  the  absence  of 
a  contract  limiting  it,  and  it  is  the  purpose  of  the  present  chap- 
ter to  consider  this  subject,  the  question  of  contract  limitations 
being  reserved  for  the  succeeding  chapter. 

II.  CARRIER  NOT  LIABLE  FOR  LOSSES  ARISING 
FROM  THE  ACT  OF  GOD. 

Sec.  269.  (§  174.)  What  is  meant  by  the  "acts  of  God."— 
The  words  "the  acts  of  God"  have  been  the  subject  of  much 
comment,  in  some  of  the  cases  in  which  carriers  have  endeavored 
to  protect  themselves  against  liability  for  losses  caused  by  acci- 
dents or  occurrences  which  they  claimed  to  have  been  the  acts 
of  God.  Perhaps  no  subject  could  open  a  wider  field  for  theo- 
logical and  speculative  discussion  than  the  question  what  are 
and  what  are  not  the  acts  of  God.  In  one  sense  it  may  be  said 
that  all  events  may  be  attributed  to  His  agency ;  but  this  is  by  no 

4.  But    where    the    carrier    has  contract  was  entered  into  that  it 

contracted    to    furnish    cars    at    a  v/ould   be   impossible   for  the  car 

certain  time  and  place,  he  cannot  rier  to  comply  with  its  terms  re 

escape   liability   by   insisting  that  lieve  the  carrier  from  liability  for 

an  act  of  God  rendered  a  perform-  its     non-performance.       Collier    v. 

ance   of   the   contract   impossible;  Swinney,   16    Mo.    484;     Myres    y 

nor  will  the  fact  that  the  owner  Diamond    Joe   Line,    58   Mo.    App 

of  the  goods  knew  at  the  time  the  199. 


292  THE  LAW  OF   CARRIERS.  [§  270. 

means  the  sense  in  which  the  phrase  is  to  be  legally  understood ; 
and  it  can  never  become  necessary,  so  far  as  the  question  of  the 
liability  of  the  carrier  is  concerned,  to  discuss  so  abstract  a 
proposition,  because  the  exception  to  his  liability  intended  by 
these  words  has  by  a  long  course  of  almost  concurrent  adjudica- 
tion received  a  tolerably  fixed  and  definite  but  limited  meaning. 
Sec.  270.  (§  175.)  Same  subject — Conflict  in  authorities. — 
Still,  the  authorities  do  not  entirely  agree  as  to  what  causes  of  a 
natural  and  unexpected  kind  are  to  be  embraced  within  the  ex- 
ception. Some  extend  its  meaning  so  as  to  include  hidden  and 
unknown  obstructions  unexpectedly  thrown  in  the  way  of  the 
carrier  by  natural  causes;  and,  when  the  carriage  is  by  water, 
even  to  such  as  are  of  a  permanent  kind  but  hitherto  unknown 
to  navigators.  These  authorities  assimilate  the  acts  of  God  to 
inevitable  or  unavoidable  accident,  when  such  accident  is  in  no 
way  attributable  to  human  agency  nor  to  the  fault  or  negligence 
of  the  carrier;  and  according  to  this  view  of  the  subject,  if  the 
occurrence  be  one  produced  by  natural  causes  without  the  in- 
tervention of  man,  whether  such  causes  be  passive  or  active,  and 
neither  negligence  nor  the  want  of  skill  on  the  part  of  the  car- 
rier has  concurred  to  produce  the  result,  he  will  be  excused.  It 
is  to  be  regarded,  it  is  said,  as  one  of  those  misfortunes  against 
which  no  skill  or  watchfulness  on  his  part  could  have  guarded, 
and  as  no  human  agency  has  brought  it  upon  him,  it  must  be 
referred  to  that  inevitable  necessity,  the  vis  major,  which  is  the 
act  of  God.  As  where  a  freshet  has  lodged  a  snag  in  the  usual 
channel  of  a  river,  and  a  vessel,  following  this  channel  as  it  had 
been  used  to  do,  strikes  upon  this  snag.^  Or  where  the  obstruc- 
tion was  a  hidden  rock  in  the  sea,  not  before  known  to  naviga- 
tors and  not  known  to  the  master  of  the  vessel.^  And  with  this 
view  of  the  subject  would  seem  to  agree  our  most  eminent  text- 
writers.'^ 

5.  Smyrl    v.    Niolon,     2     Bailey,    denied     in    Friend    v.    "Woods,     6 
421;     Faulkner     v.    Wright,   Rice,    Gratt.   189. 

107.  '  7.  Story   on   Bail.     §§    489,     490, 

6.  Williams    v.    Grant,    1    Conn.     511;   2  Kent's  Com.  597.     And  see 
487.     The  doctrine  of  this  case  is    Hays    v.    Kennedy,    41    Penn.    St. 


§  271.]  WHEN   CARRIER  NOT  LIABLE.  293 

Sec.  271.  (§176.)  Same  subject.— Other  authorities,  how- 
ever, restrain  the  meaning  of  the  exception  within  narrower  lim- 
its, and  require  that  the  inevitable  necessity,  to  come  within  the 
meaning  of  the  phrase  "the  act  of  God,"  must  arise  from  some 
violent  disturbance  of  the  elements,  such  as  a  storm  or  tempest, 
an  earthquake,  lightning,  floods,  or  the  like,  which  must  be  the 
inunediate  cause  of  the  disaster;  and  according  to  them,  to  be 
the  act  of  God,  it  must  not  only  be  an  extraordinary  violence  of 
nature,  but  it  must  be  of  so  stupendous  a  character  that  no  act 
of  man  can  do  anything  to  avoid  it.  They  deny,  therefore,  that 
losses  arising  from  accidents  attributable  to  existing  obstruc- 
tions, whether  of  old  or  recent  date  and  no  matter  how  pro- 
duced, or  to  causes  brought  about  by  quiet  changes  in  the  phys- 
ical world,  no  matter  how  sudden,  can  be  claimed  to  be  the  acts 
of  God  which  will  excuse  the  carrier;  for  these,  not  being  in 
their  own  nature  and  inherently  agents  of  mischief  and  causes 
of  danger,  the  loss,  when  it  occurs  by  reason  of  them,  must  neces- 
sarily have  sprung,  in  part  at  least,  from  human  agency.^ 

Sec.  272.     (§  177.)     The  rule  in  Colt  v.  McMechem.— One  of 

the  earliest  cases  in  this  country  involving  this  question  was  that 
of  Colt  V.  McMechen,*'  in  which  the  proof  was  that  the  vessel  was 
sailing  close  to  shore  under  a  light  wind,  which,  had  it  not  sud- 

378.  In  this  case,  Lowrie,  C.  J.,  Railway  Co.,  6  Mo.  Ap.  554;  Davis 
learnedly  reviews  the  authorities  v.  Railroad  Co.,  89  Mo.  340;  Haas 
upon  the  subject  as  well  as  the  v.  Railroad  Co.,  81  Ga.  792;  Norris 
history  of  the  words  "the  acts  of  v.  Railway  Co.,  23  Fla.  182;  Slater 
God,"  and  shows  that  previous  to  v.  Railway  Co.,  29  S.  C.  96;  Hi- 
the  decision  of  Lord  Mansfield  in  bernia  Ins.  Co.  v.  Transportation 
Forward  v.  Pittard  they  were  used  Co.,  120  U.  S.  166;  Gleeson  v.  Rail- 
in  the  sense  of  something  inevita-  road  Co.,  5  Mackey,  356,  140  U.  S. 
ble  in  the  course  of  nature,  and  435;  Strouss  v.  Railway  Co.,  17 
that  the  narrower  signification  Fed.  Rep.  209;  The  Majestic,  106 
claimed  for  them  in  modern  cases,  U.  S.  375,  17  Sup.  Ct.  R.  597,  41 
especially  in  their  application  to  L.  Ed.  1039,  reversing  Potter  v. 
carriers,  was  first  introduced  by  The  Majestic,  60  Fed.  624,  9  C.  C. 
that  decision  in  1785.  A.  161,  20  U.  S.  App.  503,  23  L.  R. 
8.  For  cases  involving  losses  A.  746;  s.  c.  56  Fed.  244,  69  Fed. 
from  the  act  of  God,  see  Packard  844. 
V.  Taylor,  35  Ark.  402;  Gillespie  v.  9.  6  Johns.   160. 


294  THE  LAW  OF   CARRIERS.       .  [§  273. 

denly  failed,  would  have  carried  her  safely ;  but  suddenly  fail- 
ing, the  vessel  ran  aground  and  the  goods  of  plaintiff  were  there- 
by injured.  The  opinion  of  the  court  was  delivered  by  Spencer, 
J.,  with  whom  a  majority  of  the  court  agreed.  "Upon  a  posi- 
tion so  plain  in  my  apprehension,"  said  he,  "as  that  the  sud- 
den cessation  of  a  wind  which  was  competent,  at  the  very 
moment  when  the  vessel  began  to  come  about,  for  the  avoidance 
of  the  shoal,  was  the  act  of  God  and  did  not  arise  from  the  fault 
or  negligence  of  man,  I  am  at  a  loss  for  further  illustration." 
But  Kent,  C.  J.,  dissented,  saying :  "I  concur  in  the  general  doc- 
trine that  the  sudden  failure  of  the  wind  was  the  act  of  God.  It 
was  an  event  which  could  not  happen  by  the  intervention  of  man 
nor  be  prevented  by  human  prudence.  But  I  think  there  was  a 
degree  of  negligence  imputable  to  the  master,  in  sailing  so  near 
the  shore  under  a  light,  variable  wind,  that  a  failure  in  coming 
about  would  cast  him  aground.  He  ought  to  have  exercised 
more  caution  and  guarded  against  such  a  probable  event,  in  that 
case,  as  the  want  of  wind  to  bring  his  vessel  about.  A  common 
carrier  is  only  to  be  excused  from  a  loss  happening  m  spite  of 
all  human  effort  and  sagacity." 

Sec.  273.  (§  178.)  Same  subject. — Of  this  decision  it  has 
been  said  that  it  may  be  fair  divinity,  and  that  upon  such  a 
philosophical  theory  of  causation  everything  may  be  the  act  of 
God;  but  that  it  is  the  most  extraordinary  version  of  the  prin- 
ciple on  which  a  common  carrier  is  discharged  from  liability 
that  the  books  contain,  and  that  upon  the  authority  of  later  cases 
it  may  be  confidently  pronounced  to  be  wrong.^*^  But  if  a  sud- 
den gust  of  wind  is  the  act  of  God  when  it  causes  the  loss,  as 
was  held  by  Lord  Mansfield,^!  it  would  seem  too  plain  for  argu- 
ment that  its  sudden  cessation  was  due  to  the  same  cause,  and 
that  if  the  physical  effect  were  the  same,  so  should  be  its  legal 
effect,  aside  from  any  negligence  or  want  of  precaution  on  the 
part  of  the  carrier.  And  it  would  be  difficult  to  distinguish 
the  difference  in  legal  effect  between  losses  occurring  from  such 

10.  Am.  Notes  to  Coggs  v.  Ber-  11.  Amies  v.  Stevens,  1  Strange, 
nard,  Smith's  Ld.  Cas.  p.  317.  128. 


§  274.]  WHEN   CARRIER  NOT  LIABLE.  295 

causes,  and  those  occasioned  by  the  freezing  up  of  canals  and 
rivers,  which  has  been  repeatedly  held  to  be  the  act  of  God 
which  will  exonerate  the  carrier  where  no  fault  is  imputable  to 
hiin.i2 

Sec.  274.  (§  179.)  Act  of  God  must  be  proximate  cause  of 
loss. — All  the  authorities,  however,  agree  that  the  act  of  God, 
to  excuse  the  carrier,  must  be  the  proximate  cause  of  the  loss  ;^  ^ 
for  the  very  definition,  as  given  by  Lord  Mansfield  in  Forward 
V.  Pittard,^^  of  the  act  of  God  is,  that  it  is  something  in  opposi- 
tion to  the  act  of  man.  If,  therefore,  another  agency  than  that 
which  may  properly  be  referred  to  as  an  act  of  God  intervenes 
to  produce  the  misfortune,  the  act  of  God  will  no  longer  be  con- 
sidered the  proximate  cause  of  the  loss,  and  the  carrier  cannot 
relieve  himself  from  liability  by  pleading  it  as  an  excuse.^^  This 
is  illustrated  by  the  case  of  Smith  v  Shepherd,i*^  which  was  an 
action  brought  against  the  defendant  as  the  master  of  a  vessel, 
and  it  appeared  that  at  the  entrance  of  the  harbor  of  Hull  there 
was  a  bank  on  which  vessels  used  to  lie  in  safety,  but  a  part  of 
which  had  been  swept  away  by  a  great  flood  some  time  before 
the  misfortune  in  question,  so  that  it  had  become  perfectly  steep 
instead  of  shelving  towards  the  river  as  formerly;  that  a  few 
days  after  this  flood  a  vessel  sunk  by  getting  on  the  bank,  and 
her  mast,  which  was  carried  away,  was  suffered  to  float  in  the 
river  tied  to  some  part  of  the  vessel,  and  that  the  defendant, 
upon  sailing  into  the  harbor,  struck  against  the  mast,  which, 
not  giving  way,  forced  the  defendant's  vessel  towards  the  bank, 
where  she  struck  and  would  have  remained  safe  had  the  bank 
been  in  its  former  situation ;  but  on  the  tide  ebbing,  her  stern 

12.  Bowman  v.  Teall,  23  Wend,  road  Co.  v.  Tapp,  6  Ind.  App.  304, 
306;  Parsons  v.  Hardy,  14  id.  215;     33    N.   E.   Rep.    462. 

Harris  v.  Rand,  4  N.  H.  259;  Cros-  14.  1  T.  R.   33. 

by  V.  Fitch,  12  Conn.  410;    Spann  15.  See    Railroad    Co.    v.    Kuhn, 

V    Transportation     Co.,     11     Misc.  107  Tenn.   106,  64  S.  W.  Rep.  202, 

Rep.  680,  33  N.  Y.  Supp.  560.  citing  Hutchinson  on  Carr.;  Jones 

13.  Hart  v.  Allen,  2  Watts,  114;  v.  Railroad  Co.,  91  Minn.  229,  97 
Ewart  V.  Street,  2  Bailey,  157;  N.  W.  Rep.  893,  103  Am.  St.  Rep. 
King    V    Shepherd,    3    Story,    349;  507. 

Siordet  v.  Hall,  4  Bing,  607;  Rail-        16.  Abbott  on   Shipping,  p.   383. 


296 


THE  LAW  OF   CARRIERS. 


[§  275. 


sank  into  the  water  and  the  goods  on  board  were  spoiled.  Proof 
that  there  was  no  actual  negligence,  which  was  offered  by  the 
defendant,  was  rejected  because,  it  was  ruled,  the  act  of  God 
which  could  excuse  the  defendant  must  be  immediate,  but  this 
was  too  remote. 

Sec.  275.  (§  180.)  Same  subject — Human  agency  must  not 
have  intervened. — But  while  the  carrier  will  be  relieved  from 
liability  for  losses  arising  from  an  act  of  God,  it  is  universally 
conceded  that  in  order  that  he  may  avail  himself  of  this  excep- 
tion to  his  liability,  human  agency  must  not  have  intervened.^  ^ 


17.  Mershon  v.  Hobensack,  2 
Zab.  372;  Backhouse  v.  Sneed,  1 
Murphy,  173;  Ewart  v.  Street,  2 
Bailey,  157;  McArthur  v.  Sears,  21 
Wend.  190;  The  Majestic,  166  U. 
S.  375,  17  Sup.  Ct.  R.  597,  41  L. 
Ed.    1039. 

In  the  case  of  Nugent  v.  Smith, 
L.  R.  1  Com.  Pleas  Div.  19,  Brett, 
J.,  stated  the  rule  to  be  that  the 
act  of  God,  to  excuse  the  carrier, 
must  be  some  irresistible  violence 
or  convulsion  of  nature  against 
which  he  could,  by  no  possible 
means,  have  guarded  or  preserved 
the  goods;  and  that,  when  over- 
taken by  such  overwhelming 
power,  it  became  his  duty  to  use 
every  possible  means  to  avoid  the 
loss  and  to  save  the  goods.  This, 
however,  was  held  by  Blackburn, 
C.  J.,  and  the  other  judges  in  the 
court  of  appeal,  to  have  been  erro- 
neous, in  requiring  too  much  of 
the  carrier  when  overtaken  by  the 
danger;  and  upon  the  subject  of 
what  was  meant  by  the  term  "the 
act  of  God,"  the  learned  chief  jus- 
tice said:  "It  is  obvious,  as  was 
pointed  out  by  Lord  Mansfield  in 
Forward  v.  Pittard,  1  T.  R.  27, 
that  all  causes  of  inevitable  acci- 
dent  (casus  fortuitus)  may  be  di- 


vided into  two  classes  —  those 
which  are  occasioned  by  the  ele- 
mentary forces  of  nature  uncon- 
nected with  the  agency  of  man  or 
other  cause,  and  those  which  have 
their  origin  either  in  whole  or  in 
part  in  the  agency  of  man,  whether 
in  acts  of  commission  or  omission, 
of  nonfeasance  or  misfeasance,  or 
in  any  other  cause  independent  of 
the  agency  of  natural  forces.  It 
is  obvious  that  it  would  be  alto- 
gether Incongruous  to  apply  the 
term  'act  of  God'  to  the  latter 
class  of  inevitable  accident.  It  is 
equally  clear  that  storm  and  tem- 
pest belong  to  the  class  to  which 
the  term  'act  of  God'  is  properly 
applicable.  On  the  other  hand,  it 
must  be  admitted  that  it  is  not 
because  an  accident  is  occasioned 
by  the  agency  of  nature,  and  there- 
fore by  what  may  be  termed  the 
'act  of  God,'  that  it  necessarily 
follows  that  the  carrier  is  entitled 
to  immunity.  The  rain  which 
fertilizes  the  earth  and  the  wind 
which  enables  the  ship  to  navi- 
gate the  ocean  are  as  much  within 
the  term  'act  of  God'  as  the  rain- 
fall which  causes  a  river  to  burst 
its  banks  and  carry  destruction 
over   a  whole  district   or  the  cy- 


§  276.  J  WHEN   CARRIER  NOT  LIABLE.  297 

An  illustrative  case  is  that  of  Merritt  v.  Earle.^^  There  a 
steamer  was  sunk  by  running  upon  the  mast  of  a  sloop  that  had 
been  sunk  in  a  squall  of  wind  a  day  or  two  previously ;  and  al- 
though the  sloop  had  been  sunk  by  the  violence  of  the  wind,  yet 
that,  it  was  said,  was  but  the  remote  cause  of  the  loss  of  the 
steamer.  It  was  also  said  that  human  agency  had  intervened  in 
the  ease  by  placing  the  sloop  in  the  position  by  which  she  was 
overtaken  by  the  wind,  and  it  was  accordingly  held  that  upon 
both  grounds  the  accident  did  not  come  within  the  meaning  of 
the  term,  the  act  of  God.  So  where  the  defendant's  vessel  was 
sunk  by  being  driven  against  a  concealed  anchor  in  the  river, 
to  which  no  buoy  was  attached,  it  was  held  by  Mansfield,  Buller 
a'nd  Ashurst,  JJ.,  that  the  carrier  was  liable.i^ 

Sec.  276.  (§  180a.)  Same  subject.— So  in  Packard  v.  Tay- 
lor^o  it  appeared  that  a  boat,  which  had  been  injured  by  a  snag, 
on  reaching  port  had  had  a  dock  run  under  her  and  holes  were 
cut  for  the  insertion  of  new  timbers,  the  boat  being  fastened  to 
the  dock  by  chains.    While  in  this  position  the  boat  was  loaded. 

clone  that  drives  a  ship  against  a  is    unseaworthy,    and     hence    per 

rock  and   sends  it  to  the  bottom,  ishes    from    the    storm    which    it 

Yet  the  carrier  who,  by  the  rule,  otherwise  would   have  weathered; 

is    entitled    to    protection    in    the  if  the  carrier,  by  undue  deviation 

latter  case,   would   clearly   not  be  or   delay,   exposes   himself   to   the 

able  to  claim  it  in  case  of  damage  danger  which  he  otherwise  would 

occurring  in  the  former.    For  here  have   avoided,   or   if  by   his   rash- 

another  principle  comes  into  play,  ness    he    unnecessarily   encounters 

The  carrier  is  bound  to  do  his  ut-  it,  as  by  putting  to  sea  in  a  raging 

most    to    protect    the    goods    com-  storm,  the  loss  cannot  be  said  to 

mitted  to  his  charge  from  loss  or  be    due   to   the   act   of   God   alone, 

damage,  and  if  he  fails  herein  he  and   the   carrier   cannot   have   the 

becomes  liable  from  the  nature  of  benefit  of  the  exception.     This  be- 

his  contract.     In  the  one  case  he  ing   granted,    the    question    arises 

can   protect   the   goods   by   proper  as  to  the  degree  of  care  which  is 

care,    in    the    other    it    is    beyond  required    of    him    to    protect    him 

his   power   to    do   so.     If,   by   his  from    liability   in    respect   of   lass 

default    in    omitting    to    take    the  arising  from  the  act  of  God." 
necessary  care,  loss  or  damage  en-         18.  29  N.  Y.  115;   s.  c.  31  Barb. 

sues,      he      remains      responsible,  38. 

though   the  so-called   'act  of   God'        19.  Trent      Navigation      Co.      v. 

may    have    been    the    immediate  "Wood,  3  Esp.   127. 
cause  of  the  mischief.    If  the  ship        20.  35  Ark.  403. 


298  THE  LAW   OF   CARRIERS.  [§277. 

A  "small  whirl  of  wind"  coming  up,  the  chain  was  broken  and 
the  boat  slipped  off  the  dock  into  the  water  and  the  goods  were 
injured.  It  was  held  that  the  carrier  was  liable.  "The  act 
of  God,"  said  the  court,  "which  shook  the  dock  from  under  the 
vessel  was  not  the  immediate  cause  of  the  damages.  It  was  the 
holes  in  the  vessel  admitting  torrents  of  water  as  soon  as  it 
touched  the  surface. ' ' 

Sec.  277.  (§  180b.)  Same  subject.— But  in  Blythe  v.  Rail- 
way Co.,  where  an  express  car,  having  in  it  a  coal  fire  burning  in 
a  stove  and  a  lighted  lamp,  was  blown  from  the  track  by  a  sud- 
den gale  of  wind  and  overturned,  and,  with  the  contents,  imme- 
diately consumed  by  fire  which  ensued,  it  was  held  that  the  act 
of  God  M^as  the  proximate  cause  of  the  loss  and  not  the  al- 
leged negligence  of  the  carrier's  servants  in  not  rescuing  the 
goods,  it  appearing  that  any  attempt  to  preserve  them  would 
have  been  unavailing.^i 

Sec.  278.  (§  181.)  Same  subject — Prudence  or  mistaken 
judgment  no  excuse. — And  whenever  the  carrier  is  placed  in  a 
situation  in  which  it  becomes  necessary  for  him  to  exercise  his 
skill  or  judgment,  no  matter  what  may  be  the  circumstances  of 
danger  or  difficulty,  he  takes  the  risk  of  their  proper  exercise; 
and  if  there  be  a  way  or  the  means  of  escape,  and  he,  by  los- 
ing his  presence  of  mind  or  by  mistaking  one  object  for  an- 
other, is  thereb}^  misled,  or  shows  a  want  of  the  necessary  skill 
and  judgment,  whereby  a  loss  occurs,  he  is  responsible.  In 
McArthur  v.  Sears,^^  which  is  an  exceedingly  instructive  case 
upon  this  subject,  the  vessel  approached  the  harbor  of  Eric 
at  night,  in  hazy  and  snowy  weather,  which  made  it  difficult 
to  see  the  beacon  light  by  which  it  should  have  been  guided. 
Another  light  close  by  was  also  visible,  which  the  master  mis- 
took for  the  beacon  light,  on  account  of  which  the  vessel  was 
turned  from  its  proper  course  and  struck  upon  a  shoal,  which 
made  it  necessary  to  throw  the  goods  overboard.  It  was  proven 
that  the  master  was  one  of  the  most  competent  masters  of  steam- 
boats on  the  lake,  and  that  the  most  prudent  master  might  have 

21.  15  Colo.  333.  22.  21   Wend.   189. 


§279.]  WHEN   CARRIER   NOT  LIABLE.  299 

run  his  boat  ashore  under  the  circumstances.  Cowen,  J.,  in  giv- 
ing the  judgment  of  the  court,  said:  "  I  have  sought  in  vain 
for  any  case  to  excuse  the  loss  of  the  carrier,  where  it  arises 
from  human  action  or  neglect,  or  any  combination  of  such  action 
or  neglect,  except  force  exerted  by  a  public  enemy.  No  matter 
what  degree  of  prudence  may  be  exercised  by  the  carrier  and 
his  servants,  although  the  delusion  by  which  it  is  baffled  or 
the  force  by  which  it  is  overcome  be  inevitable,  yet,  if  it  be  the 
result  of  human  means,  the  carrier  is  responsible.  ...  I 
believe  it  is  a  matter  of  history  that  inhabitants  of  remote  coasts, 
accustomed  to  plunder  wrecked  vessels,  have  sometimes  resorted 
to  the  expedient  of  luring  benighted  mariners  by  false  lights 
to  a  rocky  shore.  Even  such  a  harrowing  combination  of  fraud 
and  robbery  would  form  no  excuse.  .  .  .  The  difficulty  re- 
turns therefore;  if  we  receive  the  immediate  agency  of  third 
persons  in  any  shape,  we  open  the  very  door  for  collusion  which 
has  denied  an  excuse  by  reason  of  theft,  robbery  and  fire." 

Sec.  279.  (§  182.)  Loss  by  fire,  explosion  or  collision. — Loss 
by  fire,  unless  it  be  caused  by  lightning,  does  not  come  within 
the  exception,  because  it  can  originate  in  no  other  way  so  as 
to  be  fairly  called  the  act  of  God.  This  was  decided  by  Lord 
Mansfield  in  the  case  of  Forward  v.  Pittard,^^  in  a  case  of  great 
hardship  to  the  carrier.  A  wagoner  had  received  the  goods  for 
carriage  upon  his  wagon  and  had  placed  it,  securely  as  he 
thought,  under  shelter,  until  the  time  should  arrive  for  his  de- 
parture with  it.  In  the  meantime,  a  fire  originated  at  a  com- 
siderable  distance  from  it,  but  spread  so  rapidly  that  before 
the  wagon  could  be  removed  it  was  reached  by  the  flames  and 
burned.  In  giving  judgment  in  the  case  Lord  Mansfield  said: 
"The  question  is  whether  the  common  carrier  is  liable  in  this 
case  of  fire.  It  appears  from  all  the  cases  for  a  hundred  years 
back  that  there  are  events  for  which  the  carrier  is  liable  inde- 
pendent of  his  contract.  By  the  nature  of  his  contract  he  is 
liable  for  all  due  care  and  diligence,  and  for  any  negligence  he 
is  suable  on  his  contract.    But  there  is  a  further  degree  of  re- 

23.  1  T.  R.  33. 


300  THE  LAW   OF   CARRIERS.  [§  280. 

sponsibility  by  the  custom  of  the  reahii,  that  is,  by  the  com- 
mon law;  a  carrier  is  in  the  nature  of  an  insurer.  ...  In 
this  case  it  does  not  appear  but  that  the  fire  arose  from  the 
act  of  some  man  or  other.  It  certainly  did  arise  from  the  act 
of  man,  for  it  is  expressly  stated  not  to  have  happened  by 
lightning.  The  carrier  therefore  in  this  ease  is  liable  for  in- 
evitable accident. '  '^^^ 

Sec.  280.  (§  183.)  Same  subject.— In  IMjller  v.  Steam  Nav- 
igation Company,-^  the  carrier  had  deposited  the  goods  upon  a 
float  or  floating  warehouse  for  further  transportation  by  an- 
other carrier.  A  fire  broke  out  a  quarter  of  a  mile  distknt,  and 
very  soon  afterwards  a  gale  of  wind  suddenly  sprung  up  and 
blew  the  fire  in  the  direction  of  the  float,  which,  in  a  few  min- 
utes, it  reached,  and  the  goods  were  consumed  by  it.  There  was 
no  evidence  to  show  how  the  fire  originated.  It  was  therefore 
presumed  to  have  arisen  from  some  act  of  man,  and  the  car- 
rier was  held  liable.^^  In  a  very  similar  case,  however,  arising 
in  Pennsylvania,  the  carrier  was  excused.-'^  And  so  where  a  sud- 
den gale  blew  a  car  from  the  track,  upsetting  it,  and  a  stove 
which  it  contained  set  fire  to  its  contents,  it  was  held  that  the 
carrier  was  not  liable.^^ 

Sec.  281.  (§  184.)  Same  subject — Same  rule  applies  to  car- 
riers using  steam. — The  same  rule  as  to  the  carrier's  liability 
for  losses  by  fire  applies  as  well  in  cases  of  vessels  or  other  ve- 
hicles propelled  by  steam  as  in  other  cases,  although  it  has  been 
argued  that  inasmuch  as  the  use  of  fire  is  required  to  impel 
them,  the  same  rule  should  not  be  applied  to  them  as  to  vessels 
which  sail  by  the  wind,  and  that  the  carrier  by  steam  vessels 

24.  Hibler  v.  McCartney,  31  26.  See,  also,  Niblo  v.  Binse,  44 
Ala.  502;  Mershon  v.  Hobensack,  Barb.  54;  Moore  v.  Railroad,  :: 
2  Zab.  372;  Gilmore  v.  Carman,  1  Mich.  23;  Cox  v.  Peterson,  30  Ala. 
Sm.  &  M.  279;  Hollister  v.  Now-  608;  Chevallier  v.  Straham,  2  Tex. 
len,  19  Wend.  234;  Condict  i;.  Rail-  115;  Hyde  v.  Trent,  etc.  Nav.  Co., 
way,  54  N.  Y.  500;  Am.  Trans.  Co.  5  T.  R.  389. 

V   Moore,  5  Mich.  368;  York  Com-  27.  Pennsylvania      R.      Co.      r. 

pany  v.  The  Railroad,  3  Wall.  107.  Fries,  87  Penn.  St.  234. 

25.  10  N.  Y.  431;  s.  c.  13  Barb.  28.  Blythe  v.  Railway  Co.,  15 
361.  Colo.   333. 


§281. 


WHEN  CARRIER  NOT  LIABLE. 


301 


should  no  more  be  held  liable  for  accidents  by  fire  by  which  his 
vessel  and  the  goods  he  carries  may  be  consumed  than  for  the 
destruction  occasioned  by  a  tempest.  But  this  argument  seems 
to  have  had  no  weight  with  the  courts,  and  it  has  been  often 
decided  that  the  fact  that  the  carrier  employs  the  agency  of 
steam  upon  his  vessel  will  furnish  him  with  no  excuse  for  losses 
by  fire,  and  that,  unless  he  has  protected  himself  by  his  con- 
tract, his  liability  will  be  the  same  for  such  losses  as  that  of 
the  carrier  by  any  other  mode.-^  Nor  will  the  explosion  of  a 
boiler,  any  more  than  a  fire,  be  regarded  as  an  act  of  God 
which  will  excuse  him.^*^  Nor  can  a  collision  be  claimed  as 
the  act  of  God;  for  no  collision  upon  land  can  take  place  with- 
out the  direct  intervention  of  man,  and  if  happening  between 
vessels  at  sea  in  a  tempest  which  made  it  inevitable,  the  tempest 
would  be  the  vis  major  and  not  the  collision.^i 


29.  Patton  v.  Magrath,  21  Dud- 
ley, 159;  Spindler  v.  Hilliard,  2 
Rich.  286;  Singleton  v.  Hilliard, 
1  Strob.  203;  New  Jersey  S.  N. 
Co.  V.  Merchants'  Bank,  6  How. 
344;  Hale  v.  The  N.  J.  S.  N.  Co., 
15  Conn.  539;  Garrison  v.  The 
Memphis  Ins.  Co.,  19  How.  312; 
The  Northern  Belle,  9  Wall.  52'6; 
Caldwell  v.  The  N.  J.  S.  B.  Co., 
56  Barb.  425. 

30.  Bulkley  v.  The  Naumkeag 
S.  C.  Co.,  24  How.  386,  s.  c.  nom. 
The  Bark  Edwin,  1  Sprague's 
Dec.  477;  The  Mohawk,  8  Wall. 
153;  Caldwell  v.  The  N.  J.  S.  B. 
Co.,  supra. 

31.  A  loss  by  collision  could  not, 
at  least  according  to  the  authori- 
ties which  give  the  narrower 
meaning  to  the  terms  "the  acts  of 
God,"  excuse  the  carrier,  because 
such  an  accident  is  always  caused 
by  the  instrumentality  of  man, 
except  perhaps  when  unavoidably 
happening  in  a  storm  at  sea,  when 
the    loss    would    be    attributed    to 


the  storm  as  the  vis  major  and 
thus  come  within  the  exception, 
as  in  Amies  v.  Stevens,  1  Strange, 
128,  where  the  hoy,  being  driven 
by  a  gust  of  wind  against  the  pier 
of  a  bridge  and  thereby  sunk,  the 
loss  was  attributed  to  the  gust  of 
wind  and  not  to  the  obstruction 
v/hich  was  the  work  of  man,  and 
the  carrier  was  therefore  excused. 
But  a  case  of  that  kind  could 
scarcely  occur  in  river  navigation, 
and  it  has  been  held  that  col- 
lisions occurring  upon  them  can- 
not be  called  the  acts  of  God. 
Mershon  v.  Hobensack,  2  Zab.  372; 
Plaisted  v.  The  Navigation  Com- 
pany, 27  Me.  133.  This  seems, 
however,  not  to  have  been  the 
opinion  of  Lowrie,  C.  J.,  who  took 
occasion  in  Hays  v.  Kennedy,  41 
Penn.  St.  378,  to  examine  the  ques- 
tion although  the  case  did  not  re- 
quire him  to  decide  it.  The  case 
was  the  ordinary  one  of  two  steam- 
boats going  in  opposite  directions 
on    the    Ohio    river,     and     coming 


302  THE  LAW  OP   CARRIERS.  [§  282, 

Sec.  282.  (§185.)  Loss  by  sudden  inundation. — An  unpre- 
cedented freshet,  flood  or  inundation  is  within  the  exception 
of  an  act  of  God  and  will  excuse  the  carrier  if  the  loss  is  oc- 
casioned without  any  contributory  negligence  on  his  part.^-  And 
he  is  not  required  to  foresee  or  to  provide  against  an  unpre- 
cedented occurrence  like  that  of  a  flood  such  as  has  never  been 
known  before  to  occur  in  the  particular  river  or  locality.  In 
Nashville,  etc.,  R.  R.  v.  David,^^  it  was  shown  that  such  an 
unprecedented  flood  had  occurred  at  Chattanooga,  on  the  Ten- 
nessee river,  the  water  having  risen  some  fifteen  feet  above  what 
was  known  as  the  highest  water-mark  at  the  locality  made  by 
previous  overflows  or  freshets  in  the  river.  It  was  also  shown 
that  the  road  and  its  depot  were  located  on  ground  higher  than 
this  high  water-mark.  The  goods  reached  Chattanooga  before 
the  water  had  become  so  high  as  to  interfere  with  travel  on  the 
road;  but  before  they  could  be  forwarded  from  that  place,  it 
rose  above  the  track  and  at  last  submerged  the  track  of  the 
road  and  its  depot  some  ten  or  twelve  feet,  whereby  the  goods 
were  injured.  It  was  held  that  under  these  circumstances,  if 
it  also  appeared  that  the  agents  of  the  road  had  used  such 
diligence  as  prudent,  skilful  men  engaged  in  that  kind  of  busi- 
ness might  fairly  be  expected  to  use  under  the  like  circum- 
stances to  protect  and  secure  the  property  confided  to  their  care, 

into  collision,  as  it  appeared,  en-  case,  it  is  imagined,  could  ever 
tirely  by  the  fault  of  one  of  them,  occur  in  which  the  collision  could 
The  decision  turned  upon  a  special  with  any  sort  of  propriety  be  re- 
exception  in  the  bill  of  lading  of  ferred  to  the  act  of  God. 
the  dangers  of  navigation;  but  32.  Norris  v.  Railway  Co.,  23 
the  learned  judge  expressed  the  Fla.  182;  Wallace  v.  Clayton,  42 
opinion  that  had  it  been  necessary  Ga.  443;  Morrison  v.  Davis,  20  Pa. 
to  put  the  defense  of  the  carrier  St.  171;  Denny  v.  Railroad,  13 
not  in  fault  upon  the  exception  of  Gray  481;  Wald  v.  Railroad  Co., 
the  act  of  God,  the  circumstanees  162  111.  545,  44  N.  E.  Rep.  888,  53 
would  have  made  a  case  for  its  Am.  St.  Rep.  332,  35  L.  R.  A.  356, 
application.  This,  it  is  believed,  reversing  60  111.  App.  460;  Long 
however,  would  be  giving  greater  v.  Railroad  Co.,  147  Pa.  St.  343, 
extension  to  the  term  than  is  au-  23  Atl.  Rep.  459,  30  Am.  St.  Rep. 
thorized  by  any  of  the  decided  732,  14  L.  R.  A.  741. 
cases.      As    to    land    carriage,    no  33.  6   Heisk.    261. 


§283.]  WHEN   CARRIER  NOT  LIABLE.  303 

the  carrier  ought  to  be  excused.^'*  So  in  the  ease  of  Smith  v. 
The  Railway  Company,^^  it  appeared  that  a  car  containing 
goods  was  stopped  at  a  certain  point  on  account  of  a  washout 
on  the  road  some  distance  ahead  and  that  during  the  night  the 
water  in  a  nearby  river  rose  until  it  submerged  the  floor  of  the 
car  to  a  depth  of  eighteen  inches,  causing  injury  to  the  goods. 
The  overflow  was  the  greatest  that  had  ever  been  known  to 
occur  in  that  locality.  There  was  no  evidence  that  the  carrier 
had  been  negligent.  It  was  held  that  the  injury  was  due  to  an 
act  of  God  and  that  the  carrier  was  therefore  not  liable.  And 
in  Read  i\  Spaulding,^^  where  it  appeared  also  that  the  damage 
to  the  goods  had  been  caused  by  an  extraordinary  rise  in  the 
Hudson  river,  it  was  conceded  without  argument,  and  stated  as 
unquestionable  law,  that  such  an  occurrence  would  excuse  the 
carrier  as  the  act  of  God,  if  it  could  be  shown  that  no  fault  or 
negligence  could  be  imputed  to  him  which  had  contributed  to 
the  loss. 

Sec.  283,  (§  185a.)  Loss  by  earthquake. — So  a  loss  by  a 
sudden,  unusual  and  unexpected  earthquake  which  breaks  the 
walls  of  a  mill-dam,  ordinarily  sufficient,  and  precipitates  a 
flood  of  water  upon  a  railroad  company's  tracks  and  washes 
them  away,  is  a  loss  by  the  act  of  God  for  which  the  carrier  is 
not  responsible.^'^ 

Sec.  284.  Loss  by  landslide. — Where  a  loss  occurred  by  rea- 
son of  a  large  quantity  of  earth  having  fallen  upon  a  railroad 
track  from  a  hill  or  embankment  left  by  the  company  in  exca- 
vating for  its  track,  the  slide  being  caused  probably  by  the 
action  of  a  rain  storm  not  of  unusual  violence,  the  lower  court, 
regarding  it  as  having  occurred  without  the  intervention  of  im- 

34.  And  see  other  cases  growing  35.  91  Ala.  455,  8   So.  Rep.  754, 

out    of    the    same    occurrence,     in  24  Am.  St.  Rep.  929,   11  L.  R.  A. 

which    the    decision    was    to    the  619. 

same  effect.     Nashville,  etc.,  R.  R.  36.  30    N.    Y.    630. 

V.   King,   6   Heisk.   269;    Nashville,  37.  Slater  v.  Railway  Co.,  29  S. 

etc.,   R.    R.   V.   Jackson,    id.     271;  Car.  96. 
Railroad  Co.   v.   Reeves,   10  "Wall. 
176. 


304  THE  LAW  OF   CARRIERS.  [§  285. 

mediate  human  agency  but  by  the  forces  of  nature,  occult,  un- 
foreseen and  unexplained  except  by  conjecture,  held  it  to  be  an 
act  of  God  which  excused  the  carrier,^ ^  but  the  supreme  court 
of  the  United  States  reversed  this  ruling,  holding  it  to  be  such 
a  result  as  might  have  been  foreseen  and  guarded  against.^^ 

Sec.  285.  (§  185c.)  Loss  by  snowstorm. — An  unusually 
heavy  or  severe  storm  of  snow,  of  such  violence  as  to  obstruct 
the  moving  of  the  carrier's  trains  or  other  vehicles,  falls  within 
the  exception  of  the  act  of  God  and  the  carrier,  if  guilty  of 
no  contributory  negligence,  will  be  exonerated  from  liability  for 
a  loss  or  injury  thereby  occasioned.^^ 

Sec.  286.  Loss  by  wind. — An  unprecedented  and  severe  gale 
of  wind,  which  is  sufficiently  strong  to  blow  a  railway  car  from 
the  track,  is  an  act  of  God.'*^  So  a  hurricane  at  sea  which 
causes  the  vessel  to  roll  to  such  an  extent  that  a  horse  is  thrown 
down  and  injured  has  been  held  to  come  within  the  exception 
of  an  act  of  God  and  therefore  excuse  the  carrier.^^ 

Sec.  287.  (§  185e.)  Burden  of  proof. — The  law  making  the 
carrier  a  practical  insurer  of  the  safety  of  the  goods  intrusted 
to  him  for  carriage,  except  in  those  cases  in  which  he  is  exempt 
under  the  circumstances  now  being  considered,  it  is  settled  that 
whenever  the  carrier  claims  that  the  loss  occurred  from  such 
causes  as  entitle  him  to  exemption,  the  burden  of  proving  this 
fact  rests  upon  him.'*^     Where,  however,  by  the  plaintiff's  own 

38.  Gleeson  v.  Railroad  Co.,  5  a  train  load  of  cattle  was  caught 
Mackey,   356.  in  a  severe  blizzard  and  the  cat- 

39.  Gleeson  v.  Railroad  Co.,  140  tie  were  frozen  to  death,  it  was 
U.   S.  435.  held    that    the    loss    was    attribut- 

40.  Black  V.  Railroad  Co.,  30  able  to  an  act  of  God.  Jones  v. 
Neb.  197,  46  N.  W.  Rep.  428;  Railroad  Co.,  91  Minn.  229,  97  N. 
Feinberg  r.  Railroad  Co.,  52  N.  W.  Rep.  893,  103  Am.  St.  Rep. 
J.   L.   451;    Ballentine  v.  Railroad  507. 

Co.,  40  Mo.  491;  Pruitt  r.  Rail-  41.  Blythe  v.  Railway  Co.,  15 
road  Co.,  62  Mo.  527.  See,  also,  Colo.  333.  See,  also.  Amies  v. 
Chapin  v.  Railroad  Co.,  79  Iowa,  Stevens,  1  Strange,  128. 
582,  44  N.  W.  Rep.  820;  Cunning-  42.  New  England,  etc..  Steam- 
ham  V.  Railroad  Co.,  79  Mo.  App.  ship  Co.  v.  Paig«,  108  Ga.  296,  33 
524;  Herring  v.  Railroad  Co.,  101  S.  E.  Rep.  969. 
Va.  778,  45  S.  E.  Rep.  322.  Where  43.  Davis  v.  Railway  Co.,  89  Mo, 


§  288.]  WUEN   CARRIER   NOT  LIABLE.  305 

showing  it  appears  that  the  carrier  is  exempt,  the  carrier  may 
avail  himself  of  this  evidence  in  his  own  defense.-*-* 

Sec,  288.  (§  186.)  But  carrier  not  excused  if  he  negligently 
venture  forth  from  place  of  safety.— It  is  to  be  understood, 
however,  that  an  act  of  God  will  not  under  all  circumstances 
excuse  the  carrier  or  enable  him  to  escape  liability  for  the  loss. 
He  is  under  all  circumstances  bound  to  use  due  care  and 
diligence;  and  if  the  act  of  God  which  he  alleges  as  his  defense 
would  not  have  occurred  but  for  some  careless  or  incautious  con- 
duct on  his  part,  he  will  not  be  relieved.'*^  He  is  bound  to  ex- 
ercise a  reasonable  amount  of  forethought  and  prudence  in  the 
execution  of  his  trust,  and  if,  being  the  master  of  a  ship,  for 
instance,  he  ventures  to  sea  from  a  harbor  of  safety  when  the 
storm  threatens  and  w^hen  all  nautical  experience  should  have 
warned  him  of  the  danger,  and  the  ship  be  lost  in  the  tempest 
which  follows,  though  it  be  by  the  act  of  God,  he  or  the  owners 
of  the  ship  must  bear  the  loss.  And  it  may  be  stated  generally 
that  whenever  he  goes  to  meet  danger  in  spite  of  the  warning 
of  the  elements,  or  with  a  blind  confidence  that  he  will  be  able 
to  encounter  it  with  safety,  whether  it  be  upon  the  sea  or  upon 
the  land,  he  brings  the  loss  upon  himself,  and  it  will  not  avail 
him  that  the  immediate  cause  of  it  was  the  act  of  God. 

Sec.  289.  (§  187.)  Same  subject.— In  the  Charleston,  etc., 
S.  B.  Co.  V.  Bason,-*^  where  goods  were  laden  upon  a  steamboat 
which  grounded  from  the  reflux  of  the  tide,  in  consequence  of 
which  she  fell  over  and  the  water  rose  into  her  cabin  and  injured 
goods  belonging  to  the  plaintiff,  the  owners  of  the  vessel  were 
held  liable  for  the  loss,  because  it  was  held  that  the  master  of 


340;   Wallingford  v.  Railroad  Co.,  44.  Slater  v.  Railway  Co.,  29  S. 

26    S.    C.    258;    Read    v.    Railroad  C.   96;    Davis   v.   Railway   Co.,   89 

Co.,  60  Mo.   206;    Wolf  v.  Express  Mo.    340. 

Co.,    43    Mo.    423;    J.    H.    Cownie  45.  Wolf  v.  Express  Co.,  43  Mo. 

Glove    Co.    V.    Transportation    Co.,  423. 

—  Iowa,  — ,   106   N.  W.  Rep.   749.  46.  1   Harper,  262. 

See,  also,  post,  §  1353. 

20 


306  THE  LAW   OF    CARRIERS.  [§  290. 

the  vessel  was  guilty  of  negligence  in  not  selecting  a  proper 
place  for  the  grounding  of  the  vessel,  or  in  not  removing  the 
goods  when  he  saw  that  the  coming  of  the  water  into  the  cabin 
was  inevitable  under  the  circumstances  in  which  the  vessel  was 
placed.  He  was  therefore  liable  for  two  reasons:  first,  because 
of  his  negligence  in  bringing  the  vessel  into  an  improper  place 
when  the  danger  should  have  been  seen;  and  secondly,  because 
when  the  grounding  had  occurred  he  did  not  use  the  proper 
diligence  to  save  the  goods. 

Sec.  290.  Same  subject. — And  in  the  case  of  Adams  Express 
Co.  V.  Jackson,^ '^  the  carrier  accepted  a  number  of  horses  for 
transportation  with  knowledge  that  the  road  of  a  subsidiary 
carrier  over  whose  lines  the  shipment  was  to  pass  was  obstructed 
by  floods.  On  account  of  such  obstruction  the  horses  were  in- 
jured. In  an  action  against  the  receiving  carrier  it  was  held 
that,  while  he  might  have  refused  to  receive  the  horses  on  the 
ground  that  an  act  of  God  had  obstructed  the  line,  yet  having 
done  so  with  knowledge  of  the  facts,  the  full  extent  of  his  lia- 
bility attached  and  the  act  of  God  was  therefore  no  defense. 

Sec.  291.  (§  188.)  Same  subject.— So  in  Campbell  v.  Morsels 
the  carrier  undertook  to  cross  a  stream  between  sundown  and 
dark,  immediately  after  a  rain,  and  the  wheels  of  his  wagon 
stuck  fast,  and  he  was  unable  to  extricate  it  before  the  stream 
rose  so  as  to  submerge  the  body  of  his  wagon  and  damage  the 
goods.  He  relied  for  his  defense  upon  the  nature  and  cir- 
cumstances of  the  misfortune  as  an  excuse ;  and  although  it  was 
proven  that  the  rise  was  more  sudden  and  higher  than  any  that 
had  been  known  to  take  place  in  the  stream  for  forty  years,  the 
court  held  that  it  was  manifest  that,  had  he  gone  through  the 
ford  without  being  stopped,  the  accident  would  not  have  oc- 
curred. In  attempting  to  cross  the  stream  under  the  circum- 
stances he  took  upon  himself  the  risk  of  its  sudden  rise  and  the 
consequences. 

47.  92    Tenn.     (8    Pickle),    326,        48.  1    Harper,    468. 
21    S.   W.   Rep.   666. 


§  292.]  WHEN   CARRIER  NOT  LIABLE.  307 

Sec.  292.     Same  subject — Or  if  he  negligently  exposes  the 
igoods  to  danger. — But  although  the  carrier  will  be  excused  if 
Ian  act  of  God  occasioned  the  loss,  if  it  appear  that  his  own  mis- 
" conduct  concurred  with  the  act  of  God  in  bringing  the  loss  about, 
he  cannot  escape  liability.     He  is  bound  to  exercise  due  care 
,and  diligence  in  view  of  the  attending  circumstances  to  protect 
[the  goods  intrusted  to  him  for  carriage.     And  this  obligation 
will  require  that  he  take  such  precautions,  when  the  means  of 
'doing  so  are  at  hand,  as  are  reasonably  necessary  to  avert  a 
'threatened  danger;  and  if  a  loss  ensue  through  his  failure  to 
[take  such  precautions,  he  will  not  be  permitted  to  shield  him- 
self from  liability  on  the  ground  that  the  loss  was  occasioned 
by  an  act  of  God.     He  must  also  take  notice  of  any  signs  of 
approaching  danger,   and,   if   they  are  such  as  reasonably  to 
[awaken  apprehension,  and  he  has  the  facilities  for  escape  under 
his  control,  he  must  employ  such  facilities  in  removing  the  goods 
to  a  place  of  safety.     And  in  general  it   may    be    stated   that 
where  the  carrier  by  the  exercise  of  reasonable  diligence  could 
have  foreseen  the  happening  of  an  event  such  as  might  reason- 
ably be  presumed  would  cause  injury  to  the  goods,  and  he  fails 
to  make  use  of  the  means  at  his  command  to  guard  against  it, 
and  the  goods  are  thereby  lost  or  injured,  he  will  be  liable 
although  such  loss  or  injury  would  not  have  happened  but  for 
an  act  of  God.^     Thus  where  cars  loaded  with  goods  were  per- 
mitted to  remain  standing  at  a  place  where  they  were  likely  to 
be  submerged  by  a  flood,  and  the  cars  were  later  submerged 
and  the  goods  injured,  it  was  held  that  the  carrier  was  liable 
for  his  failure  to  remove  the  cars  to  a  place  of  safety.^     So 
where  a  carload  of  wheat  was  allowed  to  remain  on  a  side  track 
at  a  time  when  the  water  in  a  nearby  river  was  steadily  rising, 

1.  Nelson  v.  Railway  Co.,  28  64  S.  W.  Rep.  999;  Jones  v.  Rail- 
Mont.  297,  72  Pac.  Rep.  642;  road  Co.,  91  Minn.  229,  97  N.  W. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Kuhn,  107  Tenn.  Rep.  893,  103  Am.  St.  Rep.  507; 
106,  64  S.  W.  Rep.  202,  citing  Railway  Co.  v.  Commercial  Guano 
Hutchinson  on  Carr;  Grier  v.  Co.,  103  Ga.  590,  30  S.  E.  Rep.  555; 
Railway  Co.,  108  Mo.  App.  565,  Pinkerton  v.  Railway  Co.,  —  Mo. 
84  S.  W.  Rep.  158;  Railroad  Co.  App.  — ,  93  S.  W.  Rep.  849. 
V.  Bergman,   3   Tex.  Ct.  Rep.   168,  2.  Grier   v.   Railway   Co.,   supra. 


308  THE  LAW   OF   CARRIERS.  [§  293. 

which  fact  was  known  to  the  carrier's  servants,  and  the  car 
was  later  partially  submerged  and  the  wheat  damaged,  it  was 
held  that  the  question  whether  the  carrier  had  exercised  ordi- 
nary care  in  preventing  the  loss  by  removing  the  car  to  a  place 
of  safety  was  properly  one  for  the  jury.^ 

Sec.  293.     (§  189.)     So  if  his  vessel  be  unseaworthy.— So  if 

the  carrier  by  water  start  upon  his  voyage  in  a  vessel  which 
is  not  seaworthy  and  a  loss  occur  by  reason  of  any  of  those 
accidents  or  occurrences  which  are  understood  as  the  acts  of 
God,  he  must  answer  for  the  loss  if  it  appear  that  it  would  not 
have  happened  had  his  vessel  been  staunch  and  seaworthy.  In 
Bell  V.  Reed,^  it  was  held  that  the  loss  must  be  borne  in  such  a 
case  by  the  carrier. 

Sec.  294.    (§  190.)    Or  if  he  deviate  from  the  usual  course.— 

So  if  the  carrier  deviate  without  necessity  from  the  regular  and 
usual  course,  he  will  be  held  responsible  for  any  loss  which  may 
occur,  whether  by  the  act  of  God  or  from  any  other  cause.  And 
it  will  not  be  competent  for  him  to  show  that  had  he  gone  the 
usual  and  customary  route,  he  would  in  all  probability  have 
encountered  the  same  danger  with  the  same  consequences.  Nor 
will  it  avail  him  that  had  he  done  so,  the  same  misfortune 
would  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  have  overtaken  him.  Hav- 
ing been  guilty  of  an  inexcusable  fault  in  the  commencement 
of  his  undertaking  he  takes  the  risk  of  all  the  consequences  to 
its  end,  and  the  law  will  not  permit  him  to  say,  when  the  loss 
happens,  that  the  chances  were  that  it  would  have  happened 
in  the  same  way  and  from  the  same  cause  had  he  done  his 
duty.^  And  if  there  be  two  routes,  one  of  which  is  more 
dangerous  than  the  other,  which  is  known  to  the  carrier,  if  h( 

3.  Baltimore,  etc.,  Railroad  Co.  et  Co.  v.  Rogers,  20  Ind.  App.  594, 
V.  Keedy,  75  Md.  320,  23  Atl.  Rep.  49  N.  E.  Rep.  970;  Seavey  v 
643.  Transit   Co.,    106   Wis.    394,    82   N. 

4.  4   Binney,   127.  W.    Rep.    285;    Chicago,    etc.,    Ry. 

5.  Crosby  v.  Fitch,  12  Conn.  Co.  v.  Dunlap,  —  Kan.  — ,  80  Pac. 
410;  Powers  v.  Davenport,  7  Rep.  34;  The  Dunbeth,  L.  R. 
Blackf.  497;   Louisville  &  C.  Pack-  (1897)  P.  133,  66  L.  J.  P.  Div.  66. 


§295.]  WHEN   CARRIER  NOT  LIABLE.  309 

take  the  unsafe  or  dangerous  route  instead  of  the  safer  one,  he 
takes  the  risk  of  loss  by  so  doing.^ 

Sec.  295.    (§  191.)    Same  subject. — The  leading  case  upon  the 

subject  of  deviation  is  that  of  Davis  v  Garrett,'^  in  which  the 
plaintiff  shipped  by  the  defendant's  vessel  a  quantity  of  lime, 
which,  as  it  was  alleged,  was  lost  by  a  deviation  by  the  master 
of  the  vessel  from  the  usual  and  customary  course  between  the 
point  of  shipment  and  the  place  of  destination;  to  which  the 
defense  interposed  was  that  the  deviation  by  the  master  was 
not  a  cause  of  the  loss  sufficiently  proximate  to  entitle  the  plain- 
tiff to  recover,  inasmuch  as  the  loss  might  have  been  occasioned 
by  the  same  tempest  if  the  vessel  had  proceeded  in  her  di- 
rect course;  but  it  was  answered  that  no  wrong-doer  could  be 
allowed  to  apportion  or  qualify  his  own  wrong;  and  that  as  a 
loss  had  actually  happened  whilst  his  wrongful  act  was  in  oper- 
ation and  force,  and  which  was  attributable  to  his  wrongful 
act,  he  could  not  set  up  as  an  answer  to  the  action  the  bare 
possibility  of  a  loss  rf  his  wrongful  act  had  never  been  done.^ 

6.  Express  Co.  v.  Kountz,  8  such  barge  was  out  of  her  course, 
\Vall.  342.  in    consequence     of     stormy     and 

7.  6    Bing.    716.  tempestuous      weather,      the     sea 

8.  Tindal,  C.  J.:  "There  are  communicated  with  the  lime, 
two  points  for  the  determination  which  thereby  became  heated, 
of  the  court  upon  this  rule:  the  and  the  barge  caught  fire,  and 
first,  whether  the  damage  sus-  the  master  was  compelled  for  the 
tained  by  the  plaintiff  was  so  preservation  of  himself  and  the 
proximate  to  the  wrongful  act  of  crew  to  run  the  barge  on  shore, 
the  defendant  as  to  form  the  sub-  where  both  the  lime  and  the 
ject  of  an  action;  and  secondly,  barge  were  entirely  lost.  Now 
whether  the  declaration  is  suf-  the  first  objection  on  the  part  of 
ficient  to  support  the  judgment  the  defendant  is  not  rested,  as  in- 
of  the  court  for  the   plaintiff.  deed  it  could  not  be  rested,  on  the 

"As   to    the    first    point,    it    ap-  particular     circumstances      which 

peared    upon     the     evidence     that  accompanied    the    destruction     of 

the    master    of     the     defendant's  the  barge;    for  it  is  obvious  that 

barge  had  deviated  from  the  usual  the    legal    consequences    must    be 

and  customary  course  of  the  voy-  the    same    whether    the    loss    was 

age  mentioned  in  the   declaration  immediately,    by    the     sinking    of 

without     any     justifiable      cause;  the  barge  at  once  by  a  heavy  sea 

and    that    afterwards    and    whilst  when  she  was  out  of  her  direct 


I 


310  THE  LAW  OF   CARRIERS.  [§  296. 

Sec.  296.  (§  192.)  Same  subject. — Aud  in  Williams  v. 
Grant,*^  J.,  in  discussing  this  subject,  said:  "It  is  a  condition 
precedent  to  the  exoneration  of  carriers  that  they  should  have 
been  in  no  default;  or  in  other  words,  that  the  goods  of  the 
bailor  should  not  have  been  exposed  to  the  peril  or  accident 
which  occasioned  the  loss,  by  their  misconduct,  neglect  or  ig- 
norance.   For  though  the  immediate  or  proximate  cause  of  loss, 

and   usual   course,   or   whether    it  the  ship  strikes  against  a  rock  or 

happened   at  the  same   place,   not  perishes    by     storm     in     the     one 

in    consequence    of   an    immediate  course,  no  one  can  predicate  that 

death's  wound,  but  by  a  connected  she      might      not      equally      have 

chain    of    causes     producing     the  struck  upon  another  rock  or  met 

•same   ultimate   event.      It    is    only  with  the  same  or  another  storm  if 

a   variation    in    the    precise   mode  pursuing   her   right   and   ordinary 

by    which    the     vessel     was     de-  voyage. 

stroyed,      which     variation      will        "The  same  answer  might  be  at- 

necessarily    occur    in     each     i^di-  tempted    to    an    action    against    a 

vidual    case.  defendant    who    had,    by    mistake, 

"But  the  objection  taken  is  that  forwarded  a  parcel  by  the  wrong 
there  is  no  natural  or  necessary  conveyance  and  a  lo.ss  had  there- 
connection  between  the  wrong  of  by  ensued;  and  yet  the  defendant 
the  master  in  taking  the  barge  in  that  case  would  undoubtedly 
out  of  its  proper  course  and  the  be   liable. 

loss  itself;   for  that  the  same  loss        "But  we  think  the  real  answer 

might   have    been     occasioned     by  to  the  objection  is  that  no  wrong- 

the    very     same     tempest     if     the  doer  can  be  allowed  to  apportion 

barge  had  proceeded  in  her  direct  or    qualify    his    own    wrong;    and 

course.  that  as  a  loss   has   actually    hap- 

"But  if  this   argument  were   to  pened    whilst    this    wrongful    act 

prevail,  the  deviation  of  the  mas-  was   in   operation   and   force,   and 

ter,     which      is      undoubtedly      a  which      is      attributable      to      his 

ground     of     action      against     the  wrongful    act,    he    cannot    set    up 

owner,  would  never,  or  only  under  as    an    answer    to    the    action    the 

very    peculiar    circumstances,    en-  bare    possibility    of    a    loss    if    his 

title  the  plaintiff  to  recover.     For  wrongful  act  had  never  been  done, 

if  a  ship  is  captjired  in  the  course  It  might  admit  of  a  different  con- 

of   deviation,   no   one   can   be  cer-  struction    if    he    could    show,    not 

tain  that  she  might  not  have  been  only    that   the    same     loss     might 

captured  if  in  her  proper  course,  have   happened,   but  that  it  viust 

And   yet  in   Parker    v.    James,    4  have    happened    if   the     act    com- 

Camp.    112,    where    the    ship    was  plained  of  had  not  been  done;  but 

captured  whilst  in  the  act  of  devi-  there   is   no   evidence   to   that   ex- 

ation,  no  such  ground  of  defense  tent  in  the  present  case." 
was  even  suggested.     Or  again,  if        9.  1    Conn.    487. 


§297.]  WHEN   CARRIER  NOT  LIABLE.  311 

in  any  given  instance,  may  have  been  what  is  termed  the  act  of 
God  or  inevitable  accident,  yet  if  the  carrier  unnecessarily  ex- 
poses the  property  to  such  accident  by  any  culpable  act  or  omis- 
sion of  his  own,  he  is  not  excused. ' '  And  accordingly  in  the  case 
of  The  Delaware,io  where  the  master  of  the  vessel  had  stowed  the 
goods  on  deck  when  it  was  his  duty  to  stow  them  under  deck,  and 
the  goods  had  to  be  jettisoned  in  a  storm  in  consequence  of  such 
stowage,  it  was  held  that  the  vessel  should  bear  the  whole  loss, 
and  could  not  demand  contribution  of  its  freighters  although 
the  jettison  was  made  necessary  by  a  storm. 

Sec.  297.  (§  193.)  Where  the  loss  would  not  have  occurred 
but  for  the  carrier's  unreasonable  delay. — But  suppose  the  car- 
rier delays  an  unreasonable  time  on  his  journey,  and  it  is 
shown  that  but  for  such  unreasonable  delay  he  would  have  been 
able  to  deposit  the  goods  in  safety,  or  to  deliver  them  to  the 
next  succeeding  carrier  by  whom  they  would  have  been  carried 
beyond  the  reach  of  the  danger  which  has  occasioned  their  loss, 
shall  the  carrier  be  held  liable  under  such  circumstances  for  the 
loss  of  the  goods  as  the  consequence  of  his  delay?  Different 
views  of  this  question  have  been  taken  by  the  American  courts. 
It  is  maintained  in  those  cases  which  hold  that  the  carrier  is 
not  liable  that,  while  the  loss  might  not  have  happened  but  for 
the  delay,  the  carrier  is  responsible  only  where  his  negligence 
was  the  proximate  cause  of  the  loss ;  that  where  an  act  of  God 
has  intervenedj  it  cannot  be  said  that  the  carrier  could  have 
foreseen  and  anticipated  that  the  goods  would  be  overtaken  bj'' 
such  a  casualty  as  a  natural  and  probable  consequence  of  the 
delay,  and  that  the  delay  is  therefore  but  the  remote  cause  of 
the  loss  and  the  carrier  must  accordingly  be  excused  from  lia- 
bility. 

Sec.  298.  Same  subject. — Thus  in  Morrison  v.  Davis,ii  goods 
which  were  being  carried  on  a  canal-boat  were  injured  by  the 
wrecking  of  the  boat  by  an  extraordinary  flood,  and  it  was  held 
that  this  being  an  act  of  God  which  would  excuse  him  if  he  were 

10.  14   Wall.    579.  11.  20    Penn.    St.    171. 


312  •  THE  LAW   OF   CARRIERS.  [§  299. 

not  in  fault,  the  rule  was  not  changed  by  reason  of  the  fact  that 
one  of  the  horses  attached  to  the  boat  was  lame,  and  that  such 
delay  was  thereby  caused  that  the  boat  did  not  sooner  pass  the 
place  where  the  accident  occurred,  beyond  which  it  would  have 
been  safe.  In  other  words,  the  fact  was  that  but  for  this  delay 
the  goods  would  have  been  put  beyond  danger  and  w'ould  not 
have  been  lost.  It  was  held  that  carriers  being  answerable  for 
the  ordinary  and  proximate  consequences  of  their  negligence 
and  not  for  those  which  are  remote  and  extraordinary,  and 
the  flood  and  not  the  delay  in  this  case  being  the  proximate 
cause,  the  case  came  within  the  exception  of  the  acts  of  God.^^ 

Sec.  299.  (§  194.)  Same  subject.— In  Denny  v.  The  N.  Y. 
Central  Railroad,^  ^  the  goods  were  carried  to  the  end  of  its 
route  by  the  railway  company,  and  while  they  were  in  its  ware- 
house there  awaiting  delivery  to  another  carrier,  they  were  in- 
jured by  a  flood  in  the  Hudson  river.  It  was  found  that  the 
company  had  been  negligent  in  delaying  the  transportation  of 
the  goods,  and  that  the  goods  would  not  have  been  exposed  to 
the  cause  of  the  damage  had  they  arrived  by  the  defendant's 
road  as  soon  as  they  should  have  done,  because  in  that  event 
they  would  have  been  carried  forward  by  the  connecting  car- 
rier in  time  to  avoid  the  flood.  It  was  contended  that,  as  the 
damage  was  the  direct  consequence  of  the  delay  in  the  trans- 
portation, the  company  should  be  held  liable  for  the  loss;  but 
it  was  held  that  the  flood,  which  was  the  act  of  God,  being 
the  proximate,  and  the  delay  of  the  company  only  the  remote, 
cause  of  the  loss,  it  should  be  excused.^"* 

12.  For     cases     following     this  Co.    v.   Bergman,   3   Tex.   Ct.   Rep. 

doctrine     see,     Railroad      Co.      v.  168,    64    S.    W.    Rep.    999;     Hunt 

Millsaps,  76  Miss.  885,  25  So.  Rep.  Bros.   v.   Railway   Co.    (Tex.     Civ. 

672,  71  Am.   St.  Rep.   543,  17  Am.  App.),  74  S.  W.  Rep.  69;   Read  v. 

&    Eng.    Rd.    Cas.     (N.     S.)     269;  Railroad   Co.,    60    Mo.    199;    Pruitt 

Herring   v.   Railroad   Co.,    101   Va.  r.  Railroad  Co.,  62  Mo.  527;   Elam 

778,    45    S.    E.    Rep.    322;    Moffatt,  r.   Railroad    Co.,   —  Mo.    App.   — , 

etc.,  Co.  V.  Railroad  Co.,  —  Mo.  9:-  S.  W.  Rep.  851. 
App.  — .  88  S.  W.  Rep.  117;  Rail-  13.  13  Gray,  481. 
way  Co.  V.  Darby,  28   Tex.  Civ.  App.        14.  This   case   was   subsequently 

229,  67  S.  W.  Rep.   129;   Railroad  approved     and     followed     by     the 


§300.]  WHEN   CARRIER  NOT  LIABLE,  313 

Sec.  300.  (§  195.)  Same  subject. — These  cases  were  cited 
and  approved  by  the  supreme  court  of  the  United  States  in  the 
ease  of  The  Railroad  v.  Reeves,^  ^  where  the  carrier  also  re- 
lied upon  the  fact  that  the  goods  were  injured  by  an  extra- 
ordinary overflow.  This  was  in  turn  met  by  a  charge  of  neg- 
ligence on  the  part  of  the  carrier  in  not  forwarding  the  goods 
beyond  the  point  of  danger  as  soon  as  it  had  agreed  to  do  or 
as  soon  as  its  duty  required  it  to  do  under  the  circumstances  of 
threatened  danger.  But  the  principle  upon  which  the  foregoing 
cases  were  decided  was  approved  by  the  court,  and  as  it  was  at 
variance  with  the  general  groundwork  of  the  charge  of  the  court 
below,  under  which  the  jury  had  found  a  verdict  for  the  plaint- 
iff, the  case  was  reversed  and  remanded.  It  was  further  held 
that  even  if  the  railroad  company  had  contracted  with  the 
plaintiff  to  start  with  his  goods  the  evening  before  the  occur- 
rence, which  would  have  taken  them  byond  its  influence,  and 
which  the  plaintiff  undertook  to  prove  it  had  agreed  to  do,  it 
would  still  not  be  liable  for  the  loss,  because  the  failure  to 
comply  with  such  a  contract  would  have  been  only  the  remote 
and  not  the  proximate  cause  of  the  loss.     And  these  cases  were 

same  court  in  Hoadley  v.  The  the  result  proves,  the  damage 
Northern  T.  Co.,  115  Mass.  304,  would  not  have  happened.  The 
in  which  the  carrier  was  protect-  legal  damages  which  follow  any 
ed  from  liability  for  loss  by  fire  wrong  are  only  such  as,  according 
by  its  contract,  which  protection,  to  common  experience  and  the 
however,  it  was  contended,  it  had  usual  course  of  events,  might  rea- 
forfeited  by  its  delay  in  remov-  sonably  be  anticipated.  The  de- 
ing  the  goods.  But  this  conten-  fendant's  liability  extends  only 
tion  was  not  sustained  by  the  to  natural  and  probable  conse- 
court,  which  went  on  to  say  that  quences.  ...  It  is  the  same 
"in  cases  of  this  description  the  whether  it  arises  from  the  com- 
injury  complained  of  must  be  mon  law,  is  secured  by  special 
shown  to  be  the  direct  conse-  contract,  or  results  from  the 
quence  of  the  defendant's  negli-  changed  responsibility  which 
gence.  This,  it  was  said,  is  the  takes  place  when  the  carrier  be- 
only  practical  rule  which  can  be  comes  a  warehouseman." 
adopted  by  the  courts  in  the  ad-  15.  10  Wall.  176.  See,  also, 
ministration  of  justice.  It  is  not  Gleeson  v.  R.  R.  Co.,  5  Mack.  356; 
enough  that  the  act  charged  may  140  U.  S.  435;  Northern  Pacific 
constitute  one  of  a  series  of  an-  Ry.  Co.  v.  Kempton  (C.  C.  A.), 
tecedent  events  without  which,  as  138  Fed.  792.     To  the  same  effect. 


314  THE   LAW    OF    CARRIERS.  [§301. 

also  approved  and  followed  in  Daniel  v.  Ballantine,^*^  where 
the  facts  were  that  the  defendants  having  undertaken  to  tow 
a  barge  from  one  point  on  Lake  Erie  to  another,  after  having 
commenced  the  towage,  stopped  unnecessarily,  as  was  alleged, 
for  three  days  during  which  the  weather  was  fair,  and  at  the 
end  of  that  time  resumed  their  trip  with  the  barge  and  were 
overtaken  by  a  storm,  in  which  it  was  lost.  It  was  held  that 
though  if  they  had  not  stopped  on  the  way  the  barge  would  have 
been  taken  through  safely,  yet,  upon  the  principle  of  the  fore- 
going cases,  the  defendants  could  not  be  held  liable.  Their 
reasoning  was  also  expressly  approved  by  the  supreme  court  of 
Michigan  in  the  case  of  The  Railroad  v.  BurrowSji'^  in  which 
there  was  a  delay  beyond  the  ordinary  time  in  the  transportation 
of  a  car-load  of  apples,  caused  by  the  injury  done  to  the  track 
of  the  road  by  the  Chicago  fire,  the  great  accumulation  of 
freight  occasioned  thereby  and  the  imperative  necessity  for  the 
transportation  of  relief  goods  in  preference  to  other  freight  by 
the  road,  in  consequence  of  which  delay  the  apples  were  frozen. 
It  was  held  that  the  delay  under  these  circumstances  was  ex- 
cusable, but  that  even  if  it  had  not  been  it  could  not  have  been 
considered  as  the  natural  and  proximate  cause  of  the  loss,  and 
that  therefore  the  carrier  would  not  have  been  liable  if  no  such 
reasons  for  the  delay  had  existed. 

Sec.   301.      (§196.)     Same  subject — ^The   contrary  view. — 

Other  courts,  however,  decline  to  follow  the  rule  that  the  car- 
rier, although  he  has  negligently  delayed  in  sending  the  goods 
forward,  is  excused  from  liability  for  loss  or  injury  if  an  act 
of  God  has  intervened^  and  contend  that  the  rule  which  thus 
excuses  the  carrier  is  based  upon  a  too  strict  application  of  the 
doctrine  of  proximate  cause.^*  Nothing  is  better  settled  than  that 

Empire   State  Cattle   Co.   v.  Rail-  ance  Co.,  139  U.  S.  223,   11   Sup. 

way  Co.,  135  Fed.  135,  citing  The  Ct.  554,  35  L.  Ed.  154;   Sheffer  v. 

R.  D.  Bibber,  50  Fed.  841,  2  C.  C.  Railroad  Co.,  105  U.  S.  249,  26  L. 

A.  50;  Thomas  v.  Lancaster  Mills,  Ed.  1070. 

71  Fed.  481,  19  C.  C.  A.  88;  Insur-  16.  23  Ohio   St.   532. 

ance  Co.  v.  Tweed,  7  Wall.  44,  19  17.  33  Mich.   6. 

L.  Ed.   65;   Railway  Co.  v.  Insur-  18.  See    Bibb    Broom    Corn   Co. 


§302.]  WHEN   CARRIER  NOT  LIABLE.  315 

in  case  of  an  nnnecessary  deviation  the  carrier  will  be  liable,  no 
matter  what  the  immediate  cause  of  the  loss  may  have  been,  be- 
cause the  law  will  trace  the  loss  back  to  the  first  fault  and  will 
there  fix  the  liability  for  it,  even  though  the  immediate  cause 
may  have  been  some  violent  and  unavoidable  change  or  convul- 
sion in  nature.  In  other  words,  whenever  the  carrier  attempts 
to  evade  responsibility  for  the  loss  by  charging  it  to  such  a 
cause,  he  can  be  successfully  met  by  showing  the  deviation.!'* 
And  it  is  difficult  to  understand  why,  if  he  is  liable  for  a  loss 
or  injury  in  case  of  an  unnecessary  deviation,  he  should  be  ex- 
cused where  he  has  neglected  to  send  the  goods  forward  with 
reasonable  dispatch.  In  either  case  there  is  a  failure  to  comply 
with  an  obligation  imposed  by  the  contract  of  carriage  and  it 
would  seem  that  the  same  degree  of  responsibility  should  attach. 

Sec.  302.  Same  subject.— Thus  in  Michaels  v.  The  Railroad, 20 
the  facts  were  that  the  railroad  company  had  received  the 
goods  of  the  plaintiff  for  immediate  carriage,  but  instead  of 
forwarding  them  at  once  as  was  its  duty,  it  retained  them  for 
several  days,  when  a  flood  came  and  injured  them.  The  dam- 
age would  not  have  occurred  had  the  company  sent  them  for- 
ward without  delay,  and  their  only  excuse  for  not  having  done 
so  was  that,  being  a  connecting  road,  it  was  not  customary  to 
send  goods  forward  until  it  had  been  furnished  with  a  bill  of 
back  charges  by  the  other  connecting  road.  It  M^as  not  con- 
tended but  that  the  flood  was  a  vis  major,  and  that  as  an  act 
of  God  it  would  have  been  an  excuse  for  the  injury  suffered  by 
the  goods  but  for  the  negligence  of  the  company  in  not  sending 
them  forward  as  soon  as  it  ought  to  have  done;  but  it  waii 
held  without  any  reference  to  the  cases  of  Morrison  v.  Davis  and 
Denny  v.  The  Railroad,  that  the  company  had  not  assigned  a 
sufficient  reason  for  the  detention  of  the  goods,  and  that  they 

V.  The  Railway  Co.,  —  Minn.  — ,  Wis.  394,  83  N.  W.  Rep.  285;   Chi- 

102   N.  W.   Rep.   709,   69   L.   R.   A.  cago,   etc.,   Ry.    Co.   v.   Dunlap,   ~ 

509.  Kan.    — ,    SO    Pac.    Rep.    .14;     Par- 

19.  Crosby    r.    Fitch,     12     Conn,  malee    r.    Wilks,     22     Barb.     o.';9; 

410;    Davis    r.    Garrett,     (>     Bing.  ante.   §    115. 

716;     Seavey    v.    Transit    Co.,    1()6  20.  30   N.   Y.   564. 


316  THE   LAW   OF    CARRIERS.  [§  303. 

were  liable  for  the  loss  by  reason  of  the  delay,  though  the  flood 
might  have  been  the  proximate  and  immediate  cause  of  the  loss. 
Sec.  303.  (§  197.)  Same  subject. — And  so  in  Read  v.  Spauld- 
ing,2i  lY^Q  goods  of  the  plaintiff  were  unreasonably  delayed,  and 
while  awaiting  transportation  were  damaged  by  the  same  flood. 
It  was  conceded  that  the  injury  had  been  caused  by  the  act 
of  God,  and  that  there  had  been  inexcusable  delay,  and  the  only 
question  to  be  determined  was  whether  the  defendant  had  not 
precluded  himself,  by  his  negligence  in  not  sooner  sending 
forward  the  goods,  from  the  benefit  of  that  defense;  and  it 
was  held  that  he  had  done  so,  upon  the  broad  ground  that 
the  carrier  in  order  to  avail  himself  of  such  a  defense  must  be 
without  fault;  and  it  was  said  of  the  cases  of  Morrison  v. 
Davis  and  Denny  v.  The  Railroad,  that,  so  far  as  they  held  a 
contrary  doctrine,  they  were  certainly  in  conflict  with  numer- 
ous adjudged  cases  and  would  greatly  relax  the  rules  as  to 
the  responsibilities  of  carriers,  and  ought  not  to  be  followed. 
The  judgment  of  the  court  below,  which  had  taken  the  same 
view  of  the  question,  was  therefore  affirmed. 

Sec.  304.  Same  subject. — The  latter  cases  were  followed  in 
Bostwick  V.  The  Railroad,^^  Condict  v.  The  Railway,^^  and  Dun- 
son  V.  The  Railroad,^*  in  the  same  state ;  and  decisions  to  the 
same  effect  have  been  made  in  Wolf  v.  The  American  Express 
Company,25  Green,  Wheeler  Shoe  Company  v.  The  Railway,^^ 
Alabama,  etc..  Railroad  Company  v.  Quarles  &  Couturie,^'''  Wa- 
bash Railroad  Co.  v.  Sharpe,^^  and  in  The  Michigan  Central 
Railroad  v.  Curtis,^^  where  it  appeared  that  the  goods  had  been 
destroyed  by  freezing  which  would  not  have  occurred  but  for  the 
delay  in  the  transportation;  and  although  the  injury  occurred 
while  the  goods  were  in  the  custody  of  another  carrier  to  which 
the  defendant  had  delivered  them  to  complete  the  transportation, 

26.  —  Iowa,  — ,  106  N.  W.  Rep. 
498. 

27.  —  Ala.  — ,  40  So.  Rep.   120. 

28.  Wabash   R.    Co.     t:     Sharpe, 
—  Neb.  — ,  107  N.  W.  Rep.  758. 

29.  80    111.    324. 


21. 

30    N.    Y.    630. 

22. 

45    N.   Y.    712. 

23. 

54    N.    Y.    500. 

24. 

3    Lans.    256. 

25. 

43    Mo.    421. 

§  305.  ]  WHEN   CARRIER  NOT  LIABLE.  317 

the  defendant,  as  the  party  in  fault  by  reason  of  the  delay,  was 
held  liable.  So  in  Wald  v.  The  Railroad,-"^*^  the  carrier  was  held 
liable  where  he  negligently  failed  to  forward  a  passenger's  bag- 
gage on  the  same  train  with  the  passenger,  and  it  was  destroyed 
in  the  Johnstown  flood.  And  in  the  Southern  Express  Company 
V.  "Womack,3i  goods  were  delivered  during  the  late  civil  war  to 
the  agent  of  the  company  at  one  of  its  offices  upon  the  line  of 
the  railroad  for  transportation ;  but  OAving  to  the  great  accumu- 
lation of  freight,  the  company  was  unable  to  take  the  goods  upon 
its  car,  and  they  were  permitted  to  remain  at  the  depot  in  charge 
of  the  agent  for  some  twenty  days,  at  the  end  of  which  time 
they  were  captured  by  Federal  troops  and  lost.  Suit  was  brought 
against  the  company,  and  it  was  held  without  reference  to  any 
of  the  foregoing  cases  or  to  any  case  previously  decided  upon 
the  subject,  but  upon  general  principles  of  law,  the  court  evi- 
dently regarding  the  delay  as  the  causa  proxima  of  the  loss, 
that  although  the  captors  of  the  goods  were  to  be  regarded  as 
the  public  enemy,  the  company  was  liable  in  consequence  of  its 
delay  in  the  transportation  of  the  goods.^s 

Sec.  305.  Same  subject. — And  in  the  case  of  Bibb  Broom 
Corn  Co.  v.  The  Railway^^^  it  appeared  that  the  railway  com- 
pany accepted  for  transportation  a  carload  of  broom  corn,  and 
that  during  an  unreasonable  delay  the  car  was  submerged  by  a 
flood  which  so  greatly  damaged  the  broom  corn  that  the  plain- 
tiff, on  its  arrival  at  destination,  refused  to  accept  it  and  brought 
suit  against  the  company  for  the  loss.  It  was  admitted  that  the 
flood  was  an  act  of  God  and  the  question  was  whether  the  car- 
rier should,  on  account  of  the  delay,  be  held  responsible  for  the 
injury.  The  court,  after  a  review  of  the  cases  which  hold  that 
the  carrier  under  such  circumstances  should  be  excused,  said: 
"The  rule  that  permits  a  carrier  to  excuse  his  negligence  by  an 

30.  162  111.  545,  44  N.  E.  Rep.  32.  See,  also,  Railway  Co.  v. 
888,  53  Am.  St.  Rep.  332,  35  L.  McFadden  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  32 
R.  A.  356,  reversing  60  111.  App.  S.  W.  Rep.  18,  citing  Hutchinson 
460.      See,     also,     Edson    v.     The  on  Carr. 

Railroad,  70  111.  App.  654.  33.  —  Minn.  — ,  102  N.  W.  709, 

31.  1    Heisk.    256.  69  L.  R.  A.   509, 


318  THE   LAW   OF    CARRIERS.  [§  306. 

act  of  God  overtaking  him  while  thus  in  fault  seems  to  be  un- 
sound. It  is  based  on  too  strict  an  application  of  the  rule  of 
proximate  cause.  It  is  the  duty  of  a  common  carrier  to  whom 
goods  are  delivered  for  transportation  promptly  and  without  un- 
reasonable delay  to  forward  them  to  their  destination.  .  .  . 
If  the  defendant  had  acted  as  enjoined  by  law,  the  car  would 
have  arrived  at  its  destination  prior  to  the  flood.  That  the  de- 
fendant's neglect  concurred  and  mingled  with  the  act  of  God 
seems  the  only  reasonable  conclusion  the  facts  will  warrant,  and 
we  feel  safe  in  applying  the  general  rule  that  an  act  of  God  is 
not,  in  such  cases,  a  defense.  Every  reason  in  equity  and  justice 
relieves  the  carrier  from  the  performance  of  his  contract  and 
from  liability  for  injuries  to  property  in  his  custody  for  trans- 
portation resulting  exclusively  from  an  act  of  God  or  other 
inevitable  accident  or  cause  over  which  he  has  no  control  and 
could  not  reasonably  anticipate  or  guard  against.  But  reasons 
of  that  nature  lose  their  force  and  persuasive  powers  when  ap- 
plied to  a  carrier  who  violates  his  contract  and  by  his  unreason- 
able delay  and  procrastination  is  overtaken  by  an  overpowering 
cause  even  though  of  a  nature  not  reasonably  to  be  anticipated 
or  foreseen." 

Sec.  306.  Same  subject — How  where  loss,  due  to  cause 
excepted  by  contract,  would  not  have  occurred  but  for  the 
carrier's  unreasonable  delay. — Where  the  carrier  has  exempted 
himself  by  contract  from  liability  for  losses  arising  from  certain 
causes,  and  a  loss  ensues  from  one  of  such  excepted  causes,  which 
loss,  but  for  the  carrier's  unreasonable  delay,  would  not  have 
happened,  it  is  held  that,  if  the  cause  of  the  loss  was  not  attrib- 
utable to  any  negligence  on  the  part  of  the  carrier,  the  delay 
will  be  considered  as  only  the  remote  cause  and  the  carrier  will 
not  be  liable.^5^  Thus  grain  was  shipped  under  a  bill  of  lading 
the  terms  of  which  exempted  the  carrier  from  liability  for  loss 

34.  Davis   v.    Railroad     Co.,     66  Rep.    703,    53    Am.    St.    Rep.    391; 

Vt.  290,  29  Atl.  Rep.  313,  44  Am.  General    Fire   Extinguisher   Co.    v. 

St.    Rep.    852;    Reid    v.    Railroad  Railway  Co.,   137   N.  Car.   278,  49 

Co.,    10    Ind.    App.    385,    35    N.    E.  S.    E.   Rep.   208. 


§  307.]  WHEN  CARRIER  NOT  LIABLE.  319 

or  damage  caused  by  fire  unless  the  same  was  due  to  negligence. 
The  grain  was  placed  in  the  carrier's  warehouse  to  await  orders 
from  the  shipper  to  forward  it,  this  being  done  in  accordance 
with  a  course  of  dealing  previously  followed.  A  fire  broke  out 
in  the  warehouse  without  any  fault  or  negligence  on  the  carrier's 
part,  and  the  grain  was  destroyed.  It  appeared  that  the  grain 
had  all  been  ordered  forward  by  the  shipper  at  periods  varying 
from  thirty  to  seven  days  before  the  loss,  and  it  was  therefore 
contended  that  the  delay  or  negligence  of  the  carrier  in  not  re- 
moving it  as  speedily  as  he  should  have  done  subjected  hira  to 
liability  for  the  loss.  In  holding  that  the  carrier  had  incurred 
no  liability,  the  court  said :  "  It  is  evident  that  the  fire  was  the 
immediate  proximate  cause  of  the  destruction  and  loss  of  the 
grain.  If  the  fire  had  not  occurred,  the  grain  would  not  have 
been  lost.  The  caiisa  causans  was  the  fire.  The  concomitant  in- 
cident was  the  delay  by  the  defendant  in  removing  it  from  the 
warehouse.  But  that  delay  would  not  have  destroyed  the  grain 
and  caused  its  loss  if  the  fire  had  not  intervened.  It  is  generally 
held  that  a  common  carrier  is  liable  on  the  ground  of  negligence 
only  when  that  negligence  is  the  proximate  cause  of  the  loss,  and 
if  the  loss  arises  in  such  a  manner  that  it  will  not  support  an 
action,  neither  will  the  remote  cause,  though  incidental  to  the 
proximate  cause. ' '  ^^ 

Sec.  307.  (§  199.)  Effect  of  unreasonable  delay  upon  insur- 
ance.— Unreasonable  delay  by  the  carrier  has  been  held  to  be 
the  same  in  its  effect  upon  the  insurance  upon  the  cargo  as  a 
deviation.  In  Mount  v.  Larkins^^  it  was  so  held  by  Tindal,  C.  J., 
' '  not  only  from  the  reason  of  the  thing  itself, ' '  but  upon  numer- 
ous authorities  cited  by  him;   and  the  reason  is  said  to  be,  not 

35.  Davis  v.  Railroad  Co.,  supra,  sonable    delay   has    subjected    the 

But   where    the    loss   arises    from  goods  to  injury  by  an  act  of  God. 

a  cause  excepted  by  the  contract,  See    Tewes   v.    Steamship    Co.,    85 

the   loss   being   made    possible    by  N.  Y.  Supp.  994,  89  App.  Div.  148; 

the    carrier's    unreasonable    delay,  Keeney  v.  Railroad  Co.,  47  N.  Y. 

the    same     difference     of    opinion  525. 
would  no  doubt  be  encountered  as        36.  8  Bing.   108. 
exists    where    the    carriers     unrea- 


320  THE   LAW    OF    CARRIERS.  [§  308. 

that  the  risk  is  thereby  increased,  but  because  the  insurer  has, 
without  necessity,  substituted  another  voyage  for  that  which  was 
insured,  and  thereby  varied  the  risk  which  the  underwriter  took 
upon  himself.  If  equivalent  to  a  deviation  as  to  the  nisurer,  it 
is  not  perceived  why  it  should  not  be  so  as  to  the  carrier  him- 
self; and  if  it  be  so,  he  should  undoubtedly  be  held  liable  for 
any  loss  which  can  be  traced  to  it,  although  the  immediate  cause 
of  such  loss  may  be  an  inevitable  occurrence  which  comes  within 
the  meaning  of  the  act  of  God. 

Sec.  308.  (§  200.)  Carrier  responsible  as  in  case  of  devia- 
tion.— It  thus  appears  that  there  are  many  cases  in  which,  as 
is  well  settled,  we  may  look  further  than  to  the  mere  immediate 
occurrence  which  has  caused  the  loss,  and  trace  it  back  to  the 
fault  from  which  it  in  fact  originated  and  without  which  it  must 
be  presumed  that  it  would  not  have  happened ;  and  there  would 
seem  to  be  no  good  reason  why,  if  the  loss  can  be  traced  with  any 
certainty  to  the  fault  of  unreasonable  delay,  the  carrier  should 
not  be  held  responsible  for  it  in  the  same  manner  as  he  would 
be  for  the  fault  of  an  unnecessary  deviation. 

Sec.  309.  (§  201.)  The  degree  of  diligence  to  be  exercised 
by  the  carrier  when  the  goods  have  been  overtaken  by  dis- 
aster.— When  disaster  has  overtaken  the  carrier  from  some 
inevitable  cause  which  would  bring  the  case  within  the  legal  ex- 
ception to  his  liability,  if  the  goods  have  not  perished  thereby, 
duties  still  remain  to  be  performed  by  him  before  he  can  entitle 
himself  to  the  claim  of  exemption  from  such  liability.  As  he  is 
required  to  exercise  a  due  degree  of  diligence  and  caution  to 
avoid  the  danger,  so,  when  it  has  overtaken  him  without  his 
fault,  his  obligation  of  preservation  and  safe  custody  still  con- 
tinues, if  the  goods  have  not  been  destroyed.  If,  for  instance, 
his  vessel  has  been  sunk  or  cast  ashore,  or  in  any  way  disabled 
by  one  of  those  occurrences  known  as  the  acts  of  God,  if  tha 
goods  have  not  been  lost  but  remain,  though  in  a  condition  of 
peril,  he  cannot  abandon  them  to  their  fate,  and  escape  the  re- 
sponsibility by  the  plea  that  they  were  lost  or  destroyed  by  the 
storm  or  other  inevitable  casualty.    It  therefore  becomes  a  ques- 


§  300. ]  WHEN  CARRIER  NOT  LIABLE.  321 

tion  of  importance  to  determine  what  degree  of  diligence,  skill 
and  capacity  he  is  required  to  apply  in  such  cases,  in  order  to 
save  the  goods  from  loss  or  further  damage.     This  question  has 
been  repeatedly  passed  upon  by  the  courts,  and  it  may  be  con- 
sidered as  the  settled  law  that  all  that  can  be  required  of  him  in 
such  an  emergency  is  the  exercise  of  a  reasonable  amount  of 
skill  and  diligence,  and  that  he  shall  do  all  that  is  reasonably 
and  practically  possible  to  insure  the  safety  of  the  goods.     The 
very  question  was  brought  before  the  court  in  the  case  of  Nash- 
ville, etc.  R.  R.  V.  David.3  7     In  the  lower  court  the  jury  had 
been  instructed  that  the  law  required  of  the  carrier,  in  such  a 
predicament,  to  use  all  the  diligence  which  human  sagacity  could 
suggest  in  protecting  the  property.    But  the  supreme  court  ruled 
that  this  was  erroneous,  and  held  the  law  to  be  that,  in  case  of 
such  accident  or  emergency,  the  carrier  is  bound  to  use  such 
means  as  would  suggest  themselves  to  and  be  within  the  knowl- 
edge of  well-informed  and  competent  business  men  in  such  posi- 
tions, and  such  diligence  as  prudent,  skillful  men  engaged  in 
that  kind  of  business  might  fairly  be  expected  to  use  under  like 
circumstances,  which  should  be  actively   used  to  protect  and 
secure  the  property  confided  to  their  care.    ' '  It  would  be  impos- 
sible," say  the  court,  "for  all  the  roads  of  the  country  to  com- 
mand employees  possessing  the  highest  human  sagacity,  nor  does 
the  law  make  any  such  stringent  and  unreasonable  demand  upon 
them  in  order  to  shield  them  from  liability  in  a  case  like  the 
present."     The  duty  of  the  carrier  in  such  cases  was  stated  in 
very  nearly  the  same  language  in  Morrison  v.  Davis,^^  which  was 
approved  by  the  supreme  court  of  the  United  States  in  The  Rail- 
road V.  Reeves,^ ^  as  expressing  the  true  rule  upon  the  subject. 

37.  6   Heisk.   261.  structed      by      an      unprecedented 

38.  20  Penn.  St.  171.  See  post,  snowstorm  and  many  of  the  hogs 
§   631.  perished.     The  question  was  as  to 

39.  10  Wall.  176.  See,  also,  the  degree  of  care  which  the 
Grier  v.  The  Railway,  108  Mo.  carrier  was  bound  to  exercise  to 
App.  565,  84  S.  W.  Rep.  158.  get  the  hogs  out  of  the  cars  and 

In    Black    v.    Railroad     Co.,     30  into   a  place  of  safety.     Said   the 

Neb.   107,  46  N.    W.    Rep.    428,    a  court: 

train  loaded  with  hogs  became  ob-  "The   rule   seems   to   be   that   a 
21 


322  THE  LAW   OF   CARRIERS.  [§310. 

Sec.  310.  Same  subject. — So  where  the  carrier  permitted  a 
quantity  of  wheat  to  remain  in  a  car  for  several  days  after  water 
in  a  nearby  river  had  risen  and  partially  submerged  the  car, 
and  a  portion  of  the  wheat  which  had  not  previously  been  wet 
was  thereby  damaged,  it  was  said  not  to  be  error  to  submit  the 
question  to  the  jury  to  determine  from  their  practical  knowl- 
edge whether  by  the  exercise  of  ordinary  diligence  and  care 
some  of  the  wheat  might  not  have  been  removed  and  saved  from 
total  destruction,  and  whether  a  man    of    ordinary    prudence 

carrier  of  live  stock  is  an  insurer  common  carrier  as  against  an  act 
of  the  safety  of  the  property  while  of  God,  say:  'By  these  instruc- 
it  is  in  his  custody,  subject  to  tions  the  difference  between  the 
certain  well-defined  exceptions,  responsibility  of  the  carrier  as 
He  is  not  liable  for  injuries  re-  against  the  act  of  God  and  as 
suiting  unavoidably  from  the  na-  against  these  perils  which  the 
ture  and  propensities  of  the  prop-  carrier  is  answerable  for  is  ig- 
erty,  nor  for  damages  resulting  nored.  The  carrier  is  held  by  the 
from  the  act  of  God  or  the  public  instructions  to  the  highest  de- 
enemy.  The  evidence  brings  this  gree  of  foresight  and  care  as 
case  within  the  exception  to  the  against  an  act  of  God;  but  the 
general  rule.  An  unprecedented  law  imposes  on  him  no  such  lia- 
snowstorm,  of  such  violence  as  bility.  It  has  been  truly  said 
to  obstruct  the  moving  of  trains,  there  is  hardly  an  act  of  God, 
falls  within  the  term  'act  of  God.'  in  a  legal  sense,  which  an  exhaus- 
Ballentine  v.  Railroad  Co.,  40  Mo.  five  circumspection  might  not  an- 
491;  Pruitt  V.  Railroad  Co.,  63  ticipate,  and  supposable  diligence 
Mo.  527.  While  carriers  are  not  not  avert  the  consequence  of;  so 
insurers  against  loss  occasioned  that  the  doctrine  would  end  in 
by  the  act  of  God,  they  cannot,  making  the  carrier  responsible 
on  the  happening  of  such  an  for  acts  of  God,  when,  by  law,  the 
event,  abandon  the  property,  passenger  and  not  the  carrier  as- 
What  degree  of  care  and  diligence  sumed  the  risk.  It  has  been  said 
at  such  a  time  is  required  in  car-  that  to  make  the  rule  a  working 
ing  for  and  protecting  the  prop-  rule,  and  give  to  the  carrier  the 
erty  from  injury  and  loss?  The  practical  benefit  of  the  exemption 
plaintiffs  insist  that  the  carrier  which  the  law  allows  him,  he 
is  required  to  bestow  the  highest  must  be  held,  in  preventing  or 
degree  of  care,  and,  if  he  fails  to  averting  the  effect  of  the  act  of 
exercise  all  possible  diligence,  God,  only  to  such  foresight  and 
and  injury  occurs  by  reason  care  as  an  ordinarily  prudent  per- 
thereof,  he  is  liable.  In  Gillespie  son  or  company,  in  the  same  busi- 
r.  Railway  Co.,  6  Mo.  App.  554,  ness  would  use  under  all  the  cir- 
the  court,  in  considering  the  de-  cumstances  of  the  case.'  We 
gree    of    diligence    required    of    a  have   carefully   examined   the   nu- 


§311.]  WHEN   CARRIER  NOT  LIABLE,  323 

might  not  with  reasonable  effort  have  saved  a  large  part  of  the 
wheat.^ 

Sec.  311.    (§  202.)    Same  subject.— And  in  Nugent  v.  Smith,2 
Avhich  was  the  ease  of  a  ship  at  sea  caught  in  a  storm,  and  the 


merous  authorities  bearing  upon 
the  question,  and  the  rule  estab- 
lished by  the  adjudicated  cases  is 
that  the  carrier  is  required  to  ex- 
ercise ordinary  or  reasonable  care 
and  diligence  to  secure  the  prop- 
erty committed  to  his  custody 
from  loss  or  damage,  in  order  to 
protect  himself  from  injury  aris- 
ing from  the  act  of  God.  If  his 
negligence  contributes  to  the  in- 
jury he  cannot  claim  exemption 
from  liability.  Morrison  v.  Davis, 
20  Pa.  St.  171;  Railroad  Co.  v. 
Reeves,  10  Wall.  176;  Railroad  Co. 
V.  David,  6  Heisk.  2G1;  Denny  v. 
Railroad  Co.,  13  Gray,  481;  Swet- 
land  V.  Railroad  Co.,  102  Mass. 
276;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Anderson,  6 
Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  407;  Gleeson 
V.  Railroad  Co.,  28  id.  202  (140  U. 
S.  435);  Ballentine  v.  Railroad 
Co.,  40  Mo.  491;  Pruitt  v.  Railroad 
Co.,  62  Mo.   521. 

"In  the  instructions  given  the 
rule  is  stated  that,  if  the  defend- 
ant did  not  use  ordinary  care  in 
protecting,  caring  for  and  trans- 
porting the  hogs,  it  was  liable. 
We  were  at  iirst  inclined  to  be- 
lieve that  the  instructions  were 
faulty  on  account  of  the  using  of 
the  word  'ordinary,'  but,  after 
further  consideration,  we  are  sat- 
isfied that  there  is  no  substantial 
difference  between  ordinary  care 
and  reasonable  care.  It  seems 
that  the  words  are  interchange- 
ably used.  Kendall  v.  Brown,  74 
111.  232;  Fallon  v.  City  of  Boston, 
3  Allen,  38;  Neal  v.  Gillette,  23 
Conn.   436.     Under   the   testimony 


there  was  but  one  controverted 
fact  to  submit  to  the  jury,  and 
that  was  whether  the  defendant 
was  guilty  of  negligence.  The  in- 
structions, taken  as  a  whole, 
stated  the  law  applicable  to  the 
case,  and  fairly  submitted  to  the 
jury  the  question  of  negligence. 
The  only  conclusion  that  could 
have  been  drawn  from  the  testi- 
mony was  that  the  storm  was  ex- 
traordinary and  unprecedented 
for  that  season  of  the  year.  While 
the  charge  of  the  court  did  not 
state  in  so  many  words  that  the 
act  of  God  must  have  been  the 
immediate  or  proximate  cause  of 
the  loss  in  order  to  excuse  the 
company  from  liability,  yet  that 
was  the  plain  purport  of  the  lan- 
guage used  in  the  fifth  paragraph. 
The  jury  could  not  fail  to  under- 
stand from  that  instruction  that, 
if  the  defendant  did  not  use  or- 
dinary care,  the  negligence  of  the 
defendant  was  the  proximate 
cause  of  the  loss,  and  that  the 
plaintiffs  were  entitled  to  dam- 
ages." 

In  Feinberg  v.  Railroad  Co.,  52 
N.  J.  L.  451,  the  carrier  was  held 
liable  under  like  circumstances 
where,  during  the  detention,  it 
put  cows  and  young  calves  in  cat- 
tle-sheds, where  many  were  fro- 
zen, while  it  had  warmer  and 
sufficient  horse-sheds  at  its  dis- 
posal   unoccupied. 

1.  Baltimore,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v. 
Keedy,  75  Md.  320,  23  Atl.  Rep. 
643. 

2.  1  Law  R.  Com.  P.  Div.  423. 


324  THE   LAW   OF    CARRIERS.  [§  312. 

question  being  as  to  the  degree  of  care  which  was  required  of 
the  carrier  in  respect  to  the  goods  in  his  charge  to  protect  him 
from  a  loss  arising  from  the  act  of  God,  it  was  said  by  Coekburn, 
C.  J.,  that  "if  he  uses  all  the  known  means  to  which  prudent 
and  experienced  carriers  ordinarily  have  recourse,  he  does  all 
that  can  be  reasonably  required  of  him;  and  if  under  such  cir- 
cumstances he  is  overpowered  by  the  storm  or  other  natural 
agency,  he  is  within  the  rule  which  gives  immunity  from  such 
vis  major  as  the  act  of  God."  And  in  the  case  of  The  Gener- 
ous,^ it  was  said  that  the  carrier  would  be  protected,  if,  being  in 
peril,  he  used  all  practicable  endeavors  to  surmount  the  difficul- 
ties which  on  fair  trial  he  found  insurmountable — not  all  the 
endeavors  which  the  wit  of  man,  as  it  exists  in  actual  under- 
standing, might  suggest,  but  such  as  might  reasonably  be  ex- 
pected from  a  fair  degree  of  discretion  and  an  ordinary  knowl- 
edge of  business.  But  in  The  Propeller  Niagara  v.  Cordes,^ 
it  was  held  by  Clifford,  J.,  in  delivering  the  opinion  of  the  court, 
that  in  such  cases  it  was  the  duty  of  the  master  of  the  vessel 
"to  take  all  possible  care  of  the  goods,"  and  that  "he  was  re- 
sponsible for  every  loss  or  injury  which  might  have  been  pre- 
vented by  human  foresight,  skill  and  prudence;"  and  such  was 
the  opinion  of  Story,  J.,  in  King  v.  Shepherd.^  But  according 
to  the  more  recent  cases  which  have  been  cited,  this  was  stating 
the  rule  rather  too  strongly.  And  in  this  case,  as  in  others,  thu 
carrier's  liability  is  to  be  determined  in  the  light  of  the  circum- 
stances as  they  appeared  to  him  at  the  time,  and  not  in  the 
clearer  light  that  often  presents  itself  when  the  emergency  has 
passed  away  and  events  are  seen  in  different  relations.^ 

Sec.  312.  (§202a.)  Burden  of  proof  as  to  carrier's  con- 
tributory negligence. — Where  the  claim  is  made  that,  notw^ith- 
standing  the  intervention  of  an  act  of  God,  the  loss  would  not 

3.  2  Dodson,  324.  Railroad  Co.  v.  Kellogg,  94  U.   S. 

4.  21  How.  7.  475;     BIythe    v.    Railway    Co.,    IT) 

5.  3    Story,   358.  Colo.  333.     See,  also,  Long  r.  Rail- 

6.  Smith  V.  Railway  Co.,  91  road  Co.,  147  Pa.  St.  343,  23  Atl. 
Ala.  455,  8  So.  Rep.  754,  24  Am.  Rep.  459,  30  Am.  St.  Rep.  732,  14 
St.   Rep.    929,    11    L.    R.     A.     619;  L.  R.  A.  741. 


>5  313.]  WHEN   CARRIER  NOT  LIABLE.  325 

have  happened  but  for  the  negligence  of  the  carrier,  as  in  un- 
reasonably delaying  or  exposing  the  goods,  the  burden  of  prov- 
ing such  negligence  is,  according  to  the  weight  of  authority, 
upon  him  who  affirms  it.''' 

Sec.  313.  (§  202b.)  Act  of  God  will  not  excuse  if  carrier  has 
wrongfully  refused  to  deliver  goods.— The  act  of  God  which 
would  otherwise  excuse  will  not  relieve  the  carrier  where  the 
goods  are  destroyed  after  he  has  wrongfully  refused  to  deliver 
them  to  the  consignee  upon  presentation  of  the  bill  of  lading.^ 


III.     CARRIER    NOT    LIABLE    FOR    LOSSES    ARISING 
FROM  ACTS  OF  THE  PUBLIC  ENEMY. 

Sec.  314.  (§203.)  Exception  of  losses  arising  from  the  acts 
of  the  public  enemy. — The  only  other  exception  early  made  by 
the  law  in  favor  of  the  carrier  is  of  losses  arising  from  capture 
by  the  public  enemy,  or,  as  it  is  generally  expressed,  by  the 
king's  enemies;  and  by  the  word  enemies  in  this  connection  is 
to  be  understood  the  public  enemies  of  the  country  of  the  carrier 
and  not  of  the  owner  of  the  goods.  So  that  if  the  goods  be  in- 
trusted to  a  foreign  carrier  whose  country  is  at  war  with  another 
and  he  is  captured  by  the  latter,  it  is  a  loss  by  the  public  enemy 
which  will  excuse  him.^ 

Sec.  315.  (§204.)  Reason  for  this  exception. — This  excep- 
tion is  said  to  have  been  made  in  the  carrier's  favor  because  of 
the  exceeding  hardship  which  it  would  have  imposed  upon  him 
to  compel  him  to  pay  for  losses  when  he  could  have  no  recourse 
or  remedy  over  against  those  who  had  brought  the  loss  upon 
him;  and,  therefore,  it  is  said  that  the  enemy  must  be  the  king's 
enemy  or  the  public  enemy,  and  not  those  merely  who  engage  in 
mobs,  riots,  insurrections  and  the  like;  for  against  them  he 
might  have  his  remedy  by  proceeding  against  the  hundred.    But 

7.  See  post,  §  1354  et  seq.  9.  Russell   v.   Neiman,    17    Com. 

8.  Richmond,     etc.,     R.     Co.     v.     B.    (N.   S.)    163. 
Benson,  86  Ga.  203,  12  S.  E.  Rep. 

357. 


326  THE   LAW   OF    CARRIERS.  [§  316. 

what  appears  a  more  plausible  reason  is  that  there  could  be  but 
little  if  any  danger  of  his  combining  with  the  common  public 
enemy  to  defraud  the  owner  of  the  goods  by  a  pretense  of  being 
robbed,  while  the  danger  of  such  combinations  with  ordinary 
thieves  and  robbers  was  more  to  be  apprehended.  But  the  rea- 
son for  the  exception  or  for  its  being  confijied  to  the  public  or 
common  enemy  can  be  of  no  interest  at  this  day  except  as  a  mat- 
ter of  curious  legal  history.  The  law  has  been  settled  for  cen- 
turies that  losses  by  thieves  or  robbers  and  mobs  and  riots  are 
■to  be  borne  by  the  carrier  unless  he  has  protected  himself  from 
such  liability  by  his  contract.  "For  though  the  force  be  never 
so  great,  as  if  a  multitude  of  people  should  rob  him,  neverthe- 
less he  is  chargeable.  And  this  is  a  politic  establishment  con- 
trived by  the  policy  of  the  law  for  the  safety  of  all  persons,  the 
necessity  of  whose  affairs  oblige  them  to  trust  these  sorts  of 
persons,  that  they  may  be  safe  in  their  ways  of  dealing ;  for  else 
these  carriers  might  have  an  opportunity  of  undoing  all  per- 
sons that  had  any  dealings  with  them  by  combining  with  thieves, 
etc.,  and  yet  doing  it  in  such  a  clandestine  manner  as  would  not 
be  possible  to  be  discovered.  And  this  is  the  aeason  the  law  is 
founded  upon  in  that  point.  "^^ 

Sec.  316.  (§  205.)  Who  are  public  enemies — Mobs — Riot- 
ers— Strikers — Thieves — Pirates. — Losses,  therefore,  which  are 
occasioned  by  the  depredations  or  the  violence  of  mobs,  rioters, 
"strikers,"  thieves  and  the  like,^^  however  much  they  may  be  in 
some  sense  the  common  enemies  of  the  country,  do  not  come 
within  the  exception;    nor  do  losses  by  robbers,  whether  upon 

10.  Coggs  V.  Bernard,  2  Ld.  Pittsburgh  R.  Co.  v.  Hollowell, 
Raym.  909.  65  Ind.  188;    Pittsburgh  R.  R.  Co. 

11.  "Strikers"  are  not  the  pub-  v.  Hazen,  84  111.  36;  Haas  v.  Rail- 
lic  enemy,  so  as  to  excuse  the  car-  "road  Co.,  81  Ga.  792;  Lang  v. 
rier  for  a  destruction  of  property  Railroad  Co.,  154  Pa.  St.  342,  26 
by  them.  Hall  v.  Railroad  Co.,  Atl.  Rep.  370,  35  Am.  St.  Rep.  846, 
14  Phila.  414.  Though  their  in-  20  L.  R.  A.  360;  Railway  Co.  v. 
terference  may  excuse  a  delay  in  Nevill,  60  Ark.  375,  30  S.  W.  Rep. 
delivery.  Geismer  v.  Railway  425,  46  Am.  St.  Rep.  208,  28  L.  R. 
Co.,  102  N.  Y.  563;  Lake  Shore  A.  80,  citing  Hutchinson  on  Carr. 
Ry.   Co.   V.   Bennett,   89   Ind.   457; 


§316. 


WHEN   CARRIER  NOT  LIABLE. 


327 


the  highway  or  upon  the  sea.12  go  the  wilful  and  unlawful  de- 
struction of  the  property  by  United  States  soldiers,  not  acting 
in  the  line  of  their  duty,  is  not  a  loss  by  the  act  of  the  public 
enemy .1^  But  pirates  are  regarded  as  the  common  enemy  of  all 
mankind — hostes  humanis  generis — and  are  therefore  considered 
as  enemies  of  the  king;  and  hence  losses  by  them  are  regarded 
as  coming  within  the  exception,  although  piracy  is  in  fact  noth- 
ing more  than  robbery  or  a  forcible  depredation  upon  the  sea, 
animo  furandi.^^ 


12.  Morse  v.  Slue,  1  Ventris, 
190. 

13.  Seligman  v.  Armijo,  1  N. 
Mex.   459. 

14.  Story  on  Bail.  §  526;  Pick- 
ering V.  Barkley,  Style,  132.  The 
report  of  this  case  is  as  follows: 
Pickering  brought  an  action  of 
covenant  upon  a  deed  of  cove- 
nants of  charter-party,  whereby  it 
was  covenanted  that  the  defend- 
ant, in  consideration  of  a  certain 
sum  of  money  agreed  to  be  paid 
to  the  defendant  for  freight  of  a 
ship,  should  make  such  a  voyage 
and  bear  all  the  losses  and  dam- 
age which  should  befall  the  ship 
or  merchandises  in  her,  excepting 
only  perils  of  the  sea,  and  de- 
clares that  the  defendant  had  not 
performed  his  agreement,  and  for 
this  he  brings  his  action.  The 
defendant  pleads  that  in  the 
making  of  his  voyage  upon  the 
sea,  the  ship  was  taken,  per  guos- 
dam  ignotos  homines  bellicosos, 
whereby  he  was  hindered  in  mak- 
ing of  the  voyage  according  to 
his  agreement.  To  this  plea  the 
plaintiff  demurs.  The  question 
was,  in  regard  that  in  the  char- 
ter party  perils  of  the  sea  were 
excepted,  whether  the  taking  of 
the  ship  by  these  unknown  men 
of   war   should    be    accompted    a 


peril  of  the  sea  or  not,  according 
to  the  meaning  of  merchants. 
Twisden,  of  counsel  with  the 
plaintiff,  held  it  should  not,  and 
•so  the  plea  was  not  good,  and 
that  therefore  the  plaintiff  ought 
to  have  judgment,  and  said  that 
this  was  not  a  danger  of  the  sea, 
but  a  danger  upon  the  sea;  sec- 
ondly, he  said  the  party  (it  may 
be)  might  have  prevented  it  by 
vigilancy  or  by  making  resist- 
ance; and  so  it  may  be  it  was  his 
own  fault  the  ship  was  taken; 
thirdly,  the  men  of  war  that  took 
the  ship  were  peradventure  Eng- 
lishmen, and  then  the  defendant 
is  not  to  be  excused,  for  he  may 
have  his  remedy  for  what  he  is 
damnified  against  them;  and  ci- 
ted 33  H.  6,  fol.  1,  and  prayed 
judgment  for  the  plaintiff.  Hale 
(Sir  Matthew  Hale),  of  counsel 
with  the  defendant,  held  that  to 
be  taken  and  robbed  by  pirates 
is  a  danger  of  the  sea,  even  3.^ 
tempestuous  winds  and  shelfs 
and  rocks  are;  and  secondly,  to 
that  it  is  said  the  pirates  may  be 
Englishmen;  we  are  not  able  to 
say  of  what  nation  they  were, 
and  therefore  our  plea  is  good  in 
that  point  also;  and  prayed  judg- 
ment for  the  defendant.  Roll, 
justice,    said     it    was    not     well 


328  THE   LAW    OF    CARRIERS.  [§317. 

Sec.  317.  (§  206.)  Same  subject — Rebellion— Revolution.— 
But  rebellion  may  grow  into  revolution  and  assume  the  propor- 
tions of  a  war  which  may  entitle  those  in  revolt  to  the  acknowl- 
edgment of  belligerent  rights  from  other  nations.  In  such  cases 
carriers  of  either  belligerent  would  stand  in  the  relation  of  pub- 
lic enemy  to  the  other  and  would  be  entitled  to  the  protection 
of  the  rule  which  exonerates  them  from  losses  by  the  public 
enemy.  Such  was  the  case  of  our  Revolutionary  war,  and  so  it 
has  been  held  of  the  various  revolts  of  the  Spanish  colonies  in 
America.15  And  where  hostilities  between  the  people  of  two  sec- 
tions of  the  same  country  became  so  serious  and  flagrant  as  to 
acquire  the  character  of  a  war,  and  the  combatants  treat  each 
other  as  enemies  with  a  recognition  of  belligerent  rights,  they 
are  public  enemies  within  the  meaning  of  this  exception.  Such 
was  the  late  war  between  the  United  States  government  and 
what  were  called  the  Confederate  States,  which  attempted  to 
secede  from  it.^^  Several  cases  involving  the  liability  of  the 
carrier  where  the  goods  intrusted  to  him  w^re  lost  by  capture 
by  the  contending  military  forces  in  that  contest  have  come  be- 
fore the  courts.  During  the  war  it  was  brought  directly  to  the 
consideration  of  the  supreme  court  of  Kentucky  in  the  case  of 
Bland  v.  The  Adams  Express  Company.^'''  Goods  intrusted  to 
that  company  for  carriage  had  been  forcibly  taken  from  it  by 
what  were  known  as  Confederate  soldiers,  in  arms  against  the 

pleaded  to  say  per  homines  igno-  be   brought   into   court   to   satisfy 

tos.      Bacon,    justice,    said:      The  the   court  viva   voce   Friday   next 

defendant  doth  not  show  that  he  following.     Judgment    was    given 

and  his  ship  was  carried  per  locos  this   term,   nil    capiat   per    billam, 

incognitos,     as     he    should     have  because  the  taking  by  pirates  are 

shown.     But     Roll,     justice,     an-  accompted  perils  of  the  seas, 

swered   that   it   may   be   the   ship  15.  United    States   v.    Palmer,    3 

is   yet  kept   upon   the   sea,   but   I  Wheat.  610;  Mauran  v.  Ins.  Co.,  G 

suppose  that  pirates  are  perils  of  Wall.   1;   Nesbitt  v.  Lushington,  4 

the    sea;    and    to    this    purpose     a  Term,    783. 

certificate  of  merchants  was  read  16.  The    Prize    Cases,    2    Black, 

in    court,    that   they    were    so     es-  635;   Thorington  v.  Smith,  8  Wall, 

teemed     among     merchants.     Yet  1;     Nashville,    etc.,    R.    R.    Co.    v. 

the  court  desired  to  have  Granly,  Estes,   10  Lea,  747. 

the  master  of  the  Trinity   House,  17.  1    Duvall,    232. 
'and  other  sufficient  merchants,  to 


§318.]  WHEN   CARRIER  NOT  LIABLE.  329 

government,  and  this  fact  was  relied  upon  iu  its  defense  in  the 
suit  to  recover  for  the  loss.  Robertson,  C.  J.,  considered  the 
defense  valid.  ' '  War, ' '  said  he,  ' '  is  either  international  or  civil, 
foreign  or  domestic.  Insurrection,  however  violent  or  formid- 
able, is  not  war.  Civil  war  is  preceded  by  insurrection,  which 
becomes  magnified  and  matured  into  war  iu  the  legitimate  sense. 
And  when  so  characterized,  the  parties  are  belligerents  and  re- 
spectively entitled  to  belligerent  rights.  "^^  j^  -pj^g  Southern 
Express  Company  v.  Womack,i^  the  facts  were  the  same,  except 
that  the  relations  of  the  carrier  and  the  captors  were  reversed, 
the  latter  being  in  this  instance  the  troops  of  the  government; 
and  it  was  held  that,  whatever  might  have  been  the  political  re- 
lations in  w^iich  the  parties  stood  to  each  other  as  an  abstract 
proposition,  the  fact  that  those  upon  either  side  of  the  dividing 
line  were  engaged  in  flagrant  war  and  treated  each  other  as  ene- 
mies necessarily  made  them  public  enemies  in  the  understanding 
of  the  contracting  parties,  and  the  carrier  was  not  therefore  to 
be  regarded  as  an  insurer  against  loss  that  might  occur  by  the 
act  of  the  hostile  forces.  And  it  has  been  held  that  the  Confed- 
erate forces  were  neither  robbers  on  land  nor  pirates  at  sea.^o 
A  different  opinion,  however,  has  been  expressed  by  the  supreme 
court  of  Maine. -^ 

Sec.  318.     (§207.)     Same  subject — Declaration  of  war  not 

necessary  if  actual  hostilities  exist. — It  is  not  necessary,  to  con- 
stitute the  relation  of  public  enemy  between  the  carrier  and  his 
captors,  that  there  should  be  an  open  declaration  of  war  between 
the  two  countries  to  which  they  belong.  The  existence  of  actual 
hostilities  is  sufficient  to  constitute  the  relation  of  public  ene- 
mies, and  all  persons  within  the  respective  hostile  territories  are 
enemies  of  each  other,  whether  in  arms  or  not,  and  whatever 
may  be  their  personal  dispositions  towards  the  contending  par- 
ties.22 

18.  Frank    v.    Keith,     2     Bush,     St.    166;    Mauran    v.    Ins.    Co.,    6 
123;    Lewis    v.    Ludwick,    6    Cold.     Wall.   1. 

368.  21.  51    Me.    465. 

19.  1  Heisk.  256;   ante,  §   303.  22.  The    Prize   Cases,     2     Black, 

20.  Fifield  v.  Ins.   Co.,  47  Penn.     635;    Alexander's   Cotton,    2   Wall. 

404. 


330  THE   LAW   OF    CARRIERS.  [§319. 

Sec.  319.  (§  208.)  Carrier  liable  if  loss  by  public  enemy 
caused  by  his  negligence  or  deviation. — The  same  qualificatiou 
exists  in  reference  to  the  exemption  of  the  carrier  from  loss  by 
the  act  of  an  enemy  as  has  already  been  stated  in  regard  to  a 
loss  by  the  act  of  God ;  that  is,  that  in  order  to  be  available  as  a 
defense  it  must  not  appear  that  the  carrier  has  been  guilty  of 
negligence  or  temerity  in  not  avoiding  or  in  bringing  about  the 
capture.  If  in  the  course  of  deviation  he  be  captured  and  the 
goods  be  lost,  he  is  responsible;  for,  as  has  been  said,  the  law 
will  trace  back  the  loss  to  the  first  fault  to  which  it  is  attributa- 
ble. Parker  v.  James-^  was  this  very  case  of  a  capture  in  the 
course  of  a  deviation,  and  yet,  as  said  by  Tindall,  C.  J.,  in  Davis 
V.  Garrett,^'*  no  such  ground  of  defense  was  even  suggested.  So 
if  he  were  to  land  upon  the  enemy's  coast;  or,  being  aware  of 
his  proximity,  made  no  effort  to  escape  or  took  no  precautions 
to  avoid  him;  or  if,  having  the  choice  of  two  routes,  he  took 
that  which  was  the  more  dangerous  ;2^  or  if  he  exposed  them  to 
capture  by  an  inexcusable  or  unreasonable  delay.^^ 

Sec.  320.  Same  subject — May  carrier  show  that  loss  would 
have  happened  without  his  negligence  or  deviation. — But  sup- 
pose there  has  been  a  deviation  or  delay  or  negligence  of  any 
other  kind  on  the  part  of  the  carrier,  and  the  goods  are  de- 
stroyed by  an  act  of  God  or  of  the  public  enemy  while  such  devi- 
ation, delay  or  other  cause  resulting  from  his  negligence  is  still 
operative,  and  which,  without  more  being  shown,  would  compel 
him  to  bear  the  loss,  would  it  be  competent  for  him  to  show  that 
such  loss  would  have  occurred  in  any  event  and  though  he  had 
not  committed  the  fault  or  been  guilty  of  the  negligence?  Sup- 
pose, for  instance,  that  he  has  unnecessarily  deviated  from  the 
usual  and  proper  route,  which  has  caused  delay,  or  that,  with- 
out deviating,  he  has  improperly  delayed  upon  his  journey,  or 
has  failed  for  an  unreasonable  time  to  put  the  goods  in  transit, 
and  during  such  deviation  or  the  delay  caused  thereby,  or  that 

23.  4  Camp.  112.  26.  Southern     Express     Co.     v. 

24.  6   Bing.    716.  Womack,    1    Heisk.   256;    Holladay 

25.  Express    Co.    v.  Kountze,    8     v.  Kennard,  12  Wall.  254. 
Wall.    342. 


§  320.]  WHEN   CARRIER  NOT  LIABLE.  331 

upon  any  part  of  his  route  after  the  improper  delay  or  failure 
to  ship  the  goods  in  reasonable  time,  they  are  lost  by  a  flood  or 
a  tempest,  would  he  be  permitted  to  show  that  the  same  loss 
would,  in  all  human  probability,  have  occurred  or  must  have  oc- 
curred even  had  he  done  his  whole  duty,  and  thus  bring  himself 
within  the  benefit  of  the  exception  of  the  acts  of  God  ?  It  is  cer- 
tain that  it  will  be  no  answer  to  the  action  to  say  that  the  loss 
might  have  occurred  even  if  there  had  been  no  deviation,  delay, 
disobedience  of  instructions,  or  other  fault  or  carelessness  on 
his  part.  In  Davis  v.  Garrett,^^  as  we  have  seen,  the  contention 
was  that  the  deviation  by  the  master  of  the  vessel  was  not  a 
cause  of  the  loss  sufficiently  proximate  to  entitle  the  plaintiff  to 
recover,  inasmuch  as  the  loss  might  have  been  occasioned  by  the 
same  tempest  if  the  vessel  had  proceeded  in  her  direct  course. 
The  answer  to  this  was  that  no  wrong-doer  can  be  allowed  to  ap- 
portion or  qualify  his  own  wrong,  and  that  as  a  loss  had  actually 
happened  whilst  his  wrongful  act  was  in  operation  and  force, 
and  which  was  attributable  to  his  wrongful  act,  he  could  not 
set  up  as  an  answer  to  the  action  the  bare  possibility  of  a  loss 
if  his  wrongful  act  had  never  been  done.  "It  might  admit  of  a 
different  construction,"  it  was  said,  "if  he  could  show  not  only 
that  the  same  loss  might  have  happened  but  that  it  must  have 
happened  if  the  act  complained  of  had  not  been  done." 

Sec.  321.  (§210.)  Same  subject. — But  can  it  ever  be  made 
certain  that  the  same  loss  would  have  happened  if  there  had 
been  no  deviation  or  delay?  It  certainly  cannot  be  predicated 
of  any  voyage  that  it  is  the  same  as  if  it  had  been  commenced 
at  a  different  time,  or  that,  notwithstanding  a  deviation,  it  is 
the  same  that  it  would  have  been ;  or  that  the  goods  transported 
in  a  certain  way  or  at  a  certain  time  would  have  been  exposed  to 
exactly  the  same  dangers  to  which  they  were  exposed  when 
transported  in  another  way  or  at  another  time.  It  is  impossible 
to  say  with  certainty  that  every  circumstance  of  time,  place, 
weather  and  exposure  to  peril  of  every  kind  would  have  been 
the  same,  and  the  question  whether  they  would  have  been  must 

27.  6  Bing.  716;   ante,   §295. 


332  THE   LAW    OF    CARRIERS.  [§  322. 

necessarily  be  one  of  speculation,  with  more  or  less  approach  to 
certainty  according  to  circumstances.  Hence  it  has  been  held 
that  deviation  (and  for  that  purpose  delay  is  deviation)  abso- 
lutely discharges  the  insurer  from  his  obligation.  ' '  If  the  chance 
is  varied  or  the  voyage  altered  by  the  fault  of  the  owner  or 
master  of  the  ship,  the  insurer  ceases  to  be  liable.  "^^  If,  there- 
fore, the  owner  of  the  goods  has  insured  them  against  loss  by 
the  act  of  God  or  the  public  enemy,  and  loses  the  benefit  of  his 
policy  by  the  fault  or  negligence  of  the  carrier,  the  latter  must 
make  good  to  him  his  loss ;  and  if,  instead  of  insuring,  he 
chooses  to  take  upon  himself  the  risk  of  such  losses,  the  carrier 
would  seem  to  be  liable  to  him  upon  the  same  principle.  The 
exact  question,  however,  seems  never  to  have  been  settled  by  the 
authorities.^^ 

Sec.  322.    (§  210a.)    Effect  of  v^^ar  on  contract  of  carriage. — 

Another  excuse  which  the  law  allows  the  carrier  for  the  non-per- 
formance of  his  contract  for  the  transportation  of  the  goods 
should  be  here  alluded  to.  If  after  having  entered  into  such  a 
contract,  hostilities  should  commence  between  his  country  and 
that  to  which  the  goods  are  to  be  carried,  it  would  operate  as  a 
legal  prohibition  upon  its  execution  and  its  non-performance 
would  of  course  be  excused.  The  object  of  belligerents  being  to 
cripple  each  other's  commerce,  war  of  itself  operates  as  an  inter- 
diction of  commercial  intercourse,  and  will  dissolve  all  contracts 
of  affreightment  for  the  carriage  of  goods  from  one  to  the  other. 
And  this  will  be  the  effect  without  any  formal  declaration  of 
war.30     But  this  does  not  relieve  the  carrier  from  his  duty  to 

28.  Lord    Mansfield    in    Pelly    v.  United   States,   15  Wall.   395;   Uni- 
Royal,  etc..  Ass.  Co.,  1  Burr.  341.  ted    States    v.    Grossmayer,    9     id. 

29.  Story  on  Bail.  §  413d.  73;    The  United   States  v.   Lapene. 

30.  The    Prize    Cases,    2    Black,  17  id.  601;  Mitchell  v.  The  United 
635;    The  Teutonia,  L.  R.   3  Adm.  States,  21  id.  350. 

394;     Esposito    v.    Bowden,    7    El.         But    a    declaration    of    war    will 

&  Bl.  762;   4  id.  963;   Reid  v  Hos-  not    dissolve    a    shipping    contract 

kins,    5    id.    729;    s.   c.    6   id.    953;  between  domestic  ports.  It  is  only 

Baker  tJ.  Hodgson,  3  M.  &  Sel.  267;  where    hostilities    exist     between 

Griswold       v.       Waddington,       16  the   country   to   which    the   vessel 

Johns.    438;    Montgomery    v.    The  belongs  and  the  country  for  which 


§323.]  WHEN  CARRIER  NOT  LIABLE.  333 

preserve  the  goods  for  the  owner ;  and  if  the  restraint  be  merely 
temporary,  as  an  embargo,  the  contract  will  not  be  dissolved, 
and  after  its  removal  must  be  performed  as  though  it  had  not 
intervened.^^ 

Sec.  323.  Same  subject — Contraband  goods. — If  the  goods 
accepted  for  transportation  are  consigned  to  a  point  in  a  coun- 
try between  which  and  another  country  hostilities  are  threat- 
ened, and  war  is  later  declared,  the  fact  that  the  goods  are  con- 
traband of  war,  and  that  to  proceed  to  destination  would  sub- 
ject them  to  seizure  and  confiscation,  will  justify  the  carrier  in 
refusing  to  proceed  further  on  the  journey  and  excuse  him  from 
a  performance  of  the  contract  of  carriage.  And  if  he  have  on 
board  the  goods  of  other  shippers,  and  such  goods  are  not  con- 
traband of  war,  he  may,  in  order  to  be  able  to  proceed  safely  to 
destination,  unload  the  contraband  goods;  and  if  proper  pre- 
cautions are  taken  with  respect  to  their  safe  keeping,  he  will  not 
thereby  incur  liability .^^ 


IV.  CARRIER  NOT  LIABLE  FOR  LOSSES  FROM  THE 
ACTS  OF  THE  PUBLIC  AUTHORITY. 

Sec.  324.  (§  210b.)  Carrier  protected  if  loss  caused  by  pub- 
lic authority.  Like  every  other  person,  the  carrier  is  bound, 
both  by  duty  and  necessity,  to  respect  and  yield  to  the  para- 
mount public  authority  in  power  at  the  place  where  his  under- 
taking is  to  be  performed.33  If,  therefore,  without  his  fault  or 
neglect,  the  goods  are  lost  or  injured  by  the  act  or  mandate  of 

it  is  bound  that  such  a  result  en-  Fed.  72S,  41   C.  C.  A.  639,  revers- 

sues.      Graves    v.    Steamship    Co.,  ing  93   Fed.   474. 

29  Misc.  Rep.  645,  61  N.  Y.  Supp.  33.  But     the     voluntary      relin- 

1]5.  quishment   of  vessels  to  the    gov- 

31.  Hadley  v.  Clarke,  8  T.  R.  ernment  in  time  of  war  will  not 
259;  Bork  i'.  Norton,  2  McLean,  dissolve  contracts  of  affreight- 
422.  ment.      Governmental    compulsion 

32.  Nobel's  Explosives  Co.  v.  may  excuse  performance  but  the 
Jenkins,  2  Q.  B.  (1896)  326,  65  voluntary  act  of  the  carrier  can- 
L.   J.   Q.   B.   638;    The   Styria,   101  not    have    that    effect.      Graves    v. 


334  THE  LAW   OF   CARRIERS.  [§  325. 

the  public  authority,  the  carrier  should  be  excused,  and  such  is 
the  rule  of  law.    Thus — 

Sec.  325.  (§  210c.)  Same  subject — Destruction  or  injury 
under  police  power. — If  the  goods,  without  his  fault,  are  or 
become  obnoxious  to  the  requirements  of  the  police  power  of 
the  state,  and  are  injured  or  destroyed  by  its  authority,  as  in  the 
case  of  the  seizure  or  destruction  of  goods  infected  with  con- 
tagious diseases,  or  of  intoxicating  liquors  intended  for  use  or 
sale  in  violation  of  law,  the  carrier  cannot  be  held  liable.^*  But 
the  officer  seizing  the  goods  must  be  vested  with  the  proper  legal 
authority  to  do  so.  If,  therefore,  he  seize  them  without  the 
proper  legal  process,  he  will  be  a  mere  trespasser  and  the  car- 
rier will  be  liable  for  his  act.^^ 

Sec.  326.    (§  210d.)    Same  subject — Confederate  authority. — 

As  in  the  case  of  a  loss  by  the  public  enemy ,^6  it  is  sufficient  for 
the  protection  of  the  carrier  under  this  rule  that  the  loss  was  by 
the  act  or  mandate  of  the  paramount  public  authority  at  the 
time  being.  Thus  the  destruction  of  property  by  the  act  of  the 
Confederate  government  in  a  state  subject  to  its  authority  was 
held  to  excuse  the  carrier  from  his  liablity.^'^ 

Sec.  327.  (§  210e.)  Same  subject — Seizure  under  legal  pro- 
cess.— Within  the  same  line  and  for  the  same  reasons,  the 
carrier  will  be  excused  if  the  goods  are  taken  from  him  by  legal 
process  against  the  owner — a  subject  which  will  hereafter  be 
more  fully  discussed.^s  g^ys  Campbell,  C.  J.:  "Whatever  may 
be  a  carrier 's  duty  to  resist  a  forcible  seizure  without  process,  he 
cannot  be  compelled  to  assume  that  regular  process  is  illegal 
and  to  accept  all  the  consequences  of  resisting  officers  of  the 

Steamship  Co.,  29  Misc.  645,  61  N.  Railway  Co.  v.  Heymann,  118  Ga. 

Y.   Supp.   115.  616,    45    S.    B.    Rep.    491,    citing 

34.  Wells    V.    Steamship    Co.,     4  Hutchinson   on   Carr. 

Cliff.   228;    Bliven  v.  Railroad,   35  35.  Bennett    v.    Express    Co.,    83 

Barb.  191,  36  N.  Y.  407.     See,  also.  Me.  236,  22  Atl.  Rep.  159. 

Kidd  V.  Pearson,  128  U.  S.  1;   Li-  36.  See  ante,  §  317. 

cense  Cases,   5   How.   504;   Mugler  37.  Nashville,    etc.,    R.     Co.      v. 

V.    Kansas,    123    U.    S.    623;    Rail-  Estes,  10  Lea,  747. 

road  Co.  v.  Husen,  95  U.  S.  465;  38.  See  post,  §  738  et  seq. 


§  328.]  WHEN  CARRIER  NOT  LLVBLE.  335 

law.  If  he  is  excusable  for  yielding  to  a  public  enemy,  he  can- 
not be  at  fault  for  yielding  to  actual  authority  what  he  may 
yield  to  usurped  authority. ' '  ^^ 

To  entitle  the  carrier  to  protection  under  this  rule,  however, 
the  process  must  be  at  least  fair  upon  its  face,'*'^  and  must  be 
issued  against  the  owner  of  the  goods.'*^ 


V.  CARRIER  NOT  LIABLE  FOR  LOSSES  CAUSED  BY 
ACT  OF  THE  OWNER  OF  THE  GOODS. 

Sec.  328.  (§211.)  Exception  to  liability  on  the  ground  of 
the  fraud  of  the  owner  of  the  goods. — As  has  been  seen,  the 
rule  so  often  repeated  as  to  have  gro"wn  into  a  maxim,  that  the 
carrier  without  any  limitation  of  his  liability  by  contract  can 
be  excused  only  by  the  act  of  God  or  of  the  king's  enemy,  is  not 
strictly  accurate,  inasmuch  as  it  fails  to  include,  among  other 
losses  already  considered,  those  arising  from  the  fraud  or  fault 
of  the  owner  of  the  goods.  It  has  often  been  decided  that  losses 
so  caused  do  not  fall  upon  the  carrier  but  must  be  borne  by  the 
owner  himself.  Fraud  vitiates  and  annuls  all  contracts;  and 
if  the  owner  of  the  goods  has  by  his  own  imprudence  or  med- 
dling brought  the  loss  upon  himself,  it  would  be  an  imputation 
upon  the  justice  of  the  law  to  say  that  it  should  be  borne  by 
another.  It  is  an  elementary  principle  that  every  man  must 
bear  the  consequences  of  his  own  fraud  and  folly,  and  there  is 
no  reason  for  an  exception  to  the  rule  as  between  the  carrier 
and  his  employer.  It  was  notwithstanding  held  in  one  of  the 
earliest  cases  reported  upon  the  subject  of  the  liability  of  the 
carrier  that  he  was  responsible,  although  the  owner  of  the  goods 
had  practiced  a  gross  fraud  upon  him  by  representing  a  box 
delivered  for  carriage  as  containing  only  a  book  and  some 
tobacco  when  in  fact  it  contained  also  a  large  amount  of  money. 
The  box  was  lost,  and  Rolle,  J.,  held  that  as  the  carrier  had  not 

39.  In   Pingree   v.   Railroad   Co.,        40.  See  post,  §  742. 
66  Mich.  143.  41.  See  post,    §    741. 


336  THE   LAW    OP    CARRIERS.  [§  329. 

made  a  special  acecptanee  of  the  box,  he  was  liable  for  the  loss 
of  the  money. 

Sec.  329.  (§  212.)  Same  subject. — But  in  a  similar  case,  in 
which  the  attempt  was  made  to  hold  the  carrier  liable  for  money 
delivered  to  him  concealed  in  a  bag  filled  with  hay,  although  he 
had  given  notice  that  he  would  not  be  liable  for  money  or  valu- 
ables unless  notice  was  given  that  they  were  contained  in  the 
package  delivered  to  him  to  be  carried,  and  with  the  payment  of 
a  higher  price  for  the  carriage  accordingly,  the  object  of  the 
owner  of  the  money  being  of  course  to  impose  upon  and  cheat 
the  carrier,  and  by  practicing  a  deceit  to  have  the  money  carried 
without  paying  the  price  which  he  was  entitled  to.  Lord  Mans- 
field could  not  agree  with  the  ruling  of  Rolle,  and  held  that  the 
plaintiff  could  not  recover  because  of  the  fraud.^  And  this 
opinion  has  been  followed  in  numerous  cases  since  that  time  both 
in  this  country  and  in  England.^ 

Sec.  330.  (§213.)  Same  subject — Neglect  or  failure  to  dis- 
close contents  or  value. — Fraud  may  be  as  effectually  practiced 
upon  the  carrier  by  silence  as  by  a  positive  and  express  misrep- 
resentation. A  neglect  or  failure  to  disclose  the  real  value  of  a 
package  and  the  nature  of  its  contents,  if  there  be  anything  in 
its  form,  dimensions  or  other  outward  appearance  which  is  cal- 
culated to  throw  the  carrier  off  his  guard,  whether  so  designed 
or  not,  will  be  conduct  amounting  to  a  fraud  upon  him.  The 
intention  to  impose  upon  him  is  not  material.  It  is  enough  if 
such  is  the  practical  effect  of  the  conduct  of  the  shipper,  as  if  a 
box  or  package,  whether  designedly  or  not,  is  so  disguised  as  to 
cause  it  to  resemble  such  a  box  or  package  as  usually  contains 
articles  of  little  or  no  value,  whereby  the  carrier  is  misled.  For 
by  such  deception  the  carrier  is    thrown    off    his    guard,  and 

1.  Gibbon  v.  Paynton,  4  Burr,  rati,  1  East,  604;  Southern  Ex. 
2298.  Co.    V.    Everett,    37    Ga.    688;    The 

2.  Batson  r.  Donovan,  4  B.  &  Ionic,  5  Blatch.  538;  Phillips  v. 
Aid.  21;  Crouch  r.  Railway  Co.,  Earle,  8  Pick.  182;  The  St.  Cuth- 
14    C.    B.    255;    Relf    r.    Rapp,     3  bert,   97   Fed.   340. 

Watts  &  S.  21;    Edwards  r.   Sher- 


§331.]  WHEN   CARRIER   NOT  LIABLE.  337 

neglects  to  give  to  the  package  the  care  and  attention  which  he 
would  have  given  it  had  he  known  its  actual  value.^ 

Sec.  331.  (§214.)  Same  subject — Extent  of  carrier's  liabil- 
ity.— And  if,  under  such  circumstances,  money  or  other  valu- 
ables, concealed  in  a  package,  be  lost  by  his  negligence  or  care- 
lessness, it  would  be  unjust  to  charge  him  with  their  full  value, 
because  such  concealment  would  be  a  fraud  upon  him  as  respects 
his  compensation  for  the  carriage,  and  a  deception  as  to  the  de- 
gree of  care  which  the  package  required  and  with  which  he 
would  have  guarded  it  had  he  been  told  the  truth;  as  where 
money  or  jewels  or  other  articles  of  great  value  are  put  into  a 
valise  or  box  which  is  generally  used  to  contain  things  of  com- 
paratively small  value,  and  delivery  made  to  the  carrier  without 
informing  him  of  the  contents,  there  being  nothing  in  the  ap- 
pearance of  the  valise  or  box  to  indicate  or  to  apprise  the  car- 
rier that  it  was  of  more  than  ordinary  value,  it  would  be  an 
imposition  upon  him,  and  the  law  will  not  lend  its  aid  in  such  a 
case  to  make  him  accountable  for  the  money  or  other  valuable 
contents  if  they  should  be  lost.^ 

3.  See     post,     H     795,     425-441;  rier  from  liability  on   account  of 

Warner  v.  The  \V.  T.  Co.,  5  Robt.  the    loss    or     destruction     of     the 

(N.  Y.)  490;  Orange  County  Bank  contents.     Express   Co.    v.    Wood, 

V.  Brown,  9  Wend.    85;    Pardee  v.  98  Ga.  268,  25  S.  E.  Rep.  436. 

Drew,   25   Wend.   459;    Shaacht   v.  4.  Chicago,   etc.,   R.    R.     Co.    v. 

Railroad  Co.,  94  Tenn.  658,  :!0   S.  Thompson,   19   111.   578;    Oppenhei- 

W.  Rep.  742,  28  L.  R.   A.   176,  ci-  mer  th   The  U.   S.   Ex.   Co.,  69   id. 

ting    Hutchinson    on    Carr.      Bot-  62;    Chicago,   etc.,  R.   R.   t'.   Shea, 

turn  V.  Railway  Co.,  —  S.  Car.  — ,  66    id.    471;    Hayes    v.    Wells,    23 

51  S.  E.  Rep.  985,  citing  Hutchin-  Cal.  185;   Southern  Ex.  Co.  v.  Ev- 

son  on  Carr.  erett,    37   Ga.    688;    Houston,   etc., 

The     silence     of     the     shipper  R.    Co.    v.    Burke,     55     Tex.     323; 

touching  the  character  and  value  Magnin   v.    Dinsmore,     56     N.     Y. 

of   goods   contained   in   a  package  168;    62   id.   35;    70   id.   410;    Gor- 

which   does   not   indicate   that   its  ham  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Fargo,   35   N.  Y. 

contents   are  of  great  or   unusual  Super.    434;    Michalitschke    v.   Ex- 
value,   may,   even    in   the   absence  press   Co.,   118   Cal.   683,    50    Pac. 

of   an   inquiry   by   the   carrier   or  Rep.   847.     But  see  Rice  v.  Rail- 

of   an   actual   intent  by   the   ship-  road  Co.,  3  Mo.  App.  37. 

per   to    defraud,    absolve    the    car- 

22 


338  THE   LAW    OF    Cx\RRIERS.  [§  332. 

Sec.  332.  (§215.)  Same  subject — Illustrations. — A  leading 
case  upon  this  subject  is  that  of  Orange  County  Bank  v.  Brown,^ 
which  was  an  action  against  the  owners  of  a  steamboat  for  the 
loss  of  a  trunk  belonging  to  a  passenger.  It  was  proven  that 
the  trunk  contained  a  large  amount  of  money,  of  which  no 
notice  was  given  to  any  of  the  officers  of  the  boat,  and  for  the 
carriage  of  which  no  remuneration  was  paid  to  the  carrier  at 
all  commensurate  with  its  value.  It  was  contended  for  the  plain- 
tiff that,  notwithstanding  these  facts,  the  defendants  were  liable, 
by  the  strict  rules  of  the  common  law  in  regard  to  the  responsi- 
bility of  carriers,  for  the  full  value  of  the  trunk  including  the 
money  it  contained.  It  was  admitted  by  the  learned  judge  who 
delivered  the  opinion  in  the  case  that  no  notice  having  been 
given  limiting  their  liability  or  imposing  any  conditions  upon 
the  owner  of  the  goods  to  disclose  their  value,  it  became  their 
duty,  if  they  desired  to  be  informed  of  such  value,  to  make  in- 
quiry, which  the  owner  would  be  bound  to  answer  truly  at  his 
peril ;  and,  having  accepted  the  goods  for  carriage  without  seek- 
ing such  information  and  without  qualification,  they  would  be 
presumptively  liable  as  common  carriers  upon  common-law  prin- 
ciples for  their  full  value.  But  it  was  further  said  that  if  any 
means  were  used  to  conceal  the  value  of  the  article,  and  thereby 
the  owner  avoids  paying  a  reasonable  compensation  for  the  risk, 
such  unfairness  and  its  consequences  to  the  defendants,  upon 
principles  of  common  justice  as  well  as  those  peculiar  to  this 
action,  would  exempt  them  from  the  responsibility;  for  such  a 
result  would  be  alike  due  to  the  defendants  who  have  received 
no  reward  for  the  risk  and  to  the  party  who  has  been  the  cause 
of  it  by  means  of  disingenuous  and  unfair  dealing.  It  was 
therefore  held  that  the  delivery  of  the  trunk  without  any  infor- 
mation as  to  its  more  than  ordinarily  valuable  contents,  inducing 
the  impression  that  it  contained  only  the  ordinary  baggage  of  a 
passenger,  and  with  the  failure  to  compensate  the  carriers  for 
their  extraordinary  risk,  was  a  fraud  upon  them,  and  that  the 
plaintiff  could  not  recover.    And  in  the  case  of  Shaacht  v.  The 

5.  9    Wend.    85. 


§  333.]  WHEN   CARRIER  NOT  LIABLE.  339 

Railroad,*^  the  plaintiff  delivered  to  the  defendant's  agent,  to- 
gether with  other  freight,  a  basket  containing  a  quantity  of 
silverware  and  other  material  intended  for  use  in  business  at 
destination.  The  basket  was  covered  and  tied  and  had  the  gen- 
eral appearance  of  containing  only  household  goods.  The  de- 
fendant's agent  on  receiving  the  goods  cried  out  to  his  assist- 
ant that  the  goods  were  household  goods,  and  the  plaintiff,  who 
was  standing  nearby,  heard  the  remark  but  said  nothing.  The 
goods  were  sent  forward  by  freight  and  the  rate  charged  was  a 
fourth  class  freight  rate,  which  was  the  usual  charge  for  carry- 
ing household  goods.  When  the  goods  arrived  at  destination,  the 
basket  and  its  contents  were  missing.  It  was  held  that  the  action 
of  the  plaintiff  in  remaining  silent  and  assenting  to  the  state- 
ment that  the  basket  contained  household  goods,  as  well  as  the 
manner  in  which  the  goods  were  packed,  was  a  constructive,  if 
not  an  actual,  fraud  on  the  carrier,  and  that  the  plaintiff  could 
not  therefore  recover. 

Sec.  333.    (§  216.)    Exception  to  liability  in  case  of  loss  from 
the  intermeddling  or  mistake  of  the  owner  of  the  goods. — So 

where  the  owner  of  the  goods  has  accompanied  them  and  has 
meddled  with  them  while  in  the  carrier's  custody,'^  cr  has  under- 
taken to  direct  how  they  shall  be  carried;*  or  has  unskilfully 
packed  or  loaded  them;''  or  has  negligently  performed  his  un- 

6.  94  Tenn.   658,   30   S.  W.  Rep.  ded     by    the    carrier     for     stock 
742,  28  L.  R.  A.  176.  awaiting  transportation,   and   neg- 

7.  As  where,  without  the  car-  ligently  fails  to  secure  a  gate  to 
Tier's  knowledge,  the  owner  of  a  the  pen,  and  in  consequence  the 
horse  in  transportation  left  a  stock  escape,  the  carrier  is  not 
car  window  open  through  which  liable.  Railway  Co.  v.  Law,  68 
the  horse  escaped  and  was  killed  Ark.  218,  57  S.  W.  Rep.  258. 
(Hutchinson  v.  Railway  Co.,  37  8.  As  where  the  owner  selects 
Minn.  524);  and,  in  a  like  case,  his  own  place  and  disposes  of  his 
where  the  owner  insisted  upon  property  for  carriage  according  to 
having  the  car  door  left  open  and  his  own  ideas.  White  v.  Winnis- 
would  not  permit  the  carrier's  simmett  Co.,  7  Cush.  155;  Wilson 
servants  to  close  it.  Roderick  v.  v.  Hamilton,  4  Ohio  St.  722. 
Railroad  Co.,  7  W.  Va.   54.  9.  Rixford    v.    Smith,    52    N.    H. 

Where  the  shipper  of  live  stock     355;    Miltimore    v.    Railroad    Co., 
places   his   stock   in  a  pen   provi-    37  Wis.  190;  Ross  v.  Railroad  Co., 


340  THE   LAW   OF    CARRIERS,  [§  333. 

dertakings  in  respect  to  the  carriage  ;io  q^  j^^g  misdirected 
them/i  in  all  these  cases  the  carrier  will  be  exonerated  from 
all  liability  for  losses  which  result  from  such  intermeddling  or 
carelessness  of  the  owner.  So  it  has  been  held  that  where  a 
package  contains  articles  of  a  brittle  nature,  and  the  carrier 
is  not  informed  of  the  fact  or  in  any  way  cautioned  as  to  the 
degree  of  care  to  be  exercised  by  him  on  that  account,  he  will 
not  be  held  liable  for  any  damage  they  may  have  suffered  by 
breakage,  provided  he  has  handled  them  with  ordinary  care.^^ 
But  in  order  that  the  carrier  may  be  excused  where  the  fault  or 
mistake  of  the  owner  has  been  instrumental  in  causing  the  loss, 
he  himself  must  not  have  been  at  fault.  The  unaided  negli- 
gence of  the  owner,  where  it  occasions  the  loss,  will  preclude  him 
from  the  right  to  a  recovery.  But  if  the  carrier  himself  has  been 
guilty  of  some  negligent  act  or  omission  without  which,  not- 
withstanding the  fault  of  the  owner,  the  loss  would  not  have 
occurred,  he  will  be  liable.^" 

49   Vt.    364;    Klauber    v.    Express  Mo.  App.  — ,  92  S.  W.  Rep.  347. 
Co.,   21   Wis.   21;    Railway   Co.    v.  10.  Miltimore    v.    Railroad     Co., 
Klepper    (Tex.    Civ.    App.),   24    S.  supra;  Roderick  v.  Railroad    Co., 
W.   Rep.    567;    Payne   v.   Ralli,   74  supra;    Betts     r.     Farmers',     etc., 
Fed.   563;    Goodman  v.  Navigation  Co.,   21   Wis.   80;    Lee  v.  Railroad 
Co.,  22  Ore.   14,  28  Pac.  Rep.  894;  Co.,   72  N.  C.   236.     See,   also,  Bo- 
Cohn  V.  Piatt,  95  N.  Y.  Supp.  535,  hannon  v.  Hammond,  42  Cal.  227; 
48  Misc.  378.  Smith    v.    Smith,     2     Pick.     622; 
Where   the   owner  of  live  stock  Browuell  v.  Flagler,  5   Hill,   282. 
undertakes  to  load  the  stock  him-  11.  See  as  to   this,    §677;     Con- 
self,  he  cannot  recover  for  injury  gar  v.  Railroad  Co.,  24  Wis.   157; 
to  the  animals  caused  by  the  neg  Lake  Shore  R.  Co.  v.  Hodapp,   83 
ligent   manner   in   which   the   car  Penn.    St.    22. 
was  loaded.     Fordyce  v.  McFlynu.  12.  American   Ex.     Co.     v.     Per- 
5(3    Ark.   424,    19    S.   W.   Rep.    Ool ;  kins,    42    111.    458. 
Texas,  etc.,  Ry.  Co.  v.  Edins  (Tex.  13.  McCarthy    v.     Railroad     Co., 
Civ.    App.),    83    S.    W.    Rep.    253;  102  Ala.   193,   14   So.  Rep.   370,   48 
Ficklin  &  Son  v.  Railroad  Co.,  —  Am.    St.   Rep.    29. 


§  334.]  WHEN  CARRIER  NOT  LIABLE.  341 


VI.     CARRIER  NOT  LIABLE  FOR  LOSSES  CAUSED  BY. 
THE  INHERENT  NATURE  OF  THE  GOODS. 

Sec.  334.  (§  216a.)  Nature  of  the  exception.— So,  obviously, 
the  carrier,  if  not  himself  at  fault,  cannot  be  held  liable  for 
losses  which  have  been  caused  bj^  the  inherent  nature,  vice,  de- 
fect or  infirmity  of  the  goods  themselves,  as  in  the  case  of  decay, 
waste  or  deterioration  of  perishable  fruits,  the  evaporation  of 
liquids,  the  bursting  of  vessels  owing  to  the  fermentation  of 
their  contents,i^  the  natural  death  of  an  animal,  the  vicious  or 
uncontrollable  nature  of  live  stock,  and  the  like.^^  An  inter- 
esting case  on  the  subject  is  that  of  Lister  v.  The  Railway  Com- 
pany.^ *5  It  there  appeared  that  the  plaintiff  employed  the  de- 
fendant as  a  common  carrier  to  transport  an  engine  from  his 
yard  to  a  neighboring  station.  The  engine  was  on  wheels  and 
had  shafts  attached  by  which  it  could  be  drawn.  While  proceed- 
ing along  the  highway  one  of  the  shafts  broke,  causing  the 
horses  attached  to  the  engine  to  take  fright,  and  the  engine 
was  upset  and  damaged.  The  break  was  due  to  a  defect  in  the 
shaft,  which  could  not  have  been  discovered  by  any  ordinary  ex- 
amination. The  county  judge  decided  that  since  the  shaft  would 
not  have  been  broken  but  for  the  strain  put  upon  it  by  the  de- 
fendant's own  act,  its  defective  condition  was  no  excuse.  On 
appeal  this  decision  was  reversed.  Lord  Alverstone  saying:  "It 
may  be  that  if  there  is  no  evidence  of  intention  by  the  parties  ajs 
to  how  the  thing  is  to  be  carried,  and  there  are  alternative 

14.  Faucher  v.  Wilson,  68  N.  H.  r.  Wissman,  18  How.  231;  Cragiii 
338,  38  Atl.  Rep.  1002,  39  L.  R.  A.  r.  Railroad  Co.,  51  N.  Y.  61;  Ken- 
431.  dall    )'.   Railway   Co.,   L.   R.    7   Ex. 

15.  Louisville,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  373;  Cooper  v.  Railroad  Co.,  110 
Bigger,  66  Miss.  319;  Illinois  Ga.  659,  36  S.  E.  Rep.  240,  citing 
Cent.   R.   Co.   v.   Brelsford,   13   111.  Hutchinson  on  Carr. 

App.    251;    Warden     i\     Greer,     6  16.  1  K.  B.    (1903)    878,  72  L.  J. 

Watts,   424;    Swetland   r.   Railroad  K.  B.  385,  88  Law  T.  561,  52  Wkly. 

Co.,    102   Mass.    276;    Lawrence    r.  Rep.  12. 
Denbreens,  1  Black,  170;   Howard 


342  THE  LAW  OF   CARRIERS.  [§  335. 

modes  of  carriage,  one  of  which  will  give  play  to  an  inherent 
defect  in  the  thing  carried  and  the  other  of  which  will  not,  the 
carrier  will  be  responsible  if  he  adopts  the  former  mode  and 
damage  results  therefrom,  unless,  indeed,  the  adoption  of  the 
safer  mode  would  involve  the  taking  of  precautions  which  it 
would  be  altogether  unreasonable  to  require.  But  that  is  not 
the  case  here.  It  is  obvious  that  all  parties  intended  that  the 
engine  should  be  taken  to  the  station  on  its  own  wheels.  The 
county  court  judge,  in  thinking  that  the  rule  as  to  the  non- 
liability of  a  common  carrier  for  damage  caused  by  an  inherent 
defect  in  the  thing  carried,  was  limited  to  cases  in  which  the 
damage  would  equally  have  occurred  if  the  thing  had  not  been 
carried  at  all,  in  my  opinion  went  too  far. ' ' 


VII.     EXCEPTION  IN  THE  CASE  OF  LIVE  ANIMALS. 

Sec.  335.     (§217.)     Live  animals  not  regarded  as  goods. — 

The  exception  to  the  liability  of  the  carrier,  allowed  when  the 
subject  of  the  carriage  consists  of  living  animals,  deserves  fuller 
consideration.  It  would  of  course  be  unreasonable  to  impose 
upon  him  the  same  absolute  responsibility  for  the  safety  of  such 
animals  as  for  inanimate  goods.  It  has  indeed  been  very  much 
questioned  whether,  in  the  transportation  of  live  animals,  the 
carrier  can  be  considered  in  any  respect  as  undertaking  the  serv- 
ice as  a  common  carrier.  Live  stock,  though  the  subject  of  prop- 
erty, cannot  be  regarded  as  goods  in  the  carriage  of  which  the 
office  of  the  common  carrier  consists.  There  is  between  them 
and  the  ordinary  commodities  of  commerce,  in  the  transportation 
of  w^hich  the  common  carrier  is  principally  employed,  something 
of  the  same  difference  which  exists  betw^een  the  bale  of  inanimate 
goods  and  the  human  being  who  is  carried  neither  as  a  passenger 
nor  as  freight,  but  who,  "in  the  nature  of  things  and  in  his 
character,"  resembles  a  passenger,  and  not  a  package  of  goods, 
and  as  to  whom  the  responsibility  of  the  carrier  must  be  meas- 


§336.]  WHEN    CARRIER   NOT    LIABLE.  343 

ured  by  the  law  applicable  to  passengers  rather  than  by  that 
which  is  applicable  to  the  carriage  of  common  goods.^'^ 

Sec.  336.  (§  218.)  Difference  in  liability  based  on  inherent 
nature. — The  liability  of  the  common  carrier  of  animals,  it  is 
said,  is  essentially  different  from  that  of  the  carrier  of  mer- 
chandise or  of  inanimate  property.  While  common  carriers  are 
insurers  of  inanimate  goods  against  all  loss  and  damage  except 
such  as  is  inevitable  or  caused  by  public  enemies,  they  are  not 
insurers  of  animals  against  injuries  arising  from  their  nature 
and  propensities,  and  which  could  not  be  prevented  by  foresight, 
vigilance  and  care.^^  In  the  transportation  of  live  stock,  in  the 
absence  of  negligence,  the  carrier  is  relieved  from  responsibility 
for  such  injuries  as  occur  from  or  in  consequence  of  the  vitality 
of  the  freight.  He  does  not  absolutely  warrant  live  freight 
against  the  consequences  of  its  own  vitality.  Animals  may 
injure  or  destroy  themselves  or  each  other;  they  may  die  from 
fright  or  from  starvation,  or  they  may  die  from  heat  or  cold.  In 
all  cases,  therefore,  where  injuries  occur  by  reason  of  the  in- 
herent vices  or  natural  propensities  of  the  animals  themselves, 
the  carrier  is  relieved  from  responsibility  if  he  can  show  that  he 
has  provided  all  suitable  means  of  transportation,  and  exercised 
that  degree  of  care  which  the  nature  of  the  property  requires.^* 

17.  Boyce  v.  Anderson,  3  Pet.  Co.,  supra;  Waldron  v.  Fargo,  170 
150;  Williams  v.  Taylor,  4  Port.  N.  Y.  130,  62  N.  E.  Rep.  1077; 
234;  Clark  ads.  McDonald,  4  Mc-  Cooper  v.  Eaiiroad  Co.,  110  Ga. 
Cord,  223;  Lewis  v.  Railroad  Co.,  659,  36  S.  E.  Rep.  240,  citing 
70   N.   J.    Law,    132,    56    Atl.   Rep.  Hutchinson  on  Carr. 

128.  19-  Cragin   v.   The  Railroad,   51 

18.  Penn  v.  The  Railroad,  49  N.  N.  Y.  61;  Burke  v.  Express  Co., 
Y.  204;  Clark  v.  The  Railroad,  14  87  111.  App.  505;  s.  c.  94  111.  App. 
id.  570;  Mich.,  etc.,  R.  R.  v.  Mc-  29,  citing  Hutchinson  on  Carr. 
Donough,  21  Mich.  165;  Bissell  v.  Lackland  v.  Railway  Co.,  101  Mo. 
The  Railroad,  25  N.  Y.  442;  Smith  App.  420,  74  S.  W.  Rep.  505,  ci- 
V.  The  Railroad,  12  Allen,  531;  ting  Hutchinson  on  Carr.  Rail- 
Louisville,  etc.,  R.  Co.  V.  Bigger,  way  Co.  v.  Woodward,  164  Ind. 
66  Miss.  319;  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  360,  72  N.  E.  Rep.  558;  rehearing 
V.  Brelsford,  13  111.  App.  251;  Chi-  denied,  73  N.  E,  Rep.  810;  Coup- 
cago,  etc.,  Ry.  Co.  v.  Harmon,  12  land  v.  Railroad  Co.,  61  Conn.  531, 
111.    App.    54;    Lewis    v.    Railroad  23  Atl.  Rep.  870,  15  L.  R.  A.  534. 


344 


THE   LAW   OP    CARRIERS. 


[§337. 


And  the  opinion  has  been  frequently  expressed  that,  owing  to 
these  peculiarities  of  such  freight,  the  carrier  in  its  transporta- 
tion was  not  to  be  considered  as  assuming  the  responsibilities  of 
the  common  carrier,  and  that  it  was  always  competent  for  him 
to  make  his  own  terms  upon  which  he  would  consent  to  carry 
it.2o 

Sec,  337.     (§219.)     Same  subject. — The  question  was  some- 
what   discussed    in    the    case    of    Blower    v.    The    Railway,2i 


In  Boehl  v.  Railway  Co.,  44 
Minn.  191,  46  N.  W.  Rep.  333.  it 
is  said  by  Vanderburgh,  J.:  "Car- 
riers of  live  stock  are  liable  as 
common  carriers  for  damages  or 
injuries  thereto  arising  during 
the  transportation,  except  such 
as,  without  the  fault  or  negligence 
of  the  carrier,  result  from  the 
vitality  of  the  freight;  that  is  to 
say,  the  nature  and  propensity  of 
animals  to  injure  themselves  or 
each  other,  their  unruliness,  rest- 
iveness,  fright,  viciousness,  kick- 
ing, or  goring,  etc.  The  carrier 
is  relieved  from  liability  for  in- 
juries from  such  causes  if  he  has 
provided  suitable  means  of  trans- 
portation, and  exercised  that  de- 
gree of  care  which  the  nature  of 
the  property  requires,  or  has  not 
otherwise  contributed  to  the  in- 
jury. Of  course,  the  carrier  is 
relieved  from  special  care  and 
oversight  of  the  animals  where 
the  owner  or  agent  accompanies 
them  for  that  purpose.  Ang. 
Carr.  §214  et  seq.;  Hutch.  Carr. 
§  217;  Clarke  v.  Railroad  Co..  67 
Am.  Dec.  210;  Evans  v.  Railroad 
Co.,  Ill  Mass.  191;  3  Am.  &  Eng. 
Enc.  Law,  6;  Moulton  v  Railway 
Co.,  31  Minn.  8,5,  16  N.  W.  Rep. 
497;  2  Wait,  Act.  &  Def.  32.  But 
if     the     Injury    or    loss    arise    in 


whole  or  in  part  from  the  car- 
rier's negligence,  without  the 
fault  or  concurring  negligence  of 
the  owner  or  his  agent,  or  from 
extrinsic  causes  other  than  in- 
evitable accident,  the  carrier  is 
liable  as  in  other  cases.  And  it 
is  enough  to  make  a  prima  facie 
case  against  him  that  the  owner 
allege  and  show  the  delivery  of 
the  property  to  the  carrier,  and 
the  nature  of  the  loss  or  damage 
suffered  during  its  transit.  It 
will  then  devolve  on  the  carrier 
to  show  that  such  injury  was 
caused  without  his  fault,  and 
from  the  inherent  nature  or  pro- 
pensity, or  'proper  vice,'  as  it  is 
sometimes  called,  of  the  animals 
transported.  Shriver  v.  Railroad 
Co.,  24  Minn.  507;  Lindsley  v. 
Railway  Co.,  36  Minn.  539,  33  N. 
W.  Rep.  7;  Hull  v.  Railway  Co., 
43  N.  W.  Rep.  391.  The  carrier, 
therefore,  needs  no  special  con- 
tract limiting  his  liability  in  re- 
spect to  injuries  resulting  to  ani- 
mals from  such  causes." 

20.  Per  Pollock,  C.  B.,  and  Mar- 
tin, B.,  in  Pardington  v.  The  Rail- 
way Co.,  1  H.  &  N.  396;  Erie,  J., 
in  McManus  v.  The  Railway,  4  id. 
347;  Parke.  B.,  in  Carr  v.  The 
Railway,  7  Exch.  711. 

21.  L.  R.  7  C.  P.  655. 


§337.]  WHEN    CARRIER   NOT   LIABLE.  345 

in  which  the  attempt  was  made  to  hold  the  railwaj^  company 
liable  for  the  value  of  a  bullock  which  was  lost  by  its  escape  from 
a  truck  on  which  he  was  being  carried,  without  any  negligence, 
however,  on  the  part  of  the  company,  it  being  proven  that  the 
truck  was  reasonably  sufficient  for  his  conveyance.  "Whether 
a  railway  company,"  said  Willes,  J.,  "are  common  carriei-s  of 
animals  is  a  question  upon  which  there  has  been  much  conflict 
of  opinion,  and  although  there  may  be  difficulties  in  determining 
that  question,  such  as  induced  Lord  Wensleydale,  in  Carr  v. 
the  Lancashire  &  Yorkshire  Railway  Company^s  to  make  the 
observations  which  have  elicited  remarks  from  some  learned 
judges  apparently  to  the  contrary,  it  may  turn  out  after  all  to 
be  a  mere  controversy  of  words.  The  question  as  to  their  liabil- 
ity may  turn  on  the  distinction  between  accidents  which  happen 
by  reason  of  some  vice  inherent  in  the  animals  themselves,  or  a 
disposition  producing  unruliness  or  phrensy,  and  accidents 
which  are  not  the  result  of  inherent  vice  or  unruliness  of  the 
animals  themselves.  It  comes  to  much  the  same  thing  whether 
we  say  that  one  who  carries  live  animals  is  not  liable  in  one 
event  but  is  liable  in  the  other,  or  that  he  is  not  a  common  car- 
rier of  them  at  all,  because  there  are  some  accidents,  other  than 
those  falling  within  the  exception  of  the  act  of  God  or  of  the 
queen's  enemies,  for  which  he  is  not  responsible.  By  the  ex- 
pression 'vice,'  I  do  not  of  course  mean  moral  vice  in  the  thing 
itself  or  its  owner,  but  only  that  sort  of  vice  which,  by  its  in- 
ternal development,  tends  to  the  destruction  or  the  injury  of  the 
animal  or  thing  to  be  carried.  If  such  a  cause  of  destruction 
exists  and  produces  that  result  in  the  course  of  the  journey, 
the  liability  of  the  carrier  is  necessarily  excluded  from  the  con- 
tract between  the  parties.  This  becomes  the  more  clear  when 
we  consider  the  reason  why  a  common  carrier  is  liable  for  a  loss 
happening  without  any  negligence  at  all  on  his  part  unless  in 
the  ease  of  the  act  of  God  or  the  queen's  enemies.  The  reason 
is  so  well  known  and  so  well  explained  by  Lord  Wensleydale  in 
Wyld  V.  Pickford,23  that  it  is  unnecessary  to  add  anything  or  to 

22.  7   Exch.   707.  23.  8  M.   &  W.   443. 


346  THE  LAW  OF   CARRIERS.  [§338. 

heap  up  authorities  on  the  subject.  A  common  carrier  is  liable 
as  an  ordinary  bailee  for  negligence;  and  he  is  liable  for  loss 
occasioned  by  negligence  even  though  the  act  of  God  or  of  the 
queen's  enemies  conduce  to  the  loss.  But  he  is  further  liable, 
as  an  insurer,  for  losses  which  accrue  through  *no  negligence  on 
his  part.  It  is  only  necessary,  therefore,  to  observe  that  an  in- 
surer is  not  liable  for  accidents  happening  through  the  inherent 
vice  of  the  thing  insured,  but  only  for  such  as  happen  through 
adventitious  causes.  This  is  well  explained  in  Smith's  Mercan- 
tile Law,  where  it  is  said  that  underwriters  are  not  liable  for 
a  loss  which  is  necessarily  incidental  to  the  property  rather  than 
occasioned  by  adventitious  causes,  such  as  loss  by  worms  or  rats 
or  the  self -ignition  of  damaged  hemp."^^  So  in  Brass  v.  Mait- 
land,25  goods  were  delivered  to  a  ship-owner  to  be  carried,  but 
were  so  packed  as  to  conceal  their  real  character,  and  in  con- 
sequence of  the  insufficiency  of  the  packages,  other  parts  of  the 
cargo  were  injured,  and  it  was  held  by  a  majority  of  the  court 
of  queen's  bench  that  an  action  lay  against  the  shippers.  That 
case  was  followed  by  Hutchinson  v.  Guion,^^  and  Hearne  v.  Gar- 
ton,2'''  aj2(j  the  same  law  was  laid  down  in  Alston  v.  Herring,28 
with  regard  to  goods  causing  corruption  to  themselves.  The 
rule  is  very  accurately  laid  down  to  the  same  effect  in  Story  on 
Bailments,29  where  the  authorities  are  all  collected. 

Sec.  338.  (§220.)  Same  subject.— And  in  Kendall  v.  The 
Railway,^^  decided  immediately  afterwards  in  the  exchequer 
chamber,  the  case  being  that  of  a  horse  which  in  the  course  of 
the  transportation  was  injured,  Bramwell,  B.,  stated  the  law  as 
follows:  "No  doubt  the  horse  was  the  immediate  cause  of  its 
own  injuries,  i.  e.,  no  person  got  into  the  box  and  injured  it. 
It  slipped,  or  fell,  or  kicked,  or  plunged,  or  in  some  way  hurt 
itself.  If  it  did  so  from  no  cause  other  thau  its  inherent  pro- 
pensities,  its  proper  vice,  that   is  from  fright,  or  temper,  or 

24.  Rohl    V.    Parr,    1    Esp.    444;  27.  2   E.   &   E.   66. 
Hunter    v.    Potts,    4    Camp.    203;  28.  11  Exch.  822. 
Boyd  V.  Dubois,  3  id.  133.  29.  §   492a. 

25.  6  El.  &  B.  470.  30.  L.  R.   7  Exch.  373. 

26.  5  Com.  B.    (N.  S.)    149. 


§  339. J  WHEN    CARRIER   NOT   LIABLE.  347 

struggling  to  keep  its  legs,  the  defendants  are  not  liable.  But  if 
it  so  hurt  itself  from  the  defendant's  negligence  or  any  mis- 
fortune happening  to  the  train,  though  not  through  any  neg- 
ligence of  the  defendants,  as,  for  instance,  from  the  horse-box 
leaving  the  line  through  some  obstruction  maliciously  laid  upon 
it,  then  the  defendants,  as  insurers^  would  be  liable.  If  perish- 
able articles,  say  soft  fruits,  are  damaged  by  their  own  weight 
and  the  inevitable  shaking  of  the  carriage,  they  are  injured 
through  their  own  intrinsic  qualities.  If  through  pressure  of 
other  goods  carried  with  them  or  by  an  extraordinary  shock  or 
shaking,  whether  through  negligence  or  not,  the  carrier  is  lia- 
ble." 

Sec.  339.  (§221.)  Carrier  liable  as  common  carrier  of 
animals  except  for  losses  caused  by  their  peculiar  nature. — 
These  cases  have  been  considered  as  establishing  in  the  English 
law  the  principle,  whatever  doubts  might  have  been  previously 
cast  upon  the  question  by  the  opinions  of  learned  judges,  that 
the  carriers  of  live  animals  incur  the  responsibilities  of  com- 
mon carriers  as  to  such  freight ;  but  that,  at  the  same  time,  where 
an  injury  has  happened  to  them,  it  is  competent  for  the  car- 
rier to  show  that  it  occurred  through  the  "proper  vice"  of 
the  animal  and  not  from  any  negligence  on  his  part.  And  in 
this  country,  with  greater  unanimity,  the  9uty  and  liability  of 
the  common  carrier  as  to  such  freight  have  been  defined  with 
exactly  the  same  limitations  and  exceptions.^^     And  it  has  been 

31.  In  Kansas  Pacific  R.  R.  Co.  tion  is  made  between  the  carrying 

V.  Nichols,  9   Kan.   235,  the  court  of   cattle    and   that   of   any   other 

said:      "That    railroads     are     ere-  kind     of     property.       Under     our 

ated    common    carriers    of    some  statutes   a    railroad   may    as   well 

kind,  we  believe,  is  the  universal  be  a  common  carrier  of  cattle  as 

doctrine    of   all    the   courts.     The  of  goods,  wares  and  merchandise 

main  question  is   always  whether  or  of  any  other  kind  of  property, 

they  are  common  carriers   of  the  Now,   as   no   distinction   has   been 

particular   thing  then   under   con-  made  by  statute  between  the  car- 

sideration.     The   question   in  this  rying    of    the    different    kinds    of 

case  is  whether  they  are  common  property,    we    would     infer    that 

carriers  of  cattle.     So  far  as  our  railroads    were    created     for    the 

statutes  are  concerned  no  distinc-  purpose  of  being  common  carriers 


348 


THE   LAW   OF    CARRIERS. 


[§  339. 


said  that  the  rule  of  the  responsibility  of  the  common  carrier 
of  goods  must  be  applied  to  the  transportation  of  this  kind  of 
property,  modified  as  far  only  as  may  be  necessary  owing  to 


of  all  kinds  of  property  which  the 
wants  or  need  of  the  public  re- 
quire to  be  carried,  and  which 
can  be  carried  by  railroads;  and 
particularly  we  would  infer  that 
railroads  were  created  for  the 
purpose  of  being  common  carriers 
of  cattle.  As  Kansas  and  all  the 
surrounding  states  and  territo- 
ries, with  their  boundless  prairies 
and  nutritious  grasses,  are  des- 
tined to  be  the  great  stock-grow- 
ing countries,  it  can  scarcely  be 
supposed  that  the  legislature,  in 
providing  common  carriers  for 
the  property  of  the  public,  should 
have  omitted  to  provide  for  one 
of  the  most  important  kinds  of 
property,  a  vast  source  of  un- 
bounded wealth.  We  have  no 
navigable  streams  within  the 
boundaries  of  Kansas  upon  which 
to  transport  cattle,  and  hence 
they  must  be  transported  by  rail- 
road, if  transported  by  any  means 
except  by  driving  them  on  foot. 
It  is  claimed,  however,  that  'the 
transportation  of  cattle  and  live 
stock  by  common  carriers  hy 
land  was  unknown  to  the  common 
law.'  Suppose  it  was;  what  does 
that  prove? 

"The  transportation  of  thou- 
sands of  other  property,  either  by 
land  or  water,  was  unknown  to 
the  common  law,  and  yet  such 
kinds  of  property  are  now  car- 
ried by  common  carriers  and  by 
railroads  every  day.  We  get  our 
common  law  from  England.  It 
was  brought  over  by  our  ances- 
tors at  the  earliest  settlement  of 


this  country.  It  dates  back  to 
the  fourth  year  of  the  reign  of 
James  I.,  or  1607,  when  the  first 
English  settlement  was  founded 
in  this  country  at  Jamestown, 
Virginia.  The  body  of  the  laws 
of  England  as  they  then  existed 
now  constitute  our  common  law. 
It  is  so  fixed  by  statute  in  this 
state  (Comp.  Laws,  678;  Gen. 
Stat.  1127,  §3),  and  is  generally 
so  fixed  by  statute  or  by  judicial 
decisions  in  the  other  states.  The 
reason  why  cattle  and  live  stock 
were  not  transported  hy  land  by 
common  carriers  at  common  law 
was,  because  no  common  carrier 
at  the  time  our  common  law  was 
founded  had  any  convenient 
means  for  such  transportation. 
Among  the  other  kinds  of  prop- 
erty not  transported  by  common 
carriers,  either  by  land  or  water, 
at  the  time  our  common  law  was 
formed,  are  the  following:  Reap- 
ers, mowers,  wheat  drills,  corn 
planters,  cultivators,  threshing 
machines,  corn  shellers,  gypsum, 
guano,  Indian  corn,  potatoes,  to- 
bacco, stoves,  steam  engines,  sew- 
ing machines,  washing  machines, 
pianos,  reed  organs,  fire  and  bur- 
glar proof  safes,  etc.;  and  yet  no 
one  would  now  contend  that  rail- 
roads are  not  common  carriers  of 
these  kinds  of  articles.  At  com- 
mon law  the  character  of  the  car- 
rier was  never  determined  by  the 
kind  of  property  that  he  carried. 
He  might  have  been  a  private  or 
special  carrier  of  goods,  wares 
and  merchandise,  or  of  any  other 


§339.]                               WHEN    CARRIER   NOT    LIABLE.  349 

its  peculiar  character,  and  that  tlie  fact  that  the  carriage  ol; 
live  stock  was  unknown  when  this  rule  of  liability  becomes 
fixed  upon  the  carrier  is  answered  by  the  consideration  that 

kind  of  property,  or  he  might  law  no  person  was  a  common  car- 
have  been  a  public  or  common  rier  of  any  article  unless  he  chose 
carrier  of  cattle,  live  stock,  or  to  be,  and  unless  he  held  himself 
any  other  kind  of  property  just  as  out  as  such;  and  he  was  a  com- 
he  chose.  All  personal  property  mon  carrier  of  just  such  articles 
was  subject  to  be  carried  by  a  as  he  chose  to  be,  and  no  others, 
common  carrier,  and  no  personal  If  he  held  himself  out  as  a  com- 
property  was  exempt.  Whether  a  mon  carrier  of  silks  and  laces, 
person  was  a  common  carrier  de-  the  common  law  would  not  com- 
pended  wholly  upon  whether  he  pel  him  to  be  a  common  carrier 
held  himself  out  to  the  world  as  of  agricultural  implements,  such 
such,  and  not  upon  the  kind  of  as  plows,  harrows,  etc.;  if  he  held 
property  that  he  carried.  himself  out  as  a  common  carrier 
"A  common  carrier  was  such  of  confectionery  and  spices,  the 
as  undertook  'generally'  and  not  common  law  would  not  compel 
as  a  casual  occupation,  and  for  him  to  be  a  carrier  of  bacon,  lard 
all  people  indifferently,  to  convey  and  molasses.  Funnel  v.  Petti- 
goods  and  deliver  them  at  a  place  John,  2  Harr.  (Del.)  48.  And  it 
appointed,  for  hire,  as  a  business,  seems  to  us  clear  beyond  all 
and  with  or  without  a  special  doubt,  that  if  any  person  had,  in 
agreement  as  to  price."  2  Kent  England,  prior  to  the  year  1G07, 
Com.  598.  And  he  could  hold  held  himself  out  as  a  common 
himself  out  as  a  common  carrier  carrier  of  cattle  and  live  stock 
by  engaging  in  the  business  gen-  by  land,  the  common  law  would 
erally,  or  by  announcing  or  pro-  have  made  him  such.  If  so, 
claiming  it  to  the  world  by  the  where  is  the  valid  distinction 
issuing  of  cards,  circulars,  adver-  that  is  attempted  to  be  made  be- 
tisements,  etc.,  or  by  any  other  tween  the  carrying  of  live  stock 
means  that  would  let  the  public  and  the  carrying  of  any  other 
know  that  he  intended  to  be  a  kind  of  personal  property?  The 
common  or  general  carrier  for  common  law  never  declared  that 
the  public.  Railroads  hold  them-  certain  kinds  of  property  only 
selves  out  as  common  carriers  by  could  be  carrier  by  common  car- 
an  act  Irrevocable  on  their  part  riers,  but  it  permitted  all  kinds 
in  their  very  creation  and  organ-  of  personal,  property  to  be  so  car- 
ization.  The  very  nature  of  their  ried.  At  common  law,  any  per- 
business  is  such  that  by  engaging  son  could  be  a  common  carrier 
in  it,  or  offering  to  engage  in  it,  of  all  kinds,  or  kind,  and  just 
they  hold  themselves  out  as  com-  such  kinds  of  personal  property 
mon  carriers.  But  let  us  return  as  he  chose,  no  more  nor  less.  Of 
to  the  point  more  especially  un-  course,  it  is  well  known  that  at 
der    consideration.      At    common  the  time  when  our  common  law 


350 


THE   LAW   OF    CARRIERS. 


[§  339. 


the  law  must  keep  pace  with  the  march  of  improvement  by  ap- 
plying the  rules  already  established  to  the  changed  condition  of 
things.32 


had    its    origin,    that   is,    prior   to 
the   year   1607,    railroads   had    no 
existence.      But    when    they    came 
into  existence,  it  must  be  admit- 
ted  that  they  would   be  governed 
by  the  same  rules,  so  far  as  ap- 
plicable,  which   govern  other  car- 
riers   of    property.      Therefore,    it 
must   be    admitted    that    railroads 
might  be  created  for  the  purpose 
of  carrying  one  kind  of  property 
only,  or  for  carrying  all  kinds  of 
property  which  can  be  carried  by 
railroads,     including     cattle,     live 
stock,   etc.     In  this  state  it  must 
be   presumed   that  they   were   cre- 
ated  for   the  purpose   of  carrying 
all   kinds  of  personal  property.   It 
can  hardly  be  supposed  that  they 
were  created  simply  for  the  pur- 
pose of  being  carriers  of  such  ar- 
ticles   only    as    were     carried     by 
common   carriers   under   the   com- 
mon law  prior  to  the  year   1607; 
for    if    such    were   the   case,   they 
would   be  carriers   of   but   few   of 
the  innumerable  articles  that  are 
now   actually   carried   by   railroad 
companies,   and   it   can   hardly  be 
supposed    that   they    were   created 
for    the    mere    purpose    of   taking 
the    places    of     pack     horses,     or 
clumsy    wagons,    often    drawn    by 
oxen,     or     such     other     primitive 
means  of  carriage  and  transporta- 
tion   as    were     used     in     England 
prior  to  that  year.     Railroads  are 
undoubtedly   created   for   the   pur- 
pose   of    carrying     all     kinds     of 
property   which   the   common   law 
would  have   permitted  to  be  car- 
ried by   common  carriers  in  any 


mode,  either  by  land  or  water, 
which  probably  includes  all  kinds 
of  personal  property.  Our  deci- 
sion, then,  upon  this  question  is, 
that  whenever  a  railroad  company 
receive  cattle  or  live  stock  to  be 
transported  over  their  road  from 
one  place  to  another,  such  com- 
pany assume  all  the  responsibili- 
ties of  a  common  carrier  except 
so  far  as  such  responsibilities 
may  be  modified  by  special  con- 
tract." 

32.  United  States:  Hart  v.  Rail- 
road Co.,   112  U.   S.   331. 

Alabama:  South,  etc.,  R.  R.  Co. 
V.  Henlein,  52  Ala.  606;  Railroad 
Co.  V.  Smith,  85  Ala.  47;  Railroad 
Co.  V.  Smitha,  —  Ala.  — ,  40  So. 

Rep.    117. 

Arkansas:  Fordyce  v.  McFlynn, 
56  Ark.  424,  19  S.  W.  Rep.  961, 
citing  Hutchinson  on  Carr. 

Colorado:    Railway   Co.   v.    Rai- 

ney,  19  Colo.  225,  34  Pac.  Rep.  986. 

Georgia:    Cooper     v.      Railroad 

Co.,  110  Ga.  659,  36  S.  E.  Rep.  240; 

Railway  Co.  v.  Hall,  —  Ga.  — ,  53 

S.  E.  Rep.  679. 
Illinois:    Ohio,  etc.,  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

Dunbar,   20   111.   623;    T.  W.   &  W. 

R.    Co.    r.    Hamilton,    76    111    393; 

Toledo,   etc,  R.   Co.   v.   Thompson, 

71   111.   434;    St.  Louis,  etc.,  R.  R. 

r.   Dorman,    72    111.     504;     Illinois 

Cent.    R.    R.   v.    Hall,    58    111.    409; 

Indianapolis,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Jurey, 

8    111.    App.    160;    Express    Co.    r. 

Bratton,  106  111.  App.  563;  Wabash 

R.    Co.    V.    Johnson,    114    111.    App. 

545;  Railroad  v.  Fox,  113  111.  App. 

180. 


§  340.]  WHEN    CARRIER   NOT   LIABLE.  351 

Sec.  340.    Same   subject — Cases   holding  contraiy  view. — 

Id'  an    early    case,^^  however,  the    supreme    court   of   Michi- 

Indiana:    Evansville,  etc.,  R.  R.  61;   Waldron   v.  Fargo,   170   N.   Y. 

V.  Young,  28  Ind.  516.  130,  62  N.  E.  Rep.  1077. 

Iowa:    McCoy   v.   The   Railroad,        North     Carolina:     Lee    v.    The 

44  Iowa,  424;   Kinnick  v.  Railway  Railroad,  72  N.  Car.  236. 
Co.,  69  Iowa,  665,  29  N.   W.  Rep.        Ohio:     Wilson    v.    Hamilton,     4 

772.  Ohio   St.  722;    Welsh  v.  The  Rail- 

Kansas:   Kansas,  etc.,  R.  R.  Co.  road,   10  Ohio  St.  72. 
V.  Reynolds,  8  Kan.  623;  Railroad        Tennessee:     Baker    v.    Railroad 

Co.  V.  Simpson,  30  Kan.  645;  Rail-  Co.,   10  Lea,   304;   Railroad  Co.  v. 

way  Co.  V.  Clark,  48  Kan.  321,  329,  Jackson,  6  Heisk,  271;  Railroad  Co. 

29  Pac.  Rep.  312.  v.   Hale,   85   Tenn.   69;    Smitha   v. 

Maine:    Sager  v.   The  Railroad,  Railroad  Co.,  86  Tenn.  198;  Louis- 

31   Me.   228;    Dow   v.    Packet   Co.,  ville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Wynn,  88  Tenn. 

84  Me.  490,  24  Atl.  Rep.  945.  320,   14   S.  W.  Rep.  311;    Railroad 

Massachusetts:     Smith     v.     The  v.   Dies,    91    Tenn.    177,   18    S.   W, 

Railroad,  12  Allen,  531;    Squire  v.  Rep.  266,  30  Am.  St.  Rep.  871. 
The     Railroad,     98     Mass.      239;         Texas:     Missouri    Pac.    R'y    Co. 

Evans  v.  The  Railroad,  111  Mass.  v.  Harris,  67  Tex.  166. 
142.  Yermont:    Kimball  v.  The  Rail- 

Minnesota:   Moulton  v.  Railroad  road,  26  Vt.  247. 
Co.,  31  Minn.  85;  Lindsley  v.  Rail-        Wisconsin:     Betts  v.  The  Farm- 
road  Co.,  36  Minn.  539.  ers  Loan  Co.,  21  Wis.  80;  Ayres  v. 

Mississippi:  Railroad  Co.  v.  Railroad  Co.,  71  Wis.  372. 
Abels,  60  Miss.  1017.  Under  the  Railway  Act  of  Can- 
Missouri.-  Ballentine  v.  The  ada,  1888,  a  railroad  company. 
Railroad,  40  Mo.  491;  McFadden  when  carrying  animals,  is  a  com- 
V.  Railway  Co.,  92  Mo.  343;  Cash  mon  carrier  and  subject  to  the 
V.  Railroad  Co.,  81  Mo.  App.  109,  obligations  imposed  by  statute 
citing  Hutchinson  on  Carr.  and  common  law  on  common  car- 

Nebraska:    Railroad  Co.  v.  Wil-  riers.     McCormack  v.  Railway  Co., 

liams,  61  Neb.  608,  85  N.  W.  Rep.  6  Ont.  L.  R.  577,  3  Canadian  R'y 

832,  55  L.  R.  A.  289,  citing  Hutch-  Cases,  185. 

inson  on  Carr.;   Chicago,  etc.,  Ry.        33.  Michigan    S.    R.    R.    v.    Mc- 

Co.    V.    Slattery,    —    Neb.    — ,    107  Donough,    21    Mich.    165.      In    this 

N.  W.  Rep.    1045.  case,    Christiancy,   J.,   said:     "For 

New    Hampshire:     Rixford       v.  the  purposes  of  this  case  it  may 

Smith,  52  N.  H.  355.  be  assumed  that  this  company,  by 

New  York:   Harris  v.  The  Rail-  their  charter  and  act  of  consOlida- 

road,  20  N.  Y.  232;   Clarke  v.  The  tion,    are    required    to    take    upon 

Railroad,  14  N.  Y.  570;   Conger  v.  themselves    the    business    of    com- 

The  Railroad,   6  Duer,  375;    Penn  mon  carriers,  and  to  transport  as 

V.    The   Railroad,    49    N.    Y.    204;  such,    all   such    property   tendered 

Cragin  r.  The  Railroad,  51  N.   Y,  to  them  for  that  purpose  as  was 


352 


THE   LAW    OF    CARRIERS. 


[§  340. 


gau  held  that  live  stock,  on  account  of  its  being  more  sus- 
ceptible to  injury  while  being-  transported  than  property  usually 


naturally  transported  by  railroads 
as  common  carriers  at  the  date 
of  the  charter  of  the  Michigan 
Southern  Railroad  Company  in 
1846,  and  any  other  kinds  of  prop- 
erty which  in  the  progress  of  in- 
vention and  business  might  be 
tendered  for  such  carriage,  which 
should  not,  from  its  nature,  im- 
pose risks  of  a  different  character, 
or  require  an  essentially  different 
mode  of  managing  their  road  or 
the  incurring  of  extra  expenses 
on  account  of  the  different  char- 
acter of  such  new  kinds  of  prop- 
erty. But  the  transportation  of 
cattle  and  live  stock  by  common 
carriers  by  land  was  unknown  to 
the  common  law  when  the  duties 
and  responsibilities  of  common 
carriers  were  fixed,  making  them 
insurers  against  all  losses  and  in- 
juries not  arising  from  the  act  of 
God  or  of  the  public  enemies. 
These  responsibilities  and  duties 
were  fixed  with  reference  to  kinds 
of  property  involving,  in  their 
transportation,  much  fewer  risks 
and  of  quite  a  different  kind  from 
those  which  are  incident  to  the 
transportation  of  live  stock  by 
railroad.  Animals  have  wants  of 
their  own  to  be  supplied;  and  this 
is  a  mode  of  conveyance  at  which, 
from  their  nature  and  habits,  most 
animals  instinctively  revolt;  and 
cattle  especially,  crowded  in  a 
dense  mass,  frightened  by  the 
noise  of  the  engine,  the  rattling, 
jolting  and  frequent  concussions 
of  the  cars,  in  their  frenzy  injure 
each  other  by  trampling,  plung- 
ing, goring  or  throwing  down,  and 


frequently,  on  long  routes,  their 
strength  exhausted  by  hunger  and 
thirst,  fatigue  and  fright,  the  weak 
easily  fall  and  are  trampled  upon, 
and,  unless  helped  up,  must  soon 
die.  Hogs  also  swelter  and  per- 
ish. See,  per  Parke,  B.,  in  Carr 
r.  The  Lancashire  &  Yorkshire 
R'y,  7  Exch.  712;  Dsnio,  J.,  in 
Clarke  i:  The  Rochester  &  S.  R. 
R.  Co.,  11  N.  Y.  573.  It  is  a  mode 
of  transportation  which  but  for 
its  necessity  would  be  gross  cruel- 
ty, and  indictable  as  such.  The 
risk  may  be  greatly  lessened  by 
care  and  vigilance,  by  feeding  and 
v/atering  at  proper  intervals,  by 
getting  up  those  that  are  down, 
and  otherwise.  But  this  imposes 
a  degree  of  care  and  an  amount  of 
labor  so  different  from  what  is 
required  in  reference  to  other 
kinds  of  property,  that  I  do  not 
think  this  kind  of  property  falls 
within  the  reasons  upon  which 
the  common-law  liability  of  com- 
mon carriers  was  fixed.  In  Mc- 
INIanus  r.  The  Lancashire  R'y  Co., 
2  H.  &  N.  702,  the  court  say:  'We 
are  able  to  decide  this  case  with- 
out referring  to  the  second  point 
made  by  the  defendants,  viz.,  the 
alleged  distinction  between  the 
liability  of  carriers  as  to  the  con- 
veyance of  horses  and  live  stock, 
and  ordinary  goods;  but  should 
the  question  ever  arise,  we  think 
the  observation  which  fell  from 
Baron  Parke  in  Carr  r.  The  Lan- 
cashire &  York  Railway  Company 
is  entitled  to  much  consideration.' 
In  the  same  case  on  appeal  in  the 
Exchequer    Chamber,    4    H,    &    N. 


§340.]                              WHEN    CARRIER   NOT    LIABLE.  353 

received  for  transportation,  could  not  properly  be  considered  as 
a  commodity  which  under  the  common  law  the  carrier  was  bound 
to  transport  subject  to  his  liability  as  an  insurer,  and  that  ho 
could  neither  be  compelled  to  receive  it  in  that  capacity  nor  be 

346,  Erie,  J.,  speaking  of  the  con-  company  were  authorized  to  car- 
dition  of  the  contract  in  that  case,  ry,  placing  all  apparently  upon 
says:  'This  condition  is  imposed  the  same  ground.  The  conclu- 
in  respect  of  horses.  And  I  find  sion  from  the  statute  would  seem 
neither  authority  nor  principle  for  to  have  been  quite  as  broad  at 
holding  that  defendants  wer6  least,  as  the  premises  would  war- 
bound  to  receive  living  animals  rant.  But  it  had  the  statute  such 
as  common  carriers.'  In  Palmer  v.  as  it  was,  to  rest  upon.  It  may 
The  Grand  Junction  R'y  Co.,  4  M.  however,  be  well  doubted  whether 
&  W.  758,  Parke,  B.,  interrupting  the  decision  would  have  been  the 
counsel,  asks:  'Does  the  rule  as  same  if  the  question  had  arisen 
to  negligence  apply  to  live  ani-  for  the  first  time  after  the  deci- 
mals, as  horses?  Of  course,  if  sion  in  Oxlade  v.  The  Northeast 
they  are  stolen,  it  would;  but  is  R-  Co.,  15  Com.  B.  (N.  S.)  680 
it  so  when  they  are  delivered,  to  be  hereafter  noticed;  and  that 
although  hurt  or  damaged?  If  of  Pardington  v.  S.  Wales  Co.,  38 
misdelivered,  the  carrier  would  be  Eng.  L.  &  E.  432,  decided  in  No- 
liable,  but  they  would  not  be  vember,  1856.  In  the  latter  case, 
liable  for  a  mere  accident  to  an  t^e  question  arose  upon  the  rea- 
animal,  supposing  the  carriage  to  sonableness  of  a  notice  given  by 
be  safe,  good  and  properly  con-  the  company  to  a  shipper  of  cat- 
ducted.'  This  case  was  decided  in  tie  under  17  and  18  Vict.,  ch.  31, 
1839,  when  the  question  was  com-  §  ^  (Railway  Traffic  Act  of  1854), 
paratively  a  new  one.  And  it  is  which  expressly  held  the  company 
quite  manifest  that  Baron  Parke,  liable  for  the  loss  of,  or  injury 
in  the  above  remarks,  had  refer-  done  to,  any  'horses,  cattle  or  other 
ence  to  the  question  as  one  of  animals,'  or  to  any  goods,  etc., 
common  law  merely,  and  when  he  unless  the  conditions  fixed  by  the 
comes  to  decide  the  case,  holding  notices,  etc.,  should  be  held  by 
that  if  the  company  chose  to  carry  the  court  to  be  just  and  reason- 
horses  and  do  not  take  care  to  able.  Martin,  B.,  says:  'The  corn- 
accept  them  with  a  limited  re-  mon-law  liability  of  common  car- 
sponsibility,  then,  by  accepting  riers  does  not  apply  to  cattle  at 
them,  they  must  be  held  to  have  all.  In  former  days  they  were  not 
accepted  as  common  carriers,  it  is  carried.  They  might,  therefore, 
equally  manifest  that  the  decision  but  for  the  statutes,  make  what 
ic;  rested  wholly  upon  the  statute  conditions  they  pleased.'  Pollock, 
which  he  cites,  expressly  enumer-  C.  B.,  also  says:  'Why  should 
ating  'cattle'  with  'other  goods,  they  not  say,  if  you  insist  upon 
wares  and  merchandise,  articles,  our  carrying  your  cattle,  we  will 
matters  and  things'  which  the  carry  them;  but  it  must  be  upon 
23 


354 


THE  LAW   OF   CARRIERS. 


[§340. 


held  responsible  as  such  in  ease  of  its  having  been  injured.  This 
view  of  the  carrier's  liability  in  the  carriage  of  live  stock  has 
been  followed  in  the  later  cases,  and  the  rule  may  now  be  con- 
sidered as  settled  in  that  state  that  the  acceptance  of  live  stock 
by  the  carrier  imposes  the  duty  of  exercising  only  ordinary  care, 
skill  and  prudence  and  renders  him  responsible  for  only  those 


the  terms  that  we  shall  not  be 
responsible  for  any  injury  which 
may  happen  to  them.  They  hold 
themselves  out  as  carriers  of 
horses  and  cattle  sub  modo.'  The 
drovers  went  with  the  cattle  (as 
in  the  present  case),  and  Martin, 
B.,  in  giving  his  judgment,  says: 
*I  doubt  the  liability  of  the  com- 
pany at  all,  even  if  there  had  been 
no  stipulation  on  their  part;  for 
the  fault,  if  any,  was  the  fault  of 
those  who  went  by  the  train  with 
the  cattle.' 

"It  will  be  noticed  that  in  Eng- 
land, by  the  statute  cited,  railroad 
companies  are  common  carriers  of 
cattle,  horses,  etc.,  and  bound  to 
carry  as  such,  if  insisted  upon  by 
the  shipper,  except  as  they  may 
limit  their  liability  by  notices  or 
contracts  which  the  courts  hold 
reasonable,  and  that  the  statute 
cited  in  Palmer  v.  Grand  Junction 
Co.,  4  M.  &  W.  758,  was  then  held 
to  have  the  effect  to  make  them 
common  carriers  of  such  property, 
it  they  accepted  it  without  condi- 
tions. In  that  case,  however, 
there  was  no  evidence  of  their  hav- 
ing held  themselves  out  as  doing 
such  business  only  on  special 
terms.  But  this  case  has  been 
frequently  cited  in  this  country 
as  if  it  had  been  made  on  common- 
law  reasons  only,  and  applied  to 
cases  where  there  was  no  such 
statute  as  that  upon  which  it  was 
clearly  rested  by  the  court.     Thus 


(without  enumerating  other  in- 
stances), in  Kimball  v.  Rutland 
Co.,  26  Vt.  247,  the  court,  after 
very  correctly  holding  that  the 
company,  by  publicly  offering  to 
take  cattle  at  one  price  with  com- 
mon-law liability,  and  at  another 
and  less  rate  when  the  owner  as- 
sumes the  risk,  thereby  held  them- 
selves out  and  became  common 
carriers  of  cattle,  proceed  to  cite 
this  case  of  Palmer  v.  Grand  Junc- 
tion Company  as  proving  the 
proposition  that  'the  fact  that  the 
company  have  undertaken  such 
transportation  for  hire  and  for 
such  persons  as  choose  to  employ 
them,  establishes  their  relation  as 
common  carriers.'  The  remark 
was  correct  enough  if  applied  to 
the  facts  of  the  case  before  them; 
but  the  language  is  much  broader 
than  is  warranted  by  the  case 
cited. 

"Upon  sound  principle  and  upon 
the  English  authorities  above 
cited,  I  think  it  clear  the  trans- 
portation of  cattle  by  railroad  does 
not  come  within  the  reasons  of  the 
law  applicable  to  common  car- 
riers, so  far  as  relates  to  the  care 
of  the  property  and  responsibility 
for  its  loss  or  injury. 

"Unless,  therefore,  there  be 
something  in  the  defendant's 
charter  or  the  act  of  consolidation 
or  some  other  statute  applicable 
to  the  case,  the  company  were  not 
bound  to  receive  or  transport  cat- 


§  341.]  WHEN    CARRIER   NOT    LIABLE,  355 

injuries  occasioned  by  his  negligence."^-*  And  so  in  the  ease  of 
The  Eailroad  Company  v.  Hedger,^^  which  arose  in  Kentucky, 
it  was  said  to  be  unreasonable  to  hold  the  carrier  to  the  same 
strict  accountability  in  the  carriage  of  live  stock  that  he  was 
held  to  when  inanimate  property  was  accepted  for  transporta- 
tion, and  that  he  was  therefore  not  liable  unless  it  could  be 
shown  that  the  injury  arose  from  his  failure  to  exercise  ordinary 
care;  and  the  same  conclusion  was  reached  in  the  subsequent 
cases  of  The  Railroad  Company  v.  Harned^^  and  The  Railroad 
Company  v.  Wathen.^'^  But  in  the  later  case  of  The  Railway 
Company  v.  Sanders  &  Russell,^^  decided  by  the  same  court,  no 
mention  was  made  of  the  rule  laid  down  in  the  earlier  cases  and 
the  contrary  doctrine  was  distinctly  approved. 

Sec.  341.  (§222.)  Carrier  of  animals  is  common  carrier 
and  not  special  agent  of  owner. — The  carrier  of  living  animals 
as  freight  is,  however,  by  the  great  weight  of  authority  to  be 
regarded  as  a  common  carrier  as  to  such  freight,  and  not  as  a 
special  agent  of  the  owner  for  their  transportation  as  has  been 
sometimes  contended.  But  as  the  law  has  introduced  by  im- 
plication into  every  contract  for  the  carriage  of  goods,  an  ex- 
ception to  the  carrier's  liability  in  cases  where  the  loss  to  them, 
whilst  in  his  charge,  has  been  occasioned  by  the  act  of  God  or 
of  the  public  enemy,  or  by  their  own  decay  from  an  inherent 
infirmity,  or  by  the  fault  of  the  owner  himself,  so  it  has  from  the 
necessity  and  justice  of  the  case  introduced  an  exception  in  fa- 
vor of  the  carrier  of  live  stock,  of  accountability  for  its  loss  or 
injury  resulting  from  its  own  uncontrollable  vicious  propensi- 
ties, and  the  damages  incident  to  its  carriage  from  its  inherent 
natural  character.^^    And  this  question  as  to  the  relation  in  which 

tie   or   hogs   as   common   carriers,  35.  9  Bush,  645,  15  Am.  Rep.  740. 

but   they   might   legally   refuse  to  36.  23  Ky.  Law  Rep.  1651,  66  S. 

carry  them  in  that  or  in  any  other  W.   Rep.   25. 

capacity."  37.  23  Ky.  Law  Rep.  2128,  66  S. 

34.  Lake  Shore  R.  R.  v.  Perkins,  W.  Rep.  714. 

25   Mich.    329;    Heller   v.   Railway  38.  25  Ky.  Law  Rep.  2333,  80  S. 

Co.,  109  Mich.   53,   66  N.  W.  Rep.  W.  Rep.   488. 

667,  63  Am.  St.  Rep.  541;   McKen-  39.  See,      Keys-Marshall       Bros, 

zie  t\  Railroad  Co.,  ]37  Mich.  112,  Livery  Co.  v.  Railway  Co.,  10.")  Mo. 

100  N.  W.  Rep.  260.  App.  556,  80  S.  W.  Rep.  53,  citing 


356 


THE  LAW   OF   CARRIERS, 


[§341. 


the  carrier  stands  to  such  freight  is  of  more  importance  than 
might  at  first  be  imagined,  as  if  he  is  to  be  treated  in  its  trans- 
portation as  a  common  carrier,  he  becomes  an  insurer,  as  in  the 
case  of  other  goods,  against  loss  from  every  cause  except  the  acts 
of  God  or  of  the  public  enemy  or  of  the  animals  themselves, 
unless  he  has  further  protected  himself  by  his  contract,  and  in 
case  of  loss  of  or  injury  to  the  freight,  the  burden  of  proving 


Hutchinson  on  Carr.  In  Richard- 
son V.  Railway  Co.,  61  Wis.  596, 
Cassoday,  J.,  says:  "Whether  a 
railway  company  is  under  the 
same  obligations  to  furnish  cars 
for,  and  receive,  safely  carry,  and 
store  live  stock  as  other  ordinary 
inanimate  freight,  is  a  question 
upon  which  much  has  been  writ- 
ten, and  some  diversity  of  opinion 
has  been  expressed.  It  is  not 
necessary  here  to  analyze  the  ad- 
judged cases,  nor  indicate  the 
weight   of   reason    or   authority. 

"Betts  V.  Farmers'  L.  &  T.  Co., 
21  Wis.  80,  was  an  action  for  in- 
juries caused  by  the  carrier's 
negligence  in  carrying  the  plaint- 
iff's cattle  in  a  car  with  defective 
and  imperfectly  fastened  doors 
which  were  thrown  open  by  the 
motion  of  the  cars  so  that  the  cat- 
tle escaped.  The  cattle  were 
shipped  under  a  special  contract, 
which,  among  other  things,  pro- 
vided that  the  company  should 
'not  be  liable  for  loss  in  jumping 
from  the  cars.'  In  that  case,  Dix- 
on, C.  J.,  giving  the  opinion  of 
the  court,  said:  'As  to  this  species 
of  property  we  think  it  competent 
for  the  carrier  to  contract  that  the 
owner  shall  assume  all  risk  of 
damage  or  injury,  from  whatso- 
ever cause  happening  in  the  course 
of  transportation.'  See,  also,  C. 
&  N.  W.  R.  Co.  17.  Van  Dresar,  22 


Wis.  511;  Morrison  v.  P.  &  C. 
Const.  Co.,  44  Wis.  405.  This 
proposition  seems  to  cover  more 
ground  than  the  point  actually 
decided  in  that  case,  but  the  Eng- 
lish cases  cited  by  the  learned 
chief  justice  seems  to  sustain  the 
proposition.  To  them  others  may 
be  added.  M'Cance  v.  London  & 
N.  W.  R'y  Co.,  7  Hurl.  &  N.  477; 
Gannell  v.  Ford,  5  Law  T.  Rep. 
(N.  S.)  604;  Robinson  v.  G.  W. 
R'y  Co.,  35  L.  J.  C.  P.  123;  Har- 
rison V.  London,  B.  &  S.  R'y  Co., 
2  Best  &  S.  122;  Manchester  S.  & 
L.  R'y  Co.f  V.  Brown,  50  Law  T. 
Rep.  (N.  S.)  281.  But  there  are 
cases  even  in  England  which  seem 
to  hold  a  contrary  doctrine. 
M'Manus  v.  Lancashire  &  Y.  R'y 
Co.,  4  Hurl.  &  N.  327;  Allday  v. 
G.  W.  R'y  Co.,  5  Best  &  S.  903; 
Gregory  v.  W.  M.  R'y  Co.,  2  Hurl. 
&  C.  (Exch.)  944;  Rooth  v.  North 
Eastern  R'y  Co.,  L.  R.  2  Exch. 
173;  Doolan  v.  Directors  of  M. 
R'y  Co.,  L.  R.  2  App.  Cas.  792; 
Moore  v.  G.  S.  &  W.  R'y  Co.,  L.  R. 
10  Ir.  Com.  Law,  65.  Just  how 
far  the  cases  cited  were  controlled 
by  the  presence  or  absence  of  lo«al 
statutes  it  is  not  necessary  here 
to  determine. 

"It  is  well  settled  that  a  carrier 
of  ordinary  inanimate  freight  can- 
not by  any  agreement,  however 
plain  and   explicit,  wholly   relieve 


§341. 


WHEN    CARRIER   NOT    LIABLE. 


357 


that  it  arose  from  its  own  fault  rests  upon  him  if  he  would 
excuse  himself  upon  that  ground.  "Whereas  if  he  is  to  be  con- 
sidered merely  as  the  paid  agent  of  the  owner  for  the  trans- 
portation of  his  stock,  his  liability  would  rest  solely  upon  the 
question  of  negligence,  the  burden  of  proving  which  would  be 
upon  the  owner  of  the  freight ;  and  this  has  been  the  contention 
in  many  of  the  cases  in  Avhich  he  has  been  held  liable  as  a  com- 
mon carrier. 


itself  from  all  liability  whatsoever 
resulting  from  its  own  negligence. 
Black  V.  Goodrich  Transp.  Co.  55 
Wis.  319.  Just  the  extent  that  a 
carrier  of  such  inanimate  freight 
may  by  express  contract  exempt 
itself  from  liability  for  its  own 
negligence  need  not  here  be  de- 
termined. Certainly,  there  is  a 
broad  distinction  between  the  risk 
incident  to  the  carriage  of  such 
ordinary  inanimate  freight  and 
that  of  live  animals  having  in- 
stincts, habits,  propensities,  wants, 
necessities  and  powers  of  locomo- 
tion. Requisite  care  in  case  of 
the  transportation  of  such  live 
stock,  therefore,  necessarily  im- 
plies food  and  water  periodically, 
and  at  times  especial  care  and 
shelter  outside  of  the  vehicle  of 
carriage.  All  these  things  would 
require  help,  appliances,  conveni- 
ences and  extra  arrangements  not 
requisite  in  the  case  of  ordinary 
inanimate  freight,  which  a  car- 
rier might  be  unable  or  unwilling 
to  furnish;  and  yet,  if  furnished 
by  the  owner  of  such  live  stock, 
and  the  risk  incident  to  them  as- 
sumed by  such  owner,  the  carrier 
might  be  able  and  wiling  to  un- 
dertake such  transportation.  And 
yet,  with  all  reasonable  care,  it 
would  be  impossible  to  secure  at 
all   times   absolute   safety   in   the 


transportation    of    such    live    ani- 
mals. 

"This  broad  distinction  between 
that  class  of  freightage  and  ordi- 
nary inanimate  freight  has  fre- 
quently been  observed  by  the 
courts.  Blower  v.  G.  W.  R'y  Co., 
L.  R.  7  C.  P.  655;  Shir.  Lead.  Cas. 
No.  23,  p.  50;  Clarke  v.  R.  &  S. 
R'y  Co.,  14  N.  Y.  570;  Penn.  v.  B. 
&  E.  R'y  Co.,  49  N.  Y.  204;  Cragin 
V  N.  Y.  C.  R.  R.  Co.,  51  N.  Y. 
61;  Holsapple  v.  R.,  W:  &  0.  R.  R. 
Co.,  3  Am.  &  Eng.  R'y  Cas.  487; 
Smith  V.  N.  H.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,  13 
Allen,  531;  Evans  v.  Fitchburg  R. 
R.  Co.,  Ill  Mass.  142;  Michigan  S. 
&  N.  Ind.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  McDonough, 
21  Mich.  189;  Lake  Shore  &  M.  S. 
R.  R.  Co,  V.  Perkins,  25  Mich.  329. 
There  would  certainly  seem  to  be 
no  good  reason  why  a  carrier 
might  not  by  express  contract  ex- 
empt itself  from  damage  caused 
wholly,  or,  perhaps,  in  part,  by 
the  instincts,  habits,  propensities, 
wants,  necessities,  vices  or  loco- 
motion of  such  animals.  Ibid. 
As  to  injury  from  such  causes 
the  common-law  liability  and 
obligation  do  not  seem  to  attach; 
certainly  not  with  the  same  rigid- 
ity as  they  do  in  ordinary  in- 
animate freight.  Ibid.  Thus,  in  a 
late  case  in  Minnesota  It  is  held 
that  'a  railroad  corporation  which 


358 


THE   LAW   OF    CARRIERS. 


[§  342. 


Sec.  342.     Though    injury    caused    by    peculiar   nature    of 
the  animals,   carrier  not   excused  if  he  has  been  negligent. 

— But  while  it  is  always  competent  for  the  carrier  to 
show  in  his  defense  that  the  injury  resulted  from  the  peculiar 
nature  or  inherent  vices  of  the  animals  themselves  and  thus  ex- 
cuse himself  from  liability,  if  it  appear  that  he  has  been  guilty 
of  any  negligence  and  that  such  negligence  contributed  to  the 
injury,  the  excuse  can  no  longer  avail  him.i  It  is  his  duty  to 
exercise  at  all  times  ordinary  care  in  guarding  the  stock  against 
such  injuries  as  are  likely  to  result  from  their  natural  propen- 
sities and  which,  in  view  of  the  character  of  the  animals,  can 
reasonably  be  foreseen  and  provided  against ;  and  for  a  failure 
to  do  so  whereby  the  animals  cause  themselves  injury,  he  will  be 
liable.  Thus  in  the  case  of  Looser  ik  The  Railway  Company ,2 
it  appeared  that  the  defendant's  servants  unloaded  a  number 
of  horses  from  the  car  in  which  they  were  being  transported  and 


undertakes  to  transport  live  stock 
for  hire  for  such  persons  as  choose 
to  employ  it  assumes  the  relation 
of  a  common  carrier  with  such 
modifications  of  the  common-law 
liability  of  carriers  as  arise  from 
the  nature  of  the  animals  and 
their  capacity  for  inflicting  injury 
upon  themselves  and  upon  each 
other.'  Moulton  v.  St.  P.,  M.  &  M. 
R'y  Co.,  12  Am.  &  Eng.  R'y  Cas. 
13.  To  these  things  may  well  be 
added  other  things  incident  to 
live  stock." 

1.  Giblin  r.  Steamship  Co.,  8 
Misc.  Rep.   22,   28   N.   Y.   Supp.   69. 

If,  during  transit,  the  carrier 
negligently  exposes  cattle  to  the 
cold  weather  prevailing  at  that 
season  of  the  year  and  they  are 
damaged,  he  will  be  liable.  Rail 
road  Co.  v.  Smissen,  31  Tex.  Civ. 
App.    549,    73    S.   W.   Rep.   42. 

That  a  horse  becomes  fright- 
ened, breaks  its  bridle  and   runs 


away,  is  not  suflicient  to  charge 
the  carrier  with  a  failure  to  exer- 
cise proper  care.  Kaplan  v.  Rail- 
road  Co.,  88   N.  Y.   Supp.   945. 

Where  a  carrier  negligently 
sent  forward  a  dog  by  an  earlier 
train  than  it  should  have  done, 
and  there  being  no  one  at  destina- 
tion to  receive  it,  shipped  it  back 
again,  and  the  owner  on  its  return 
directed  that  it  be  reshipped,  it 
was  held  by  a  divided  court  that 
the  death  of  the  dog  through  an 
overstrained  bladder  due  to  its 
long  confinement  had,  as  its  prox- 
imate cause,  the  failure  of  the 
owner  to  properly  attend  it  be- 
fore its  reshipment,  and  that  the 
carrier  was  not  liable  for  its  loss. 
Harrison  v.  Weir,  75  N.  Y.  Supp. 
909,  71  App.  Div.  248,  s.  C.  73  N. 
Y.  Supp.  1119,  reversing  69  N.  Y. 
Supp.  957,  34  Misc.  Rep.   519. 

2.  94  Wis.  571,  69  N.  W.  Rep. 
372. 


§343.]  WHEN    CARRIER    NOT   LIABLE.  359 

drove  them  in  a  group  iuto  a  yard,  where  they  were  to  be  tied. 
Before  all  of  the  horses  were  tied,  two  of  the  number  began  to 
kick  and  one  of  them,  by  its  own  act  of  kicking,  dislocated  its 
leg  at  the  hock,  necessitating  its  being  killed.  The  jury  found 
that  the  manner  of  driving  the  horses  loosely  in  a  body  instead 
of  separately  was,  under  the  circumstances,  a  negligent  act,  and 
returned  a  verdict  against  the  defendant.  On  appeal,  judgment 
on  the  verdict  was  affirmed,  the  court  saying  that  ordinary  care 
mi^ht  well  have  required  in  such  a  case  that  vigilance  be  used 
to  guard  against  and  restrain  the  natural  propensities  of  the 
animals  to  cause  themselves  injury. 

Sec.  343.  Duty  of  shipper  to  disclose  peculiarities  af- 
fecting risk. — It  is  clearly  the  duty  of  the  shipper  to  dis- 
close, if  requested,  any  peculiarities  or  infirmities  in  the  animals, 
known  to  him  and  not  to  the  carrier,  which  would  increase  the 
risk  of  carriage  in  the  usual  manner  or  require  greater  precau- 
tions for  their  safety  than  those  usually  requisite  j^  and  so,  with- 
out request,  it  would  be  the  duty  of  the  shipper  to  disclose  such 
peculiarities  or  infirmities  not  known  to  the  carrier  and  not  dis- 
cernible from  the  appearance  or  condition  of  the  animal;-*  and 
the  carrier  would  not  be  liable,  in  the  absence  of  such  a  dis- 
closure, where,  having  used  the  care  and  diligence  usually  re- 
quisite, an  injury  was  sustained  proximately  owing  to  such 
peculiarity  or  infirmity. 

But  a  failure  so  to  disclose  would  not  relieve  the  carrier  for 
a  loss  proximately  caused  by  his  own  negligence,  nor  could  he 
complain  of  the  failure  to  disclose  a  condition  of  things  evident 
from  the  appearance  of  the  animal  itself. 

VIII.     EXCEPTIONS  MADE  BY  STATUTE. 
Sec.  344.      (§224.)     Statutes  limiting  carrier's  liability. — 

Besides  the  exceptions  which  are  allowed  by  the  common  law  to 
the  liability  of  the  carrier  for  loss  of  the  goods,  or  the  injury 
which  may  have  happened  to  them  whilst  in  this  custody,  statu- 
torj^  enactments  have  been  made,  both  in  this  country  and  in 
England,  which  have  greatly  modified  as  to  certain  classes  of  car- 
3.  See  ante,  §  329.  4.  See  ante,  §  330. 


360  THE   LAW   OF    CARRIERS.  [§  345. 

riers  the  rigorous  liability  which  was  imposed  upon  them  by  the 
rules  of  the  common  law.  The  English  Land  Carriers'  Act,  which 
will  be^more  particularly  referred  to  in  the  chapter  upon  the  sub- 
ject of  the  limitation  of  the  carrier's  liability  by  contract,  and 
which,  as  its  title  indicates,  is  confined  to  carriers  by  land,  was 
designed  to  protect  all  such  carriers  from  imposition,  and  from 
losses  for  which  they  could  not  fairly  be  held  liable  on  account  of 
the  failure  of  their  employer  to  disclose  the  value  of  packages 
intrusted  to  them,  as  well  as  to  promote  a  system  of  fair  dealing 
between  the  carrier  and  the  public ;  and  with  respect  to  the  own- 
ers of  sea-going  vessels  as  carriers,  besides  the  exceptions  always 
contained  in  their  bills  of  lading,  their  common-law  liability  is 
greatly  narrowed  by  acts  of  parliament  protecting  them  against 
liability  for  losses  by  fire;  from  the  obligation  to  make  good 
losses  of  gold,  silver,  diamonds,  watches,  jewels  or  precious 
stones  by  robbery  or  embezzlement,  unless  the  owner  has  at  the 
time  of  the  shipment  declared  the  value  thereof;  from  making 
good  any  losses  incurred  by  the  misconduct  of  the  master  and 
mariners  without  their  privity,  or  by  robbery,  by  whomsoever 
committed,  to  a  greater  extent  than  the  value  of  the  ship  and 
freight;  and  to  all  other  cases  of  loss  occasioned  without  their 
default  or  privity.^  And  a  similar  law  has  been  enacted  by  the 
congress  of  the  United  States,  under  its  constitutional  power  to 
regulate  commerce,  for  the  protection  of  the  owners  of  all  ves- 
sels employed  as  common  carriers.^ 

Sec.  345.  Policy  of  United  States  courts  towards  car- 
riers  by   water   changed    by  Harter  Act. — On  February  13, 

5.  English  notes  to  Coggs  v.  Ber-  Sec.  4281.  If  any  shipper  of 
nard,  1  Smith's  Ld.  Cases,  368,  platina,  gold,  gold  dust,  silver, 
369.  bullion   or   other  precious  metals, 

6.  The  above  laws  of  the  con-  coins,  jewelry,  bills  of  any  bank 
gress  of  the  United  States  for  the  or  public  body,  diamonds  or  other 
protection  and  to  limit  the  liabil-  precious  stones,  or  any  gold  or 
ity  of  the  owners  of  vessels  as  silver  in  a  manufactured  or  an  un- 
common carriers  are  to  be  found  manufactured  state,  watches, 
in  the  Revised  Statutes  from  sec.  clocks  or  time-pieces  of  any  de- 
4281  to  4289  inclusive,  and  are  scription,  trinkets,  orders,  notes  or 
as   follows:  securities    for    the     payment     of 


345. 


WHEN    CARRIER   NOT   LIABLE. 


3G1 


1893,  the  Congress  of  the  United  States  changed  the  entire  policy 
of  the  federal  courts  towards  carriers  by  water  by  the  passage 
of  what  is  known  as  the  Plarter  Act.    The  text  of  the  first  three 


money,  stamps,  maps,  writings, 
title  deeds,  printings,  engravings, 
pictures,  gold  or  silver  plate  or 
plated  articles,  glass,  china,  silks 
in  a  manufactured  or  unmanufac- 
tured state,  and  whether  wrought 
up  or  not  wrought  up  with  any 
other  material,  furs,  or  lace  or  any 
of  them,  contained  in  any  par- 
cel or  package  or  trunk,  shall  lade 
the  same  as  freight  or  baggage  on 
any  vessel,  without  at  the  time 
of  such  lading  giving  to  the  mas- 
ter, clerk,  agent  or  owner  of  such 
vessel  receiving  the  same  a  writ- 
ten notice  of  the  true  character 
and  value  thereof,  and  having  the 
same  entered  on  the  bill  of  lading 
therefor,  the  master  and  owner  of 
such  vessel  shall  not  be  liable  as 
carriers  thereof  in  any  form  or 
manner;  nor  shall  any  such  mas- 
ter or  owner  be  liable  for  any  such 
goods  beyond  the  value  and  ac- 
cording to  the  character  thereof 
so  notified  and  entered. 

See  Wheeler  v.  Navigation  Co., 
125  N.  Y.  155;  Carlson  v.  Oceanic 
Steam  Nav.  Co.,  109  N.  Y.  362; 
Ocean  Steamship  Co.  v.  Way,  90 
Ga.  751;  Calderon  v.  Steamship 
Co.,  170  U.  S.  272,  reversing  69 
Fed.  574,  16  C.  C.  A.  332,  35  U.  S. 
App.  587  and  64  Fed.  874;  The 
St.  Cuthbert,  97  Fed.  341;  The 
Bermuda,   29  Fed.   399. 

This  section  does  not  apply  to 
a  passenger's  baggage.     La  Bour- 

goyne,  C.  C.  A. ,  144  Fed. 

781. 

Sec.  4282.  No  owner  of  any  ves- 
sel shall   be  liable   to  answer  for 


or  make  good  to  any  person,  any 
loss  or  damage  which  may  hap- 
pen to  any  merchandise  whatso- 
ever which  shall  be  shipped,  taken 
in  or  put  on  board  any  such  ves- 
sel, by  reason  or  by  means  of  any 
fire  happening  to  or  on  board  the 
vessel,  unless  such  fire  is  caused 
by  the  design  or  neglect  of  such 
owner. 

See  Constable  v.  National  Steam 
■ship  Co.,  154  U.  S.  62,  14  Sup 
Ct.  R.  1062,  38  L.  Ed.  903;  Steam 
ship  Co.  V.  Hill  Mfg.  Co.  109  U.  S 
587;  In  re  Old  Dominion  Steam 
ship  Co.,  115  Fed.  845;  The  City  of 
Clarkville,  94  Fed.  201;  The 
Strathdon,  89  Fed.  378;  The  Rapid 
Transit,  52  Fed.  320;  Heye  v.  North 
German  Lloyd,  33  Fed.  70;  The 
Garden  City,  26  Fed.  769;  The 
Marine  City,  6  Fed.  415;   The  San 

Rafael,  141  Fed.  270,  C.  C.  A. 

,  modifying  134  Fed.  749. 

Sec.  4283.  The  liability  of  the 
owner  of  any  vesel  for  any  em- 
bezzlement, loss  or  destruction  by 
any  person  of  any  property,  goods 
or  merchandise,  shipped  or  put  on 
board  of  such  vessel,  or  for  any 
loss,  damage  or  injury  by  collision, 
or  for  any  act,  matter  or  thing, 
loss,  damage  or  forfeiture,  done, 
occasioned  or  incurred,  without 
the  privity  or  knowledge  of  such 
owner  or  owners,  shall  in  no  case 
exceed  the  amount  or  value  of  the 
interest  of  such  owner  in  such 
vessel  and  her  freight  then  pend- 
ing. 

See  O'Brien  v.  Miller,  168  U.  S. 
303;  The  Chattahoochee,  173  U.  S. 


362 


THE   LAW   OF    CARRIERS. 


[§  345. 


554,  a^'g  74  Fed.  809,  21  C.  C.  A. 
162;  The  Main  v.  Williams,  152 
U.  S.  128;  In  re  Morrison,  147  U. 
S.  34;  Craig  v.  Continental  Ins. 
Co.,  141  U.  S.  645;  Butler  v.  Steam- 
ship Co.,  130  U.  S.  558;  The  Mani- 
toba, 122  U.  S.  Ill;  The  City  of 
Norwich,  118  U.  S.  503;  The  Scot- 
land,   lis   U.   S.   518;    The  Mamie, 

110  U.  S.  742;  Steamship  Co.  r. 
Hill  Mfg.  Co.,  109  U.  S.  589;  Lord 
V.  Steamship  Co.,  102  U.  S.  543; 
The  Benefactor,  103  U.  S.  243;  The 
City  of  Hartford,  97  U.  S.  323; 
The  Virginia  Ehrman,  97  U.  S. 
317;  Norwich  Co.  v.  Wright,  13 
Wall.  (U.  S.)  121;  The  Tommy, 
142  Fed.  1034;  The  Harry  Hudson 

Smith, C.  C.  A.  ,  142  Fed. 

724;  In  re  Pacific  Mail  S.  S.  Co., 
130  Fed.  76,  64  C.  C.  A.  410,  69 
L.  R.  A.  71;  Weisshaar  v.  Kim- 
ball S.  S.  Co.,  128  Fed.  397,  63 
C.  C.  A.  139,  65  L.  R.  A  84,  revers- 
ing. In  re  Kimball  S.  S.  Co.,  123 
Fed.  838;  The  Cygnet,  126  Fed. 
742,  61  C.  C.  A.  348;  Gleason  v. 
Duffy,  116  Fed.  301;  In  re  Old 
Dominion  S.  S.  Co.,  115  Fed.  849; 
Parsons  r.  Empire  Transp.  Co.,  Ill 
Fed.    208;    The    George    W.    Roby, 

111  Fed.  601,  49  C.  C.  A.  481;  The 
Eureka,  108  Fed.  672;  The  La 
Bourgoyne,  104  Fed.  823;  The 
Longfellow,  104  Fed.  363;  The 
Jane  Grey,  99  Fed.  591,  s.  c.  95 
Fed.  693;  In  re  Piper  Aden  Good- 
all  Co.,  86  Fed.  670;  The  Colima, 
82  Fed.  679;  The  Annie  Faxon,  75 
Fed.  312,  21  C.  C.  A.  366,  44  U.  S. 
App.  591;  The  H.  F.  Dimock,  77 
Fed.  238;  The  Columbia,  73  Fed. 
226,  44  U.  S.  App.  326,  19  C.  C.  A. 
436;  The  Republic,  61  Fed.  109, 
9  C.  C.  A.  386,  aff'g  57  Fed.  240; 
Quinlan  v.  Pen,  56  Fed.  119;  The 
Rosa,  53  Fed.  132;  The  Giles  Lor- 


ing,  48  Fed.  471;  The  Anna,  47 
Fed.  5^6;  The  City  of  Para,  44 
Fed.   691. 

Sec.  4284.  Whenever  any  such 
embezzlement,  loss  or  destruction 
is  suffered  by  several  freighters  or 
owners  of  goods,  wares,  merchand- 
ise or  any  property  whatever,  on 
the  same  voyage,  and  the  whole 
value  of  the  vessel  and  her  freight 
for  the  voyage  is  not  sufficient  to 
make  compensation  to  each  of 
them,  they  shall  receive  compen- 
sation from  the  owner  of  the  ves- 
sel in  proportion  to  their  respect- 
ive losses;  and  for  that  purpose 
the  freighters  and  owner  of  the 
property  and  the  owner  of  the  ves- 
sel or  any  of  them  may  take  the 
appropriate  proceedings  in  any 
court  for  the  purpose  of  appor- 
tioning the  sum  for  which  the 
owner  of  the  vessel  may  be  liable, 
among  the  parties  entitled  there- 
to. 

See  O'Brien  v.  Miller,  168  U.  S. 
306;  The  City  of  Norwich,  118 
U.  S.  491;  Butler  v.  Steamship  Co., 
130  U.  S.  551;  Ex.  p.  Slayton,  105 
U.  S.  452;  The  La  Bourgoyne,  117 
Fed.  264;  The  M.  Mo  ran,  107  Fed. 
526;  The  Eureka  No.  32,  108  Fed. 
673;  The  S.  A.  McCaulley,  99  Fed. 
203;  The  Catskill,  95  Fed.  702; 
In  re  Harris,  57  Fed.  245;  The 
H.  F.  Dimock,  52  Fed.  600. 

Sec.  4285.  It  shall  be  deemed  a 
sufficient  compliance  on  the  part 
of  such  owner  with  the  require- 
ments of  this  title  relating  to  his 
liability  for  any  embezzlement, 
loss  or  destruction  of  any  prop- 
erty, goods  or  merchandise,  if  he 
shall  transfer  his  interest  in  such 
vessel  and  freight  for  the  benefit 
of  such  claimants  to  a  trustee  to 
be  appointed  by  any  court  of  com- 


i345.J 


WHEN    CARRIER    NOT   LIABLE, 


363 


sections  of  that  act  is  given  in  full  in  the  notesJ  Before  the 
passage  of  the  act,  the  owner  could  not  contract  against  his 
liability  and  that  of  his  vessel  for  loss  occasioned  by  negligence 
or  fault  in  the  officers  and  crew,  because  such  a  contract  was 


petent  jurisdiction,  to  act  as  such 
trustee  for  ttie  person  who  may 
prove  to  be  legally  entitled  there- 
to; from  and  after  which  trans- 
fer all  claims  and  proceedings 
against  the  owner  shall  cease. 

See  Ex.  p.  Phenix  Ins.  Co.,  118 
U.  S.  617;  Steamship  Co.  v.  Hill 
Mfg.  Co.,  109  U.  S.  600;  The  Cats- 
kill,  95  Fed.  702;  The  H.  F.  Dim- 
ock,  77  Fed.  238;  In  re  Meyer,  74 
Fed.  881. 

Sec.  4286.  The  charterer  of  any 
vessel,  in  case  he  shall  man,  vic- 
tual and  navigate  such  vessel  at 
his  own  expense  or  by  his  own 
procurement,  shall  be  deemed  the 
owner  of  such  vessel  within  the 
meaning  of  the  provisions  of  this 
title  relating  to  the  limitation  of 
the  liability  of  the  owners  of  ves- 
sels; and  such  vessel,  when  so 
chartered,  shall  be  liable  in  the 
same  manner  as  if  navigated  by 
the  owner  thereof. 

See  The  Barnstable,  181  U.  S. 
468;  Smith  v.  Booth,  122  Fed.  626, 
58  C.  C.  A.  479. 

Sec.  4287.  Nothing  in  the  five 
preceding  sections  shall  be  con- 
strued to  take  away  or  affect  the 
remedy  to  which  any  party  may 
be  entitled  against  the  master, 
officers  or  seamen  for  or  on  ac- 
count of  any  embezzlement,  in- 
jury, loss  or  destruction  of  mer- 
chandise or  property  put  on  board 
any  vessel,  or  on  account  of  any 
negligence,  fraud  or  other  mal- 
versation of  such  master,  officers 
or    seamen    respectively,     nor     to 


lessen  or  take  away  any  responsi- 
bility to  which  any  master  or  sea- 
men of  any  vessel  may  by  law  be 
liable,  notwithstanding  such  mas- 
ter or  seaman  may  be  an  owner 
or  part  owner  of  the  vessel. 

See  Craig  v.  Continental  Ins. 
Co.,   141  U.   S.   646. 

Sec.  4288.  Any  person  shipping 
oil  of  vitriol,  unslaked  lime,  in- 
flammable matches  or  gunpowder 
in  a  vessel  taking  cargo  for  divers 
persons  on  freight  without  deliv- 
ering at  the  time  of  shipment  a 
note  in  writing  expressing  the  na- 
ture and  character  of  such  mer- 
chandise to  the  master,  mate,  offi- 
cer or  person  in  charge  of  the  lad- 
ing of  the  vessel,  shall  be  liable 
to  the  United  States  in  a  penalty 
of  $1,000.  But  this  section  shall 
not  apply  to  any  vessel  of  any  de- 
scription whatsoever  used  in  riv- 
ers or  inland  navigation. 

Sec.  4289.  The  provisions  of 
this  title  relating  to  the  limita- 
tion of  the  liability  of  the  owners 
of  vessels  shall  not  apply  to  the 
owners  of  any  canal  boat,  barge  or 
lighter,  or  to  any  vessel  of  any 
description  whatsoever  used  in 
rivers  or  inland  navigation. 

See  In  re  Garnett,  141  U.  S.  12; 
The  Columbia,  73   Fed.  227,   19  C. 
C.  A.  436;    The  Anna,  47  Fed.  525; 
The  Katie,  40  Fed.  480. 
7.  HARTER   ACT. 

"An  act  relating  to  navigation 
of  vessels,  bills  of  lading,  and  to 
certain  obligations,  duties  and 
rights  in  connection  with  the  car- 


364                                             THE   LAW    OF    CARRIERS.  [§  345. 

held  by  the  federal  courts  to  be  contrary  to  public  policy,  and, 

in  this  particular  the  owners  of  American  vessels  were  at  a  dis- 
advantage as  compared  with  the  owners  of  foreign  vessels,  who 
could  at  that  time  contract  with  shippers  against  any  liability 
for  negligence  or  fault  on  the  part  of  the  officers  and  crew.  This 

inequality,   of  course,   operated  unfavorably  on  the  American 

riage    of   property. —  (Act    of   Feb.  whereby    the    obligations     of     the 

13,  1893,  ch.  105,  27  Stat.  L.  445.)"  master,    officers,    agents,     or     ser- 

"Sec.    1.      That   it   shall   not   be  vants     to     carefully    handle    and 

lawful    for    the    manager,    agent,  stow    her   cargo    and   to   care    for 

master,    or    owner    of    any    vessel  and   properly    deliver   same,   shall 

transporting  merchandise  or  prop-  in   any   wise   be    lessened,    weak- 

erty  from  or  between  ports  of  the  ened,   or  avoided." 

United  States  and  foreign  ports  to  "Sec.   3.     That  if  the  owner  of 

insert  in  any  bill  of  lading  or  ship-  any   vessel   transporting   merchan- 

ping   document   any    clause,    cove-  dise   or  property   to   or  from  any 

nant,  or  agreement  whereby  it,  he,  port  in  the  United  States  of  Amer- 

or  they  shall  be  relieved  from  lia-  ica  shall  exercise  due  diligence  to 

bility  for   loss   or   damage  arising  make  the   said   vessel    in    all    re- 

from  negligence,   fault,  or  failure  spects     seaworthy     and     properly 

in   proper   loading,    stowage,    cus-  manned,    equipped,    and    supplied, 

tody,   care,   or   proper   delivery   of  neither   the   vessel,   her   owner   or 

any    and    all    lawful    merchandise  owners,  agent,  or  charterers  shall 

or    property    committed    to    its    or  become  or  be  held  responsible  for 

their  charge.     Any  and  all  words  damage    or    loss     resulting     from 

or  clauses  of  such  import  inserted  faults   or   errors   in   navigation  or 

in  bills  of  lading  or  shipping  re-  in    the    management    of    said    ves- 

ceipts  shall  be  null  and  void  and  sel  nor  shall  the  vessel,  her  owner 

of  no  effect."  or    owners,    charterers,    agent,    or 

"Sec.  2.  That  it  shall  not  be  master  be  held  liable  for  losses 
lawful  for  any  vessel  transport-  arising  from  dangers  of  the  sea  or 
ing  merchandise  or  property  from  other  navigable  waters,  acts  of 
or  between  ports  of  the  United  God,  or  public  enemies,  or  the  in- 
states of  America  and  foreign  herent  defect,  quality,  or  vice  of 
ports,  her  owner,  master,  agent,  the  thing  carried,  or  from  insuffi- 
or  manager,  to  insert  in  any  bill  ciency  of  package,  or  seizure  un- 
of  lading  or  shipping  document  any  der  legal  process,  or  for  loss  re- 
covenant  or  agreement  whereby  suiting  from  any  act  or  omission 
the  obligation  of  the  owner  or  of  the  shipper  or  owner  of  the 
owners  of  said  vessel  to  exercise  goods,  his  agent  or  representative, 
due  diligence  [to]  properly  equip,  or  from  saving  or  attempting  to 
man,  provision,  and  outfit  said  save  life  or  property  at  sea,  or 
vessel,  and  to  make  said  vessel  from  any  deviation  in  rendering 
seaworthy  and  capable  of  perform-  such  service." 
ing     her     intended     voyage,     or 


§346.]  When  carrier  not  liable.  365 

ship  owner  and  Congress  saw  fit  to  remove  the  disadvantage, 
not  by  declaring  that  it  should  be  competent  for  the  owners 
of  vessels  to  exempt  themselves  from  liability  for  the  faults  of 
the  master  and  crew  by  stipulations  to  that  effect  contained  in 
bills  of  lading,  but  by  enacting  that,  if  the  OAvner  exercised  due 
diligence  in  making  their  ships  seaworthy  and  in  duly  manning 
and  equipping  them,  there  should  be  no  liability  for  the  naviga- 
tion and  management  of  the  ships,  however  faulty.^ 

Sec.  346.  Statute  similar  to  Harter  Act  enacted  in  Great 
Britain  in  1900.— In  1900  the  Parliament  of  Great  Britain 
passed  an  amendment  to  the  Merchant  Shipping  Act  of 
1894,^  by  which  it  was  enacted  that  ' '  the  limitation  of  the  liabil- 
ity of  the  owners  of  any  ship  set  by  section  503  of  the  Merchant 
Shipping  Act  of  1894  in  respect  of  loss  of  or  damage  to  vessels, 
goods,  merchandise,  or  other  things  shall  extend  and  apply  to  all 
cases  where  (without  their  actual  fault  or  privity)  any  loss  or 
damage  is  caused  to  property  or  rights  of  any  kind,  whether 
on  land  or  on  water,  or  whether  fixed  or  moveable,  by  reason  of 
the  improper  navigation  or  management  of  the  ship, ' '  The  laws 
of  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States,  therefore,  are  substan- 
tially similar  at  this  time  upon  this  subject. 

Sec.  347.  To  what  vessels  and  property  Harter  Act  ap- 
plies.— The  Harter  Act  applies  to  all  vessels  transport- 
ing merchandise  to  and  from  any  port  of  the  United  States,  situ- 
ated upon  any  navigable  waters,  inland  or  otherwise,  over  which 
the  federal  government  has  jurisdiction.^^     The  third  section 

8.  The  Irrawaddy,  171  U.  S.  187,  9.  63  &  64  Vict,  C.  32. 

18  Sup.  Ct.  831,  43  L.  Ed.  130.  Charterers  of  a  vessel  for  a  short 

The  Harter  Act  was  not  retro-  period  are  not  its  "owners"  with- 

active     in     its     provisions.       The  in  the  meaning  of  the  above  stat- 

Energia,  66  Fed.  605,  13  C.  C.  A.  ute    and    are    not    entitled    to    a 

653,  35  U.  S,  App.  6;   aff'g  Insur-  limitation    of    liability    under    its 

ance  Co.  v.  The  Energia,  61  Fed.  terms.      The    Steam    Hopper,    No. 

222   and   Phillips  v.   The  Energia,  66,  75  L.  J.  P.  22. 

56  Fed.  124.    See  also  to  the  same  10.  In   re   Piper    Aden    Goodall 

effect:     Humboldt,    etc.,    Ass'n    v.  Co.,  86  Fed.  670. 
Christopherson,    73    Fed.    239,    19 
C.  C.  A.  481,  46  L.  R.  A.  264. 


366  THE   LAW   OF   CARRIERS.  [§348. 

which  provides  that  if  the  owner  of  any  vessel  transporting 
property  "to  or  from  any  port  of  the  United  States  shall  exer- 
cise due  diligence,  etc.,"  applies  to  vessels  engaged  in  com- 
merce on  the  Great  Lakes,  notwithstanding  that  sections  1,  2  and 
4  are  expressly  confined  to  shipping  "between  ports  of  the 
United  States  and  foreign  ports.  "^^  The  act  will  also  be  ap- 
plied to  foreign  vessels  in  suits  brought  in  tne  United  States, 
and  when  the  vessel  owner  sets  up  the  act,  he  must  take  the  bur- 
dens with  the  benefits,  and  cannot  claim  a  greater  limitation  of 
liability  under  the  terms  of  a  bill  of  lading.^  ^ 

Damages  for  personal  injuries  received  by  a  passenger  or  for 
loss  of  his  personal  baggage  are  not  within  the  provisions  of  the 
Harter  Act.^^ 

Sec.  348.  Harter  Act  only  modifies  relations  between  a 
vessel  and  her  cargo. — The  whole  object  of  the  act  is  to 
modify  the  relations  previously  existing  between  a  vessel 
and  her  cargo.  This  is  apparent  not  only  from  the  title  of  the 
act,  but  from  its  general  tenor  and  provisions,  which  are  evi- 
dently designed  to  fix  the  relations  between  the  cargo  and  the 
vessel,  and  to  prohibit  contracts  restricting  the  liability  of  the 
vessel  and  owners  in  certain  particulars  connected  with  the  con- 
struction, repair  and  outfit  of  the  vessel,  and  the  care  and  de- 
livery of  the  cargo.     The  liability  of  a  vessel  to  other  vessels 

11.  The  E.  A.  Shores,  Jr.,  73  A.  262,  35  U.  S.  App.  395,  64  Fed. 
Fed.  342.  607;    The    Frey,    92    Fed.    667,    re- 

12.  The  Germanic,  196  U.  S.  versed  in  106  Fed.  319,  45  C.  C.  A. 
589,  25  Sup.  Ct.  R.   317,  aff'g,   124  309  on  another  point. 

Fed.    1,    59    C.   C.   A.    521    and    107  The  third  section  applies  to  the 

Fed.  294;  Knott  v.  Botany  Worsted  negligence   of   the   pilot  of  a  ves- 

Mills,    179    U.    S.    69,    21    Sup.    Ct.  sel  in  a  foreign  port.     The  Etona, 

R.  30,  45  L.  Ed.  90;   aff'g  Botany  71   Fed.   895,   18   C.   C.   A.   380,   38 

Worsted   Mills   v.   Knott,    82    Fed.  U.    S.    App.    50,    aff'g    Doherr    v 

471,    27    C.    C.    A.    326,    51    U.    S.  The   Etona,   64    Fed.    880. 

App.    467,    and    76    Fed.    582;    The  13.  The    Rosedale,    88    Fed.    324, 

Chattahoochee,    173   U.    S.    540,    19  afftrmecl  92  Fed.  1021,  35  C.  C.  A. 

Sup.  Ct.  491,  43  L.  Ed.  801;  aff'g  167;   Moses  v.  Packet  Co.,  88  Fed. 

74  Fed.  899,  21  C.  C.  A.  162;   The  329;  In  re  California  Nav.  &  Imp. 

Silvia,  171  U.   S.  462,   19   Sup.  Ct.  Co.,   110  Fed.   678;    La  Bourgoyne, 

R.  7,  43  L.  Ed.  241,  aff'g  15  C.  C.    C.  C.   A.  ,   144   Fed.   781. 


§349.]  WHEN    aVERIER   NOT    LIABLE.  367 

with  which  it  may  come  in  contact  was  not  intended  to  be  af- 
fected/'* nor  was  the  relation  between  owners  and  charterers.^'' 

Sec.  349.  Stipulations  in  bills  of  lading  contrary  to  sec- 
tion one  of  Barter  Act  are  void. — Under  the  first  two  sec- 
tions of  the  Harter  Act,  it  is  clear  that  the  common-law  liability 
of  the  ship  owner  regarding  the  necessity  for  due  care  being 
taken  in  respect  of  the  cargo  was  carefully  preserved,  except  so 
far  as  that  liability  may  have  been  expressly  cut  down  by  the 
provisions  of  section  three.^^  The  courts  have  given  full  effect 
to  the  words  of  section  one,  and  stipulations  in  bills  of  lading 
seeking  to  exempt  shipowners  from  liability  for  loss  or  damage 
arising  from  negligence  in  loading,  stowage,  custody,  care  or 
proper  delivery  of  the  cargo  have  been  held  to  be  null  and 
void.i'^ 

Sec.  350.  Meaning  of  word  "loading"  in  section  one  of 
Harter  Act. — The  word  "loading"  in  section  one  is  not 
synonymous  with  the  word  "stowage"  in  the  same  section.  It 
refers  to  the  proper  use  of  the  means  used  for  the  transference 
of  the  goods  to  the  vessel.  Thus  if  taking  a  cargo  to  a  vessel  in 
lighters  be  part  of  the  loading  of  the  vessel,  a  stipulation  in  a 

14.  The  Delaware,  161  U.  S.  459,  lutely  at  the  risk  of  the  owners 
16  Sup.  Ct.  R.  516,  40  L.  Ed.  771.  in  every  respect,  and  that  the  car- 

15.  Lake  Steam  Shipping  Co.  v.  rier  is  responsible  for  no  loss,  de- 
Bacon,  129  Fed.  819.  lay    or    damage    thereto,    however 

16.  Rowson  V.  Atlantic  Trans-  arising,  including  stowage,  and 
port  Co.  (1903)  2  K.  B.  666,  72  all  risks  of  breakdown  and  in- 
L.  J.  K.  B.  811,  aff'g  (1903)  1  K.  jury,  however  caused,  whether  to 
B.  114.  its      refrigerator      or     machinery, 

17.  Calderon  v.  Steamship  Co.,  even  though  arising  from  defect 
170  U.  S.  272,  reversing,  69  Fed.  existing  at  or  previous  to  the 
574,  16  C.  C.  A.  332,  35  U.  S.  App.  commencement  of  the  voyage." 
587  and  64  Fed.  874;  The  Mani-  In  Bethel  v.  Mellor  &  Ritten- 
toba,  104  Fed.  145.  In  The  South-  house  Co.,  131  Fed.  129,  a  nota- 
wark,  191  U.  S.  1,  48  L.  Ed.  65,  tion  on  the  bills  of  lading  that  the 
24  Sup.  Ct.  R.  1,  reversing  108  Fed.  ship  was  "not  responsible  for 
880,  48  C.  C.  A.  123,  the  following  broken  or  cut  bales"  could  not 
printed  stipulation  was  held  void:  protect  the  ship  from  responsibil- 
"It  is  expressly  provided  that  the  ity  for  negligent  loading  and  stow- 
goods  shipped  hereunder  are  abso-  age. 


36S  THE   LAW    OF    CARRIERS.  [§351. 

bill  of  lading  relieving  the  carrier  from  failure  to  provide  a  fit 
lighter  is  prohibited  by  section  one.^^ 

Sec.  351.  "Stowage"  used  in  two  senses  in  section  one 
of  Harter  Act. — The  word  "stowage"  in  the  first  section 
is  used  in  two  senses.  It  is  used,  first,  with  a  view  to  the 
proper  distribution  and  placement  of  the  cargo,  having  in  mind 
its  inherent  and  natural  characteristics,  and,  second,  with  a  view 
to  the  proper  trim  of  the  vessel  and  the  ease  with  which  it  will 
be  able  to  carry  its  cargo  when  at  sea.  We  will  treat  the  latter 
aspect  first. 

Sec.  352.  Stowage  with  a  view  to  the  proper  trim  of 
the  vessel. — Stowage,  with  a  view  to  the  proper  trim  of  the 
vessel  and  the  ease  with  which  it  will  be  able  to  carry  its 
cargo  when  at  sea,  calls  for  the  exercise  of  the  greatest  skill  and 
care  on  the  part  of  the  ship-owner.^^  Consequently  a  lack  of  care 
and  skill,  such  as  will  render  the  carrier  liable  for  damages  re- 
sulting to  the  cargo,  is  shown  when  a  ship,  in  other  respects 
seaworthy,  is  so  laden  under  the  carrier's  orders  as  to  become 
top  heavy  at  starting,  with  the  result  that  part  of  her  cargo 
is  jettisoned  in  a  gale  which  otherwise  could  have  been  weath- 
ered in  safety.^*'  So  if  a  barge  is  so  heavily  laden  that  it  shows 
signs  of  listing  and  unsteadiness  while  being  towed,  its  owners 
will  be  liable  for  the  loss  of  the  cargo  if  it  sinks  at  the  dock.^i 

Sec.  353.  Responsibility  for  such  stowage  rests  upon  the 
carrier  alone. — Questions  pertaining  to  the  proper  distribu- 
tion of  heavy  and  light  cargo,  or  proper  ballasting  and 
stowage  in  order  to  make  the  ship  sufficiently  easy  and  safe  are 
not  questions  that  devolve  upon  the  shipper  to  determine,  nor  is 
he  in  any  way  responsible  for  their  solution.    The  responsibility 

18.  Insurance  Co.  of  North  260,  modifying  The  Musselerag, 
America   v.    North   German   Lloyd    125  Fed.  786. 

Co.,   106   Fed.   973;    aft'd  in  Nord-  20.  The     Whitlieburn,     89     Fed. 

Deutscher  Lloyd  v.  President,  etc.,  526;   Master  and  Owners  of  S.   S. 

of  Insurance  Co.,  110  Fed.  420,  49  "City  of  Lincoln"  v.  Smith,  L.  R. 

C    C.  A.  1.  (1904)   App.  Cas.  250. 

19.  Corsar  v.  Spreckels  &  Bros.  21.  The  G.  B.  Boren,  132  Fed. 
Co.,  C.   C.   A.   ,    141    Fed.  887. 


354.] 


WHEN   CARRIER   NOT   LIABLE. 


369 


is  upon  the  carrier  alone.22  He  alone  must  judge  whether  the 
vessel  is  being  overloaded,  and  if,  in  his  judgment  the  vessel  is 
being  overloaded,  he  should  stop  it.  If  the  vessel  cannot  carry, 
without  straining,  the  load  put  upon  her,  the  vessel's  owner 
will  be  liable  for  any  damage  resulting  to  the  cargo.^^ 

Sec.  354.  Stowage  with  reference  to  the  natural  charac- 
teristics of  the  cargo  carried — Effect  of  custom. — Improper 
stowage,  used  in  the  sense  of  the  distribution  and  place- 
ment of  the  cargo  with  reference  to  its  inherent  and  natural 
characteristics,  will  render  a  ship-owner  liable  under  the  Harte)- 
Act.2-*  But  in  determining  what  is  proper  stowage  the  customs 
and  usages  of  the  place  of  shipment  are  to  be  considered,  and,  if 
these  customs  are  followed,  and  if  none  of  the  known  and 
usual  precautions  for  safe  stowage  are  omitted,  no  breach  of 
duty  or  negligence  can  be  imputed  to  the  ship,  and  in  case  of 
damage  under  great  stress  of  weather  the  injuries  will  be  as- 
cribed to  perils  of  the  seas.^^ 


22.  The  Frey,  92  Fed.  667,  re- 
versed in  106  Fed.  319,  45  C.  C.  A. 
309  on  question  of  fact. 

23.  The  William  Power,  131  Fed. 
136;  The  Giles  Loring,  48  Fed. 
463. 

Provisions  in  a  charter  party 
that  charterer's  stevedores  be  em- 
ployed by  the  master  and  paid  by 
him  does  not  affect  the  liability 
of  the  ship,  or  the  owners,  for 
Improper  stowage,  since  the  steve- 
dores in  such  case  are  held  to  be 
in  the  employ  of  the  captain  and 
under  his  direction  and  control  as 
the  representative  of  the  owners. 
Bethel  v.  Mellor  &  Rittenhouse, 
131   Fed.   129. 

If  a  steamship  company  ap- 
points a  shipping  agent  who  is 
wholly  incompetent  for  that  line 
of  business,  and  the  shipping 
agent  loads  cargoes  on  vessels 
which  are  not  suited  for  that  class 
of  cargo,  and  the  cargoes  are 
24 


consequently  lost  or  damaged,  the 
Harter  Act  will  not  relieve  the 
steamship  company  from  the  con- 
sequences of  its  own  gross  negli- 
gence in  the  appointment  of  that 
agent.  Parsons  v.  Transportation 
Co.,   Ill  Fed.  202,  49  C.  C.  A.  302. 

24.  The  Palmas,  108  Fed.  87, 
47  C.  C.  A.  220. 

In  the  Victoria,  114  Fed.  902, 
the  carrier  was  held  liable  for 
the  improper  stowage  of  a  piece 
of  marble. 

In  Crooks  v.  The  Fanny  Skol- 
fields,  65  Fed.  814,"  the  ship  was 
held  liable  for  the  damage  due  to 
placing  heavy  casks  of  oil  on 
small   casks  of  plumbago. 

But  in  The  Tjomo,  115  Fed.  919, 
the  court  held  that  proper  skill 
had  been  exercised  in  stowing  cat- 
tle. 

25.  The  Tjomo,  115  Fed.  919; 
see  also  The  Colima,  82  Fed.  665. 


370  THE   LAW    OF    CARRIERS.  [§  355. 

Sec.  355.  Stowage  of  liquid  cargo. — The  stowage  of  liquid 
cargo  requires  especial  care  on  account  of  its  liability 
to  leak  and  injure  cargo  under  or  near  it.  In  this  connection" 
it  has  been  held  that  it  is  not  improper  stowage  to  place  it  in 
the  between-decks,  over  dry  cargo  in  the  hold,  provided  the 
decks  are  permanently  laid,  in  thorough  order,  well  caulked  and 
tight,  and  provided  with  sufficient  scuppers  for  the  escape  of 
leakage.26  But  to  stow  a  liquid  cargo  in  the  same  compartment 
with  other  cargo  peculiarly  susceptible  to  injury  from  liquids, 
when  other  compartments  are  available,  is  such  negligence  as 
will  render  the  carrier  liable.^"^ 

Sec.    356.    Duty    of    ship   to    provide    proper    dunnage. — 

It  is  the  duty  of  a  ship  to  dunnage  the  cargo  in  a  manner  rea- 
sonably sufficient  to  protect  it  from  what  is  naturally  to  be  ex- 
pected, and  in  accordance  with  the  usages  of  the  port  of  ship- 
ment. For  failure  to  use  such  reasonable  care  and  customary^ 
dunnage  as  would  have  protected  the  cargo,  even  in  extraordi- 
nary weather  if  such  weather  ought  to  have  been  expected,  the 
ship  remains  liable.^^  The  ship  must  provide  proper  dunnage 
even  though  the  goods  are  loaded  by  the  charterers'  stevedores. 
The  stevedores  cannot  be  supposed  to  have  notice  that,  by  the 
construction  of  the  ship,  dunnage  is  necessary  unless  dunnage 
is  provided  for  their  use.-^ 

26.  This  has  been  held  with  re-  below.     The  Mississippi,  113  Fed. 

gard  to  Ceylon  cocoanut  oil  which,  985,  affirmed.  120  Fed.  1020,  56  C. 

partly   by   reason   of   its   inherent  C.  A.  525. 

qualities  and  partly  because  of  bad  27.  In    The    Orcadian,    116    Fed. 

cooperage,     always    leaks    greatly  930,  the  vessel  was  held  liable  for 

from  the  casks.     The  Dunbritton,  the  negligent  stowage  of  barrels  of 

73  Fed.  352,  19  C.  C.  A.  449,  38  U.  cod    oil    in    a    compartment    filled 

S.  App.  369,  reversing    Crooks    v.  with  wool,  when  another  compart- 

The  Dunbritton,  61  Fed.  764.  ment  was  available,  the  wool,  in 

The  same  holding  has  been  made  consequence,   having  become  satu- 

with   reference   to  molasses.     The  rated  with  the  cod  oil. 

Centurion,  68  Fed.  382,  15  C.  C.  A.  28.  The  Aspasia,  79  Fed.  91,  af- 

480,  35  U.  S.  App.   332,  reversing  firmed  without  opinion.    (C.  C.  A.) 

Bregaro  v.  The  Centurion,  57  Fed.  80  Fed.  1003. 

412.      If    the    hatch    is    not    abso-  29.  Robinson   r   Franklin    Sugar 

lutely    tight,    the    vessel     will     be  Refining  Co.,  70  Fed.  792. 
liable    for    damage    to    the    cargo 


§357.]  WHEN    CARRIER   NOT   LIABLE,  371 

Sec.  357.    Stowage   of  delicate   and  easily   tainted  goods. 

—Goods  which  emit  an  odor  and  are  liable  to  taint  and 
spoil  delicate  cargo  should  not  be  placed  in  the  same  hold.  Thus 
stowing  skins  which  emit  a  pungent  odor  in  the  same  hold  with 
teas  is  at  the  risk  of  the  ship,  and  even  if  the  closing  of  the  hold 
on  account  of  storm,  or  anticipated  storm,  results  in  the  dam- 
age, the  ship  can  find  no  exoneration  on  the  ground  that  it  was 
a  fault  in  the  management  of  the  vessel,  because  the  negligent 
stowage  is  the  proximate  cause  of  the  loss.^o  Along  the  same 
line  is  the  fact  that  if  the  ship  itself  is  tainted  through  the 
carriage  of  prior  cargoes,  it  will  be  liable  for  the  consequent 
damage  resulting  to  a  delicate  cargo,  such  as  meat.^i 

Sec.  358.  Goods  should  be  secured  from  possibility  of 
shifting. — The  goods  having  been  placed  in  a  proper  com- 
partment, they  should  be  secured  from  possibility  of  shift- 
ing even  in  heavy  weather,  if  heavy  weather  should  reasonably 
be  anticipated.^^  "Where  no  extraordinary  weather  or  seas  such 
as  might  not  have  been  reasonably  anticipated  at  that  time  of 
year,  or  no  such  weather  as  naturally  to  cause  a  shifting  and 
destruction  of  cargo  in  a  well-loaded  and  well-ballasted  ship  is 
shown,  the  primary  cause  of  loss  due  to  a  shifting  of  the  cargo 
must  be  ascribed  to  the  deficiencies  in  the  ship's  condition  in 
that  regard  at  the  time  of  sailing.^^ 

30.  The  Hudson,   122  Fed.  96.  32.  The  Mississippi,  113  Fed.  985, 

31.  This  was  held  in  a  case  out-  affirmed  without  opinion,  120  Fed. 
side  the  Harter  Act,  but  is  un-  1020,  56  C.  C.  A.  525. 
doubtedly  applicable  here.  In  Best-  See  also  Steamship  Co.  ;;.  Pilk- 
wick  V.  Steamship  Co.  (1904)  1  K.  ington,  28  S.  C.  R.  (Canada)  146. 
B.  319,  73  L.  J.  K.  B.  240,  the  ship  where  glass  was  improperly  stowed, 
was  tainted  with  carbolic  acid  and  33.  The  Frey,  92  Fed.  667,  re- 
unfit  for  carriage  of  a  delicate  car-  versed  in  106  Fed.  319,  45  C.  C.  A. 
go  like  meat,  and  the  ship  was  held  309,  on  ground  that  the  evidence 
liable  notwithstanding  a  very  gen-  showed  the  winds  and  waves  were 
eral  exemption  clause  in  the  bill  sufficiently  violent  as  to  constitute 
of  lading.  A  judgment  for  the  a  peril  of  the  sea.  The  text,  how- 
plaintiff  was  affirmed  in  Steam-  ever,  is  undoubtedly  a  good  state- 
ship  Co.  V.  Bostwick,  App.  Cas.  ment  of  the  law  when  the  state  of 
(1905),  93.  facts  therein  described  exists. 


372  THE  LAW   OF   CARRIERS.  [§359. 

Sec.  359.    Proper    stowage    at    commencement    of    voyage 
may   be    made    improper   by    change  of   vessel's    trim   dur- 
ing voyage. — Thus  far  we  have  considered  questions  relating 
to  the  proper  trim  of  the  vessel  separately  from  questions  re- 
lating to  the  proper  distribution  and  placement  of  the  cargo, 
having  in  mind  its  inherent  and  natural  characteristics.     But 
changes  in  the  loading  or  unloading  at  different  stages  in  the 
voyage  may  affect  the  trim  of  the  ship,  and  in  that  case  if  cargo, 
properly  stowed  at  the  beginning  of  the  voyage,  is  damaged 
through  the  changed  trim  of  the  ship,  the  ship  is  liable  under 
section  one  of  the  Harter  Act.     Thus  bales  of  wool  were  stowed 
on  end,  with  proper  dunnage,  between  decks  near  the  bow  of  a 
vessel,  and  forward  of  a  temporary  wooden  bulkhead,  which 
was  not  tight.     The  vessel  after  touching  at  several  points  took 
on  at  Pernambuco  two  hundred  tons  of  wet  sugar  (from  which 
there  is  always  drainage)  which  was  stowed,  with  proper  dun- 
nage, between  decks,  aft  of  the  wooden  buU^head.    At  that  time 
the  vessel  was  trimmed  by  the  stern,  and  all  drainage  from  the 
sugar,  flowing  aft,  was  carried  off  by  the  scuppers,  which  were 
sufficient  for  the  purpose  when  the  vessel  was  down  by  the  stern, 
or  on  even  keel  in  calm  weather.    There  was  no  provision  for  car- 
rying off  the  drainage  in  case  it  ran  forward.  She  discharged  the 
cargo  at  Para,  and  when  she  left  that  port  she  was  two  feet 
down  by  the  head.     She  continued  in  this  trim  until  she  took 
on  an  additional  cargo  at  Port  of  Spain,  where  the  error  in 
trim  was  corrected.    It  was  agreed  that  there  was  no  damage  to 
the  wool  by  sugar  drainage  until  the  vessel  was  trimmed  by  the 
head  at  Para,  and  that  the  wool  was  damaged  by  sugar  drainage 
at  Para  or  between  Para  and  Port  of  Spain.     The  question  for 
the  court  was  whether  this  damage  to  the  wool  was  "loss  or 
damage   arising  from  negligence,   fault  or  failure    in    proper 
loading,  stowage,  custody,  care  or  proper  delivery"  of  cargo, 
within  the  first  section  of  the  Harter  Act;  or  was  "damage  or 
loss  resulting  from  faults  or  errors  in  navigation  or  in  the  man- 
agement of  said  vessel,"  within  the  third  section  of  that  act. 
The  District  Judge  held,  and  his  words  were  approved  by  the 


§360.]  WHEN    CARRIER   NOT   LIABLE.  373 

Circuit  Court  of  Appeals  and  United  States  Supreme  Court, 
that  the  negligence  consisted  in  stowing  the  wool  far  forward, 
without  taking  care  subsequently  that  no  changes  of  loading 
should  bring  the  ship  down  by  the  head;  that  the  question, 
therefore,  was  solely  one  of  negligence  in  the  stowage  and  dis- 
position of  the  cargo,  and  of  damage  consequent  thereon,  though 
brought  about  by  the  effect  of  these  negligent  changes  in  load- 
ing on  the  trim  of  the  vessel,  and  that  since  this  drainage  arose 
through  negligence  in  the  particular  mode  of  stowing  and 
changing  the  loading  of  cargo,  as  the  primary  cause,  though 
that  cause  became  operative  through  its  effect  on  the  trim  of  the 
ship,  that  negligence  in  loading  fell  within  the  first  section.  The 
ship  and  owner  were,  therefore,  liable  for  the  damage  and  the 
third  section  was  inapplicable.^* 

Sec.  360.  Negligence  in  delivery  of  cargo  within  the  first 
section  of  the  Harter  Act. — When  the  primary  cause  of  a 
loss  is  negligence  in  delivery  of  the  cargo,  the  loss  comes 
within  the  first,  and  not  the  third,  section  of  the  Harter  Act.*^^ 
Care  must  be  exercised  by  the  owner  to  see  that  a  vessel  is  un- 
loaded evenly,  and  that  it  is  not  made  top  or  side  heavy. 
If,  through  an  uneven  unloading,  the  vessel  lurches  to  one  side 
and  springs  a  leak  or  sinks,  or  if  it  capsizes  and  injures  the 
cargo  remaining  on  board,  the  vessel  will  be  liable  in  damages.^^ 

Sec.  361.  Vessel  is  liable  for  failure  to  deliver  at  all 
through   master's  negligence   in   overlooking   goods. — A   ves- 

34.  Knott  V.  Botany  Worsted  Id.  107  Fed.  294.  In  this  case  the 
Mills,  179  U.  S.  69,  45  L.  Ed.  90,  vessel  became  top-heavy  by  the 
aff'g  Botany  Worsted  Mills  v.  careless  discharge  of  cargo  and 
Knott,  82  Fed.  471,  27  C.  C.  A.  lurched  violently  to  port  until  an 
326,  51  U.  S.  App.  467,  and  Id.  76  open  coal  port  was  carried  down 
Fed.  582.  below  the  water  line  sinking  the 

35.  The  Seaboard,  119  Fed.  375.  ship  and  injuring  all  the  merchan- 
In   this   case   goods   were   lost   by    dise  on  board. 

the  sinking  of  a  lighter  to  which  See  also  to  the  same  effect  Mc- 

the    goods    had    been    transferred  Allister  v.  Railway,  111  Fed.  938, 

before  the  lighter  could  reach  the  aff'd    (C.    C.    A.)    113    Fed.    1019; 

wharf.  Donaldson  v.  Perry  Co.   (C.  C.  A.) 

36.  The  Germanic,  196  U.  S.  589,  138  Fed.  643. 
aff'g  124  Fed.  1,  59  C.  C.  A.  521  and 


374  THE   LAW   OF    CARRIERS.  [§  362. 

sel  is  liable  for  negligence  in  so  stowing  goods  that  their  de- 
livery at  their  destination  is  overlooked,  resulting  in  their  sub- 
sequent loss.  It  is  clearly  the  duty  of  the  master  of  a  vessel  be- 
fore leaving  a  port  to  examine  the  manifests  or  other  memo- 
randa of  the  vessel  to  ascertain  whether  the  portion  of  the  cargo 
consigned  to  that  place  has  been  delivered,  and  if  not,  to  search 
for  the  missing  consignment  before  leaving  port.  His  failure  to 
do  this  is  obviously  a  breach  of  his  general  obligation  to  deliver 
his  cargo  to  its  consignees  within  the  meaning  of  the  first  or 
second  section  of  the  Harter  Act.  Regard  may  doubtless  be  had 
to  the  custom  of  the  port  as  to  what  shall  be  termed  a  proper 
delivery  with  respect  to  the  time  and  manner  of  such  delivery, 
but  a  failure  to  deliver  at  all  is  negligence.  No  such  want  of 
delivery  can  be  excused  under  the  terms  either  of  the  first  or 
second  sections  of  the  Harter  Act.^'^ 

Sec.  362.  Second  section  of  Harter  Act  is  the  comple- 
ment of  section  three. — Before  the  passage  of  the  act  of 
Congress,  known  as  the  Harter  Act,  it  was  the  settled  law  of  the 
United  States  courts  that,  in  the  absence  of  special  contract, 
there  was  a  warranty  upon  the  part  of  the  shipowTier  that  the 
ship  was  seaworthy  at  the  beginning  of  her  voyage.  The  war- 
ranty was  absolute,  and  did  not  depend  upon  the  knowledge  of 
the  owner  or  the  diligence  of  his  efforts  to  provide  a  seaworthy 
vessel.ss 

After  its  passage,  this  act  became  the  rule  of  law  for  cases 
coming  within  its  terms.  In  section  two  it  is  expressly  pro- 
vided that  it  shall  be  unlawful  for  any  vessel  transporting  prop- 
erty or  merchandise  from  or  between  ports  of  the  United  States 
and  foreign  ports  to  insert  in  any  bills  of  lading  or  shipping 

37.  Calderon  v.  Atlas  Steamship  affirming  43  Fed.  681  and  50  Fed. 
Co.,  170  U.  S.  272,  reversing,  Id.  567;  The  Edwin  I.  Morrison,  153 
69  Fed.  574,  16  C.  C.  A.  332,  35  U.  U.  S.  199,  14  Sup.  Ct.  823;  The  Ir- 
S.  App.   587,  and  Id.  64  Fed.  874.  rawaddy,  171  U.  S.  187,  18  Sup.  Ct. 

38.  The  Southwark,  191  U.  S.  1,  R.  831,  43  L.  Ed.  130;  on  certifica- 
48    L.    Ed.    65,    24    Sup.    Ct.    R.    1,  tion  from  Flint  v.  Chrystal,  83  Fed. 
reversing.  Id.,  108  Fed.  880,  48  C.  987,  31  C.  C.  A.  593,  and  reversing 
C.  A.  123;  The  Caledonia,  157  U.  S.  Chrystal  v.  Flint,  82  Fed.  472. 
124,  15  Sup.  Ct.  537,  39  L.  Ed.  644, 


§  363.]  WHEN    CAKREER   NOT   LIABLE.  375 

documents  any  covenant  or  agreement  whereby  the  .obligation 
of  the  owner  to  use  due  diligence  to  properly  equip,  man,  pro- 
vision and  outfit  said  vessel,  and  to  make  the  vessel  seaworthy 
and  capable  of  performing  her  intended  voyage  shall  in  anywise 
be  lessened,  weakened  or  avoided/'^  In  this  respect  section  two 
of  the  Barter  Act  is  the  complement  of  section  three,  which  ex- 
cuses the  shipowner  if  he  has  exercised  due  diligence  to  make 
the  vessel  *'in  all  respects  seaworthy  and  properly  manned, 
equipped  and  supplied."  The  two  sections  are  to  be  read 
together,  both  being  intended  to  enforce  the  same  rule  of  dili- 
gence in  respect  to  the  same  subject  matter."**^ 

Sec.  363.  Effect  of  sections  two  and  three  on  the  war- 
ranty of  seaworthiness. — The  provisions  of  the  second  section 
deal,  not  with  the  general  duty  of  the  owner  to  furnish  a  sea- 
worthy ship,  but  solely  with  his  powder  to  exempt  himself 
from  so  doing  by  contract  where  the  particular  conditions  ex- 
acted by  the  statute  obtain.  Because  the  owner  may,  when  he 
has  used  due  diligence  to  furnish  a  seaworthy  ship,  contract 
against  the  obligations  of  seaworthiness,  it  does  not  at  all  follow 
that  when  he  has  made  no  contract  to  so  exempt  himself  he  nev- 
ertheless is  relieved  from  furnishing  a  seaworthy  ship,  and  is 
subjected  only  to  using  due  diligence.  To  make  it  unlawful  to 
insert  in  a  contract  a  provision  exempting  from  seaworthiness 
where  due  diligence  has  not  been  used,  cannot  by  any  sound 
rule  of  construction  be  treated  as  implying  that  where  due  dili- 

39.  The  Southwark,  191  U.  S.  1,  purpose  of  the  act,  and  shows  an 
48  L.  Ed.  65,  reversing  108  Fed.  intention  upon  the  part  of  Congress 
880,  48  C.  C.  A.  123.  to   relax   in   certain    respects    the 

40.  The  Prussia,  93  Fed.  837,  35  harshness  of  the  previous  rules  of 
C.  C.  A.  625  aff'y.  Id.,  88  Fed.  531.  obligation  upon  ship  owners,  pro- 
In  this  case  it  was  held  that  sec-  vided  the  owner  shall  exercise  due 
tion  two  does  not  forbid  exemption  diligence  to  make  the  vessel  sea- 
from  liability  in  a  bill  of  lading  for  worthy  in  all  respects,  in  which 
a  latent  defect  in  the  refrigerating  event  neither  the  vessel  nor  the 
n^p-iratus.  In  The  Southwark,  191  owner  shall  be  liable,  among  other 
II.  S.  1,  48  L.  Ed.  65,  reversing,  108  things,  for  faults  of  management 
Fed.  s.iO,  48  C.  C.  A.  123,  the  court  or  for  loss  from  inherent  defect, 
^ail:  "Section  three  must  be  read  quality  or  vice  of  the  thing  car- 
v.it'.i  section  two  to  effectuate  the  ried." 


376  THE   LAW    OP    CARRIERS.  [§  363. 

gence  has  been  used,  and  there  is  no  contract  exempting  the 
owner,  his  obligation  to  furnish  a  seaworthy  vessel  has  ceased 
to  exist.^^  His  use  of  due  diligence  has  only  the  effect,  so  far  as 
the  second  section  is  concerned,  of  reviving  his  right  to  limit  by 
special  contract  his  liability  against  unseaworthiness;  and,  with- 
out such  special  contract,  the  absolute  warranty  of  seaworthi- 
ness remains  even  though  due  diligence  has  been  used.^^ 

The  same  kind  of  result  has  been  reached  with  reference  to 
section  three.  The  exemption  of  the  owners  or  charterers  from 
loss  resulting  from  "faults  or  errors  in  navigation  or  in  the 
management  of  the  vessel,"  and  for  certain  other  designated 
causes,  in  no  way  implies  that  because  the  owner  is  thus  ex- 
empted when  he  has  been  duly  diligent  that  thereby  the  law  has 
relieved  him  from  the  duty  of  furnishing  a  seaworthy  vessel. 
The  immunity  from  risks  of  a  described  character,  when  due 
diligence  has  been  used^  cannot  be  so  extended  as  to  cause  the 
statute  to  say  that  the  owner  when  he  has  been  duly  diligent  is 
not  only  exempted  in  accordance  with  the  tenor  of  the  statute 
from  the  limited  and  designated  risks  which  are  named  therein, 
but  is  also  relieved,  as  respects  every  claim  of  every  other  de- 
scription, from  the  duty  of  furnishing  a  seaworthy  ship.*^     In 

41.  The  Carib  Prince,  170  U.  S.  though  the  parties  said,  'If  we  have 
655,  18  Sup.  Ct.  753,  42  L.  Ed.  1181,  in  the  exceptions  inadvertently  in- 
reversing  Id.  68  Fed.  254,  15  C.  C.  serted  a  clause  cutting  down  the 
A.  385  and  Wupperman  v.  The  obligation  in  respect  of  seaworthi- 
Carib  Prince,  63  Fed.  266.  ness  below  an  obligation  to  exer- 

42.  The  Carib  Prince,  supra;  The  cise  care,  that  clause  shall  be  null 
Silvia,  171  U.  S.  462,  19  Sup.  Ct.  R.  and  void';  but  it  does  not  amount 
7,  43  L.  Ed.  241,  affirming  64  Fed.  to  a  stipulation  that  the  exercise 
607,  35  U.  S.  App.  395,  15  C.  C.  A.  of  due  diligence  shall  be  sufficient. 
262;  The  Aggi,  107  Fed.  300,  46  C.  For  that  purpose  an  express  stipu- 
C.  A.  276,  affirming  93  Fed.  484.  lation  is  necessary,    and    there    is 

In  McFadden  ?;.  Blue  Star  Line,  none  to  be  found  in  the  section  it- 

(1905)  1  K.  B.  697,  the  court  said;  self,  and  of  course  therefore  none 

"The  effect  of  the  incorporation  of  imported  by  its  incorporation." 

.s.  2,  which  provides  that  it  shall  In   The  Tjomo,   115   Fed.   919,  a 

not  be  lawful  to  insert  a  clause  in  special  contract  existed  exempting 

a  bill  of  lading  whereby  the  obliga-  the  vessel  from  liability, 

tion  of  the  owner  to  exercise  due  43.  The  Carib  Prince,  supra. 

diligence  shall  be  lessened,    is    as  In  McFadden  r.  Blue  Star  Line. 


364.] 


WHEN    CARRIER   NOT   LIABLE. 


377 


other  words,  if  the  unseaworthiness  is  not  a  result  of  error  or 
fault  in  management  or  of  one  of  the  other  causes  designated 
in  the  third  section,  the  third  section  does  not  apply;  and  even 
if  it  is  the  result  of  one  of  the  designated  causes,  the  exemption 
still  cannot  obtain,  unless  the  owner  used  due  diligence  to  make 
the  vessel  seaworthy.'*'* 

Sec.  364.  Same  subject— Latent  defects.— In  all  cases, 
therefore,  in  which  unseaworthiness  is  not  a  result  of  one 
of  the  causes  designated  in  the  third  section,  the  warranty  of 
seaworthiness  remains  absolute.  This  warranty  does  not  depend 
on  the  shipowner's  knowledge  or  ignorance,  his  care  or  negli- 
gence.^^ The  shipowner's  undertaking  is  not  merely  that  he  will 
do  and  has  done  his  best  to  make  the  ship  fit,  but  that  the  ship 
is  really  fit  to  undergo  the  perils  of  the  sea  and  other  incidental 
risks  to  which  she  might  be  exposed  in  the  course  of  the  voyage ; 
and  this  being  sOj  that  undertaking  is  not  discharged  because  the 
want  of  fitness  is  the  result  of  latent  defects.^*^ 


supra,  the  court  said:  "And  the 
incorporation  of  s.  3  does  nothing 
more  than  give  immunity  in  re- 
spect of  loss  resulting  from  cer- 
tain specified  causes  in  the  course 
of  the  voyage,  provided  the  ship- 
owner has  exercised  due  diligence 
to  make  the  ship  seaworthy.  The 
reference  to  due  diligence  is  a 
mere  qualification  upon  that  im- 
munity; it  is  not  a  limitation  of 
the  obligation  under  the  war- 
ranty." 

44.  International  Navigation  Co. 
V  Farr  &  Bailey  Mfg.  Co.,  ISl  U.  S. 
218,  45  L.  Ed.  830,  21  Sup.  Ct.  R. 
591,  affirming  Farr  &  Bailey  Mfg. 
Co.  V.  International  Navigation  Co. 
9S  Fed.  636,  39  C.  C.  A.  197. 

45.  The  Edwin  I.  Morrison,  153 
U.  S.  199,  14  Sup.  Ct.  R.  823. 

46.  In  The  Carib  Prince,  170  U. 
S.  655,  18  Sup.  Ct.  R.  753,  42  L. 
Ed.  1181,  reversing  Id.  68  Fed.  254, 


15  C.  C.  A.  385  and  Wupperman  v. 
The  Carib  Prince,  63  Fed.  266,  the 
vessel  was  a  new  British  steam- 
ship, built  by  builders  of  the  high- 
est class.  The  damage  was  due  to 
a  latent  defect  in  a  rivet,  arising 
from  the  fact  that  the  quality  of 
the  iron  had  been  injured  by  too 
much  hammering  at  the  time  it 
was  annealed.  After  the  construc- 
tion the  tank  had  been  tested  by 
hammer  and  by  water  pressure, 
and  it  was  found  to  be  tight,  and 
strong  enough  to  sustain  the 
weight  of  water  when  not  in  mo- 
tion, but  when  in  motion  the  rivet 
proved  insufficient  and  gave  waj'. 
The  Supreme  Court  of  the  United 
States  held  that  the  exemptions 
contained  in  the  Harter  Act  were 
inapplicable,  and  the  vessel  was 
liable  for  damage  to  the  cargo  re- 
sulting from  that  latent  defect. 
See  also  The  Caledonia,  157  U.  S. 


378 


THE   LAW   OF    CARRIERS. 


[§  365. 


In  all  cases  in  which  unseaworthiness  is  a  result  of  one  of  the 
causes  designated  in  the  third  section,  the  shipowner  is  relieved 
from  the  warranty  of  absolute  seaworthiness  to  which  he  was 
bound  prior  to  the  Harter  Act.  The  difference  is  important  be- 
cause in  those  cases  it  relieves  the  shipowner  from  responsibility 
for  latent  and  undiscoverable  defects,  but  the  warranty  of  dili- 
gence remains.^ ''^ 

Sec.  365.  Exemption  clauses  in  bills  of  lading  strictly  con- 
strued.— Even  though  due  diligence  has  been  used,  clauses  of 
a  bill  of  lading  exempting  the  owner  from  the  general  obliga- 
tion of  furnishing  a  seaworthy  vessel  must  be  confined  within 
strict  limits,  and  are  not  to  be  extended  by  latitudinarian  con- 
struction or  forced  implication  so  as  to  comprehend  a  state  of 
unseaworthiness,  whether  patent  or  latent,  existing  at  the  com- 
mencement of  the  voyage.  In  other  words,  the  court  will  not 
readily  infer  an  exception  of  that  warranty.*^ 


124,  39  L.  Ed.  644,  15  Sup.  Ct.  R. 
537,  affirming  43  Fed.  681  and  50 
Fed.  567. 

47.  In  The  Irrawaddy,  171  U.  S. 
192,  43  L.  Ed.  130,  18  Sup.  Ct.  R. 
831;  The  Southwark,  191  U.  S.  1, 
48  L.  Ed.  65;  Nord-Deutscher 
Lloyd  V.  President,  etc.,  of  Insur- 
ance Co.,  110  Fed.  420,  49  C.  C.  A.  1, 
and  The  Colima,  82  Fed.  665,  there 
are  general  dicta  to  the  effect  that 
"the  main  purposes  of  the  act  were 
to  relieve  the  shipowner  from  lia- 
bility for  latent  defects,  not  dis- 
coverable by  the  utmost  care  and 
diligence."  As  thus  stated,  those 
dicta  are  undoubtedly  too  broad, 
and  all  that  the  courts  had  in  mind 
probably  were  those  cases  in  which 
unseaworthiness  is  a  result  of  one 
of  the  causes  designated  in  the 
third  section  of  the  act. 

48.  The  Carib  Prince,  170  U.  S. 
655,  18  Sup.  Ct.  R.  753,  42  L.  Ed. 
1181,  reversing.  Id.  68  Fed.  254,  15 


C.  C.  A.  385,  and  Wupperman  v. 
The  Carib  Prince,  63  Fed.  266; 
Borthwick  v.  Steamship  Co.  (1904) 

1  K.  B.  319,  73  L.  J.  K.  B.  240; 
Rathbone  Bros.  &  Co.  v.  Mclver 
(1903)  2  K.  B.  378,  72  L.  J.  K.  B. 
703,  19  Times  L.  R.  590,  reversing, 
(1902)   8  Com.  Cas.  1. 

The  provision  in  a  bill  of  lading 
that  the  ship  is  not  to  be  answer- 
able for  loss  through  any  "latent 
defect  in  the  machinery  or  hull 
not  resulting  from  want  of  due 
diligence  by  the  owners  "does  not 
cover  a  condition  of  unseaworthi- 
ness existing  at  the  commence- 
ment of  the  voyage,  but  applies 
only  to  a  state  of  unseaworthiness 
arising  during  the  voyage.  The 
Aggi,  107  Fed.  300,  46  C.  C.  A. 
276,  affirming,  93  Fed.  484.  In 
The  Maori  King  r.  Hughes,  (1895) 

2  Q.  B.  550,  65  L.  J.  Q.  B.  168, 
affirming  64  L.  J.  Q.  B.  744,  a 
similar  exception   was  under  con- 


§366. 


WHEN    CARRIER   NOT   LIABLE. 


379 


Sec.  366.  The  test  of  seaworthiness.— The  test  of  seaworthi- 
ness is  whether  the  vessel  is  reasonably  fit  to  carry  the  cargo 
which  she  has  undertaken  to  transport.  Seaworthiness  depends 
not  only  upon  the  vessel  being  staunch  and  fit  to  meet  the  perils 
of  the  sea,  but  also  upon  its  character  in  reference  to  the  par- 
ticular cargo  to  be  transported.  A  vessel  must  be  able  to  trans- 
port the  cargo  which  it  is  held  out  as  fit  to  carry  or  it  is  not 
seaworthy  in  that  respect.  A  vessel,  for  instance,  without  spe- 
cial appliances,  would  be  unseaworthy  as  to  a  perishable  cargo 
of  dressed  beef,  to  be  shipped  on  a  long  voyage  in  hot  weather.'*'* 

Sec.  367.  Burden  of  proof  on  carrier  to  prove  vessel  was 
seaworthy  or  due  diligence  was  used  to  make  her  seaworthy. — 

Even  if  a  loss  occurs  through  the  fault  or  error  in  management 
of  a  vessel,  the  exemption  given  by  the  Harter  Act  cannot  be 
availed  of  unless  the  vessel  is  seaworthy  when  she  sails  or  due 


sideration  and  the  court  came  to 
the  same  conclusion.  See  also  The 
Sandfleld,  93  Fed.  663,  34  C.  C.  A. 
612,  afflrming  79  Fed.   371. 

49.  The  South wark,  191  U.  S.  1, 
48  L.  Ed.  65,  24  Sup.  Ct.  R.  1, 
reversing  108  Fed.  880,  48  C.  C.  A. 
123;  American  Sugar  Refining  Co. 
V.  Rickinson  Sons  &  Co.,  124  Fed. 
188,  59  C.  C.  A.  604,  reversing  120 
Fed.  591;  Neilson  v.  Coal,  etc.,  Co., 
122  Fed.  617,  60  C.  C.  A.  175,  af- 
firming The  Nellie  Floyd,  116  Fed. 
80;  The  Thames,  61  Fed.  1014,  10 
C.  C.  A.  232,  8  U.  S.  App.  580; 
Rowson  V.  Atlantic  Transport  Co., 
(1903)  2  K.  B.  666,  72  L.  J.  K.  B. 
811,  affirming  (1903)  1  K.  B.  114; 
The  Maori  King  v.  Hughes  (1895) 
2  Q.  B.  550,  65  L.  J.  Q.  B.  168, 
affi'g,  64  L.  J.  Q.  B.  744;  Dene 
Shipping   Co.    v.    Tucedie   Trading 

Co.,  C.   C.   A.  ,   143   Fed. 

854,  affirming   133   Fed.   589. 

Seaworthiness  has  been  defined 
as  "that  quality  of  a  ship  which 


fits  it  for  carrying  safely  the  par- 
ticular merchandise  which  it  takes 
on  board."  The  Artie  Bird,  109 
Fed.  167. 

A  vessel,  under  the  Harter  Act, 
must  be  reasonably  fit  to  carry  her 
cargo,  having  in  view  the  time  of 
the  year  and  the  weather  to  be 
fairly  expected  during  the  voyage. 
The  C.  W.  Elphicke,  122  Fed.  439, 
58  C.  C.  A.  421,  affirming  117  Fed. 
279. 

The  warranty  of  seaworthiness 
does  not  imply  a  warranty  of  in- 
surability at  the  usual  rates,  and 
the  refusal  of  insurance,  while  it 
may  be  considered  as  evidence  of 
unseaworthiness,  more  or  less  con- 
vincing according  to  the  circum- 
stances of  the  case,  is  never  con- 
clusive evidence  thereof,  but  is  a 
fact  to  be  considered  in  connection 
with  the  actual  condition  of  the 
vessel.     Moore  &  Co.   v.  Cornwall. 

C.    C.    A.    ,    144    Fed.    22, 

affirming  132  Fed.  868. 


380  THE   LAW   OF    CARRIERS.  [§368. 

diligence  to  make  her  so  has  been  exercised,  and  it  is  for  the 
owner  to  establish  the  existence  of  one  or  the  other  of  these  con- 
ditions.^ But  the  casting  of  the  burden  of  proof  on  a  shipowner 
does  not  destroy  the  presumptions  in  his  favor  which  exist  under 
the  general  law  of  evidence.  Thus,  although  the  burden  of 
proving  seaworthiness  rests  upon  one  who  wishes  to  avail  him- 
self of  the  exemption  of  the  third  section  of  the  act  there  is  a 
presumption  that  the  owner  of  a  vessel  performed  his  duty  in 
making  her  seaworthy,  and  properly  manning,  equipping  and 
supplying  her  for  the  voyage  she  was  about  to  make,  and  this 
presumption  of  fact,  where  not  controverted,  sustains  that  bur- 
den, or,  in  case  of  controversy,  may  help  to  sustain  it.^  The 
question,  therefore,  whether  a  ship  is  reasonably  fit  to  carry  her 
cargo,  or  due  diligence  has  been  exercised  to  make  her  so,  must 
depend  on  the  particular  facts  of  each  case  and  must  be  deter- 
mined upon  the  whole  circumstances  and  the  whole  evidence.^ 

Sec.  368.  How  far  warranty  of  seaworthiness  extends — 
Vessel  must  be  seaworthy  at  each  stage  of  voyage. — The  im- 
plied warranty  of  seaworthiness  extends  to  the  time  when  the 
vessel  actually  breaks  ground  for  the  voyage,  and  not  merely 
to  the  time  when  she  begins  to  take  in  cargo.    Hence  there  is  a 

1.  The  South wark,   191  U.   S.   1,  making  the  ship  seaworthy.     The 

48  L.  Ed.  65,  24  Sup.  Ct.  R.  1,  re-  Friesland,    104    Fed.    99;    The    Co- 

versing  108  Fed.  880,  48  C.  C.  A.  lima,     82     Fed.     665,     679;      The 

123    and    104    Fed.     103;     Interna-  Presque  Isle,  140  Fed.  202. 

tional    Navigation    Co.    r.    Farr    &  2.  The   Wildcroft,   130   Fed.   521, 

Bailey  Mfg.  Co.,  181  U.  S.  218,  45  65  C.  C.  A.  145,  affl'g,  126  Fed.  229 

L.  Ed.  830,  affirming  Farr  &  Bailey  and   124    Fed.    631.     See   also   The 

Mfg.   Co.   V.   International   Naviga-  Giles  Loring,  48  Fed.  463. 

tion  Co.,  98  Fed.  636,  39  C.  C.  A.  The  finding  that  a  vessel  is  un- 

197.  seaworthy  ought  not  to  be  based 

The  burden  is  on  a  shipowner  to  on   doubtful   inferences.     Memphis 

show    seaworthiness.      The    South-  &  C.  Packet  Co.  v.   Overman  Car- 

wark,  supra;  The  Oneida,  128  Fed.  riage  Co.,  93  Fed.  246. 

687,  63  C.  C.  A.  239,  reversing  108  3.  International    Navigation    Co. 

Fed.  886;   The  Manitoba,  104  Fed.  r.  Farr  &  Bailey  Mfg.  Co.  181  U.  S. 

145;    The   Gordon    Campbell,    141  218,  45  L.  Ed.  830,  21  Sup.  Ct.  591, 

Fed.  435.  affirming  Farr  &  Bailey  Mfg.   Co. 

The  burden  of  proof  is  on  a  ship-  f.  International  Navigation  Co.,  98 

owner   to    show    due    diligence    in  Fed.  636,  39  C.  C.  A.  197. 


§369.]  WHEN    CARRIER   NOT   LIABLE.  381 

breach  of  the  warranty  where  the  vessel  is  pierced  by  an  un- 
known obstruction  while  receiving  cargo  at  a  dock  and  th(3 
owners  of  the  vessel  are  solely  liable  for  a  resulting  injury  to 
part  of  the  cargo.^ 

When  a  voyage  consists  of  several  stages,  the  vessel  must  be 
made  seaworthy  at  the  commencement  of  each  stage  of  the  voy- 
age she  then  enters  upon.^ 

Sec.  369.  Vessel  liable  for  initial  instability. — Where  dam- 
age can  be  traced  directly  to  the  initial  instability  of  a  ship,  the 
shipowner  is  not  relieved  from  the  consequences  of  that  fault  by 
the  Harter  Act.^  Nor  can  he,  in  such  case,  be  relieved  by  plead- 
ing the  usages  of  the  time  and  port.  However  material  usages 
may  be  in  questions  relating  to  the  equipment  of  the  ship,  the 
carrying  of  a  deck  load,  or  of  different  kinds  of  cargo  on  the 
same  voyage,  the  amount  and  arrangement  of  dunnage,  the 
proximity  of  different  kinds  of  goods  to  each  other,  and  the 
mode  of  stowing  and  securing  them,  usages  can  have  little  ap- 
plication to  questions  affecting  the  stability  of  the  ship.  For  no 
custom  can  validate  navigation  by  unstable  ships,  nor  can  cus- 
tom determine  whether  a  given  vessel  with  a  given  loading  is 

4.  Bowring  v.  Thebaud,  56  Fed.  6.  In  The  Oneida,  128  Fed.  687, 
520,  5  C.  C.  A.  640,  11  U.  S.  App.  63  C.  C.  A.  239,  reversing  108  Fed. 
648,  affirming  42  Fed.  795.  886,  faulty  loading  produced  a  list, 

In  McFadden  v.  Blue  Star  Line  and  in  order  to  readjust  the  cargo 

(1905)    1   K.   B.   697,   Channel,   J.,  it    became    necessary    to    open    a 

came  to  the  following  conclusion:  cargo   port   in   the   lower  between 

"The    ordinary    warranty    of    sea-  decks.    Opening  the  port,  followed 

worthiness,    then,    does    not    take  by  the  sudden  lurch  of  the  ship, 

effect  before  the  ship  is  ready  to  caused   the  damage  to  the   cargo, 

sail,  nor  does  it  continue  to  take  for  which  the  ship  was  held  liable, 

effect  after  she  has  sailed;    it  takes  In  the  opinion  of  the  court  a  ship 

effect  at  the  time  of  sailing,  and  cannot   be    said    to    be    seaworthy 

at  the  time  of  sailing  alone."  which  has  at  the  inception  of  the 

5.  McFadden  v.  Blue  Star  Line,  voyage  little,  if  any,  positive  meta- 
(1905)  1  K.  B.  697;  The  Vortigem,  centric  height,  a  list  of  eight  or 
(1899)  Prob.  140,  68  L.  J.  Prob.  49,  nine  degrees,  and  which  has  her 
80  Law  T.  (N.  S.)  382,  47  W'kly  cargo  so  distributed  that  her  in- 
Rep.  437;  Thin  v.  Richards  &  Co.,  stability  must  increase  as  she  pro- 
(1892)   2  Q.  B.  141,  62  L.  J,  Q.  B.  ceeds. 

39. 


382  THE   LAW    OF    CARRIERS.  [§  370. 

stable  or  not.  Ships  vary  greatly  in  model,  and  the  require- 
ments of  loading  in  order  to  insure  stability  vary  accordingly. 
These  requirements  are  matters  of  positive  knowledge,  which  no 
usage  can  affect  or  vary.  Each  ship  presents  its  own  problems. 
Custom  has  little,  if  any,  scope  for  application.  And  as  the  lim- 
its of  stable  loading  are  determinable  by  rule  for  any  given  ship, 
no  usage  or  practice  can  justify  a  departure  from  it.^ 

Inferences  as  to  the  instability  of  a  ship,  however,  may  be 
drawn  from  the  circumstances  surrounding  an  injury  to  it. 
Thus  if  a  vessel  is  not  able  to  withstand  the  swells  of  passing 
vessels,  the  inference  is  that  she  is  in  need  of  repairs  and  is  not 
seaworthy.^  So  also  there  is  a  presumption  of  unseaworthiness 
when  a  vessel  capsizes  and  sinks  in  less  than  twenty-four  hours 
after  leaving  port  without  having  encountered  any  storm  or 
other  known  cause  sufficient  to  account  for  the  catastrophe,^  or 
if  a  steamship,  in  an  ordinary  storm,  when  not  disabled,  can 
neither  keep  out  of  the  trough  of  the  sea,  nor  ride  safely  over 
it.^"  But  if  other  facts  material  to  the  inquiry  as  to  the  seawor- 
thiness of  the  vessel  are  proved,  those  facts  must  also  be  consid- 
ered; and  they  must  be  weighed  against  such  presumptive  evi- 
dence, and  unless  the  balance  of  the  evidence  warrants  the  con- 
clusion that  the  vessel  was  unseaworthy  when  she  sailed,  such 
unseaworthiness  cannot  be  properly  treated  as  established.^^ 

Sec.  370.  Presumption  of  unseaworthiness  when  leaks  soon 
happen  in  ordinary  weather. — Leaks  soon  happening  in  ordi- 

7.  The  Colima,  82  Fed.  665.  boilers  below,  and  in  the  absence 

8.  Forbes  v.  Express  &  Trans-  of  heavy  sails  and  spars  aloft, 
portation  Co.,  Ill  Fed.  796.  They   should  be  stable  enough  to 

9.  Ajum  Goolam  Hossen  &  Co.  lie  safely,  in  ordinary  storms,  in 
V.  Insurance  Co.,  L.  R.  (1900)  App.  the  trough  of  the  sea,  because 
Cas.  362.  they  are  liable  at  any  time  to  be 

10.  The  Colima,  82  Fed.  665.  forced  into  that  situation,  and  of- 
Steamers  ought  not  to  capsize,  ex-  ten  are  forced  into  it  for  consider- 
cept  under  most  extraordinary  cir-  able  periods  by  the  accidental  dis- 
cumstances.     As  respects  stability,  abling  of  their  machinery. 

they  have  naturally  a  double  ad-  11.  Ajum  Goolam  Hossen  &  Co. 
vantage  over  sail  vessels,  in  the  v.  Insurance  Co.,  L.  R.  (1900)  App, 
great  weight  of  their  engines  and    Cas.  362. 


§371.]  WHEN    CARRIER   NOT   LIABLE.  383 

nary  weather,  and  without  other  adequate  causes  of  injury,  arc 
presumptive  evidence  of  unseaworthiness  at  the  time  of  sailing. 
The  law  will  intend  the  want  of  seaworthiness  because  no  visible 
or  rational  cause  other  than  a  latent  or  inherent  defect  in  the 
vessel  can  be  assigned  for  the  result.^-  But  where  it  satisfac- 
torily appears  that  the  vessel  incurred  marine  perils  which 
might  well  disable  a  staunch  and  well-manned  ship,  no  such  pre- 
sumption can  be  invoked.^^  And  where  for  a  considerable  time 
she  has  incurred  such  perils,  and  shown  herself  staunch  and 
strong,  any  such  presumption  is  not  only  overthrown,  but  the 
fact  of  her  previous  seaworthiness  is  persuasively  indicated.^'* 

Sec.  371.  Leaking  decks  or  hatches.— There  is  no  presump- 
tion that  a  vessel  was  unseaworthy  merely  because  the  decks 
or  hatches  began  to  leak  after  she  had  encountered  a  continuous 
gale  or  hurricane.^^  But  it  is  manifest  that  a  vessel  commencin*^ 
her  voyage  with  hatches  so  improperly  or  negligently  covered, 
or  with  decks  so  improperly  caulked,  that  water  in  large  quan- 
tities can  find  its  way  through  them,  is  not  seaworthy  especially 
when  the  voyage  is  undertaken  at  a  season  of  the  year  when  it  is 
to  be  anticipated  that  the  vessel  will  encounter  heavy  seas  and 
that  her  decks  will  be  constantly  flooded.^  *^ 

Sec.  372.  Defective  rivets  or  bolts. — Unseaworthiness  may 
consist  of  defects  in  rivets  or  bolts  on  tanks  or  boilers  or  on 
parts  of  the  vessel  adjoining  the  cargo.^^     Thus  water  entered 

12.  The  Warren  Adams,  74  Fed.  439,  58  C.  C.  A.  421,  affirming  117 
413,  20  C.  C.  A.  486,  38  U.  S.  App.     Fed.  279. 

356,  s.  c.  163  U.  S.  679;    The  Sin-  A  cargo  of  cement  is  peculiarly 

tram,  64  Fed.  884;  The  Artie  Bird,  susceptible  to  injury  from   water, 

109   Fed.   167;    The   Nellie  R.   Bo-  and    if   the   deck   is   not   properly 

hannon,  64  Fed,  883.  caulked,  the  vessel  is  unseaworthy 

13.  The  Warren  Adams,  supra;  as  to  such  cargo.  Neilson  v.  Coal, 
The  Simtram,  supra.  etc.,  Co.,  122  Fed.  617,  60  C.  C.  A. 

14.  The  Warren  Adams,  supra.  175,  affirming  The    Nellie    Floyd, 

15.  The    Marochal     Suchet,     112  116  Fed.  80. 

Fed.    440;    The    Marlborough,     47        17.  The  Carib  Prince,  170  U.  S. 

Fed.    667;    The    Hyades,    124    Fed.  655,  18  Sup.  Ct.  R.  753,  42  L.  Ed. 

58,  59  C.  C.  A.  424,  affirming  118  1181,  reversing  Id.  68  Fed.  254,  15 

Fed.    85.  C.    C.    A.    385   and    Wupperman    r. 

16.  The  C.  W.  Elphicke,  122  Fed.  The  Carib  Prince,  63  Fed.  266. 


384  THE  LAW   OF    CARRIERS.  [§373. 

around  the  bolts  fastening  the  scroll  work  of  the  figurehead  on 
the  bow  of  a  vessel,  and  injured  sugar  stored  in  the  main  peak. 
Five  or  six  bolts  were  sufficiently  loose  to  admit  the  water  to 
the  main  deck,  from  which  it  flowed  through  small  holes  to  the 
main  peak.  The  vessel  w^as  held  liable  for  the  damage  to  the 
sugar.is 

But  the  fact  that  one  rivet  among  thousands  in  the  hull  of  a 
vessel  parted  under  the  stress  of  heavy  weather,  is  insufficient 
to  raise  a  presumption  of  unseaworthiness  at  the  inception  of 
the  voyage.^  ^ 

Sec.  373.  Unfastened  ports. — Whether  an  unfastened  port 
on  sailing  renders  a  vessel  unseaworthy  or  not,  evidently  de- 
pends on  the  situation  of  the  port,  its  relation  to  the  cargo  or 
passengers,  and  the  means  provided  for  closing  it  on  the  voyage 
when  necessary.  If  its  situation  is  such  that  it  is  safe  in  mod- 
erate weather  and  all  the  requisite  means  and  conditions  are 
provided  for  closing  it  on  the  voyage  when  necessary,  the  vessel 
is  not  unseaworthy;  and  if,  when  closing  becomes  necessary  on 
the  voyage,  those  means  are  not  made  use  of,  the  case  is  one  of 
neglect  or  error  in  management  within  the  meaning  of  section 
three  of  the  Harter  Act.^o  But  knowledge  that  a  cargo  port  is 
open,  is  one  of  the  indispensable  requisites  and  conditions  for 
securing  the  closing  of  it  when  necessary  on  the  voyage.  With- 
out that  information  all  other  provisions  are  useless ;  so  that 
where  no  further  inspection  is  expected  or  ordinarily  required 

18.  The  Aggi,  107  Fed.  300,  46  that  the  usual  and  ordinary  tests 
C.  C.  A.  276,  affirming  93  Fed.  had  been  applied  before  sailing. 
484.  The  court  held  that  the  breaking 

19.  The  Sandfield,  92  Fed.  663,  of  the  rivets  occurred  through  the 
34  C.  C.  A.  612,  affirming  79  Fed.  heavy  weather  encountered,  and 
371.  not   because   the   ship   was   unsea- 

In  Grubman  v.  The  Ontario,  115  worthy. 
Fed.  769,  53  C.  C.  A.  199,  affirming         20.  The  Silvia,  171  U.  S.  462,  19 

The  Ontario,  106  Fed.  324,  damage  Sup.  Ct.  7,  43  L.  Ed.  241,  affirming 

was  caused  by  the  giving  way  of  64   Fed.    607,   35   U.    S.   App.    395; 

two  rivets  about  8  inches  apart  on  The   Manitoba,    104   Fed.    145;    see 

the   top   of   a  ballast    tank    upon  also  Steel  v.  Steamship  Co.,  3  App. 

which,    properly    dunnaged,    wool  Gas.  72. 
was  stowed.    The  evidence  showed 


J 


§374.]  WHEN   CARRIER   NOT   LIABLE.  385 

to  be  made,  and  no  knowledge  that  the  port  is  open  can  be  ex- 
pected to  be  acquired  by  the  officers  on  the  voyage,  a  port  sup- 
posed to  be  closed  but  in  fact  open  and  blocked  by  cargo  and 
not  likely  to  be  discovered  to  be  open,  must  be  considered  un- 
seaworthiness  on  sailing,  in  so  far  as  it  is  likely  to  imperil  ship 
and  cargo,  though  no  farther.-'i  In  the  case  of  ports  situated 
only  two  or  three  feet  above  the  water  line^^  or  of  ports  situated 
so  low  in  the  vessel  as  to  be  submerged  when  the  vessel  is  fully 
loaded,  such  a  rule  is  especially  applicable,  and  the  owners  of 
the  vessel  will  not  be  heard  to  say  it  was  a  fault  in  the  "manage- 
ment" of  the  vessel.23  The  same  rule  obtains  where  no  test  is 
made  of  a  port  before  sailing,  and  damage  is  caused  by  a  badly 
fitting  blind  and  glass  door  through  which  streams  of  water 
spurt  at  every  roll  of  the  ship,^* 

Sec.  374.  Water  and  steam  pipes,  etc.— The  water  or  steam 
pipes  in  a  vessel  should  be  carefully  inspected  and  placed  in  a 
serviceable  condition  before  sailing.  Existing  leaks  should  be 
stopped^s  and  the  pipes  shoulcl  be  suitably  protected  against 
frost.-*^     Suitable    casing    should    be    provided-^  and  valves  in 

21.  The  Manitoba,  104  Fed.  145;  ship    at   starting,    and     not    from 

Dobell  &  Co.  V.  Steamship  Co.,  64  faults  or  errors  in  navigation. 

L.    J.    Q.    B.    777,    (1895)    2    Q.    B.  22.  International  Navigation  Co. 

408.     In  this  latter  case  the  cargo  v.  Farr  &  Bailey  Mfg.  Co.,  181  U. 

was  injured  by  sea  water  coming  S.  218,  45  L.  Ed.  830,  21  Sup.  Ct. 

into  the  vessel  during  the  voyage  R.    591,    affirming    Farr   &    Bailey 

through   a    port    hole    which    the  Mfg.   Co.   v.   International   Naviga- 

ship's    carpenter,    whose     duty    it  tion  Co.,  98  Fed.  636,  39  C.  C.  A. 

was  to  do  so,  had  omitted  properly  197. 

to  close  before   the  vessel   started  23.  The  Tennedos,  137  Fed.  443. 

upon   her  voyage.     The  port  hole  24.  The  Phoenicia,   90   Fed.   116, 

in  question  was  used  for  shipping  affirmed  on  opinion  of  lower  court, 

cargo,    and    was    intended     to     be  Id.  99  Fed.  1005,  40  C.  C.  A.  221. 

closed  when  the  loading  was  com-  25.  Northwestern  Transp.  Co.  v. 

pleted     and     before      the     vessel  Leiter,  107  Fed.  953,  47  C.  C.  A. 

started.    Once  the  ship  had  started  97. 

on  her  voyage  the  port  hole  could  26.  There  is  a  lack  of  suitable 

not  be  promptly  closed  nor  with-  care  in  loading  cargo  into  a  com- 

out    shifting    a    considerable    por-  partment  which  contains  a  water- 

tion  of  the  cargo.    It  was  held  that  service  pipe,  not  suitably  protected 

the  damage  to  the  cargo  resulted  against  frost  and  without  inspec- 

from   the   unseaworthiness   of   the  tion    as    to    its    condition    which 
25 


386  THE  LAW   OF   CARRIERS.  [§375. 

pipes  through  which  water  or  steam  might  find  its  way  into 
cargo  compartments  should  be  closed.-^  Unless  those  things  are 
done  the  vessel  is  unseaworthy  as  to  cargo  which  may  be  injured 
by  the  escape  of  water  or  steam  from  the  pipes. 

Unseaworthiness,  however,  cannot  be  predicated  of  accidental 
and  temporary  obstructions  in  pipes  which  could  not  fail  to  be 
removed  by  application  of  the  tests  prescribed  by  the  shipown- 
er's instructions,-''  unless,  indeed,  the  shipowner  has  failed  to 
use  due  diligence  at  the  beginning  of  the  voyage  in  equipping 
the  ship  with  appliances  at  the  end  of  the  pipes  to  prevent  the 
entrance  of  foreign  substances  which  might  foul  the  pipes.^^ 
Nor  are  the  owners  of  a  vessel  called  upon  to  test  a  manhole 
joint  by  a  much  greater  pressure  than  is  produced  by  the  normal 
conditions  of  navigation.^i 

Sec.  375.  Bulkheads. — Bulkheads  are  often  used  for  other 
purposes  than  to  make  water-tight  divisions  of  the  hold,  and 
hence  in  such  cases  are  not  expected  to  be  water-tight ;  and  even 
when  they  are  designed  to  be  tight,  for  the  greater  safety  of  the 
ship  or  the  better  preservation  of  the  cargo,  mere  imperfection 
in  carrying  out  this  design  cannot  be  said  to  constitute  unsea- 

could  have  been  readily  discovered  as  a  peril  of  the  seas,  where  such 
and  easily  remedied.  The  Catania,  water  entered  because  of  the  ob- 
107  Fed.  152.  struction  of  a  valve  in  a  pipe  lead- 
in  McFadden  v.  Blue  Star  Line,  ing  to  a  tank  used  for  the  stowage 
(1905)  1  K.  B.  697,  the  vessel  was  of  cargo,  when  the  obstruction  of 
held  liable  for  defective  packing  the  valve  was  due  to  the  failure 
of  a  valve-chest.  to  use  due  diligence  in  equipping 

27.  The  Glenmavis,  69  Fed.  472;  the  ship  at  the  beginning  of  the 
Gilroy  v.  Price,  (1893)  App.  Cas.  voyage  with  a  rose  or  screen  on 
56.  the  lower  end  of  the  pipe  to  pre- 

28.  The  Manitou,  127  Fed.  554,  vent  the  entrance  of  foreign  sub- 
63  C.  C.  A.  109,  affirming  116  Fed.  stances  which  might  f(JTll  the  pipe 
60.  and  thus  allow  the  water  to  enter 

29.  Steinwender  v.  The  Mexican  the  tank  and  injure  the  cargo 
Prince,  82  Fed.  484;  affirmed  on  there  stored.  The  Brilliant,  138 
opinion  of  trial  court  in  The  Mex-  Fed.    743. 

ican  Prince,  91  Fed.  1003,  34  C.  C.        31.  American  Sugar  Refining  Co 

A.  168.  V.  Rickinson  Sons  &  Co.,  124  Fed. 

30.  A  ship  cannot  exempt  herself  188,  59  C.  C.  A.  604,  reversing  120 
by  bill  of  lading  from  liability  for  Fed.  591. 

damage  to  cargo  from  sea  water. 


§  376.]  WHEN   CARRIER  NOT  LIABLE.  387 

worthiness,  when  the  absence  of  bulkheads  altogether  has  no 
such  effect.  If  there  has  been  any  express  or  implied  warranty 
or  representation  that  a  vessel's  bulkheads  are  water-tight,  any 
damage  resulting  from  leaking,  must  in  that  case  be  sought 
upon  the  ground  of  a  breach  of  warranty  or  for  the  false  repre- 
sentation, and  not  for  unseaworthiness ;  and  the  pleadings  must 
aver,  and  the  evidence  sustain,  such  a  case.^^ 

Where  cargo  is  stowed  against  a  water  tank,  or  against  a 
bulkhead  serving  as  one  side  of  a  tank,  if  the  tank  or  bulkhead 
is  not  tight,  the  vessel,  though  seaworthy  as  respects  navigation, 
may  be  unseaworthy  as  respects  cargo,  since  the  direct  natural 
consequences  of  the  leak  in  that  case  is  to  damage  the  cargo, 
and  the  ship,  therefore,  is  not  in  a  reasonably  fit  condition  for 
its  transportation.33  But  that  is  a  wholly  different  case  from  a 
mere  leak  between  adjoining  cargo  compartments.  In  the  lat- 
ter case,  if  the  ingress  of  water  in  the  first  compartment  is  due 
to  sea-perils,  or  to  negligence  in  the  "management"  of  the  ship, 
the  extension  of  the  damage  to  an  adjoining  compartment  by  a 
leak  in  the  bulkhead  is  of  the  same  nature,  unless  some  repre- 
sentation or  warranty  can  be  invoked  as  a  separate  ground  of 
liability.34 

Sec.  376.  Insufficiency  of  coal. — A  vessel  may  be  unsea- 
worthy through  an  insufficiency  of  coal  to  complete  the  voyage.^^ 
If  a  vessel  was  unseaworthy  on  that  account  at  the  beginning  of 
the  voyage,  an  exception  in  the  bill  of  lading  covering  negli- 
gence of  the  engineer  in  not  informing  the  master  that  the  coal 

32.  The  British  King,  89  Fed.  the  bottom  to  the  main  deck  was 
872,  afflrmed  on  opinion  of  trial  not  water-tight,  and  sugar  stored 
court,  92  Fed.  1018,  35  C.  C.  A.  159.  next  to   the   locker   was   damaged 

33.  The  Carib  Prince,  170  U.  S.  by  sea  water  entering  through  the 
655,  18  Sup.  Ct.  R.  753,  42  L.  Ed.  chain  pipes.  The  ship  was  held 
1181,  reversing  Id.  68  Fed.  254,  15  liable  in  damages. 

C.   C.   A.    385   and   Wupperman   v.  34.  The  British  King,  supra. 

The  Carib  Prince,  63  Fed.  266.  35.  The  Vortigem,    (1899)    Prob. 

In  The  Palmas,  108  Fed.  87,  47  140,  68  L.  J.  P.  49,  80  Law  T.   (N. 

C.  C.  A.  220,  the  chain  locker  of  S.)    382,  47  W'kly  Rep.  437;    The 

a  steamship  which  extended  from  Abazzia,  127  Fed.  495, 


388  THE  LAW   OF   CARRIERS.  [§377. 

supply  was  short  Avill  not  protect  the  shipowner  from  liability 
for  damage  to  the  cargo  resulting  from  such  unseaworthiness.^® 

Sec.  377.  Defective  fog  horns. — So  a  failure  to  have  a  me- 
chanical fog  horn  in  good  condition  for  use  at  the  beginning  of 
a  voyage  shows  a  want  of  due  diligence  in  equipping  the  vessel. 
The  shipowner  cannot  be  exempted  from  liability  in  such  case  by 
claiming  that  it  was  a  fault  in  the  "management"  of  the  vessel.^^ 

Sec.  378.  Deviations  in  compass. — But  a  slight  deviation  of 
a  fraction  of  a  point  in  a  compass  cannot  be  regarded  as  ground 
to  condemn  a  vessel  as  unseaworthy,  especially  in  the  absence  of 
any  showing  of  its  continuance  for  a  sufficient  time  to  raise  a 
presumption  of  notice.^^ 

Sec.  379.  Vessel  should  be  cleaned  and  repaired  often  and 
well. — In  general  it  may  be  said  that  a  vessel  should  be  often 
examined  and  thoroughly  inspected  so  as  to  be  sure  of  its  con- 
dition. It  should  not  be  used  after  it  has  become,  from  age,  or 
decay,  or  injury,  unfit  for  use,  and  should  be  repaired  often  and 
well,  so  long  as,  by  repairing,  it  can  be  used  safely,  and  no 
longer.39  jf  ^  vessel's  bottom  is  unusually  foul  and  is  so  cov- 
ered with  grass  and  slime  below  her  load  line  that  her  progress 
is  materially  retarded,  the  existence  of  that  condition  for  a  long 
time  prior  to  and  during  a  voyage  will  constitute  unseaworthi- 
ness as  to  the  cargo  carried.^^  So  if  plates  in  the  hold  of  a  vessel 
are  worn  out,  and  their  condition  could  easily  be  ascertained  if 
the  owner  uses  due  diligence  in  examination,  until  that  defect  is 
repaired  the  vessel  is  unseaworthy  as  to  cargo.*^  And  in  a  case 
where  a  cargo  was  injured  by  sea  water  which  entered  the  vessel 
through  a  hole  which  had  been  eaten  by  corrosion  through  the 
iron  bottom  of  a  valve  chest  three-eighths  of  an  inch  thick,  and 
it  did  not  appear  that  the  valve  chest  had  ever  been  taken  out 
for  examination  during  the  nine  years  previous  to  the  damage, 

36.  The  Vortigem,  supra.  39.  The  Northern  Belle  r.   Rob- 

37.  The  Niagara,  84  Fed.  902,  28     son,  154  U.  S.  571,  14  Sup.  Ct.  R. 
C.    C.    A.    528,    55    U.    S.    App.    445,     1166,  19  L.  Ed.  748. 

affirming  77  Fed.  329.  40.  The  Abbazia,  127  Fed.  495. 

38.  The  E.  A.  Shores,  Jr.,  73  Fed.        41.  The    Flamborough,    69    Fed. 
342.  470. 


§  380.]  WHEN    CARRIER    NOT   LIABLE.  389 

the  ship  was  held  liable  for  the  damage  to  the  eargo.*-  But  it* 
a  vessel  has  been  adequately  repaired  prior  to  the  commence- 
ment of  the  voyage  and  her  classification  has  been  kept  up  on 
repeated  surveys,  the  presumption  of  seaworthiness  thus  arising 
will  not  be  overcome  by  evidence  to  the  effect  that  the  parts  re- 
paired were  found  in  a  worse  condition  than  before,  after  the 
vessel  had  met  with  unusually  heavy  weather.^^ 

Sec.  380.  What  is  due  diligence — Vessel  owner  responsible 
for  acts  of  his  agents. — The  third  section  of  the  llarter  Act 
provides  that  if  the  owner  "shall  exercise  due  diligence  to  make 
the  said  vessel  in  all  respects  seaworthy  and  properly  manned, 
equipped,  and  supplied,  neither  the  vessel,  her  owner  or  owners, 
agent  or  charterers,  shall  become  or  be  held  responsible  for 
damage  or  loss  resulting"  from  certain  specified  causes.  It 
should  be  remembered  that  the  diligence  required  is  diligence  to 
make  the  ship  in  all  respects  seaworthy.^*  That  means  diligence 
to  equip  and  supply  the  vessel  'with  all  the  requisites,  and  to  do 
all  the  things  mentioned  in  the  preceding  sections.  It  must  be 
diligence  adequate  to  the  occasion,  requiring  such  watchful 
caution  and  foresight  as  the  circumstances  of  the  particular 
service  demand.  It  must  be  due  diligence  in  the  work  itself, 
and  not  merely  in  the  selection  of  the  agents  to  do  the  work; 
otherwise,  shipowners  might  escape  all  responsibility  merely  by 
selecting  agents  of  good  reputation,  and  would  be  relieved 
whether  such  agents  exercised  due  care  or  not  to  make  their 
vessel  seaworthy,  and  any  responsibility  would  be  frittered 
away.  The  clear  intent  of  the  act  is  to  require  due  diligence, 
not  merely  in  the  personal  acts  of  the  ow^ner,  but  also  on  the 
part  of  the  agents  he  may  employ,  or  to  whom  he  may  have  com- 
mitted the  work  of  fitting  the  vessel  for  sea.'*^ 

42.  The   Friesland,    104   Fed.   99.  tion  Co.,  98  Fed.  636,  39  C.  C.  A. 

43.  The  Guadeloupe.  92  Fed.  670.  197. 

44.  International  Navigation  Co.  45.  International  Navigation  Co. 
V.  Farr  &  Bailey  Mfg.  Co.  181  U.  v  Farr  &  Bailey  Mfg.  Co.,  supra; 
S.  218,  45  L.  Ed.  830,  21  Sup.  Ct.  Dobell  &  Co.  t'.  Steamship  Co., 
R.  591,  affirming  Farr  &  Bailey  (1895)  2  Q.  B.  40.s,  64  L.  J.  Q.  B. 
Mfg.  Co.  V.   International   Naviga-  777;      Nord-Deutscher      Lloyd     v. 


390 


THE   LAW    OF    CARRIERS. 


[§  380. 


Proof  of  inspection  only  of  a  general  character  is  insufficient, 
and  a  shipowner  cannot  escape  liability,  where  proof  of  general 
inspection  only  is  made,  by  claiming  that  a  defect  in  the  vessel 
arose  from  the  inherent  qualities  of  the  cargoes  carried.'^^  In  a 
few  cases  some  weight  has  been  given  to  the  possession  of  sur- 


President,  etc.,  of  Insurance  Co., 
110  Fed.  420,  49  C.  C.  A.  1,  aMrm- 
ing  Insurance  Co.  v.  North  German 
Lloyd  Co.,  106  Fed.  973;  The  Co- 
lima,  82  Fed.  665;  The  Flam- 
borough,   69   Fed.   470. 

Due  diligence  is  not  used  in 
making  a  vessel  seaworthy  when 
seams  start  from  rocking  of  the 
vessel  due  to  the  swells  from  a 
passing  steamer.  Nord-Deutscher 
Lloyd  V.  President,  etc.,  of  Insur- 
ance Co.,  supra. 

Due  diligence  "to  make  the  ship 
in  all  respects  seaworthy"  includes 
diligence  to  secure  the  fitness  of 
all  cargo  compartments,  and  every 
other  element  of  initial  seaworthi- 
ness.   The  Manitoba,  104  Fed.  145. 

In  The  Mary  L.  Peters,  68  Fed. 
919,  affirmed  on  opinion  of  trial 
court  in  79  Fed.  998,  25  C.  C.  A. 
681,  26  U.  S.  App.  784,  due  dili- 
gence was  held  not  to  have  been 
used  in  repairing  leaks  in  water- 
ways, hatches  and  decks. 

46.  In  The  Alvena,  79  Fed.  974, 
25  C.  C.  A.  261,  affirming  74  Fed. 
252,  a  cargo  of  sugar  was  damaged 
by  water  coming  through  the  bot- 
tom of  the  ship.  The  hole  was 
caused  by  the  corrosive  action  of 
the  sugar  drainage  upon  the  iron 
plate  of  the  steamer.  This  cor- 
rosive action  being  well  known, 
iron  steamers  intending  to  carry 
sugar  cargoes  ought  to  have,  as 
the  Alvena  had,  a  layer  of  Port- 
land cement  covering  the  entire 
bottom  where  the  sugar  is  expected 


to  be  stored,  which  layer  of  cement 
should  be  kept  solid  and  free  from 
cracks.  The  accepted  explanation 
was  that  through  some  crack  in 
the  cement  the  sugar  drainage  had 
worked  down  so  as  to  corrode  the 
plate  beneath.  The  bill  of  lading 
stipulated  against  any  liability, 
loss  or  unseaworthiness  of  the  ship 
provided  all  reasonable  means  had 
been  taken  to  make  her  seaworthy. 
The  acid  had  eaten  out  a  small 
hole.  It  was  contended  on  the 
part  of  the  ship  that  the  cement 
had  been  broken  by  some  blow  on 
the  outside.  The  court  said  that 
rested  on  conjecture  only,  without 
such  evidence  of  actual  facts  as  was 
necessary  to  sustain  it,  and  that 
that  did  not  dispense  with  proof  of 
such  inspection  of  the  ship  before 
commencement  of  the  voyage  as 
the  nature  of  the  case  admitted 
and  required.  Proof  of  inspection 
was  only  of  a  general  character 
and  the  accident  arose  from  a 
lack  of  repair  at  the  time  the 
crack  occurred  or  of  the  requisite 
inspection  afterwards.  "For  such 
fault  the  Harter  Act,  even  upon  the 
broadest  construction  of  it,  aifords 
no  exemption  of  liability,"  the 
court  said,  "even  though  the  cor- 
rosive action  of  sugar  drainage  was 
one  of  its  inherent  qualities.  The 
ship  was  bound  to  the  exercise  of 
due  diligence  before  the  com- 
mencement of  the  voyage  to  pre- 
vent the  access  of  drainage  to  the 
iron   plates."     The   decree   of  the 


§381.]  WHEN    CARRIER   NOT   LIABLE.  391 

veyors'  certificates  by  a  vessel.'*'^  But  the  better  opinion  seems 
to  be  that  the  possession  of  surveyors '  certificates  is  not  of  great 
importance.  The  diligence  required  of  vessels  to  enable  them 
to  claim  the  benefit  of  the  Harter  Act  with  reference  to  due 
diligence,  is  diligence  with  respect  to  the  vessel,  not  in  obtaining 
certificates.'*^ 

Sec.  381.  Due  diligence  in  manning  vessel. — In  order  to 
avail  himself  of  the  exceptions  contained  in  the  third  section  of 
the  Harter  Act,  a  shipowner  must  use  due  diligence,  not  only 
to  provide  a  seaworthy  vessel,  but  he  must  also  provide  the  ves- 
sel with  a  crew  adequate  in  number  and  competent  for  their 
duty  with  reference  to  all  the  exigencies  of  the  intended  route ; 
not  merely  competent  for  the  ordinary  duties  of  an  uneventful 
voyage,  but  for  any  exigency  that  is  likely  to  happen  such,  for 
example,  as  the  striking  of  the  ship  on  a  reef  of  rocks — and  the 
consequent  imperative  necessity  for  instant  action  to  save  the 
lives  of  passengers  and  crew.  Thus  a  vessel  cannot  be  said  to  be 
properly  manned  when  the  crew  is  composed  mostly  of  Chinese 
to  whom  orders  can  only  be  given  through  the  Chinese  boatswain 
and  who  do  not  understand  ordei's  given  them  by  other  officers.^* 
And  if  the  owners  of  the  ship  know  of  a  custom  of  the  crew 
that  on  the  voyage,  or  at  ports  intermediate  or  otherwise,  or  on 
the  seas,  the  fires  will  be  banked,  the  water  for  steam  allowed 
to  get  cold,  that  the  captain  and  engineer  will  go  ashore  and 
the  rest  of  the  crew  will  go  to  sleep,  that  there  is  no  method  of 
being  forewarned  of  leaks  and  that  all  equipment  for  avoiding 
injury  therefrom  wnll  be  rendered  useless,  and  if  the  owners 
approve,  suffer,  or  connive  at  such  custom  or  practice,  such  ves- 
sel is  not  properly  manned,  nor  do  the  owners  intend  that  the 
initial  equipment  and  crew  shall  perform  the  duties  for  which 
they  are  provided.     If  the  Harter  Act  was  expected  to  absolve 

district   judge    holding    the     ship  48.  The   Abbazia,    127   Fed.    495. 

liable  was  affirmed  by  the  Circuit  49.  In  re  Pacific  Mail  S.  S.  Co., 

Court  of  Appeals.  130    Fed.    76,    69    L.    R.   A.    71,   64 

47.  The  Jane  Grey,  99  Fed.  582,  C.   C.   A.   410,   reversing   126   Fed. 

s.  c.  95  Fed.  693;  The  Guadeloupe,  1020.     See  also  The  Fri,  140  Fed. 

92  Fed.   670.  123. 


392  THE   LAW   OF    CARRIERS.  [§  382. 

owners  under  such  conditions  it  goes  beyond  its  present  under- 
stood purpose,  and  allows  them  to  make  provision  for  negligent 
acts  and  omissions,  and  for  undoing  on  the  voyage  what  they 
have  done  before  the  voyage  began.^^ 

Gross  negligence  on  the  part  of  the  master  will  raise  a  strong 
presumption  of  fact  that  the  master  was  not  competent  and  will 
throw  the  burden  on  the  shipowners  to  establish  the  proposition 
that  they  used  due  diligence  with  reference  to  his  selection, 
whether  the  statute  does  or  does  not  impose  such  a  burden.  Nor 
do  the  owners  prove  "due  diligence"  by  simply  showing  that 
they  had  no  knowledge  or  reason  to  believe  that  the  master  was 
not  competent.  "Due  diligence"  implies  more  than  that.'^^ 
Especially  would  this  be  true  where  the  master  was  of  such 
intemperate  habits,  and  so  addicted  to  intoxication  as  to  ren- 
der him  unfit  for  his  position.^  2 

There  is  no  presumption  that  a  vessel  was  not  properly 
manned  from  the  absence  of  a  lookout.  Whether  a  lookout  is 
stationed  forward  or  not,  when  the  ship  has  a  competent  crew, 
depends  wholly  upon  the  management  or  direction  of  the  offi- 
cers ;  or,  in  other  words,  it  is  a  part  of  the  ' '  management  of  the 
ship"  for  which  the  owners  are  not  responsible  to  the  shippers 
of  cargo.^^ 

Sec.  382.  Faults  or  errors  in  management. — "Due  dili- 
gence" having  been  used  "to  make  the  said  vessel  in  all  respects 
seaworthy  and  properly  manned,  equipped  and  supplied,"  the 
shipowner  is  relieved  from  liability,  among  other  things,  for 
damage  or  loss  resulting  from  ' '  faults  or  errors  in  navigation  or 
in  the  management  of  said  vessel."  Cases  of  difficulty  may 
often  arise  as  to  whether  the  negligence  which  has  resulted  in  an 

50.  The  Valentine,  131  Fed.  353.    pilot  in  accordance  with  Sec.  4401, 

51.  The  Cygnet,  126  Fed.  742,  61    R.  S.    In  re  Meyer,  74  Fed.  881. 
C.  C.  A.   348.  52.  The   Guildhall,  58  Fed.   800; 

Where  the  evidence  shows  that  affirmed,  64  Fed.  867,  12  C.  C.  A. 

the  master  had  been  duly  licensed  445,  26  U.  S.  App.  414. 
by  the  United   States  inspector  of        53.  The  Rosedale,    88   Fed.    324; 

steam  vessels  it  will  be  presumed,  affirmed  in  92  Fed.  1021,  35  C.  C. 

in  the  absence  of  evidence  to  the  A.  167. 
contrary,  that  he  was  a  licensed 


§382.]  WHEN    CARRIER   NOT   LIABLE.  393 

injury  to  cargo  is  to  be  regarded  as  negligence  in  the  care  of 
the  cargo  within  the  tirst  section  of  the  Act,  or  negligence  in 
the  management  of  the  vessel  under  section  three.  Looking  at 
section  three  it  is  reasonably  clear  that  the  section  directly  aims 
at  negligence  of  the  owners,  agents  or  charterers  of  the  vessel 
in  respect  of  the  navigation  or  management  of  the  vessel,  re- 
garded as  a  vessel.  But  a  vessel  may  also  be  regarded  as  a 
cargo-bearing  carrier  and  moreover  it  may  be  regarded  specially 
by  the  consideration  of  the  particular  cargo  carried  during  tho 
voyage.  For  faults  or  errors  in  the  management  of  the  vessel, 
regarded  as  a  vessel,  the  shipowner  is  excused  from  liability.  For 
faults  or  errors  in  the  management  of  the  vessel,  regarded  as  a 
cargo  bearing  carrier,  he  is  not  excused  from  liability.  But  it 
is  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  to  attempt  successfully  to  lay  down 
any  general  principles  as  to  when  a  particular  set  of  facts  falls 
within  the  operation  of  one  rule  and  when  it  falls  within  the 
operation  of  the  other.  One  must  look  at  the  facts  of  each  case 
as  it  arises,  and  on  those  facts  determine  which  rule  to  apply. 
The  following  special  facts,  however,  are  worthy  of  considera- 
tion in  determining  the  question:  "What  was  the  act  of  neg- 
ligence complained  of?  By  whom  was  it  committed?  In  par- 
ticular was  the  man  who  was  guilty  of  the  negligence  acting  at 
the  time  as  an  ordinary  member  of  the  officers,  engineers  or 
crew  of  the  ship  ?  Was  he,  or  not,  acting  in  the  ordinary  course 
of  his  duties  and  on  behalf  of  the  vessel  regarded  as  a  whole,  or 
was  he  acting  solely,  or  in  particular,  in  looking  after  the  cargo 
and  for  the  purpose  of  the  cargo?  Further,  in  some  cases  it 
may  be  important  to  consider  whether  the  injury  to  the  cargo 
was  caused  directly  or  indirectly  by  the  act  of  negligence. ' '  ^ 

1.  The  above  questions  are  all  refrigerating  apparatus,  whereby- 
propounded  in  Rowson  v.  Atlantic  in  the  course  of  the  voyage  the 
Transport  Co.,  (1903)  2  K.  B.  666,  temperature  of  the  chambers  was 
72  L.  J.  K.  B.  811,  affirming  allowed  to  rise  too  high.  The  re- 
(1903)  1  K.  B.  114.  In  that  case  frigerating  apparatus  was  not 
butter  was  delivered  in  a  damaged  used  exclusively  for  the  butter, 
condition,  resulting  from  the  neg-  but  was  also  used  for  the  ship's 
ligence  of  one  of  the  ship's  engi-  provisions.  The  air  of  all  the 
neers   in   the  management  of  the  chambers,     including    those    used 


394 


THE   LAW    OF    CARRIERS. 


:§383. 


Cases  coming  within  section  one  of  the  Harter  Act  have  already 
been  treated  in  previous  sections,  and  examples  of  cases  which 
have  been  held  to  be  faults  or  errors  in  the  management  of  the 
vessel,  regarded  as  a  vessel,  are  given  in  the  notes.^ 

Sec.  383.     Faults  or  errors  in  navigation. — Very  few  cases 
of  difficulty  arise  as  to  whether  the  negligence  which  has  re- 


fer the  ship's  provisions,  was 
cooled  by  one  pipe,  and  so  far  as 
the  engineer  attending  to  that  one 
pipe  was  concerned,  all  he  had  to 
do  was  to  look  upon  it  as  it  was, 
namely,  as  a  pipe  required  for 
the  general  purposes  of  the  ves- 
sel. His  failure  to  look  after  the 
pipe,  therefore,  was  an  act  of  neg- 
ligence by  an  officer  of  the  ship  in 
the  performance  of  his  duties  to 
the  ship  as  a  ship,  not  with  re- 
gard to  any  particular  cargo,  and 
was  such  an  act  as  really  con- 
cerned the  management  of  the 
vessel  as  a  whole,  and,  therefore, 
really  came  within  the  express 
limitation   of  section  three. 

2.  In  The  Silvia,  171  U.  S.  462, 
19  Sup.  Ct.  R.  7,  43  L.  Ed.  241, 
affirming  68  Fed.  230,  35  U.  S. 
App.  395,  the  port  holes  of  a  com- 
partment were  furnished  with  the 
usual  glass  covers  and  with  the 
usual  iron  shutters  or  deadlights. 
When  The  Silvia  began  her  voy- 
age, the  weather  being  fair,  the 
glass  covers  only  were  shut,  and 
the  iron  ones  were  left  open  for 
the  purpose  of  lighting  the  com- 
partment. As  no  cargo  was 
stowed  against  the  ports  so  as  to 
prevent  or  embarrass  access  to 
them  in  case  a  change  of  weather 
should  make  it  necessary  or 
proper  to  close  the  iron  shutters, 
and  as  the  ports  were  in  a  place 
where  the  iron  shutters  would  be 


usually  left  open  for  the  admis- 
sion of  light,  and  could  be  speed- 
ily got  at  and  closed  if  occasion 
should  require,  there  was  no 
ground  for  holding  that  the  ship 
was  unseaworthy  at  the  time  of 
sailing,  and  if  there  was  any 
neglect  in  not  closing  the  iron 
covers  of  the  port,  it  was  a  fault 
or  error  in  the  navigation  or  in 
the  management  of  the  ship. 

In  The  Wildcroft,  130  Fed.  521, 
65  C.  C.  A.  145,  affirming  124  Fed. 
G31  and  126  Fed.  229,  damage  to 
sugar  arising  from  the  flowing  of 
fresh  water  into  the  hold,  where 
the  sugar  was  stored,  through  a 
sea  cock  which  had  been  negli- 
gently left  open  while  water  from 
the  river  was  being  pumped  into 
the  engine  tank  on  the  discharge 
of  the  cargo,  was  held  a  fault  in 
the  "management"  of  the  vessel, 
as  a  vessel. 

In  The  Merida,  107  Fed.  146, 
46  C.  C.  A.  208,  an  accumulation 
of  water  in  the  bilges  due  to  a 
lack  of  ordinary  precautions 
through  three  engineers  being 
prostrate  with  yellow  fever  and 
to  the  consequent  failure  to  make 
use  of  the  pump  was  held  a  fault 
in  the  "management"  of  the  ves- 
sel, as  a  vessel. 

In  The  Sandfield,  92  Fed.  663, 
34  C.  C.  A.  612,  affirming  79  Fed. 
371,  an  omission  to  open  the 
sluice  gate,  designed  to  empty  the 


§  383.] 


WHEN    CARRIER   NOT   LIABLE. 


395 


suited  in  an  injury  to  cargo  is  to  be  regarded  as  negligence  in 
the  navigation  of  the  ship.  If  a  shipowner  has  used  due  dili- 
gence to  make  the  vessel  in  all  respects  seaworthy  and  properly 
manned,  equipped  and  supplied,  he  is  not  liable  for  damage  to 
cargo  resulting  from  navigation  of  the  vessel,  however  faulty. 
Thus  failure  to  heed  the  warning  of  a  government  light  which 


bilges,  for  20  days  during  heavy 
weather,  was  held  a  fault  in  the 
"management"  of  the  vessel,  as  a 
vessel. 

In  The  Guadeloupe,  92  Fed.  670, 
an  error  of  judgment  on  the  part 
of  the  master  as  to  the  extent  of 
repairs  necessary  during  a  voy- 
age, when  he  uses  due  diligence 
and  acts  in  good  faith,  was  held 
to  pertain  to  the  "management" 
of  the  vessel,  as  a  vessel. 

In  Steinwender  v.  The  Mexican 
Prince,  82  Fed.  484,  affirmed  in 
The  Mexican  Prince,  91  Fed.  1003, 
34  C.  C.  A.  168,  where  adequate 
provisions  for  removing  water 
from  compartments  were  made  by 
means  of  a  pipe  line  and  pump 
running  through  each  cargo  com- 
partment with  an  offset  from  the 
main  line  in  each,  which  could  be 
opened  and  closed  by  an  easily 
tested  Kingston  valve,  the  vessel 
was  held  unseaworthy  in  respect 
of  dry  cargo  near  a  water  ballast 
tank  by  reason  of  the  failure  to 
provide  deck  sounding  pipes,  and 
the  neglect  of  those  in  charge  of 
the  ship  to  test  the  valve  by 
means  of  the  pump  or  to  count 
the  turns  of  the  spindle  controll- 
ing the  valve  before  discharging 
the  water  ballast  was  held  to  be 
a  fault  in  the  "management"  of 
the  vessel,  as  a  vessel. 

In  The  Rodney,  L.  R.  (1900) 
P.  112,  69  L.  J.  P.  29,  the  ship 
having  met  with   rough   weather, 


the  drainage  pipe  in  the  fore- 
castle became  choked  and  the 
forecastle  was  flooded  with  water. 
In  order  to  allow  the  water  to 
escape  into  the  bilges,  the  boat- 
swain endeavored  to  clear  the 
pipe  with  a  hammer  and  poker, 
with  the  result  that  a  hole  was 
driven  in  the  syphon  trap  of  the 
pipe,  and  the  water,  instead  of 
escaping  into  the  bilges,  ran  into 
the  hold  and  damaged  the  cargo. 
The  act  of  the  boatswain  was 
held  to  be  an  act  done  in  the 
"management"  of  the  ship. 

In  The  Glenochil,  (1896)  Prob. 
10,  65  L.  J.,  P.  1,  the  ship  when 
she  left  New  Orleans  was  in  a 
perfectly  seaworthy  condition,  but 
met  with  exceptionally  heavy 
weather  on  the  voyage,  with  the 
result  that  certain  pipes  and  con- 
nections had  broken  owing  to  the 
straining,  amongst  others  a  sound- 
ing-pipe communicating  with  one 
of  the  water-ballast  tanks.  This 
tank  it  became  necessary  to  fill 
with  water,  as  the  discharge  of 
the  cargo  went  on,  in  order  to 
stiffen  the  ship,  and  the  engineer 
thereupon  opened  the  cock  to  ad- 
mit the  water  without  first  hav- 
ing used  the  sounding  rod  or 
taken  any  steps  to  ascertain  the 
condition  of  the  sounding  pipe. 
The  result  was  that  the  water  on 
being  admitted  to  the  tank  forced 
its  way  up  the  broken  sounding 
pipe  and,  escaping  into  the  hold, 


396 


THE   LAW   OF    CARRIERS. 


[§  384. 


indicates  the  location  of  a  reef,  and  in  presuming  upon  the 
entire  accuracy  of  the  compass  or  course  are  faults  or  errors  in 
navigation  within  the  meaning  of  section  three.^  So  a  steamer, 
towing  a  barge  on  which  goods  are  loaded,  is  not  liable  for  the 
loss  of  the  goods  due  to  the  barge  striking  an  obstruction  in  the 
river.'^  And  a  mistake  of  the  captain  in  going  into  a  bay  on  an 
ebb  tide,  whereby,  owing  to  shallow  water,  the  steamer  becomes 
stranded,  is  a  fault  in  the  navigation  of  the  ship  under  section 
three.^ 

Sec.  384.  Dangers  of  the  sea. — Questions  arising  under  the 
next  exemption  in  the  third  section  of  the  Harter  Act  against 
loss  from  "dangers  of  the  sea  or  other  navigable  waters"  are 
generally  linked  with  questions  concerning  the  initial  seaworthi- 
ness of  a  vessel.  All  that  need  be  said  here  is  that  where  the 
condition  of  the  vessel  at  the  beginning  of  a  voyage  is  shown 


damaged  the  cargo.  If  the  engi- 
neer had  used  the  sounding-rod 
before  admitting  the  water  to  the 
ballast  tank,  he  would  have  as- 
certained that  the  sounding  pipe 
was  broken.  His  negligence  was 
held  to  be  a  fault  in  the  "manage- 
ment" of  the  vessel,  as  a  vessel. 

In  The  Cressington,  L.  R. 
(1891)  Prob.  152,  60  L.  J.  P.  25. 
a  bill  of  lading  contained  the 
usual  exceptions  as  to  perils  of 
the  sea  and  other  accidents  of 
navigation  being  excepted,  even 
when  occasioned  by  the  negli- 
gence, default  or  error  of  judg- 
ment of  the  pilot,  master,  marin- 
ers, or  other  servants  of  the  ship- 
owners. The  cargo  was  damaged 
by  sea-water  which  entered  the 
vessel's  hold  through  a  rivet  hole 
at  the  foot  of  one  of  the  stanch- 
ions supporting  the  main  rail,  the 
rivet  having  become  loose  owing 
to  the  working  of  the  ship  during 
bad  weather.     The  neglect  of  the 


master,  after  discovering  the 
leakage,  to  take  proper  measures 
to  prevent  its  continuance  was 
held  to  be  within  the  exception  in 
the   bill   of  lading. 

In  The  Ferro,  L.  R.  (1893) 
Prob.  38,  62  L.  J.  P.  48,  it  was 
held  that  the  words  "neglect  or 
default  in  the  management  of  the 
ship"  in  a  bill  of  lading  did  not 
exonerate  the  shipowners  from 
damage  to  oranges  caused  by  im- 
proper stowage. 

3.  The  E.  A.  Shores,  Jr.,  73  Fed. 
342. 

4.  The  Nettie  Quill,  124  Fed. 
667. 

5.  In  re  Meyer,  74  Fed.  881. 

A  failure  of  the  master  to  put 
in  for  repairs  when  he  could  have 
done  so  is  a  fault  in  the  naviga- 
tion    of     the     vessel.      Corsar     r. 

Spreckels  &  Bros.   Co.,  C.   C. 

A.   ,    141    Fed.    260,    modifying 

The    Musselcrag,    125    Fed.    786. 


§385.]  THE  LAW   OF   CARRIERS,  397 

to  have  been  good  in  all  respects  and  it  satisfactorily  appears 
that  the  vessel  incurred  marine  perils  which  might  well  disable 
a  staunch  and  well  manned  ship  and  are  sufficient  to  account  for 
the  defects  in  the  vessel  causing  damage  to  cargo,  the  vessel 
owner  will  not  be  liable  for  such  damage  to  the  cargo/' 

Sec.  385.  The  inherent  defect,  quality  or  vice  of  the  thing 
carried. — A  shipowner  who  has  used  due  diligence  to  make  the 
vessel  in  all  respects  seaworthy  and  properly  manned,  equipped 
and  supplied  will  not  be  liable  for  damage  due  entirely  to  "the 
inherent  defect,  quality,  or  vice  of  the  thing  carried."  Thus 
cargoes  of  hay  are  apt  to  sweat  during  damp  weather,  especially 
where  there  is  a  lack  of  ventilation,  and  in  a  case  where  the  hay 
was  confined  for  an  undue  period,  owing  to  no  fault  of  the  car- 
rier, and  it  became  affected  and  damaged  by  sweat,  the  court 
held  that  the  carrier  was  not  liable.'^  But  such  a  case  is  rad- 
ically different  from  one  where  the  cargo  is  only  indirectly  dam- 
aged by  its  own  inherent  defects  and  the  direct  cause  of  the 
damage  is  unseaworthiness  of  the  ship  brought  about  by  a  fail- 
ure of  the  shipowner  to  guard  against  injury  to  the  vessel  from 
the  well  known  characteristics  of  the  cargo  carried.  The  ship- 
owner in  such  case  will  be  liable  for  failure  to  use  due  diligence 
to  make  his  vessel  seaworthy.^ 

6.  The  Hyades,   124  Fed.   58,   59  that  the  sinking  of  a  barge  was 

C.    C.    A.    424,   affirming    lis    Fed.  due    to    a    storm,    and    the    conse- 

85;   Davidson  S.  S.  Co.  v.  119,  254  quent    pressing    together    of    two 

Bushels  of  Flaxseed,  117  Fed.  283;  large    steamships,   between    which 

Grulman  v.  The  Ontario,  115  Fed.  she  was  lying,  and  not  to  unsea- 

769,  53  C.  C.  A.  199,  affirming  106  worthiness. 

Fed.    324;     The   Marechal    Suchet,  In   The   Homeric,   106   Fed.   960, 

112,   Fed.    440;    The    Sandfield,   92  a  defect  in  the  propeller  after  a 

Fed.  663,  34  C.  C.  A.  612,  affirming  tempestuous   voyage    was   held    to 

79  Fed.  371;   The  Warren  Adams,  have    arisen    from    perils    of    the 

74   Fed.   413,   20   C.   C.   A.   486,   38  sea. 

U.  S.  App.   356,  writ  of  certiorari  7.  The   M.    C.    Currie,    132    Fed. 

denied,    163   U.    S.    679;    The   Sin-  125. 

tram,    64    Fed.   884;    The   Marlbor-  8.  The  Alvena,   79   Fed.   974,   25 

ough,  47  Fed.  667.  C.    C.    A.    261,    affirming    74    Fed. 

In    The    Samuel    F.    Houseman,  252.     A  cargo  of  sugar  was  dam- 

108  Fed.   875,  48  C.  C.  A.   120,  re-  aged  in  this  case  by  water  coming 

versing  103  Fed.  663,  it  was  held  through    the   bottom   of   the   ship. 


398  THE  LAW   OP   CARRIERS.  [§386. 

Sec.  386.  Efifect  of  deviation. — Every  vessel  transporting 
merchandise  and  passengers  to  or  from  different  ports — her  own- 
ers having  exercised  due  diligence  to  make  her  in  all  respects 
seaworthy,  and  properly  manned,  equipped  and  supplied — has 
the  right  to  deviate  for  the  purpose  of  saving  life  and  property, 
even  if  the  bill  of  lading  contains  no  stipulation  allowing  such 
deviation  for  salvage  purposes,^  but  as  soon  as  this  duty  is  per- 
formed, her  right  of  deviation  ceases,  and  it  becomes  her  duty 
then  to  pursue  her  regular  voyage  and  fulfill  her  contracts  by 
carrying  her  cargo  and  passengers  to  their  port  of  destination. 
The  Harter  Act  was  not  passed  for  the  purpose  of  enabling  ves- 
sels, saving  life  and  property  at  sea,  to  earn  salvage.  That  right 
is  only  incidental  to  such  service.^  *^ 

Sec.  387.  Effect  of  the  Harter  Act  on  damages  recoverable 
by  cargo  owner  or  on  rights  of  a  general  average  contribution. 

- — It  was  not  the  intention  of  the  Harter  Act  to  allow  the  ship- 
owner to  share  in  the  benefits  of  a  general  average  contribution 
to  meet  losses  occasioned  by  faults  in  the  navigation  and  man- 
agement of  the  ship.^i  While  the  shipowner,  however,  freed 
from  liability  under  the  statutes,  may  not  invoke  an  action  for 
general  average  adjustment,  to  obtain  payment  of  his  own 
losses,  the  cargo  owner  may  do  so;  but  as  the  statutes  prevent 
his  recovering  any  damages  based  upon  the  shipowner's  alleged 
negligence,  the  cargo  owner  may  not,  in  the  adjustment  invoked 

The  hole  was  caused  by  a  failure  Hine    v.    New    York    &    Berruudez 

of  the  shipowner  to  guard  against  Co.,  68  Fed.  920. 
the  well-known  corrosive  action  of        9.  In    re    Meyer,    74    Fed.    881; 

the  sugar  drainage  upon  the  iron  The  Chinese  Prince,  61  Fed.  697; 

plate  of  the  steamer,  and  the  ves-  see  also  The  Wells  City,  61  Fed. 

sel  was  held  liable.  857,  10  C.  C.  A.  123,  26  U.  S.  App. 

The    melting   of    asphalt   in   the  76,  affirming  57  Fed.  317. 
warm   climate    of   a   port   of   ship-         10.  In  re  Meyer,  74  Fed.   881. 
ment   is   not  an   "inherent   defect,        11.  The  Irrawaddy,  171  U.  S.  187, 

quality,  or  vice  of  the  thing  car-  18  Sup.  Ct.  831,  43  L.  Ed.  130;  on 

ried,"   but    on   the   contrary    it   is  certification   from   Flint  v.   Chrys- 

one    of    its    natural     qualities     in  tal,  83  Fed.  987,  31  C.  C.  A.   593, 

view   of   which    a   charterer    may  and    reversing    Chrystal    r.    Flint, 

well    stipulate    in    the   charter   for  82    Fed.    472;    Trinidad    Shipping, 

special      fittings     in     the      vessel,  etc.   Co.   v.  Frame,   88   Fed.   528. 


§387.]  WHEN   CARRIER  NOT   LUBLE.  399 

by  him,  derive  any  benefit  from  such  alleged  negligence.  In 
such  case  the  usual  rule  of  reciprocity  of  right  and  obligation 
exists,  and  the  adjustment  should  be  made  as  if  there  was  no 
negligence  in  the  case,  there  being  none  in  fact  on  the  part  of 
the  owners.i2  ]\Tqj.  jg  ^^g  shipper  entitled  to  look  for  damages 
to  the  vessels  or  owners,  or  to  any  funds  in  court  representing 
such  vessel  and  freight  pending.i^ 

The  liability  of  one  vessel  to  other  vessels  with  which  it  may 
collide  is  not  affected  by  the  Ilarter  Act  which  only  applies  to 
the  relations  between  a  vessel  and  her  cargo.^"*  In  relieving  the 
carrier  vessel  and  her  owners  from  their  responsibility  for  their 
half  of  the  damage  to  the  cargo,  the  Act  was  not  designed  to 
increase  thereby  the  damage  payable  in  such  cases  by  the  other 
vessel.1'5  Nor  does  the  act  affect  the  operation  of  the  equitable 
rule  which  gives  priority  to  the  claim  of  the  innocent  cargo  own- 
ers over  that  of  the  vessel  owner  against  the  fund  available  for 
the  payment  of  damages  sustained  through  a  collision  for 
which  both  vessels  have  been  adjudged  in  fault.^*^ 

12.  The  Strathdon,  94  Fed.  206.  15.  The   Rosedale,    88    Fed.    334, 

13.  In  re  California  Nav.  &  affirmed,  92  Fed.  1021,  35  C.  C.  A. 
Imp.  Co.,  110  Fed.  678.  167. 

14.  The  Viola,  60  Fed.  296,  s.  c.  16.  The  George  W.  Roby,  111 
59  Fed.  632;  The  Berkshire,  59  Fed.  601,  49  C.  C.  A.  481,  modify- 
Fed.  1007.  ing  103  Fed.  328. 


CHAPTER   Vn. 

OF  THE  LIMITATION  OF  THE  CARRIER'S  LIABILITY 
BY  CONTRACT. 


§  388.  Goods  usually  shipped  un- 
der contracts  limiting  lia- 
bility. 

389.  Rigor    of    common-law    rule 

relaxed. 

390.  Rule    permitting    limitation 

of  liability  by  contract  of 
early  origin  in  England. 

391.  Same    subject — Notice   suffi- 

cient. 

392.  Same     subject — Extent     of 

limitation — Anything  ex- 
cept gross  negligence  or 
misfeasance. 

393.  Considerations     leading     to 

English  Land  Carriers' 
Act. 

394.  Summary  of  act. 

395.  Construction  of  act. 

396.  Modification      of      Carriers' 

Act  by  Railway  and  Canal 
Traffic  Act. 

397.  Same  subject— Effect  of  lat- 

ter act. 

398.  Same  subject — Language  of 

contract  to  relieve  from 
negligence  must  be  ex- 
plicit. 

399.  Early    American   cases. 

400.  Same  subject. 

401.  Carrier  may   limit   liability 

by  special  contract. 

402.  Same     subject  —   Contract 

must  be  express. 


§  403.  Same  subject — Such  limita- 
tions result  from  ship- 
per's waiver  of  common- 
law  liability. 

404.  Same   subject — But   shipper 

must  be  allowed  real  free- 
dom of  choice  between  re- 
stricted or  common-law 
liability. 

405.  Same     subject  —  Limitation 

prohibited  in  some  states. 

406.  Mere    notice    is    not    suffi- 

cient —  What  constitutes 
special   contract. 

407.  Same   subject. 

408.  The  acceptance  of  the  car- 

rier's receipt  creates  a 
contract  according  to  its 
terms  between  him  and 
the  shipper — Failure  to 
read  no  defense  if  no 
fraud  practiced. 

409.  Same  subject — Shipper  pre- 

sumed by  accepting  re- 
ceipt to  have  assented  to 
its  conditions. 

410.  Same    subject — Cases    hold- 

ing mere  acceptance  in- 
sufficient— Rule  in  Illi- 
nois. 

411.  Form  and  nature  of  the  con- 
tract— Need  not  be  in 
writing — Evidence  to  es- 
tablish. 


400 


CONTRACTS  LnilTING  LIABILITY. 


401 


§  412.  Same  subject — Parol  modi- 
fications— Signing  by  one 
party — Effect  of  carrier's 
omission  to  sign. 

413.  Same     subject  —  Statutory 

requirements. 

414.  Notices     not     intended     to 

limit  liability. 

415.  Terms    of    limitation    must 

be  embodied  in  the  con- 
tract— Must  be  plain  and 
easily  legible. 

416.  Receipt   to   be    effectual    in 

limiting  liability  must  be 
given  to  and  accepted  by 
the  shipper  at  the  time  of 
the   receipt  of   the   goods. 

417.  Same   subject — Parol   agree- 

ment acted  upon  cannot 
be  limited  by  receipt  sub- 
sequently delivered. 

418.  Extent     to     which     carrier 

may  limit  his  liability. 

419.  Carrier    may    stipulate     for 

exemption  from  liability 
for  certain  losses  in  car- 
riage of  live  stock. 

420.  Carrier    may    stipulate    for 

exemption  in  case  of  loss 
by  fire. 

421.  Carrier    may    stipulate    for 

exemption  in  case  of  loss 
caused  by  strikes,  mobs, 
etc. 

422.  Carrier    may    stipulate    for 

exemption  in  case  of  loss 
by  thieves  or  robbers. 

423.  Carrier    may    stipulate    for 

exemption  where  goods  of 
a  dangerous  character  are 
accepted  for  carriage. 

424.  Carrier    may    stipulate    for 

liability  of  warehouseman 
while  goods  are  awaiting 
further  conveyance. 

425.  Contracts        limiting       the 

amount     of    damages    re- 
coverable. 
26 


S)  426.  Same  subject  —  Contracts 
limiting  recovery  to 
agreed  value  of  goods. 

427.  Same  subject  —  Valuation 

agreement  must  be  bona 
fide — Valuation  must  be 
reasonable. 

428.  Same  subject  —  Execution 

of  contracts  limiting  re- 
covery to  agreed  value  of 
goods — Construction. 

429.  Same    subject — Measure    of 

recovery  where  loss  is 
only  partial. 

430.  Same     subject  —  Contracts 

limiting  recovery  to  value 
of  goods  at  time  and 
place  of  shipment. 

431.  Same     subject  —  Contracts 

limiting  liability  to  fixed 
amount  without  regard  to 
value. 

432.  Same  subject— Effect  of  de- 

livery, after  notice  given 
to  stop  goods  in  transit, 
upon  agreement  limiting 
recovery  to  stated  value 
of  goods — Conversion. 

Notice  contained  in  receipt 
that  unless  informed  of 
value  of  goods  carrier 
will  be  liable  only  to  lim- 
ited amount. 

Same   subject. 

Same  subject — But  carrier 
may  waive  requirement 
that,  unless  value  of 
goods  is  stated,  he  will  be 
liable  only  to  limited 
amount. 

436.  Same    subject — How    under 

English  Land  Carriers' 
Act. 

437.  Same    subject — When    ship- 

per bound  to  disclose 
value. 

438.  Same     subject  —    Illustra* 

tions. 


433. 


434. 
435. 


402 


THE   LAW    OF    CARRIERS. 


§439. 
440. 
441. 
442. 

443. 

444. 
445. 

446. 

447. 

448. 

449, 

450, 

451, 
452, 

453 

454 


Same  subject  —  Notice  un- 
der English  Carriers'  Act. 

Same  subject — Weight  of 
English  cases. 

Same  subject — Notice  from 
course  of  dealing. 

Carrier  may  limit  time 
within  which  claim  shall 
be  made  for  loss. 

Same  subject  —  Condition 
limiting  time  within 
which  claim  shall  be 
made  must  be  reasonable. 

Same  subject — Carrier  may 
waive  benefit  of  such  con- 
ditions. 

Same  subject — How  where 
damage  has  resulted  from 
carrier's  delay — Effect  of 
failure  to  make  delivery — 
Conversion. 

Same  subject — How  where 
carrier  is  holding  goods 
in  the  character  of  a 
warehouseman. 

Same  subject  —  Burden  of 
proof. 

Carrier  may  limit  time 
within  which  suit  shall 
be  commenced. 

Where  liability  is  limited 
by  contract,  burden  of 
proof  is  upon  the  carrier 
to  show  himself  within 
the  exception. 

Carrier  cannot  provide  by 
contract  against  liability 
for  negligence. 

Same  subject  —  The  con- 
trary view. 

Same  subject — The  rule  of 
the  United  States  Su- 
preme Court. 

Same  subject — This  rule 
the  prevailing  one. 

Same  subject  —  Contrary 
rule  prevails  in  New 
York. 


^  455. 
456. 

457. 


458. 
459. 


460. 

461. 
462. 
463. 

464. 
465. 


((466 


467. 
468. 


469. 
470. 


471. 

472. 


Same  subject— Rule  in  Illi- 
nois. 

Same  subject  —  Stipulation 
as  to  amount  of  proof  re- 
quired. 

Power  of  an  agent  to  bind 
the  owner  of  goods  to 
limitation. 

Same  subject. 

Same  subject — How  where 
carrier  has  notice  that 
authority  of  agent  is  re- 
stricted. 

Powers  of  agents  of  car- 
riers to  bind  them  by  con- 
tract. 

Same  subject — The  English 
rule. 

Same  subject — Implied  au- 
thority. 

What  will  be  construed  as 
a  contract  exempting 
from  liability  for  negli- 
gence— Language  must  be 
clear. 

Contracts  limiting  liability 
must  be  construed  strictly 
against  the  carrier. 
Same  subject  —  Particular 
exemptions  not  enlarged 
by  general  language. 
.  Same  subject — Construction 
of  specific  terms  not  al- 
tered to  release  carrier. 

Same  subject. 

Same  subject  —  Ambiguous 
words  construed  against 
carrier. 

Same  subject. 

How  the  benefit  of  such 
contracts  can  be  claimed 
by  connecting  carriers. 

Same  subject. 

Same  subject  —  Limitation 
inures  to  benefit  of  con- 
necting carrier  only  when 
contract  for  through  car- 
riage exists. 


§388. 


CONTRACTS  LIMITING  LIABILITY . 


403 


473.  Same  subject. 

474.  By  what  law  contract  is  to 

be  construed. 

475.  The      consideration      neces- 

sary to  uphold  such  con- 
tracts. 

476.  Contract  must  have   a   fair 

construction. 

477.  Carrier  liable  notwithstand- 

ing exemption  if  the  loss 
be  the  result  of  his  negli- 
gence. 

478.  Carrier    liable,    though    ex- 

emptljn  from  negligence 
would  otherwise  be  sus- 
tained, if  loss  occasioned 
by  his  misfeasance. 

479.  Or,    though    exemption    be 

for  losses  resulting  from 
delay,  if  delay  is  occa- 
sioned by  negligence. 

480.  Or  if  he  departs  from  the 

stipulated  method  of 
transportation — When  de- 
parture will  be  excused. 

481.  Exceptions    to    liability    in 

the  bills  of  lading  of  car- 
riers by  water. 


§  4S2.  Same  subject— Perils  of  the 
sea — Dangers  of  naviga 
tion. 

483.  Same  subject— Perils  of  the 

sea,  etc.,  not  synonymous 
with  act  of  God,  etc. 

484.  Same      subject— What      In- 

cluded— Illustrations. 

485.  Same     subject  —  Jettison, 

when  included. 
Same    subject— Hidden    ob- 
structions. 

Same  subject— Other  perils. 
Same  subject. 

Same   subject — Other   perils 
— Fire    not    included. 

490.  Same     subject— How     ques- 

tion  determined. 

491.  Same     subject— Carrier    li- 

able, notwithstanding  ex- 
ception, for  loss  from 
theft,  embezzlement,  rob- 
bery, etc. 

492.  Same     subject — Carrier     li- 

able notwithstanding  ex- 
emption if  loss  caused  by 
negligence. 


486. 

487. 
488. 
489. 


Sec.  388.  (§225.)  Goods  usually  shipped  under  contracts 
limiting  liability. — The  bill  of  lading  or  receipt  of  the  carrier, 
so  far  as  it  is  a  mere  acknowledgment  of  the  delivery  of  the 
goods  and  a  contract  to  carry  them,  has  already  been  treated  of. 
But  this  instrument  is  made  use  of  to  serve  another  purpose. 
We  have  already  seen  that  carriers  are  now  allowed  to  contract 
with  their  employers  so  as  very  greatly  to  qualify  and  diminish 
the  liability  imposed  upon  them  by  the  common  law.  Goods 
are  in  fact  now  but  rarely  accepted  by  them  without  an  agrci?- 
ment  or  contract  for  such  limitation;  and,  it  being  important 
that  such  contracts  should  be  reduced  to  writing,  no  more 
natural  or  convenient  place  can  be  found  for  them  than  in  tlie 
same  instrument  which  evidences  their  receipt  and  the  contract 
to  transport  them.     Hence  it  has  become  the  universal  practice 


404  THE   LAW   OF    CARRIERS.  [§  389, 

for  carriers,  both  by  land  and  water,  to  include  in  their  bills 
of  lading  the  terms  as  to  liability  upon  which  they  accept  the 
goods,  which,  when  accepted  by  the  shipper,  are  the  conditions 
upon  which  the  carrying  is  to  be  done,  and  are  binding  upon 
both  parties,  provided  they  are  such  as  can  be  lawfully  agreed 
upon.  And  such  contracts  are  not  to  be  regarded  as  made 
solely  in  the  interest  or  for  the  exclusive  benefit  of  the  carrier, 
though  they  universally  qualify  and  moderate  the  harsh  terms 
imposed  upon  him  by  the  law  when  no  express  contract  is  made 
with  his  employer.  It  is  supposed,  however  the  fact  may  be, 
that,  the  liability  of  the  carrier  being  lessened,  terms  correspond- 
ingly favorable  have  been  gained  by  the  shipper,  and  that  thus 
the  advantage  from  such  contracts  is  to  some  extent  mutual.  It 
often  happens  that  the  shipper  may  desire  by  contract  to  vary 
the  terms  upon  which  alone  the  carrier  could  be  compelled  to 
receive  and  carry  his  goods,  as,  for  instance,  to  bind  him  by 
what  is  known  as  a  through  contract,  where  they  must  neces- 
sarily be  passed  over  several  lines  of  connecting  carriers  to 
reach  their  destination.  In  such  cases,  as  we  have  seen,  the  law 
generally  in  this  country  binds  the  carrier  to  convey  only  to  the 
end  of  his  own  route  and  there  deliver  to  the  next  succeeding 
carrier;  but  still  it  is  perfectly  competent  for  the  carrier  who 
first  receives  the  goods  to  bind  himself  for  the  entire  transporta- 
tion and  to  be  responsible  for  the  safety  of  the  goods  until  they 
reach  their  destination;  and  in  such  cases  if  they  be  lost  the 
owner  may  look  to  him  to  be  made  whole,  without  undertaking 
the  difficult  task  of  ascertaining  where  the  fault  was  or  of 
resorting  to  his  legal  remedy  in  a  distant  state.  So  it  frequently 
happens  that,  by  entering  into  a  contract  with  the  carrier 
limiting  his  liability,  the  shipper  may  obtain  transportation 
at  greatly  reduced  rates,  which  he  may  regard  as  a  matter  of 
more  importance  to  him  than  the  liability  of  the  carrier.  Other 
instances  might  be  given,  but  these  are  sufficient  to  show  that 
such  contracts  are  not  always  and  altogether  for  the  benefit  of 
the  carrier. 

Sec.  389.     (§226.)     Rigor  of  common-law  rule  relaixed. — 
These  considerations,  together  with  the  further  fact  that,  owing 


8  390.]  CONTRACTS  LIMITING  LIABILITY.  405 

to  the  improved  state  of  society  and  the  rapidity  and  compara- 
tive safety  of  modern  modes  of  carriage,  there  is  not  now  the 
same  necessity  as  formerly  existed  for  holding  carriers  to  the 
rigorous  accountability  of  insurers  against  all  losses  except  those 
caused  by  the  act  of  God  or  of  the  public  enemy,  have  induced 
the  courts  of  many  of  the  states  of  this  country  to  relax  the 
rigor  of  this  rule  at  least  in  so  far  as  to  permit  the  carrier  to 
qualify  this  liability  by  express  contract  with  his  employer.^ 

Sec.  390.  (§227.)  Rule  permitting  limitation  of  liability 
by  contract  of  early  origin  in  England.— In  England  it  has 
been  from  very  early  times  the  law  that  such  contracts  might 
be  entered  into  not  only  expressly  but  by  notice  to  the  owner  of 
the  goods.  The  first  reference  to  the  subject  is  to  be  found  in  a 
note  to  Southcote's  Case,-  in  which  Lord  Coke  says  that,  if 
goods  are  delivered  to  one  person  to  be  delivered  over  to  another, 
it  is  good  policy  for  him  to  provide  for  himself  in  special  man- 
ner "for  doubt  of  being  charged  with  his  general  acceptance;" 
and  this  language  has  been  generally  understood  as  having 
reference  to  the  carrier  as  bailee;  but  this  seems  to  be  uncer- 
tain.    In  Morse  v.  Slue.^  it  was  said  by  Lord  Hale  that  the 

1.  Since  the  duties  of  a  common  has  been  that  the  courts  now  up- 

carrier  are  public  in  their  nature,  hold  as  just  and  reasonable  num- 

the    tendency    of    the    courts    for-  erous  limitations  to,  or  exemptions 

merly   was   to   hold    that    it    was  from  the  common  law  liability  of 

against  public  policy,  or  as  other-  carriers     which     would     formerly 

wise  expressed,  not  just  and  rea-  have   been   against    public    policy 

sonable  to  permit  a  common  car-  and  void.     In  fact,  it  has  now  be- 

rier  to  stipulate  for  any  modifica-  come    the    accepted    general    busi- 

tion  of  his  common   law  liability  ness  usage,  (which  is  itself  stronj^ 

even  by  special  contract  with  his  evidence  as  to  what  is  in  accord 

customer.     But  in  course  of  time  with    public    policy)    for    carriers 

the  improved  state  of  society,  the  and  shippers  to  contract  for  some 

introduction    of    better    and    safer  exemptions  from  the  strict  liabil- 

modes  of  transportation,  the  dim-  ity  imposed   by  the  common  law. 

inished  opportunities  for  collusion  Alair    v.    Railroad    Co.,    53    Minn, 

and  bad  faith  on  the  part  of  the  160,   54  N.  W.  Rep.    1072,   39  Am. 

carrier,    and    other   considerations,  St.  Rep.  588,  19  L.  R.  A.  764. 

rendered   less   imperative   the   rig-  2.  4  Coke,  84. 

orous  application  of  the  iron  rule  3.  1  Ventris,  238. 
of  the   common   law.     The   result 


406  THE   LAW    OF    CARRIERS.  [§391. 

master  of  the  ship  "might  have  made  a  caution  for  himself." 
Nearly  a  century  intervened  during  which  time  we  find  no 
allusion  to  the  subject  until  the  case  of  Gibbon  v.  Paynton/- 
in  which  the  attempt  was  made  to  hold  the  carrier  liable  for 
money  delivered  to  him  concealed  in  a  bag  filled  with  hay,  the 
carrier  having  given  notice  that  he  would  not  be  liable  for 
money  unless  informed  of  the  fact.^  Lord  Mansfield,  as  we 
have  seen,  rested  his  decision  upon  the  fraud;  but  the  other 
judges  considered  the  notice  as  equivalent  to  a  special  accept- 
ance, thus  assuming  that  the  carrier  could  in  this  way  limit 
his  liability.  The  next  heard  of  such  special  acceptance  was  in 
Forward  v.  Pittard*'  before  the  same  court,  in  1785,  until  which 
Burrough,  J.,  says  the  doctrine  of  notices  by  carriers  was  never 
known  in  Westminster  Hall.'^ 

Sec.   391.      (§228.)      Same   subject— Notice   sufficient.— At 

length  in  1804,  in  the  case  of  Nicholson  v.  Willan,*  the  question 
as  to  the  validity  of  such  notices  came  up  directly  for  decision 
before  Lord  Ellenborough,  in  the  king's  bench.  The  defend- 
ants, who  were  carriers,  had  put  up  a  notice  on  a  board  in  their 
office,  of  which  the  plaintiff  knew,  that  they  would  not  be  liable 
for  any  package  whatever  above  the  value  of  £5,  unless  insured 
and  paid  for  at  the  time  of  delivery,  and  unless,  if  lost,  its  value 
should  be  demanded  in  one  month  after  such  damage  was  sus- 
tained. The  parcel  in  question  contained  £58,  of  which  no 
notice  was  given  to  the  defendants.  After  a  curia  advisari 
vult,  Lord  Ellenborough  delivered  his  judgment  in  which  he 
said:  "Considering  the  length  of  time  during  which  and  the 
extent  and  universality  in  which  the  practice  of  making  such 
special  acceptances  of  goods  for  carriage  by  land  and  water 
has  now  prevailed  in  this  kingdom,  under  the  observation  and 
with  the  allowance  of  courts  of  justice,  and  with  the  sanction 
and  countenance  of  the  legislature  itself,  which  is  known  to 
have  rejected  a  bill  brought  in  for  the  purpose  of  narrowing 

4.  4  Burr.  2298    (A.  D.   1769).  7.  Smith  v.  Home,  8  Taunt,  146. 

5.  Ante,   §  330.  8.  5  East,   507. 

6.  1  T.  R.  27. 


§  392.]  CONTRACTS  LIMITING  LIABILITY.  407 

the  carrier's  responsibility  in  certain  cases,  on  the  ground  of 
such  a  measure  being  unnecessary,  inasmuch  as  carriers  were 
deemed  fully  competent  to  limit  their  own  responsibility  in  all 
cases  by  special  contract;  considering  also  that  there  is  no 
case  to  be  met  with  in  the  books  in  which  the  right  of  the  car- 
rier thus  to  limit  his  own  responsibility  by  special  contract  has 
ever  been  by  express  decision  denied,  we  cannot  do  otherwise 
than  sustain  such  right,  however  liable  to  abuse  and  produc- 
tive of  inconvenience  it  may  be,  leaving  to  the  legislature  if  it 
shall  think  fit  to  apply  such  remedy  hereafter  as  the  evil  may 
require."  And  the  judgment  was  that  the  plaintiff  could  not 
recover  even  the  £5  which  the  jury  had  found  for  him.  And 
Lord  Kenyon  in  another  case  said:  "When  no  rate  is  fixed 
by  law,  the  carrier  is  entitled  to  say  on  what  terms  he  will 
carry;  he  is  not  obliged  to  take  everything  that  is  brought  to 
his  warehouse  unless  the  terms  on  which  he  chooses  to  under- 
take the  risk  are  complied  with  by  the  person  who  employs 
him.  The  old  mode  of  declaring  used  to  be  on  the  custom  of 
the  realm,  but  this  is  in  assumpsit;  it  is  founded  on  contract, 
and  the  contract  must  therefore  govern  the  parties.  "'^ 

Sec.  392.  (§229.)  Same  subject— Extent  of  limitation— 
Anything  except  gross  negligence  or  misfeasance. — From  the 
time  of  these  decisions,  many  cases  are  to  be  found  in  the 
English  reports  expressly  recognizing  the  right  of  the  carrier 
at  common  law  to  limit  his  liability  for  loss  or  injury  to  the 
goods,  resulting  from  any  cause  whatever,  even  the  felony  of  his 
own  servants,  except  his  own  gross  negligence  or  misfeasance, 
either  by  express  contract  with  his  employer,  by  special  accept- 
ance or  by  public  notice  brought  to  his  knowledge.!*^  The  mode 
resorted  to,  however,  in  the  great  majority  of  the  cases  was  that 

9.  Anonymous  v.  Jackson,  Railway,  11  Com.  B.  140;  Brooke 
Peake's  Addl.  Cas.  185.  v.  Pickwick,  4  Bing.  218;  Smith  v. 

10.  Batson  v.  Donovan,  4  B.  &  Home,  8  Taunt.  144;  Birkett  v. 
Aid.  21;  Mayhew  v.  Eames,  3  B.  &  Willan,  2  B.  &  Aid.  356;  Garnett 
C.  601 ;  Having  v.  Todd,  1  Starkie,  v.  Willan,  5  id.  53 ;  Sleat  v.  Fagg, 
72;  Leeson  v.  Holt,  id.  186;  Riley  id.  342;  Wyld  v.  Pickford,  8  M.  & 
V.    Home,    5    Bing.    217;    Butt   v.  W.  443. 


408  THE  LAW  OF   CARRIERS.  [§  393. 

of  public  notice,  which  according  to  all  of  them,  if  brought  to 
the  knowledge  of  the  owner  of  the  goods,  constituted  what  was 
called  a  special  or  qualified  acceptance  by  the  carrier,  and  was 
the  contract  of  the  parties.^  ^ 

Sec.  393.  (§230.)  Considerations  leading  to  English  Land 
Carriers'  Act. — But  it  was,  in  many  instances,  impossible  for 
the  carrier  to  prove  knowledge  of  the  notice  by  his  employer; 
and  many  questions  arose  as  to  what  should  be  sufficient  evi- 
dence that  notice  had  come  to  his  knowledge;  whether  it  was 
to  be  presumed  that  he  had  seen  it  in  a  newspaper  which  he  had 
been  accustomed  to  read,  or  whether  he  had  seen  it  posted  up 
in  the  office  where  the  carrier  transacted  his  business.  Questions 
also  arose  as  to  the  construction  to  be  put  upon  the  various 
forms  of  notices.  And  these  considerations,  in  connection  with 
the  frauds  which  were  being  practiced  upon  carriers  by  conceal- 
ments of  value  and  the  frequent  hardships  upon  them  caused 
by  the  carelessness  of  their  servants,  induced  the  legislature 
to  pass  the  act  of  11  Geo.  IV.  and  1  William  IV.  (1830),  com- 
monly known  as  the  English  Land  Carriers'  Act.^^ 

Sec.  394.  (§  231.)  Summary  of  act.— The  object  of  this  act, 
as  stated  in  its  title,  was  the  more  effectual  protection  of  carriers 
for  hire  against  loss  or  injury  to  parcels  or  packages  delivered 
to  them  for  conveyance  or  custody,  the  value  or  contents  of 
which  shall  not  be  declared  to  them  by  the  owners;  and  after  a 
preamble  which  recites  that  by  reason  of  the  frequent  practices 

11.  Those   whose   curiosity    may  in  the  case  of  Cooper  v.  Railroad 

prompt    them    to    investigate    the  Co.,    110    Ga.    659,    36    S.    E.    Rep. 

state  of  the  English  law  upon  this  240,  followed  the  English  rule  and 

subject  previous  to  the  passage  of  held  that  a  contract  exempting  the 

the    English    Land    Carriers'    Act  carrier     from     liability     excepting 

(1830)    will    find    the    cases    cited  for  losses  occasioned  by  fraud  oi) 

and  commented  upon  at  length  by  gross   negligence   was   neither   un- 

Bronson   and   Cowen,  JJ.,   in  Hoi-  reasonable    nor    illegal,    and    that 

lister  V.  Nowlen  and  Cole  v.  Good-  the   carrier   would   be   excused  on 

win,    19    Wend.    234,    251,    in    The  proof    that    slight    diligence    had 

N.    Y.    Cent.    R.    R.    ?■.    Lockwood,  been   exercised. 

17  Wall.  357,  and  in  Sager  r.  The  12.  Hinton    v.    Dibbin,    2    Ad.    & 

Railway  Co.,  31  Me.  228.  EI.    (N.  S.)    646. 

The  Supreme  Court  of  Georgia 


§  395.]  CONTRACTS  LIMITING  LIABILITY.  409 

of  bankers  and  others  sending  by  public  conveyances  for  hire 
parcels  and  packages  containing  articles  of  great  value  in  small 
compass,  much  valuable  property  is  rendered  liable  to  depreda- 
tion, and  the  responsibility  of  such  common  carriers  is  greatly 
increased ;  and  by  the  frequent  omission  of  the  persons  sending 
such  parcels  to  notify  the  value  and  nature  of  the  contents 
thereof,  so  as  to  enable  such  carriers  to  protect  themselves 
against  losses,  and  the  difficulty  of  fixing  parties  with  knowledge 
of  notices  published  to  limit  their  responsibility,  they  have  sus- 
tained heavy  losses,  it  is  enacted  that  no  such  common  carrier 
shall  be  liable  for  the  loss  of  or  injury  to  any  of  the  articles 
therein  named  above  the  value  of  £10,  not  occasioned  by  the 
felonious  acts  of  his  servants  or  his  own  personal  negligence, 
unless  at  the  time  of  the  delivery  thereof  at  the  office  of  such 
carrier,  the  value  and  nature  of  such  property  shall  have  been 
declared  and  the  increased  charges  authorized  by  the  act  shall 
have  been  paid ;  and  further,  that  no  public  notice  or  declaration 
should  thereafter  exempt  any  carrier  from  his  liability  at  com- 
mon law  for  the  loss  or  injury  to  any  articles  other  than  those 
specified  in  the  act,  but  that  as  to  such  other  articles  his  liability 
as  at  common  law  should  remain,  notwithstanding  such  notice; 
and  provided,  also,  that  the  act  should  not  be  so  construed  as  in 
anywise  to  affect  any  special  contract  with  the  carrier.^  ^ 

Sec.  395.  (§  232.)  Construction  of  act. — Commenting  upon 
this  act,  the  English  judges  have  said  that  protection  to  carriers 
was  its  object,  as  its  title  imports,  and  that  they  would  not  put 
upon  it  a  more  limited  construction  than  its  language  required. 
Hence,  they  have  held  that  although  public  notices  will  no 
longer  avail  the  carrier  in  limiting  his  liability,  special  contracts 
for  that  purpose  are  still  allowed  and  are  not  affected  by  the 
act;  and  that  if  notice  be  given  to  the  customer  of  the  carrier, 
and  he  subsequently  sends  his  goods  to  be  carried  without  ob- 
jection to  the  terms  of  the  notice,  he  is  bound  by  them.  So  that 
the  validity  and  effect  of  notices  other  than  such  as  are  called 

13.  This  act,  so  far  as  it  affects    full  in  Story  on  Bailments,  §§  554a, 
the  question  of  the  liability  of  the    554b   and   554c. 
carrier,  will  be  found  set  out  in 


410  THE   LAW   OF    CARRIERS.  [§  396. 

public  remain  the  same  as  before  the  act.^"*  And  in  numerous 
cases  it  has  been  decided  that  he  may  protect  himself  by  such 
notices  against  loss  caused  by  the  negligence  of  his  servants 
though  not  against  such  as  are  occasioned  by  their  felonious  acts. 
Nor  is  it  material,  under  this  act,  in  what  manner  the  contract 
is  made.  Neither  writing  nor  signing  nor  any  other  formality 
is  required,  the  question  in  every  case  being  one  of  fact,  whether 
there  was  such  a  contract  (Walker  v.  Railway,  supra).  And, 
although  a  mere  public  notice  may  not  be  sufficient,  if  a  ticket 
containing  such  notice  be  delivered  to  the  customer  or  his  agent, 
it  will  suffice  to  limit  the  carrier's  liability,  whether  it  was  read 
over  or  explained  or  understood  by  him  or  not.^^ 

Sec.  396.  (§233.)  Modification  of  Carriers'  Act  by  Rail- 
way and  Canal  TraflEic  Act. — The  Carriers'  Act  was,  however, 
somewhat  modified  by  the  legislature  in  1854,  by  what  is  known 
as  the  Railway  and  Canal  Traffic  Act,  as  to  the  class  of  carriers 
indicated  by  its  title,  so  far  as  to  prohibit  such  carriers  from 
limiting  their  liability  by  "notice,  condition  or  declaration;" 
provided,  however,  that  nothing  contained  in  the  act  shall  be 
construed  to  prevent  said  companies  from  making  such  condi- 
tions as  to  the  terms  of  carriage  as  shall  be  signed  by  the  shipper 
and  adjudged  by  the  court  or  judge  before  whom  any  question 
relating  thereto  shall  be  tried,  to  be  just  and  reasonable;  and 
further,  that  the  amount  of  recovery,  in  case  of  losSj  for  the 
various  articles  therein  enumerated  shall  not  exceed  a  certain 
designated  sum,  varying  according  to  the  nature  of  the  article 
to  be  carried,  unless  the  shipper  shall  declare  them  to  be  of 
higher  value  and  pay  additional  compensation  for  the  increased 
risk  and  care  thereby  occasioned.  But  the  act  expressly  excepts 
from  its  provisions  all  such  articles  as  are  named  in  the  general 
Carriers'  Act. 

Sec.  397.  (§  234.)  Same  subject— Effect  of  latter  act.— The 
material  alteration  efl'ected  by  this  latter  act,  as  will  be  observed, 

14.  Walker   v.   Railway,    2   Ellis  15.  Gr.  N.  Ry.  v.  Marville,  7  Rail. 

&  B,  750;  Austin  v.  Railway,  10  C.  Cas.  830;  Palmer  v.  Railway,  4  M. 

B.  454;    Carr  v.   Railway,   7  Exch.  &  W.  749. 
707;   Fowles  v.  Railway,  id.  699. 


§  397.] 


CONTRACTS  LIMITING  LIABILITY. 


411 


is  that  by  this  act  railway  and  canal  companies  can  limit  their 
liability  as  carriers  of  the  articles  enumerated  in  it  only  by 
special  contract  signed  by  the  shipper  which  shall  be  adjudged 
by  the  courts  to  be  reasonable  and  just.  Many  cases  under 
this  act  have  come  before  the  judges  requiring  decision  as  to 
whether  conditions  or  stipulations  in  such  contracts  were  just 
and  reasonable;  and,  following  the  cases  under  the  Carriers' 
Act,  it  has  been  repeatedly  determined  that  while  a  contract 
which  relieves  the  carrier  from  all  liability  is  not  reasonable, 
it  is  so  when  it  stipulates  that  he  shall  not  be  held  liable  for 
losses  caused  by  the  negligence  of  himself  or  his  servants.^** 


16.  This  act  having  given  an 
unlimited  discretion  to  the  courts 
to  determine  what  are  reasonable 
and  what  are  unreasonable  condi- 
tions in  contracts  between  carriers 
and  their  employers,  it  will  be  in- 
teresting as  well  as  instructive  to 
know,  as  far  as  the  cases  inform 
us,  what  has  been  considered  just 
and  reasonable  in  such  cases,  and 
by  what  principles  the  courts  have 
been  guided  in  coming  to  their 
conclusions. 

In  Peek  v.  The  Railway  Co.,  10 
H.  L.  Cases,  473,  the  contract  was 
that  the  company  would  not  be  re- 
sponsible for  loss  of  or  injury  to 
the  goods  unless  declared  and  in- 
sured according  to  their  value. 
The  Lord  Chancellor  (Westbury), 
speaking  to  the  question  of  its  rea- 
sonableness, said:  "If  the  present 
condition  were  introduced  in  a 
contract  between  the  company 
and  the  owner  of  the  goods,  de- 
livered to  be  carried  by  that  com- 
pany, the  necessary  effect  of  such 
a  contract  would  be  that  it  would 
exempt  the  company  from  respon- 
sibility for  the  injury,  however 
caused,  including,  therefore,  gross 
negligence  and  even  fraud  and  dis- 
honesty  on   the  part  of  the  serv- 


ants of  the  company,  for  the  con- 
dition was  expressed  without  any 
limitation  or  exception.  I  am 
therefore,  in  the  first  place,  clear- 
ly of  opinion  that  the  condition 
insisted  on  by  the  company,  even 
if  it  had  been  duly  embodied  in  a 
special  contract  between  the  par- 
ties, is  a  condition  which  it  would 
be  the  duty  of  a  court  or  judge  to 
hold  to  be  neither  just  nor  reason- 
able." 

In  Aldridge  v.  The  Railway  Co., 
15  Com.  B.  (N.  S.)  582,  certain 
goods  consisting  of  empty  pack- 
ages which  had  already  been  car- 
ried over  the  road  were  sent  back 
according  to  custom,  without  fur- 
ther charge. 

The  printed  contract  provided 
that  the  company  would  not  be 
answerable  for  the  loss  or  deten- 
tion of,  or  damage  to,  packages  of 
any  description  charged  by  the 
company  as  empties.  This  condi- 
tion was  considered  unreasonable. 
There  was  a  consideration  for  the 
return  carriage  of  these  empty 
packages  in  the  amount  paid  for 
their  carriage  to  the  place  from 
which  they  were  to  be  returned, 
and  their  return  free  was  only 
one  of  the   inducements  held  out 


412 


THE  LAW   OF    CARRIERS. 


[§  398. 


Sec.  398.  Same  subject — Language  of  contract  to  relieve 
from  negligence  must  be  explicit. — But  while  the  carrier  un- 
der the  latter  act  may  stipulate  against  liability  for  losses  occa- 
sioned by  negligence,  the  language  of  the  stipulation  must,  in 


to  the  public  to  send  full  packages. 
The  return  carriage  was  therefore 
fcr  a  consideration,  and  the  com- 
pany could  not  therefore  divest  it- 
self of  all   liability. 

In  McManus  v.  Railway  Co.,  4  H. 
&  N.  327,  the  plaintiff  desiring  to 
send  horses  by  the  company's  road 
signed  a  ticket  containing  the  con- 
dition that  the  owner  of  the 
horses  should  undertake  all  the 
risk  of  conveyance  whatsoever,  as 
the  company  would  not  be  respon- 
sible for  any  injury  or  damage, 
however  caused,  occurring  to  live 
stock  of  any  description  traveling 
upon  the  railway  or  in  its  vehicles. 
The  horses  were  injured  by  being 
put  into  an  insufficient  truck,  and 
it  was  held  that  the  contract  was 
not  just  and  reasonable  and  was 
therefore  void. 

In  Lewis  v.  Railway  Co.,  5  H.  & 
N.  867,  and  in  Simons  v.  Railway 
Co.,  18  Com.  B.  805,  the  condition 
was  that  no  claim  for  deficiency, 
damage  or  detention  would  be  al- 
lowed unless  made  within  three 
days  after  the  delivery  of  the 
goods,  nor  for  loss  unless  made 
within  seven  days  after  the  time 
when  they  should  have  been  de- 
livered. A  part  of  the  goods  were 
lost  but  no  claim  was  made  until 
more  than  seven  days  from  the 
time  when  they  should  have  been 
delivered,  and  it  was  held  that  the 
condition  was  reasonable  and  that 
the  company  had  a  good  defense 
to  the  action  on  the  ground  that 
the  claim  had  not  been  made  with- 


in the  seven  days. 

A  condition  that  a  railway  com- 
pany should  not  be  liable  for  a  loss 
of  market  or  other  delay  arising 
from  detention  is  a  reasonable 
condition.  White  v.  Railway  Co., 
2  Com.  B.  (N.  S.)  7.  But  a  condi- 
tion not  to  be  liable  for  delay 
however  caused  is  unreasonable. 
Kirby  v.  Railway  Co.  18  L.  T. 
(N.  S.)     658. 

A  condition  that  the  company 
will  not  be  answerable  for  dam- 
age done  to  any  horse  conveyed 
by  a  railway  is  reasonable.  Wise 
'*;.  Railway  Co.,  1  H,  &  N.  63.  So 
a  condition  that  the  company  was 
to  be  held  "fi-ee  from  all  risk  in 
respect  of  any  damages  arising  in 
the  loading  or  unloading,  from 
suffocation  or  from  being  trampled 
upon,  bruised  or  otherwise  injured 
in  transit,  from  fire  or  from  any 
other  cause  whatsoever,"  was  held 
reasonable.  Pardington  t-.  Rail- 
way Co.,  1  H.  &  N.  392.  It  is  also 
held  reasonable  to  stipulate  that 
horses  shall  be  carried  at  the  own- 
er's risk.  McCance  v.  Railway 
Co.,  7   H.  &  N.  477. 

It  has  also  been  held  reasonable 
to  give  public  notice  that  perish- 
able or  fragile  articles  will  be 
conveyed  only  by  special  agree- 
ment or  by  particular  trains,  and 
that  the  carrier  shall  not  be  held 
responsible  for  the  loss  of  market, 
or  for  loss  or  injury  arising  from 
delay  or  detention  of  trains,  ex- 
posure to  'weather,  stowage,  or 
from    any    cause    whatever,    other 


§399. 


CONTRACTS  LIMITING  LIABILITY. 


413 


order  to  be  effective,  be  clear  and  express.  Tlius  an  exemption 
from  liability  contained  in  general  words  which  do  not  expressly 
relate  to  negligence  will  be  construed  as  limiting  the  carrier's 
liability  as  an  insurer  only,  and  not  as  relieving  him  from  the 
duty  of  exercising  reasonable  skill  and  care.  If  he  will  relieve 
himself  from  the  duty  of  exercising  reasonable  skill  and  care, 
it  is  said,  he  must  do  so  in  plain  language  and  explicitly,  and 
not  by  general  words.^^ 

Sec.  399.    (§  235.)      Early  American  cases. — In  this  country 
the  contest  between  the  carrier  and  his  employer  upon  this  ques- 


than  gross  neglect  or  fraud.  Beal 
V.  Railway  Co.,  3  H.  &  C.  337.  It 
has  also  been  held  reasonable  for 
railway  companies  to  make  dis- 
tinctions in  the  conditions  for  car- 
riage by  different  kinds  of  trains. 
Thus,  in  a  case  where  the  owner 
of  horses,  knowing  that  there  was 
a  certain  rate  for  carrying  horses 
by  a  passenger  train  and  a  lower 
rate  for  their  conveyance  by  a 
freight  train,  sent  them  by  the 
former  at  his  own  risk,  it  was  held 
that,  as  there  was  an  alternative 
mode  of  conveyance,  the  condition 
was  reasonable.  Harrison  v. 
Railway  Co.,  2  Best  &  S.  122. 
Thus,  it  appears  that  a  carrier 
may  have  two  modes  of  convey- 
ance— one  by  which  he  takes  a 
greater  responsibility  and  charges 
a  higher  rate;  the  other  by  which 
he  charges  a  cheaper  rate  and 
takes  upon  himself  less  respon- 
sibility. 

In  Simons  v.  Railway  Co.,  18 
Com.  B.  805,  it  was  decided  that  a 
condition  that  the  company  would 
not  be  liable  for  loss  from  delay, 
detention  or  damage  to  goods  im- 
properly packed  was  unreasonable. 
And  in  this  case  it  was  said  that 
there  were  no  fixed  or  established 


rules  by  which  the  courts  could  be 
governed  in  concluding  whether 
or  not  particular  conditions  in  con- 
tracts of  this  character  were  just 
and  reasonable  or  not;  but  that 
each  case  must  be  determined 
upon  its  own  circumstances. 

In  Rooth  V.  Railway  Co.,  2  Law 
R.  Ct.  of  Exch.  173,  15  L.  T.  (N. 
S. )  624,  the  condition  was  that  the 
owner  should  undertake  all  risks 
of  loading,  unloading  and  carriage, 
whether  arising  from  negligence 
or  default  of  the  company  or  its 
•servants,  or  imperfections  in  sta- 
tions, platforms  or  other  places  of 
loading  or  unloading,  or  of  the  car- 
riage in  which  the  cattle  might  be 
loaded  or  conveyed,  or  from  any 
other  cause  whatever;  in  consider- 
ation of  which  the  company  would 
grant  free  passes  to  persons  hav- 
ing care  of  the  stock  as  an  induce- 
ment to  the  owners  to  send  proper 
persons  to  take  care  of  them. 
This  was  considered  neither  just 
nor  reasonable,  the  offer  of  free 
passes  not  having  the  effect  of 
changing  the  character  of  the  first 
clause. 

17.  The  Pearlmoor,  L.  R.  (1904) 
P.  286,  73  L.  J.  P.  50. 


414  THE  LAW   OF    CARRIERS.  [§  400. 

tion  of  the  carrier's  right  to  limit  his  extraordinary  common- 
iaw  liability,  commenced,  so  far  as  the  cases  show,  in  1838,  be- 
fore the  supreme  court  of  the  state  of  New  York,  with  the  well- 
known  cases  of  HoUister  v.  Nowlen  and  Cole  v.  Goodwin.^^ 
Both  turned  upon  the  validity  of  public  notices  by  stage-coach 
proprietors  that  all  baggage  should  be  at  the  risk  of  the  owners. 
Although  the  amount  involved  in  the  cases  was  of  but  little 
value,  they  seem  to  have  been  of  great  interest,  on  account  of 
the  question  involved,  for  each  of  them  was  argued  twice  before 
the  court.  The  difficulty  with  the  judges  was  whether  they 
should  follow  the  decisions  of  the  English  courts,  which,  as  we 
have  seen,  had  long  before  decided  in  favor  of  such  notices,  or 
disregard  such  authority  as  post-revolutionary,  and,  upon 
grounds  of  public  policy,  decide  the  question  differently.  Their 
conclusion,  after  great  deliberation,  was  that,  by  the  common 
law,  carriers  never  had  the  right  to  limit  their  liability  by  such 
notices,  though  brought  to  the  knowledge  of  their  employers, 
and  that,  on  grounds  of  public  policy,  it  ought  not  to  be  allowed 
that  they  should ;  thus  arriving  at  a  conclusion  directly  opposite, 
on  both  grounds,  to  that  to  which,  as  we  have  seen,  the  English 
judges  had  come. 

Sec.  400.  (§236.)  Same  subject. — As  the  question  did  not 
arise  in  these  cases  as  to  the  carrier's  power  to  restrict  his  lia- 
bility by  express  or  special  contract  with  the  bailor,  the  court 
expressly  declined  to  decide  whether  this  could  be  done.  A  few 
years  afterwards,  however,  this  very  question  came  before  the 
same  court  in  Gould  v.  Hill.i"  In  that  case  the  carrier  had 
given  a  receipt  for  the  goods,  in  which  it  was  stipulated  that  he 
would  forward  them,  ''danger  of  fire  excepted,  and  not  holding 
ourselves  responsible  if  lost,  stolen  or  damaged,  beyond  the  value 
of  $200."  The  goods  were  destroyed  by  fire  on  their  passage 
by  the  negligence  of  the  carrier.  The  court  below  instructed, 
and  the  jury  found,  for  the  defendant.  But  the  judgment  was 
reversed  in  the  supreme  court.  Nelson,  C.  J.,  dissenting;  and 
it  was  held  that,  on  grounds  of  public  policy,  the  carrier  could 

18.  19   Wend.   251.  19.  2   Hill,   623. 


§  401.]  CONTRACTS  LIMITING  LIABILITY.  415 

not  vary  or  qualify  his  common-law  liability,  either  by  contract 
or  notice,  Cowen,  J.,  who  gave  the  opinion  of  the  court,  saying 
that  he  could  no  more  regard  a  special  acceptance  as  operating 
to  take  from  the  duty  of  the  carrier  than  a  general  one,  and  that 
the  one  was  as  much  a  contract  as  the  other,  the  only  difference 
being  in  the  different  kind  of  evidence  by  which  the  contract 
was  made  out. 

Sec.  401.  (§237.)  Carrier  may  limit  liability  by  special 
contract. — But  a  few  years  after  this  decision,  the  very  same 
question  came  before  the  supreme  court  of  the  United  States  in 
the  case  of  The  New  Jersey  Steam  Navigation  Company  v.  The 
Merchants'  Bank,2o  and  the  ruling  in  Gould  v.  Hill  was  disap- 
proved, the  court  being  unanimously  of  the  opinion  that  a  com- 
mon carrier  might,  at  least  by  special  contract,  restrict  his  lia- 
bility. This  decision  was  soon  followed  in  the  courts  of  New 
York,  in  which  the  decision  in  Gould  v.  Hill  was  abandoned  as 
untenable,2i  and  the  right  of  the  carrier  thus  to  limit  his  re- 
sponsibility has  ever  since  remained  unquestioned  in  that  state, 
and  may  now  be  stated  as  the  well  settled  law  of  most  of  our 
states,- 2  as  well  as  of  the  supreme  court  of  the  United  States.^^ 

20.  6  How.  344.  Indiana:    Bvansville,   etc.  R.  R. 

21.  Parsons  v.  Monteath,  13  v.  Young,  28  Ind.  516;  Indian- 
Barb.  353;  Morse  v.  Evans,  14  id.  apolis,  etc.  R.  R.  v.  Allen,  31  Ind. 
524;  Dorr  v.  N.  J.  S.  Nav.  Co.,  1  394;  Michigan,  etc.  R.  R.  v.  Hea- 
Ker.  485;  Stoddard  v.  Railroad,  5  ton,  37  Ind.  448;  Adams  Ex.  Co. 
Sand.  180.  V.  Fendrick,  38  Ind.  150. 

22.  Connecticut :  Camp  v.  Steam-  Iowa:  Mulligan  r.  The  Railroad, 
boat  Co.,   43   Conn.   333;   Mears  v.  3G  Iowa,  181. 

Railroad  Co.,  75  Conn.  171,  52  Atl.  Kansas:    Kallman  r.  Ex.  Co.,   3 

Rep.  610,  96  Am.   St.  Rep.   192,   56  Kan.   205. 

L    R.  A.  884.  Louisiana:    Roberts  v.  Riley,  15 

Georgia:  Cooper  v.  Railroad  Co.,  La.   Ann.    103;    New   Orleans   Ins. 

110  Ga.  659,  36  S.  E.  Rep.  240,  cit-  Co.   v.   Railroad   Co.,   20   La.    Ann. 

ing  Hutchinson  on  Carr.  302;  Simon  v.  The  Fung  Shuey,  21 

Illinois:    111.  Cent.  R.  R.  v.  Mor-  La.  Ann.  363. 
rison,  19  111.  136;  W.  Trans.  Co.  v.  Maine:     Fillebrown    v.    Railroad 
Newhall,    24   111.    466;    Adams   Ex.  Co.,    55    Me.    462;    Morse    r.    Rail- 
Co.  V.  Haynes,  42  111.  89;   Am.  Ex.  way  Co.,  97  Me.   77,  53   Atl.   Rep. 
Co.  V.  Schier,  55  111.  140;  111.  Cent.  874. 

R.  R.  Co.  V.  Frankenberg,   54   111.  Massachusetts:    Judson    r.   Rail- 

88.  road   Co.,   6   Allen,   486;    Perry   v. 


416 


THE  LAW    OF   CARRIERS. 


[§401. 


The  validity  of  such  special  contracts  has  indeed  been  nowhere 
denied,  and  the  case  of  Gould  v.  Hill  stands  as  the  only  reported 
ease  in  which  the  right  of  the  carrier  to  limit  his  liability  in 


Thompson,  98  Mass.  249;  Grace  v. 
Ex.  Co.,  100  Mass.  505;  Hoadley  v. 
N.  T.  Co.,  115  Mass.  304;  Orndorff 
V.  Adams  Ex.  Co.,  B.  Cush.  194; 
Adams  Ex.  Co.  v.  Loeb,  7  Cush. 
501;  Adams  Ex.  Co.  v.  Guthrie,  9 
Cush,  78;  Cox  V.  Railroad  Co.,  170 
Mass.   129,  49  N.  E.  Rep.  97. 

Maryland:  McCann  v.  The  Rail- 
road Co.,  20  Md.  202. 

Michigan:  Am.  Trans.  Co.  v. 
Moore,  5  Mich.  368;  McMillan  v. 
The  Railroad,  16  Mich.  79;  Smith 
V.  Express  Co.,  108  Mich.  572;  66 
N.  W.  Rep.  479. 

Minnesota:  O'Malley  v.  The 
Railway,  86  Minn.  580,  90  N.  W. 
Rep.   974. 

Mississippi:  Southern  Ex.  Co.  v. 
Moon,  39  Miss.  822;  Mobile,  etc. 
R.   Co.  V.  Weiner,  49  Miss.   725. 

Missouri:  Rice  v.  The  Railroad, 
63  Mo.  314;  Snider  v.  The  Express 
Co.,  63  Mo.  376;  Read  v.  The  Rail- 
road, 60  Mo.  199;  Wolf  V.  The  Ex- 
press Co.,  43  Mo.  421. 

New  Jersey:  Ashmore  v.  Penn. 
etc.  Co.,  4  Butcher,  180;  Taylor  v. 
The  Railroad,  8  N.  J.  Law,  149. 

New  York:  Stedman  v.  W. 
Trans.  Co.,  48  Barb.  97;  Westcott 
V.  Fargo,  63  Barb.  353,  s.  c.  61  N. 
Y.  542;  Magnin  v.  Dinsmore,  56 
N,   Y.  168. 

North  Carolina:  Smith  v.  Rail- 
road Co.,  64  N.  Cor.  235. 

Ohio:  Davidson  v.  Graham,  2 
Ohio  St.  131. 

Pennsylvania:  Camden,  etc.  R. 
R.  V.  Baldauf,  16  Penn.  St.  67; 
Verner  v.  Sweitzer,  32  Penn.  St. 
208;  Farnham  r.  Railroad  Co.  55 
Penn.  St.  53. 


Rhode  Island:  Ballou  v.  Earle, 
17  R.  I.  441,  22  Atl.  Rep.  1113, 
33  Am.  St.  Rep.  881,  14  L.  R.  A. 
433. 

South  Carolina:  Swindler  v. 
Hilliard,   2  Rich.   286. 

Tennessee:  Nashville,  etc.  R.  R. 
V.  Jackson,  6  Heisk.  271;  Olwell 
V.  Adams  Ex.  Co.  (Tenn.  S.  Court, 
1874)  1  Cen.  Law  Journal,  186; 
Railway  Co.  v.  Stone  &  Haslett, 
112  Tenn.  348,  79  S.  W.  Rep.  1031, 
105  Am.  St.  Rep.  955. 

Vermont:  Kimbal  v.  Railroad 
Co.,  26  Vt.  247;  Davis  v.  Railroad 
Co.,  66  Vt.  290,  29  Atl.  Rep.  313, 
44  Am.   St.  Rep.   852. 

Virginia:  Va.  &  Tenn.  R.  R.  v. 
Sayers,  26  Grattan,  328. 

West  Virginia:  Baltimore,  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.  r.  Skeels,  3  W.  Va.  556; 
Zouch  V.  The  Railway,  36  W.  Va. 
524,  15  S.  E.  Rep.  185,  17  L.  R.  A. 
116,  citing  Hutchinson  on  Carr. 

Wisconsin:  Boorman  v.  lix. 
Co.,   21  Wis.   152. 

23.  Philadelphia  &  Reading  R. 
R.  V.  Derby,  14  How.  468;  The  S. 
B.  New  World  v.  King,  16  id.  469; 
York  Company  v.  The  Railroad,  3 
Wall.  107;  Express  Co.  v.  Kountze, 
8  id.  342;  N.  Y.  Cent.  R.  R.  v. 
Lockwood,  17  id.  357;  Bank  of 
Kentucky  v.  Adams  Ex.  Co.,  93 
U.  S.  174;  Cau  v.  The  Railway, 
194  U.  S.  427,  affirming  113  Fed. 
91,   51   C.  C.  A.   76. 

See  also,  Washburn  Crosby  Co.       J 
r.    Johnston   &   Co.,    125    Fed.    273,       '■ 
60  C.  C.  A.  187;   Saunders  r.  Rail- 
way Co.,  128  Fed.   15,  62  C.  C.  A. 
523. 


§  402.]  CONTRACTS  LIMITING  LIABILITY.  417 

this  way  is  held  to  be  unlawful.  It  may  therefore  be  stated  as 
the  universal  law  of  this  country,  that,  in  the  absence  of  a 
statute  prohibiting  it,  all  common  carriers  may,  by  express  or 
special  contract  with  their  employer,  be  exonerated  from  that 
rigorous  rule  of  the  common  law  which  in  the  absence  of  con- 
tract makes  them  insurers  of  the  safety  of  the  goods  intrusted 
to  them. 

Sec.  402.  (§237a.)  Same  subject— Contract  must  be  ex- 
press.— In  order,  however,  to  effect  such  a  limitation,  it  is  well 
settled,  as  the  rule  itself  clearly  indicates,  that  the  contract  by 
which  the  exemption  is  secured  must  be  clear,  special  and  ex- 
press. The  immunity  cannot  arise  from  inference  or  from  the 
use  of  general  or  ambiguous  terms.^^ 

Sec.  403.  Same  subject — Such  limitations  result  from  ship- 
per's waiver  of  common-lav^r  liability. — The  fundamental  idea 
of  a  contract  involves  a  meeting  of  the  minds  of  the  parties  and 
requires  a  mutuality  of  assent.  It  is  obvious,  therefore,  that  the 
result  attained,  namely,  the  limitation  of  the  carrier's  common- 
law  liability,  is  not  the  fruit  of  his  ex  parte  action  but  of  the 
mutual  assent  of  himself  and  his  employer.  In  other  words,  as 
has  been  clearly  pointed  out  in  several  cases,  the  carrier  cannot 
himself  restrict  his  liability  at  all ;  that  liability  is  imposed  by 
law,  and  the  utmost  that  the  law  admits  is  that  the  employer 
may,  when  he  deems  it  for  his  advantage,  by  special  contract 
release  the  carrier  from  a  portion  of  that  liability  which  the  law 
would  otherwise  impose  upon  him.^s 

Sec.  404.  Same  subject — But  shipper  must  be  allowed  real 
freedom  of  choice  between  restricted  or  common-law  liability. 

— In  order,  therefore,  to  render  the  contract  restricting  the  car- 
rier's liability  binding  upon  the  owner  of  the  goods,  it  must 
appear  that  at  the  time  the  goods  were  accepted  for  transporta- 
tion the  carrier  stood  ready  and  willing  to  assume  with  respect 

24.  Westcott  V.  Fargo,  61  N.  Y.  Co.,  89  N.  Y.  370;  Saunders  r.  The 

542;  Magnin  v.  Dinsmore,  56  N.  Y.  Railway,  128  Fed.   If),  62  C.  C.  A, 

168;    Mynard   v.   Railroad   Co.,   71  523. 

N.    Y.    180;    Nicholas    i".    Railroad  25.  See    McMillan     v.     Railroad 

27 


418  THE  LAW   OF    CARRIERS,  [§404, 

to  them  the  full  measure  of  responsibility  imposed  by  the  com- 
mon law,  or,  in  other  words,  that  the  owner  was  allowed  a  rea- 
sonable and  bona  fide  alternative  or  a  real  freedom  of  choice 
between  shipping  the  goods  subject  to  the  terms  of  a  special 
contract  or  under  the  carrier's  liability  as  an  insurer.-^  It  is 
not  necessary,  however,  to  conclude  the  owner  by  the  terms  of  a 
special  contract,  that  he  should  actually  have  been  offered  the 
option  of  shipping  subject  to  the  terms  of  such  contract  or 
under  the  carrier's  liability  as  an  insurer.  It  will  be  sufficient 
if  it  would  have  been  given  had  the  owner  demanded  it.^^  But 
if  such  demand  would  have  been  unavailing,  the  owner  would  be 
under  no  duty  to  make  it,  and  his  assent  to  a  contract  restricting 

Co.,  16  Mich.  79,  per  Cooley,  J.;  carrier  to  transport  his  goods 
Mich,  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Hale,  6  signs  such  a  contract  under  pro- 
Mich,  243,  per  Martin,  C.  J.  test,  he  will  not,  in  case  of  damage 

26.  Railway   Co.   v.   Cravens,    57  or  injury  to  the  goods,  be  bound 

Arli.    112,   20   S.   W.   Rep.   803,   38  by     its     terms.       Railroad    Co.    v. 

Am.  St.  Rep.  230,  18  L.  R.  A.  527;  Mason,    4   Kan.   App.    391,   46   Pac 

Louisville,   etc.   R.    Co.   v.   Gilbert,  Rep.  31. 

88  Tenn.  430,  12  S.  W.  Rep.   1018,  27.  Railroad    Co.    v.    Manchester 

7   L.   R.    A.    162;    Deming  v.   Mer-  Mills,  88  Tenn.  653,  14  S.  W.  Rep. 

chants'  Cotton  Press  &  Storage  Co.,  314;   Railway  Co.  v.  Stone  &  Has- 

90  Tenn.   (6  Pickle)   306,  17  S.  W.  lett,  112  Tenn.  348,  79  S.  W.  Rep. 

Rep.  89,  13  L.  R.  A.  518;  Railroad  1021;  Deming  v.  Merchants  Cotton 

Co.    V.    Craig,    102    Tenn.    298,    53  Press  &  Storage  Co.,  supra.    If  the 

S.    W.    Rep.    164;    Railroad   Co.    v.  shipper  desires  to  ship  under  the 

Dill,  48  Kan.  210,  29  Pac.  Rep.  148;  common    law    liability,    he   should 

Pacific  Express  Co.  v.  Wallace,  60  object  to  the  terms  of  the  bill  of 

Ark,  100;  29  S,  W.  Rep.  32.  lading  when   tendered  to   him   by 

If  the   carrier  has  two   rates, —  the  carrier.     Arthur  v.  The  Rail- 
one  if  the  goods  are  carried  sub-    way,    139   Fed.    127,  C.   C.   A. 

ject  to   the   common-law   liability,    . 

and  the  other  if  carried  under  a  The  shipper  should,  if  he  de- 
limited or  special  contract, — the  sires  to  ship  his  goods  under  the 
shipper  must  have  real  freedom  of  common-law  liability,  demand  that 
choice  in  deciding  which  rate  he  they  be  accepted  for  shipment  sub- 
will  pay  and,  consequently,  which  ject  to  such  liability.  It  will  al- 
liability  will  be  imposed.  If  the  ways  be  competent  for  the  carrier 
carrier  declines  to  accept  the  to  show  that  he  was  willing  and 
goods  for  transportation  because  ready  to  execute  another  con- 
the  shipper  refuses  to  enter  into  tract  upon  terms  reasonable  to  the 
a  special  limited  contract,  and  the  shipper,  if  he  preferred  it,  in 
shipper    in    order   to    procure    the  which    no   limitations   of   liability 


§405.]  CONTRACTS  LIMITING  LIABILITY.  419 

the  carrier's  liability  would  not  bind  him  to  its  torms.2«  The 
law,  as  we  have  seen,  charges  the  carrier  with  the  duty  of  ac- 
cepting for  transportation  all  goods  of  the  kind  he  professes 
to  carry  and  makes  him  a  practical  insurer  of  their  safety  while 
in  his  custody.  The  owner,  therefore,  may  rightfully  demand 
that  they  shall  be  received  and  carried  under  the  carrier's  lia- 
bility as  an  insurer;  and  a  contract  limiting  such  liability  to 
which  he  is  obliged  to  assent  in  order  to  secure  transportation 
cannot  be  considered  as  having  been  freely  and  fairly  entered 
into  and  will  be  of  no  effect  in  relieving  the  carrier  from  tlic 
duties  and  obligations  which  the  law  imposes  upon  him. 

Sec.  405.  (§  237c.)  Same  subject — Limitation  prohibited  in 
some  states. — In  some  of  the  states,  however,  it  has  been 
deemed  contrary  to  the  true  policy  of  the  state  to  permit  the 
carrier  to  limit  his  common-law  liability  by  any  contract  what- 
ever. Prohibition  of  such  contracts  has  been  declared  by  statute 
in  Kansas,29  lowa^*^  and  Texas,-^^  while  in  Nebraska-"*-  and  Keu- 
tucky,33  they  are  forbidden  by  the  constitution. 

were  required  as  a  prerequisite  to  way  Co.  v.  Sherlock,  59  Kan.  23, 
the  shipment;  and  it  will  not  be  51  Pac.  Rep.  899.  See  also,  Rail- 
necessary  for  him  to  specifically  way  Co.  v.  Tribbey,  6  Kan.  App. 
tender  such  contract,  since  the  467,  50  Pac.  Rep.  458. 
readiness  to  make  it  is  sufficient.  30.  Iowa  Code,  §  2074,  provides 
Railway  v.  Stone  &  Haslett  supra,  that  no  contract  made  with  a  rail- 

28.  Railway  Co.  v.  Cravens,  su-  way  company  shall  operate  to  ex- 
pra.  empt    it   from    the    liability    of    a 

29.  Railroad  Companies  under  common  carrier  which  would  exist 
the  statutes  of  Kansas  are  pro-  had  no  contract  been  made.  It 
hibited  from  changing  or  limiting  was  held  that  false  and  fraudulent 
their  common-law  liability  except  representations  made  by  a  shipper 
by  regulation  or  order  of  the  as  to  the  value  of  the  property 
board  of  railroad  commissioners,  shipped,  in  order  to  obtain  a 
It  was  held  under  this  provision  cheaper  rate,  would  not  give  vital- 
that  a  stipulation  in  a  contract  ity  to  a  stipulation  in  the  ship- 
for  the  shipment  of  live  stock  ping  contract  limiting  the  car- 
limiting  the  amount  for  which  the  rier's  liability;  that  in  case  of 
railroad  company  should  be  liable  loss  under  such  circumstances,  the 
in  case  of  loss  or  injury,  which  carrier  would  be  liable  for  the  full 
was  made  without  the  permission  value  of  the  article  shipped,  its 
or  order  of  the  board  of  railroad  remedy  being  against  the  shipper 
commissioners,  was  invalid.     Rail-  for  the  difference  between  the  rate 


420  THE  LAW  OF   CARRIERS.  [§  406, 

Sec.  406.  (§238.)  Mere  notice  is  not  sufficient— What  con- 
stitutes special  contract. — But  while  the  cases  admit  the  power 
of  the  carrier  to  qualify  his  risk  by  special  contract,  it  is  at  the 
same  time  denied  that  he  can  do  so  by  a  mere  notice  to  the 
bailor,34  or  by  anything  less  than  a  special  or  express  contract. 
It  therefore  becomes  important  to  determine  what  is  to  be  under- 
stood by  the  term  special  contract  in  the  meaning  of  these  cases, 
and  what  is  required  to  be  done  between  the  carrier  and  his 
employer  to  create  such  a  special  or  express  contract  as  the  law 
requires.  According  to  all  the  English  cases  on  the  subject  of 
limitation  of  liability  by  notice,  a  contract  sprung  from  a 
knowledge  of  the  notice.  The  theory  upon  which  they  all  stand 
is  that,  if  a  party,  knowing  his  published  terms,  employs  the 
carrier  without  objection,  a  contract  according  to  those  terms  is 
implied  between  the  employed  and  the  employer.  And  as  be- 
tween parties  who  are  not  carriers  and  other  persons  who  deal 
with  them,  there  can  be  no  question  but  that  this  is  the  law, 
upon  the  most  obvious  principles.  But,  as  has  been  said,  such 
notice  with  knowledge  of  it  does  not  constitute  a  contract,  but 
is  merely  evidence  from  which  a  jury  is  bound  to  imply  one  as 

charged     and     the    regular    rate.  149,   19   S.  W.  Rep.   459;    Railway 

Lucas   V.    Railway    Co.,    112    Iowa,  Co.   v.   Richmond,  94  Tex.   571,   63 

594,  84  N.  W.  Rep.  673.  S.    W.    Rep.    619,    reversing    (Tex. 

31.  Common  carriers  of  goods,  Civ.  App.)  61  S.  W.  Rep.  410. 
wares  and  merchandise  for  hire,  32.  Missouri  Pac.  R'y  Co.  v. 
within  the  body  of  the  state,  are  Vandeventer,  26  Neb.  222;  Rail- 
prohibited  from  limiting  their  road  Co.  v.  Palmer,  38  Neb.  463, 
common-law  liability.  See  Brit-  56  N.  W.  Rep.  957,  22  L.  R.  A. 
Ish  Ins.  Co.  V.  Railway  Co.,  335;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Kennard 
63  Tex.  475;  Houston,  etc..  Glass  &  Paint  Co.,  59  Neb.  435,  81 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Burke,  55  Tex.  N.  W.  Rep.  372. 
323;  Gulf,  etc.,  R'y  Co.  v.  Booton,  33.  See  The  City  of  Clarksville, 
(Tex.  Civ.  Supp.),  15  S.  W.  Rep.  94  Fed.  201,  and  Barnes  v.  Rall- 
909.  The  statute  is  held  to  have  road  Co.,  93  N.  Y.  Supp.  616,  where 
no  application  to  an  interstate  the  provision  of  the  Kentucky  con- 
shipment.  See  Railway  Co.  v.  stitution  was  involved. 
Sherwood,  84  Tex.  125,  19  S.  W.  34.  Georgia,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Gann, 
Rep.  455,  17  L.  R.  A.  643;  Rail-  68  Ga.  350;  Brown  v.  Express  Co., 
way  Co.  V.  China  Mfg.  Co.,  79  Tex.  15  W.  Va.  812;  Williams  v.  The 
28,  14  S.  W.  Rep.  785;  Missouri,  Railroad,  88  N.  Y.  Supp.  434,  93 
etc.   Ry.    Co.    v.    Ins.    Co.,    84    Tex.  App.   Div.   582. 


§  407.]  CONTRACTS  LIMITING  LIABILITY.  421 

effectual  as  if  it  had  been  expressed.^s  An  express  contract 
cannot,  therefore,  spring  from  a  notice  unless  something  be  done 
by  the  party  to  be  affected  by  it  to  make  it  binding  upon  liim. 
If,  however,  there  be  an  express  assent  to  the  notice  it  would 
be  equivalent  to  an  express  contract.  And  this  is  the  sense  in 
which  the  words  are  to  be  taken  when  it  is  said  that  the  contract, 
to  avail  the  carrier,  must  be  special ;  and  the  bailor  or  shipper 
is  considered  as  assenting  to  the  terms  of  the  notice  when  he 
takes  a  bill  of  lading  or  receipt  for  his  goods  embodying  the 
notice,  which  makes  it  a  special  contract  between  himself  and  the 
carrier.3^ 

Sec.  407.  (§  239.)  Same  subject.— The  same  words  are  used 
in  the  English  Carriers'  Act,  which,  while  it  declares,  as  we 
have  seen,  all  public  notices  by  carriers  ineffectual  to  limit  their 
liability,  provides  that  nothing  therein  contained  shall  affect 
special  contracts  for  that  purpose.  Since  its  passage,  many 
cases  have  occurred  which  give  us  examples  of  what  are  con- 
sidered special  contracts  with  carriers  by  the  English  courts.  It 
seems  from  them  that  the  universal  custom  of  land  carriers 
since  that  act  has  been  to  deliver  to  the  employer  a  ticket  or 
printed  notice  in  which  are  stated  the  conditions  upon  which 
the  carrying  is  to  be  done,  and  which,  when  received  by  him, 
constitutes  the  special  contract.  This,  in  their  view,  makes  a 
contract  in  which  the  parties  are  named  and  the  terms  agreed 
upon  between  them,  and  that  without  resorting  to  anything  like 
a  public  notice,  which  satisfies  the  requirements  of  the  act  and 
avoids  the  evils  against  which  it  was  intended  to  provide.'^ '^    In- 

35.  Crouch  v.  Railway  Co.,  2  C.  the  shipper  for  a  special  contract; 
&  K.  789.  and  when  the  agent  has  assented 

36.  When  the  shipper  fills  out  to  such  proposal  by  signing  and 
blank  receipts  at  his  own  office,  redelivering  it  to  the  shipper,  the 
and  in  accordance  with  such  proposal  ripens  into  a  special  con- 
practice  fills  out  a  receipt  and  tract,  and,  as  such,  it  becomes 
presents  it  to  an  employe  of  an  binding  upon  both  parties.  Bern- 
express  company  for  his  signature  stein  v.  Weir,  40  Misc.  Rep.  6:55, 
when  he  delivers  his  merchandise  83  N.  Y.  Supp.  48. 

for  transportation,  its  terms  con-  37.  Palmer  v.  Railway  Co.,  4  M. 
stitute  a  proposal  on  the  part  of    &  W.  749;  Chippendale  v.  Railway 


422  THE  LAW   OF   CARRIERS.  [§408, 

deed  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  a  contract  could  be  made  more 
special. 

Sec.  408.  (§240.)  The  acceptance  of  the  carrier's  receipt 
creates  a  contract  according  to  its  terms  between  him  and  the 
shipper — Failure  to  read  no  defense  if  no  fraud  practiced. — As 

in  England,  the  land  carriage  of  this  country  is  nearly  en- 
grossed by  railways,  canals  and  express  companies,  and  the 
usage  as  to  their  manner  of  contracting  with  their  employers 
is  in  effect  the  same.  When  goods  are  delivered  to  them  re- 
ceipts are  usually  given  in  which  are  stated  the  terms  as  to  the 
liability  of  the  carrier  on  which  they  are  to  be  carried,  which 
are  treated  in  all  respects  as  to  their  legal  effect  as  bills  of 
lading  ;3^  and  it  was  never  doubted  that  the  bill  of  lading  of 
the  carrier  by  water  was  not  only  the  receipt  of  the  carrier  for 
the  goods,  but  an  express  contract  between  him  and  the  shipper 
as  to  every  exception  of  liability  in  it.  And  no  reason  is  per- 
ceived why  a  different  legal  effect  should  be  given  to  the  latter 
merely  because  they  relate  to  carriage  by  water,  unless  it  be 
upon  the  ground  of  the  antiquity  of  their  use  for  that  pur- 
pose. Hence  most  of  the  American  cases  above  cited,  while 
denying  the  right  of  the  carrier  to  protect  himself  by  public 
or  general  notices,  even  when  brought  home  to  the  knowledge 
of  the  bailor,  have  treated  such  receipts  as  creating  contracts! 
sufficiently  special  for  that  purpose,  without  inquiring  whether 
they  had  been  read  or  explained  to,  or  understood  or  expressly 
assented  to,  by  the  shipper  Or  bailor  or  not,  provided  the  car- 
rier has  resorted  to  no  unfair  means  of  deception,  and  the 
employer  has  had  the  opportunity  to  know  the  contents  of  such 
receipt  if  he  had  so  desired.^^     And  this  is  in  accordance  with 

Co.,  7  Eng.  L.  &  E.  395;  Morville  v.   Brownlee,    14   Bush,    590;    Mor- 

V.  Railway  Co.,  10  id.  366;  Austin  rison  v.  Construction  Co.,  44  Wis. 

V.  Railway  Co.,  10  C.  B.  454.  405;  Black  v.  Railway  Co.,  Ill  111. 

38.  Downs  v.  Perrin,  16  N.  Y.  351;  Jones  v.  Railroad  Co.  89  Ala. 
325;  Downs  v.  Green,  24  N.  Y.  376;  Western  Ry.  Co.  v.  Harwell, 
638;    ante,    §127.  91  Ala.   340,  8   So.  Rep.   649;    Pat- 

39.  Kirkland  v.  Dinsmore,  62  N.  terson  v.  The  Railway,  56  Mo. 
Y,  171;   Louisville,  etc.   R.  R.   Co.  App.  657;    s.  c.  47  Mo.  App.   570; 


§  409.]  CONTRACTS  LIMITING  LIABILnT.  423 

the  English  decisions.^^  Nor  is  there  anything  unreasonable  in 
this.  Every  man  of  ordinary  intelligence  knows  that  no  indi- 
vidual or  company  engaged  in  the  business  of  carrying  to  dis- 
tant places  now  undertakes  to  carry  his  goods  subject  to  the 
old  common-law  liability  of  the  carrier.  He  knows,  moreover, 
that  bills  of  lading  are  constantly  given,  not  only  as  the  evidence 
of  the  receipt  of  the  goods,  but  as  an  express  and  direct  notice 
that  they  will  be  carried  on  certain  terms.  Knowing  this,  he 
cannot  be  wilfully  blind  and  plead  ignorance  when  it  was  his 
duty  to  know;  and  knowing  in  such  cases  is  assenting.  If  it 
was  his  intention  to  hold  the  carrier  to  his  common-law  liability 
he  should  have  said  so,  and  have  either  declined  to  employ  him 
or  sued  him  for  his  refusal,  after  tendering  a  reasonable  sum  for 
his  services  and  risk.^i 

Sec.  409.  (§241.)  Same  subject — Shipper  presumed  by  ac- 
cepting receipt  to  have  assented  to  its  conditions. — Accord- 
ingly, when  the  owner  of  the  goods  accepts  a  receipt,  he  is 
conclusively  presumed,  in  the  absence  of  fraud  and  imposition, 
to  have  assented  to  all  the  terms  and  conditions  contained  in  it. 

Railroad  Co.   v.  Dill,  48  Kan.  210,  In  Hadd  v.  Express  Co.,  52  Vt. 

29   Pac.   Rep.    148.  335,    the    shipper   could    not   read. 

That  the  receipt  was  not  read  is  and  the  agent  undertook  to  read 

immaterial   if  no   fraud   or   deceit  the   receipt   to   him.     He   omitted 

is  practiced.    Germania  F.  Ins.  Co.  to  read  a  clause  limiting  the  lia- 

V.  Railroad   Co.,   72  N.   Y.   90.  bility   of    the   carrier   to    its    own 

The   fact   that  the    contract    of  line.      Held,    no    fraud,     as     this 

shipment   is   signed   in   haste   and  would   be   the   legal   result   if   the 

without  being  read  will  not  relieve  clause  had  not  been  inserted, 

the  shipper  from  its  lawful  provi-  40.  Y.,  N.  &  B.  Railway  v.  Crisp, 

sions.     Hengstler  v.  Railroad  Co.,  25    Eng.    L.   &   E.    .'596;    Palmer   v. 

125  Mich.  530,  84  N.  W.  Rep.  1067.  Railway     Co.,     4    M.    &    W.    749; 

That  the  contract  was  not  read  or  Stewart  v.  The  Railway  Co.,  3  H. 

explained    to    the    shipper    is    im-  &   C.    135;    Zunz    v.    The   Railway 

material  if  no  unfair  means  were  Co.,  L.   R.   4   Q.   B.   539;    Acton   v. 

resorted    to   by   the   carrier.     The  Castle  Mail   Packets   Co.,   73   Law 

burden  of  proof  is  on  the  shipper  T.    (1895)    158;    Dean   r.   Furness 

to   show   that   unfair   means   were  (Canada),  9  Rap.  .Tud.  Que.  B.  R. 

resorted    to    in    securing    the    con-  SI. 

tract.     Railroad  Co.  v.  Dill,  supra,  41.  United     States:      Evansville. 

citing  Hutchinson  on  Carr.  etc.  R.   R.   v.   Androscoggin  Mills, 


424                                           THE  LAW   OF   CARRIERS.  [§  409. 

and  this  amounts  to  a  contract  with  the  carrier,  which,  whether 
called  a  special  or  express  contract  or  a  special  acceptance,  be- 
comes at  once  binding  upon  both  parties.  This  has  been  either 
tacitly  or  expressly  assumed  in  most  of  the  cases  as  the  indis- 
putable eifect  of  such  an  acceptance;  and  in  the  two  leading 

22  Wall.  594;  Cau  v.  Railway  Co.,  Kansas:     Kallman     v.     Express 

194  U.  S.  427;  Van  Shaack  v.  N.  T.  Co.,  3  Kan.  205. 

Co.,    3    Biss.    394;    Bank    of    Ken-  Kentucky:     Louisville,     etc.    R. 

tucky    V.    Express    Co.,    93    U.    S.  Co.  v.  Brownlee,  14  Bush.  590. 

174;    Arthur   v.   Railway   Co.,    139  Massachusetts:      Squire    v.    The 

Fed.    127,    citing     Hutchinson     on  Railroad,   98   Mass.   239;    Grace  v. 

Carr.  Adams    Ex.    Co.,    100    Mass.    505; 

Alabama:     Steele    v.    Townsend,  Hoadley  v.   Trans.   Co.,    115  Mass. 

37  Ala.  247;   Louisville,  etc.  R.  R.  304;     Cox    v.    The    Railroad,    170 

V.  Meyer,  78  Ala.  597.  Mass.  129,  49  N.  E.  Rep.  97,  citing 

Florida:    Atlantic,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Hutchinson  on  Carr. 

Dexter, Fla.  ,  39  So.  Rep.  Michigan:      McMillan     v.     The 

634.  Railroad,   16   Mich.    112;    Smith  v. 

Georgia:    The  carrier  is  prohib-  Ex.   Co.,   108  Mich.   572,  66  N,  W. 

ited   by  statute  from   limiting  his  Rep.  479. 

liability  by  any  notice  given  or  by  Missouri:  Patterson  v.  The  Rail- 
entry  on  receipts.  He  can  do  so  way,  56  Mo.  App.  657;  s.  c.  47 
only  by  an  express  contract.  Ga.  Mo.  App.  570;  Snider  v.  The 
Civ.  Code,  §§2264,  2276.     See  Cen-  Adams  Ex.   Co.,  63  Mo.   376;   Wy- 

tral,  etc.  R'y  Co.  v.  Hall,  Ga.  rick  v.  The  Railway,  71  Mo.  App. 

,    52    S.   E.   Rep.    679.  406. 

Indian     Territory:     Patrick     v.  New  Hampshire:    Merrill  v.  Ex- 
Railway  Co.,  Ind.  Terr.  ,  press  Co.,   62  N.   Hamp.   514. 

88  S.  W.  Rep.  330,  reversed  on  New  York:  Belger  v.  Dinsmore, 
another  point  in  Railway  Co.  v.  51  N.  Y.  166;  Kirkland  v.  Dins- 
Patrick,    C.    C.    A.    ,    144  more,  62  N.  Y.  171;  Huntingdon  v. 

Fed.    632.  Dinsmore,   4   Hun,   66;    Maghee   v. 

Indiana:      Stewart    v.     Railway  The  Railroad,  45  N.  Y.  514;   Long 

Co.,    21    Ind.    App.    218,    52    N.    E.  v.     The     Railroad,     50    N.    Y.    76; 

Rep.   89;    Railway  Co.  v.  Nicholai,  Hinckley  v.  The  Railroad,  3  N.  Y. 

4    Ind.    App.    119,    30    N.    E.    Rep.  281;   Steers  v.  The  Steamship  Co., 

424,    51    Am.    St.   Rep.    206,    citing  57  N.  Y.  1;  Mills  v.  Weir,  81  N.  Y. 

Hutchinson  on   Carr.     Adams   Ex.  Supp.  801,  82  App.  Div.  396;   Wil- 

Co.  V.  Carnahan,  29  Ind.  App.  606,  son  v.  Piatt,  84  N.  Y.   Supp.   143; 

63  N.  E.  Rep.  245;   s.  c.  64  N.  E.  Hoffman  v.  Express  Co.,  97  N.  Y. 

Rep.    647,    94    Am.    St.    Rep.    279,  Supp.  838. 

citing  Hutchinson  on  Carr.  Pennsylvania:    Farnham  v.  The 

loioa:    Mulligan  v.  Railroad  Co.,  Railroad,   55   Penn.   St.   53. 

36    Iowa,    181;    Robinson    v.    Mer-  South     Carolina:      Swindler     v. 

chants  D.  T.  Co.,  45   Iowa,  470.  Hilliard,  2  Rich.  286. 


§410.] 


CiJNTRACTS  LIMITING  LIABILITY. 


425 


cases  of  Belger  v.  Dinsmore.-i^  and  Kirklaud  v.  Dinsmore,"  it 
being  denied  by  the  plaintiff  that  this  was  the  effect  ol"  the  ac- 
ceptance of  the  receipt,  and  the  contention  being  made  for  him 
that  the  conditions  thus  incorporated  in  it  amounted  to  nothing 
more  than  a  mere  notice,  the  position  was  expressly  decided 
to  be  untenable,  and  it  was  held  that  by  such  acceptance  he 
had  estopped  himself  from  saying  that  a  contract  had  not  been 
made  between  himself  and  the  carrier  according  to  the  terms 
of  the  receipt.^^ 

Sec.  410.   Same  subject — Cases  holding  mere  acceptance  in- 
sufficient— Rule  in  Illinois.— It  is  held,  however,  in  some  of  the 


Tennessee:  Dillard  v.  Railroad 
Co.,  2  Lea,  288;  Railway  v.  Stone 
&  Haslett,  112  Tenn.  318,  79  S.  W. 
Rep.  1031,  105  Am.  St.  Rep.  955. 

Vermont:  King  v.  Woodbridge, 
34  Vt.  565;  Davis  v.  The  Railroad, 
66  Vt.  290,  29  Atl.  Rep.  313,  44 
Am.   St.  Rep.   852. 

Wisconsin:  Boorman  v.  The 
Am.  Ex.  Co.,  21  Wis.  154;  Schaller 
V.  The  Railway,  97  Wis.  31,  71 
N.   W.   Rep.    1042. 

42.  51  N.  Y.   166. 

43.  62  N.  Y.   171. 

44.  Cau  V.  Railway,  194  U.  S. 
427,  24  Sup.  Ct.  R.  663,  48  L.  Ed. 
1053.  See  also  cases  cited  in  pre- 
ceding section. 

From  the  delivery  and  accept- 
ance of  a  bill  of  lading  at  the  time 
goods  are  delivered  to  a  carrier 
for  shipment,  the  presumption 
arises  that  the  shipper  assents  to- 
its  terms,  and  mere  ignorance  of 
its  contents,  arising  from  failure 
to  read  it,  or  to  make  some  rea- 
sonable effort  to  obtain  informa- 
tion in  that  regard,  in  the  absence 
of  any  evidence  of  fraud  on  the 
part  of  the  carrier,  or  of  the  use 
of  any  other  means  to  deter  the 
shipper   from   fully   understanding 


the  contract,  is  not  sufficient  to 
overcome  the  presumption  thus 
raised.  While  the  carrier  in  the 
making  of  such  a  contract  must 
act  in  the  utmost  good  faith  and 
with  the  utmost  fairness,  if,  in 
the  regular  course  of  business,  he 
delivers  to  the  shipper  a  contract 
upon  the  latter's  delivery  of  the 
goods  for  shipment,  without  any 
circumstances  of  concealment, 
nothing  further  on  the  carrier's 
part  is  required.  In  the  absence 
of  any  request  for  an  explanation, 
the  carrier  owes  no  duty  to  the 
shipper  to  make  such  explanation 
and  the  latter  cannot  successfully 
allege  ignorance  of  the  contract 
merely  because  he  negligently 
fails  to  inform  himself  of  its  pro- 
visions. The  familiar  rule  applies 
that  if  a  person  makes  a  written 
contract  with  another,  he  takes 
upon  himself  the  responsibility  of 
acting  intelligently  and  exercising 
ordinary  care  to  inform  himself 
of  its  provisions.  Failure  to  read 
the  contract  or  to  examine  it,  or, 
in  case  of  inability  to  do  so  with- 
out assistance,  to  obtain  such  as- 
sistance if  reasonably  within 
reach,   is  negligence  as  a  matter 


426 


THE  LAW  OF   CARRIEKS. 


[§  410. 


cases  that  the  mere  aeeeptauee  by  the  owner  of  the  goods  of 
a  receipt  in  which  are  inserted  terms  or  conditions  intended  to 
alter  or  modify  the  carrier's  common-law  liability  is  insufficient 
to  constitute  a  contract  between  him  and  the  carrier  according 
to  such  terms  or  conditions.  In  order  that  the  owner  may  be 
concluded  by  the  limitations  contained  in  the  receipt,  it  must 
further  appear,  so  it  is  said,  that  he  assented  to  its  conditions 
or  restrictions  when  he  accepted  it  from  the  carrier,  and  that 
whether  there  was  such  an  assent  on  his  part  must  be  determined 
by  the  jury  on  evidence  aliunde  and  from  all  the  circumstances 
attending  the  acceptance ;  the  burden  of  proof  being  on  the  car- 
rier to  show  that  such  conditions  were  so  assented  to  by  the 
owner  of  the  goods.^     The  courts  of  Illinois  have  repeatedly 


of  law.  In  view  of  the  way  busi- 
ness has  been  conducted  by  trans- 
portation companies  for  a  long 
period  of  time  as  a  matter  of  com- 
mon knowledge,  there  is  no  rea- 
son why  contracts  between  such 
companies  and  their  customers 
should  be  excepted  from  the  fore- 
going rule.  Schaller  v.  Railway, 
97  Wis.   31,  71   N.  W.  Rep.   1042. 

The  subject  was  also  consider- 
ably discussed  by  Cooley,  J.,  in 
McMillan  v.  The  Railway  Co.,  16 
Mich.  112,  in  favor  of  the  position 
that  if  the  consignor  of  goods  re- 
ceive a  bill  of  lading  or  receipt 
from  the  carrier  containing  limita- 
tions of  the  latter's  liability  with- 
out making  any  objection  thereto, 
and  has  not  been  misled  or  im- 
posed upon,  he  cannot  deprive  the 
carrier  of  the  benefit  of  such 
limitations  by  showing  that  he 
took  the  bill  of  lading  or  receipt 
without  reading  it  and  without 
being  aware  that  it  contained 
them,  but  that  in  the  absence  of 
fraud  the  terms  of  the  bill  of  lad- 
ing or  receipt  will  be  conclusive. 


1.  This  subject  was  extensively 
discussed  by  Johnson,  J.,  in  the 
case  of  Gaines  v.  The  Union  Trans- 
portation Co.  in  the  supreme  court 
commission  of  Ohio,  28  Ohio  St. 
418,  and  the  settled  law  of  that 
state  was  said  by  him  to  be  as 
follows: 

"1.  That  a  special  exception  of 
the  liability  of  a  common  carrier 
of  goods  for  any  loss  which  may 
arise  from  damage  by  fire  happen- 
ing without  his  neglect  or  fault 
may  be  lawfully  created  by  special 
contract  between  the  parties, 
though  it  cannot  be  made  by  gen- 
eral notice  known  or  unknown  to 
the  party  engaging  the  services  of 
the  common  carrier.  Davidson  r. 
Graham,  2  Ohio  St.  131;  Graham 
&  Co.  V.  Davis  &  Co.,  4  id.  362; 
Welsh  V.  Pittsburg,  Ft.  W.  &  C. 
R.  R.  10  id.  65;  C.  H.  &  D.  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Pontius,  19  id.  221. 

"2.  That  while  a  common  carrier 
by  special  contract  with  the  owner 
of  the  goods  intrusted  to  him  may 
so  far  restrict  his  common-law 
liability   as   to   exonerate   himself 


§  411.]  CONTRACTS  LIMITING  LIABILITY.  <i27 

adhered  to  this  view  and  it  may  be  stated  as  the  settled  law  in 
that  state.- 

Sec.  411.     (§242.)     Form  and  nature  of  the  contract— Need 
not  be  in  writing— Evidence  to  establish.— In  the  absence  of  a 

from  losses  arising  from  causes  judge,  "the  numerous  and  some- 
over  which  he  had  no  control,  and  what  conflicting  cases  on  this 
to  which  his  own  fault  or  negli-  point,  it  is  enough  to  say  that  the 
gence  in  no  way  contributed,  he  principle  adopted  in  Ohio  and 
cannot  by  such  stipulation  relieve'  steadily  adhered  to,  that  the  com- 
himself  from  responsibility  for  mon-law  liability  of  the  carrier 
losses  caused  by  his  own  negli-  can  be  limited  by  a  special  agree- 
gence  or  want  of  care  or  skill,  and  ment  only,  is  supported  both  by 
the  burden  of  proof  is  upon  the  reason  and  authority.  That  there 
carrier  to  show  not  only  a  loss  should  be  an  express  assent  to 
within  the  terms  of  the  excep-  limitations  of  a  carrier's  liability 
tion,  but  also  that  proper  care  and  is  decided  in  the  following  cases: 
skill  were  exercised  to  prevent  it.  Adams  Ex.  Co.  v.  Nock,  2  Duvall, 
Graham  &  Co.  v.  Davis  &  Co.,  4  503;  Express  Co.  v.  Moon,  39  Miss. 
Ohio  St.  362.  832;     Levering    v.    Union    Trans. 

"3.  A    bill    of    lading   signed    by  Co.,  42  Mo.  88;    Adams  Ex.  Co.  v. 

the  company's  receiving  agent  and  Haynes,  42  111.  89;  Adams  Ex.  Co. 

accepted  and  acquiesced  in  by  the  v.  Stettaners,  61  id.  186;  Railroad 

consignor  is  binding  upon  the  lat-  Co.  v.  Manufacturing  Co.,  16  Wall, 

ter   although   not   signed    by    him,  329,  and  numerous  other  cases." 
and   the   terms   and   conditions   of        The     mere     acceptance    by    the 

the  contract  expressed  therein  can-  shipper  of  a  bill  of  lading  in  which 

not  be  contradicted  by  parol  proof,  the  liability  of  the  carrier,  in  the 

C,  H.  &  D.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Pontius  &  event    of    loss,    is    limited    to    five 

Richmond,  19  Ohio  St.  222.  dollars    per   one    hundred    pounds, 

"4.  That  where   a  common   car-  the  true  value  being  much  more, 

rier,  who  has  received  and  under-  will    not   bind    the   shipper   to    its 

taken    to    carry   the    goods    of   an-  terms.     In  order  to  so  bind   him, 

other,  seeks,  in  an  action  against  the   evidence    must   show   that   he 

him,  to  limit  his  common-law  lia-  assented    or   agreed   to   its   terms, 

bility   as   such,   the   burden   is   on  St.  Louis,  etc.  Railway  Co.  v.  Mc- 

him  not  only  to  establish  the  spe-  Intyre,   (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  82  S.  W. 

cial  agreement  limiting  the  liabil-  Rep.   346. 

ity,  but  also  to  show  that  the  loss        2.  Adams    Ex.    Co.    v.    Haynes, 

falls    within    the    terms     of     such  42     111.     89;     Adams     Ex.     Co.     r. 

agreement.      Graham    v.    Davis,    4  Stettaners,     61    id.     184;      Anchor 

Ohio  St.   362;    The  Union  Ex.   Co.  Line  r.  Dater,  68  id.  369;  111.  Cent, 

r.  Graham,  26  id.  595;  The  United  R    R.    r.   Frankenberg,   54   id.   88; 

States    Ex.    Co.    r.    Backman,    28  Field  v.  Railroad,  71  id.  458;  U.  S. 

id.    144."    .    .    .    "Without    review-  Express  Co.  v.  Haines,  67  id.  137; 

Ing   at   large,"    said    the    learned  Merchants'     Dis.      Co.      v.      Ley- 


428  THE  LAW   OF   CARRIERS.  [§  411, 

statute  to  the  contrary  no  particular  form  or  mode  is 
required  to  constitute  such  a  contract  as  will  be  binding  upan 
the  carrier's  employers.  The  courts  have  gone  no  further  in 
this  regard  than  to  hold  that  no  such  contract  can  spring  from 
a  general  or  public  notice,  even  when  it  is  most  explicitly  shown 
that  the  owner  of  the  goods  had  notice  of  it;  and  to  this  extent 
they  have  uniformly  and  persistently  adhered  to  the  doctrine 
of  Hollister  v.  Nowlan  and  Ccle  v.  Goodwin.  And  it  is  equally 
well  settled  that  a  private  notice,  though  given  directly  to  the 
owner,  cannot  be  made  to  bind  him  as  a  contract,  unless  some- 
thing is  done  by  him,  besides  the  delivery  of  his  goods  to  the 
carrier,  to  show  his  agreement  to  the  terms  of  such  notice. 
Whenever,  however,  it  appears  that  what  has  been  proposed 
on  one  side  has  been  accepted  by  the  other,  a  contract  is  proven 
which  will  be  mutually  binding,  whether  the  proposition  is 
made  in  the  form  of  notice  or  in  any  other  manner.  But  the 
proof  of  assent  to  the  terms  proposed  by  the  carrier  must 
be  clear  in  such  a  case;  for  the  law  having  imposed  an  im- 
portant duty  upon  him  upon  grounds  of  public  policy,  will  not 
permit  him  to  divest  himself  of  its  responsibilities  and  throw 
the  loss  upon  his  employer,  when  the  proof  that  the  latter  has 
so  agreed  is  doubtful.  But  it  is  not  required  that  such  proof, 
if  otherwise  satisfactory,  shall  be  written.  A  verbal  contract 
is  as  obligatory  as  a  written  one  when  established.     The  only 

sor,    89    III.    43;     Merchants'    Dis.  61    N.    E.   Rep.    1095,    88    Am.    St. 

Co.  V.   Joesting,  89  111.   152;    Rail-  Rep.  68,  affirming  96  111.  App.  337. 

road  Co.  v.  Fox,  113  111.  App.  180;  But  see  Anchor  Line  v.  Knowles, 

Express    Co.    v.    Bratton,    106    111.  66  111.   150,  in  which  it  was  held 

App.  563;   Railroad  Co.  v.  Harris,  that  if  the  receipt  contain  a  pro- 

55  111.  App.  159;  Coles  v.  Railroad  vision  that  the  carrier  should  not 

Co.,  41  111.  App.  607;  Railroad  Co.  be  liable  for  loss  by  fire  or  other 

V.  Davis,  159  111.  53,  42  N.  E.  Rep.  casualty,     and     no    question    was 

382,    50    Am.    St.   Rep.    143;    Rail-  made   as   to   the   shipper's   knowl- 

road  Co.  v.  Simon,  160  111.  648,  43  edge  of  its  contents,  it  must  be  in- 

N.   E.   Rep.    596,   affirming   57   111.  ferred  that  he  had  such  knowledge 

App.  502;   Chicago,  etc.  R'y  Co.  v.  at  the  time  of  the  shipment,  and 

Calumet   Stock   Farm,    194   111.   9,  agreed  to  its  terms. 


§412.] 


CONTRACTS  LIMITING  LIABILITY. 


429 


difference  is  in  the  manner  and  in  the  degree  of  certainty  of 
the  proof.^ 

Sec.  412.  (§  243.)  Same  subject— Parol  modifications— Sign- 
ing by  one  party— Effect  of  carrier's  omission  to  sign.— As  we 
have  seen,^  however,  all  verbal  agreements  entered  into  previous 
to  the  acceptance  of  the  bill  of  lading  or  receipt  are  considered 
as  merged  in  the  latter,  and  no  evidence  will  be  admissible  to 
vary  or  contradict  or  to  modify  its  terms  by  such  previous  in- 
structions  or  contracts.  But  it  has  been  held  to  be  competent 
for  the  parties  to  show  subsequent  modifications  or  changes  of 
the  written  contract  by  the  enlargement  of  the  time  of  perform- 
ance or  to  vary  it  in  any  of  its  terms;  or,  if  founded  upon  a 
new  consideration,  to  waive  and  discharge  it  altogether.-'"'  Nor, 
if  the  evidence  of  the  contract  is  in  writing,  is  it,  in  the  absence 
of  a  statute  to  that  effect,  required  to  be  signed  by  both  par- 


3.  Missouri,  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Pat- 
rick,    C.  C.  A.  ,  144  Fed. 

632,  citing  Hutchinson  on  Carr; 
reversing  Patrick  v.  Railway  Co., 

Ind.  Terr. ,  88  S.  W.  Rep. 

330;  Roberts  v.  Riley,  15  La.  An. 
103;  111.  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Mor- 
rison, 19  111.  136;  Gould  V.  Hill, 
2  Hill,  623;  Railway  Co.  v.  Nicho- 
lai,  4  Ind.  App.  119,  30  N.  E.  Rep. 
424,  51  Am.  St.  Rep.  206,  citing 
Hutchinson  on  Carr. 

"While  it  is  true,"  says  Camp- 
bell, J.,  "that  it  devolves  upon  a 
carrier  to  show  affirmatively  the 
terms  of  any  contract  which  les- 
sens his  common-law  liability,  yet 
that  fact  is  to  be  proven  like  any 
other,  by  any  pertinent  evidence. 
If  in  writing,  the  writing  must  be 
shown;  but  if  by  parol,  there  is 
no  rule  which  requires  different 
proof  from  that  which  would  es- 
tablish any  other  contract.  It 
does  not  matter  that  the  evidence 
is  conflicting,  for  in  civil  cases 
the  jury  must  always  decide  upon 


the  weight  of  the  evidence;  and 
there  is  no  rule  (except  where 
turpitude  or  illegality  is  in  issue) 
which  requires  one  contract  to  be 
proven  by  more  or  different  testi- 
mony than  another.  The  jury,  in 
each  case,  must  be  satisfied  that 
a  certain  contract  exists;  and  if 
satisfied,  that  is  sufficient." 
American  Transp.  Co.  v.  Moore,  5 
Mich.   368. 

A  bill  of  lading,  unsigned  by  the 
carrier's  agent  but  furnished  the 
shipper  on  his  request,  while  not 
constituting  a  written  contract,  is 
evidence  of  the  contract  actually 
made.  Missouri,  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Patrick,   supra. 

4.  Ante,   §§  167-171. 

5.  The  Delaware,  14  Wall.  603. 
But  where  the  contract  of  ship- 
ment does  not  provide  for  a  limita- 
tion of  liability,  it  will  not  be 
competent  by  proof  of  a  custom 
to  vary  the  contract  in  such  re- 
spect. McMillan  r.  Express  Co.. 
123  Iowa,  236,  98  N.  W.  Rep.  629. 


430  THE  LAW  OF   CARRIERS.  [§  413. 

ties.  Bills  of  lading  and  receipts  given  by  carriers  are  always 
signed  by  them,  because,  as  we  have  seen,  they  are  not  only 
acknowledgments  of  the  receipt  of  the  goods,  but  are  contracts 
to  carry;  and,  as  such  receipts  and  contracts,  they  should  al- 
ways be  required  by  the  shipper.  If,  however,  they  contain  the 
terms  and  conditions  upon  which  the  goods  are  received  to  be 
carried,  they  are,  when  signed  by  the  carrier,  conclusive  as  evi- 
dence that  he  has  assented  to  them;  and  when  accepted  by  the 
shipper,  such  terms  and  conditions,  according,  at  least,  to  the 
weight  of  authority,  become  also  his  contract  as  conclusively  as 
if  he  had  also  signed  such  receipt.'' 

Sec.  413.     (§243a.)     Same  subject — Statutory  requirements. 

— In  many  of  the  states,  however,  statutes  have  been  enacted 
regulating  the  form  in  which  contracts  limiting  the  carrier's 
liability  shall  be  made.  Thus,  it  is  frequently  provided  that  the 
contract  shall  not  be  valid  unless  signed  by  both  parties,  and, 
less  frequently,  unless  the  contract  shall  be  wholly  in  ivriting 
and  signed  by  both  parties.  These  statutes  have  for  their  pur- 
pose not  only  to  secure  tangible  evidence  of  the  shipper's  con- 
sent without  relying  upon  the  uncertainties  of  parol  evidence, 
but  also  to  secure  the  shipper  against  the  imposition  or  mis 
take  which  is  possible  to  result  from  the  use  of  printed  forms 
prepared  by  one  party. 

Statutes  of  this  nature  are  lawful  and  must  be  observed.'^ 

Sec.  414.  (§244.)  Notices  not  intended  to  limit  liability. — 
But  while  the  power  of  the  carrier  to  limit  his  liability  by 
what  are  called  public  or  general  notices  or  by  private  notice 
without  some  act  on  the  part  of  his  employer  to  show  his 
agreement  to  be  bound  by  it,  which  would  give  rise  to  a  con- 
tract according  to  its  terms,  is  universally  denied  in  this  coun- 
try, it  does  not  follow  that  there  may  not  be  cases  in  which  he 
may  claim  protection  from  such  notices  when  they  are  known 
to  those  who  send  their  goods  by  him.^     A  distinction  is  to  be 

6.  Ante,  §  407.  8.  See  post,  §§  437-438. 

7.  See  Feige  v.  Railroad  Co.,  62 
Mich.  1. 


§414.]  CONTRACTS  LIMITING  LIABILITY.  431 

drawn  between  such  notices  as  can  be  strictly  said  to  limit  his 
liability  by  relieving  him  from  the  strict  common-law  liability 
for  losses  against  which  carriers  are  understood  to  be  insurers, 
and  notices  which  warn  the  public  that  his  business  is  confined 
to  the  carriage  of  only  a  particular  class  of  goods,  or  within 
the  limits  of  his  own  route,  or  to  those  not  above  a  specified 
value,  without  a  compliance  on  the  part  of  those  who  employ 
him  with  certain  conditions.  Such  notices  as  these  last  are 
not  to  be  considered  so  much  in  the  light  of  notices  to  restrict 
his  liability  as  in  the  nature  of  means  to  prevent  fraud  and 
imposition  upon  him;  and  when  they  are  reasonable  and  fairly 
resorted  to,  no  reason  is  to  be  found  in  law,  morals  or  in  pub- 
lie  policy  why  they  should  not  be  allowed  to  protect  him  against 
imposition.  If,  for  instance,  the  carrier  should  give  notice 
that  he  would  not  carry  money  or  jewels,  or  that  he  would 
not  carry  parcels  above  a  certain  value,  or  be  responsible  for 
them  unless  their  value  was  declared  and  compensation  paid 
for  the  carriage  accordingly,  the  law  would  not  make  him  liable 
for  their  value  in  case  of  loss  if  they  were  given  to  him  to 
carry  by  one  who  was  cognizant  of  his  notice,  without  inform- 
ing him  of  their  nature  or  value,  of  which  he  was  ignorant. 
And  any  rule  or  custom  of  his  business  of  that  character,  known 
to  his  employer,  would  impose  the  same  obligation  upon  the  lat- 
ter to  make  known  the  nature  or  value  of  the  goods,  and  would 
have  the  same  effect  in  protecting  the  carrier  from  deceit  and 
imposition.  And  in  such  cases  it  is  not  obligatory  upon  the 
carrier  to  inquire  as  to  the  character  or  value  of  the  goods,  but 
it  is  the  duty  of  the  owner  to  inform  him;  otherwise  he  is  guilty 
of  a  deception,  and  if  the  goods  are  lost,  he  would  be  estopped 
from  demanding  compensation.  "If  he  has  given  general  no- 
tice," says  Nelson,  J.,  in  Orange  County  Bank  v.  Brown,**  "that 
he  will  not  be  liable  over  a  certain  amount  unless  the  value  is 
made  known  to  him  at  the  time  of  delivery  and  a  premium  for 
insurance  paid,  such  notice,  if  brought  home  to  the  knowledge 
of  the  owner,  is  as  effectual  in  qualifying  the  acceptance  of  the 

9.  9  Wend.  115. 


432  THE   LAW    OF    CARRIERS.  [§  415. 

goods  as  a  special  agreement,  and  the  owner,  at  his  peril,  must 
disclose  the  value  and  pay  the  premium.  The  carrier  in  such 
case  is  not  bound  to  make  the  inquiry,  and  if  the  owner  omits 
to  make  known  the  value  and  does  not  therefore  pay  the  prem- 
ium at  the  time  of  deliveryj  it  is  considered  as  dealing  unfairly 
with  the  carrier,  and  he  is  liable  only  to  the  amount  mentioned 
in  his  notice,  or  not  at  all,  according  to  the  terms  of  his  no- 
tice, "lo 

Sec.  415.  Terms  of  limitation  must  be  embodied  in  the  con- 
tract— Must  be  plain  and  easily  legible. — The  mere  acceptance 
of  the  carrier's  receipt,  however,  will  not  operate  to  bind  the 
sender  of  the  goods  to  its  terms  of  limitation  unless  such  terms 
are  written  or  printed  upon  the  receipt  as  a  part  of  the  contract 
embodied  in  it  and  are  so  plainly  legible  that  they  cannot  rea- 
sonably be  overlooked.  And  it  has  been  held  that  if  the  terms 
of  limitation  be  written  or  printed  upon  the  back  of  the  receipt, 
no  presumption  will  arise  that  they  were  known  to  the  party 
accepting  it,  and  that  they  will  be  no  evidence  in  the  carrier's 
favor  of  a  special  contract.^^     So  it  has  been  held  that  the  fact 

10.  F.  &  M.  Bank  v.  Champlain  imputed  to  the  shipper  unless  the 
T.  Co.,  23  Vt.  186;  Moses  v.  Bos-  evidence  shows  to  a  moral  cer- 
ton,  etc.  R.  R.,  4  Foster,  71;  3  tainty  that  they  could  not  have 
Greenl.  on  Ev.  §  215.  escaped  his  attention.     Baltimore, 

11.  Michigan  Cent.  R.  R.  V.  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Doyle,  142  Fed.  669. 
Mineral  Springs  Mfg.  Co.,  16  Wall.  See  also.  Brown  v.  The  Railroad, 
(83  U.  S.)  318;  Ayres  v.  The  Rail-  11  Cush.  97;  Malone  v.  The  Rail- 
road, 14  Blatch.  9,  Fed.  Cas.  No.  road,  12  Gray,  388;  Limburger  v. 
689;  Doyle  v.  The  Railroad,  126  Westcott,  49  Barb.  283;  McMillan 
Fed.  841;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Hale,  6  v.  The  Railroad,  16  Mich.  79;  Brit- 
Mich.  244;  Newell  v.  Smith,  49  Vt.  tan  v.  Barnaby,  21  How.  527;  Ver- 
255;  Prentice  v.  Decker,  49  Barb,  ner  v.  Sweitzer,  32  Penn.  St.  208; 
21;  Merchants,  etc.  Co.  v.  Furth-  Am.  note  to  Coggs  v.  Bernard,  1 
mann,  149  111.  66,  36  N.  E.  Rep.  Smith's  leading  cases,  7th  Am. 
624,  41  Am.  St.  Rep.  265;  Trans-  Ed.;  Colwin  v.  Fargo,  94  N.  Y. 
portation    Co.    v.    Newhall,    24    111.  Supp.  377. 

466;  Belger  r.  Dinsmore,  34  How.-  A  contract  for  the  shipment  of 

Pr.  421;  Railway  Co.  v.  Tribbey,  6  horses,  and  a  contract  on  the  back 

Kan.   App.   467,   50   Pac.  Rep.   458.  for   the   transportation   of   a   man 

Knowledge   of   limitations    on   the  to  accompany  them,  each  contract 

back  of  the  receipt  will  never  be  being  separately  signed,  are  sepa- 


§  415.]  CONTRACTS  LIMITING  LIABILITY.  433 

that  terms  of  limitation  printed  upon  the  back  of  the  receipt  arc 
referred  to  upon  its  face  will  give  rise  to  no  presumption  that 
they  were  known  to  the  sender  of  the  goods  when  he  accepted 
the  receipt.! 2  In  general,  therefore,  it  may  be  stated  that 
whenever  conditions  intended  to  limit  the  carrier's  liability  are 
written  or  printed  upon  the  receipt,  but  not  as  a  part  of  the 
contract  embodied  in  it,  they  will  be  considered  as  notices  only, 
and  as  such  not  binding  on  the  sender  of  the  goods  unless  his 
assent  to  them  has  been  secured.  So  if  any  attempt  at  impo- 
sition or  deception  appears,  or  any  device  be  resorted  to  to 
mislead  him  or  to  keep  from  his  notice  any  of  the  written  or 
printed  indorsements  upon  the  receipt,  which  are  intended  to 
affect  such  liability,  they  will  not  avail  the  carrier  if  they  have 
been  overlooked.  In  order  that  such  conditions  may  inure  in 
any  degree  to  his  exoneration,  the  law  exacts  the  utmost  fair- 
ness on  his  part,  and  that  full  opportunity  shall  be  given  to 
the  owner  of  the  goods  for  information  as  to  the  terms  thus 
proposed.  In  Blossom  v.  Dodd,!^  a  railroad  passenger  in  a 
car  dimly  lighted  delivered  his  baggage  checks  to  an  express 
messenger  and  received  in  return  a  receipt  on  which  the  num- 

rate  contracts,  and  an  agreement  the  contract  unless  brought  to  the 

on  the  back  of  the  latter  that  it  knowledge  of  the  shipper  in  such 

shall  be  governed  by  the  laws  of  a    way    as    to    imply     his     assent 

a  certain  state  cannot  be  read  into  thereto  when  he  accepted  the  re- 

or  affect  the  interpretation  of  the  ceipt.     Railroad  Co.   v.   Sayles,  87 

contract  for  the  shipment  of  the  Fed.  444,  32  C.  C.  A.  485. 
horses.     Brockway  v.  Express  Co.,        13.  43  N.  Y.  264. 
171  Mass.  158,  50  N.  E.  Rep.  626;         In  Perry  v.  Thompson,  98  Mass. 

s.  c.  168  Mass.  257,  47  N.  E.  Rep.  249,   the   owner   of   goods,   on   de- 

87.  livering  them   to   the   carrier,   ac- 

12.  Michigan     Cent.     R.     R.     v.  cepted   a   receipt   which   contained 

Mineral   Springs  Mfg.  Co.,  supra;  a  printed  clause  limiting  the  car- 

Ayres  v.  The  Railroad,  supra.  rier's  liability.     A  revenue  stamp 

A   clause    limiting    the    liability  was  affixed  to  the  receipt  in  such 

of  the  carrier  which  is  impressed  a   way   that   the   limitation   could 

in  red  ink  upon  one  corner  of  the  not   be   intelligibly   read.     It   was 

paper  upon  which  the  freight  re-  held   that   there   was   no   contract 

ceipt  is  printed  in  black  ink,  and  according    to    the    terms     of     the 

which    is    at    right    angles    to    the  limitation, 
text   of  the   paper,   is   no   part  of 
28 


434 


THE   LAW    OF    CARRIERS, 


[§415. 


ber  of  the  check  was  entered,  and  which  also  contained  an 
agreement  limiting  the  liability  of  the  express  company,  printed 
in  much  smaller  type  than  the  rest  of  the  card,  and  so  fine  as 
to  be  illegible  where  the  passenger  was  sitting,  and  it  was  held 
that  this  printed  matter  did  not  enter  into  or  form  a  contract 
between  the  parties  and  could  not  be  claimed  as  a  limitation 
upon  its  liabilit}^  by  the  express  company,  the  court  saying  that 
the  circumstances  under  which  the  paper  was  received  repel  the 
idea  of  a  contract,  and  that  whilst  the  carrier  should  be  pro- 
tected in  his  legal  right  to  limit  his  responsibility,  the  public 
should  also  be  protected  against  imposition  and  fraud;  and  that 
if  he  desires  to  limit  his  liability  he  must  deal  with  the  public 
upon  terms  of  equality  and  secure  the  assent  of  those  with  whom 
he  transacts  business. !•*     But,  as  we  have  seen,i^  if  there  be  no 


14.  In  Madan  v.  Sherard,  73  N. 
Y.  329,  defendant's  agent  came 
into  a  railroad  car  in  which 
plaintiff  was  traveling  and  called 
for  baggage;  received  the  plaint- 
iff's check  for  his  trunk  and  direc- 
tions for  its  delivery;  made  an 
entry  in  pencil  in  his  tally  book; 
marked  on  the  receipt  the  date, 
the  number  of  check  anti  place  of 
delivery;  handed  the  receipt  to 
plaintiff,  and  immediately  passed 
on,  nothing  further  being  said. 
Plaintiff,  without  reading  the  re- 
ceipt, put  it  in  his  pocket.  The 
car  was  dimly  lighted,  and  plaint- 
iff could  not  have  read  the  receipt 
where  he  was  sitting.  The  receipt 
purported  to  be  a  contract  between 
plaintiif  and  defendant  for  the  car- 
riage of  the  baggage.  It  contained 
several  hundred  printed  words, 
and  acknowledged  the  receipt  of 
the  trunk,  "subject  to  this  bill  of 
lading,"  which,  in  the  margin  was 
designated,  "domestic  bill  of  lad- 
ing." Then  followed  a  restriction 
of    defendant's    liability,    declaring 


that  he  shall  not  be  liable  for 
"merchandise,  money,  or  jewelry, 
contained  in  baggage,  nor  for  loss 
by  fire,  nor  in  case  of  loss  or  dam- 
age or  detention  by  reason  of  neg- 
ligence or  otherwise,  for  an 
amount  exceeding  $100,  upon  any 
trunk,  etc.,  including  the  contents 
thereof,  unless  specially  agreed 
for  in  writing,  and  noted  hereon, 
and  the  extra  risk  paid  therefor." 
The  receipt  was  in  good  type,  and 
under  ordinary  circumstances 
could  have  been  easily  read.  The 
trial  judge  charged  that  if  plaint- 
iff did  not  know  that  the  receipt 
was  proffered  to  him  as  a  con- 
tract, "and  received  it,  not  know- 
ing its  contents,  and  supposing 
that  it  was  given  simply  to  enable 
him  to  trace  his  property,  or  as 
a  mere  receipt,  then  the  plaintiff 
was  not  bound  by  its  limitations." 
This  was  qualified  by  the  state- 
ment "that  if  the  paper  was 
handed  to  the  plaintiff  under  such 
circumstances  that  he  might  have 
read    it,    and    neglected   to   do   so, 


§  416.]  CONTRACTS  LIMITING  LIABILITY.  435 

evidence  of  an  attempt  on  the  part  of  the  carrier  to  mislead 
or  to  conceal  from  his  employer  the  terms  of  his  proposed  con- 
tract, and  there  is  in  fact  no  want  of  opportunity  on  the  part 
of  the  latter  to  read  the  conditions  and  limitations  of  liability 
embodied  in  the  receipt  or  so  plainly  indorsed  upon  it  that  he 
could  not,  without  being  obnoxious  to  the  charge  of  negligence, 
have  overlooked  them,  he  cannot  avoid  their  effect  as  a  contract 
by  alleging  that  he  did  not  read  them  or  did  not  in  fact  under- 
stand that  they  were  so  intended;  and  no  fraud  or  imposition 
having  been  practiced  upon  him,  it  must  be  conclusively  pre- 
sumed that  he  knew,  when  he  took  such  receipt  in  the  usual  and 
customary  course  of  business,  the  stipulations  contained  in  it 
as  to  the  liability  assumed  by  the  carrier,  and  he  would  be  pre- 
cluded from  denying  such  knowledge  or  his  assent  to  them 
merely  because  he  had  negligently  omitted  to  examine  the  re- 
ceipt. 

Sec.  416.  (§246.)  Receipt,  to  be  effectual  in  limiting  lia- 
bility, must  be  given  to  and  accepted  by  the  shipper  at  the  time 
of  the  acceptance  of  the  goods. — To  make  the  terms  or  condi- 
tions of  the  receipt  effectual  in  limiting  the  liability  of  the  car- 
rier, it  must  be  delivered  to  the  shipper  of  the  goods  at  the 
time  they  are  accepted  for  carriage,  unless  there  is  an  agree- 
ment that  it  shall  be  delivered  at  some  future  time;  for,  the 
carrier  having  accepted  the  goods  unconditionally,  his  unlimited 
liability  has  become  fixed^  and  he  cannot  afterwards,  without 
the  consent  of  the  owner  of  the  goods,  change  it  to  a  limited 
one.^^  And  although  it  be  agreed  when  the  goods  are  accepted 
for  carriage  that  a  bill  of  lading  shall  be  forwarded  to  the 

he    was    bound    by    its    contents."  Railroad,   62  Mo.   527;    Louisville. 

Under   this   instruction    the    jury  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Meyer,  78  Ala.  597; 

found    for    the    plaintiff,    and    the  American  Exp.  Co.  v.  Spellman,  90 

judgment    was    not    disturbed    in  111.  455;   Michigan  Cent.  R.  Co.  v. 

the  supreme  court.  Boyd,  91  111.  268;   Merchants'  Dis. 

15.  Ante,  §407.  Co.    v.    Cornforth,     3     Colo.     280; 

16.  Blossom  V.  Griffin,  13  N.  Y.  Railway  Co.  v.  Clark,  48  Kan.  321, 
569;  Gaines  v.  The  Transportation  329,  29  Pac.  Rep.  312,  citing  Hutch- 
Co.,  28  Ohio  St.  418;  Pruitt  v.  The  inson  on  Carr. 


436  THE   LAW   OF   CARRIERS.  [§  417. 

shipper  at  some  future  time,  he  will  not  be  bound  by  any  limi- 
tations inserted  in  it  if  it  appear  that  no  mention  was  made  of 
them  to  him  and  that  he  in  good  faith  supposed  it  would  be 
nothing  more  than  an  ordinary  receipt.^ '^  But  after  the  bill  of 
lading  has  been  forwarded  to  the  shipper,  he  may,  either  ex- 
pressly or  by  conduct  amounting  to  a  ratification,  adopt  its 
limitations,  and  if  they  are  such  as  the  law  considers  reasonable, 
he  will  be  bound  by  them.^^  So  if  there  has  been  an  habitual 
course  of  dealing  between  the  parties  for  one  to  deliver  the 
goods  and  for  the  other  afterwards  to  make  out  and  deliver  bills 
of  lading  containing  uniform  conditions  as  to  liability,  the 
former  will  be  bound  to  accept  them,  and  such  conditions  will 
become  the  terms  of  the  contract  between  the  parties.^  ^ 

Sec.  417.  (§247.)  Same  subject — Parol  agreement  acted 
upon  cannot  be  limited  by  receipt,  subsequently  delivered. — If, 

however,  there  be  no  such  course  or  habit  of  dealing  between 
the  parties,  a  receipt  or  bill  of  lading  delivered  after  the  loss 
will  be  of  no  avail,  although  the  carrier  may  have  intended  at 
the  time  to  give  the  receipt,  but  was  prevented  from  so  doing 
by  accidental  circumstances,  there  being,  however,  no  consent 
on  the  part  of  the  owner  of  the  goods  to  receive  it  at  some 
future  time.2o  And  if  the  goods  be  delivered  and  the  trans- 
portation commenced  under  a  verbal  agreement  as  to  the  time, 
manner  or  conditions,  such  verbal  agreement  is  not  merged  in 
a  bill  of  lading  delivered  afterwards  to  the  shipper,  when  he 
has  parted  with  all  control  over  them;  and  the  mere  receipt 
of  such  a  bill  of  lading,  after  the  verbal  agreement  has  been 
acted,  does  not  estop  him  from  showing  what  the  actual  agree- 
ment was.2i      Thus,   in   Bostwick   v.   Railroad,-^    plaintiff  had 

17.  Railroad  Co.  v.  Craig,  102  20.  Gott  v.  Dinsmore,  111  Mass. 
Tenn.  298,  52  S.  W.  Rep.  164.  45. 

18.  Rubens  v.  Steamship  Co.,  65  21.  Missouri  Pac.  R'y  Co.  v.  Bee- 
Hun,  625,  20  N.  Y.  Supp.  481.  son,  30  Kans.  298;  Swift  v.  Steam- 

19.  Shelton  v.  The  Merchants'  ship  Co.,  106  N.  Y.  206;  Guillaume 
D.  T.  Co.,  59  N.  Y.  258.  See  also,  v  Transportation  Co.,  100  N.  Y. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Richardson,  23  Ky.  491;  Wheeler  v.  Railroad  Co.,  115 
I^aw  Rep.  2334,  66  S.  W.  Rep.  U.  S.  29;  Wilde  v.  Transportation 
1035.  Co.,  47  Iowa,  247;  Merchants,  etc. 


§418.] 


CONTRACTS  LIMITING  LIABILITY. 


437 


made  a  verbal  contract  with  the  agent  of  the  railroad  company 
to  transport  his  cotton  by  "all  rail"  from  Cincinnati  to  New 
York.  Under  this  agreement  he  delivered  his  cotton  at  the 
company's  depot  and  its  transportation  was  immediately  com- 
menced. One  or  two  days  afterwards  the  company's  agent 
sent  to  the  plaintiff  a  bill  of  lading  which  by  its  terms  re- 
served to  the  company  the  right  to  forward  in  part  by  water. 
When  the  cotton  reached  Baltimore  it  was  shipped  on  steamers 
for  New  York  and  a  part  of  it  was  lost  by  the  wrecking  of 
the  vessel  in  a  storm.  It  was  held  that,  after  the  verbal  agree- 
ment had  been  consummated  and  rights  had  accrued  under  it,  it 
could  not  be  altered  without  the  express  assent  of  the  shipper, 
and  that,  the  cotton  having  been  exposed  to  the  danger  by  the 
fault  of  the  company,  it  was  liable,  though  the  immediate  cause 
of  the  loss  might  have  been  the  act  of  God.-^ 

Sec.  418.     (§248.)     Extent  to  which  carrier  may  limit  his 
liability. — The  extent  to  which  the  carrier  may  exonerate  him- 


Co.  V.  Furthmann,  149  111.  66,  36 
N.  E.  Rep.  624,  41  Am.  St.  Rep. 
265;  Caldwell  v.  Railway  Co.,  21 
Ky.  Law  Rep.  397,  51  S.  W.  Rep. 
575;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Cooper,  21 
Ky.  Law  Rep.  1644,  56  S.  W.  Rep. 
144;  Railway  Co.  ;;.  Clark,  48  Kan. 
321,  329,  29  Pac.  Rep.  312.  See, 
ante,  §  171. 

A  passenger's  rights  and  the 
carrier's  liability  as  to  baggage 
are  fixed  and  determined  when  his 
ticket  is  bought.  Subsequent 
notice  of  a  limitation  of  liability 
will  not  alter  the  rights  thus  de- 
termined, unless  the  passenger  as- 
sents thereto  upon  a  suflBcient  con- 
sideration. Saunders  t?.  Railway 
Co.,  128  Fed.  15,  62  C.  C.  A.  523. 

22.  45  N.  Y.  712. 

23.  In  Union  Pac.  R'y  Co.  v. 
Marston,  30  Neb.  241,  46  N.  W. 
Rep.  485,  it  appeared  that  one  M. 
applied  to  an  agent  of  the  Rock 


Island  &  Peoria  Railroad  Cota- 
pany,  at  one  of  its  stations  in  the 
state  of  Illinois,  to  ship  certain 
office  furniture,  including  a  stove,- 
to  Kearney,  on  the  line  of  defend- 
ant's road  in  the  state  of  Nebras- 
ka. The  agent  informed  M.  that 
the  custom  was  for  shippers  to  re- 
lease stoves,  but  advised  him  not 
to  do  it  for  reasons  given,  but  to 
pay  the  additional  expense  of  send- 
ing it  at  carrier's  risk.  To  this 
M.  assented,  and  offered  to  pay  the 
freight  to  said  agent,  who  in- 
formed him  that  he  could  as  well 
pay  it  at  the  end  of  the  route. 
The  agent  placed  the  goods  in  a 
car  of  a  freight  train,  which  pro- 
ceeded on  its  way.  Four  or  five 
hours  afterwards  the  agent 
handed  M.  a  paper,  saying  that  it 
was  a  receipt  for  the  goods 
shipped.  This  paper  M.  put  in  his 
pocket  without  examining  it,  and 


438 


THE  LAW  OF  CARRIERS. 


[§418. 


self  from  responsibility  by  such  express  or  special  agreements, 
■where  permitted,  is,  subject  to  the  exceptions  to  be  hereafter 
considered,  almost  unlimited.  He  cannot,  of  course,  exonerate 
himself  from  the  consequences  of  the  fraud  or  felony  either  of 
himself  or  of  his  servants,  though,  as  we  have  seen,^^  it  was 
formerly  otherwise  in  England  as  to  the  felony  of  his  servants ; 
and,  as  will  be  hereafter  seen,^^  according  to  the  weight  of 
authority  in  this  country,  based  upon  considerations  of  public 
policy,  he  cannot  contract  for  exemption  from  liability  for  losses 
caused  by  his  own  or  the  negligence  of  his  servants.  But,  with 
these  exceptions,  there  is  no  danger  or  risk  which  can  arise  in 
the  course  of  the  transportation  of  the  goods,  or  of  his  con- 
nection with  them,  for  which  he  cannot  avoid  responsibility  by  a 
contract  fairly  and  understandingly  made  with  his  employer, 
upon  the  theory  that  the  owner  of  the  goods,  for  the  considera- 
tion which  it  is  supposed  he  receives,  either  in  the  reduced  com- 
pensation or  in  some  equivalent  advantage,  may  surrender,  if 


it  proved  to  be  a  bill  of  lading  of 
the  goods,  containing,  inter  alia, 
ttie  condition,  "stoves  at  owner's 
risk  of  breakage."  The  goods  were 
received  at  Council  Bluffs  from  the 
Rock  Island  Railroad  by  defend- 
ant, the  Union  Pacific  Railway 
Company,  and  carried  to  Kearney. 
Upon  arrival  the  stove  was  found 
to  have  been  broken  en  route.  In 
an  action  by  M.  against  the  Union 
Pacific  Railway  Company  for  dam- 
ages for  injury  to  the  stove,  it 
was  held  that,  as  between  M.  and 
the  Rock  Island  &  Peoria  Railroad 
Company,  the  stove  was  carried  at 
carrier's  risk. 

The  same  rule  was  followed  in 
American  Exp.  Co.  v.  Spellman,  90 
111.  455,  where  the  receipt  or  bill 
was  given  some  time  after  the 
goods  had  been  shipped,  and  the 
evidence  negatived  expressly  any 
presumption      that     the      shipper 


knew  of  it;  and  in  Michigan  Cent. 
R.  Co.  V.  Boyd,  91  111.  268,  where 
a  bill  of  lading  was  given  a  few 
days  after  the  delivery  to  the 
carrier,  and  while  the  goods  were 
on  their  way,  this  contract  oi* 
limitation  not  being  assented  to 
by  the  consignee  and  owner,  and 
the  consignor's  authority  to  bind 
the  consignee  as  his  agent,  hav- 
ing expired  with  the  shipment; 
and  in  Merchants'  Dis.  Co.  v. 
Cornforth,  3  Colo.  280,  where,  af- 
ter a  verbal  contract  for  the  ship- 
ment had  been  made  and  the  goods 
were  loaded,  the  receipt  was  de- 
livered to  the  consignors,  though 
the  question  was  not  of  conse- 
quence, as  the  loss  was  by  the 
carrier's  negligence.  To  like  ef- 
fect, also,  is  Louisville,  etc.  R. 
Co.  r.  Meyer,   78   Ala.   597. 

24.  See  ante.  §  392. 

25.  See  post,  §  450. 


§  419.]  CONTRACTS  LIMITING  LIABILITY.  439 

he  will,  the  obligation  of  the  carrier  as  an  insurer,  to  any  ex- 
tent he  may  choose.    Thus — 

Sec.  419.  (§248a.)  Carrier  may  stipulate  for  exemption 
from  liability  for  certain  losses  in  carriage  of  live  stock.— As 
has  been  already  seen,^^  the  carrier  of  living  animals  as  freight 
is,  by  the  weight  of  authority,  to  be  regarded  as  a  common  car- 
rier as  to  such  freight.  It  has  also  been  seen27  that  the  carrier 
of  animals  is  by  law  exempt  from  liability  for  those  losses 
which  are  occasioned,  not  by  his  fault  or  neglect,  but  by  the  in- 
herent nature,  vice  or  propensity  of  the  animals  themselves. 
The  carriage  of  animals  evidently  involves  different  require- 
ments than  those  involved  in  the  carriage  of  inanimate  objects. 
They  must  be  loaded  and  unloaded  with  more  care;  they  must 
be  fed,  watered  and  protected;  they  must  be  secured  from 
escape;  they  must  be  guarded  against  heating,  crowding  and 
suffocation;  they  must  often  require  skilled  attention  and  as- 
sistance. For  these  and  like  reasons  the  owner  and  the  car- 
rier may  both  desire  that  the  owner,  or  some  experienced  per- 
son in  his  behalf,  shall  accompany  the  stock  and  assume  its  care, 
leaving  to  the  carrier  only  the  duty  of  transportation  with  its 
necessary  incidents.  In  view  of  these  facts,  it  is  well  settled  that 
the  owner  and  the  carrier  may,  by  contract,  provide  that  the 
carrier  shall  be  exempt  from  all  liability  for  injuries  occur- 
ring to  the  stock  disconnected  and  apart  from  the  conduct  and 
running  of  the  trains,  such  as  injury  from  loading  or  unload- 
ing, from  overloading,  suffocation,  heating,  and  the  like,  or  from 
the  weakness,  escape  or  viciousness  of  the  stock. ^^     Such  a  con- 

26.  Ante,  §339.  v.  Railway  Co.,  83  Mo.  574;   Stur- 

27.  Ante,  §336.  geon  v.  Railway  Co.,  65  Mo.  569; 

28.  Georgia  R.  R.  Co.  t\  Beatie,  Oxley  v.  Railway  Co.,  65  Mo.  629; 
66  Ga.  438;  Georgia  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Clark  v.  Railway  Co.,  64  Mo.  440; 
Spears,  66  Ga.  485;  Mitchell  v.  Levering  v.  Transportation  Co..  42 
Railroad  Co.,  68  Ga.  644;  East  Mo.  88;  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.  r. 
Tenn.  R.  Co.  v.  Johnston,  75  Ala.  Raiordan,  119  Penn.  St.  577;  Cen- 
596;  St.  Louis,  etc.  R'y  Co.  v.  tral  R.  Co.  r.  Bryant.  73  Ga.  722; 
Lesser.  46  Ark.  236;  Myers  v.  Betts  r.  Loan  &  Trust  Co..  21  Wis. 
Railway  Co.,  90  Mo.  98;  Atchison  SO;  Morrison  r.  Construction  Co., 
V.  Railroad  Co.,  80  Mo.  213;   Ball  44  Wis.  405;  Burns  v.  Railway  Co., 


440  THE  LAW   OF   CARRIERS.  [§  420. 

tract  does  not  relieve  the  carrier  from  the  due  performance  of 
his  undertaking;  nor  can  he,  according  to  the  weight  of  author- 
ity, by  such  a  contract  escape  responsibility  for  the  negligence 
of  himself  or  his  servants.^^  The  consideration  for  such  con- 
tracts is  usually  found  in  the  reduced  rates  given  and  the  free 
transportation  of  the  shipper  or  his  agent  to  and  from  the  des- 
tination of  the  stock. 

Sec.  420.  (§248b.)  Carrier  may  stipulate  for  exemption  in 
case  of  loss  by  fire. — So  a  carrier  may  stipulate  for  exemption 
from  liability  in  case  the  goods  are  lost  or  injured  by  fire,  and 
if  he  does  so,  the  measure  of  his  obligation  is  ordinary  dili- 
gence f^  but  if  the  fire  is  caused  by  his  negligence,  or  if  he 
negligently  places  or  leaves  the  goods  in  a  place  of  danger,  he 
cannot,  by  such  a  stipulation,  escape  responsibility.^! 

Sec.  421.  (§248c.)  Carrier  may  stipulate  for  exemption  in 
case  of  loss  caused  by  strikes,  mobs,  etc. — So  it  is  held  that  a 

104  Wis.  646,  80  N.  W.  Rep.  927;  Co.  v.  Heath,  22  Ind.  App.  47,  53 

Railway   Co.   v.    Patterson,   69    111.  N.  E.  Rep.  198;   Armstrong  v.  Ex- 

App.  438;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Fox,  113  press    Co.,    159    Penn.    St.    640,    28 

111.    App.    180;    Morse    r.    Railway  Atl.   Rep.    448. 

Co.,   97   Me.   77,  53  Atl.  Rep.   874;  30.  Little  Rock,   etc.   R'y   Co.   v. 

Railroad  Co.  v.  Sherwood,  132  Ind.  Daniels,    49     Ark.    352;     Rand    v. 

129,    31    N.    E.    Rep.    781,    32    Am.  Transportation  Co.,  59  N.  H.  363; 

St.  Rep.  239,  17  L.  R.  A.  339;  Rail-  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.   v.  Manches- 

road    Co.   v.   Reid,   91    Ga.    377,   17  ter  Mills,  88   Tenn.  653,   14   S.   W. 

S.    E.    Rep.    934;    Railroad    Co.    v.  Rep.    314;    Reid    v.    The   Railroad, 

Schuldt,  66  Neb.  43,  92  N.  W.  Rep.  10  Ind.  App.  385,  35  N.  E.  Rep.  703, 

162.  5'!  Am.  St.  Rep.  391;  Indianapolis, 

29.  See   post,    §450;    Moulton   v.  etc.    R'y    Co.    v.    Forsythe,    4    Ind. 

Railway   Co.,   31   Minn.   85;    Coup-  App.  326,  29  N.  E.  Rep.  1138,  cit- 

land    V.    The    Railroad,    61    Conn,  ing     Hutchinson    on    Carr.;     Con- 

531,  23  Atl.  Rep.  870,  15  L.  R.  A.  stable  V.  Steamship  Co.,  154  U.  S. 

534;    Candee   v.   The   Railroad,   73  51,  14  Sup.  Ct.  R.  1062,  38  L.  Ed. 

Conn.  667,  49  Atl.  Rep.  17;  Minter  903;    Walters    v.    Railway     Co.,     1 

V.  The  Railway,  82  Mo.  App.  130;  Terr.  L.  R.  88. 

Botts   i\    The   Railroad,     106    Mo.  31.  McFadden  v.  Railway  Co.,  92 

App.  397,  80  S.  W.  Rep.  976;  Rail-  Mo.    343;    Liverpool,    etc.    Ins.    Co. 

way  Co.  r.  Ragsdale,  14  Ind.  App.  v.   McNeill,   89   Fed.    131,   32  C.   C, 

406,  42  N.  E.  Rep.  1106;   Railway  A.  173.     See  also,  post,  §  477. 


§  422.]  CONTRACTS  LIMITING  LIABILITY.  441 

carrier  may  by  contract  secure  immunity  from  liability  for  loss 
caused  by  mobs,  strikes  or  \'iolence  to  persons  or  property .3 2 

Sec.  422.  (§  248d.)  Carrier  may  stipulate  for  exemption  in 
case  of  loss  by  thieves  or  robbers.— So  the  carrier  may,  by 
special  contract,  secure  exemption  from  liability  for  losses  by 
thieves  or  robbers  where  his  own  negligence  has  not  given  op- 
portunity or  occasion  for  the  loss.^s 

Sec.  423.  Carrier  may  stipulate  for  exemption  where  goods 
of  a  dangerous  character  are  accepted  for  carriage.— It  being 
optional  with  the  carrier  whether  he  will  accept  for  carriage 
goods  of  a  dangerous  character,  he  may,  it  is  held,  if  he  chooses 
to  accept  them  at  all,  impose  such  restrictions  or  limitations  upon 
his  common  law  liability  as  he  sees  fit.^* 

Sec.  424.  Carrier  may  stipulate  for  liability  of  warehouse- 
man while  goods  are  awaiting  further  conveyance. — While  the 
carrier,  as  has  been  seen,  ^s  ig  ^ot  permitted  to  become  a  ware- 
houseman of  the  goods,  before  their  arrival  at  destination,  by 
simply  storing  them  at  some  intermediate  point,  he  may.  by  a 
special  contract  to  that  effect,  provide  that  he  will  be  liable  as  a 
warehouseman  only  in  case  the  goods  are  delayed  while  awaiting 
further  conveyance  by  another  carrier,  and  such  provision  will 
be  enforced.  Thus  where  the  carrier's  bill  of  lading  provided 
that  no  carrier  in  the  route  should  be  liable  in  any  other  respect 
than  as  a  warehouseman  while  the  goods  shipped  under  it  were 
awaiting  further  conveyance,  and  while  awaiting  delivery  to  a 
connecting  carrier  the  warehouse  in  which  they  were  stored  was 
destroyed  by  fire  without  fault  on  the  part  of  the  carrier,  it  was 
held  that  the  limitation  was  valid  and  that  the  goods  having  been 
destroyed  while  awaiting  further  conveyance  within  the  clause 
of  the  bill  of  lading,  the  carrier  was  not  liable.^^ 

32.  Gulf,    etc.,   Ry.    Co.   v.    Gate-    The  Railroad.  113  Cal.  329,  45  Pac. 
wood,   79    Tex.    89,    14    S.    W.   Rep.     Rep.  691,  36  L.  R.  A.  648. 

913.  35.  See  ante,  §  141. 

33.  The  Saratoga,  20  Fed.  869.  36.  Courteen    v.    Kanawha     Dis- 

34.  California  Powder  Works  v.    patch,  110  Wis.  610,  86  N.  W.  Rep'. 

176,  55  L.  R.  A.   182. 


442  THE  LAW   OF    CARRIERS.  [§425. 

Sec.  425.  Contracts  limiting  the  amount  of  damages  re- 
coverable.— Conditions  are  frequently  to  be  found  in  carrier's 
receipts  to  the  effect  that  in  case  of  loss  the  carrier  will  be 
liable  only  to  the  extent  of  a  certain  sum.  If  the  sum  thus 
named  is  fixed  without  any  regard  to  the  real  value  of  the 
goods,  the  limitation  will  be  considered  as  an  attempt  by  the 
carrier  to  secure  a  partial  exemption  from  liability,  and,  in  so 
far  as  its  validity  is  concerned,  it  will  stand  on  the  same  foot- 
ing as  any  other  condition  intended  to  secure  immunity  from 
the  consequences  of  negligence.  By  the  great  weight  of  author- 
ity, as  we  shall  see,^'^  the  carrier  is  not  permitted  to  relieve 
himself  by  contract  from  liability  for  losses  occasioned  by  his 
negligence.  If,  therefore,  a  loss  occurs  which  is  attributable  to 
the  carrier's  negligence,  a  condition  by  which  it  is  attempted 
to  fix  the  amount  recoverable  at  a  certain  sum,  irrespective  of 
the  real  value  of  the  goods,  cannot  avail  the  carrier,  and  the 
owner  may  recover  to  the  full  extent  of  his  actual  loss.^^  But 
if  the  loss  or  injury  result  from  causes  for  which  the  carrier 
is  in  no  manner  responsible,  a  contract  founded  upon  an  ade- 
quate consideration  limiting  the  amount  recoverable  to  a  desig- 
nated sum  will  be  valid  and  conclusive  between  the  parties,  and 
the  owner  will  be  limited  in  his  recovery  to  the  sum  named.^^ 

37.  See  post,  §450.  N.  Y.  542;   Rowan  v.  Exp.  Co.,  80 

38.  Everett  §.  Railroad  Co.,  138  N.  Y.  Supp.  226,  80  App.  Div.  31; 
N.  Car.  68,  1  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  985;  Bernstein  v.  Weir,  83  N.  Y.  Supp. 
Southern    Ex.    Co.    v.    Marks,    etc.  48,    40    Misc.    635;     Woodburn    v. 

Co.,  Miss.  ,   40   So.   Rep.  Railway  Co.,  40  Fed.  731;  Railroad 

65;   Chicago,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Abels,  Co.  v.  Keener,  93  Ga.  808,  21  S.  E. 

60  Miss.  1017;   Black  v.  Transpor-  Rep.  287,  44  Am.  St.  Rep.   197. 

tation  Co.,  55  Wis.  319;   Southern  39.  Chesapeake,    etc.    R'y    Co.    v. 

Exp.    Co.    ('.    Moon,    39    Miss.    822;     Beasley,   Va.   ,    52    S.   E. 

United  States  Exp.  Co.  v.  Back-  Rep.  566;  Express  Co.  v.  Foley 
man,  28  Ohio  St.  144;  Kansas  (Kan.)  26  Pac.  Rep.  665;  Kail- 
City,  etc.  R.  Co.  V.  Simpson,  30  man  r.  Express  Co.,  3  Kan.  205; 
Kan.  645;  Moulton  r.  Railroad  Co.,  Hopkins  v.  Westcott,  6  Blatch.  64; 
31  Minn.  85;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Lit-  Brehme  v.  Adams  Ex.  Co.,  25  Md. 
tie,  71  Ala.  611;  Louisville,  etc.  328;  Boorman  r.  Express  Co.,  21 
Co.  V.  Wynn,  88  Tenn.  320,  14  S.  Wis.  152;  Oppenheimer  v.  United 
W.  Rep.  311;  Magnin  r.  Dinsmore,  States  Ex.  Co.,  69  111.  62;  Levy  v. 
56  N.  Y.  168;  Westcott  i\  Fargo,  61  Southern    Ex.    Co.,    4    Rich.    S.    C. 


§  426.]  CONTRACTS  LIMITING  LIABILITY.  443 

Sec.  426.  Same  subject— Contracts  limiting  recovery  to 
agreed  value  of  goods.— The  rule  is  well  settled  that  the  car- 
rier, in  order  that  he  may  exercise  a  degree  of  care  and  atten- 
tion commensurate  with  the  risk  assumed,  is  entitled  to  be  in- 
formed of  the  value  of  the  goods  intrusted  to  him  for  trans- 
portation. For  the  purpose,  therefore,  of  securing  such  in- 
formation and  of  establishing  a  basis  upon  which  to  compute 
his  charges,  the  carrier  may,  by  a  contract  fairly  and  honestly 
entered  into  with  the  owner  of  the  goods,  stipulate  either  that 
the  goods  are  of  a  certain  value,'*o  or  that  their  value  does  not 
exceed  a  certain  sum"*!  and  that,  in  the  event  of  loss,  his  lia- 
bility shall  not  exceed  the  sum  at  which  the  goods  are  valued; 
and  when  fairly  entered  into  with  a  view  to  placing  a  bona  fidv 
value  on  the  goods,  the  contract  will  be  conclusive  on  the  owner, 
and  the  carrier  will  not  be  liable  for  a  greater  sum  than  that  at 
which  the  goods  are  valued  although  his  own  misconduct  has 
caused  their  loss.^-     And  it  has  been  held  that  where  no  men- 

(N.  S.)   234;   Snider  v.  Adams  Ex-  28  L.  Ed.  177,  f)  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  151; 

press  Co.,  63  Mo.  376;   Ketchum  v.  Durgin  v.   Express   Co.,    66   N.   H. 

American  Ex.  Co.  52  id.  390;  Har-  277,  20  Atl.  Rep.  328,  9  L.  R.  A. 

vey  V.  Railroad   Co.,   74  Mo.   538;  453;    Alair    v.    Railroad     Co.,     53 

Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Oden,  80  Minn.  160,  54  N.  W.  Rep.  1072,  39 

Ala.  38;   South,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Hen-  Am.    St.    Rep.    588,    19    L.    R.    A. 

lein,    52    Ala.    606,    56    Ala.    368;  764;    Douglas    Co.    v.    Transporta- 

Hart   V.    Railroad    Co.,    112    U.    S.  tion  Co.,  62  Minn.  288,  64  N.  W. 

331;    The   Bermuda,   27   Fed.   Rep.  Rep.    899,    30   L.   R.   A.   860;   Rail- 

476.  road  Co.,  v.  Payne,  86  Va,  481,  10 

40.  The  following  cases  involve  S.  E.  Rep.  749,  6  L.  R.  A.  849; 
contracts  where  the  value  was  Ballou  v.  Earle,  17  R.  I.  441,  22 
fixed:  Brehme  r.  Dinsmore,  25  Atl.  Rep.  1113,  33  Am.  St.  Rep. 
Md.   328;    Graves  v.  Railroad  Co.,  SSI,  14  L.  R.  A.  433. 

137  Mass.  33,  50  Am.  Rep.  282;  42.  United  States:  Hart  v.  The 
Hill  V.  Railroad  Co.,  144  Mass.  Railroad,  112  U.  S.  331,  28  L.  Ed. 
284,  10  N.  E.  Rep.  836;  Zimmer  v.  177,  5  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  151;  Jen- 
Railroad  Co.,  137  N.  Y.  460,  33  nings  v.  Smith,  106  Fed.  139,  45  C. 
N.  E.  Rep.  642;  Coupland  v.  Rail-  C.  A.  249;  Metropolitan  Trust  Co. 
road  Co.,  61  Conn.  531,  23  Atl.  v.  Railroad  Co.,  107  Fed.  628; 
Rep.  870,  15  L.  R.  A.  534.  Doyle    v.    Railroad    Co.,    126    Fed. 

41.  For  cases  where  a  maximum  841;  Macfarlane  /'.  Express  Co., 
value  was  agreed  upon,  see  Hart  137  Fed.  982;  Hopkins  r.  West- 
V    The    Railroad,    112    U.    S.    331,  cott,  6  Blatch.  64;   Earnest  r.  Ex- 


444                                            THE  LAW   OF   CARRIERS.  [§  426. 

tion  is  made  in  the  contract  as  to  the  effect  upon  the  carrier's 
liability'  of  inserting  the  sum  at  which  the  goods  are  valued, 
the  carrier,  in  the  event  of  loss,  will  be  liable  only  to  the  extent 

press  Co.,  1  Woods,  573;  Muser  v.     States  Express  Co.  v.  Joyce,  

Holland,  17  Blatch.  412;  Railway  Ind.  ,  72  N.  E.  Rep.  865,  re- 
Co.  V.  Patrick,  C.  C.  A.  — — ,  versing.  (Ind.  App.)  69  N.  E.  Rep. 

144  Fed.   632.  1015. 

Alabama :  South,   etc.  R.  R.  Co.  Massachusetts:     Squire   v.    New 

V.   Henlein,   53   Ala.   606;    s.   c.   56  York  Central  R.  R.  Co.,  98  Mass. 

Ala.    368;    Railway    Co.    v.    Jones,  239;  Graves  v.  Lake  Shore  R'y  Co., 

132    Ala.    437,    31    So.    Rep.    501;  137    Mass.    33;    Graves   v.   Express 

Railroad    Co.    r.    Sherrod,    84    Ala.  Co.,  176  Mass.,  280,  57  N.  E.  Rep. 

178;    but  see  Railway  Co.  v.  Hug-  462;   John  Hood  Co.  v.  American, 

hart,  90  Ala.  36,  8  So.  Rep.  62.  etc.  Co.,  Mass.  ,  77  N.  E. 

Arkansas:       Railroad      Co.      v.  Rep.  638. 

Weakly,  50  Ark.  397.  Maryland:   Brehme  v.  Dinsmore, 

California:  Michalitschke  v.  25  Md.  329. 
Wells  Fargo  &  Co.,  118  Cal.  683,  Minnesota:  Moulton  v.  Railway 
50  Pac.  Rep.  847;  Pierce  v.  Rail-  Co.,  31  Minn.  85;  Alair  t7.  The  Rail- 
road Co.,  120  Cal.  156,  47  Pac.  Rep.  road,  53  Minn.  160,  54  N.  W.  Rep, 
874,  40  L.  R.  A.  350,  354,  52  Pac.  1072,  39  Am.  St.  Rep.  588,  19  L. 
Rep.  302.  R.  A.  764;  Douglass  Co.  v.  Rail- 
Connecticut:  Coupland  i'.  Rail-  way  Co.,  62  Minn.  288,  64  N.  W. 
road  Co.,  61  Conn.  531,  23  Atl.  Rep.  899,  30  L.  R.  A.  860;  O'Malley 
Rep.  870,  15  L.  R.  A.  534.  v.   Railway   Co.,   86   Minn.    580,   90 

Georgia:    Railway    Co.    v.    Mur-  N.  W.  Rep.  974. 

phey,   113   Ga.    514,   38   S.   E.  Rep.  Missouri:       Harvey      v.      Terre 

970,  53  L.  R.  A.  720;  Railway  Co.  Haute  R.  R.  Co.,  74  Mo.  538;  Con- 

V.    Johnson   King   &   Co.,    121    Ga.  over  v.  Express  Co.,  40  Mo.   App. 

231,    48    S.    E.    Rep.    807;    Central,  31;    Crow  v.  Railroad  Co.,   57  Mo. 

etc.  R'y  Co.  v.  Hall, Ga.  ,  App.  135;   Vaughn  v.  Railway  Co., 

52  S.   E.  Rep.   679.  78  Mo.  App.  639;   s.  c.  62  Mo.  App. 

Illinois:  Oppenheimer  v.  United  461. 
States  Express  Co.,  69  111.  62;  New  York:  Magnin  v.  Dinsmore, 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Miller,  79  111.  App.  56  N.  Y.  168;  s.  c.  62  N.  Y.  35: 
473.  s.  c.  70  N.  Y.  410;  Zimmer  v.  Rail- 
Indiana:  Adams  Express  Co.  v.  road  Co.,  137  N.  Y.  460,  33  N.  E. 
Carnahan,  29  Ind.  App.  606,  63  Rep.  642,  affirming  62  Hun,  619, 
N.  E.  Rep.  245,  64  N.  E.  Rep.  647,  16  N.  Y.  Supp.  631;  Toy  v.  Rail- 
94  Am.  St.  Rep.  279;  Russell  v.  road  Co.,  56  N.  Y.  Supp.  182,  26 
Pittsburg,  etc.,  Ry.  Co.,  157  Ind.  Misc.  792;  Belger  v.  Dinsmore,  51 
311,  61  N.  E.  Rep.  678,  87  Am.  St.  N.   Y.    166. 

Rep.   214,   55   L.  R.   A.   253;    Rail-  North      Carolina:      Gardner     v. 

road  Co.  v.  McKinney,  34  Ind.  App.  Railway  Co.,   127   N.  Car.   293,   37 

402,    73   N.   E.   Rep.     148;     United  S.  E.  Rep.  328. 


H-^-\  CONTRACTS  LIMITING  LIABILITY.  445 

72  Ohio,  302    74  N.  E.  Rep.  214.        value.     We  see  nothing,  however, 
Oregon:    Normile   v.  Railroad  &    in  this  contract  which  can  be  re- 
Navigation  Co.,  41  Or.  177.  G9  Pac.    garded  as  having  been  intended  or 
^^P-   ^^^-  calling   for   such   a   disclosure   on 

Rhode  Island:  Ballou  v.  Earle.  the  part  of  the  plaintiffs  or  as 
17  R.  L  441,  22  Atl.  Rep.  1113,  33  estopping  them  from  claiming  a 
Am.  St.  Rep.  8S1,  14  L.  R.  A.  recovery,  upon  the  ground  of  the 
^^^-  carrier's  negligence,  of  the  actual 

South    Carolina:      Johnstone    v.    value   of  the   horses " 
Railroad  Co.,  39   S.  Car.  55,  17  S.        u   is   often  a   question   whether 
E.  Rep.  512.  an  amount  stated  in  a  contract  of 

Tennessee:  Louisville,  etc.  R.  shipment  limiting  the  carrier's 
Co.  V.  Lowell.  90  Tenn.  17,  15  S.  liability  is  inserted  merely  for  the 
W.  Rep.  837;  Louisville,  etc.  R.  purpose  of  restricting  such  liabil- 
Co.  V.  Wynn,  88  Tenn.  320.-  ity,  or  for  the  purpose  of  measur- 
Starnes  v.  Railroad  Co.,  91  Tenn.  ing  the  carrier's  responsibility  by 
516,  19  S.  W.  Rep.  675.  the  actual  value   of  the  property. 

Washington:  Hill  v.  Railway  When  the  words  of  the  contract 
Co.,  33  Wash.  697,  74  Pac.  Rep.  clearly  indicate  an  intention  to 
1054.  Words  "Released  value"  fix  a  value  upon  which  the  carrier 
must  be  construed  to  embrace  real  may  gauge  his  charges,  and  the 
■^^1^6.  contract   was    fairly    entered    into, 

West  Virginia:  Zouch  v.  Rail-  it  is  almost  universally  recognized 
way  Co.,  36  W.  Va.  524,  15  S.  E.  that  the  limitation  is  binding  on 
Rep.  185,  17  L.  R.  A.  116.  Will  the  shipper;  and  in  case  of  loss 
not  release  from  liability  yhere  his  recovery  will  be  limited  to  the 
negligence  is  gross,  wanton  or  sum  agreed  upon.  Ullman  v.  Rail- 
willful,  way  Co.,  112  Wis.  168,  88  N.  W. 
Wisconsin:  Loeser  v.  The  Rail-  Rep.  41,  88  Am.  St.  Rep.  949,  56 
way,  94  Wis.   571,   69   N.   W.  Rep.     L.  R.  A.  246, 

372;  Ullman  v.  Railway  Co.,  112  in  Alair  v.  The  Railroad  Co.,  53 
Wis.  150,  88  N.  W.  Rep.  41,  88  Minn.  160,  54  N.  W.  Rep.  1072,  39 
Am.  St.  Rep.  949.  56  L.  R.  A.  246.  Am.  St.  Rep.  588,  19  L.  R.  A.  764, 
In  Moulton  v.  Railway  Co.,  31  it  appeared  that  the  plaintiff  de- 
Minn.  85.  cited  above,  it  is  said:  livered  to  the  defendant  for  trana- 
"We  do  not  question  the  right  of  portation  seven  horses  of  the 
a  carrier  to  require  the  disclosure,  value  of  $2,100.  In  the  contract 
by  the  consignor,  of  the  value  of  of  shipment  was  a  provision  that 
the  property  presented  for  trans-  the  value  of  the  horses  did  not 
portation  where  its  value  is  not  exceed  the  sum  of  $100  each,  which 
apparent  and  well  known.  This  value  was  declared  to  be  the  value 
is  reasonable,  both  to  the  end  that  upon  which  the  rate  of  compensa- 
proper  care  may  be  taken  of  the  tion  for  the  carrier's  services  was 
property  while  it  is  in  the  hands  based.  The  horses  were  lost  while 
of  the  carrier,  and  because  the  in  transit  through  the  negligence 
proper  charges  for  transportation    of   the   carrier,   and    the    plaintiff 


446 


THE  LAW   OB^    CARRIERS. 


[§  426. 


of  the  sum  agreed  upon.^'^  It  has  been  contended  by  some 
courts'*^  that  contracts  fixing  an  amount  beyond  which  the  car- 
rier will  not  be  liable^  while  conclusive  on  the  owner  of  the 
goods  where  the  carrier  has  been  guilty  of  no  misconduct  con- 
tributing to  the  loss,  are,  in  effect^  limitations  upon  the  car- 
rier's legal  liability  and,  as  such,  inoperative  where  the  loss  has' 


sued  to  recover  the  real  value  of 
the  horses.  In  denying  the  plain- 
tiff's right  to  recover  more  than 
the  amounts  stated  in  the  con- 
tract, Mitchell,  J.,  in  speaking  for 
the  court,  said:  "If  the  purpose 
of  this  stipulation  was  merely  to 
place  a  limit  on  the  amount  for 
which  the  defendant  should  be 
liable,  then  clearly,  as  to  losses 
resulting  from  negligence,  it  is 
not  just  or  reasonable,  and  is  not 
binding  on  the  plaintiff.  On  the 
other  hand,  if  it  was  a  stipulation 
as  to  the  value  of  the  property, 
fairly  and  honestly  made  as  the 
basis  of  the  carrier's  charges  and 
responsibility,  then  we  think  it 
ought  to  be  upheld  as  a  just  and 
reasonable  mode  of  securing  a  due 
proportion  between  the  amount  for 
which  the  carrier  may  be  responsi- 
ble and  the  freight  he  receives, 
and  of  protecting  him  against  ex- 
travagant and  fanciful  valuations. 
And  at  this  point  we  may  suggest 
that  so  far  as  the  question  now  un- 
der consideration  is  concerned,  we 
see  no  difference  between  a  case 
like  the  present,  where  the  stipu- 
lation is  that  the  value  of  the 
property  does  not  exceed  a  speci- 
fied sum,  and  one  where  the  value 
is  stipulated  to  be  a  specified  sum. 
.  .  .  We  think  that  we  are  jus- 
tified in  taking  judicial  notice  of 
the  fact  that  the  maximum  value 
placed  by  this  contract  on  differ- 


ent kinds  of  domestic  animals  are 
approximately  those  of  average, 
ordinary  animals  in  the  country 
through  which  defendant  does 
business.  By  executing  this  con- 
tract the  plaintiff  stipulated,  and 
in  effect  represented  to  the  de- 
fendant that,  his  horses  were  not 
worth  to  exceed  $100  each,  and 
that  the  charges  for  transportation 
should  be  based  on  that  valuation. 
Assuming,  as  we  must,  that  the 
contract  was  fairly  made  for  the 
purposes  expressed  in  it,  we  think 
it  ought  to  be  upheld  as  just  and 
reasonable.  It  is  not  in  any  sense 
a  contract  for  exemption  from  the 
consequences   of  negligence." 

43.  Coupland  v.  The  Railroad,  61 
Conn.  531,  23  Atl.  Rep.  870,  15 
L    R.    A.    534. 

44.  Grogan  v.  Adams  Express 
Co.,  114  Pa.  St.  523,  60  Am.  Rep. 
360;  Weiller  v.  Railroad  Co.,  134 
Pa.  St.  310,  19  Atl.  Rep.  702,  19 
Am.  St.  Rep.  700;  Ruppel  v.  Rail- 
road Co.,  167  Pa.  St.  166,  31  Atl. 
Rep.  478,  46  Am.  St.  Rep.  666; 
Hughes  V.  Railroad  Co.,  202  Pa. 
St.  222,  51  Atl.  Rep.  990,  97  Am. 
St.  Rep.  713,  63  L.  R.  A.  513;  Rail- 
road Co.  V.  Owens,  93  Ky.  201,  19 
S.  W.  Rep.  590;  Railroad  Co.  r. 
Radford,  23  Ky.  Law  Rep.  886,  64 
S.  W.  Rep.  511;  Railroad  Co.  r. 
Taber,  98  Ky.  503,  32  S.  W.  Rep. 
.168;  Railway  Co.  v.  Graves,  21  Ky. 
Law  Rep.  684,  52  S.  W.  Rep.  961. 


§•127.]  CONTRACTS  LIMITING  LIABILITY.  447 

been  occasioned  by  his  negligence.  But  it  cannot  fairly  be  said 
that  such  contracts  tend  to  relieve  the  carrier  from  the  conse- 
quences of  his  negligence.  For  the  purpose  of  the  contract 
the  goods  have  no  greater  value  than  that  agreed  upon  by  the 
parties,  and  to  that  value  the  carrier  must  respond  where  his 
negligence  has  been  instrumental  in  causing  the  loss.  And  it 
may  be  stated  as  now  the  well  settled  rule  that  where  the  con- 
tract fixes  a  sum  beyond  which  it  is  stipulated  the  carrier  will 
not  be  liable,  and  such  contract  has  been  fairly  entered  into 
with  a  view  to  placing  a  bona  fide  value  on  the  goods,  it  will 
be  upheld,  although  the  carrier's  negligence  has  occasioned  the 
loss,  as  a  just  and  lawful  mode  of  securing  a  due  proportion 
between  the  amount  for  which  the  carrier  may  be  liable  and  the 
charges  he  receives,  and  as  a  lawful  agreement  to  dispense  with 
the  necessity  of  offering  testimony  to  prove  the  value  of  the 
goods ;  and  the  owner,  after  a  loss  has  occurred,  will  be  estopped 
by  his  admission  from  asserting  that  their  value  was  more.  As 
was  said  by  Blatchford,  J.,  in  Hart  v.  The  Railroad,^^'"'  which  is 
the  leading  case  on  the  subject,  "where  a  contract  of  the  kind 
signed  by  the  shipper,  is  fairly  made,  agreeing  on  the  valuation 
of  the  property  carried,  with  the  rate  of  freight  based  on  the 
condition  that  the  carrier  assumes  liability  only  to  the  extent 
of  the  agreed  valuation,  even  in  case  of  loss  or  damage  by 
the  negligence  of  the  carrier  the  contract  wull  be  upheld  as  a 
proper  and  lawful  mode  of  securing  a  due  proportion  between 
the  amount  for  which  the  carrier  may  be  responsible  and  the 
freight  he  receives,  and  of  protecting  himself  against  extrava- 
gant and  fanciful  valuation.  ""^^ 

Sec.  427.  Same  subject — Valuation  agreement  must  be  bona 
fide — Valuation  must  be  reasonable. — But  while  the  owner  of 

45.  112  U.  S.  331,  28  L.  Ed.  177,  at  a  low  rate  of  freight,  on  the 
5  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  151.  assertion   and   agreement   that   its 

46.  The  learned  justice  further  value  is  a  less  sum  than  that 
said:  "There  is  no  justice  in  al-  claimed  after  a  loss.  It  is  just  to 
lowing  the  shipper  to  be  paid  a  hold  the  shipper  to  his  agreement, 
large  value  for  an  article  which  fairly  made,  as  to  value,  even 
he  has  induced  the  carrier  to  take  where  the  loss  or  injury   has  oc- 


448 


THE  LAW  OF   CARRIERS. 


[§  427. 


the  goods  and  the  carrier  may  fix  a  value  on  the  goods  beyond 
which  the  carrier  in  the  event  of  loss  will  not  be  liable,  the 
agreement  fixing  value,  in  order  to  be  conclusive  on  the  owner, 
must  be  bona  fide  and  the  value  reasonable.  If,  for  instance, 
the  value  agreed  upon  should  be  so  far  below  the  real  value  of 
the  goods  that  from  their  appearance  the  carrier  must  have 
known  of  the  discrepancy,  the  agreement  fixing  value  would  not 
be  bona  fide  and,  depending  on  no  value  at  all,  would  amount  to 
an  arbitrary  limitation  upon  the  carrier's  legal  liability  which, 
in  the  event  of  loss  occasioned  by  negligence,  would  not  deprive 
the  owner  of  the  right  to  recover  the  real  value  of  the  goods. 
While  it  is  true  that  the  owner  of  goods  of  great  value  which 
are  concealed  in  packages  or  otherwise  hidden  from  view,  and 

curred  through  the  negligence  of 
the  carrier.  The  effect  of  the 
agreement  is  to  cheapen  the 
freight  and  secure  the  carriage,  if 
there  is  no  loss,  and  the  effect  of 
disregarding  the  agreement,  after 
a  loss,  is  to  expose  the  carrier  to 
a  greater  risk  than  the  parties  in- 
tended he  should  assume.  The 
agreement  as  to  value,  in  this  case, 
stands  as  if  the  carrier  had  asked 
the  value  of  the  horses,  and  had 
been  told  by  the  plaintiff  the  sum 
inserted  in  the  contract. 

"The  limitation  as  to  value  has 
no  tendency  to  exempt  from  lia- 
bility for  negligence.  It  does  not 
induce  want  of  care.  It  exacts 
from  the  carrier  the  measure  of 
care  due  to  the  value  agreed  on. 
The  carrier  is  bound  to  respond 
in  that  value  for  negligence.  The 
compensation  for  carriage  is  based 
on  that  value.  The  shipper  is 
estopped  from  saying  that  the  val- 
ue is  greater.  The  articles  have 
no  greater  value,  for  the  purposes 
of  the  contract  of  transportation, 
between  the  parties  to  that  con- 
tract.    The    carrier    must    respond 


for  negligence  up  to  that  value.  It 
is  just  and  reasonable  that  such  a 
contract,  fairly  entered  into,  and 
where  there  is  no  deceit  practiced 
on  the  shipper,  should  be  upheld. 
There  is  no  violation  of  public 
policy.  On  the  contrary,  it  would 
be  unjust  and  unreasonable,  and 
would  be  repugnant  to  the  sound- 
est principles  of  fair  dealing  and 
of  the  freedom  of  contracting,  and 
thus  in  conflict  with  public  policy, 
if  a  shipper  should  be  allowed  to 
reap  the  benefit  of  the  contract  if 
there  is  no  loss,  and  to  repudiate 
it   in   case  of  loss." 

Where  the  contract  exempts  the 
carrier  fi'om  all  loss  except  for 
collision,  and  provides  that  the  lia- 
bility for  a  given  article  of  freight 
■shall  not  exceed  a  certain  price, 
and  the  freight  is  injured  from  an- 
other cause,  the  shipper  cannot, 
upon  the  ground  that  such  a 
sweeping  provision  is  invalid,  re- 
cover more  than  the  stipulated 
sum.  Hill  V.  Railroad  Co.,  144 
Mass.  284;  Graves  v.  Railway  Co., 
137  Mass.  33. 


§  427.]  CONTRACTS  LIMITING  LIABILITY.  449 

upon  which  a  very  inconsiderable  value  has  been  placed  by  him, 
will  be  precluded,  in  case  of  loss,  from  the  right  to  recover  a 
greater  sum  than  the  value  which  he  has  placed  upon 
them,  the  reason  for  this  exception  is,  that  to  charge. the  carrier 
with  their  real  value,  when  by  the  owner's  misrepresentation  he 
has  been  induced  to  undertake  the  employment  at  a  reduced 
compensation  and  to  lessen  the  degree  of  care  and  vigilance? 
which  he  otherwise  would  have  exercised,  would  be  to  sanction 
fraud  and  to  enable  the  owner  to  gain  an  unfair  advantage  over 
the  carrier  through  his  own  misrepresentation.  The  knowledge 
which  the  carrier  has  of  the  real  value  of  the  goods  tendered  to 
him  for  shipment  would,  therefore,  seem  to  be  material  in  de- 
termining the  effect  of  the  valuation  agreement  upon  his  lia- 
bility, although  a  contrary  conclusion  has  been  reached  by  some 
courts.  And  it  may  be  stated  as  the  better  rule  that,  where 
the  value  agreed  upon  is  so  out  of  harmony  with  the  ordinary 
values  of  similar  kinds  of  goods  as  to  indicate  that  the  question 
of  value  did  not  in  fact  enter  into  the  agreement,  and  the  car- 
rier, under  the  circumstances,  must  have  known  of  the  dis- 
crepancy, the  agreement  placing  a  value  on  the  goods  will  be 
considered  as  a  mere  attempt  by  the  carrier  to  secure  a  partial 
exemption  from  liability,  and  of  no  effect  in  relieving  him  from 
the  obligation  of  responding  for  their  real  value  where  his  mis- 
conduct has  occasioned  their  loss.i     So  in  the  absence  of  fraud 

1.  Railway  Co.  v.  Jones,  132  Ala.  loss  or  injury  the  recovery  shall 
437,  31  So.  Rep.  501;  Railway  Co.  be  limited  to  a  valuation  of  the 
V.  Stone  &  Haslett,  112  Tenn.  348,  property  expressed  in  the  bill  of 
79  S.  W.  Rep.  1031;  Railway  Co.  lading,  and  such  an  agreement 
V.  Mclntyre,  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  83  will  be  enforced  by  the  courts 
S.  W.  Rep.  346;  Everett  v.  Rail-  when  such  valuation  is  not  great- 
road  Co.,  138  N.  Car.  68,  1  L.  R.  A.  ly  below  the  real  worth  of  the 
(N.  S.)  985;  Central,  etc.,  Ry.  Co.  property,  such  agreements  will  not 

^_    Hall,   Ga.  ,   52   S.   E.  be  countenanced  or  given  effect  if 

Rep.  679.     In  Railway  Co.  v.  Jones,  they    are    unreasonable,— if    they 

supra,     McClellan,     C.     J.,     said:  limit  damages  for  loss   or  injury 

"While    under    our    adjudications  to  an  amount  greatly  less  than  the 

the  carrier,  in  consideration  of  re-  damages  in  fact  sustained.     It  is 

duced  freight  charges,  may  agree  plain  that  this   doctrine  must  be 

with  the   shipper  that  in  case  of  rested  upon  the  same  ground  that 

29 


450 


THE  LAW  OF    CARRIERS. 


[§  428. 


or  concealment  on  the  part  of  the  owner  of  the  goods  whereby 
the  carrier  has  been  misled,  the  valuation  agreed  upon,  it  is 
said,  must  be  reasonable,  regard  being  had  to  the  real  value  of 
the  goods;  and  if  such  value  be  unreasonable,  the  owner  will 
not  be  estopped  from  claiming  damages  on  the  basis  of  their  real 
value.2 

Sec.  428.  Same  subject — Execution  of  contracts  limiting  re- 
covery to  agreed  value  of  goods— Construction.— If  the  owner, 
at  the  request  of  the  carrier,  deliberately  places  a  value  on  the 
goods  when  he  tenders  them  for  transportation,  he  will,  of 
course,  where  the  carrier's  request  was  made  in  good  faith,  be 
estopped  from  afterwards  asserting  that  their  value  was  more. 
So  if  the  owner  voluntarily  accepts  a  receipt  in  which  there  is 
inserted  a  clause  fixing  a  value  upon  the  goods,  he  will  be  pre- 
sumed, in  the  absence  of  proof  of  any  unfair  advantage  having 
been  taken  of  him,  to  have  assented  to  the  value  stated.^    Thus 


underlies  the  original  proposition 
forbidding  agreements  against  lia- 
bility for  the  results  of  negligence, 
— public  policy.  And  in  determin- 
ing whether  a  stipulation  is  void 
as  being  against  public  policy, 
there  is  no  room  for  inquiry  into 
the  knowledge,  information  or  in- 
tention of  the  parties.  The  ques- 
tion is  not  what  the  parties  knew, 
or  intended,  but  what  was  the  ef- 
fect of  the  stipulation;  not  wheth- 
er the  parties  intended  evil  or 
knew  that  their  act  was  hurtful 
to  the  public,  but  whether  to  al- 
low and  uphold  such  contracts 
would  be  fraught  with  wrong  and 
injury  to  the  people  of  a  character 
from  which  it  is  the  province  and 
duty  of  government  to  protect 
them.  So  it  is  immaterial,  when  a 
carrier  has  stipulated  for  a  limita- 
tion of  damages  resulting  from  his 
negligence  to  a  greatly  dispropor- 
tionately   small    valuation    of    the 


property  carried,  whether  he  knew 
or  was  informed  of  its  real  value 
or  not.  It  is  against  the  public 
igood  in  respect  of  a  matter  of  gov- 
ernmental concern  that  he  should 
be  allowed  to  make  such  stipula- 
tion under  any  circumstances;  and 
to  allow  it  to  stand  in  any  instance 
or  upon  any  consideration  would 
be  to  emasculate  the  principle  of 
public  policy  obtaining  in  the 
premises,  and  to  leave  the  public 
exposed  to  uncertainties  incident 
to  injuries,  into  what  carriers  in- 
tended, or  knew  or  had  been  in- 
formed as  to  the  real  value  of  the 
property   transported   by   them." 

2.  Railway  Co.  v.  Stone  &  Has- 
lett,  112  Tenn.  348,  79  S.  W.  Rep. 
1031. 

3.  Graves  v.  Express  Co.,  176 
Mass.  280,  57  N.  E.  Rep.  462;  John 
Hood    Co.    V.   American,    etc.,    Co., 

Mass.    ,    77    N.    E.    Rep. 

638;    Michalitschke  v.  Wells,  Far- 


§428.]  CONTRACTS  LIMITING  LUBILITY.  451 

in  the  case  of  Alair  v.  The  Railroad,-*  Mitchell,  J.,  in  speakintj 
for  the  court,  said:  "It  makes  no  difference  whether  the  valua- 
tion expressed  in  the  contract  is  one  previously  made  by  the 
shipper  on  request  of  the  carrier,  or  one  inserted  in  the  con- 
tract by  the  carrier  without  being  named  by  the  shipper  but 
acquiesced  in  by  him.  In  either  case  it  becomes  a  part  of  the 
contract  on  which  the  minds  of  the  parties  meet  and  on  which 
they  act."  Where,  however,  the  valuation  is  written  upon  the 
receipt  in  such  a  manner  that  it  cannot  properly  be  said  to  form 
a  part  of  the  contract,  as  for  instance,  where  it  is  written  upon 
the  back,  it  will  be  considered  as  a  notice  only  and  as  such  not 
conclusive  on  the  owner  unless  it  can  be  shown  that  it  was 
known  and  assented  to  by  him  when  he  accepted  the  receipt.^ 

If  the  wording  of  the  contract  clearly  indicates  an  intention 
to  fix  a  value  on  the  goods,  parol  evidence  will,  of  course,  be 
inadmissible  to  vary  or  explain  its  terms.  But  if  the  wording 
of  the  contract  is  not  clear,  or  the  receipt,  although  clearly  ex- 
pressing a  valuation,  is  claimed  to  have  been  accepted  under 
circumstances  such  that  the  owner's  assent  to  its  terms  cannot 
reasonably  be  presumed,  the  contract  will  be  viewed  in  the  light 
of  the  situation  of  the  parties  at  the  time  it  was  made,  and  ex- 
trinsic evidence  of  the  circumstances  surrounding  its  execution 
will  be  admissible  for  the  purpose  of  showing  whether  a  bona 
fide  .valuation  agreement  was  made.^  And  if  from  such  evidence 
it  should  appear  that  a  bona  fide  agreement  fixing  the  value  of 

go    &    Co.,    118    Cal.    683,    50   Pac.  Rep.   41,  88  Am.   St.  Rep.  949,   56 

Rep.   847.     See  ante   §   408.  L   R.  A.  246, 

4.  53  Minn.  160,  54  N.  W.  Rep.  The  construction  of  contracts  of 
1072,  39  Am.  St.  Rep.  588,  19  L.  R.  this  nature  and  the  obligations 
A  764.  See  also,  Normile  v.  R.  &  arising  therefrom,  and  what  the 
N.  Co.,  41  Or,  177,  69  Pac.  Rep.  928.  parties  intended   by   the  language 

5.  See  ante,  §  415;  Doyle  v.  employed,  must,  when  the  same  Is 
Railroad   Co.,   126   Fed.    841.  clear  and  unambiguous,  be  deter- 

6.  O'Malley  v.  The  Railway,  86  mined  from  the  writing  itself; 
Minn.  580,  90  N.  W.  Rep.  974;  and  extrinsic  evidence  is  inadmis- 
Power's  Mercantile  Co,  v.  Wells,  sible  to  alter  or  vary  its  terms. 
Fargo  &  Co.,  93  Minn.  143,  100  But  when  it  is  claimed  that  the 
N.  W.  Rep.  735;  Ullman  v.  The  limitations  inserted  therein  were 
Railway,   112  Wis.   168,  88  N.  W.  not    fairly    inserted,    or    that    the 


452  THE  LAW  OF   CARRIERS.  [§  429. 

the  goods  was  not  in  fact  made,  the  owner,  in  ease  of  loss,  will 
be  entitled  to  recover  the  full  value  of  the  goods.  So  if  doubt 
arise  as  to  the  meaning  of  the  terms  employed,  the  doubt  will 
be  resolved  against  the  carrier,  it  being  well  settled  that  such 
contracts  will  be  construed  most  strongly  against  him.''' 

Sec.  429.  Same  subject — Measure  of  recovery  where  loss 
is  only  partial. — Where  the  parties  have  agreed  that  in  the 
event  of  loss  the  liability  of  the  carrier  shall  not  exceed  a  certain 
sum  at  which  it  is  stipulated  the  goods  are  valued,  the  question 
arises  as  to  the  extent  of  the  carrier's  liability  where  there  has 
been  only  a  partial  loss  of  the  goods.  While  it  is  held  by  some 
courts  that  the  owner  of  the  goods  will  be  entitled  to  recover  an 
amount  equal  to  the  actual  loss  sustained,  providing  such 
amount  is  not  greater  than  the  sum  at  which  the  goods  are  val- 
ued,^ the  better  rule  would  seem  to  be  that  he  should  be  con- 
fined in  his  recovery  to  an  amount  equal  to  that  proportion  of 
the  real  loss  that  the  declared  value  of  the  goods  bears  to  their 
actual  value  as  it  existed  before  the  loss  occurred.^     Where  the 

carrier  did  not  act  in  good  faith,  charges,  it  was  held  that  evidence 

evidence  of  the  circumstances  sui'-  of  the  circumstances  surrounding 

rounding  its  execution  is  admiss-  its  execution  was  properly  admis- 

ible,  not  to  contradict  or  vary  its  sible  for  the  purpose  of  showing 

express      terms,      but      to      show  whether  or  not  it  had  been  fair- 

whether  it  was  fairly  and  honestly  ly    and    understandingly    entered 

made  in  respect  to  the  particular  into.     O'Malley     v.     Railway     Co., 

subject.     Thus,  where  it  appeared  supra. 

that  the  contract  containing  a  val-  7.  Black   v.   Transportation    Co., 

nation   was   signed   at  ten   o'clock  55^  Wis.    319;    Gardner  v.   Railway 

at  night,  just  before  the  departure  Co.,  127  N.  Car.  293,  37  S.  E.  *Rep. 

of  the   train   on   which   the  goods  328. 

were  to  go,   that  no   previous  ne-  8.  Brown  v.   Steamship  Co.,   147 

gotiations  relative  to  what  the  con-  Mass.    58,    16    N.    E.    Rep.    717; 

tract  should  contain  were  had,  and  Starnes  v.  Railroad  Co.,  91  Tenn. 

that   the   sum   stated  in   the   con-  516,  19  S.  W.  Rep,  675;  Nelson  v. 

tract   was    inserted   by   the    agent  Railway  Co.,  28  Mont.  297,  72  Pac. 

in  accordance  with  his  own  esti-  Rep.  642;  Goodman  v.  Railway  Co., 

mate   of   similar   kinds   of   goods,  71  Mo.  App.  460. 

the  shipper  not  having  been  con-  9.  United   States  Express  Co.  v. 

suited     on    the    subject,    nor    in-    Joyce, Ind. ,  72  N.  E.  Rep. 

formed  that  a  valuation  was  865,  reversing,  69  N.  E.  Rep.  1015. 
necessary     to     estimate     freight 


§  430.]  CONTRACTS   LIMITING   LIABILITY.         '  453 

parties  have  stipulated  that  the  carrier's  liability  in  case  uf  los8 
shall  not  exceed  the  sum  at  which  the  goods  are  valued,  it  is 
hardly  reasonable  to  suppose  that  it  was  thereby  intended  that 
the  carrier,  in  the  event  of  only  a  partial  loss,  should  be  liable 
for  an  amount  which  might  be  equal  to  the  sum  fixed  as  the 
value  of  the  goods,  thus  making  it  possible  for  the  same  amount 
to  be  recovered  where  the  loss  was  only  partial  as  would  be  re- 
coverable where  the  loss  w^as  total.  The  owner,  therefore,  is 
held  not  to  be  estopped  by  the  statement  as  to  value  from  show- 
ing what  the  real  value  of  the  goods  was  for  the  purpose  of  ar- 
riving at  the  correct  proportion.!*^ 

Sec.  430.  Same  subject — Contracts  limiting  recovery  to 
value  of  goods  at  time  and  place  of  shipment. — The  (luostion 
whether  the  carrier  may  lawfully  stipulate  with  the  owner  of 
the  goods  that  in  case  of  loss  the  value  of  the  goods  at  the  time 
and  place  of  shipment  shall  be  the  measure  of  recovery  has  sev- 
eral times  come  before  the  courts,  and  conclusions  not  in  har- 
mony have  been  reached.  It  is  contended  on  the  one  hand  that 
if  the  parties  may  lawfully  limit  the  amount  to  be  recovered  in 
case  of  loss  to  the  sum  at  which  the  goods  are  valued,  there  can 
be  no  good  reason  why  a  standard  may  not  be  fixed  by  which 
such  value  shall  be  determined.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  said 
that  the  usual  measure  of  damages  is  the  market  value  of  the 
goods  as  they  should  have  arrived  at  the  place  of  destination, 
and  that  a  contract  which  has  for  its  purpose  the  establishment 
of  some  other  time  and  place  must  necessarily  amount  to  a  lim- 
itation upon  the  carrier's  liability  and  be  inoperative  where  the 
carrier's  negligence  has  been  instrumental  in  causing  the  loss.^' 

10.  United  States  Express  Co.  v.  Without  a  consideration,  usual- 
Joyce,  supra.  l.v  a  reduced  rate,  a  clause  in  the 

11.  Ruppel  t'.  The  Railway,  167  contract  of  shipment  fixing  the 
Penn.  St.  166,  31  Atl.  Rep.  478,  damage  in  case  of  loss  at  the 
46  Am.  St.  Rep.  666;  Railway  Co.  value  of  the  goods  at  time  and 
V.  Greathouse,  82  Tex.  104,  17  S.  place  of  shipment  instead  of  des- 
W.  Rep.  834;  Railway  Co.  v.  D'Ar-  tination  is  invalid,  since  the  usual 
cais,  27  Tex.  Civ.  App.  57,  64  S.  W.  legal  liability  would  be  the  price 
Rep.  813;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Bogard,  of  the  goods  at  destination  in  their 
78  Miss.  11,  27  So.  Rep.  879.  condition  as  they  should  have  ar- 


454 


THE  LAW  OP    CARRIERS. 


[§431. 


The  former  rule  is  sustained  by  the  weight  of  authority,  and  the 
value  as  established  at  the  time  and  place  of  shipment  will  ordi- 
narily under  such  a  stipulation  be  conclusive  on  the  owner  of 
the  goods. 12 

Sec.  431.  Same  subject — Contracts  limiting  liability  to  fixed 
amount  without  regard  to  value. — From  what  has  already  been 
said  upon  the  subject,  it  will  be  apparent  that  an  agreement  lim- 
iting the  amount  for  which  the  carrier  will  be  liable  in  case  of 
loss  must,  in  order  to  be  conclusive  on  the  owner,  be  based  upon 
the  value  of  the  goods.  If,  therefore,  the  contract  should  pro- 
vide that  in  case  of  loss  the  carrier's  liability  shall  not  exceed  a 


rived.     Railroad    Co.    v.    Coolidge, 

Ark.  ,  83  S.  W.  Rep.  333, 

67  L.  R.  A.  555,  citing  Hutchinson 
on  Carr, 

12.  Squire  v.  The  Railroad,  98 
Mass.  239,  93  Am.  Dec.  162;  Rail- 
road Co.  V.  Oden,  80  Ala.  38;  York 
Co.  V.  Railroad  Co.,  3  Wall.  107; 
Pearce  v.  Steamship  Co.,  24  Fed. 
285;  The  Lydian  Monarch,  23  Fed. 
298;  The  Hadji,  18  Fed.  459; 
Pierce  v.  Railroad  Co.,  120  Cal. 
156,  47  Pac.  Rep.  874,  40  L.  R.  A. 
350,  354;  s.  c.  52  Pac.  Rep.  302; 
Railway  Co.  v.  Harwell,  91  Ala. 
340,  8  So.  Rep.  649;  Zouch  v. 
Railway  Co.,  36  W.  Va.  524,  15  S. 
E  Rep.  185,  17  L.  R.  A.  116;  Rail- 
road Co.  V.  Phillipson,  (Tex.  Civ. 
App.)  39  S.  W.  Rep.  958;  Railroad 
Co.  V.  Parish,  18  Tex.  Civ.  App. 
130,  43  S.  W.  Rep.  1066;  Tibbitts 
V.  Railroad  Co.,  49  111.  App.  567; 
Rogan  V.  Railway  Co.,  51  Mo.  App. 
665;  101  Live  Stock  Co.  v.  Railroad 
Co.  100  Mo.  App.  674,  75  S.  W. 
Rep,  782;  Railway  Co.  v.  Jones, 
132  Ala.  437,  31  So.  Rep.  501.  In 
Shea  V.  Railway  Co.,  63  Minn.  228, 
65  N.  W.  Rep.  458,  it  was  held  that 
a  stipulation  in  a  shipping  con- 
tract providing  that  the  amount  of 


any  loss  or  damage  for  which  the 
carrier  would  be  liable  should  be 
computed  at  the  value  of  the  prop- 
erty at  the  time  and  place  of  ship- 
ment was  unjust,  unreasonable, 
and  contrary  to  public  policy  in 
that  the  freight  charges  paid  or 
incurred  by  the  consignee  were 
ignored  as  an  element  of  dam- 
ages. But  in  Davis  v.  Railway  Co., 
70  Minn.  37,  72  N.  W.  Rep.  823,  it 
was  considered  by  the  same  court 
that  there  was  really  nothing  in 
such  a  condition  excluding  from  a 
computation  of  damages  charges 
for  transportation  paid  or  incurred 
by  or  on  behalf  of  the  consignee, 
and  that  when  so  construed,  the 
contract  was  not  on  its  face  un- 
reasonable or  opposed  to  public 
policy.  But  a  condition  in  the 
contract  that  the  value  of  the 
property  at  the  time  and  place  of 
shipment  shall  govern  the  settle- 
ment in  which  the  amount  claimed 
shall  not  exceed,  for  a  stallion  or 
jack,  $200,  for  a  horse  or  mule, 
$125,  was  held  not  to  constitute  a 
bona   fide    estimate    or    valuation. 

Central,  etc.,  Ry.  Co.  v.  Hall,  

Ga.  ,  53  S.  E.  Rep.  679. 


§  432.]  CONTRACTS   LIMITING  LIABILITY.  455 

certain  sum,  no  reference  being  made  to  the  value  of  the  goods, 
and  a  loss  occurs  through  some  misconduct  on  the  part  of  the 
carrier,  the  contract  will  be  considered  as  a  mere  attempt  to 
secure  a  partial  exemption  from  liability  for  the  consequences 
of  negligence,  and  of  no  avail  in  relieving  the  carrier  from  lia- 
bility for  the  full  value  of  the  goods.^^ 

Sec.  432.  Same  subjecl^Effect  of  delivery,  after  notice 
given  to  stop  goods  in  transit,  upon  agreement  limiting  re- 
covery to  stated  value  of  goods— Conversion.— Although  it  is 

provided  in  the  contract  of  shipment  that  the  carrier  will  not 
be  liable  in  case  of  loss  for  more  than  a  certain  sum  at  which  it 
is  stipulated  the  goods  are  valued,  if  the  owner  should  exercise 
his  right  of  stopping  the  goods  while  in  transit,  the  law  will  at 
once  create  a  new  relation  between  the  parties  which  is  inde- 
pendent of  the  contract  of  shipment;  and  if  the  carrier  should 
negligently  make  a  delivery  of  the  goods  after  the  owner  has 
thus  exercised  his  right  of  stopping  them  in  transit,  the  agree- 
ment limiting  recovery  to  their  stipulated  value  will  be  inopera- 
tive, and  the  owner  may  recover  to  the  full  extent  of  his  actual 
loss.14 

So  where  the  carrier  has  converted  the  goods,  he  will  be 
deemed  to  have  thereby  abandoned  the  contract  of  shipment, 
and  he  cannot  thereafter  insist  on  a  stipulation  that  his  liability 

13.  Abrams  v.  The  Railway,  87  482;  Railroad  Co.  i-.  Keener,  93  Ga. 
Wis.  485,  58  N.  W.  Rep.  780,  41  8G8,  21  S.  E.  Rep.  287,  44  Am.  St. 
Am.  St.  Rep.  55;  Railway  Co.  v.  Rep.  197;  Railway  Co.  v.  Johnson, 
Murphy,  113  Ga.  514,  38  S.  E.  Rep.  King  &  Co.,  121  Ga.  231,  48  S.  E. 
970,  53  L.  R.  A.  720;  Everett  v.  Rep.  807;  Eells  v.  Railway  Co.,  52 
Railroad  Co.,  138  N.  Car.  68,  50  S.  Fed.  903;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Lock- 
E.  Rep.  557,  citing  Hutchinson  on  wood,  84  U.  S.  (17  Wall),  357,  21 
Carr.;  Railway  Co.  v.  Witty,  32  L.  Ed.  627;  Schwarzchild  v.  Steam- 
Neb.  275,  49  N.  W.  Rep.  183,  29  ship  Co.,  74  Fed.  257;  The  Kon- 
Am.  St.  Rep.  436;  Wells,  Fargo  &  sington,  183  U.  S.  263,  22  Sup.  Ct. 
Co.  V.  Bell,  65  Ohio  St.  408,  62  N.  Rep.  102,  46  L.  Ed.  190,  reversing, 
E  Rep.  1035;  Baughman  v.  Rail-  94  Fed.  885,  36  C.  C.  A.  533.  See 
road   Co.,   14   Ky.    Law   Rep.   268;  ante,   §  425. 

Railroad  Co.  v.  Frazee,  24  Ky,  Law        14.  Rosenthal  v.  Weir,  170  N.  Y. 

Rep.  1273,  71  S.  W.  Rep.  437;  Har-  148,  63  N.  E.  Rep.  65,  57  L.  R.  A. 

ned   V.  Railway  Co.,   51   Mo.   App.  527. 


456  THE  LAW   OF   CARRIERS.  [§433. 

shall  be  limited  to  a  certain  sum  at  which  the  goods  are  val- 
ued ;^^  nor  can  he  do  so  where  the  negligence  which  occasioned 
the  loss  was  wanton  or  wilfiil.^^ 

Sec.  433.    Notice  contained  in  receipt  that  unless  informed 
of  value  of  goods  carrier  will  be  liable  only  to  limited  amount. 

— As  will  be  seen  in  a  later  section/'''  the  carrier  is  entitled  to  be 
informed  of  the  value  of  the  goods  intrusted  to  him  for  trans- 
portation. Where  the  goods  are  open  to  his  inspection,  he,  of 
course,  is  in  a  position  to  form  an  estimate  of  their  value  and 
compute  his  charges  in  proportion  to  the  risk  assumed ;  and  an 
agreement  fairly  entered  into  with  the  shipper  placing  a  value 
on  the  goods  and  stipulating  that  he  will  not  be  liable,  in  case  of 
loss,  beyond  the  sum  at  which  the  goods  are  valued,  such  value 
not  being  greatly  disproportionate  to  the  ordinary  values  of 
similar  kinds  of  property,  will  be  conclusive  on  the  shipper.i'^ 
But  goods  which  are  concealed  in  boxes  or  packages,  or,  if  not 
so  concealed,  which  are  of  such  a  character  that  from  an  ordi- 
nary inspection  their  real  value  is  not  apparent,  are  frequently 
offered  to  the  carrier  for  transportation,  and  where  their  value 
is  so  concealed,  he  may,  in  order  to  know  the  degree  of  care  and 
attention  to  bestow  upon  them,  insert  in  the  contract  by  which 
he  undertakes  to  carry  them,  whether  it  be  in  the  form  of  a  re- 
ceipt accepted  by  the  owner  or  any  other  form  of  express  con- 
tract, a  provision  that,  unless  apprised  of  their  real  value,  he 
will  not  be  liable  in  case  of  loss  for  more  than  a  certain  sum; 

15.  Railway  Co.  v.  Sloat,  93  Ga.  complained  of  is  a  conversion  of 

803,  20  S.  E.  Rep.  219;  Railway  Co.  the    goods    after    the    contract    of 

V.   Johnson,   King   &   Co.,    121   Ga.  shipment  has  been  performed,  the 

231,   48    S.   E.   Rep.    807;    Express  carrier  cannot  claim  advantage  of 

Co.  V.  Joyce,  Ind.  ,  72  N.  a  stipulation  limiting  the  amount 

E.  Rep.  865.  Where  the  carrier  has  to   be    recovered.     Railway   Co.    v. 

been    guilty    of    a    conversion,    he  Chicago   Portrait  Co.,   122   Ga.    11, 

cannot  insist  on  a  stipulation  that  49  S.  E.  Rep.  727,  106  Am.  St.  Rep. 

the  amount  of  any  loss  or  damage  87. 

shall  be  computed  at  the  value  of  16.  Zouch  v.  Railway  Co.,  36  W. 

the   goods   at   the   time   and   place  Va.  524,   15   S.  E.  Rep.   185,  17  L. 

of  shipment.     Merchants,  etc.,  Co.  R.  A.  116. 

V.  Moore  &  Co.,  Ga.  ,  52  17.  See  post,   §   795. 

S.  E.  Rep.  803.    Where  the  wrong  18.  See  ante,  §  426. 


§433.] 


CONTRACTS   LIMITING   LIABILITV. 


457 


and  if  the  shipper  should  desire  that  a  greater  liability  be  as- 
sumed than  that  provided  for  in  the  contract,  he  must  inform 
the  carrier,  whether  the  inquiry  be  made  of  him  or  not,  of  the 
value  of  which  he  wishes  him  to  assume  the  risk,  and  must  com- 
pensate him   accordingly.! »     Provisions  of  this  character  are 


19.  Smith  V.  Express  Co.,  108 
Mich.  572,  66  N.  W.  Rep.  479; 
Michalitschke  v.  Wells,  Fargo  & 
Co.,  lis  Cal.  683,  50  Pac.  Rep.  847; 
Macfarlane  v.  Adams  Express  Co., 
137  Fed.  982;  The  Denmark,  27 
Fed.  141;  Belger  v.  Dinsmore,  51 
N.  Y.  166;  Toy  v.  Railroad  Co.,  56 
N.  Y.  Supp.  182,  26  Misc.  Rep.  792; 
Hirsch  v.  Dispatch  &  Delivery  Co., 
85  N.  Y.  Supp.  198;  Ballou  v. 
Earle,  17  R.  I.  441,  22  Atl.  Rep. 
1113,  33  Am.  St.  Rep.  881,  14  L.  R. 
A.  433;  Adams  Express  Co.  v.  Car- 
nahan,  29  Ind.  App.  606,  63  N.  E. 
Rep.  245;  s.  c.  64  N.  E.  Rep.  647, 
94  Am.  St.  Rep.  297;  U.  S.  Express 

Co.  V.  Joyce,  Ind.  ,  72  N. 

E.  Rep.  865 ;  Graves  v.  Express  Co., 
176  Mass.  280,  57  N.  E.  Rep.  462; 
Royal,  etc.,  Co.  v.  Weir,  95  N.  Y. 
Supp.  575,  48  Misc.  376. 

Where  a  book  of  blank  receipts 
was  furnished  the  shipper  which 
contained  on  the  inside  of  the  cov- 
er a  notice  that  the  carrier  would 
not  be  liable  for  more  than  $50, 
for  any  article  carried,  unless  the 
true  value  was  stated,  the  notice 
being  referred  to  in  each  receipt, 
it  was  held  that  the  notice  of 
limitation  was  incorporated  into  a 
receipt  filled  out  by  the  shipper, 
and  that  he  could  not  by  inatten- 
tion say  that  he  did  not  read  the 
condition  and  thereby  impose  on 
the  carrier  liability  for  a  greater 
value  than  that  expressed  in  the 
contract.  Gerry  v.  Am.  Ex.  Co., 
Me,  ,  62  Atl.  Rep.  498. 


Where  goods  are  delivered  to 
an  express  company  for  transpor- 
tation, and  a  contract  is  accepted 
by  the  shipper  which  provides  that 
the  liability  of  the  carrier  shall  be 
limited  in  case  of  loss  to  the  sum 
of  $50,  the  carrier,  in  the  absence 
of  anything  showing  that  he  had 
knowledge  of  the  true  value  of 
the  goods,  will  be  responsible  only 
to  the  amount  named.  It  is  the 
duty  of  the  shipper  to  disclose  the 
true  value  of  the  goods  and  to  pay 
accordingly  if  he  would  hold  the 
carrier  liable  to  a  greater  amount 
than  that  named  in  the  contract, 
and,  if  he  remains  silent  and  pays 
charges  computed  on  the  sum 
named,  he  cannot  later  say  that 
the  value  of  the  goods  exceeded 
such  sum.  Smith  v.  Express  Co., 
supra. 

In  Michalitschke  v.  Wells  Fargo 
&  Co.,  supra,  it  appeared  that  the 
plaintiff,  through  his  agent,  de- 
livered to  the  defendant  carrier 
at  the  city  of  New  York  four  pack- 
ages of  cigars  of  the  value  of  $625, 
which  the  defendant  undertook  to 
carry  to  the  city  of  San  Francisco. 
The  receipt,  which  was  accepted  at 
the  time  the  goods  were  delivered 
to  the  carrier,  provided  that  Wells 
Fargo  &  Co.  was  not  to  be  held 
liable  for  loss  or  damage  for  any 
amount  exceeding  $50,  unless  the 
true  value  was  stated  in  the  re- 
ceipt. During  transit,  the  goods 
were  destroyed  by  fire.  The 
plaintiff  sued  for  the  full  value  of 


458 


THE  LAW  OF   CARRIEB6. 


[§  433. 


almost  universally  to  be  found  in  the  receipts  of  express  com- 
panies and  frequently  in  those  of  other  carriers,  and  the  rule 
has  become  well  settled  that  if  the  owner  of  goods  of  greater 
value  than  is  indicated  by  the  box  or  package  in  which  they  are 
concealed  accepts  such  a  receipt  when  the  goods  are  received  by 


the  packages.  The  defendant  con- 
tended that  its  liability  was  gov- 
erned by  the  terms  of  the  receipt 
and  in  its  answer  averred  that  the 
plaintiff  had  full  knowledge  of 
such  terms,  that  it  believed  the 
value  of  the  packages  did  not  ex- 
ceed fifty  dollars,  and  that  it  would 
have  charged  a  greater  rate  if  the 
true  value  had  been  stated.  The 
plaintiff  interposed  a  demurrer  to 
the  answer  which  the  trial  court 
sustained.  In  reversing  the  judg- 
ment of  the  trial  court,  McFarland, 
J.,  said:  "The  demurrer  should 
have  been  overruled.  We  presume 
the  demurrer  was  sustained  upon 
the  ground  that  a  common  carrier 
cannot,  by  contract  with  a  cus- 
tomer, relieve  himself  from  re- 
sponsibility for  his  own  negli- 
gence, and  that  the  contract  set 
up  in  the  answer  is  void  because 
contrary  to  legal  policy.  But  the 
rule  established  by  the  weight  of 
the  authorities  is  that,  where 
goods  done  up  in  packages  are  re- 
ceived by  a  carrier  for  transpor- 
tation, he  cannot  be  held  responsi- 
ble in  case  of  loss  for  damages 
beyond  the  value  of  the  goods 
agreed  upon  with  the  shipper,  and 
furthermore,  that  an  instrument 
in  writing,  such  as  that  set  up 
in  the  answer,  and  made  under 
the  circumstances  there  detailed, 
constitutes  a  contract  as  to  such 
value.  The  rule  is  fair  and  just. 
It  would  be  unreasonable  for  a 
shipper  to  expect  his  packages  to 


be  carried  for  a  compensation 
based  upon  an  agreed  valuation 
much  less  than  the  actual  value, 
and  then,  in  case  of  loss,  recover 
the  full  value.  As  common  car- 
riers are  insurers  and  are  liable 
for  all  losses,  whether  caused  by 
their  own  negligence  or  not,  ex- 
cept those  which  are  the  result  of 
an  act  of  God  or  a  public  enemy, 
they  are  entitled  to  know  the 
value  of  goods  concealed  in  pack- 
ages; and  where,  in  such  a  case, 
the  shipper  agrees  to  a  certain 
value,  he  should  not  be  heard  in 
case  of  loss  to  claim  a  greater 
value.  Such  a  contract  is  fair 
and  reasonable  and  not  contrary 
to  public  policy." 

In  the  case  of  The  Denmark,  27 
Fed.  Rep.  141,  arising  in  the  dis- 
trict court  for  the  southern  dis- 
trict of  New  York,  a  quantity  of 
highly  valuable  musk  was  shipped 
on  the  steamer  under  a  bill  of 
lading  which  read,  "Not  account- 
able for  .  .  .  highly  valuable 
goods  or  beyond  the  amount  of 
one  hundred  pounds  sterling  for 
any  one  package,  unless  bills  of 
lading  are  signed  therefor,  and 
the  value  therein  expressed,  and 
freight  paid  accordingly."  The 
value  of  the  musk,  which  was  £202 
3s,  was  not  disclosed  by  the  ship- 
per nor  was  extra  freight  paid. 
It  was  usual  to  pay  a  much  larger 
rate  on  musk.  The  musk  was 
shipped  in  a  case  with  another 
case  of  small  value  and  like  it  in 


§434. 


CONTRACTS   LIMITING   LIABILITY. 


459 


the  carrier  for  transportation,  and  fails  to  inform  the  carrier 
of  their  extraordinary  value,  or  to  pay  charges  on  them  in  pro- 
portion to  the  risk  he  would  have  the  carrier  assume,  he  cannot, 
in  case  of  their  loss,  impose  a  greater  liability  upon  him  than 
the  limit  prescribed  in  the  contract,  unless  the  loss  was  occa- 
sioned by  negligence  of  so  gross  a  character  as  to  be  tantamount 
to  a  misfeasance. 

Sec.  434.  Same  subject.— Thus  in  the  case  of  Oppenheimer 
V.  The  Express  Company,2o  the  facts  were  that  a  box  having 
the  appearance  of  containing  goods  of  only  ordinary  value  but 
really  containing  jewelry  worth  several  thousand  dollars  was 
delivered  to  the  express  company  to  be  carried  from  New  York 

nary  damage  by  stipulating  for 
notice  of  articles  specially  valu- 
able in  order  that  special  care  may 
be  given  to  them,  i,nd  to  require 
the  payment  of  a  proportionate 
compensation,  is  now  too  well  set- 
tled to  be  questioned.  Muser  v. 
American  Exp.  Co.,  1  Fed.  Rep. 
382;  The  Hadji,  18  Fed.  Rep.  459; 
Hart  V.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,  112 
U  S.  331;  Magnin  r.  Dinsmore, 
70  N.  Y.  410.  No  express  inquiry 
by  the  carrier  was  necessary.  The 
duty  of  disclosure  was  incumbent 
on  the  shipper.  Good  faith  re- 
quired it.  "Warner  v.  Western 
Transp.  Co.,  5  Rob.  490;  Tate  v. 
Hyslop,  15  Q  B.  Div.  368."  The 
libel    was   dismissed. 

But  where  the  article  was  ex- 
posed, and  its  nature  was  known 
to  the  carrier,  it  was  held  that  a 
notice  contained  in  the  receipt  to 
the  effect  that  unless  its  true  value 
was  stated  the  carrier  would  not 
be  liable  for  more  than  $50,  was 
not    conclusive     on     the     shipper. 

Hayes  v.  Adams  Ex.  Co., N.  J. 

Law,  ,  62  Atl,  Rep.  284. 

20.  69  111.  62. 


appearance.  On  the  voyage  the 
case  was  rifled  and  the  musk  lost. 
The  action  was  to  recover  its 
value.  Brown,  D.  J.,  said:  "The 
libelant's  agents  must  be  assumed 
to  have  been  acquainted  with  the 
fact  that  extra  freight  was  by  cus- 
tom always  payable  on  musk,  as 
well  as  with  the  usages  of  this 
line  of  steamers,  and  with  the  bills 
of  lading  and  their  stipulations, 
including  the  stipulation  above 
quoted.  These  stipulations  had 
been  long  in  use,  and  it  was  the 
plain  duty  of  the  shipper  to  make 
known  the  extreme  value  of  the 
musk  package,  and  to  pay  freight 
accordingly,  both  from  the  custom 
and  from  the  express  stipulations. 
I  cannot  regard  the  shipment  of 
these  valuable  articles  as  ordinary 
merchandise,  along  with  other 
cases  of  small  comparative  value 
and  of  similar  external  appear- 
ance, without  making  known  the 
great  value  of  one  of  the  cases, 
as  other  than  presumptively  a 
fraudulent  concealment  and  im- 
position upon  the  carrier.  The 
right  of  a  carrier  to  protect  him- 
self against  claims  for  extraordi- 


460  THE  LAW  -OF   CARRIERS.  [  §  434, 

to  Chicago  for  the  plaintiffs.  A  receipt  in  the  ordinary  form 
of  express  companies'  receipts,  containing  the  clause  limiting 
the  carrier's  liability  in  case  of  loss  to  $50,  unless  a  higher  value 
was  fixed  by  the  shipper  and  a  rate  for  carriage  paid  accord- 
ingly, was  at  the  same  time  presented  to  the  company's  agent 
for  signature  and  was  signed  by  him,  the  space  in  the  receipt 
for  filling  in  the  value  when  fixed  by  the  shipper  being  left  un- 
filled with  any  amount,  and  nothing  being  said  upon  that  sub- 
ject, the  shipper  paying  only  about  $1.50  for  the  carriage  instead 
of  the  amount  to  which  the  carrier  would  have  been  entitled  had 
its  real  value  been  stated.  The  box  was  carried  safely  to  desti- 
nation as  ordinary  freight,  being  supposed  to  contain  goods  of 
but  little  value.  Whilst  there  in  the  company's  warehouse  and 
before  the  company  had  had  time  to  make  delivery  of  it,  it  was 
consumed  by  a  devastating  fire.  It  appeared  that  all  the  valued 
packages  were  saved ;  but  the  fire  had  spread  so  rapidly  that  the 
company  had  not  been  able  to  save  its  ordinary  freight  with 
which  this  box  had  been  put.  The  attempt  was  made  to  hold  it 
liable  nevertheless  upon  the  ground  of  negligence;  but  it  was 
said  that  even  if  ordinary  negligence  had  been  shown,  there 
could  have  been  no  recovery  by  reason  of  the  failure  of  the 
plaintiff's  agent  to  disclose  the  value  of  the  box  at  the  time  of 
its  shipment  and  pay  the  increased  rate ;  and  that  to  hold  other- 
wise would  be  an  imposition  upon  the  carrier.  And  in  another 
case  in  which  the  facts  were  almost  exactly  the  same,  except  that 
there  was  very  strong  evidence  that  the  goods  were  lost  by  the 
negligence  of  the  carrier,  it  was  said  that  the  silence  as  to  value 
amounted  to  such  an  imposition  upon  the  defendant  (the  car- 
rier) as  would  relieve  it  from  a  liability  for  the  total  value  of 
the  goods  unless  something  more  was  shown  than  negligence  to 
carry  safely  and  deliver  promptly.  But  it  was  added  that  while 
such  a  concealment  under  the  contract  relieves  the  carrier  from 
liability  for  a  loss  occurring  from  ordinary  negligence,  it  was 
not  intended  to  be  said  that  he  would  be  thus  relieved  where  his 
acts  or  those  of  his  servants  amount  to  a  misfeasance  or  aban- 
donment of  his  character  as  a  carrier.21 
81.  Magnin  v.  Dinsmore,   63   N.  Y.  35;  s.  c.  70  N.  Y.  410. 


§435.]  CONTRACTS  LIMITING  LIABILITY.  461 

Sec.  435.  Same  subject— But  carrier  may  waive  requirement 
that,  unless  value  of  goods  is  stated,  he  will  be  liable  only  to 
limited  amount.— The  carrier  may,  however,  by  accepting  the 
box  or  package  with  knowledge,  obtained  either  from  a  previous 
course  of  dealing  or  from  the  appearance  of  the  box  or  packagc- 
itself,  of  what  it  contains  estop  himself  from  insisting  on  a  pro-* 
vision  in  the  receipt  that  unless  the  true  value  of  the  goods  is 
stated  he  will  be  liable  only  to  a  limited  amount.  Thus  where 
a  valuable  piece  of  statuary  was  shipped  in  a  box  which  was 
marked  ''marble  statuary,"  and  it  appeared  that  the  plaintiff 
was  a  well  known  art  dealer  who  for  a  period  of  twenty-seven 
years  had  been  shipping  works  of  art  over  the  defendant's  road, 
it  was  held  that  the  shipment  having  been  made  in  the  usual 
manner,  the  carrier,  by  accepting  the  box  containing  the  stat- 
uary, waived  the  condition  in  the  receipt  that  unless  the  true 
value  of  the  goods  was  disclosed,  he  would  be  liable  only  to  a 
limited  amount.-^ 

Sec.  436.  (§  251.)  Same  subject— How  under  English  Car- 
riers' Act. — This  contract  restricting  the  liability  of  the  car- 
rier to  a  limited  amount,  in  case  of  the  failure  of  the  bailor  for 
carriage  to  declare  a  higher  value  and  pay  a  higher  rate  for  the 
carriage  accordingly,  is  similar  to  the  limitation  provided  by  the 
English  Carriers'  Act,  the  first  section  of  which  enacts  that  no 
common  carrier  by  land  shall  be  liable  for  the  loss  of  any  of  the 
articles  therein  enumerated  if  the  value  of  such  property  shall 
exceed  £10,  "unless  at  the  time  of  the  delivery  the  value  and 
nature  be  declared  and  an  increased  charge  or  an  engagement 
to  pay  the  same  be  accepted,"  the  benefit  of  which  cannot  be 
claimed  if  it  be  shown  that  the  loss  arose  from  the  felonious 
acts  of  the  carrier's  servants;-^  and  under  which  it  has  been 
held  that  where  the  value  of  the  goods  is  above  £10,  the  duty  de- 
volves upon  the  owner  to  make  known  such  value  and  pay  the 

22.  Rathbone    v.    Railroad    Co.,        23.  Metcalfe  v.  The  Railway  Co., 
140   N.   Y.   48,   35   N.   E.  Rep.   418,     4  Com.  B.    (N.  S.)    307. 
reversing   69   Hun,    617,   23   N.   Y. 
Supp.  1148. 


462  THE  LAW  OF   CARRIERS.  [§437. 

increased  price  for  carriage  if  he  desires  insurance  for  a  greater 
value ;  and  if  he  fails  to  do  so,  he  can  derive  no  benefit  from  the 
fact  that  the  carrier  knew  the  value  of  the  goods.^^  And  when 
such  declaration  of  value  is  made,  it  is  conclusive  upon  him  in 
case  of  loss.25 

Sec.  437.  (§252.)  Same  subject — When  shipper  bound  to 
disclose  value — Limitation  by  notice — Regulations. — We  have 
already  seen  that  where  there  is  no  special  contract  limiting  the 
common-law  liability  of  the  carrier,  and  no  qualification  of  the 
risk  assumed  by  him  by  any  notice  so  specially  brought  to  his 
knowledge  as  to  have  that  effect,  the  owner  of  the  goods  is  not 
bound  to  disclose  their  value  unless  inquiry  is  made  by  the  car- 
rier, but  that  the  carrier  has  the  right  to  make  such  inquiry  and 
to  have  a  true  answer;  and  that  if  he  is  deceived  by  the  artifice 
of  the  owner  or  even  by  his  unintentional  concealment  of  such 
value  or  by  a  false  answer  given,  he  will  not  be  liable.^^  If,  how- 
ever, he  makes  no  inquiry,  and  no  artifice  or  unfair  means  are 
used  to  deceive  him,  he  is  responsible  for  the  value  in  case  of 
loss  however  great  the  value.^^  The  rule  is  different,  however, 
where  there  is  a  special  contract  that  in  case  no  value  is  fixed 
upon  the  goods  by  the  shipper  at  the  time  of  the  bailment,  and 

24.  Boys  V.  Pink,  8  Car.  &  P.  value  of  the  articles  before  re- 
361.  ceiving  them.     If   the   shipper   is 

25.  MeCance  v.  Railway  Co.,  3  guilty  of  fraud  or  imposition,  by 
H.  &  C.  343.  misrepresenting     the     nature     or 

26.  See  ante,  §§  328-332.  value  of  the  articles,   he  destroys 

27.  "As  a  general  rule,"  says  his  claim  to  indemnity,  because 
Blatchford,  J.,  in  Hart  v.  Railroad  he  has  attempted  to  deprive  the 
Co.,  112  U.  S.  331,  "and  in  the  ab-  carrier  of  the  right  to  be  compen- 
sence  of  fraud  or  imposition,  a  sated  in  proportion  to  the  value 
common  carrier  is  answerable  for  of  the  articles  and  the  consequent 
the  loss  of  a  package  of  goods,  risk  assumed,  and  what  he  has 
though  he  is  ignorant  of  its  con-  done  has  tended  to  lessen  the  vigi- 
tents,  and  though  its  contents  are  lance  the  carrier  would  otherwise 
ever  so  valuable,  if  he  does  not  have  bestowed.  2  Kent's  Comm. 
make  a  special  acceptance.  This  603,  and  cases  cited;  Relf  v.  Rapp, 
i.3  reasonable,  because  he  can  al-  3  Watts  &  Serg.  21;  Dunlap  v. 
ways  guard  himself  by  a  special  International  Steamboat  Co.,  98 
acceptance,  or  by  insisting  on  be-  Mass.  371;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Fraloff, 
ing   informed    of   the   nature   and  100  U.  S.  24." 


§438.]  CONTRACTS  LIMITING  LIABILITY,  463 

remuneration  made  for  the  carriage  and  risk  accordingly,  he 
will  be  responsible  only  to  a  limited  amount  ;28  or  perhaps  where 
notice  that  such  were  the  carrier's  terms  is  brought  directly  to 
the  knowledge  of  the  shipper,  which  might  make  such  notice,  if 
unobjected  to,  tantamount  to  a  contract  to  that  effect;  or  if, 
from  previous  dealings  between  the  parties,  this  condition  were 
known  to  the  shipper.29  Such  notices,  it  has  been  said,  are  not 
proposals  which  ripen  into  contracts  between  the  carrier  and  his 
customers,  when  the  services  of  the  former  are  engaged  in  the 
transportation  of  the  goods,  to  lessen  or  restrict  his  common-law 
liability;  but  they  are  rather  to  be  looked  upon  in  the  light  of 
rules  or  regulations  which  the  carrier  may  prescribe  in  the  con- 
duct of  his  business,  in  order  to  insure  that  fair  dealing  on  the 
part  of  his  employers  which  the  law  requires ;  and  when  his 
services  are  engaged  with  a  full  knowledge  on  the  part  of  his 
employer  that  such  are  the  terms  upon  which  he  carries,  fair 
dealing  would  seem  to  require  that  he  should  be  held  to  them 
as  tantamount  to  a  contract.  They  would  stand  upon  the  same 
ground  as  notices  by  the  carrier  that  he  would  not  be  liable  for 
the  breakage  of  brittle  goods  unless  informed  of  their  nature, 
or  for  the  damage  by  detention  to  goods  subject  to  rapid  decay 
if  their  character  was  concealed  from  him,  to  which  no  objection 
has  ever  been  made  because  they  were  unreasonable  or  because 
they  were  mere  notices.^^ 

Sec.  438.  Same  subject — Illustrations. — In  the  case  of  Dunt- 
ley  V.  The  Railroad,^!  the  right  of  the  carrier  to  limit  his  lia- 
bility to  a  stated  amount,  by  a  regulation  to  that  effect,  was 
recognized.  There  it  appeared  that  the  carrier  had  a  regulation 
that  rates  for  the  transportation  of  animals  were  based  upon 
and  intended  only  for  those  of  ordinary  value,  which  in  the  case 
of  horses  was  fixed  at  $200,  and  that  when  animals  of  greater 
value  were  offered  for  carriage  an  additional  charge  would  be 

28.  See  ante,   §433;   post,   §441.  327.     See,  also,  Durgin  v.  Express 

29.  See  ante,  §414.  See  Graves  Co.,  66  N.  H.  277,  20  Atl.  Rep. 
V.  Express  Co.,  176  Mass.  280,  57  329;  Klair  v.  Steamboat  Co.,  4 
N.  E.  Rep.  462.  Pennewill,  (Del.)   51,  54  Atl.  Rep. 

30.  See  ante,  §  414.  694. 

31.  66    N.    H.    263,   20   Atl.    Rep. 


464  THE  LAW  OP   CARRIERS.  [§  439. 

made.  The  plaintiff,  with  knowledge  of  this  regulation,  shipped 
a  horse  b}^  defendant's  line  as  an  ordinary  horse.  The  horse 
being  injured,  the  plaintiff  claimed  and  recovered  in  the  lower 
court  damages  to  the  amoimt  of  $350.  The  supreme  court,  how- 
ever, held  that  he  was  bound  by  the  regulation,  saying  that  the 
plaintift"s  conduct  in  shipping  his  horse  as  an  ordinary  horse, 
in  the  face  of  this  regulation,  was  equivalent  to  a  declaration 
on  his  part  that  its  value  and  the  carrier's  liability  did  not  ex- 
ceed $200.  "The  rule  or  regulation  of  the  defendant,"  said  tho 
court,  "of  which  the  plaintiff  had  notice,  was  not  designed,  and 
did  not  purport,  to  relieve  the  defendant  from  its  common-law 
responsibility  as  a  carrier.  The  purpose  was  to  secure  informa- 
tion as  to  the  value  of  the  animals  received  for  transportation, 
and  compensation  proportionate  to  the  risk  incurred.  As  such 
the  regulation  was  a  reasonable  one,  and  not  in  conflict  with  the 
general  principle  that  a  common  carrier  cannot  discharge  him- 
self of  legal  responsibility  by  general  notice.^^  _  _  _  There  is 
no  injustice  in  restricting  the  shipper's  claim  for  damages  to 
the  value  he  places  upon  his  property  for  transportation.  If 
the  plaintiff  obtained  the  lowest  rate  of  freight  by  shipping  his 
horse  as  of  ordinary  value,  it  is  not  unreasonable'  that  his  re- 
covery should  be  restricted  to  $200,  which  was  the  amount  of 
the  risk  the  parties  understood  the  plaintiff  paid  for  and  the 
defendant  assumed  as  carrier.  "^•'' 

Sec.  439.  (§253.)  Same  subject — Notice  under  English 
Carriers'  Act. — The  rule  was  well  established  by  a  number  of 
well-considered  English  cases,  when  public  notices  in  regard  to 
the  limitation  of  their  common-law  liability  were  resorted  to  by 
carriers,  and  before  the  legislation  which  destroyed  their  valid- 
ity. Before  the  passage  of  the  Carriers'  Act,  it  was  customary 
for  common  carriers  to  give  public  notice  that  they  would  not  be 
carriers  of  packages  of  over  the  value  of  £5  unless  information 

32.  Citing  Moses  v.  Railroad  Co.,  62  N.  Y.  35;  Squire  v.  Railroad 
24  N.  H.  71;  Hart  v.  Railroad  Co.,  Co.,  98  Mass.  239;  Graves  v.  Rail- 
112  U.  S.  331.  way    Co.,    137    Mass.    33;    Hill    v. 

33.  Citing  Magnin   r.   Dinsmore,  Railroad  Co.,  144  Mass.  284. 


§440.]  CONTRACTS   LIMITING   LIABILITY.  46;") 

was  given  of  the  actual  value  and  the  carriage  paid  for  accord- 
ingly. Cases  frequently  occurred  in  which  the  employer  lia.l 
delivered  to  the  carrier  a  package  of  greater  vahie  without  giv- 
ing the  required  information  or  paying  the  higher  rate  for  the 
service,  and  the  package  having  been  lost,  the  attempt  was  made 
to  hold  the  carrier  liable ;  but  it  was  uniformly  held  by  the  Eng- 
lish courts  that  this  could  not  be  done.-''*  The  object  of  such  no- 
tices was  said  to  be  to  prevent  the  necessity  of  inquiry  by  the 
carrier  of  the  value  of  the  package  in  every  particular  instance, 
the  responsibility  of  doing  which  the  law,  without  such  notice, 
threw  upon  him.  The  notice,  however,  was  held  to  cast  the  duty 
of  making  the  disclosure  of  value  upon  the  owner  of  the  goods, 
and  the  offer  of  payment  for  the  carriage  according  to  the  excess 
of  such  value  over  the  limited  sum ;  and  in  case  he  failed  to  do 
so,  the  carrier  had  the  right  to  presume  that  the  package  or 
goods  were  of  the  value  only  to  which  by  the  notice  he  had  lim- 
ited his  liability ;  and  in  case  the  value  should  prove  greater,  and 
the  terms  of  his  notice  had  not  been  complied  with,  it  was  a 
fraud  upon  him  and  the  contract  for  carriage  was  a  nullity,  and 
the  owner  of  the  goods  could  recover  nothing.  And  the  law  as 
thus  established  was  left  unaltered  by  the  Land  Carriers'  Act 
except  in  so  far  as  it  destroyed  the  effect  of  what  were  known 
as  public  notices,  requiring  them  to  be  given  according  to  its 
provisions.  So  that  as  to  all  other  carriers  except  those  engaged 
in  railway  and  canal  traffic,  by  the  express  terms  of  the  act,  so 
long  as  they  comply  with  its  conditions,  the  duty  is  incumbent 
upon  the  bailor,  as  a  condition  precedent  to  the  liability  of  the 
carrier,  to  make  known  to  him  the  value  of  the  goods  where  it 
exceeds  £10  and  to  pay  or  engage  to  pay  the  increased  charge 
for  the  carriage.^ ^ 

Sec.  440.    (§  254.)     Same  subject — Weight  of  English  cases. 
— These  cases  are  of  course  of  no  authority  in  this  country  ex- 

34.  Clay  v.  Willan,  1  H.  Bl.  298;  son  r.  Donovan,  4  B.  &  Aid.  21. 
Yate  V.  Willan,  2  East.   128;    Izett         35.  Wyld    v.    Pickford,    8    M.    & 

V.  Mountain,  4  id.  371;   Nicholson  W.   443;   Metcalfe  v.  Railway  Co., 

V.   Willan,   5   id.   507;    Brignold  v.  4  C.  B.    (N.   S.)    307. 
Waterhouse,   1  M.  &  S.  259;   Bat- 
30 


466  THE  LAW   OF    CARRIERS.  [§441. 

cept  so  far  as  they  may  show  the  reasonableness  of  such  notices, 
not  as  contracts  between  the  carrier  and  his  employers  limiting 
the  common-law  liability  of  th^  former,  but  as  rules  which  he 
may  adopt  with  the  knowledge  of  his  employer  to  prevent  fraud 
and  deception,  and  that  he  may  know  the  risk  which  he  is  as- 
suming and  be  paid  accordingly.  The  carrier  certainly  should 
not  be  deprived  of  all  means  of  thus  protecting  himself;  and  so 
long  as  the  duty  of  disclosing  the  actual  value  and  paying  the 
compensation  for  its  carriage,  wherever  it  exceeds  the  limited 
value  which  the  carrier  announces  that  he  will,  unless  otherwise 
instructed,  place  upon  it,  is  cast  upon  the  shipper  only  where 
he  accepts  a  receipt  for  the  goods  embodying  the  condition,  or 
w^here  notice  is  directly  given  to  him  otherwise  and  he  makes 
no  objection,  or  where  a  course  of  dealing  between  himself  and 
the  carrier  must  have  made  him  familiar  with  the  requirement, 
no  objection  can  be  seen  to  it.  If  the  carrier  cannot  protect  him- 
self to  this  extent,  great  injustice  might  in  many  instances  be 
done  him.  By  accepting  the  service  of  carriage  upon  terms  as 
to  liability  so  directly  and  certainly  brought  to  his  knowledge, 
the  shipper  indicates  his  choice  of  the  portion  of  the  risk  which 
he  desires  the  carrier  to  assume  and  for  which  he  is  willing  to 
pay,  and  his  silence  as  to  the  real  value  must  be  regarded  as 
the  same  thing  as  an  assertion  of  the  limited  value  which  the 
carrier  holds  himself  out  as  assuming  unless  otherwise  informed 
and  compensated.  Besides,  the  purpose  of  the  shipper  in  thus 
withholding  the  truth  can  only  be  supposed  to  be  to  procure  the 
carriage  for  less  than  the  adequate  reward ;  and  having  for  this 
purpose  misled  the  carrier  as  to  the  needed  care  to  be  bestowed 
upon  the  goods,  but  for  which  the  loss  would  have  probably 
been  avoided,  the  rule  would  seem  to  be  unfair  which  would 
hold  the  latter  liable  for  the  extraordinary  value.^^ 

Sec.  441.  (§255.)  Same  subject — Notice  from  course  of 
dealing. — Accordingly  there  are  cases  in  this  country  which 

36.  See  Hart  v.  Railroad  Co.,  112  lish  cases  of  Gibbon  v.  Paynton.  4 
U.  S.  331,  wliere  similar  conclu-  Burr.  2298,  and  Batson  r.  Donovan, 
sions  were  reached,  and  thie  Eng-     4  B.  &  A.  21,  were  cited. 


§442.; 


CONTRACTS  LIMITING  LIABILITY, 


467 


hold  that  where,  either  from  a  previous  course  of  dealing  be- 
tween the  parties  or  from  direct  notice,  it  was  known  to  the 
shipper  that  the  carrier  received  goods  for  transportation  only 
upon  terms  that  they  should  be  considered  as  of  a  certain  value, 
which  should  be  the  limit  of  his  liability,  unless  they  were  valued 
at  a  higher  sum  and  paid  for  accordingly,  if  the  goods  are  de- 
livered for  carriage  without  any  notice  of  their  being  of  a  hitrher 
value  and  are  lost,  the  limit  of  the  recovery  would  be  the  value 
which  the  carrier  had  fixed  by  his  own  terms.-"*"  And  if  the 
means  resorted  to  by  carriers  to  protect  themselves  are  to  be 
tested  by  their  justice  and  reasonableness,  as  the  rule  is  said  to 
be  by  the  supreme  court  of  the  United  States  in  The  Railroad  v. 
Loekwood,38  no  objection  could  be  well  made  to  such  rule  unless 
we  deny  to  the  carrier  all  right  to  protect  himself  by  a  mere 
notice.39 

Sec.  442.     (§259.)     Carrier  may  limit  time  within  which 
claim  shall  be  made  for  loss. — It  is  frequently  the  custom  for 


37.  Orange  Bank  v.  Brown,  9 
Wend.  114;  Oppenheimer  v.  Ex- 
press Co.,  69  111.  62;  Magnin  v. 
Dinsmore,  62  N.  Y.  35;  Farmers' 
&  M.  Bank  v.  Champlaln  T.  Co.,  23 
Vt.  186;  Moses  v.  Railroad,  4  Fos- 
ter, 71;  2  Greenleaf  on  Ev.  §215; 
Western  T.  Co.  v.  Newhall,  24  111. 
466;  Hopkins  v.  Westcott,  6 
Blatch.  64;  Klair  v.  Wilmington 
Steamboat  Co.,  4  Pennewill,  (Del.) 
51,   54  Atl.  Rep.   694. 

38.  17  Wall.   357. 

39.  The  distinction  between  the 
notice  which  goes  to  the  limita- 
tion of  the  liability  of  the  car- 
rier and  that  which  is  intended 
only  as  a  protection  against  im- 
position in  his  business  is  fully 
recognized  by  Cowen,  J.,  in  his 
opinion  in  Cole  v.  Goodwin,  19 
Wend.  251.  "I  will  only  repeat," 
says  he,  "in  respect  to  this  case 
•what  seems  to  me  perfectly  obvi- 


ous, and  which  I  have,  if  not  very 
unsuccessful,  made  somewhat  ap- 
parent to  others,  that  the  differ- 
ence between  the  two  cases  from 
Burrow  and  East  (Gibbon  r. 
Paynton  and  Nicholson  r.  Willan) 
and  that  of  Evans  v.  Soule  (2 
Maule  &  S.  1)  is,  that  the  notices 
in  the  former  went  merely  to  pro- 
tect against  the  fraud  of  the 
bailor,  and  the  latter  to  conceal 
and  favor  fraud  directed  against 
the  owner  and  in  favor  of  the 
party  giving  the  notice.  The  one 
was  for  and  the  other  against  pub- 
lic morals;  the  former  said 
merely  'give  me  a  due  reward  and 
I  will  be  accountable  as  a  com- 
mon carrier;'  the  latter,  'give  me 
the  same  reward'  (for  the  carrier 
fixes  it;  it  may  be  less,  but  it 
may  also  be  more),  'and  yet  1 
claim  to  throw  all  risk  upon  you, 
or  such  a  degree  of  it  as  I  please.' 


468 


THE  LAW   OP   CARRIERS. 


[§442. 


the  carrier  to  insert  in  the  contract  of  shipment  a  condition  that, 
in  the  event  of  loss,  the  owner  shall  give  notice  of  his  claim 
within  a  specified  time.  Such  conditions  are  usually  to  the 
effect  that  the  notice  shall  be  in  writing  and  presented  to  some 
officer  or  agent  of  the  carrier,  either  before  the  goods  are  re- 
moved from  the  point  of  destination  or  within  a  certain  time 
thereafter,  or  within  a  designated  time  after  the  loss  has  oc- 
curred; and  when  such  conditions  are  reasonable,  the  owner 
will  be  precluded  from  the  right  to  maintain  an  action  against 
the  carrier  unless  he  has  presented  the  notice  within  the  time 
stated  and  in  the  manner  provided.^*^     The  object  of  conditions 


In  the  former,  the  plaintiff  sought 
to  commit  and  did  commit  actual 
frauds  after  express  notice  that 
he  must  be  honest.  He  sought  in 
that  way  to  deprive  the  laborer  of 
a  reasonable  reward  for  his  hire. 
In  the  latter,  he  was  paid  all  he 
demanded  and  yet  he  refuses  to 
carry  under  the  obligation  re- 
quired by  law." 

40.  England:  Lewis  v.  Railway 
Co.,  5  H.  &  N.  867. 

United  States:  Express  Co.  v. 
Caldwell,  21  Wall.  264;  The  Queen 
of  the  Pacific,  180  U.  S.  49,  45  L. 
Ed.  419,  21  Sup.  Ct.  R.  278,  re- 
versing Pacific  Coast  S.  S.  Co.  v. 
Bancroft  Whitney  Co.,  94  Fed.  180, 
36  C.  C.  A,  135,  and  78  Fed.  155; 
Angel  V.  Steamship  Co.,  55  Fed. 
1005;  Central,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Soper, 
59  Fed.  879,  8  C.  C.  A.  341,  21  U. 
S.  App.  24;  Ginn  v.  Ogdensburg 
Transit  Co.,  85  Fed.  985,  29  C.  C. 
A.  521;  Metropolitan  Trust  Co.  v. 
Railroad  Co.,  107  Fed.  628;  The 
Artie  Bird,  109  Fed.  167;  The 
Westminster,  127  Fed.  680,  62  C. 
C.  A.  406,  affirming  116  Fed.  123. 

A  provision  that  the  shipowner 
is  not  to  be  liable  for  any  claim, 
notice  of  which  is  not  given  before 


the  removal  of  the  goods,  will  be 
construed  as  meaning  the  removal 
from  the  place  of  deposit  of  the 
goods  upon  the  dock  or  wharf 
when  freed  from  the  ship's  tackle, 
and,  as  thus  construed  will  be  rea- 
sonable and  valid.  The  St.  Hub- 
ert, 107  Fed.  727,  46  C.  C.  A.  603, 
affirming   102   Fed.   362. 

A  stipulation  limiting  the  time 
within  which  suit  shall  be  filed 
applies  as  well  to  a  suit  in  rem 
against  the  vessel  carrying  the 
property  as  to  an  action  in  per- 
sonam against  the  owner.  The 
shipper  cannot  avoid  the  opera- 
tion of  such  a  stipulation  by  sim- 
ply changing  his  form  of  action 
from  one  in  personam  to  one  in 
rem.  The  Queen  of  the  Pacific, 
supra;    The  St.  Hubert,  supra. 

Alabama:  Railroad  Co.  v.  Sand- 
ers,  135  Ala.  504,  33  So.  Rep.  482. 

Arkansas:  Railroad  Co.  v. 
Hurst,  67  Ark.  407,  55  S.  W.  Rep, 
2]  5.  Under  a  provision  requiring 
notice  of  claim  before  the  removal 
of  live  stock  and  within  one  day 
after  delivery,  it  was  held  that 
since  the  provision  was  inserted 
for  the  benefit  of  the  carrier  to 
give  him  an  opportunity  to  exam- 


§442.; 


CONTRACTS   LIMITING  LIABILITY. 


469 


of  this  character,  it  is  said,  is  to  enable  the  carrier,  while  the  oc- 
currence is  recent,  to  better  inform  himself  of  what  the  actual 
facts  occasioning  the  loss  or  injury  were,  and  thus  protect  him- 
self against  claims  which  might  be  made  upon  him  after  such  a 
lapse  of  time  as  to  frequently  make  it  difficult,  if  not  impossi- 
ble, for  him  to  ascertain  their  truth.     It  is  just,  therefore,  that 


ine  the  stock  before  it  was  min- 
gled with  other  stock,  it  did  not 
apply  to  stock  that  had  been 
killed,  because  as  to  such  stock 
the  carrier  had  all  the  opportunity 
necessary  to  examine  it.  Railway 
Co.  V.  Ayres,  63  Ark.  331,  38  S.  W. 
Rep.   515. 

Canada:  Express  Co.  v.  Martin, 
26  S.  C.  R.  135;  Gelinas  r.  Rail- 
way Co.,  11  Rap.  Jud.  Que.  (C.  S.) 
253;  Steamship  Co.  v.  Drysdale,  32 
S.  C.  R.  379. 

Georgia:  Railway  Co.  v.  Adams, 
115  Ga.  705,  42  S.  B.  Rep.  35,  cit- 
ing Hutchinson  on  Carr.  It  is 
provided  under  the  code  that  a 
common  carrier  cannot  limit  his 
legal  liability  by  any  notice  given 
either  by  publication  or  by  entry 
on  receipts.  Held,  that  a  stipula- 
tion in  a  bill  of  lading  exempting 
the  carrier  from  liability  unless 
notice  should  be  given  within  a 
specified  time  was  not  effectual  for 
that  purpose  without  proof  that 
the  shipper  assented  thereto.  Rail- 
road Co.  V.  Hasselkus,  91  Ga.  382, 
17  S.  E.  Rep.  838,  44  Am.  St.  Rep. 
37. 

Illinois:  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Simms,  18  111.  App.  68;  Railway 
Co.  V.  Newlin,  74  111.  App.  638; 
Railway  Co.  r.  Bozarth,  91  111. 
App.  68;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Ross, 
105  111.  App.  54;  Railroad  Co.  r. 
Fox,  113  111.  App.  180.  That  the 
shipper  did  not  read  the  contract 
is  no  defense  if  no  fraud  was  prac- 


ticed   upon    him.     Black    v.    Rail- 
road Co.,  Ill  111.  350;  ante  §  408. 

Indiana:  Case  v.  The  Railway, 
11  Ind.  App.  517,  39  N.  E.  Rep. 
420;  Railway  Co.  v.  Ragsdale,  14 
Ind.  App.  406,  42  N.  E.  Rep.  1106; 
Anderson  r.  The  Railway,  26  Ind. 
App.  196,  59  N.  E.  Rep.  390.  citing 
Hutchinson  on  Carr;  Railway  Co. 
V.  Fifth  National  Bank,  26  Ind. 
App.  600,  59  N.  E.  Rep.  43. 

In  Adams  Ex.  Co.  v.  Reagan,  29 
Ind.  21,  a  stipulation  in  the  com- 
pany's receipt  that  it  was  not  to 
be  liable  for  any  loss  or  damage 
unless  claim  in  writing  was  made 
in  thirty  days  after  date  of  receipt 
was  held  unreasonable  and  void. 
But  in  the  subsequent  case  of  the 
United  States  Express  Co.  r.  Har- 
ris, 51  Ind.  127,  a  stipulation  In 
exactly  the  same  words  in  the 
company's  receipt  was  held  to  be 
valid  and  binding  upon  the  own- 
er of  the  goods,  there  being  noth- 
ing unreasonable  in  such  a  condi- 
tion; and  it  was  said  that  the  de- 
cision in  the  previous  case  of  the 
Express  Co.  r.  Reagan  was  to  be 
explained  by  the  unsettled  state 
of  the  country  when  the  receipt  in 
that  case  was  given,  it  having 
been  during  the  civil  war,  and 
the  undertaking  of  the  company 
having  been  to  carry  the  goods 
from  Indiana  to  Savannah  in  the 
state  of  Georgia,  which,  under 
such  circumstances,  might  be  at- 
tended with  great  delay. 


470 


THE  LAW   OF   CARRIERS. 


[§442. 


the  owner,  when  a  loss  or  injury  has  occurred,  should  be  re- 
quired, as  a  condition  precedent  to  enforcing  the  carrier's  lia- 


lowa:  Hudson  v.  The  Railroad, 
92  Iowa,  231,  60  N.  W.  Rep.  608, 
54  Am.    St.   Rep.   550. 

Kansas:  Sprague  v.  Railroad  Co., 
34  Kan.  347;  Railroad  Co.  r.  Col- 
lins, 47  Kan.  11,  27  Pac.  Rep.  99; 
Railroad  v.  Temple,  47  Kan.  7,  27 
Pac.  Rep.  98,  13  L.  R.  A.  362;  Rail- 
way Co.  V.  Kirkham,  63  Kan.  255, 
65  Pac.  Rep.  261;  Railway  Co.  v. 
Morris,  65  Kan.  532,  70  Pac.  Rep. 
651;  Railway  Co.  v.  Park,  66  Kau. 
248,  71  Pac.  Rep.  586;  Kalina  & 
Cizek  V.  The  Railroad,  69  Kan. 
172;  76  Pac.  Rep.  438;  Railroad 
Co.  r.  Crittenden,  4  Kan.  App.  512, 
44  Pac.  Rep.  1000. 

Massachusetts :  Cox  v.  The  Rail- 
road, 170  Mass.  129,  49  N.  E.  Rep. 
97. 

Minnesota:  Engesether  v.  The 
Railway,  65  Minn.  168,  68  N.  W. 
Rep..  4. 

Mississippi:  Southern  Express 
Co.  V.  Hunnicutt,  54  Miss.  566. 

Missouri:  Dawson  v.  The  Rail- 
road, 76  Mo.  514;  Rice  v.  The  Rail- 
road, 63  Mo.  314;  Harned  v.  The 
Railway,  51  Mo.  App.  482,  citing 
Hutchinson  on  Carr;  Hamilton  v. 
The  Railroad,  80  Mo.  App.  597; 
101  Live  Stock  Co.  v.  The  Railroad, 
100   Mo.   App.    674,   75    S.   W.   Rep. 

782;  Freeman  v.  Railway  Co., 

Mo.  App.  ,  93  S.  W.  Rep.  302; 

Bellows  V.  Railway  Co.,  Mo. 

App.  ,  94  S.  W.  Rep.  557. 

New  York:  American  Grocery 
Co.  V.  The  Railroad,  51  N.  Y.  Supp. 
307,  23  Misc.  356;  Hirshberg  v. 
Dinsmore,  12  Daly,  429;  Smith  v. 
Dinsmore,   9  Daly,   188. 

In  Westcott  v.  Fargo,  61  N.  Y. 
551,  where  the  condition  in  the  re- 


ceipt was  that  the  company 
would  not  be  liable  for  any  loss 
or  damage  "unless  the  claim 
therefor  should  be  made  in  writ- 
ing within  thirty  days  from  the 
accruing  of  the  cause  of  action," 
and  it  was  contended  for  the  de- 
fendant that  as  no  claim  had  been 
made  within  the  prescribed  time 
there  could  be  no  recovery,  the 
opinion  was  announced  that  this 
could  not  be  considered  in  the  na- 
ture of  a  condition  precedent  to 
the  right  to  recover.  It  was  said 
that  this  clause  assumed  that  the 
plaintiff  had  a  cause  of  action 
which  had  already  accrued  to  him 
before  the  thirty  days  commenced 
to  run,  and  in  that  view  was  in 
the  nature  of  a  statute  of  limita- 
tions, and  as  defendant  had  not  set 
it  up  in  its  answer,  it  could  not 
avail  him.  "Had  we  come  to  the 
conclusion,"  say  the  court,  "that 
the  clause  was  a  condition  prece- 
dent, the  question  would  have  been 
open  to  consideration  whether  so 
short  a  time  was  reasonable." 

North  Carolina:  Selby  r.  The 
Railroad,  113  N.  Car.  588,  18  S.  E. 
Rep.  88,  37  Am.  St.  Rep.  635; 
Wood  V.  The  Railway,  118  N.  Car. 
1056,  24  S.  E.  Rep.  704;  Gwyn  Har- 
per Mfg.  Co.  V.  The  Railroad,  128 
N.  Car.  2S0,  38  S.  E.  Rep.  894,  S3 
Am.   St.  Rep.   675. 

North  Dakota:  Hatch  r.  Railway 

Co.,  N.  Dak.  ,  107  N.  W. 

Rep.  1087;   Welch  v.  Railway  Co., 

14  N.  Dak.  ,   103  N.  W.  Rep. 

396. 

Ohio:  Railroad  Co.  v.  Hubbard, 
72  Ohio,  302,  74  N.  E.  Rep.  214. 

Pennsylvania:     Pavitt     v.     The 


§443.] 


CONTRACTS   LIMITING   LIABILITY. 


471 


bility,  to  give  notice  of  his  claim  accordinc:  to  the  reasonable 
conditions  of  the  contract. 

Sec.  443.  Same  subject — Condition  limiting  time  within 
which  claim  shall  be  made  must  be  reasonable.— The  owner, 
however,  will  not  be  precluded  from  the  right  to  recover  for  a 
loss  or  injury  where,  to  require  him  to  present  a  notice  of  his 
claim  within  a  specified  time,  would  be  unreasonable.^     Thus  if 


Railroad,  153  Penn.  St.  302,  25 
Atl.  Rep.  1107;  Eckert  v.  The  Rail- 
road, 211  Penn.  St.  267,  60  Atl. 
Rep.  781 ;  Weir  v.  Express  Co.,  5 
Phila.  355. 

Tennessee:  Southern  Express 
Co.  V.  Glenn,  16  Lea,  472;  Glenn  v. 
Express  Co.,  86  Tenn.  594. 

Texas:  Gulf,  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Tra- 
wick,  68  Tex.  314;  Texas,  etc.  Ry. 
Co.  V.  Adams,  78  Tex.  372;  Rail- 
way Co.  V.  Greathouse,  82  Tex.  104, 
17  S.  W.  Rep.  834. 

The  Iowa  code  provides  that  no 
contract,  receipt,  rule  or  regula- 
tion shall  operate  to  relieve  any 
railroad  corporation  from  the  lia- 
bility of  a  common  carrier  which 
would  exist  had  no  contract,  re- 
ceipt, rule  or  regulation  been 
made.  It  was  held  under  this  pro- 
vision that  a  condition  to  the  ef- 
fect that  no  claim  for  loss  or 
damage  should  be  valid,  unless 
made  in  writing  and  delivered  to 
an  agent  of  the  railroad  company 
within  10  days  from  the  time  the 
goods  were  removed  from  the  cars, 
gould  not  be  upheld.  Grieve  v.  The 
Railroad,  104  Iowa,  659,  74  N.  W. 
Rep.  192. 

In  Kentucky,  by  constitution, 
common  carriers  are  forbidden  to 
contract  for  relief  from  their  com- 
mon law  liability.  An  agreement 
that  no  claim  for  loss  or  dam- 
age   to    stock    should    be    valid 


against  the  carrier,  unless  made 
in  writing  and  delivered  to  an 
agent  of  the  carrier  within  10  days 
after  the  stock  was  removed  from 
the  cars,  was  held  to  be  violative 
of  the  constitutional  provision  and 
therefore  void.  Brown  v.  The 
Railroad,  100  Ky.  525,  38  S.  W. 
Rep.  862;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Rad- 
ford, 23  Ky.  Law  Rep.  886,  64  S. 
W.  Rep.  511.  See  also,  Ohio,  etc. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Taber,  98  Ky.  503, 
36  S.  W.  Rep.  18,  34  L.  R.  A.  685. 

A  provision  that  notice  of  claim 
must  be  presented  within  10  days 
from  the  date  of  unloading  the 
goods  is  held  to  be  void  under  the 
law    of    Nebraska.      Union    Pacific 

R.    Co.    V.    Thompson,    Neb. 

,  106  N.  W.  Rep.  598. 

1.  Central,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Soper, 
59  Fed.  879,  8  C.  C.  A.  341,  21  U. 
S,  App.  24;  The  Minnetonka,  132 
Fed.  52;  Southern  Express  Co.  v. 
Caperton,  44  Ala.  101;  Express  Co. 
V  Bank  of  Tupelo.  108  Ala.  517, 
18  So.  Rep.  664;  Railway  Co.  v. 
Steele,  6  Ind.  App.  183,  33  N.  E. 
Rep.  236;  Richardson  v.  The  Rail- 
way, 62  Mo.  App.  1;  Popham  v. 
Barnard,  77  Mo.  App.  619;  Oster- 
houdt  V.  The  Railway,  62  N.  Y. 
Supp.  134,  47  App.  Div.  146;  Jen- 
nings r.  The  Railway  Co.,  127 
N.  Y.  Supp.  438,  28  N.  E.  Rep.  394; 
Dixie  Cigar  Co.  v.  Express  Co.,  120 
N.  Car.  348,  27  S.  E.  Rep.  73,  58 


472 


THE  LAW   OF   CARRIERS. 


[§  443. 


the  contract  were  to  provide  that  notice  of  the  claim  should  be 
presented  within  a  certain  time  to  some  officer  or  agent  nearest 
the  point  of  destination,  and  it  were  shown  that  the  officer  or 
agent  was  at  such  a  distance  from  that  point,  or  was  so  other- 
wise inaccessible  that  the  owner  in  the  exercise  of  reasonable 
diligence  could  not  have  presented  the  notice  within  the  time 
stated,  the  condition  would  be  unreasonable  and  would  not 
avail  the  carrier.^  In  determining  whether  the  time  within 
which  the  notice  of  claim  must  be  presented  is  reasonable,  re- 
Am.  St.  Rep.  795;  Memphis,  etc. 
R.  Co.  V.  Holloway,  9  Baxt.  188; 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Temple,  47  Kan. 
7,  27  Pac.  Rep.  98,  13  L.  R.  A. 
362;  Goggin  v.  Railway  Co.,  12 
Kan.  416;  Missouri,  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Paine,  1  Tex.  Civ.  App.  621,  21  S. 
W.  Rep.  78;  Railway  Co.  v.  Great- 
house,  82  Tex.  104,  17  S.  W.  Rep. 
834;   Pecos,  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Evans, 

etc.  Co.,  Tex.  Civ.  App.  , 

93,  S.  W.  Rep.  1024. 

A  stipulation  in  a  bill  of  lading 
which  requires  a  written  claim  for 
loss  or  damage  to  be  made  with- 
in 30  days  after  the  loss  or  dam- 
age occurs,  where  the  entire  tran- 
sit may  reasonably  consume  the 
whole  of  such  time,  is  unreason- 
able and  void.  Central,  etc.  R.  Co. 
V.   Soper,   supra. 

But  the  fact  that  the  shipper 
gives  notice  of  his  claim  as  soon 
as  he  learns  of  the  injury  will  not 
excuse  him  for  failure  to  give  it 
within  the  time  stated  where  he 
made  no  effort,  after  the  shipment 
arrived,  to  learn  of  its  condition. 

Freeman  v.  Railway  Co.,  Mo. 

App.  ,  93  S.  W.  Rep.  302. 

2.  Engesether  v.  The  Railway, 
65  Minn.  168,  68  N.  W.  Rep.  4; 
Missouri,  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Paine,  1 
Tex.  Civ.  App.  621,  21  S.  W.  Rep. 
78.    Where  a  stipulation  in  a  stock 


shipping  contract  provided  that 
the  owner  of  the  stock,  as  a  condi- 
tion to  his  right  to  hold  the  car- 
rier liable  for  loss  or  damage  to 
the  stock,  should  give  notice  in 
writing  of  his  claim  to  the  near- 
est station  agent  or  some  officer 
of  the  carrier  before  the  stock  was 
moved  from  the  place  of  destina- 
tion and  before  it  was  mingled 
with  other  stock,  and  it  was 
shown  that  the  point  to  which  the 
stock  was  to  be  transported  was 
several  hundred  miles  beyond  the 
carrier's  line  of  railroad,  and  that 
at  such  place  there  was  no  officer 
or  agent  upon  whom  the  service  of 
notice  could  be  had,  it  was  held 
that  the  contract  was  unreasonable 
and  therefore  void.  Carpenter  r. 
The  Railway,  67  Minn.  188,  69  N. 
W.  Rep.  720. 

A  requirement  that  notice  in 
writing  shall  be  given  to  an  initial 
carrier  before  stock,  which  has 
passed  over  several  connecting 
lines,  has  been  removed  from  des- 
tination, is  unreasonable.  Coles  i\ 
Railroad  Co.,  41  111.  App.  607.  But 
•since  a  carrier,  in  undertaking  by 
contract  to  carry  over  several  con- 
necting routes  to  destination, 
adopts  the  routes  of  such  connect- 
ing carriers  as  its  own,  notice 
served  upon  an  agent  of  the  final 


§444. 


CONTRACTS   LIMITING   LIABILITY. 


473 


gard  must  be  had  to  the  time  which  might  ordinarily  be  expected 
to  elapse  in  the  usual  course  of  business  before  the  owner,  by  the 
exercise  of  reasonable  diligence,  could  be  in  a  position  'to  pre- 
sent the  notice  to  the  carrier  ;3  and  since  the  question  must  de- 
pend upon  the  circumstances  of  the  individual  case,  it  is  ordi- 
narily one  of  fact  for  the  jury .4  So  if  the  injury  to  the  goods 
be  such  that  the  oAvner  in  the  exercise  of  reasonable  diligence 
could  not  have  discovered  its  extent  until  after  the  time  foi- 
presenting  notice  of  his  claim  had  expired,  the  condition  would 
be  unreasonable  and  a  notice  presented  within  such  reasonable 
time  thereafter  as  would  enable  him  to  ascertain  the  extent  of 
his  loss  would  be  a  substantial  and  sufficient  compliance  with 
the  condition.^ 

Sec.  444.  Same  subject— Carrier  may  waive  benefit  of  such 
conditions.— A  condition  requiring  that  notice  of  claim  must 
be  presented  within  a  certain  time,  being  intended  for  the  bene- 


carrier  will  be  sufficient.  Railway 
Co.  V.  Koch,  47  Kan.  753,  28  Pac. 
Rep.    1013. 

3.  Cox  V.  Railroad  Co.,  170  Mass. 
129,  49  N.  E.  Rep.  97. 

4.  International,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Garrett,  5  Tex.  Civ.  App.  540,  24 
S.  W.  Rep.  354;  Texas,  etc.  Ry.  Co. 
V.  Barber,  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  30  S. 
W.  Rep.  500;  Railway  Co.  r.  Ayers, 
63  Ark.  331,  38  S.  W.  Rep.  515. 

5.  Railway  Co.  v.  Steele,  6  Ind. 
App.  183,  33  N.  E.  Rep.  236;  Pop- 
ham  V.  Barnard,  77  Mo.  App.  619; 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Temple,  47  Kan. 
7,  27  Pac.  Rep.  98,  13  L.  R.  A.  362. 
Failure  to  give  notice  of  claim 
within  the  time  agreed  upon  will 
not  prevent  a  recovery  where  the 
injuries  sustained  were  such  that 
they  could  not  readily  have  been 
seen  and  were  not  actually  discov- 
ered until  the  time  for  giving  no- 
tice had  passed.  Oxley  v.  The 
Railroad,  65  Mo.  629;  Rice  v.  The 
Railway,  63  Mo.  314;   Jennings  v. 


The  Railway,  127  N.  Y.  438,  28  N. 
E.  Rep.  394. 

Since  the  object  of  a  stipulation 
requiring  notice  of  claim  within  a 
certain  time  is  to  prevent  fraud 
on  the  carrier,  if  the  injury  be 
such  that  with  ordinary  diligence 
its  extent  cannot  be  discovered 
within  the  period  named,  a  notice 
of  claim  within  such  reasonably 
short  time  thereafter  as  will  ef- 
fectually secure  the  carrier 
against  fraud  will  be  a  sufficient 
compliance  with  the  stipulation. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Sanders,  135  Ala. 
504,   33   So.  Rep.  482. 

If  the  carrier  requires  notice  of 
claim  to  be  given  within  an  un- 
reasonably short  time,  the  shipper 
is  not  relieved  from  giving  any  no- 
tice whatever.  He  must  still  give 
notice  of  his  claim  within  a  rea- 
sonable time;  that  is,  he  must  at 
least  comply  with  the  requirement 
to  the  extent  that  he  reasonably 
can.     Osterhoudt  v.  The  Railway, 


474 


THE  LAW  OF   CARRIERS. 


5  444. 


fit  of  the  carrier,  he  may,  either  expressly  or  by  conduct  incon- 
sistent with  an  intent  to  rely  upon  it,  waive  the  benefit  of  the 
condition.  Thus  if  the  carrier  by  his  conduct  should  induce  the 
owner  to  delay  'the  presentment  of  the  notice  until  after  the 
time  fixed  for  presenting  it  had  expired,  he  would  not  be  per- 
mitted to  escape  liability  on  the  ground  that  the  notice  of  claim 
was  not  presented  within  the  stipulated  time.^    And  if  the  agent 


62  N.  Y.  Supp.  134,  47  App.  Div. 
146. 

6.  Bennett  v.  Express  Co.,  12 
Oreg.  49;  Merrill  v.  Express  Co., 
62  N.  H.  514;  Railway  Co.  v. 
Trawick,  80  Tex.  270,  15  S.  W. 
Rep.  568;  Railway  Co.  v.  Ball,  80 
Tex.  602,  16  S.  W.  Rep.  441;  Rail- 
way Co.  V.  Jacobs,  70  Ark.  401,  68 
S.  W.  Rep.  248;  Soper  v.  Railroad 
Co.,  113  Mich.  443,  71  N.  W.  Rep. 
853;  Railroad  Co.  v-  Grimes,  71  111. 
App.  397;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Johnson, 
114  111.  App.  545;  Railway  Co.  v. 
Heath,  22  Ind.  App.  47,  53  N.  E. 
Rep.  198;  Frankfurt  v.  Weir,  83 
N.  Y.  Supp.  112,  40  Misc.  683;  Fal- 
kenberg  v.  The  Railroad,  59  N.  Y. 
Supp.  44,  28  Misc.  165;  Hess  v. 
The  Railway  Co.,  40  Mo.  App.  202; 
Harned  v.  The  Railway,  51  Mo. 
App.  482;  Wood  v.  The  Railway, 
118  N.  Car.  1056,  24  S.  E.  Rep. 
704;  United  States  Watch  Case 
Co.  V.  Express  Co.,  120  N.  Car.  351, 
27  S.  E.  Rep.  74;  Hinkle  v.  The 
Railway  Co.,  126  N.  Car.  932,  36 
S.  E.  Rep  348,  78  Am.  St.  Rep. 
685;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Bogard,  78 
Miss.  11,  27  So.  Rep.  879;  Rail- 
road Co.  V.  Lazarus,  13  Ky.  Law 
Rep.  461. 

Where  it  is  shown  that  the 
proper  agents  of  the  carrier  had 
verbal  notice  of  loss,  and  that  they 
acted  upon  it  without  demanding 
any  written  notice,  promptly  mak- 
ing all   the   investigation   desired. 


a  requirement  that  written  notice 
of  loss  or  damage  should  be  given 
within  a  certain  time  will  be 
deemed  to  have  been  waived.  Rail- 
way Co.  V.  Jacobs,  70  Ark.  401, 
68   S.  W.  Rep.  248. 

Where  the  carrier  fails  to  al- 
lege in  its  answer  the  existence  of 
a  condition  requiring  notice  of 
claim  within  a  certain  time,  or 
the  manner  in  which  the  shipper 
has  failed  to  comply  with  it,  but 
goes  to  trial  on  an  answer  setting 
up  other  defenses,  it  will  be 
deemed  to  have  abandoned  or 
waived  the  condition  as  a  defense. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Pace,  69  Ark.  256, 
63  S.  W.  Rep.  62,  citing  Hutchin- 
son on  Carr. 

But  the  fact  that  the  carrier  re- 
linquishes his  right  to  insist  upon 
certain  exemptions  from  his  com- 
mon law  liability  by  virtue  of  a 
contract  previously  made  will  not 
relieve  the  shipper  from  present- 
ing a  written  claim  for  loss  where 
the  contract  of  shipment  so  pro- 
vides. Because  the  carrier  may 
waive  the  benefit  of  certain  pro- 
visions exempting  him  from  lia- 
bility in  case  of  loss,  he  does  not 
thereby  waive  the  right  to  demand 
the  performance  of  a  condition  on 
the  part  of  the  shipper  which  is 
to  be  performed  after  the  deliv- 
ery of  the  goods.  Pavitt  v.  The 
Railroad,  153  Penn.  St.  302,  25 
Atl.  Rep.  1107.    So  the  failure  of 


§  444.]  CONTRACTS  LIMITING  LIABILITY.  475 

of  the  carrier  should  induce  the  owner  to  go  to  the  trouble  and 
expense  of  making  out  a  notice  of  his  claim,  and  should  lead 
him  to  believe  that  its  presentment  would  not  be  insisted  upon 
within  the  stipulated  time,  the  carrier  would  be  estopped  from 
availing  himself  of  the  owner's  failure  to  present  it  within  such 
time  as  a  defense."^  So  if  the  carrier  should  accept  a  verbal 
notice  without  objection,  and  should  treat  the  claim  as  pending, 
his  conduct  would  amount  to  a  waiver  of  a  condition  that  the 
notice  should  be  in  writing.^  If  the  notice  be  defective  in  mat- 
ter of  form,  as,  for  instance,  if  there  were  no  affidavit  attached 
as  was  required  by  the  contract,  and  the  carrier  should  accept 
it  and  enter  into  negotiations  for  a  settlement,  his  conduct  would 
constitute  a  waiver  of  the  requirement.^  And  it  is  held  that  a 
failure  by  the  carrier  to  insert  in  the  contract  such  information 
as  is  necessary  to  enable  the  owner  to  comply  with  its  pro- 
visions in  respect  to  giving  notice  will  be  equivalent  to  a  waiver 
of  the  condition.io  ^^^  where,  beside  a  stipulation  requiring 
that  notice  of  any  claim  shall  be  given  the  carrier  within  a  cer- 
tain time,  it  is  provided  that  no  agent  of  the  carrier  has  any 
authority  to  waive  or  modify  any  of  the  provisions  of  the  con- 
tract, conduct  by  an  agent  which  would  ordinarily  amount  to  a 
waiver  will  not  be  binding  on  the  carrier.^^ 

the  agents  of  a  steamship  line  td  Supp.  112,  40  Misc.  683;  Railroad 

insist    upon    notice    of    claim    on  Co.   v.   Grimes,    71    111.    App.   397; 

prior    occasions    will    amount    tu  Railway  Co.  v.  Jacobs,  70  Ark.  401, 

nothing  on  the  question  of  waiver  68  S.  W.  Rep.  248.  See  also,  Isham 

in    a    later    case.     The    Westmin-  v.  Erie  R.  Co.,  98  N.  Y.  Supp.  G09. 

ster,  127  Fed.  680,  62  C.  C.  A.  406.  9.  Wabash,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Brown, 

Where    the    carrier    receives    a  152    111.    484,    39    N.    E.   Rep.    273, 

claim   after  the   time   limited   for  affirming   51   111.   App.   656;    Soper 

presentment  has  expired,  treats  it  v.   The   Railroad,    113    Mich.    443, 

as  pending  and  then  rejects  it  on  71   N.   W.  Rep.   853;    Summers   v. 

other  grounds,  he  will  be  deemed     The  Railroad,  Mo.  App.  , 

to  have  waived  his  right  to  notice  79   S.  W.  Rep.  481;    Ingwersen  r. 

within   the   time   limited.     McFall    Railway  Co.,  Mo.  App.  , 

V.    Railroad    Co.,   Mo.   App.;  92  S.  W.  Rep.  357. 

,  94  S.  W.  Rep.  570.  10.  Railway  Co.  v.  Reeves.  97  Va. 

7.  Hudson   v.    The    Railroad,   92  284,  33  S.  E.  Rep.  606.   16  Am.  & 
Iowa,  231;    60  N.  W.  Rep.  608,  54  Eng.  R.  Cas.    (N.  S.)   166. 

Am.  St.  Rep.  550.  11-  Railway  Co.  v.  Kirkham,  63 

8.  Frankfurt  v.  Weir,  83  N.  Y.     Kan.  255,  65  Pac.  Rep.  261. 


476  THE  LAW   OF    CARRIERS.  [§445. 

Since  stipulations  of  this  character  are  intended  to  secure  the 
carrier  against  fraud  and  imposition,  it  is  held  that  if  the  car- 
rier is  aware  of  the  condition  of  the  goods  before  they  are 
removed  from  the  place  of  destination,  and  is  afforded  ample 
opportunity  to  examine  and  inspect  them,  a  notice  of  claim 
presented  to  him  shortly  after  the  goods  are  removed  will  be  a 
substantial  compliance  with  a  condition  requiring  the  owner  to 
present  a  notice  of  his  claim  before  the  goods  are  removed  from 
the  place  of  delivery.^^ 

Sec.  445.  Same  subject — How  where  damage  has  resulted 
from  carrier's  delay — Effect  of  failure  to  make  delivery — Con- 
version.— Since  the  purpose  of  these  conditions  is  to  afford 
the  carrier  a  prompt  opportunity  to  investigate  the  nature  and 
extent  of  an  alleged  injury  to  the  goods,  they  will  be  construed 
as  referring  only  to  claims  for  injuries  to  the  goods  themselves 
and  not  to  claims  for  damages  arising  from  a  decline  in  their 
market  value  due  to  a  delay  by  the  carrier  in  sending  them  for- 
ward.^ ^  Nor  can  the  carrier  insist  on  the  performance  of  a  con- 
dition that  notice  of  claim  shall  be  presented  within  a  certain 
time  after  the  goods  have  arrived  at  their  destination  where  they 
have  never  in  fact  arrived  at  such  point.^^     So  where  the  car- 

12.  Railroad  Co.  v.  Temple,  47  Ward  v.  The  Railway,  158  Mo.  226, 
Kan.  7,  27  Pac.  Rep.  98,  13  L.  R.     58  S.  W.  Rep.   28. 

A.  362.  A    condition    that    a    claim    for 

13.  Kramer  v.  The  Railway,  101  damages  should  be  filed  within  20 
Iowa  178,  70  N.  W.  Rep.  119;  Loeb  days   after   delivery,   or   after  the 

V.    The    Railway,    Mo.    App.  time  for  delivery,  cannot  be  plead- 

,  85  S.  W.  Rep.  118;   Leonard  ed   as  a  defense  to  an  action  for 

V.  The  Railway,  54  Mo.  App.  293;  misdelivery  where  instead  of  in- 
s.  c.  57  Mo.  App.  366;  Louisville,  forming  the  consignee  that  deliv- 
etc.  R.  Co.  V.  Bell,  13  Ky.  Law  Rep.  ery  had  been  made,  the  carrier 
393;  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  falsely  asserted  that  he  still  con- 
Smith,  14  Ky.  Law  Rep.  814.  tinned     to     hold     the     goods     and 

14.  A  condition  that  a  claim  for  promised  a  speedy  return.  Marrus 
damages  must  be  made  within  36  v.  Steamboat  Co.,  62  N.  Y.  Supp. 
hours  after  the  consignee  has  been  474,  30  Misc.  Rep.  421,  reversing, 
notified     of    the    arrival     of    the  60  N.  Y.  Supp.  994. 

freight  at  the  place  of  delivery  is  Where  the  shipper  of  a  live  ani- 
nullified  by  the  failure  of  the  mal  contracted  to  give  the  carrier 
goods  to  arrive  at  all  at  such  place,     notice  in  writing  of  his  claim  in 


§446.  J  CONTRACTS  LIMITING  LIABILITY.  477 

rier  has  been  guilty  of  a  conversion  of  the  goods,  he  cannot 
escape  liability  on  the  ground  that  the  owner  failed  to  present 
a  notice  of  his  claim  according  to  the  contract  of  shipment. '•' 

Sec.  446.  Same  subject — How  where  carrier  is  holding  goods 
in  the  capacity  of  a  warehouseman.— Where  the  carrier  is 
rightfully  retaining  possession  of  the  goods  in  the  capacity  of 
a  warehouseman,  as  where  he  is  holding  them  at  their  destina- 
tion for  the  purpose  of  securing  his  freight  charges,  he  may  still 
claim  the  protection  of  a  stipulation  in  the  contract  of  shipment 
that  no  claim  for  loss  or  damage  shall  be  valid  unless  presented 
in  writing  within  a  limited  time.  The  retention  of  the  goods  in 
the  capacity  of  a  warehouseman  is  an  incident  to  the  contract 
for  their  transportation,  and  the  stipulation  will  not  be  deemed 
inapplicable  in  respect  to  the  ordinary  and  incidental  duties  of 
a  warehouseman  which  may  rest  upon  him  when  his  duties  as 
a  carrier  have  ceased.^  ^ 

Sec.  447.  Same  subject — Burden  of  proof. — It  has  been  held 
that  a  stipulation  in  the  contract  of  shipment  requiring  the 
owner  of  the  goods  to  present  a  notice  of  his  claim  to  the  carrier 
within  a  specified  time  after  the  goods  have  arrived  at  their 
destination  is  in  the  nature  of  a  condition  precedent  to  the 

case   of  damage  or  injury  to  the  15.  Merchants,    etc.    Transporta- 

animal  within  five  days  after  the     tion  Co.  v.  Moore  &  Co.,  Ga. 

loss   or   injury    occurred,    and   the     ,  52  S.  E.  Rep.  802;   Railway 

animal,  after  it  was  injured,  was  Co.  v.  Fifth  Natl.  Bank,  26  Ind. 
not  taken  to  destination  where  App.  600,  59  N.  E.  Rep.  43;  Rail- 
timely  notice  might  have  been  way  Co.  v.  Potts  &  Co.,  33  Ind. 
given,  but  was  hauled  by  the  car-  App.  564,  71  N.  B.  Rep.  685.  A 
rier,  without  the  shipper's  knowl-  stipulation  limiting  the  time  for 
edge  or  direction,  to  a  point  be-  presentation  of  claims  for  loss  or 
yond  his  reach  and  there  killed,  it  injury  does  not  apply  to  a  case 
was  held  that  to  require  the  ship-  where  an  express  company  is 
per  to  give  notice  of  his  claim  charged  with  a  failure  to  account 
within  the  five  days  would  be  un-  for  money  collected  by  it.  Bard- 
reasonable  and  unjust  and  that  he  well  v.  Express  Co.,  35  Minn.  344. 
was  not  bound  by  the  condition.  16.  Armstrong  r.  The  Railway. 
Richardson  v.  The  Railway,  149  53  Minn.  183,  54  N.  W.  Rep.  1059. 
Mo.  311,  50  S.  W.  Rep.  782,  13  Am. 
&  Eng.  R.  Cas.  (N.  S.)  170. 


478  THE  LAW   OP   CARRIERS.  [§448. 

owner's  right  to  enforce  a  recovery,  and  that  he  must  show  in 
the  first  instance  that  he  has  complied  with  the  condition,  or 
that  the  circumstances  were  such  that  to  have  complied  with  it 
would  have  required  him  to  do  an  unreasonable  thing.^'^  The 
weight  of  authority,  however,  sustains  the  view  that  such  a 
stipulation  is  more  in  the  nature  of  a  limitation  upon  the  own- 
er's right  to  a  recovery,  and  that  the  burden  of  proof  is  accord- 
ingly on  the  carrier  to  show  that  the  limitation  was  reasonable 
and  that  the  owner  omitted  to  present  the  notice  in  proper  form 
or  within  the  time  stated.^  ^  But  in  the  case  of  Baxter  v.  The 
Railroad,^ ^  it  was  said:  "It  would  seem  that  the  apparent  con- 
flict between  decisions  bearing  on  the  question  may  be  recon- 
ciled upon  the  just  construction  that,  when  the  shipper  seeks 
to  avoid  such  a  condition,  as  applied  to  a  shipment  over  the 
carrier's  own  line,  the  burden  is  upon  him  to  prove  such  facts 
and  circumstances  as  render  compliance  with  its  terms  imprac- 
ticable or  unreasonable;  but  that,  when  the  carrier  seeks  to 
apply  it  to  a  shipment  terminating  on  a  connecting  line,  it  must 
show  that  it  had  an  officer  or  station  agent  at  or  near  the  place 
of  delivery  upon  whom  the  required  notice  could  have  been 
served,  and  who  could,  by  reasonable  diligence  on  the  part  of 
the  consignee,  have  been  ascertained  and  found. ' ' 

Sec.  448.  Carrier  may  limit  time  within  which  suit  shall 
be  commenced. — The  carrier  may,  by  an  agreement  with  the 
owner  of  the  goods,  provide  that,  in  case  of  loss  or  damage,  suit 

17.  Kalina  &  Cizek  v.  Railroad  Tex.  104,  17  S.  W.  Rep.  834;  Mis- 
Co.,  69  Kan.  172,  76  Pac.  Rep.  438.     souri,  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Paine,  1  Tex. 

The  burden  rests  upon  the  ship-  Civ.  App.   621,  21   S.  W.  Rep.  ?8; 

per  to  prove  such  notice  when  the     Hat«h  v.  Railway  Co., N.  Dak. 

failure  to  give  it  is  set  up  as  a     ,   107  N.  W.  Rep.  1087,  citing 

defense.      The    Westminster,     127  Kahnweiler    v.    Ins.    Co.,    67    Fed. 

Fed.    680,    62    C.    C.    A.    406;    s.    c.  483,    14    C.    C.    A.    485;    Malloy    v. 

116   Fed.   123.  Railway   Co.,    109   Wis.   29,   85   N. 

18.  Cox  V.  Railroad  Co.,  170  W.  Rep.  130;  Gatzow  v.  Buening, 
Mass.  129,  49  N.  E.  Rep.  97;  Rail-  106  Wis.  1,  81  N.  W.  Rep.  1003, 
way  Co.  V.  Ayers,  63  Ark.  331,  49  L.  R.  A,  475,  80  Am.  St.  Rep.  1. 
38  S.  W.  Rep.  515;  Railway  Co.  v.  19.  165  111.  78,  45  N.  E.  Rep. 
Pace,  69  Ark.  256,  63  S.  W.  Rep.  1003,  reversing  64  III.  App.  130. 
62;  Railway  Co.  v.  Greathouse,  82 


§449. 


CONTRACTS  LIMITING   LIABILITY, 


479 


shall  be  commenced  within  a  limited  time,  and,  if  the  limitation 
is  reasonable,  it  will  be  conclusive  on  the  owner  of  the  goods 
although  it  will  require  him  to  file  his  suit  before  the  period 
fixed  by  the  statute  of  limitations  has  expired.-o  But  in  Ken- 
tucky where  common  carriers  are  forbidden  to  contract  against 
their  liability  as  it  exists  at  the  common  law,  a  stipulation  lim- 
iting the  time  within  which  suit  should  be  commenced  was  held 
to  be  contrary  to  the  statute  of  limitations  and  therefore  void.-'' 
Sec.  449.  (§  259a.)  Where  liability  is  limited  by  contract, 
burden  of  proof  is  upon  the  carrier  to  show  himself  within 
the  exception.— Where  under  the  contract  of  shipment  the 
carrier  is  exempted  from  liability  for  losses  arising  from  cer- 
tain designated  causes,  the  burden  of  proving  that  a  loss  which 
has  occurred  falls  within  the  exceptions  of  the  contract  rests 
upon  the  earrier.22    But  where  the  loss  occurs  from  such  a  cause 


20.  Gulf,  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Gate- 
wood,  79  Tex.  89;  Texas,  etc.  Ry. 
Co.  V.  Hawkins,  (Tex.  Civ.  App.) 
30  S.  W.  Rep.  1113;  Texas,  etc. 
Ry.  Co.  V.  Klepper,  5  Tex.  Ct.  Rep. 
533,  24  S.  W.  Rep.  567;  Railway  v. 
Godair  Commission  Co.,  (Tex.  Civ. 
App.)  87  S.  W.  Rep.  871;  North 
British  &  Mercantile  Insurance  Co. 
V.  The  Railroad,  40  N.  Y.  Supp. 
1113;  9  App.  Div.  4;  affirmed  with- 
out opinion,  158  N.  Y.  726,  53  N. 
E.  Rep.  1128;  Central,  etc.  R.  Co. 
V.  Soper,  59  Fed.  879,  8  C.  C.  A. 
341,  21  U.  S.  App.  24.  Whether  or 
not  the  time  limited  within  which 
suit  must  be  filed  is  reasonable  is 
usually  a  question  for  the  jury. 
Jlailway  Co.  v.  Hume,  87  Tex.  211, 
27  S.  W.  Rep.  110;  Gulf,  etc.  Ry. 
Co.  V.  Clarke,  5  Tex.  Civ.  App. 
547,  24  S.  W.  Rep.  355.  If  the 
carrier's  conduct  is  such  as  to  rea- 
sonably induce  the  shipper  to  be- 
lieve that  his  claim  for  damages 
will  be  paid  without  suit,  and  for 
such    reason   suit   is   not   brought 


within  the  time  stipulated,  the 
shipper  will  not  be  precluded  from 
the  right  to  maintain  an  action 
after  the  expiration  of  the  stipu- 
lated time.  Railway  Co.  v.  Sileg- 
man,  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  23  S.  W. 
Rep.   298. 

21.  Express  Co.  v.  Walker,  26 
Ky.  Law  Rep.  1025,  83  S.  W.  Rep. 
106. 

22.  See  post.  §  13.-.3,  where  the 
subject  is  more  fully  treated.  See 
also,  Missouri,  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Mfg. 
Co.,  79  Tex.  26,  14  S.  W.  Rep. 
785;  Ryan  v.  Railway  Co.,  65  Tex. 
15;  Steele  v.  Townsend,  37  Ala. 
247;  Alabama,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Little, 
71  Ala.  611;  Park  v.  Preston,  108 
N.  Y.  434;  Brown  v.  Express  Co., 
15  W.  Va.  812;  Hull  v.  Railway 
Co.,  41  Minn.  510;  Bonfiglio  v.  The 
Railway,  125  Mich.  476,  84  N.  W. 
Rep.  772;  Schaeffer  v.  The  Rail- 
road, 168  Penn.  St.  209.  31  Atl. 
Rep.  1088,  47  Am.  St.  Rep.  884; 
Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Bourne, 
15  Ky.  Law  Rep.  445;   Mitchell  v. 


480 


THE  LAW   OF   CARRIERS. 


[§  450. 


that  the  law  will  not  presume  negiigeuee,  or  where  it  happens 
from  an  excepted  cause,  as  from  fire,  the  burden  of  proving 
that  the  carrier  was  guilty  of  negligence  and  that  such  negli- 
gence contributed  to  the  loss  is,  by  the  weight  of  authority,  upon 
the  plaintiff.23 

Sec.  450.  (§260.)  Carrier  cannot  provide  by  contract 
against  liability  for  negligence. — The  question  whether  the 
carrier  can  exempt  himself  from  liability  for  losses  occurring 
from  the  negligence  of  himself  or  his  servants  or  employees  is 
one  upon  which  the  authorities  differ.  By  the  English  law,  as  we 
have  seen,  he  possesses  the  unlimited  power  to  do  so  under  the 
several  acts  in  relation  to  carriers,  and  the  construction  which 
has  been  given  them  by  the  English  courts.     In  this  country. 


The  Railroad,  124  N.  Car.  236,  32 
S  E.  Rep.  671,  44  L.  R.  A.  515; 
Parker  v.  The  Railroad,  133  N. 
Car.  335,  45  S.  E.  Rep.  658,  63  L. 
R.  A.  827;  Johnstone  v.  The  Rail- 
road, 39  S.  Car.  55,  17  S.  E.  Rep. 
512;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Lawler,  40 
Neb.  356,  58  N.  W.  Rep.  968;  Ka- 
lina  &  Cizek  v.  The  Railroad,  69 
Kan.  172,  76  Pac.  Rep.  438,  citing 
Hutchinson  on  Carr;  Railway  Co. 
V  Grocery  Co.,  55  Kan.  525,  40 
Pac.  Rep.  899;  Normile  v.  Railroad 
Co.,  41  Or.  177,  69  Pac.  Rep.  928; 
Steamship  Co.  v.  Burrows,  36  Fla. 
121,  18  So.  Rep.  349;  The  Guj  C. 
Goss,  53  Fed.  826;  The  Beeche 
Dene,  55  Fed.  525,  5  C.  C.  A.  207, 
2  U.  S.  App.  582;  Insurance  Co.  r. 
Transportation  Co.,  97  Fed.  653; 
Argo  Steamship  Co.  v.  Seago,  101 
Fed.  999,  42  C.  C.  A.  128;  Doherr 
V.  Houston,  128  Fed.  594,  64  C.  C. 
A.  102;  The  Patria,  132  Fed.  971, 
68  C.  C.  A.  397;  Jenkins  v.  Rail- 
way Co.,  S.   Car.  ,   53   S. 

E.    Rep.    480;    McFall   v.   Railway 

Co.,  Mo.  App.  ,  94  S.  W. 

Rep.    570. 


23.  See  post,  §  1355.  See  also, 
Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Manches- 
ter Mills,  88  Tenn.  653;  Little 
Rock,  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Talbot,  39 
Ark.  523;  Transportation  Co.  v. 
Downer,  11  Wall.  133;  Wertheimer 
r.  Railroad  Co.,  17  Blatchf.  421; 
The  Glendarroch,  Johnson  &  Co.  v. 
Wainwright  Bros.  &  Co.,  L.  R. 
(1894)  P.  226,  63  L.  J.  P.  89;  Rail- 
road Co.  r.  Sherwood,  132  Ind.  129, 

31  N.  E.  Rep.  781,  32  Am.  St.  Rep. 
239,  17  L.  R.  A.  339,  citing  Hutch- 
inson on  Carr;  Indianapolis,  etc. 
Ry.  Co.  V.  Forsythe,  4  Ind.  App. 
326,  29  N.  E.  Rep.  1138;  Morse  v. 
The  Railway,  97  Me.  77,  53  Atl. 
Rep.  874;  Van  Akin  v.  The  Rail- 
road, 87  N.  Y.  Supp.  871,  92  App. 
Div.  23;  Thyll  v.  The  Railroad,  87 
N.  Y.  Supp.  345,  92  App.  Div.  513; 
The  Henry  B.  Hyde,  90  Fed.   115, 

32  C.  C.  A.  534,  61  U.  S.  App.  147; 
The  Lennox,  90  Fed.  308;  Crowell 
r.  Union  Oil  Co.,  107  Fed.  302,  46 
C.  C.  A.  296;  The  Isaac  Reed,  82 
Fed.  566;  The  Timor,  67  Fed.  356, 
14  C.  C.  A.  412,  35  U.  S.  App.  278; 
The  Flintshire,  69  Fed.  471. 


§  450.]  CONTRACTS  LIMITING  LIABILITY.  481 

since  it  has  been  admitted  that  he  might  contract  for  a  limited 
liability,  various  opinions  have  been  entertained  by  the  differ- 
ent courts  upon  the  question  whether,  conceding  this  general 
right,  an  exception  ought  not,  upon  grounds  of  public  policy  as 
well  as  upon  legal  precedent,  to  be  made,  of  the  power  to  enter 
into  contracts  to  screen  himself  from  the  consequences  of  negli- 
gence in  the  performance  of  his  duties.  Our  state  courts  are 
divided  upon  this  subject,  as  we  have  seen  them  to  be  upon  sev- 
eral other  questions  relating  to  the  rights  and  duties  of  carriers ; 
and  this  difference  exists  not  only  in  the  unqualified  concession 
of  the  power  by  some  of  them  and  its  unqualified  denial  by 
others,  but  amongst  those  which  concede  the  power,  some  at- 
tempt to  put  a  limit  upon  it  by  distinguishing  between  the  dif- 
ferent degrees  of  negligence,  allowing  it  only  as  to  slight  or  or- 
dinary negligence,  but  not  as  to  that  of  a  grosser  character.  But 
the  great  weight  of  authority  in  this  country  is  in  favor  of  ex- 
cluding it  altogether  as  an  element  of  contract  between  the 
carrier  and  his  employer,  and  of  holding  the  former  to  a  rigid 
responsibility  for  every  degree  of  negligence,  without  the  power 
by  contract  or  in  any  other  mode  to  divest  himself  of  it.^* 

24.  Alabama:  Mobile,  etc.  R.  R.  boat  Co.,  43  Conn.  333. 

V.  Hopkins,  41  Ala.  486;  Montgom-  Delaware:  Finn  v.  The  Railroad, 

ery,  etc.  R.  R.  v.  Edmonds,  41  Ala.  1  Hous.  469. 

667;  Steele  v.  Townsend,  37  Ala.  Georgia:  Berry  v.  Cooper,  28  Ga. 
247;  Southern  Express  Co.  v.  543;  but  see  Cooper  v.  The  Rail- 
Crook,  44  Ala.  468;  South.,  etc.,  road,  110  Ga.  659,  36  S.  E.  Rep. 
R.  R.  V.  Henlein,  52  Ala.  606;  240,  where  a  contract  exempting 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Grant,  99  Ala.  325,  the  carrier  from  liability  for  loss 
13  So.  Rep.  599;  Railroad  Co.  v.  unless  occasioned  by  fraud  or 
Cowherd,  120  Ala.  51,  23  So.  Rep.  gross  negligence  was  held  to  ex- 
793;  Railway  Co.  v.  Jones,  132  Ala.  cuse  the  carrier  if  he  could  show 
437,  31  So.  Rep.  501;  Railroad  Co.  that  he  had  exercised  slight  dili- 
V.  Sanders,  135  Ala.  504,  ,33  So.  gence.  In  the  carriage  of  live  stock 
Rep.  482;  Louisville,  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  the  carrier,  under  the  law  as  con- 
V.  Oden,  80  Ala.   38.  strued    by    the    supreme    court    of 

California:  Pierce  v.   The  Rail-  Georgia,  may  limit  his  liability  to 

road,    120   Cal.    156,   47   Pac.   Rep.  gross  negligence.  Central,  etc.  Ry. 

874,  52  Pac.  Rep.  302,  40  L.  R.  A.     Co.  v.  Hall, Ga.  ,  52  S.  E. 

350,  citing  Hutchinson  on  Carr.  Rep.  679. 

Connecticut:     Camp    v.     Steam-  Indiana:  Michigan,  etc.  R.  R.  Co. 

31 


482 


THE  LAW   OF    CARRIERS. 


[§  451. 


Sec.  451.     (§261.)    Same  subject — The  contrary  view. — The 

other  view  of  the  question  is,  however,  takeu  by  some  of  the 
courts  of  the  highest  authority.  In  some  of  them  the  unlimited 
power  is  allowed  to  carriers  to  contract  for  exemption  from  all 


V.  Heaton,  37  Ind.  448;  Ohio,  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  Selby,  47  Ind.  471; 
Adams  Express  Co.  v.  Harris,  120 
Ind.  73;  Baltimore,  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Ragsdale,  14  Ind.  App.  406,  42  N. 
E.  Rep.  1106;  Anderson  v.  The 
Railway,  26  Ind.  App.  196,  59  N. 
E.  Rep.  396. 

Iowa:  Rose  v.  The  Railroad,  39 
Iowa,  246;  Stewart  v.  Dispatch  Co., 
47  Iowa,  229;  Hudson  v.  The  Rail- 
road, 92  Iowa,  231,  60  N.  W.  Rep. 
608,  54  Am.  St.  Rep.  550. 

Kansas:  Kansas,  etc.  R.  R.  Co. 
V.  Reynolds,  17  Kan.  251. 

Kentucky:  Baughman  v.  The 
Railroad,  94  Ky.  150,  21  S.  W.  Rep. 
757,  citing  Hutchinson  on  Carr; 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Bell,  13  Ky.  Law 
Rep.  393;  OrndorfE  v.  Express  Co., 
3  Bush,  194. 

Louisiana:  Maxwell  v.  The  Rail- 
road, 48  La.  Ann.  385,  19  So.  Rep. 
287. 

Maine:  Fillebrown  v.  The  Rail- 
road, 55  Me.  462;  Sager  v.  The 
Railroad,  31  Me.  228;  Willis  v. 
The  Railroad,  62  Me.  488. 

Massachusetts:  School  District 
V.  The  Railroad,  102  Mass.  552; 
Commonwealth  v.  The  Railroad, 
108  Mass.  7;  Cox  v.  The  Railroad, 
170  Mass.  129,  49  N.  E.  Rep.  97. 

Minnesota:  Jacobus  v.  The  Rail- 
road, 20  Minn.  125;  Shriver  v.  The 
Railroad,  24  Minn.  506. 

Mississippi:  Southern  Express 
Co.  17.  Moon,  39  Miss.  822;  Mobile, 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Weiner,  49  Miss. 
725;  Southern  Express  Co.  v. 
Seide,  67  Miss.  609,  7  So.  Rep.  547; 


Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Moss,  60 
Miss.  1003;  New  Orleans,  etc.  R. 
Co.  V.  Faler,  58  Miss.  911;  Rail- 
road Co.  V.  Bogard,  78  Miss.  11, 
27  So.  Rep.  879;  Southern  Ex.  Co. 

t'.  Marks,  etc.  Co.,  Miss.  , 

40  So.  Rep.  65. 
Missouri:  Read  v.  The  Railroad, 

60  Mo.  199;  Wolf  v.  American  Ex- 
press Co.,  43  Mo.  421;  Ketchum  v. 
American  Merchants'  Union  Ex. 
Co.,  52  Mo.  390;  Snider  v.  Adams 
Ex.  Co.,  63  Mo.  376;  McFadden  v. 
The  Railway,  92  Mo.  343;  Doan  v. 
The  Railway,  38  Mo.  App.  408; 
McCullough  V.  The  Railway,  34  Mo. 
App.  23;  Smith  v.  The  Railway, 
112   Mo.    App.   610,   87   S.   W.   Rep. 

9;  Griffin  v.  Railroad  Co., Mo. 

App.  ,  91  S.  W.  Rep.  1015. 

Montana:  Nelson  v.  The  Rail- 
way, 28  Mont.  297,  72  Pac.  Rep. 
642,  citing  Hutchinson  on  Carr. 

Nebraska:  Atchison,  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Washburn,  5  Neb.  117;  Rail- 
road Co.  V.  Lawler,  40  Neb.  356; 
58  N.  W.  Rep.  968;  Railway  Co. 
V.  Witty,  32  Neb.  275,  49  N.  W. 
Rep.  183,  29  Am.  St.  Rep.  436. 

New  Hampshire:  Hall  i'.  Che- 
ney, 36  N.  H.  26;  Peerless  Mfg.  Co. 
V    Railroad  Co.,  N.  H.  , 

61  Atl.  Rep.  511. 

New  Jersey:  Paul  v.  The  Rail- 
road, 70  N.  J.  Law  442,  57  Atl.  Rep. 
139;  Russell  v.  The  Railroad,  70 
N.  J.  Law  808,  59,  Atl.  Rep.  150, 
67  L.  R.  A.  433. 

North  Carolina:  Swindler  v.  Hil- 
liard,  2  Rich.  286;  Smith  v.  The 
Railroad,  64  N.  Car.  235;   Branch 


451.] 


CONTRACTS  LIMITING  LIABILITY. 


483 


liability  arising  from  or  caused  by  negligence  of  every  degree. 
In  others  they  are  permitted  to  contract  for  exemption  from  lia- 
bility arising  from  negligence  of  every  degree  excepting  that 
which  is  characterized  as  gross  or  willful.    But  all  of  the  courts 


V.  The  Railroad,  SS  N.  Car.  573; 
Gardner  v.  The  Railway,  127  N. 
Car.  293,  37  S.  E.  Rep.  328;  Ever- 
ett V.  The  Railroad,  138  N.  Car. 
68,  50  S.  E.  Rep.  557,  1  L.  R.  A. 
(N.  S.)   985. 

Ohio:  Jones  v.  Vorhies,  10  Ohio, 
145;  Davidson  v.  Graham,  2  Ohio 
St.  131;  Graham  v.  Davis,  4  Ohio 
St.  362;  Wilson  v.  Hamilton,  4 
Ohio  St.  722;  Welsh  v.  The  Rail- 
road, 10  Ohio  St.  65;  Railroad  Co. 
V.  Curran,  19  Ohio  St.  1;  Knowlton 
V.  The  Railroad,  19  Ohio  St.  260; 
Cincinnati,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Pontius, 
19  Ohio  St.  221;  Union  Ex.  Co.  v. 
Graham,  26  Ohio  St.  595;  Railroad 
Co.  V.  Sheppard,  5G  Ohio  St.  69, 
46  N.  E.  Rep.  61,  60  Am.  St.  Rep. 
732. 

Pennsylvania:  Camden,  etc.  R. 
R.  V.  Baldauf,  16  Penn.  St.  67; 
Goldey  r.  The  Railroad,  30  Penn. 
St.  242;  Penn.,  etc.  R.  R.  v.  Hen- 
derson, 51  Penn.  St.  315;  Farnham 
V-  The  Railroad,  55  Penn.  St.  53; 
Empire  T.  Co.  v.  Oil  Co.,  63  Penn. 
St.  14;  Colton  v.  The  Railroad,  67 
Penn.  St.  211;  American  Ex.  Co. 
V.  Bank,  69  Pa.  St.  394;  Pennsyl- 
vania R.  Co.  V.  Weiller,  (Penn. 
St.),  19  Atl.  Rep.  702;  Grogan  r. 
Express  Co.,  114  Penn.  St.  523; 
Buck  V.  The  Railroad,  150  Penn. 
St.  170,  24  Atl.  Rep.  678,  30  Am. 
St.  Rep.  800;  Armstrong  v.  Ex- 
press Co.,  159  Penn.  St.  640,  28 
Atl.  Rep.  448;  Willock  v.  The  Rail- 
road, 166  Penn.  St.  184,  30  Atl. 
Rep.  948,  45  Am.  St.  Rep.  674,  27 
L   R.  A.  228. 


South  Carolina:  Wallingford  v. 
The  Railroad,  26  S.  Car.  :::>s. 

Tennessee:  Coward  r.  The  Rail- 
road, 16  Lea,  225. 

Texas:  Southern  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Maddox,  75  Tex.  300;  Good  r.  The 
Railway,  (Tex.)  11  S.  W.  Rep. 
854;  Railway  Co.  /;.  Williams, 
(Tex.  Civ.  App.)  31  S.  W.  Rep. 
556;  Southern  Pac.  Co.  v.  Phillip- 
son,  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  39  S.  W. 
Rep.  958,  citing  Hutchinson  on 
Carr;  San  Antonio,  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Dolan,  (Tex.  Civ.  App.)  85  S.  W. 
Rep.  302. 

Virginia:  Virginia  &  Tennessee 
R.  R.  V.  Sayers,  26  Gratt.  328; 
Richmond,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Payne, 
86  Va.  481,  10   S.  E.  Rep.  749. 

West  Virginia:  Bosley  v.  The 
Railroad,  54  W.  Va.  563,  46  S.  B. 
Rep.  613,  66  L.  R.  A.  871. 

Wisconsin:  Schaller  i>.  The 
Railway,  97  Wis.  31,  71  N.  W.  Rep. 
1042;  Lamb  r.  The  Railway,  101 
Wis.  138,  76  N.  W.  Rep.  1123; 
Densmore  Commission  Co.  v.  The 
Railway,  loi  Wis.  563,  77  N.  W. 
Rep.  904;  Courteen  v.  Kanawha 
Dispatch,  110  Wis.  610,  86  N.  W. 
Rep.  176,  55  L.  R.  A.  182;  Nevius 
V.  The  Railway,  124  Wis.  313,  103 
N.  W.  Rep.  489. 

In  Willock  r.  The  Railroad,  166 
Penn.  St.  184,  30  Atl.  Rep.  948. 
45  Am.  St.  Rep.  674,  27  L.  R.  A. 
228,  Williams,  J.,  said:  "A  com- 
mon carrier  is  bound  to  employ 
safe  and  sufficient  means  of  car- 
riage, trustworthy  and  competent 
servants,  and  by  himself  and   his 


484 


THE  LAW  OF   CARRIERS. 


[§452. 


agree  that  the  contract  for  such  an  exemption,  to  be  effective, 
must  contain  clear  and  distinct  expressions  for  that  purpose, 
and  mere  general  terms  of  exemption,  such  as  that  the  carrier 
"shall  not  be  held  liable  for  loss  or  damage,"  will  not  be  con- 
strued as  extending  to  loss  or  damage  by  negligence.  In  other 
words,  the  exemption  from  liability  for  negligence  must  be  ex- 
press by  the  use  of  the  word  itself  or  of  something  equivalent; 
and  in  construing  the  terms  of  such  contracts,  where  the  claim 
is  that  such  an  exemption  has  been  agreed  to,  the  words  will  be 
taken  most  strongly  against  the  carrier  whose  language  they  are 
and  who  is  in  an  advantageous  position  for  dictating  the  con- 
tract.25 

Sec.  452.     (§262.)     Same  subject— The  rule  of  the  United 
States  supreme  court. — This  subject  was  before  the  supreme 


agents  to  exercise  an  iLitelligent 
supervision  over  the  system  of 
carriage  which  he  employs.  He  is, 
therefore,  to  all  intents  and  pur- 
poses, an  insurer  against  such  per- 
ils of  transportation  as  it  is  his 
duty  to  provide  against,  and  these 
include  all  the  perils  of  the  jour- 
ney except  such  as  arise  from  the 
act  of  God  or  the  king's  enemies. 
Our  forefathers  brought  this  defi- 
nition of  the  duties  of  a  common 
carrier  with  them  when  they 
came  to  this  continent,  and  its  out- 
lines remain  substantially  the 
same  to  this  day.  Some  limitations 
upon  this  common  law  liability 
have  been  sustained  to  protect  the 
carrier  against  unjust  and  fraud- 
ulent claims  on  the  part  of  cus- 
tomers, but  the  measure  of  care 
due  from  him  to  those  whom  he 
serves  has  not  been  abated  in  the 
slightest  degree.  He  must  not  be 
negligent.  It  is  against  public  pol- 
icy that  he  should  be.  A  stipula- 
tion, therefore,  intended  to  pro- 
tect him   in   the  violation   of  his 


contract  as  a  carrier,  and  in  dis- 
regarding a  settled  principle  of 
public  policy,  will  not  be  sus- 
tained. In  contracts  attempting 
to  limit  the  liability  of  the  car- 
rier, the  carrier  and  the  shipper 
are  the  ostensible  parties,  but  the 
public,  as  represented  by  the 
courts  of  law,  is  the  third  party 
and  may  refuse  its  consent  to  stip- 
ulations on  which  carrier  and  ship- 
per have  agreed.  When  such  a 
contract  comes  before  the  courts, 
the  question  is  not  what  terms  the 
parties  have  incorporated  into 
their  agreement,  but  are  the  terms 
so  incorporated  just  and  reason- 
able so  that  they  ought  on  grounds 
of  public  policy  to  be  enforced.  In 
determining  this  question,  the 
courts  have  been  constrained  to 
apply  common-law  principles  and 
hold  that  to  be  just  or  unjust 
which  was  so  at  common  law." 

25.  Belger  v.  Dinsmore,  51  N.  Y. 
166;  Magnin  v.  Dinsmore,  56  id. 
168;  Steers  v.  The  Steamship  Co., 
57  id.  1;  Westcott  v.  Fargo,  61  id. 


i452.] 


CONTRACTS   LIMITING   LIABILITY. 


48: 


court  of  the  United  States  in  the  case  of  Railroad  Company  c. 
Lockwood.26  The  facts  of  the  ease  were  that  the  plaintiff,  a 
drover,  had  signed  an  agreement  to  take  all  risk  of  injury  to  his 
cattle  and  of  personal  injury  to  himself,  and  had  thereupon  n'- 
ceived  what  was  denominated  a  pass,  one  of  the  conditions 
printed  upon  which  was,  that  it  was  to  be  considered  a  waiver 
of  all  claims  for  injuries  or  damages  received  on  the  train.  lie 
was  injured  whilst  traveling  upon  the  road  under  this  agree- 
ment, and  brought  suit  against  the  railroad  company  to  recover 
for  the  injury  received.  Evidence  being  given  to  show  that  the 
injury  complained  of  was  sustained  in  consequence  of  negligence 
on  the  part  of  the  defendants  or  their  servants,  they  contended 
that  they  were  exempt  by  the  terms  of  their  contract  from  re- 


542;  Blair  v.  The  Railroad,  66  id. 
313;  Western  T.  Co.  v.  Newhall,  24 
111.  466;  Adams  Ex.  Co.  v.  Haynes, 
42  id.  89;  111.  Cent.  R.  R.  v.  Read, 
37  id.  484;  Adams  Ex.  Co.  v.  Stet- 
taners,  61  id.  184;  Bal.  &  O.  R.  R. 
V.  Brady,  32  Md.  333;  Hale  v.  N. 
J.  etc.  Co.,  15  Conn.  539;  Peck  v. 
Weeks,  34  id.  145;  Lawrence  v. 
Railroad,  36  id.  63 ;  Kimball  v.  Rail- 
road, 26  Vt.  247;  Mann  v.  Birch- 
ard,  40  id.  326;  Higgins  v.  The 
Railroad,  28  La.  Ann.  133;  Hawk- 
ins V.  Railroad,  17  Mich.  57;  R. 
R.  V.  Hawkins,  18  id.  427;  Kin- 
ney V.  Railroad,  3  Vroom,  407; 
French  v.  Railroad,  4  Keyes,  108; 
Zimmer  v.  The  Railroad,  137  N. 
Y.  460,  33  N.  E.  Rep.  642,  affirm- 
ing 16  N.  Y.  Supp.  631,  62  Hun, 
619;  Giles  v.  Fargo,  17  N.  Y.  Supp. 
476;  Morris  v.  Wier,  46  N.  Y.  Supp. 
413,  20  Misc.  586;  Security  Trust 
Co.  V.  Express  Co.,  80  N.  Y.  Supp. 
830,  81  App.  Div.  426;  affirmed 
without  opinion  in  178  N.  Y.  620, 
70  N.  E.  Rep.  1109;  Steamship  Co. 
V.  Pilkington,  (Canada)  28  S.  C. 
R.  146;  Isham  v.  Erie  R.  Co.,  98 
N.  Y.   Supp.  609. 


General  words  of  exemption 
from  liability  for  damage  will  not 
operate  to  relieve  the  carrier  from 
the  consequences  of  negligence. 
Rieser  v.  Metropolitan  Express  Co., 
91  N.  Y.  Supp.  170,  45  Misc.  632. 
A  contract  for  the  shipment  of 
live  stock  exempted  the  carrier 
from  liability  excepting  for  fraud 
or  gross  negligence.  It  was  held 
that  such  a  contract  was  neither 
unreasonable  nor  illegal.  Cooper  r. 
The  Railroad,  110  Ga.  659,  36  S.  E. 
Rep.  240. 

A  limitation  in  a  contract  based 
upon  a  reduced  rate  that  baggage 
must  be  at  owner's  risk  against  all 
casualties  is  valid  and  will  be  en- 
forced. Dixon  t\  Navigation  Co., 
(Canada),  18  S.  C.  R.  704.  But  a 
clause  in  a  bill  of  lading  exempt- 
ing the  carrier  from  liability  for 
his  own  negligence  will  not  ex- 
tend to  or  include  cases  of  either 
unjustifiable  destruction  or  con- 
version of  the  goods.  Wilson  r. 
Canadian  Development  Co.,  (Can 
ada),   33   S.   C.  R.   432. 

26.  17  Wall.  357. 


486  THE  LAW  OF   CARRIERS.  [§  452. 

sponsibility  for  all  accidents,  including  those  occurring  from 
negligence,  at  least  from  the  ordinary  negligence  of  their  ser- 
vants, and  requested  the  judge  at  the  trial  to  so  charge.  Their 
request  being  refused^  and  the  verdict  having  gone  against  them, 
they  appealed  to  the  supreme  court,  which,  after  a  most  careful 
examination  of  the  principal  authorities,  both  English  and 
American,  reached  the  conclusions,  as  announced  in  its  opinion : 
First,  that  a  common  carrier  cannot  lawfully  stipulate  for  ex- 
emption from  responsibility  when  such  exemption  is  not  just 
and  reasonable  in  the  eye  of  the  law.  Secondly,  that  it  is  not 
just  and  reasonable  in  the  eye  of  the  law  for  a  common  carrier 
to  stipulate  for  exemption  from  responsibility  for  the  negligence 
of  himself  or  his  servants.  Thirdly,  that  these  rules  apply  both 
to  carriers  of  goods  and  carriers  of  passengers,  and  with  special 
force  to  the  latter.  Fourthly,  that  a  drover  traveling  on  a  pass, 
such  as  was  given  in  this  case,  for  the  purpose  of  taking  care 
of  his  stock  on  the  train,  is  a  passenger  for  hire.  The  rule  laid 
down  in  the  Lockwood  Case  has  been  reviewed  and  fully  ap- 
proved in  later  cases  in  the  same  court.^'^ 

27.  Speaking  of  the  Lockwood  own  or  their  servants'  negligence, 
case  in  the  case  of  Liverpool,  etc.  The  English  Railway  and  Canal 
Steamship  Co.  v.  Phenix  Ins.  Co.,  Traffic  Act  of  1854,  declaring  void 
129  U.  S.  397,  in  which  the  rule  all  notices  and  conditions  made 
of  the  Lockwood  case  was  em-  by  those  classes  of  common  car- 
phatically  approved,  Mr.  Justice  riers,  except  such  as  should  be 
Gray  says:  "The  course  of  reason-  held  by  the  court  or  judge  before 
ing,  supported  by  elaborate  argu-  whom  the  case  should  be  tried  to 
ment  and  illustration,  and  by  co-  be  just  and  reasonable,  was  sub- 
pious  references  to  authorities,  by  stantially  a  return  to  the  rule  of 
which  those  conclusions  were  the  common  law.  The  only  im- 
reached,  may  be  summed  up  as  portant  modification  by  the  con- 
follows:  gress  of  the  United  States  of  the 

"By  the  common  law  of  England  previously    existing    law    on    this 

and    America   before   the    declara-  subject  is  the  act  of  1851,  to  limit 

tion    of    independence,    recognized  the   liability   of   shipowners    (Act 

by  the  weight  of  English  authority  March  3,   1851,  ch.  43,  9  St.  fe35; 

for  half  a  century  afterwards,  and  Rev.    St.    §§    4282-4289),   and   that 

upheld   by   decisions   of  the   high-  act    leaves    them    liable    without 

est  courts  of  many  states  of  the  limit  for  their  own  negligence,  and 

Union,  common  carriers  could  not  liable   to   the   extent   of   the   ship 

stipulate   for   immunity    for  their  and  freight  for  the  negligence  or 


453.] 


CONTRACTS  LIMITING  LIABILITY. 


487 


Sec.  453.  (§263.)  Same  subject— This  rule  the  prevailing 
one.— These  conclusions,  after  so  thorough  an  examination  of 
the  subject,  may  be  said  to  have  most  decidedly  turned  the  scale 
in  favor  of  the  exclusion  of  ail  contracts  between  carriers  and 
their  employers,  exempting  the  former  from  the  eonsetiuences 


misconduct  of  the  master  and 
crew.  The  employment  of  a  com- 
mon carrier  is  a  public  one,  charg- 
ing him  with  the  duty  of  accom- 
modating the  public  in  the  line  of 
his  employment.  A  common  car- 
rier is  such  by  virtue  of  his  oc- 
cupation, not  by  virtue  of  the  re- 
sponsibilities under  which  he 
rests.  Even  if  the  extent  of  those 
responsibilities  is  restricted  by 
law  or  by  contract,  the  nature  of 
his  occupation  makes  him  a  com- 
mon carrier  still.  A  common  car- 
rier may  become  a  private  carrier, 
or  a  bailee  for  hire,  when,  as  a 
matter  of  accommodation  or  spe- 
cial engagement,  he  undertakes  to 
carry  something  which  it  is  not 
his  business  to  carry.  But  when 
a  carrier  has  a  regularly  estab- 
lished business  for  carrying  all  or 
certain  articles,  and  especially  if 
that  carrier  is  a  corporation  cre- 
ated for  the  purpose  of  the  carry- 
ing trade,  and  the  carriage  of  the 
articles  is  embraced  within  the 
scope  of  its  chartered  powers,  it 
is  a  common  carrier,  and  a  special 
contract  about  its  responsibility 
does  not  divest  it  of  that  char- 
acter. The  fundamental  principle 
upon  which  the  law  of  common 
carriers  was  established  was  to  se- 
cure the  utmost  care  and  diligence 
in  the  performance  of  their  du- 
ties. That  end  was  effected  in  re- 
gard to  goods  by  charging  the 
common  carrier  as  an  insurer,  and 
in  regard  to  passengers  by  exact- 


ing the  highest  degree  of  careful- 
ness and  diligence.  A  carrier  who 
stipulates  not  to  be  bound  to  the 
exercise  of  care  and  diligence 
seeks  to  put  off  the  essential  du- 
ties of  his  employment.  Nor  can 
those  duties  be  waived  in  respect 
to  his  agents  or  servants,  especial- 
ly where  the  carrier  is  an  artificial 
being,  incapable"  of  acting  except 
by  agents  and  servants.  The  law 
demands  of  the  carrier  carefulness 
and  diligence  in  performing  the 
service;  not  merely  an  abstract 
carefulness  and  diligence  in  pro- 
prietors and  stockholders  who 
take  no  active  part  in  the  business. 
To  admit  such  a  distinction  in  the 
law  of  common  carriers,  as  the 
business  is  now  carried  on,  would 
be  subversive  of  the  very  object 
of  the  law.  The  carrier  and  his 
customer  do  not  stand  upon  a  foot- 
ing of  equality.  The  individual 
customer  has  no  real  freedom  of 
choice.  He  cannot  afford  to  hig- 
gle or  stand  out  and  seek  redress 
in  the  courts.  He  prefers  rather 
to  accept  any  bill  of  lading,  or  to 
sign  any  paper,  that  the  carrier 
presents,  and  in  most  cases  he  has 
no  alternative  but  to  do  this  or  to 
abandon  his  business.  Special 
contracts  between  the  carrier  and 
the  customer,  the  terms  of  which 
are  just  and  reasonable  and  not 
contrary  to  public  policy,  are  up- 
held; such  as  those  exempting  the 
carrier  from  responsibility  for 
losses  happening  from  accident,  or 


488                                           THE  LAW   OF   CARRIERS.  [§453. 

of  the  negligence,  of  every  grade,  of  themselves  or  their  em- 
ployees or  servants.  And,  except  in  those  states  in  which  a 
contrary  rule  has  been  too  firmly  established  to  be  now  de- 
parted from,  considerations  of  advantage  from  uniformity  upon 

from  dangers  of  navigation  that  123,  134;  Bank  v.  Express  Co.,  93 
no  human  skill  and  diligence  can  U.  S.  174,  183;  Railway  Co.  v. 
guard  against;  or  for  money  or  Stevens,  95  U.  S,  655;  Hart  v. 
other  valuable  articles,  liable  to  be  Railroad  Co.,  112  U.  S.  331,  338; 
stolen  or  damaged,  unless  in-  Insurance  Co.  v.  Transportation 
formed  of  their  character  or  val-  Co.,  117  U.  S.  312,  322;  Inman  v. 
ue;  or  for  perishable  articles  or  Railway  Co.,  129  U.  S.  128." 
live  animals,  when  injured  with-  See  to  same  effect.  The  Kensing- 
out  default  or  negligence  of  the  ton,  183  U.  S.  263,  reversing  94 
carrier.  But  the  law  does  not  al-  Fed.  885,  36  C.  C.  A.  533;  Gait  v. 
low  a  public  carrier  to  abandon  al-  Express  Co.,  4  MacArth.  124;  Cam- 
together  his  obligations  to  the  pania  de  Navigacion  la  Flecha  v. 
public,  and  to  stipulate  for  exemp-  Brauer,  168  U.  S.  104,  18  Sup.  Ct. 
tions  which  are  unreasonable  and  Rep.  12,  42  L.  Ed.  398,  affirming 
improper,  amounting  to  an  abne-  66  Fed.  777,  35  U.  S.  App.  44  and 
gation  of  the  essential  duties  of  61  Fed.  860;  Calderon  v.  Steam- 
his  employment.  It  being  against  ship  Co.,  170  U.  S.  272,  reversing 
the  policy  of  the  law  to  allow  stip-  69  Fed.  574,  16  C.  C.  A.  332,  35  U. 
ulations  which  will  relieve  the  S.  App.  587;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Hughes, 
railroad  company  from  the  exer-  191  U.  S.  477,  24  Sup.  Ct.  R. 
cise  of  care  and  diligence,  or  132,  48  L,  Ed.  268;  Cau  v.  The 
which,  in  other  words,  will  excuse  Railway,  194  U.  S.  427,  24  Sup.  Ct. 
it  from  negligence  in  the  per-  R.  663,  48  L.  Ed.  1053,  afflrming 
formance  of  its  duty,  the  company  113  Fed.  91,  51  C.  C.  A.  76;  Doyle 
remains  liable  for  such  negligence,  v.  The  Railroad,  126  Fed.  841; 
This  analysis  of  the  opinion  in  Saunders  v.  The  Railway,  128  Fed. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Lockwood  shows  15,  62  C.  C.  A,  523. 
that  it  affirms  and  rests  upon  the  Any  contract  by  which  a  corn- 
doctrine  that  an  express  stipula-  mon  carrier  of  goods  or  passen- 
tion  by  any  common  carrier  for  gers  undertakes  to  exempt  him- 
hire,  In  a  contract  of  carriage,  that  self  from  all  responsibility  for 
he  shall  be  exempt  from  liability  loss  or  damage  from  the  negli- 
for  losses  caused  by  the  negli-  gence  of  himself  or  his  servants  is 
gence  of  himself  or  his  servants,  is  void  as  against  public  policy,  as 
unreasonable  and  contrary  to  pub-  an  attempt  to  put  off  the  essential 
lie  policy,  and  consequently  void,  duties  resting  upon  every  public 
And  such  has  always  been  the  carrier  by  virtue  of  his  employ- 
understanding  of  this  court,  ex-  ment,  and  as  an  attempt  to  defeat 
pressed  in  several  later  cases.  Ex-  the  fundamental  principle  upon 
press  Co.  v.  Caldwell,  21  Wall.  264,  which  the  law  of  common  carriers 
268;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Pratt,  22  Wall,  is  established.  Railway  Co.  v.  So- 
lan, 169  U.  S.  133. 


§454.]  CONTRACTS   LIMITING   LIABILITY,  489 

a  question  of  so  much  importance,  and  of  public  policy,  to- 
gether with  the  weight  of  authority  in  its  favor  as  a  mere 
question  if  law,  will  perhaps  induce  its  universal  adoption  as 
a  rule  of  law  in  this  countr3^ 

Sec.  454.  (§264.)  Same  subject— Contrary  rule  prevails  in 
New  York.— The  court  of  appeals  of  New  York  have,  how- 
ever, come  to  a  different  conclusion  from  that  arrived  at  in  the 
above  case  by  the  supreme  court  of  the  United  States,  and  in 
a  series  of  cases,  all  against  the  same  defendant  and  resting 
upon  the  validity  and  effect  of  similar  drovers'  passes,  as  they 
are  called,  have  held  that  the  company  had  the  power  to  stip- 
ulate for  exemption  from  responsibility  for  injury  to  such 
passengers  caused  even  by  the  gross  negligence  of  its  agents.^ 
These  cases  are  commented  on  and  disapproved  in  the  case  of 
Lockwood;  but  since  the  decision  of  the  supreme  court  in  the 
latter  ease,  the  appellate  court  of  New  York  has  adhered  in 
the  most  unqualified  terms  to  its  former  ruling,  that  the  car- 
rier may  by  contract  relieve  himself  from  respon.sibility  for 
the  negligence  of  every  degree  of  its  agents  and  servants;  and 
this  is  now  the  settled  law  of  that  state  ;2  and  in  this  it  ac- 
cords with  the  long  established  English  law.  The  highest  court 
of  that  state  has  expressly  refused  to  follow  the  rulings  of 
the  United  States  supreme  court  upon  this  question  as  not  bind- 
ing upon  the  state  courts.^  But  in  all  these  cases  it  is  held 
that  the  language  of  the  contract,  to  protect  the  carrier  from 
the  consequences  of  his  negligence,  must  have  clear,  direct  and 
unmistakable  reference  to  the  subject  of  negligence ;  and  where 
its  language  was  that  the  carrier  "should  not  be  liable  for  the 
loss  or  damage  of  any  box,  package  or  thing  for  over  fifty  dol- 
lars unless  the  true  value  be  stated/'  it  was  held  that  there  was 

1.  Smith  V.  N.  Y.  Cent.  R.  R..  G19,  16  N.  Y.  Supp.  631,  affirmed, 
24  N.  Y.  222;  Bissell  v.  N.  Y.  Cent.  137  N.  Y.  460,  33  N.  E.  Rep.  642; 
R.  R.,  25  id.  442;  Poucher  v.  N.  Y.  Campe  v.  Weir,  58  N.  Y.  Supp. 
Cent.  R.  R.,  49  id.  263.  1082,  28  Misc.  Rep.  243. 

2.  Magnin  v.  Dinsmore,  56  N.  Y.  3.  Mynard  v.  Railroad,  7  Hun, 
168;  Westcott  v.  Fargo,  61  id.  542;  399;   71  N.  Y.   180. 

Zlmmer  v.  Railroad  Co.,   62  Hun, 


490  THE  LAW   OP   CARRIERS.  [§455. 

not  in  its  phraseology  any  such  clear  and  distinct  expression  of 
exemption  from  loss  by  negligence  as  the  law  required.* 

Sec.  455.  Same  subject — Rule  in  Illinois. — According-  to  the 
decisions  of  the  courts  of  Illinois  tlie  carrier  is  permitted  to 
contract  against  liability  for  the  acts  or  omissions  of  himself  or 
his  servants,  providing  they  are  not  of  such  a  character  as  to 
amount  to  gross  negligence.  But  since  it  is  held  that  gross 
negligence  is  a  failure  to  exercise  ordinary  care  in  view  of  the 
circumstances  of  the  particular  case,  contracts  which  operate 
to  exempt  the  carrier  from  liability  where  he  has  failed  to  ex- 
ercise ordinary  care  in  the  transaction  of  his  business  as  a 
common  carrier  are  considered  unreasonable;^  and  where  there 
is  some  evidence  of  negligence  adduced,  the  question  whether  it 
was  gross  in  character  is  held  to  be  one  of  fact  for  the  jury.*^ 

Sec.  456.  Same  subject — Stipulation  as  to  amount  of  proof 
required. — A  stipulation  in  the  contract  of  shipment  which 
provides  that  the  carrier  will  not  be  liable  for  losses  resulting 
from  certain  causes,  unless  it  shall  affirmatively  appear  and 
without  presumption  be  proven  that  the  loss  was  caused  by  neg- 
ligence, being,  in  effect,  an  attempt  by  the  carrier  to  relieve 
himself  from  liability  for  losses  occasioned  by  his  negligence 

4.  Magnin  v.  Dinsmore,  56  N.  Y.  Ross,  105  111.  App.  54;  Wabash, 
168;  Westcott  v.  Fargo,  61  id.  542.  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Brown,  152  111.  484, 
See  also,  Canfield  v.  Railroad  Co.,  30  N.  E.  Rep.  273,  affirming  51  111. 
93  N.  Y.  532;  Holsapple  v.  Rail-  App.  656.  In  the  Railroad  Co.  v. 
road  Co.,  86  N.  Y.  275;  Galloway  v.  Fox,  113  111.  App.  ISO,  it  was  said 
Railroad  Co.,  95  N.  Y.  Supp.  17,  107  by  the  court  that  a  more  compre- 
App.  Div.  210.  hensive  statement  of  the  rule  laid 

5.  Western  T.  Co.  v.  Newhall,  24  down  in  the  Arnold  case,  supra, 
111.  466;  Adams  Ex.  Co.  v.  Haynes,  namely,  that  the  carrier  could  ex- 
42  111.  89;  111.  Cent.  R.  R.  v.  Read,  empt  himself  from  liability  for 
37  111.  484;  Adams  Ex.  Co.  v.  Stet-  negligence  when  it  was  not  gross 
taners,  61  111.  184;  Arnold  v.  The  or  willful,  would  be  that  the  car- 
Railroad,  9  Chicago  Legal  News,  rier  could  not  contract  for  exemp- 
211;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Grimes,  71  111.  tion  from  responsibility  for  a  fail- 
App.  397;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Miller,  ure  on  his  part,  or  that  of  his 
79  111.  App.  473;  Express  Co.  v.  servants,  to  exercise  ordinary  care 
Council,  84  111.  App.  491;  Express  in  the  transaction  of  his  business. 
Co.  V.  Burke,  94  111.  App.  29;  s.  c.  6.  Wabash,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Brown, 
87  111.  App.   505;    Railroad  Co.  v.  152  111.  484,  39  N.  E.  Rep.  273. 


§  'i57.]  CONTRACTS   LIMITING  LIABILITY.  491 

where  the  proof  fails  to  come  up  to  the  standard  required,  will 
be  considered  as  an  evasion  of  the  law  and  of  no  effect  in 
exonerating  him  from  liability  for  losses  occasioned  by  his  negli- 
gence J 

Sec.  457.  (§265.)  Power  of  an  agent  to  bind  the  owner 
of  goods  to  limitation.— If  the  owner  of  the  goods  intrusts 
them  to  another  for  the  purpose  of  having  them  delivered  to  the 
carrier  for  transportation,  the  person  to  whom  they  are  so  in- 
trusted will  be  presumed  to  have  authority  to  agree  with  the 
carrier  upon  the  terms  of  shipment;  and  this  authority  will 
include  the  right  to  enter  into  a  reasonable  agreement  on  behalf 
of  the  owner  restricting  the  carrier's  liability  as  an  insurer. 
And  where  the  carrier  is  without  knowledge  that  the  person  to 
whom  the  goods  are  so  intrusted  has  no  authority  to  enter  into 
a  contract  restricting  the  carrier's  common  law  liability,  the 
mere  acceptance  by  the  latter  of  the  carrier's  receipt  will 
operate  to  bind  the  owner  of  the  goods  to  its  lawful  limitatidiis. 
This  is  well  illustrated  by  the  case  of  Nelson  v.  The  Railroad.** 
The  plaintiff  had  purchased  a  large  mirror,  and  gave  instruc- 
tions to  the  party  from  whom  he  had  purchased  it  as  his  agent 
to  forward  it  to  him  by  defendant  railroad  company.  The  agent 
sent  it  to  the  depot  of  the  road  by  a  carman,  who  delivered  it 
and  received  from  the  agent  of  the  road  a  receipt,  with  a  pro- 
vision in  it  releasing  the  company  from  any  liability  for  damage 
or  loss  by  reason  of  breakage.  This  receipt  was  taken  by  the 
carman  to  the  plaintiff's  agent,  who  retained  it  Avithout  objec- 
tion. The  mirror  was  transported  to  destination  with  ordinary 
care,  but  on  arrival  there  was  found  to  be  broken.  The  receipt 
was  held,  under  those  circumstances,  to  constitute  a  binding 
contract  between  the  company  and  the  plaintiff.    So  in  Squire  r. 

7.  Cox  V.  The  Railroad,  170  road,  L37  N.  Y.  460,  33  N.  E.  Rei). 
Mass.   129,  49  N.  E.  Rep.  97.  642;  Root  r.  The  Railroad.  83  Hun. 

8.  48  N.  Y.  498.  See  also,  Wal-  in;  31  N.  Y.  Supp.  357;  s.  c.  27 
dron  t'.  Fargo,  170  N.  Y.  130,  63  N  Y.  Supp.  611,  76  Hun,  23; 
N.  E.  Rep.  1077,  reversing  64  N.  Brown  v.  The  Railroad,  36  111.  App. 
Y.  Supp.  798;  Zimmer  v.  The  Rail-  140. 


492 


THE  LAW   OF   CARRIERS. 


[§457. 


Railroad,^  the  plaintiff,  who  had  become  the  purchaser  of  hogs, 
sent  a  drover  to  take  care  of  them  and  to  transport  them  by 
railroad.  The  ticket-master  of  the  road  gave  the  drover  a  pass, 
and  handed  to  him  at  the  same  time  a  written  contract  to  be 
signed  by  him  with  the  name  of  the  plaintiff,  which  was  done 
by  the  drover.  This  contract  limited  the  liability  of  the  com- 
pany in  several  important  particulars,  and,  among  other  things, 
exempted  it  from  liability  for  injury  to  the  hogs  by  suffocation. 
A  number  of  them  were  suffocated  before  reaching  their  desti- 
nation, and  the  plaintiff  brought  suit  to  recover  their  value ;  but 
it  was  held  that  the  contract  was  binding  upon  him  and  that 
the  company  was  not  liable.  In  York  Company  v.  Central  Rail- 
road,^^  the  agent  of  the  plaintiffs  accepted  a  bill  of  lading  re- 
lieving the  defendant  carrier  from  liability  for  loss  by  fire.  The 
goods  were  destroyed  whilst  in  transit,  by  fire,  and  it  was  held 
that  the  plaintiffs  could  not  recover,  the  stipulation  in  the  re- 
ceipt excepting  liability  for  loss  from  that  cause  being  binding 


9.  98   Mass.   239. 

A  contract  between  the  agent  of 
the  owner  of  the  goods  and  the 
carrier  is  not  affected  by  a  secret 
limitation  of  the  agent's  authority 
to  agree  to  terms  of  limitation. 
Smith  V.  Robinson  Bros.,  Lumber 
Co.,    34    N.    Y.    Supp.    518. 

In  California  Powder  Works  v. 
The  Railroad,  113  Cal.  329,  45  Pac. 
Rep.  691,  36  L.  R.  A.  648,  the  plain- 
tiff, a  powder  manufacturer,  em 
ployed  at  different  times  a  com- 
mon drayman  to  haul  quantities  of 
powder  from  a  certain  depot  to  the 
depot  of  the  defendant.  It  was  cus- 
tomary for  the  drayman,  when  de- 
livering the  powder  to  the  defend- 
ant's agent,  to  sign  a  form  of  ship- 
ping order  in  which  terms  were 
inserted  to  the  effect  that  the  car- 
rier would  not  be  liable  for  loss 
by  fire  from  any  cause.  The  plain- 
tiff had  no  knowledge  of  the  dray- 
man's practice  of  signing  its  name 


to  the  shipping  orders  since  the 
orders,  after  being  signed,  were  re- 
tained by  the  carrier;  nor  had  the 
drayman  any  actual  authority  to 
do  so.  During  the  transit  of  a 
quantity  of  powder  which  the  de- 
fendant had  accepted  under  a  ship- 
ping order  signed  in  the  usual 
manner  by  the  drayman,  the  pow- 
der exploded,  entailing  a  loss  of 
the  entire  shipment.  The  plain- 
tiff contended  that  the  drayman 
had  no  actual  or  implied  authority 
to  bind  it  by  signing  its  name  to 
a  contract  to  the  terms  of  which  it 
had  never  agreed.  It  was  held 
that  the  drayman,  having  had  au- 
thority to  ship  the  powder  for  the 
plaintiff,  had  a  general  and  im- 
plied authority  to  agree  with  the 
carrier  with  respect  to  the  terms 
upon  which  the  goods  were  to  be 
shipped,  and  that  the  plaintiff  was 
without  remedy. 
10.  3  Wall.  107. 


§458.]  CONTRACTS  LIMITING  LIABILITY, 


493 


upon  thera.ii  And  in  Armstrong  v.  Railway  Company/ 2  it 
appeared  that  the  plaintiff's  agent,  who  was  sent  by  the  shipper 
of  live  stock  to  care  for  the  stock  during  transportation,  entered 
into  a  contract  with  the  connecting  carrier  for  the  carriage  of 
the  stock  to  destination.  The  contract  contained  a  clause  limit- 
ing the  time  within  which  a  written  claim  for  damage  or  loss 
should  be  filed  with  the  carrier.  The  stock  was  injured  while 
on  the  journey  but  no  claim  was  filed  within  the  time  agreed 
upon.  It  was  held  that  the  plaintiff*  was  bound  by  the  act  of 
his  agent  and  was  accordingly  precluded  from  the  right  to  main- 
tain an  action. 

Sec.  458.  (§266.)  Same  subject.— And  not  only  has  the 
agent  for  shipment  the  authority  to  deliver  the  goods  and  to  ac- 
cept the  carrier's  receipt,  but  whenever  it  becomes  his  duty  to 
send  or  to  forward  them,  it  is  his  duty  also  to  accept  such  terms 
of  the  carrier  as  may  not  be  unreasonable,  if  necessary  to  pro- 
cure the  acceptance  of  the  goods  by  him;  and  if  he  be  a  paid 
agent  to  have  them  carried,  he  would  become  responsible  for  any 
damage  which  might  occur  to  them  in  consequence  of  his  fail- 
ure, and  it  would  be  no  defense  that  he  had  no  authority  to 
deliver  the  goods  upon  such  terms.     In  Rawson  v.  Holland*^ 

11.  Christenson  v.  Am.  Ex.  Co.,  the  principal  who  adopts  the  act 
15  Minn.  270;  Briggs  v.  Railroad,  of  one  professing  to  act  for  him 
6  Allen,  246;  Mills  v.  Railroad,  45  must  adopt  it  in  toto,  and  will  not 
N.  Y.  622;  Shelton  v.  Merchants'  be  permitted  to  claim  the  benefits 
D.  T.  Co.,  59  id.  258;  Barnett  v.  therefrom  and  at  the  same  time 
Railway  Co.,  5  Hurl.  &  Nor.  604;  repudiate  the  burdens  thereof,  ap- 
Moriarty  v.  Harnden's  Ex.,  1  Daly,  plies  to  a  shipping  contract  con- 
227;  New  Jersey  Steam  Nav,  Co.  taining  limitations  of  liability 
V.  Merchants'  Bank,  6  How.  344;  which  has  been  entered  into  by  an 
Robinson  v.  Merchants'  Des.  T.  Co.,  agent  and  adopted  by  the  princi- 
45  Iowa,  470.  pal.     Adams  Express  Co.  v.  Carna- 

Upon  question  of  agent's  author-  han,   29   Ind.   App.   606,   63   N.   E. 

ity  to  bind  the  owner  by  contract  Rep.    245,    64    N.    E.   Rep.   647,   94 

limiting  the  carrier's  liability,  see  Am.  St.  Rep.  279,  citing  Hutchin- 

Southern  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Maddox,  son  on  Carr. 

75  Tex.  300.  13.  59    N.    Y.   611. 

12.  53  Minn.  183,  54  N.  W.  Rep.  The  general  course  of  business 
1059,   citing   Hutchinson   on   Carr.  cf    forwarding    goods     when    the 

The  general  rule  of  agency  that    ship   of  the   signer   of   a   through 


494  THE  LAW   OF    CARRIERS.  [§  459. 

the  carrier,  an  express  company,  transported  the  goods  to  the 
end  of  its  own  route,  but  failed  to  offer  or  deliver  them  to  the 
next  succeeding  carrier  on  the  route  to  destination,  because 
it  required  the  express  company,  as  a  condition  precedent  to 
its  acceptance  of  the  goods,  to  sign  a  contract  containing  vari- 
ous restrictions  and  limitations  of  its  liability.  This  the  ex- 
press company  declined  to  do,  but  stored  the  goods  in  its  ware- 
house and  notified  their  owners  of  the  fact  and  awaited  in- 
structions from  them.  Before  any  such  instructions  were  re- 
ceived, and  after  the  goods  had  remained  thus  stored  for  about 
twenty  days,  they  were  consumed  by  fire.  The  carrier  was  held 
liable  because,  having  contracted  to  forward  the  goods  from 
the  end  of  its  own  route,  and  being  therefore  the  agent  of  the 
owners  for  that  purpose,  it  had  the  power  to  sign  the  contract, 
and  it  was  its  duty  to  have  done  so  and  forwarded  the  goods. 
The  detention  was  said  to  have  been  inexcusable,  and  the  loss 
having  occurred  from  the  fault  of  the  express  company,  it  was 
responsible,  although  in  its  receipt  for  the  goods  it  had  con- 
tracted for  exemption  from  liability  for  loss  by  fire. 

Sec.  459.  Same  subject — How  where  carrier  has  notice  that 
authority  of  agent  is  restricted. — Where,  however,  the  carrier 
has  notice  that  the  agent  is  without  authority  to  bind  the  owner 
by  a  contract  containing  limitations  of  liability,  or  where  a 
contract  has  been  previously  entered  into  between  the  owner 
and  the  carrier  without  reference  to  terms  of  limitation,  the 

bill  of  lading  does  not  go  all  the  ond   contract   contains   exemptions 

way  to  the  port  of  ultimate  des-  from  liability  not  contained  in  the 

tination,      of      which      fact      the  through   contract,    and    loss   occur 

through  bill  of  lading  gives  notice,  on  the  route  of  the  second  carrier 

and  the  manifest  necessity  of  the  from  one  of  such  excepted  causes, 

case  that  the  through  undertaker  the  shipper  will  not  be  permitted 

should  tranship  under  such  a  con-  to   question   the   authority   of   the 

tract  as  he  can  reasonably  make,  first  carrier  to  enter  into  the  sec- 

justifies    the    presumption    of    the  ond   contract  with  the  connecting 

requisite  authority,  in  the  absence  carrier  and  must  seek  his  remedy 

of    any    want    of    notice    thereof  against  the  first  carrier  under  the 

brought  to  the  knowledge  of  the  through  contract.    The  St.  Hubert, 

second  carrier,  to  enter  into  such  107  Fed.  727,  46  C.  C.  A.  603,  af- 

a  contract.     If,  therefore,  the  sec-  firming  102  Fed.  362. 


§459.]  CONTRACTS  LIMITING  LIABILITY.  495 

acceptance  of  a  receipt  by  the  agent,  or  the  signing  by  him  of  a 
bill  of  lading,  cannot  operate  to  bind  the  owner  to  terms  of  lim- 
itation which  may  be  included  in  such  receipt  or  bill  of  lading.' •« 
But  if  the  owner,  wnth  full  knowledge  of  the  facts,  adopts  the 
act  of  his  agent,  such  conduct  will  be  tantamount  to  an  original 
authority  to  the  agent  to  agree  to  the  terms  proposed,  and  the 
owner  will  be  concluded  by  the  agreement  as  made  by  the  agent. 
In  Russell  v.  The  Railroad/ s  it  appeared  that  a  storage  com- 
pany, in  accordance  with  the  plaintiff's  directions,  deliveix'd  to 
the  defendant  for  transportation  a  box  containing  household 
goods  of  the  value  of  $300.    The  storage  company  made  out  a 
freight  bill  on  one  of  the  printed  forms  of  the  defendant  com- 
pany and  inserted  therein  the  directions  as  to  shipment.     No 
mention  was  made  in  the  freight  bill  of  sending  the  box  forward 
under  a  contract  limiting  the  defendant's  liability.    The  storage 
company  gave  the  box  and  freight  bill  to  their  cartman  for  de- 
livery to  the  defendant  and  instructed  him  to  pay  the  freight 
charges  and  secure  a  copy  of  the  bill  of  lading.    No  directions 
were  given  to  the  cartman  in  respect  to  the  rate  of  freight  he 
was  to  pay.    On  receipt  of  the  box  by  the  defendant,  it  issued 
to  the  cartman  a  bill  of  lading  which  contained  a  clause  limiting 
its  liability  in  case  of  loss  to  $5.00  for  each  hundred  pounds,  and 
the  reduced  rate  of  freight  usually  charged  under  such  contracts 
was  paid  by  the  cartman.     The  box  was  lost,  and  suit  being 
brought  to  recover  its  full  value,  the  defendant  relied  upon 
the  contract  as  evidenced  by  the  bill  of  lading  delivered  to  the 
cartman.     It  was  held  that  while  ordinarily  where  a  person  is 
intrusted  with  goods  for  the  purpose  of  delivering  them  to  a 
carrier  for  shipment,  such  person  is  presumed  to  have  authority 
to  enter  into  an  agreement  limiting  the  carrier's  liability,  if  the 
carrier  knows  that  his  authority  is  restricted,  the  acceptance  by 

14.  Russell  V.  The  Railroad,   70     N.   Y.   Supp.   140;   Railway  Co.   t'. 
N.  J.  Law  808,   59  Atl.  Rep.  150,     Hamlin,  42  111.  App.  441. 
67  L.  R.  A.  433;   Jennings  v.  The         15.  70   N.   J.   Law   808,   59    Atl. 
Railway,  127  N.  Y.  438,  28  N.  E.     Rep.    150,   67   L.   R.   A.   433.     See 
Rep.  394,  affirming  52  Hun,  227,  5    also,    Hailparn    v.   Joy    S.    S.    Co., 

99    N.   Y.    Supp.    464. 


496  THE   LAW   OP   CARRIERS.  [§460. 

him  of  a  receipt  in  which  limitations  of  liability  are  inserted 
will  amount  to  no  more  than  an  ex  parte  proposition  on  the  part 
of  the  carrier  and  the  owner  will  not  be  bound  by  its  terms; 
that  since  the  box,  together  with  the  shipping  order  containing 
the  shipping  directions,  were  offered  to  the  defendant  and  no 
mention  was  made  in  the  shipping  order  of  sending  the  box 
under  a  limited  liability  contract,  it  was  the  defendant's  duty 
to  have  accepted  the  box  on  the  terms  stated  in  the  shipping 
order  which  was  ample  notice  to  the  defendant  that  the  cart- 
man's  authority  was  in  no  sense  discretionary,  and  that  the 
agreement  entered  into  with  the  cartman  could  not  avail  the 
carrier. 

Sec.  460.  (§  267.)  Powers  of  agents  of  carriers  to  bind 
them  by  contract. — Where  carriers  transact  their  business 
through  agents,  either  general  or  local,  it  is  equally  competent 
for  such  agents  to  bind  them  by  such  contracts  as  the  public 
have  a  right  to  suppose  they  are  authorized  to  make  from  the 
manner  in  which  they  are  employed  or  are  seemingly  intrusted 
by  their  principals;  and,  as  most  of  the  carrying  business  is 
now  done  by  corporations,  which  can  act  only  through  the  in- 
strumentality of  agents,  it  is  necessary  for  the  protection  of 
those  who  have  goods  to  send  by  them  that  this  should  be  so.^^ 

16.  A  shipping  agent  of  a  com-  not  be  held  unusual  or  extraordi- 
mon  carrier  has  general  authority  nary,  and  is  within  the  general  au- 
to make  all  contracts  of  ship-  thority  of  the  agent.  The  carrying 
ment.  Any  undisclosed  limitation  business  of  the  country  is  mostly 
upon  such  agent's  authority   will  done    by    corporations    which    act 


not  be  binding  on  the  shipper 
Only  when  contracts  are  of  an  un 
usual  and  extraordinary  charac 
ter  is  the  shipper  to  put  to  iu 
quiry  as  to  the  agent's  authority 


through  agents,  and  when  the  con- 
tract is  a  reasonable  one,  it  will 
be  upheld  in  the  absence  of  no- 
tice that  the  agent  was  without 
authority.    Rudell    v.    Transit    Co., 


Such    an    agent,    therefore,    may  117  Mich.  568,  76  N.  W.  Rep.  380, 

agree     to     deliver     the     shipper's  44   L.   R.   A.   415,   citing   Hutchin- 

goods  by  a  certain  time,  and  when  son  on  Carr. 

the      shipper      and      the      carrier        Although  an  unauthorized  agent 

through    its   agent   agree    upon    a  may  make  a  parol  agreement  for 

date    of    delivery    at    destination  the  shipment  of  goods,   if  an  au- 

which    gives    the    usual    time    to  thorized    agent    later    accepts    the 

make  the  trip,  sucn  contract  can-  goods  under  such  agreement  with- 


§  461.]  CONTRACTS  LIMITING  LIABILITY.  497 

Whenever  the  claim  is  made  by  the  carrier  that  liis  liability  hii.s 
been  limited  by  a  contract,  there  could  never  be,  of  course, 
ground  for  disputing  the  authority  of  his  agent.  If  the  ship- 
per has  assented  to  such  contract,  whether  the  agent  had  au- 
thority or  not,  it  could  be  adopted  by  the  carrier  and  become 
valid  by  a  subsequent  ratification.  Consequently,  in  an  action 
against  the  carrier,  where  he  defends  upon  the  ground  of  con- 
tract restricting  his  liability,  the  authority  of  his  agent  to  make 
the  contract  could  never  come  in  question  if  the  sender  of  the 
goods  had  bound  himself  by  an  acceptance  of  the  receipt  or  in 
any  other  manner  which  would  make  the  contract  legal  and 
obligatory  upon  him.  But  if  the  agent  has  undertaken  to  im- 
pose upon  the  carrier  obligations  beyond  those  imposed  by  law, 
the  question  of  his  authority  to  do  so  may  become  a  very  serious 
one  in  an  action  to  recover  for  a  failure  to  perform  the  con- 
tract.!^ 

Sec.  461.  (§268.)  Same  subject— The  English  rule.— The 
English  rule  is  that  a  mere  local  or  station  agent,  as  he  is  called, 
may  bind  the  carrier  to  the  performance  of  contracts  beyond  the 
scope  of  his  legal  duties.  The  station  agent  of  a  railway  com- 
pany may  therefore  bind  it  to  carry  beyond  its  own  route,  al- 
though notice  may  have  been  given  that  such  railway  will  be 
responsible  for  the  carriage  only  to  the  extent  of  its  route;  and 
he  may  bind  his  principal  to  carry  within  a  certain  time,  and 
even  that  the  goods  shall  be  delivered  at  destination  beyond  the 
line  of  the  road^  before  a  particular  hour.^^ 

Sec.  462.  (§  269.)  Same  subject — Implied  authority. — Un- 
less some* special  reasons  known  to  the  shipper  restrict  the  gen- 
eral powers  of  the  agent,  the  public  have  a  right  to  assume  that 

out  objection,  the  carrier  will  bo  a    contract    that    goods    shall    be 

bound  by  it.     Gulf,  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  shipped    in    solid    trains,    or    that 

Jackson     &    Edwards,    Tex.  each  train  shall  be  drawn  by  a  sin- 

,  89  S.  W.  Rep.  968,  reversing  gle  engine.     Gulf,  etc.  Ry.  Co.   c. 

(Tex.  Civ.  App.)  8C  S.  W.  Rep.  47.  Jackson  &  Edwards,  supra. 
17.  See  ante,  §  241.  18.  Wilson    v.    Railway    Co.,    IS 

A    local    agent    has    no    implied  Eng.    L.    &    Eq.    .5.57;    Pickford    r. 

authority    to   bind   the   carrier   by  Railway  Co.,  12  M.  &  W.  706. 
32 


498 


THE   LAW   OF    CARRIERS. 


[§462. 


the  agents  of  carriers,  whether  corporations  or  not,  and  whether 
such  agents  be  local  or  general,  have  the  right  to  bind  such 
carriers  by  contracts  with  their  employers  in  the  particular 
line  of  business  in  which  they  are  employed,  or  are  represented 
or  held  out  as  being  employed,  and  within  the  scope  of  the 
business  of  tlieir  principals.!^  Thus,  where  the  defendant  was 
the  owner  of  a  line  of  steamers,  and  the  clerk  of  his  agent,  who 
had  been  in  the  habit  of  giving  bills  of  lading,  contracted  that 
certain  freight  should  be  carried  by  a  particular  boat  of  the  line, 
though  not  the  next  in  order  of  departure,  the  contract  was  held 
binding,  and  the  freight,  being  sent  by  another  boat,  it  was 


19.  Rudell  V.  Transit  Co.,  117 
Mich.  568,  76  N.  W.  Rep.  380,  44 
L.  R.  A.  415;  Trimble  v.  The  Rail- 
road, 57  N.  Y.  Supp.  437,  39  App. 
Div.  403;  s.  c.  162  N.  Y.  84,  56 
N.  E.  Rep.  532,  48  L.  R.  A.  115; 
Graves  v.  Steamship  Co.,  61  N.  Y. 
Supp.    115,   29    Misc.    645. 

An  agent  at  a  station  where  a 
carrier  is  soliciting  freight  and 
quoting  freight  charges  upon  ship- 
ments has  implied  authority  to 
include  in  a  contract  of  affreight- 
ment a  provision  for  clearance  of 
customs  duties.  Waldron  v.  The 
Railway,  22  Wash.  253,  60  Pac. 
Rep.  653,  citing  Hutchinson  on 
Carr. 

Unless  a  shipper  has  notice  that 
a  station  agent  has  no  authority 
to  do  so,  such  agent  has  implied 
authority  to  agree  to  furnish  a 
reasonable  number  of  cars  for  live 
stock  at  a  certain  date.  Railway 
Co.  V.  Racer,  10  Ind.  App.  503,  37 
N.  E.  Rep.  280. 

A  verbal  contract  of  shipment 
entered  into  by  a  station  agent 
will  be  binding  on  the  carrier  un- 
less the  shipper  has  knowledge 
that  the  agent  has  no  authority  to 
enter  into  such  a  contract.     Rail- 


way  Co.    V.   Williams,    (Tex.   Civ. 
App.)  57  S.  W.  Rep.  883. 

Where  two  railroad  companies 
with  connecting  lines  unite  to 
form  an  association  or  partnership 
b>  which  each  is  to  receive 
freight  on  its  own  line  for  ship- 
ment over  the  other,  each  com- 
pany is  a  general  agent  of  the 
other,  and  a  freight  agent  of  one 
company  has  the  same  authority 
to  make  a  contract  binding  on 
the  other  company  that  he  has  to 
make  a  contract  binding  on  his  im- 
mediate principal.  A  shipper, 
therefore,  has  a  right  to  rely  upon 
this  apparent  authority,  and  is  not 
chargeable  with  notice  of  special 
limitations  upon  an  agent's  au- 
thority to  contract  for  the  rates 
over  the  line  of  the  other  com- 
pany. Southern  Pac.  Co.  v.  Dun- 
can, 16  Ky.  Law  Rep.  119.  But  a 
carrier's  agent  in  a  foreign  state 
whose  duty  it  is  to  solicit  freight 
business  has  no  general  authority 
to  make  rates  or  to  deviate  in  a 
particular  instance  from  the  terms 
set  out  in  circulars  sent  by  the 
carrier  to  shippers.  Lienkauf  v. 
Lombard,  Ayres  &  Co.,  42  N.  Y. 
Supp.  391,  12  App.  Div.  302. 


§  462.]  CONTRACTS   LIMITING    LIABILITY.  499 

held  that  the  carrier  took  all  the  risks  ol'  its  loss,  althou^'h  the 
designated  vessel  may  have  been  withdrawn  in  the  meautinic 
from  the  route.20  So  a  clerk  of  a  carrier  authorized  to  receive 
goods  for  transportation  has  implied  power  to  agree  that  certain 
instructions  as  to  their  delivery  shall  go  with  the  goods,  and 
th«  carrier  is  liable  for  a  loss  occasioned  by  a  failure  to  do  so.-' 
A  local  custom  not  to  make  such  contracts  cannot  affect  the 
rights  of  the  shipper,  to  whom  the  custom  was  unknown.^-  So 
such  a  clerk  i.  e.,  a  station  agent,  has  implied  authority  to  agre-.^ 
that  a  person  going  in  charge  of  animals  may  ride  in  the  stock- 
car.23  And  it  has  been  held  in  this  country  that  the  station 
agent  of  a  railroad  company  may  bind  the  company  to  deliver 
beyond  the  terminus  of  its  route  and  within  a  fixed  time.-^  So 
in  Deming  v.  The  Railroad,^^  where  the  owner  of  the  goods  had 
contracted  to  deliver  them  by  a  certain  time,  and  the  station 
agent  of  the  railroad,  aware  of  that  fact,  had  contracted  on  be- 
half of  the  road  that  they  should  be  so  delivered,  the  road  was 
held  bound  for  the  damages  for  the  non-delivery  within  the 
time.  But  it  has  also  been  held  in  another  case  that  such  agent 
for  a  railway  has  no  power  to  bind  his  company  by  a  contract 
to  forward  freight  by  a  passenger  train. ^c  It  has  been  held  also 
that  where  the  company  had  furnished  blank  receipts  to  its  agent 
which  bound  the  company  to  transport  freight  only  to  points 
upon  its  own  route  or  to  its  terminus,  a  receipt  given  by  such 
agents,  so  altered  as  to  make  it  a  contract  by  the  company  to 
carry  beyond  its  route,  was  not  obligatory  upon  it,  the  agent 
having  no  power  to  enter  into  such  contract  to  perform  a  duty 
not  enjoined  by  law  and  not  assumed  by  notice  to  the  public 
or  in  any  other  authorized  manner.  And  it  was  said  that  the 
English   authorities  upon  the  question  were  of  no  weight  in 

20.  Goddard,  v.  Mallory,  52  Barb.  24.  Strohn  v.  The  Railroad,  21! 
87;  Goodrich  v.  Thompson,  44  N.  Wis.  126;  Hanson  v.  The  Railroad. 
y_   324.  73  Wis.   646. 

21.  Hutchings  v.  Ladd,  16  Mich.  25.  48  N.  H.  455. 

493  26.  Elkins    v.    The    Railroad,    .3 

22.  Hutchings   r.   Ladd,  supra.       Foster,  275. 

23.  Lawson  i;.  The  Railroad,  64 
Wis,    447. 


500  THE  LAW  OF   CARRIERS.  [§463. 

those  states  which  had  refused  to  follow  the  rule  which  pre- 
vails there,  of  putting  the  responsibility  of  the  carriage  through- 
out to  destination  upon  the  receiving  carrier,  independently  of 
contract.2'^  And  where  the  defendant  railroad  was  one  of  a 
number  of  roads  which  had  associated  to  carry  through  freight 
under  the  name  of  the  ' '  White  Line, ' '  the  receipt  of  an  agent  of 
the  association  for  freight  received  at  an  intermediate  station 
was  held  not  to  bind  the  defendant  company,  as  such  agent  could 
only  bind  a  member  of  the  line  when  he  contracted  about  busi- 
ness in  which  the  particular  member  was  interested  and  bound 
to  assist  in  performing;  and  as  defendant  was  not  bound  as  a 
member  of  the  line  to  assist  in  the  transportation  of  freight 
taken  up  at  an  intermediate  station,  the  contract  made  by  the 
agent  was  held  to  be  unauthorized.^^ 

Sec.  463.  (§  270.)  What  will  be  construed  as  a  contract  ex- 
empting from  liability  for  negligence — Language  must  be 
clear. — No  contract,  however,  exempting  the  carrier  from  lia- 
bility for  losses  or  damage  occurring  from  negligence  will  be 
implied  from  doubtful  language.  To  have  this  effect  where  al- 
lowable at  all,  the  contract  must  so  clearly  and  explicitly  include 
liability  for  the  consequences  of  negligence  as  to  leave  no  doubt 
of  its  meaning  and  intent.^^  The  contract  must  operate  accord- 
ing to  its  terms;  but  when  doubtful  terms  are  employed,  the 
general  rule  binding  common  carriers  to  a  stringent  liability 
will  determine  the  construction,  because  when  the  carrier  insists 
that  an  exception  has  been  created  in  his  favor,  the  burden  oc 

27.  Burroughs  v.  Railroad,  100  29.  Nicholas  v.  Railroad  Co.,  89 
Mass.  26.  See  also,  Grover  &  Bak-  N.  Y.  370;  Mynard  v.  Railroad  Co., 
er  Co.  V.  Railway  Co.,  70  Mo.  672;  71  N.  Y.  180;  Holsapple  v.  Rail- 
White  V.  Railroad  Co.,  19  Mo.  App.  road  Co.,  86  N.  Y.  275;  Canfield  r. 
400;  Turner  ^.  Railroad  Co.,  20  Mo.  Railroad  Co.,  93  N.  Y.  532;  Ad- 
App.  632;  Crouph  r.  Railroad  Co.,  ams  Ex.  Co.  v.  Carnahan,  29  Ind. 
42  Mo.  App.  248;  Patterson  V.  Rail-  App.  606,  63  N.  E.  Rep.  245,  64 
road  Co.,  47  Mo.  App.  570;  s.  c.  N.  E.  Rep.  647,  94  Am.  St.  Rep. 
56  Mo.  App.  657;  Minter  v.  Rail-  279;  citing  Hutchinson  on  Carr.; 
road  Co.,  56  Mo.  App.  282.  Price  v.   Union   Lighterage   Co.,    1 

28.  Irwin  v.  The  Railroad,  59  N.  K.  B.  (1904)  412,  73  L.  J.  K.  B. 
Y.   653.  222,  20  T.  L.  R.  177. 


§  463.]  CONTRACTS  LIMITING  LIABILITY.  501 

showing  it  rests  upon  him ;  and  when  the  terms  of  the  exception 
are  general  and  can  be  reasonably  satisfied  by  a  limited  con- 
struction, their  meaning  will  not  be  extended  beyond  such  rea- 
sonable limits.  Hence  where  the  agreement  between  the  common 
carrier  and  the  owner  of  the  goods  provided  in  general  terms 
that  they  were  to  be  transported  at  the  owner's  rLsk,  it  was  held 
that  the  owner  assumed  the  risks  arising  from  the  ordinary  dan- 
gers of  transportation  by  the  means  employed  which  the  reason- 
able  and  ordinary  care  of  the  carrier  might  be  insuflicieut  to 
prevent;  but  that  the  carrier  was  still  liable  for  losses  arising 
from  dangers  which  ordinary  care  and  prudence  might  have 
avoided.30  So  the  exception  in  the  carrier's  receipt  of  liability 
for  all  loss  or  damage  "arising  from  the  dangers  of  railroad, 
ocean,  steain  or  river  navigation,  leakage,  fire,  or  from  any  cause 
whatever,"  was  held  not  to  exempt  him  from  liability  for  losses 
or  damage  occurring  from  his  own  negligence  or  that  of  his 
servants,  the  court  remarking  that  "the  terms  of  these  con- 
tracts are  very  much  under  the  control  of  the  carriers,  and  they 
may  justly  be  required  to  express  in  plain  terms  the  entire  ex- 
emption for  which  they  stipulate.  The  language  of  this  clause 
is  very  broad;  but  if  it  be  desired  that  a  clause  shall  cover 
losses  by  negligence,  it  is  not  too  much  to  say  that  the  purpose 
must  be  clearly  expressed,  "^i  It  has  also  been  decided  that 
where  such  contract  relieves  the  carrier  from  responsibility  for 
losses  by  fire,  he  is  still  liable  for  such  losses,  if  it  appear  that 
they  have  resulted  from  his  negligence.^^  And  where  the  ex- 
emption was  from  damage  or  loss  from  any  act,  neglect  or  de- 
fault of  the  pilot,  master  or  mariners,  it  was  held  that  the  gross 
carelessness  of  the  mate  in  delivering  property  in  port  ought  not 
to  be  deemed  within  the  exception.^^ 

30.  French    v.    Railroad    Co.,    4     Y.,  168;  Westcott  r.  Fargo,  C  Lans. 
Keyes  (N.  Y.)   108;  Nashville,  etc.     319. 

R.    R.    V.    Jackson,    6    Heisk.    271;         32.  Steinweg  r.  Railroad,  43   N. 

Baltimore,  etc.  R.  R.  v.  Rathbone,  Y.    123;    Lamb   /•.  Railroad.  46  vl. 

1  W.   Va.    87;    Mobile,   etc.   R.   R.  271;   Bostwick  r.  Railroad,   45  id. 

V.  Jarboe,  41  Ala.  644;  Canfield  v.  712. 
Railroad  Co.,  93  N.  Y.  532.  33.  Guillaume  r.  Hamburgh,  etc. 

31.  Magnin  v.   Dinsmore,   56  N.  F.  Co.,  42  N.  Y.  212. 


502 


THE  LAW   OF   CARRIERS. 


[§464. 


Sec.  464.  (§  275.)  Contracts  limiting  liability  must  be  con- 
strued strictly  against  the  carrier. — When  such  contracts  be- 
tween the  carrier  and  his  employer  depend  upon  the  notices  of 
the  carrier  or  upon  terms  and  conditions  which  he  has  put  into 
his  receipts,  if  there  be  doubt  or  ambiguity  in  such  notices  or 
in  the  language  of  the  receipts,  it  will  be  solved  in  favor  of  the 
employer  and  against  the  carrier.^*  The  law  is  said  to  be  jealous 
of  the  duty  and  obligation  of  the  carrier,  and  will  not  allow 
him  to  divest  himself  of  them  without  plain  language  indicative 
of  an  agreement  to  that  effect.  The  imposition  of  his  duties  is 
not  a  light  thing  to  be  shuffled  off  at  his  pleasure.    It  has  been 


34.  Kansas  City,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Holland,  68  Miss.  351,  8  So.  Rep. 
516;  Black  v.  Transportation  Co., 
55  Wis.  319;  Little  Rock,  etc.  Ry. 
Co.  V.  Talbot,  39  Ark.  524;  Nor- 
man V.  Binnington,  25  Q.  B.  Div. 
475;  Taylor  v.  Steam  Co.,  L.  R.  9 
Q.  B.  at  p.  549;  Burton  v.  English, 
12  Q.  B.  Div.  at  p.  224;  The  Cale- 
donia, 157  U.  S.  124,  15  Sup.  Ct. 
Rep.  537,  39  L.  Ed.  644;  Compania 
De  Navigacion  La  Plecha  r.  Brau- 
er,  168  U.  S.  104,  18  Sup.  Ct.  Rep. 
12,  42  L.  Ed.  398;  Railway  Co.  r. 
Reiss,  183  U.  S.  621,  22  Sup.  Ct.  R. 
53,  affirming  99  Fed.  1006,  39  C. 
C.  A.  679  and  98  Fed.  533,  39  C. 
C.  A.  149;  Fairbank  &  Co.  r.  Rail- 
way Co.,  81  Fed.  289,  26  C.  C.  A. 
402,  47  U.  S.  App.  744,  38  L.  R.  A. 
271,  reversing  66  Fed.  471;  Rail- 
road Co.  V.  Nichols,  85  Fed.  945, 
29  C.  C.  A.  500;  Smith  v.  Booth, 
122  Fed.  626,  58  C.  C.  A.  479,  af- 
firming 110  Fed.  680;  Pierce  v. 
The  Railroad,  120  Cal.  156,  47  Pac. 
Rep.  874,  52  Pac.  Rep.  302,  40  L. 
R.  A.  350,  354;  Parker  v.  The 
Railroad,  133  N.  Car.  335,  45  S.  E. 
Rep.  658,  63  L.  R.  A.  827;  Amory 
Mfg.  Co.  V.  The  Railway,  89  Tex. 
419,  37  S.  W.  Rep.  856,  59  Am.  St. 


Rep.   65;    Welch   v.   The  Railway, 

N.  Dak.  ,  103  N.  W.  Rep. 

396;  Railway  Co.  v.  Nicholai,  4 
Ind.  App.  119,  30  N.  E.  Rep.  424, 
51  Am.  St.  Rep.  206;  Steamship 
Co.  V.  Pilkington,  (Canada)  28  S. 
C.  R.   146. 

A  provision  in  a  bill  of  lading 
that  the  railroad  company,  in  case 
of  loss,  should  have  the  benefit  of 
any  insurance  that  may  have  been 
obtained  upon  the  goods  was  con- 
strued to  cover  loss  or  damage  to 
the  goods  themselves,  and  not 
damage  sustained  by  reason  of  a 
mere  failure  to  carry  and  deliver 
the  goods  at  a  reasonable  time. 
Klass  Commission  Co.  v.  The  Rail- 
road, 80  Mo.  App.  164.  So  a  con- 
dition in  the  contract  that  the 
shipper,  in  case  of  loss  or  injury, 
should  give  the  carrier  notice  of 
his  claim  within  a  certain  time 
was  held  not  to  apply  to  a  claim 
for  damages  arising  on  account  of 
a  delay  in  transportation.  Louis- 
ville, etc.  R.  Co.  V.  Bell,  13  Ky. 
Law  Rep.  393;  Louisville,  etc.  R. 
Co.  V.  Smith,  14  Ky.  Law  Rep.  814; 
Leonard  v.  The  Railway,  54  Mo. 
App.  293;   s.  C.  57  Mo.  App.  366. 


§464.]  CONTRACTS   LIMITING   LIABILITY.  503 

sanctioned  by  the  accumulated  wisdom  of  many  years,  and  can 
only  be  laid  aside  under  circumstances  which  import  a  clear 
agreement  upon  the  part  of  the  other  party  to  the  contract. 
Thus,  where  the  carrier  had  given  two  notices,  he  was  held  to  be 
bound  by  the  one  least  beneficial  to  himself.^-''  And  where  he 
had  put  up  on  a  board  in  his  office  a  notice  which  limited  his 
liability,  and  had  also  circulated  handbills,  proposing  to  carry  on 
terms  of  less  restricted  liability,  he  was  held  bound  by  the  lat- 
ter.36  go  where  a  bill  of  lading  provided  that  the  carrier  would 
not  be  liable  for  loss  or  damage  arising  from  causes  incident  to 
railroad  transportation,  nor  from  fire  or  the  elements  "while  at 
depots, ' '  and  the  goods  were  destroyed  by  fire  while  in  the  depot 
at  destination,  it  was  held  that  since  doubtful  expressions  were 
to  be  taken  most  strongly  against  the  carrier,  the  words,  "whih; 
in  depots, ' '  referred  only  to  the  depots  at  which  the  cars  con- 
taining the  goods  might  be  stopped  and  not  to  the  depot  at 
destination.^'^  And  where  a  carrier  effected  an  arrangement 
with  a  compress  company  to  act  as  its  agent  and  receive  cotton 
intended  for  transportation  over  its  route,  and  it  accepted  a  de- 
livery of  cotton  at  such  place  instead  of  at  its  own  depot  and 
issued  its  ordinary  bill  of  lading  therefor  which  stipulated  for 
exemption  from  liability  for  loss  by  fire  while  the  cotton  was  in 
its  depots,  stations,  or  places  of  transshipment,  it  was  held  that 
the  exemption  was  not  to  be  construed  as  relating  to  fire  in  the 
cotton  press.38  So  a  clause  in  a  ship's  bill  of  lading  which 
stated  that  the  ship  would  not  be  answerable  for  loss  occasioned 
by  latent  defects  in  the  machinery  or  hull  of  the  vessel  not  re- 
sulting from  a  want  of  due  diligence  was  held  not  to  cover  a 
condition  of  unseaworthiness  existing  at  the  commencement  of 

35.  Munn    v.    Baker,    2    Starkie,         37.  E.    0.    Standard    Milling   Co. 
255.  r.  Transit  Co.,  122  Mo.  25S.  26  S. 

36.  St.     Louis,     etc.     R.     R.     v.     W.  Rep.  704. 

Smuck,    49    lud.    302 ;    Atwood   v.        38.  Deming  r.  Merchants'  Cotton 

Trans.  Co.,  9  Watts,  87;   Aiery  v.  Press  &  Storage  Co..  90  Tenn.   (6^ 

Merrill,  2  Curtis,  S;  Edsall  v.  Rail-  Pickle)   :506,  17  S.  W.  Rep.  89,  13 

road,  50  N.  Y.  661.  L.   R.   A.   518, 


504  THE  LAW   OF   CARRIERS.  [§  465. 

the  voyage,  but  to  apply  only  to  a  state  of  unseaworthiness  aris- 
ing during  the  voyage.^^ 

Sec.  465.  (§276.)  Same  subject — Particular  exemptions 
not  enlarged  by  general  language. — When  the  particular 
dangers  or  risks  against  which  the  carrier  has  specifically  guard- 
ed himself  in  his  receipt  are  followed  by  more  general  and  com- 
prehensive words  of  exemption,  the  latter  are  to  be  construed  to 
embrace  only  occurrences  ejusdem  generis  with  those  previously 
enumerated,  unless  there  be  a  clear  intent  to  the  contrary.  Aa 
where  the  owner  of  horses  who  was  about  to  send  them  by  rail- 
road entered  into  a  contract  with  the  company  that  he  would 
"take  all  risks  of  loss,  injury,  damage  or  other  contingencies  in 
loading,  conveyance,  unloading  and  otherwise,  whether  arising 
from  negligence,  default  or  misconduct,  gross  or  culpable  or  oth- 
erwise, on  the  part  of  the  railway  company's  servants,  agents 
or  officers,"  and  upon  the  journey  the  horses  were  injured  by  the 
bottom  of  the  car  in  which  they  were  placed  giving  way,  it  was 
held  that  this  defect  in  the  car  had  no  relation  to  any  of  the  risks 
assumed  by  the  owner  and  was  not  therefore  included  in  them. 
The  contract,  it  was  said,  had  reference  to  such  risks  only  as  were 
likely  to  arise  from  the  nature  of  the  freight,  from  delays,  and 

39.  The   Aggi,    107   Fed.   300,   46  as   to   comprehend   a  state   of  un- 

C.  C.  A.  276,  affirming  93  Fed.  484.  seaworthiness,   whether   patent  or 

A   stipulation   in   a   contract   of  latent,  existing  at  the  commence- 

affreightment   exempting   the   ves-  ment   of   the   voyage.     The   Carib 

sel  from  liability  for  loss  or  dam-  Prince,  170  U.  S.  655,  18  Sup.  Ct. 

age  occasioned   by  "latent  defects  R.  753,  42  L.  C.  A.  1181,  reversing 

in  the  hull  of  the  vessel"  will  not  68  Fed.  254  and  63  Fed.  266.     But 

extend  to  such  defects  as  were  in  the  breaking  of  a  junk  ring  on  a 

existence  at  the  time  of  the  com-  steamship     engine     cylinder     was 

mencement   of   the    voyage.      The  held  to  be  "an  accident  of  the  sea 

Sandfield,  92  Fed.  663,  34  C.  C.  A.  and  of  the  machinery"  within  the 

612,  affirming  79  Fed.  371.  meaning  of  an  exemption  from  lia- 

Clauses  exempting  the  owner  of  bility  for  losses  from  such  dangers, 

the   vessel   from  the  general  obli-  The  Curlew,  55  Fed.  1003,  5  C.  C. 

gation  of  furnishing  a  seaworthy  A.  386,  8  U.  S.  App.  405. 

vessel    must    be    confined    within  See     also,     The    Maori    King   v. 

strict  limits,  and  are  not  to  be  ex-  Hughes,  2  Q.  B.   (1895)   550,  65  L. 

tended      by      latitudinarian      con-  J.   Q.  B.   168. 
struction  or  forced  implication  so 


§466.]  CONTRACTS   LIMITING  LIABILITY.  505 

from  casualties  and  defaults  occurring  during  the  loading,  trans- 
portation, unloading  and  delivery  of  the  horses,  but  not  to  risks 
not  incident  to  the  ordinary  transaction  of  business  and  arising 
from  negligence  in  no  way  likely  to  be  incurred  by  a  company 
using  ordinary  care  in  the  management  of  its  business.*"  And 
where  the  contract  was  that  the  shipper  of  the  goods  released  the 
carrier  "from  any  and  all  damages  that  may  occur  to  the  said 
goods  arising  from  leakage  or  decay,  chafing  or  breakage,  or 
from  any  other  cause  not  the  result  of  collision  of  trains  or  of 
cars  being  thrown  from  the  track  while  in  transit,"  it  was  held 
not  to  release  him  from  total  loss  or  destruction  of  the  goods  by 
fire." 

Sec.  466.  Same  subject — Construction  of  specific  terms  not 
altered  to  release  carrier.— In  the  case  of  Amory  :Manufactur- 
ing  Co.  V.  The  Railway ,^2  it  appeared  that  a  quantity  of  cotton 
was  placed  upon  the  platform  of  a  compress  company  at  the 
point  of  shipment  for  the  purpose  of  being  compressed.  While 
the  cotton  was  still  on  the  platform  of  the  compress  company, 
the  defendant  issued  to  the  shipper  its  bill  of  lading  by  which  it 
agreed  to  transport  the  cotton.  The  bill  of  lading  provided  that 
neither  the  company  issuing  the  bill  of  lading  nor  any  connect- 
ing carrier  would  be  liable  in  case  of  loss  by  fire  while  the  cot- 
ton was  in  transit,  or  in  depot  or  place  of  transshipment,  or  on 
landing  at  the  place  of  delivery.  The  cotton  was  destroyed  by 
fire  while  still  upon  the  platform  of  the  compress  company.  In 
an  action  to  recover  the  value  of  the  cotton,  the  trial  court  found 
that  the  fire  was  due  to  no  negligence  on  the  part  of  the  defend- 

40.  Hawkins  v.  Great  W.  R'y  fining  Co.  v.  The  G.  R.  Booth,  64 
Co.,  17  Mich.  57.  Fed.    878;    The    Waikato    v.    New 

41.  Menzell  v.  The  Railroad,  1  Zealand  Shipping  Co.  (189»),  1  Q. 
Dillon  531.  See  also.  Railway  Co.  B.  56,  68  L.  J.  Q.  B.  1,  79  Law  T. 
V.  Callender,  183  U.  S.  632,  22  (N.  S.)  326;  Trainor  v.  Steamship 
Sup.  Ct.  R.  257,  affirming  98  Fed.  Co.  (Canada),  16  S.  C.  R.  156. 
538,  39  C.  C.  A.  154;  The  G.  R.  42.  89  Tex.  419,  37  S.  W.  Rep. 
Booth,  171  U.  S.  450,  19  Sup.  Ct.  856,  59  Am.  St.  Rep.  65.  See  also. 
R.  9,  43  L.  Ed.  234;  s.  c.  91  Fed.  Gulf,  etc.  R'y  Co.  v.  Pepperell  Mfg. 
164,  33  C.  C.  A.  430,  reversing  on  Co.  (Tex.  Civ.  App.),  37  S.  W.  Rep. 
other  grounds  American  Sugar  Re-  965. 


506  THE   LAW    OF    CARRIERS.  [§  466. 

ant,  and  held  that  under  the  exemption  clause  of  the  bill  of 
lading  it  was  not  liable.  This  ruling  was  affirmed  in  the  court  of 
civil  appeals.    But  the  supreme  court,  in  reversing  the  ruling  of 
the  lower  court,  said:     "In  order  to  sustain  the  ruling  of  the 
court  of  civil  appeals  and  of  the  trial  court,  it  must  be  held  that 
the  cotton,  while  upon  the  platform  of  the  compress  company, 
was  either  in  transit  or  in  depot  within  the  meaning  of  those 
terms  as  used  in  the  bill  of  lading.     .     .     .    It  is  contended  on 
the  one  side  that  the  words  in  transit  are  the  equivalent  of  the 
words  in  transitu,  and  that  goods  in  the  hands  of  a  carrier  are 
in  transit  from  the  moment  of  their  delivery  to  him  until  they 
reach  the  hands  of  the  consignee.     In  a  sense,  the  meaning  of 
the  two  phrases  is  the  same.     The  one  is  a  literal  translation  of 
the  other.     But  as  actually  employed,    they    have    a    different 
meaning  and  application.    In  transit  means  literally  in  course 
of  passing  from  point  to  point,  and  such  is  its  common  accepta- 
tion.   Such  also  is  the  literal  meaning  of  the  phrase  in  transitu, 
but  for  the  sake  of  convenience  in  defining  the  right  of  a  cred- 
itor to  stop  goods  which  have  been  sold  but  not  delivered  to  an 
insolvent  purchaser,  they  have  been  given  a  broader  significa« 
tion.     ...    It  would  seem,  therefore,  that  if  the  parties  to  the 
contract  had  desired  to  employ  a  single  phrase  which  would  cover 
the  carrier's  exemption  from  liability  from  the  time  the  goods 
were  received  by  it  until  it  had  delivered  them  to  the  consignee, 
they  would  have  used  the  more  comprehensive  terms.       .     . 
But  here  the  words  in  transit,  the  words  actually  used,  according 
to  their  ordinary  signification,  apply  only  to  the  cotton  from  the 
time  the  transportation  was  to  begin  until  it  was  to  end  under 
the  contract.    The  cotton  not  having  been  set  in  motion  towards 
its  destination  was  not  in  fact  in  transit,  and  we  cannot  hold  it 
constructively  in  transit  while  on  the  platform.    ...      It  may 
be  true  that  no  satisfactory  answer  can  be  given  to  the  question 
why  the  defendant  should  limit  its  liability  from  the  very  mo- 
ment the  transportation  began  until  the  delivery  of  the  cotton 
to  the  consignee,  and  it  should  omit  to  limit  it  at  its  receiving 
depot.     It  may  be  that  its  intention  was  to  make  its  exemption 
general  and  to  contract  that  it  should  not  be  liable  for  the  loss  of 


§467.]  CONTRACTS  LIMITING   LIABILITY.  507 

the  property  either  while  in  transit  or  while  at  the  place  it  was 
received.  But  we  hold  that  the  phrase  while  in  transit  did  not 
exempt  the  company  from  the  loss  of  the  cotton  before  the  trans- 
portation actually  began ;  and  in  any  event,  there  is  such  ^'rave 
doubt  as  to  the  construction  of  the  phrase  as  would  rcMniiiv  that 
the  doubt  should  be  resolved  in  favor  of  the  shipper." 

Sec.  467.  Same  subject.— So  in  De  Rothschild  v.  Steam 
Packet  Company/  where  it  appeared  that  a  number  of  boxes  of 
gold  dust  were  delivered  to  the  defendant  by  the  agent  of  tht; 
plaintiff,  to  be  carried  from  South  America  to  London,  under  a 
bill  of  lading  containing  exceptions  to  the  carrier's  liability  for 
losses  "by  the  act  of  God,  the  queen's  enemies,  pirates,  robbers, 
fire,  accidents  from  machinery,  boilers  and  steam,  the  dangers  of 
the  seas,  roads  and  rivers  of  what  kind  and  nature,"  and  the 
boxes  were  stolen  from  a  railroad  truck  in  which  they  had  been 
put  after  their  arrival  at  Southampton,  for  conveyance  thence  to 
London,  it  was  held  that,  under  the  circumstances,  and  consider- 
ing the  value  of  the  goods,  it  could  never  have  been  intended  to 
relieve  the  company  from  responsibility  for  losses  by  larceny; 
and  that  robbers  meant  such  as  might  take  by  force  and  not  those 
who  might  take  by  stealth,  and  dangers  of  the  roads,  if  they  had 
reference  at  all  to  roads  on  land,  meant  only  such  dangers  as 
the  overturning  of  carriages  at  rough  and  precipitous  places  and 
could  not  include  theft.  And  where  the  carrier  limits  his  lia- 
bility in  reference  to  specific  articles,  goods  not  falling  clearly 
within  the  description  specified  will  not  be  included.^ 

Sec.    468.      Same    subject — Ambiguous    words    construed 
against  carrier. — In  Taylor  v.  Steam  Company,^  it  appeared 

1.  7  Exch,  734.  A   limitation   that   the   value  of 

2.  Cream    City   R'y    v.   Railway     each  horse  or  mule  shipped   does 
Co.,   63  Wis.  93.  not    exceed    $100.    will    not    apply 

An  exemption  from  liability  for  to  a  jack  shipped  under  the  con- 

the  negligence  of  the  carrier's  ser-  tract.      Richardson     r.    The   Rail- 

vants,  collision  and  other  dangers,  way,  62  Mo.  App.  1. 
will    not    extend    to    the    personal        3.  L.  R.  9  Q.  B.  rAC.     See  also, 

negligence  of  the  carrier  himself.  Steinman    n.   Angier   Line    (1891) 

The  Guildhall,  64  Fed.  867,  26  U.  1  Q.  B.  619,  60  L.  J.  Q.  B.  425. 
S.  App.  414,   12  C.  C.  A.  445. 


508  THE  LAW  OF   CARRIERS.  [§469. 

that  five  boxes  of  diamonds  had  been  shipped  on  one  of  defend- 
ant's  steamships  under  a  bill  of  lading  which  provided  that  de- 
fendant should  not  be  liable  for  losses  from  the  act  of  God,  the 
queen's  enemies,  pirates,  robbers,  thieves,  barratry  of  master 
and  mariners,  and  the  like.  One  box  of  the  diamonds  was 
stolen  from  the  ship,  either  on  the  voyage  or  on  her  arrival  in 
port  before  the  time  for  delivery  arrived ;  but  there  was  no  evi- 
dence to  show  whether  they  were  stolen  by  one  of  the  crew  or 
by  a  passenger,  or,  after  her  arrival,  by  some  person  from  the 
shore. 

"The  first  question,"  said  Lush,  J.,  "is,  does  'thieves'  include 
persons  on  board  the  ship,  or  is  it  to  be  limited,  as  has  been  held 
in  cases  as  to  policies  of  insurance,  to  persons  outside  the  ship 
and  not  belonging  to  it.  The  word  is  ambiguous,  and,  being  of 
doubtful  meaning,  it  must  receive  such  a  construction  as  is  most 
in  favor  of  the  shipper,  and  not  such  as  is  most  in  favor  of  the 
ship-owner,  for  whose  benefit  the  exceptions  are  framed;  for  if 
it  was  intended  to  give  to  it  the  larger  meaning  which  is  now 
contended  for,  the  intention  to  give  the  ship-owner  that  protec- 
tion ought  to  have  been  expressed  in  clear  and  unambiguous  lan- 
guage. It  is  not,  I  think,  reasonable  to  suppose,  when  the  lan- 
guage used  is  ambiguous,  that  it  was  intended  that  the  ship- 
owner should  not  be  liable  for  thefts  by  one  of  the  crew  or  per- 
sons on  board.  The  ship-owner  must  protect  himself,  if  he  in- 
tends this,  by  the  use  of  unambiguous  language.  I  say  nothing 
as  to  whether  barratry  can  include  theft  by  one  of  the  crew,  be- 
cause there  were  passengers  on  board,  and  therefore  the  theft 
was  not  necessarily  committed  by  one  of  the  crew,  but  might 
have  been  committed  by  one  of  the  passengers."  The  loss  was 
therefore  held  not  to  be  within  the  exception. 

Sec.  469.  Same  subject. — But  in  Spinetti  v.  Steamship  Com- 
pany,* two  boxes  of  specie  had  been  shipped  under  a  bill  of 
lading  providing  that  the  carrier  should  not  be  liable  for  losses 
from  "theft  on  land  or  afloat,"  "barratry  of  master  or  mar- 
iners," "any  act,  neglect  or  default  of  the  pilot,  master,  mar- 

4.  80  N.  Y.  71,  reversing  s.  c.  14  Hun.   100. 


§470.]  CONTRACTS   LIMITING   LIABILITY.  500 

iners,  engineers,  servants  or  agents  of  the  company,"  and  others. 
On  the  voyage  a  large  sum  was  abstracted  from  one  of  the  bo.ves, 
and  there  was  evidence  tending  to  show  that  it  liad  been  taken 
by  the  purser,  and  the  question  was  whether  the  h)s.s  was  within 
the  exceptions  or  either  of  them,  and  it  was  held  that  it  was. 
The  purser,  the  court  held,  was  a  mariner,  and  the  loss  was  with- 
in the  exception  of  losses  by  "barratry  of  master  or  mariners," 
as  it  "is  well  established  that  the  term  'barratry'  includes  theft 
and  embezzlement  by  the  crew."  And  even  if  the  purser  were 
not  a  mariner,  it  was  held  that  the  loss  fell  clearly  within  the 
exception  of  ' '  theft  on  land  or  afloat. '  '^ 

Sec.  470.  (§271.)  How  the  benefit  of  such  contracts  can 
be  claimed  by  connecting-  carriers. — An  important  (picstion, 
growing  out  of  the  contracts  of  carriers  for  limited  liability, 
sometimes  arises  as  to  the  extent  to  which  they  may  be  taken  ad- 
vantage of  by  those  carriers  with  whom  they  are  not  directly 
made,  but  who,  as  connecting  carriers  in  the  line  to  destination, 
receive  them,  directly  or  indirectly,  from  the  contracting  carrier 
for  further  transportation.  In  Maghee  v.  Railroad,"  the  goods 
were  received  by  a  railroad  company  at  Louisville,  to  be  trans- 
ported thence  to  New  York,  "unavoidable  accidents  of  railroad 
and  fire  in  depot  excepted."  They  were  carried  by  this  road  to 
its  terminus  and  thence  by  other  companies  to  their  destination, 
but  after  arrival  there  were  burned  in  the  depot  of  the  defend- 
ant which  had  completed  their  transportation.  It  was  held  that 
the  contract  made  with  the  first  road  at  Louisville  inured  to  the 
benefit  of  all  the  succeeding  carriers.  It  was  said  to  be  reason- 
able to  suppose  that  the  compensation  fixed  for  the  carriage  had 

5.  Citing   American   Ins.   Co.   v.  247;    The   Jane    and     Matilda,     1 

Bryan,  1  HilL  25;   s.  c.  26  Wend.  Hagg.    Adm.    187,    190;    Smith    v. 

663;     1    PhilL    on    Ins.    1071;     At-  Sloop  Pekin,  Gilpin,  203;  Bouvier's 

lantic  Ins.  Co.  v.  Storrow,  5  Paige  Law  Diet.  tit.  "Mariner";    Boehm 

285_  V.  Combe,  2  Maule  &  Sel.   172. 

Upon  the  point  that  the  purser  6.  45  N.  Y.  514.     See  also,  Rail- 
was  a  "mariner,"  the  court  cited  way  Co.  v.  Sharp.  04  Ark.  115.  40 
In  re  Hayes,   2   Curteis  Ec.   338;  S   W.  Rep.  781,  citing  Hutchinson 
McLachlan  on  Shipping,  146,  148;  on  Carr. 
The    Gratitudine,    3    C.   Rob.   240, 


510  THE   LAW   OF    CARRIERS.  [§  471. 

relation  to  the  restricted  liability  assumed,  and  that  the  con- 
tracting company,  having  undertaken  to  carry  the  goods  to  their 
ultimate  destination,  had  an  interest  in  making  the  exception 
commensurate  with  the  scope  and  duration  of  its  contract,  and 
that  it  must  be  held  that  all  the  connecting  lines  acted  under  its 
employment;  from  which  it  resulted  that  all  contracts  made  by 
the  first  carrier  would  inure  to  their  benefit. 

Sec.  471.  (§272.)  Same  subject. — On  the  other  hand,  in 
Babcock  v.  Railroad^  the  goods  were  delivered  to  a  company 
other  than  the  defendant  to  carry  to  the  terminus  of  its  own 
route,  to  be  there  delivered  to  a  succeeding  carrier.  After  sev- 
eral transfers  to  successive  carriers  on  their  way  to  destination, 
the  goods  finally  came  into  possession  of  the  defendant  for  con- 
tinued carriage,  and  while  in  its  possession  they  were  destroyed 
by  fire,  which  was  one  of  the  excepted  risks  in  the  contract  of 
the  first  company.  The  question  being  whether  advantage  could 
be  taken  of  this  contract  by  the  defendant,  it  was  determined 
that  it  could  not.  The  contract,  it  was  said,  not  being  intended 
as  a  through  contract,  no  rate  of  freight  was  agreed  upon  for 
any  part  of  the  route  beyond  the  terminus  of  the  first  carrier's 
route,  and  there  was  therefore  no  consideration  for  an  agree- 
ment by  the  plaintiff  to  relieve  the  carriers  who  should  there- 
after receive  the  property  for  transportation  from  their  common- 
law  liabilities,  and  no  such  agreement  was  made.  It  was  ad- 
mitted that  carriers  who  were  not  named  in  the  contract  for  the 
carriage  of  goods,  and  who  are  not  formal  parties  to  it,  may, 
under  certain  circumstances,  have  the  benefit  of  it;  as  when  it 
is  made  by  one  of  several  carriers  upon  connecting  lines  or 
routes,  for  the  carriage  of  the  property  over  the  several  routes 
for  an  agreed  price,  by  an  arrangement  among  the  several  lines ; 
or  when,  in  the  absence  of  such  an  arrangement,  one  carrier  con- 
tracts for  the  carriage  of  the  goods  over  his  own  and  other  lines, 
which  would  be  a  through  contract.  In  all  such  cases  the  con- 
tract has  respect  to  and  provides  for  the  services  of  the  carriers 
upon  the  connecting  routes.     But  where  there  is  no  such  con- 

7.  49   N.  Y.   491. 


§472.]  CONTRACTS   LIMITING   LIABILITY.  511 

tract  for  the  entire  transportation,  but  iiKMt-ly  an  a.-rroeuiciit  lo 
carry  to  the  end  of  its  own  line  and  there  deliver  to  the  succeed- 
ing carrier,  the  contracting-  carrier  is  und('r.stt)()d  to  jirovidc  only 
for  himself,  and  those  who  succeed  him  take  the  goods  as  though 
no  contract  whatever  had  been  made.  The  connecting  carrier 
in  such  a  case  is  not  only  a  stranger  to  the  contract  hut  to  its 
consideration.  There  can  be  no  presumption  that  there  has  been 
on  his  part  any  abatement  of  his  charges,  as  a  consideration  for 
exemption  from  liability  on  the  part  of  the  owner  of  the  goods; 
and  there  being  no  express  contract  with  him  the  law  will  not 
imply  one  for  his  benefit.^ 

SeCo  472.  (§273.)  Same  subject— Limitation  inures  to  ben- 
efit of  connecting  carrier  only  when  contract  for  through  car- 
riage exists. — The  reasons  upon  which  these  decisions  are  based 
are  obvious.  When  the  carrier  has  undertaken  to  convey  only 
to  the  end  of  his  own  route,  and  there  to  deliver  to  the  succeed- 
ing carrier  for  further  carriage,  he  is  a  carrier  only  for  his  own 
route,  and  a  forwarder  only  by  the  next  succeeding  carrier,  as 
agent  for  the  owner  of  the  goods.  He  has  no  interest  in  the 
further  transportation,  and  any  contract  as  to  liability  which  he 
may  have  made  is  to  be  understood  as  only  co-extensive  with  liis 
obligation,  unless  expressly  stipulated  otherwise.  The  succeed- 
ing carriers  are  in  no  wise  his  agents,  but  carry  for  the  owner  of 
the  goods,  and  cannot  claim  the  benefit  of  innnunities  for  which 
he  contracted.^ 

But  when  he  undertakes  for  the  conveyance  to  destination,  his 
responsibility  continues  throughout  the  transit.  The  succeeding 
carriers  are  but  his  agents,  and  as  such  are  entitled  for  their 
protection  to  the  benefit  of  all  contracts  made  with  their  princi- 
pal.   Hence  it  follows  that  whenever  the  carrier  is  bound  by  his 

8.  Merchants'  D.  T.  Co.  r.  Bolles,  sections,  470,  471.  See  also,  West- 
80  111.  473;  Manhattan  Oil  Co.  v.  em,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Cotton  Mills, 
Railroad,  54  N.  Y.  197;  ^tna  Ins.  81  Ga.  522;  Robinson  v.  Steam- 
Co.  V.  Wheeler,  49  N.  Y.  616;  Ban-  ship  Co.,  71  N.  Y.  Supp.  424.  O:! 
croft  V.  Transportation  Co.,  47  App.  Div.  211;  s.  c.  affirmed  wlth- 
lowa,  262.  out  opinion.   177  N.   Y.   565,  69   N. 

9.  See  cases  cited   in   preceding  E.  Rep.  1130. 


512  THE  LAW   OF   CARRIERS.  [§473. 

contract  or  by  law  to  carry  the  goods  to  the  place  of  th<nr  con- 
signment, all  carriers  who  engage  in  the  transportation  for  any 
portion  of  the  route  are  entitled  to  all  the  protection  which  the 
first  carrier  has  secured  by  his  contract  with  the  shipper,^"* 
Whenever,  therefore,  as  in  England  and  in  many  of  the  states  of 
this  country,  upon  the  delivery  of  goods  to  a  common  carrier, 
consigned  to  a  particular  point,  the  law  obliges  him  to  become 
responsible  for  the  carriage  to  that  place,  all  subsequent  carriers 
who  may  be  employed  to  aid  in  the  through  transportation  do  so 
as  agents  of  the  carrier  to  whom  they  are  first  delivered,  and  are 
protected  by  his  contracts.^  ^  By  the  English  law,  as  we  have 
seen,  the  question  could  never  arise,  because  the  right  of  action 
in  such  cases  would  be  confined  to  the  first  company. 12 

Sec.  473.  (§  274.)  Same  subject. — The  American  courts,  as 
we  have  seen^  have  not  confined  the  right  of  action  to  the  carrier 
upon  whom  rests  the  responsibility  of  the  entire  transportation 
where  more  lines  than  one  have  to  be  traveled  by  the  goods  to 
reach  destination,  whether  that  responsibility  arises  by  contract 
or  is  forced  upon  him  by  construction  of  law ;  so  that  even  those 

10.  See  cases  cited  in  §§470,  415,  an  express  company  delivered 
471.  See  also,  Adams  Ex.  Co.  v.  a  receipt  to  a  shipper  which  con- 
Harris,  120  Ind.  73;  Taylor  v.  tained  a  stipulation  exempting  it- 
Railroad  Co.,  39  Ark.  148;  Whit-  self  from  liability  except  for  fraud 
worth  V.  Railway  Co.,  87  N.  Y.  or  gross  negligence.  It  was  fur- 
414;  Kiff  V.  Railroad  Co.,  32  Kan.  ther  provided  that  such  stipulation 
263;  Bird  v.  The  Railway,  99  should  inure  to  the  benefit  of  any 
Tenn.  719,  42  S.  W.  Rep.  451,  63  connecting  carrier.  A  connecting 
Am.  St,  Rep.  856,  citing  Hutchin-  carrier,  in  receiving  the  goods, 
son  on  Carr.;  White  v.  Weir,  53  N.  made  out  a  new  and  different  con- 
Y.  Supp.  465,  33  App.  Div.  145;  tract  from  that  contained  in  the 
Railway  Co.  v.  Viers,  24  Ky.  Law  first  carrier's  receipt.  It  was  held 
Rep.  356,  68  S.  W.  Rep.  469;  Mears  that  by  so  doing  it  could  no  longer 
V.  The  Railroad,  75  Conn.  171,  53  claim  the  benefit  of  the  stipula- 
Atl.  Rep.  610,  96  Am.  St.  Rep.  tion  in  the  first  contract. 
192,  56  L.  R.  A.  884;  Railroad  Co.  11.  Ante,  §  225. 
V.  Bridger,  94  Ga.  471,  20  S.  E.  12.  Wilby  v.  Railway  Co.,  2 
Rep.  349;  Railway  Co.  v.  Sales  Hurl.  &  N.  703;  Mytton  v.  Rail-. 
(Canada),  26  S.  C.  R.  663.  In  way  Co.,  4  id.  615;  The  Directors, 
Browning  v.  Transportation  Co.,  etc.  v.  Collins,  7  H.  L.  Cas.  194; 
78  Wis.  391,  47  N.  W.  Rep.  428,  Coxon  v.  Railway,  5  H.  &  N.  274. 
23  Am.  St.  Rep.  414,  10  L.  R.  A. 


§474.]  CONTRACTS  LIMITING   LIABILITY.  513 

courts  which  have  adopted  the  English  rule^^  permit  actions  to 
be  brought  against  any  of  the  connecting  carriers  upon  whose 
lines  the  loss  or  damage  may  have  occurred ;  but  there  can  be  no 
doubt  but  that,  in  such  cases,  the  carrier  who  is  sued  is  entitled 
to  every  advantage  from  the  contract  for  the  carriage  which  the 
contracting  carrier  could  himself  derive  from  it. 

Sec.  474.  (§277c.)  By  what  law  contract  is  to  be  con- 
strued.— The  question,  by  what  law  the  contract  is  to  be  con- 
strued, is  an  interesting  and  important  one,  but  jus  the  whole 
matter  has  been  considered  in  previous  sections,  the  question  will 
not  be  reviewed  here.^^ 

Sec.  475.  (§  278.)  The  consideration  necessary  to  uphold 
such  contracts. — But,  like  all  contracts,  in  order  to  be  binding 
upon  those  who  enter  into  them,  those  which  are  entered  into  by 
the  carrier  and  his  employers  must  be  upheld  by  some  considera- 
tion.^^ So  far  as  the  carrier  is  concerned,  the  consideration  con- 
sists in  the  diminution  of  the  risk  which  he  assumes.  But  the 
consideration  def-ived  from  the  agreement  by  the  owner  of  the 
goods  is  not  always  so  apparent.  As  the  common  carrier  is 
bound  to  carry  without  any  contract  limiting  his  liability,  and 
may  be  compelled  to  do  so  when  his  compensation  is  tendered, 
his  mere  agreement  to  carry  does  not  furnish  a  consideration  for 
the  agreement  to  limit  his  liability,  and  if  his  rate  of  compen- 
sation were  so  fixed  by  law  that  he  could  charge  neither  more 
nor  less  than  a  given  amount  for  the  service  which  is  required 

13.  Ante,   §236.  v.    The   Railway,     ns     Iowa,     127; 

14.  See  ante,  §§  199-224.  Gardner    v.    The  Railway,    127   N. 

15.  Rosenfield  v.  The  Railway,  Car.  293,  37  S.  E.  328;  Railway 
103  Ind.  121,  2  N.  E.  Rep.  344;  Co.  r.  Gilbert,  88  Tenn.  430,  12 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Holland,  162  Ind.  S.  W.  Rep.  1018,  7  L.  R.  A.  162; 
406,  69  N.  E.  Rep.  138,  63  L.  R.  A.  Railway  Co.  v.  Mclntyre,  (Tex. 
948;  McFadden  v.  The  Railway,  Civ.  App.)  82  S.  W.  Rep.  346j 
92  Mo.  343,  4  S.  W.  Rep.  689,  1  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.  r.  Oden,  80 
Am.  St.  Rep.  721;  Wehmann  v.  Ala.  38;  Mouton  r.  The  Railroad, 
The  Railway,  58  Minn.  22,  59  N.  128  Ala.  537,  20  So.  Rep.  f.02; 
W.  Rep.  546;  Southard  v.  The  York  Co.  v.  Central  Railroad,  3 
Railway,  60  Minn.  383,  62  N.  W.  Wall.  107. 

Rep.    442,    619;    German,   etc.    Co. 


/; 


514  THE  LAW  OF   CARRIERS.  [§  475. 

of  him,  it  would  be  difficult  to  find  in  the  contract  to  carry  for 
the  legal  rate  any  consideration  which  could  make  such  contract 
obligatory  upon  his  employer.  But  such  is  not  the  case,  and 
the  compensation  for  the  service  of  the  carrier  is  always  sub- 
ject to  the  agreement  of  the  parties.  The  law,  therefore,  will 
presume  that  in  fixing  the  amount  of  compensation  which  he  is 
to  receive,  something  has  been  allowed  to  his  employer  in  the 
way  of  a  reduced  rate  as  the  consideration  to  him  for  agreeing 
to  a  reduced  responsibility  on  the  part  of  the  carrier ;  and  where 
it  is  claimed  that  no  such  reduced  rate  was  in  fact  allowed  him, 
it  will  require  clear  and  satisfactory  evidence  to  rebut  the  pre- 
sumption that  the  diminished  responsibility  was  assumed  in  con- 
sideration of  a  reduced  rate.^^  It  is  held  by  some  courts,^"  how- 
ever, that  the  mere  fact  that  the  contract  to  carry  contains  a 
limitation  upon  the  carrier's  common  law  liability  will  give  rise 
to  no  presumption  that  the  limitation  was  based  upon  a  reduced 
rate  of  compensation,  and  that,  unless  it  can  be  shown  that  the 
rate  charged  was  less  than  the  usual  rate  for  shipments  under 
the  common  law  liability,  the  limitation  will  be  without  a  con- 
sideration to  support  it  and  will  not  be  obligatory  upon  the 
sender  of  the  goods.  But  while  an  agreement  that  the  carrier 
shall  assume  a  diminished  responsibility  will  ordinarily  give  rise 
to  a  presumption  that  some  concession  in  the  way  of  a  reduced 
rate  has  been  allowed  to  his  employer,  if  it  is  shown  that  the 
rate  charged  by  the  carrier  was  the  usual  and  customary  rate 
for  similar  kinds  of  shipments  made  subject  to  his  full  common 

16.  Schaller  v.  The  Railway,  97  136  Mo.  177,  34  S.  W.  Rep.  41, 
Wis.  31,  71  N.  W.  Rep.  1042;  37  S.  W.  Rep.  828;  Duvenick  v. 
Stewart  v.  The  Railway,  21  Ind.  Railroad  Co.,  57  Mo.  App.  550; 
App.  218,  52  N.  E.  Rep.  89;  Weh-  Paddock  v.  Railway  Co.,  60  Mo. 
mann   v.   The   Railway,    58   Minn.  App.    328;    Keyes,   Marshall   Bros. 

22,  59  N.  W.  Rep.  546;   York  Co.  Livery   Co.   v.   Railroad   Co.,  

V.  Railroad  Co.,  3  Wall.  107;  Cau  Mo.  App.  ,  87  S.  W.  Rep.  553; 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  194  U.  S.  427,  24  Sloop   v.    Railroad    Co.,    Mo. 

Sup.  Ct.  6G3,  48  L.  Ed.  1053;   s.  c.  App.     ,     84    S.    W.    Rep.    Ill; 

113  Fed.  91,  51  C.  C.  A.  76;  Arthur  Phoenix  Powder  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Rail- 

V.  Railway  Co.,  139  Fed.  127,  road  Co.,  Mo.  ,  94  S.  W. 

Q    Q    A.  .  Rep.   235;    s.   c.   101  Mo.  App.   442, 

17.  Kellerman    r.    Railroad    Co.,  74  S.  W.  Rep.  492. 


§476.] 


CONTRACTS  LIMITING  LIABILITY, 


515 


law  liability,  and  that  no  concession  of  any  sort  was  in  fact 
allowed,  the  limitation  will  rest  upon  no  consideration  ami  will 
not  relieve  the  carrier.is  And  although  it  may  be  recited  in  the 
contract  of  shipment  that  the  rate  charged  is  less  than  the  usual 
tariff  rate,  such  a  recital  is  not  conclusive  and  may  be  explained 
or  contradicted  by  other  evidence  tending  to  show  that  the  rate 
charged  was  the  usual  tariff  rate.^'-*  But  where  the  contract  was 
for  an  interstate  shipment,  and  abatement  of  rates  was  prohib- 
ited by  an  act  of  congress,  it  was  held  that,  the  contract  being 
silent  on  the  subject,  a  rebate  would  not  be  presumed,  and  that 
the  full  common  law  liability  attached  irrespective  of  the  limita- 
tions contained  in  the  contract.-"^ 

Sec.  476.     (§279.)     Contract  must  have  a  fair  construction. 

— The  intent  of  the  parties  to  such  contracts  is,  of  course,  as  in 
all  other  cases,  to  be  gathered  from  the  whole  instrument.    But 


18.  Richardson  v.  Railway  Co., 
149  Mo.  311,  50  S.  W.  Rep.  782, 
13  Am.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  (N.  S.) 
170;  McPadden  r.  Railway  Co.,  92 
Mo.  343,  4  S.  W.  Rep.  689;  Ficklin 

&  Son  V.   Railroad   Co.,  Mo. 

App.    ,    92     S.    W.    Rep.    347; 

Summers  v.  Railroad  Co., Mo. 

App.    ,    79    S.    W.    Rep.    481; 

Kellerman  v.  Railroad  Co.,  136 
Mo.  177,  34  S.  W.  Rep.  41,  37  S. 
W.   Rep.   828;    Ficklin  v.  Wabash 

R    Co.,  Mo.  App.  — ,  93  S. 

W.  Rep.  847. 

Where  the  rate  charged  is  that 
established  by  law,  and  only  that 
rate  is  offered  to  the  shipper,  a 
special  provision  limiting  the  car- 
rier's liability  is  void.  Railroad 
Co.  r.  Insurance  Co.,  79  Miss.  114, 
30  So.  Rep.  43. 

But  see  Nelson  r.  Railroad  Co., 
4S  N.  Y.  498;  Rubens  v.  Ludgate 
Hill  S.  S.  Co.,  65  Hun,  625,  20 
N.  Y.  Supp.  481. 

19.  The  reduction  in  charge  in 


order  to  support  a  contract  for  a 
limited  liability  must  be  real  and 
not  fictitious.  A  mere  recital, 
therefore,  that  the  abatement  is 
made  and  accepted  by  the  shipper 
will  not  be  conclusive,  but  will 
be  open  to  explanation  or  con- 
tradiction by  parol  evidence  for 
the  purpose  of  showing  what  the 
real  transaction  was.  Railroad 
Co.  r.  Holland,  162  Ind.  406,  69 
N.  E.  Rep.  138,  63  L.  R.  A.  948, 
citing  Railway  Co.  r.  Weakly,  50 
Ark.  397,  8  S.  W.  Rep.  134,  7  Am. 
St.  Rep.  104;  Railroad  Co.  c.  Reid, 
9]  Ga.  377,  17  S.  E.  Rep.  934; 
Railroad  Co.  r.  Crawford,  65  111. 
App.  113;  Railway  Co.  r.  Rey- 
nolds, 17  Kan.  251;  Railway  Co. 
r.  Carter,  9  Tex.  Civ.  App.  677. 
29  S.  W.  Rep.  565.  See  also.  Chi- 
cago,  etc.   R'y   Co.    r.    Hare,   

Ind.  App.  ,  75  X.  E.  Rep.  867. 

20.  Wehmann  /•.  Railway  Co.,  58 
Minn.  22,  59  N.  W.  Rep.  546. 


516  THE   LAW   OF    CARRIERS,  [§  477. 

this  general  rule  of  construction,  when  applied  to  the  contracts 
of  carriers  with  their  employers,  especially  when  such  contracts 
are  created  by  the  acceptance  of  their  carefully  prepared  re- 
ceipts, is  to  be  understood  with  the  qualification  just  stated,  that 
when  their  meaning  is  doubtful  or  ambiguous,  that  construction 
will  be  put  upon  them  which  is  less  favorable  to  the  carrier,  and 
that  their  language,  in  order  to  exclude  his  liability,  should  be 
clear,  and  its  meaning  unmistakable.  But  while  care  is  to  be 
taken  not  to  extend  their  meaning  so  as  to  embrace  immunity 
which  was  never  intended,  it  is  equally  important  to  guard  against 
the  other  extreme  of  excluding  risks  which  are  fairly  embraced. 
Examples  have  been  given  in  which  the  courts  have  put  upon  them 
the  very  narrowest  construction  which  their  terms  would  justify, 
especially  when  the  effort  has  been  on  the  part  of  the  carrier 
to  screen  himself  from  the  consequences  of  negligence,  or  to 
throw  the  whole  risk  upon  his  employer.  Such  cases  show  the 
inclination  of  the  law,  even  while  it  permits  him  to  contract  for 
a  limited  liability,  to  look  with  some  jealousy  upon  such  con- 
tracts. This  no  doubt  grows,  in  part,  out  of  the  fact  that  they 
are  almost  universally  in  the  terms  prepared  by  the  carrier  him- 
self, and  are  rarely  if  ever  scrutinized  by  those  who  intrust  their 
goods  to  him ;  and  certainly  this  Is  a  potent  reason  why  nothing 
which  is  not  clearly  expressed  should  be  understood  in  his  favor. 

Sec.  477.  (§280.)  Carrier  liable  notwithstanding  exemp- 
tion if  the  loss  be  the  result  of  his  negligence. — Whenever  the 
carrier  claims  exemption  from  liability  by  virtue  of  his  contract, 
if  it  appear  that  the  loss  occurred  from  his  negligence,  even 
though  it  be  from  a  cause  excepted  in  the  contract,  he  will  be 
liable  for  the  loss  notwithstanding  the  contract,  unless  liability 
for  loss  by  negligence  be  distinctly  excepted,  whenever  by  the 
rules  of  law  that  may  be  done,  as  in  England  and  some  of  the 
American  states.^i     If,  for  instance,  the  contract  should  exempt 

21.  See     cases     cited     in     §  450,  from      liability      for     loss      from 

ante.  suffocation    of    the    animals.     Mc- 

This   would   be   true  where  the  Fall  r.  Railway  Co., Mo.  App. 

stipulation    relieved    the     carrier  ,  94  S.  W.  Rep.  570. 


§478.]  CONTRACTS   LIMITING   LIABILITY.  517 

him  from  liability  for  losses  by  fire,  and  it  should  be  made  to 
appear  that  the  fire  was  the  result  of  his  neglioenco,  or  tliat  it 
might  with  proper  diligence  have  been  extinguished  before  the 
damage  was  done,  he  will  be  held  liable.  The  cases  upon  this 
subject,  where  the  loss  has  occurred  from  fire  occasioned  or  not 
prevented  by  the  negligence  of  the  carrier,  are  numerous."  Neg- 
ligence and  misfeasance  universally  deprive  the  carrier  of  all 
advantage  which  he  might  have  otherwise  derived,  either  from 
defenses  based  upon  inevitable  accident,  the  act  of  God,  or  con- 
tract, unless  such  contract  cover  his  negligence;  and  even  then 
it  will  not  avail  him  unless,  as  we  have  seen  by  the  law  of  the 
particular  country,  such  exemption  is  considered  just  and  rea- 
sonable. 

Sec.  478.  Carrier  liable,  though  exemption  from  negligence 
would  otherwise  be  sustained,  if  loss  occasioned  by  his  mis- 
feasance.— Although  the  law,  as  in  some  states  permits  exemp- 
tion bj'  contract  from  the  results  of  negligence,  the  contract  can- 
not avail  if  the  act  of  the  carrier  or  his  servants  amounts  to  mis- 
feasance. But  "it  would  be  trifling  with  contracts  deliberately 
made  by  shippers,  and  the  decisions  of  our  courts,  and  saying  in 
effect  that  they  could  not,  by  any  contract,  limit  or  restrict  their 
common-laAv  liability,  to  hold  that  by  calling  ordinary  neglect, 
from  which  a  loss  ensues,  'misfeasance,'  or  'an  abandonment  of 

22.  Montgomery,  etc.  R.  R.  v.  Civ.  App.)  32  S.  W.  Rep.  18; 
Edmonds,  41  Ala.  667;  York  Com-  Marande  r.  Railway  Co.,  184  U.  S. 
pany  r.  Cent.  R.  R.,  3  Wall.  107;  3  73,  22  Sup.  Ct.  R.  340,  46  L.  Ed. 
Steinweg  i:  Railroad,  43  N.  Y.  487;  Thomas  v.  Lancaster  Mills, 
123;  X."  J.  S.  Nav.  Co.  v.  Mer-  71  Fed.  481,  19  C.  C.  A.  88.  34  U.  S. 
chants'  Bank,  6  How.  344;  Rail-  App.  404,  affirming  63  Fed.  200. 
road  Co.  r.  Reeves,  10  Wall.  176;  Where  the  carrier  has  failed  to 
I^amb  V.  Railroad,  46  N.  Y.  271;  make  a  delivery  at  destination, 
Erie  •  Railroad  r.  Lockwood,  28  the  jury  will  be  entitled  to  infer 
Ohio  St.  358;  Insurance  Co.  of  negligence  and  a  contract  exempt- 
North  America  v.  Railroad  Co.,  ing  the  carrier  from  liability  can- 
1.52  Ind.*  333,  .53  N.  E.  Rep.  382;  not  avail  him.  Railway  Co.  r. 
Hutkoff  V.  Railroad  Co.,  61  N.  Y.  Nicholai,  4  Ind.  App.  119.  30  N.  E. 
Supp.  2d4,  29  Misc.  770;  affirmed.  Rep.  424,  51  Am.  St.  Rep.  206. 
63  N.  Y.  Supp.  198,  30  Misc.  802;  See  also,  ante,  §420. 
Railway   Co.   v.   McFadden,    (Tex. 


518 


THE  LAW   OF   CARRIERS. 


§479. 


the  character  of  carriers,'  the  limitation  was  nullified  and  the 
full  common-law  liability  established.  The  act  which  will  de- 
prive the  carrier  of  the  benefit  of  a  contract  for  limited  liability 
fairly  made  must  be  an  affirmative  act  of  wrong-doing,  not 
merely  ordinary  neglect  in  the  course  of  the  bailment.  It  need 
not  -necessarily  be  intentional  wrong-doing,  but  the  mere  omis- 
sion of  ordinary  care  in  the  safe-keeping  and  carriage  of  goods 
is  not  the  misfeasance  intended  by  the  authorities. '  '23 

Sec.  479.  Or,  though  exemption  be  for  losses  resulting  from 
delay,  if  delay  is  occasioned  by  negligence.— Where  the  car- 
rier has  stipulated  that  he  will  not  be  liable  for  losses  resulting 
from  a  delay  in  transportation,  he  cannot  avail  himself  of  tho 
exemption  if  the  delay  has  been  occasioned  by  his  negligence .2* 
But  where,  as  in  England,  the  carrier  is  permitted  to  contract 
against  the  consequences  of  his  negligence,  a  stipulation  that  he 
will  not  be  liable  for  losses  arising  from  a  negligent  delay  will 
be  upheld.25 

Sec.  480.  Or  if  he  departs  from  the  stipulated  method  of 
transportation — When  departure  will  be  excused. — So  if  the 
carrier  depart  from  the  stipulated  method  of  transportation,  his 
contract  for  exemption  will  not  avail  him,  but  during  such  de- 
parture he  will  be  subject  to  his  common-law  responsibility  for 
losses  then  occurring.^^ 

Thus,  if  he  stipulates  for  transportation  entirely  by  rail,  but 
carries  part  of  the  way  by  steamboat  r^  or  if  he  agrees  to  carry 
by  canal,  but  sends  the  goods  by  sea  ■,-^  or  if  he  undertakes  that 


23.  Magnin  v.  Dinsmore,  70  N. 
Y,  410.  Where  the  carrier  is 
guilty  of  a  conversion  of  the 
goods,  the  contract  for  exemption 
will  not  avail  him.  Railway  Co. 
V.  Fifth  National  Bank,  26  Ind. 
App.    600,    59    N.    E.   Rep.    43. 

24.  Parker  v.  The  Railroad,  133 
N.  Car.  33.5,  45  S.  E.  Rep.  658,  63 
L.  R.  A.  827;  Bosley  v.  The  Rail- 
road, 54  W.  Va.  563,  46  S.  E.  Rep. 
613,  66  L.  R.  A.   871. 

25.  Foster  v.  The  Railway,  2  K. 


B.    (1904)    306,  73  L.   J.  K.  B.  811. 

26.  Robinson  v.  Transportation 
Co.,  45  Iowa,  470;  Hand  v.  Baynes, 
4  Whart.  204;  Collins  v.  Railroad 
Co.,  11  Excheq.  790;  Galveston, 
etc.  R.  Co.  V.  Allison,  59  Tex.  193; 
Graham  v.  Davis,  4  Ohio  St.  362; 
Sleat  V.  Flagg,  5  B.  &  Aid.  342; 
Goodrich  v.  Thompson,  44  N.  Y. 
324;    post,    §§617-619. 

27.  Maghee  r.  Railroad  Co.,  45 
N.  Y.  514;  post  §  §  618,  619. 

28.  Hand  v.  Baynes,  supra. 


I 


§  481.]  CONTRACTS  LIMITING   LIABILITY.  519 

the  goods  shall  go  through  without  change  of  ears,  but  traiisi"ci-s 
them  on  the  way  ;29  or  if  he  contracts  to  care  for  the  goods  whil.« 
in  transit,  but  fails  to  exercise  the  requisite  care;-''**  or  if  he 
agrees  to  transport  the  goods  by  passenger  train  service,  but 
sends  them  forward  by  freight  train,3i  he  will  be  liable,  notwitli- 
standing  his  contract  for  exemption,  for  injuries  happening  dur- 
ing such  deviation.  So  if  the  carrier  discriminates  against  the 
shipper  in  the  time  or  rapidity  of  forwarding  his  goods,''-  he  will 
lose  the  benefit  of  exemptions  which  otherwise  might  have  pro- 
tected him.  But  a  well  known  and  notorious  usage  may  be  an 
important  factor  in  determining  whether  there  has  been  a  de- 
parture from  the  stipulated  method  of  transportation;  and  if 
such  a  usage  sanctioning  a  departure  be  proven,  the  usage  not 
contradicting  but  simply  explaining  the  terms  of  the  contract, 
full  force  and  effect  will  be  given  an  exemption  from  liability 
where  the  loss  has  occurred  during  such  a  departure.^^ 

Where,  however,  there  is  a  breach  of  the  contract  of  carriage, 
and  such  breach  occurs  upon  the  stipulated  route,  as  where  the 
carrier  has  stipulated  that  the  goods  shall  be  carried  by  a  stipu- 
lated route  but  owing  to  a  mistake  on  his  part  he  neglects  to 
transfer  the  goods  at  an  intermediate  station  at  which  point  it  is 
necessary  to  transfer  them  to  another  train  in  order  that  then* 
may  be  forwarded  by  the  stipulated  route  and  within  the  time 
contemplated,  he  will  not  be  deprived  of  the  benefit  of  exemp- 
tions from  liability  contained  in  his  contract  if,  in  order  to  de- 
crease the  sum  for  which  he  would  be  liable,  he  forwards  the 
goods  by  another  route  than  that  provided  for  in  the  contract.*^ 

Sec.  481.  (§281.)  Exceptions  to  liability  in  the  bills  of 
lading  of  carriers  by  water. — Something  remains  to  be  said 
in  this  chapter  upon  the  subject  of  the  exceptions  always  to  be 

29.  Robinson  v.  Transportation  32.  Keeney  c.  Railroad  Co.,  47 
Co.,  supra.  N.   Y.   r)2.). 

30.  Hunnewell  v.  Taber,  2  33.  Robertson  r.  Steamship  Co., 
Sprague,    1.  139  N.  Y.  41fi,  .'54  N.  E.  Rep.  lo.").!, 

31.  Pavitt   V.   Railroad   Co.,    153  reversing  17  N.  Y.  Supp.  4.V.). 
Penn.   St.   302,  25   Atl.  Rep.   1107.  34.  Foster  v.  Railway  Co.,  2  K. 

B.    (1904)   306,  73  L.  J.  K.  B.  811. 


520 


THE  LAW   OF   CARRIERS. 


[§  482. 


found  in  the  bills  of  lading  of  carriers  by  water,  and  which  are 
peculiar  to  them.  From  the  remotest  times,  and  long  before 
carriers  by  land  had  begun  to  put  any  limit  upon  their  common- 
law  liability  by  contract  or  notice,  it  had  become  common  for 
carriers  by  sea  to  provide  for  themselves  a  somewhat  more  exten- 
sive protection  than  was  allowed  them  by  the  exceptions  of  what 
were  known  as  the  acts  of  God  and  of  the  king's  enemies,  the 
benefit  of  which  the  law  always  allowed  them,  as  we  have  seen, 
by  inserting  in  their  bills  of  lading  exceptions  also  of  the  perils 
or  dangers  of  the  seas ;  and  this  limitation  of  their  liability  by 
contract  to  this  extent  with  their  employers  became  at  length, 
from  long  usage,  one  of  their  conceded  rights.  And  when  the 
carrying  business  upon  rivers  and  other  internal  bodies  of  water 
became  of  sufficient  importance  to  demand  it,  the  words  were 
extended  so  as  to  include  not  only  the  perils  and  dangers  of 
navigation  upon  the  high  seas,  but  also  of  river  and  other  water 
navigation.35 

Sec.  482.  (§282.)  Same  subject — Perils  of  the  sea — 
Dangers  of  navigation. — This  exception  is  one  of  the  highest 
importance  to  carriers  upon  the  rivers  of  this  country,  especially 
upon  our  western  rivers,  which,  owing  to  continually  shifting 
currents  and  other  unexpected  obstructions  to  their  navigation, 
make  the  carrying  business  upon  them  more  than  ordinarily  dan- 
gerous ;  and  for  this  reason,  as  we  have  seen,  some  of  the  courts 
have  held  that  losses  occurring  in  their  navigation  from  such 
causes  come  within  the  exceptions  of  the  acts  of  God  from  which 
the  carrier  is  protected  independently  of  contract.  "It  is  to  be 
observed,"  say  the  court  in  Steamboat  Company  ads.  Bason,3« 
"that  in  our  river  navigation,  owing  to  forests  upon  their  banks 


35.  The  earliest  mention  of  the 
exception  of  the  perils  of  the  sea 
in  a  bill  of  lading  or  charter-party 
is  said  to  be  in  Pickering  r.  Bark- 
ley,  Style,  132,  which  is  copied  in 
full,  ante,  §  316. 

The  English  bill  of  lading,  as  it 
is  called  in  Laveroni  v.  Drury,  8 


Exch.  166,  contains  exceptions  of 
"the  act  of  God,  the  king's 
enemies,  fire,  and  all  and  every 
other  dangers  and  accidents  of  the 
seas,  rivers  and  navigation  of 
whatever  nature  and  kind  soever." 
Abbott  on  Ship.  322. 
36.  Harper,  Law,  262. 


§483.]  CONTRACTS   LIMITING   LIABILITY,  521 

and  frequent  inundations,  hidden  snags  frequently  occur  and 
constitute  a  danger  peculiar  to  rivers  so  situated ;  and  from  the 
frequent  shiftings  of  these  snags  and  their  i-ecurrence  from 
freshets,  they  constitute  in  our  rivers  an  instance  of  th<'  actus 
Dei  which  skill  and  experience  cannot  guard  against."  Hence 
the  provision  against  the  dangers  of  navigation  is  never  omitted 
from  the  bills  of  lading  of  those  engaged  in  transporting  goods 
upon  our  rivers. 

Sec.  483.  Same  subject— Perils  of  the  sea,  etc.,  not  synony- 
mous with  act  of  God,  etc.— While  perils  of  the  sea  have  been 
said  to  refer  to  those  accidents  peculiar  to  navigation  which  an- 
of  an  extraordinary  character,  or  which  arise  from  some  irrt'sisl- 
ible  force  or  overwhelming  power  which  cannot  be  guarded 
against  by  the  ordinary  exertions  of  human  skill  and  prudence,-"'^ 
such  exceptions  are  by  no  means  synonymous  with  those  of  the 
acts  of  God  and  of  the  king's  enemies.  They  have  a  more  exten- 
sive signification,  and  include  many  perils  which,  according  to 
the  construction  which  has  been  given  to  those  words,  would  not 
come  within  the  meaning  of  the  acts  of  God  or  of  the  king's 
enemies.3^  They  include  many  casualties  which  the  agency  of 
man  has  concurred  in  producing,  which,  as  we  have  seen,  would 
preclude  them  from  being  treated  as  the  acts  of  God.  Thus,  di.s- 
asters  from  collisions,  where  the  carrier  who  claims  exemption 
from  liability  from  the  loss  thereby  occasioned  by  reason  of  such 
an  exception  in  his  contract  is  not  in  fault,  are  held  to  be  em- 
braced in  the  meaning  of  the  term  "the  dangers  of  naviga- 
tion."^^ But  if  such  loss  might  have  been  avoided  by  the  exer- 
cise of  any  reasonable  skill  or  diligence  at  the  time  when  it  oc- 
curred, it  is  not  to  be  deemed  in  the  sense  of  the  phra.se  such  a 

37.  The  Arctic  Bird,  109  Fed.  .312;  Story  on  Bail.  S  512;  The 
167.  Schooner     Reeside,    2    Sum.    .')('>7; 

38.  Gordon  v.  Buchanan,  .")  Yerg.  Plaisted  v.  Navigation  Co.,  27  Me. 
71;  McArthur  v.  Sears,  21  Wend.  1.32;  Steamship  Co.  r.  Burrows,  3(j 
190;    Hays    r.    Kennedy,    41    Penn.  Fla.    121.   is   So.  Rep.   .'549. 

St.    37S;    Williams    r.    Branson,    1         39.  The    Xantho.    12    App.    Cas. 

Murphey,      417;      Whitesides      v.  503;   Garston  Co.  r.  Hlckie,  IS  Q. 

Thurlkill,   12  Sm.  &  M.  599;   Gar-  B.  Div.  17. 
rison    v.    Insurance    Co.,    19    How. 


522  THE  LAW  OF   CAKRIEES.  [§  484. 

loss  by  the  perils  of  navigation  as  will  exempt  the  carrier  from 
liability,  but  rather  as  a  loss  attributable  to  his  negligence.^^ 
And  when  a  ship  was  run  down  in  open  daylight  and  in  mod- 
erate weather  by  one  or  two  other  ships  sailing  in  an  opposite 
direction  to  her,  but  under  such  circumstances  that  no  blame 
could  be  attached  to  any  of  the  vessels,  the  accident  was  held  to 
have  happened  by  a  peril  of  the  sea,  and  to  come  within  the  ex- 
ception.'*^ 

Sec.  484.  (§284.)  Same  subject— What  included— Illustra- 
tions.— So  where  the  master  of  a  vessel  on  a  foggy  night,  in 
entering  a  port,  mistook  the  signal  lights  and  ran  his  vessel 
aground,  whereby  the  cargo  was  damaged,  a  misfortune  happen- 
ing under  almost  precisely  the  same  circumstances  which  were 
held  in  McArthur  v.  Sears^^  ^qi  iq  \)q  attributable  to  the  act  of 
God,  and  for  which,  therefore,  the  carrier  in  that  case  was  held 
liable,  it  was  held  that  he  was  protected  from  liability  by  the 
clause  in  his  bill  of  lading  providing  against  the  perils  of  navi- 
gation.-*^ 

Sec.  485.  (§  285.)  Same  subject — Jettison,  when  included. 
— So  a  jettison  made  necessary  by  a  tempest  is,  in  ordinary 
cases,  a  loss  by  the  perils  of  the  sea.'*^  But,  if  it  be  rendered 
necessary  by  any  fault  of  the  master  or  owners  of  the  vessel,  it 
will  be  attributed  to  such  fault  and  not  to  the  peril  of  the  sea, 
though  the  latter  may  cause  the  immediate  necessity  for  it.  And 
in  the  case  in  which  this  was  held  the  carrier  was  held  to  have 
been  in  fault,  because  in  the  night  and  in  a  fog  he  entered  by 
mistake  the  wrong  port,  supposing  it  to  be  the  port  of  destina- 
tion, when  he  could  with  safety   have    remained   outside   until 

40.  Hays  v.   Kennedy,   41   Penn.        42.  21  Wend.   190. 

St.    supra;    Whitesides    v.    Thurl-  43.  The   Juniata   Paton,   1   Biss. 

kill,  supra;  Abbott  on  Ship.  240;  15. 

Story  on  Bail.   §514;     Costigan  v.  44.  Gillett,  v.  Ellis,   11   111.   579; 

Transportation    Co.,    33    Mo.    App.  Lawrence    v.    Minturn,     17     How. 

269;  Woodley  v.  Michell,  11  Q.  B.  100;     The    Bergenseron,    36    Fed. 

Div.  47;   Nill  v.  Sturgeon,  28  Mo.  Rep.    700;     The    Marlborough,    47 

328.  Fed.   667. 

41.  Buller  v.  Fisher,  3  Esp.  67. 


§486.]  CONTRACTS   LIMITING   LIABIL1T\  .  523 

morning.  Being  in  doubt,  prudence  should  have  restrainecd  him 
from  entering  the  port  until  morning ;  and  having  ventured  in 
and  grounded  in  the  night,  which  made  the  jettison  necessary, 
he  could  derive  no  benefit  from  such  a  clause  in  his  bill  of 
lading.45  To  the  same  effect  is  the  ease  of  The  Delaware,^"  in 
which  it  was  shown  that  the  goods  were  jettisoned  in  a  storm, 
and  the  carrier  claimed  exemption  from  liability  undt'r  lh»' 
clause  in  his  bill  pf  lading  excepting  losses  from  the  perils  of  the 
sea.  But  it  also  appearing  that  the  goods,  without  the  consent 
of  the  shipper,  had  been  stowed  on  deck,  contrary  to  the  duty  of 
the  carrier,  he  was  allowed  to  take  no  benefit  from  the  exception. 
And  where  the  master  and  crew  became  panic  stricken  and 
drove  overboard  a  number  of  head  of  cattle,  it  appearing  that 
the  vessel  did  not  encounter  any  extraordinary  or  unusual  stress 
of  weather,  the  owners  of  the  vessel  were  not  allowed  to  take 
advantage  of  the  exemption  from  liability  for  losses  arising  from 
the  perils  of  the  sea."^''' 

Sec.  486.  (§286.)  Same  subject — Hidden  obstructions. — 
So  if  an  obstruction  be  recently  placed  in  a  navigable  stream  and 
be  hidden  and  unknown,  such  as  no  human  prudence  or  fore- 
sight could  have  guarded  against,  and  the  carrier's  boat  be  run 
upon  it  and  sunk,  he  will  be  protected  by  the  exception  of  the 
dangers  of  navigation  in  his  bill  of  lading.^*^  And  under  a  bill 
of  lading  for  goods  to  be  delivered  in  good  condition,  ' '  the  dam- 
ages of  the  seas  and  fire  only  excepted,"  the  carrier  is  not  liable 
for  a  loss  of  the  goods  occasioned  by  the  striking  of  his  boat  on  a 
hidden  obstruction  of  recent  origin  in  the  channel  of  the  river, 
causing  it  to  sink  while  being  towed  upon  the  river,  without 
fault  or  negligence  on  his  part.  Such  an  obstruction,  it  was  said, 
was  a  peril  of  the  sea.*^ 

45.  The  Portsmouth,  9  Wall.  682.  48.  Johnson  v.  Friar,  4  Yerg.  48; 

46.  14  Wall.  579.  Gordon     v.    Buchanan,    5    id.    71; 

47.  Compania  de  Navigacion  La  Chouteaux  v.  Leech,  18  Pa.  St. 
Flecha  v.   Brauer,   168   U.   S.    104,  224. 

18  Sup.  Ct.  12,  42  L.  Ed.  398,  af-  49.  Redpath  r.  Vaughan.  .V2 
firming  35  U.  S.  App.  44,  and  61  Barb.  489.  See.  also.  The  Favorite, 
Fed.  860;  s.  c.  57  Fed.  403.  2  Biss.  502;  Boyce  r.  Welch.  5  La. 


524  THE  LAW   OF   CARRIERS.  [§  487. 

Sec.  487.  (§  287.)  Same  subject — Other  perils. — In  the  case 
of  The  Washington  Insurance  Company  v.  Keed,^*^  after  stating 
the  law  to  be  that  the  perils  of  the  seas  which  constitute  a  part 
of  the  risks  in  almost  every  marine  policy  comprehend  those  of 
the  winds,  waves,  lightning,  rocks,  shoals,  collision,  and,  in  gen- 
eral, all  causes  of  loss  and  damage  to  the  property  insured, 
arising  from  the  elements  and  inevitable  accidents,  the  court 
held  the  underwriters  of  a  policy  insuring  goods  upon  a  flatboat 
against  the  perils  of  the  river  liable  for  damage  caused  by  the 
waves  made  by  a  steamboat  passing  such  flatboat,  the  court  say- 
ing that  it  could  see  no  difference  in  reason,  so  far  as  it  con- 
cerned the  question  of  what  perils  were  included  in  the  excep- 
tion, whether  the  waves  were  raised  by  human  or  by  natural 
means.  But  in  the  same  court  it  has  been  held  that,  when  the 
carrier  relies  upon  the  exception  of  the  dangers  of  the  river  in 
his  bill  of  lading,  he  must  show  that  the  highest  degree  of  skill 
and  care  was  exercised  by  him.^i  And  in  Laurie  v.  Douglass,^- 
it  was  held  that  the  breaking  of  a  rope  by  which  the  ship,  then 
in  dock  and  unloading,  was  made  to  cant  and  take  in  water, 
whereby  a  portion  of  her  cargo  was  damaged,  came  within  the 
exception  of  the  perils  of  the  seas  in  her  bill  of  lading. 

Sec.  488.     Same  subject. — But  a  rush  of  water  through  a 

rent  in  the  side  of  the  vessel,  the  rent  having  been  caused  by  an 

Ann.    623;    Hibernia    Ins.    Co.    v.  sea  or  other  specified  perils  does 

St.  Louis  Co.,  120  U.  S.  166;   Tur-  not  excuse  him  from  that  obliga- 

ney  v.  Wilson,  7  Yerg.  340;   Smyrl  tion  or  exempt  him  from  liability 

V.  Nolan,  2  Bailey,  421.  for   loss   or   damage   from   one   of 

50.  20  Ohio,  199.  Losses  from  those  perils  to  which  the  negli- 
coUision  or  stranding  are  within  gence  of  himself  or  his  servants 
the  perils  of  the  sea.  Liverpool,  has  contributed."  Gray,  J.,  in 
etc.  Steam  Co.  r.  Insurance  Co.,  Liverpool  Steam  Co.  r.  Insurance 
129  U.  S.  397.  Co.,   supra,   citing   Navigation  Co. 

51.  Graham  r.  Davis,  4  Ohio  St.  v.  Bank,  6  How.  344;  Express  Co. 
362.  "The  ordinary  contract  of  a  v.  Kountze,  8  Wall.  342;  Trans- 
carrier  does  involve  an  obligation  portation  Co.  v.  Downer,  11  Wall, 
on  his  part  to  use  due  care  and  129;  Grill  v.  Screw  Co.,  L.  R.  1 
skill  in  navigating  the  vessel  and  C.  P.  600;  s.  c.  L.  R.  3  C.  P.  476; 
carrying  the  goods;  and,  as  is  The  Xantho,  L.  R.  12  App.  Cas. 
everywhere  held,   an   exception  in  503,  510,  515. 

the  bill  of  lading  of  perils  of  the         52.  15  M.  &  W.  746. 


J 


§488. 


CONTRACTS   LIMITING   LIABILITY. 


o'So 


unforeseen  explosion  of  blasting-  caps,  was  held  not  to  eoine 
within  an  exception  of  perils  of  the  seas  or  accidents  of  navina- 
tion.-''>3  Nor  will  damage  occasioned  by  rats  gnawing  a  hole  in  a 
water  pipe,  causing  water  to  escape  and  injure  the  cargo,  be  con- 
sidered a  peril  of  the  sea.^-^  So  an  injury  to  the  vessel  caused 
by  worms  is  not  a  peril  of  the  sea  within  an  exemption  from 
liability  for  perils  of  the  seas.^^  3^^^  damage  occasioned  by  sea 
water  entering  the  ship's  ventilator  holes,  after  the  ventilators 
had  been  carried  away  by  a  heavy  gale,  was  hold  to  have  h.M'n 
caused  by  a  peril  of  the  sea  within  the  exemption  of  the  bill  of 
lading.^<5  So  M^here  logs,  having  been  brought  alongside  tlie  ves- 
sel for  the  purpose  of  being  loaded,  were  caused  to  go  adrift  by 
a  heavy  gale,  it  was  held  that  the  loss  was  caused  by  a  peril  of 
the  sea  within  the  clause  for  exemption  from  liability  for  losses 
due  to  such  causes.'^'^    And  where  a  loss  resulted  from  the  giving 


53.  The  G.  R.  Booth,  171  U.  S. 
450,  19  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  9,  43  L.  Ed. 
234,  reversing  American  Sugar  Re- 
fining Co.  V.  The  G.  R.  Booth,  64 
Fed.  87S,  s.  c.  91  Fed.  164,  33  C.  C. 
A.  430. 

54.  The  Euripides,  71  Fed.  729, 
38  U.  S.  App.  1,  18  C.  C.  A.  226, 
reversing  63  Fed.  140,  and  52  Fed. 
161. 

55.  The  Giles  Loring,  48  Fed. 
463. 

56.  The  Dunbritton,  73  Fed.  352, 
19  C.  C.  A.  449,  38  U.  S.  App.  369, 
reversing  Crooks  v.  The  Dunbrit- 
ton,  61   Fed.   764. 

But  the  damage  of  cargo  by  sea- 
water  entering  the  hold,  through 
the  negligent  calking  of  the 
hatches,  is  not  due  to  a  peril  of 
the  sea.  The  Glide,  78  Fed.  152, 
24   C.   C.   A.   46. 

A  severe  storm,  during  which  all 
the  sails  of  the  vessel  are  blowH 
away,  her  foreboom  broken  and 
both  her  anchors  parted  from 
their  chains  is  a  peril  of  the  sea 


which  justifies  her  abandonment. 
The  Calvin  S.  Edwards,  50  Fed. 
477,  1  C.  C.  A.  533,  1  U.  S.  App. 
173,  aft'g  46  Fed.  815. 

The  mere  rolling  of  a  vessel  in 
a  cross  sea  is  not  of  itself  a  peril 
of  the  sea.  But  a  loss  which  is 
sustained  during  cross  seas  of  un- 
usual violence  may  be  fairly  at- 
tributed to  a  peril  of  the  seas. 
The  Frey,  106  Fed.  319,  45  C.  C. 
A.   309,  reversing  92  Fed.  667. 

57.  Munson  S.  S.  Line  c.  Steiger 
&  Co.,  132  Fed.  160;  s.  c.  136  Fed. 
772. 

It  cannot  be  presumed  that  a 
greater  liability  was  intended  to 
be  contracted  for  as  to  cargo  de- 
livered alongside  the  ship,  than  for 
cargo  received  aboard  for  which 
bills  of  lading  are  outstanding. 
When,  therefore,  bills  of  lading 
contain  exceptions  as  to  perils  of 
the  sea,  and  pieces  of  timber  are 
received  alongside  the  ship,  the 
carrier  will  not  be  liable  if  they 
are  lost  through  a  violent  storm 


526 


THE  LAW  OF   CAKRIERS. 


[§  489. 


way  of  a  stanchion  in  heavy  weather,  it  was  considered  that  the 
loss  fell  within  a  clause  providing  for  exemption  from  liability 
for  all  damage  and  accidents  of  the  seas  and  navigation.'^s 

Sec.  489.  (§288.)  Same  subject — Other  perils — Fire  not 
included. — Losses  by  fire,  though  it  may  be  accidental,  do  not 
come  within  the  exception  of  the  pejils  or  dangers  of  the  seas  in 
bills  of  lading,^^  though  this  and  other  losses  may  be  excluded.*''^ 
And  the  fact  that  fire  produces  the  motive  power  of  the  vessel 
makes  no  difference.^^  Nor  does  the  explosion  of  the  boiler  of  a 
steam  vessel  come  within  the  exception,^^  though  it  has  been 
held  that  the  escape  of  steam  without  the  fault  of  the  officers  of 
the  boat,  whereby  mules  which  are  being  carried  as  freight,  and 
which  were  properly  stationed  on  the  boat,  were  injured,  came 
within  the  meaning  of  the  exception  of  the  perils  of  navigation.^^ 
And  where  the  carrier  of  cattle  put  them  in  a  lighter  to  be  land- 
ed, which  was  the  customary  mode,  confining  them  by  a  chain 


of  wind.  Southerland-Innes  Co.  v. 
Thynas,  128  Fed.  42,  64  C.  C.  A. 
116. 

58.  The  Exe,  57  Fed.  399,  6  C. 
C  A.  410,  14  U.  S.  App.  626,  re- 
versing   52    Fed.    155. 

See  also,  The  Folmina,  143  Fed. 
636. 

59.  New  Jersey  Steam  Nav.  Co. 
V.  Merchants'  Bank,  6  How.  344; 
Garrison  v.  The  Memphis  Ins.  Co., 
19  id.  312;  Parsons  v.  Monteath, 
13  Barb.  353;  Swindler  v.  Milliard, 
2  Rich.  286. 

60.  Losses  from  sweating,  heat- 
ing, etc.,  may  be  provided  against 
if  carrier  not  negligent.  The  Por- 
tuense,  35  Fed.  Rep.  670 ;  The  Key- 
stone, 31  Fed.  Rep.  412;  The  Jef- 
ferson, id.  489;  Wolff  v.  The  Vader- 
land,  18  Fed.  Rep.  739.  So  a  loss 
by  leakage  may  be  provided 
against,  and  relieve  the  carrier  if 
goods  were  properly  stowed  (The 
Barracouta,  39  Fed.  Rep.  288),  but 
not     if     defectively    stored.      The 


Britannia,  34  Fed.  Rep.  906.  Leak- 
age means  leaking  of  the  cask  or 
can  and  not  leaking  of  the  ship 
(Hill  V.  Sturgeon,  28  Mo.  323), 
nor  leaking  from  other  goods. 
Thrift  V.  Youle,  2  C.  P.  Div.  434. 
So  of  breakage  or  drainage.  The 
Bitterne,  35  Fed.  Rep.  927.  So 
loss  from  fire  "at  any  time  or 
place"  before  or  after  loading. 
The  Egypt,  25  Fed.  Rep.  320;  Hall 
V.  Railroad  Co.,  14  Phila.  414; 
Scott  X.  Steamship  Co.,  19  Fed. 
Rep.  56;  Little  Miami  R.  Co.  v. 
Wetmore,  19  Ohio  St.  110. 

61.  New  Jersey  Steam  Nav.  Co. 
r.  Merchants'  Bank,  supra;  Hale 
V.  The  N.  J.  Steam  Nav.  Co.,  15 
Conn.  539;  Singleton  v.  Hilliard,  1 
Strob.  Law,  203. 

62.  Bulkley  v.  The  Naumkeag, 
etc.  Co.,  24  How.  386;  The  Mo- 
hawk, 8  Wall.  153;  McCall  v. 
Brock,  5  Strob.  Law,  119. 

63.  Union  Ins.  Co.  v.  Groom,  4 
Bush,    289. 


§490.] 


CONTRACTS   LIMITING  LIABILITY 


527 


running  fore  and  aft,  to  which  they  were  tied,  and  before  they 
could  be  landed  they  became  violent,  broke  the  chain  and  some 
of  them  were  drowned,  the  loss  was  held  to  have  been  by  the 
perils  of  the  sea.^^ 

Sec.  490.    (§289.)    Same  subject— How  question  determined. 

—These  are  given  as  a  few  of  the  many  illustrations  which 
might  be  given  from  the  decided  cases  upon  this  subjoci.cs  The 
question,  what  is  and  what  is  not  to  be  included  in  such  excep- 
tions, has  perhaps  more  frequently  arisen  between  the  insurer 
and  the  insured  in  actions  upon  policies  than  between  the  car- 
rier and  his  employer.  The  distinction  in  such  cases  is  that  the 
insurer  is  liable  at  all  events,  provided  the  danger  from  which 
the  loss  has  ensued  comes  within  the  terms  of  his  policy,  while 


64.  Anthony  v.  MinB.  Ins.  Co.,  1 
Abb.  Ct.  Ct.  343. 

65.  "Blowing"  of  bilge  water  is 
within  exemption  of  "blowing" 
and  perils  of  the  sea.  East  Ten- 
nessee R.  Co.  V.  Wright,  76  Ga. 
532.  Loss  from  the  motion  of  the 
boat  is  a  peril  of  the  sea  unless 
caused  by  defective  stowage. 
Christie  v.  The  Craighton,  41  Fed. 
Rep.  63.  Sweating  of  a  cargo  of 
sugar  in  a  storm  is  a  sea  peril. 
Matthiessen  Co.  v.  Gusi,  29  Fed. 
Rep.  794.  But  a  loss  which  is  the 
result  of  ordinary  wear  and  tear 
or  of  the  employment  of  the  ves- 
sel in  the  usual  course  of  naviga- 
tion is  not  a  loss  by  "perils  of  the 
sea."  The  term  may  be  defined 
as  denoting  all  marine  casualties 
resulting  from  the  violent  action 
of  the  elements  as  distinguished 
from  their  natural,  silent  influence 
upon  the  fabric  of  the  vessel; 
casualties  which  may  and  not  con- 
sequences which  must  occur.  The 
Warren  Adams,  74  Fed.  413,  20  C. 
C.  A.  486,  38  U.  S.  App.  356,  writ 
of  certiorari  denied,  163  U.  S.  679. 


Damage  from  coal  dust  is  not  a 
peril  of  the  sea  (Hills  v.  Mackill, 
36  Fed.  Rep.  702),  nor  is  an  in- 
jury to  cargo  by  rats.  The  Isa- 
bella, 8  Ben.  139.  Contra,  where 
water  admitted  through  holes 
made  by  rats,  Hamilton  v.  Pan- 
dorf,  12  App.  Cases,  518.  Ship- 
ping water  is  a  peril  of  sea  (The 
Chasca,  23  Fed.  Rep.  156),  and  sc 
is  leakage  (The  Blue  Jacket,  10 
Ben.  248;  Evans  v.  Spreckels,  45 
Fed.  Rep.  265);  and  the  breaking 
of  the  tiller  rope  without  negli- 
gence is  an  "unavoidable  danger 
of  navigation.  The  Morning 
Mail,  17  Fed.  Rep.  545.  Desertion 
by  seamen  is  not  a  peril  of  the 
sea.  The  Ethel,  5  Ben.  154.  Bur- 
den of  proof  is  on  carrier  to  show 
loss  to  be  within  exemption.  The 
C  J.  Willard,  38  Fed.  Rep.  759; 
The  Thos.  Melville,  31  id.  48G; 
The  Lydian  Monarch,  23  id.  298; 
The  Sinnickson,  24  id.  304;  The 
Polynesia,  16  id.  702.  But  see  The 
Jefferson,  31  Fed.  Rep.  489;  The 
Stevenson,  17  id.  540. 


528 


THE  LAW   OP   CARRIERS. 


[§  490. 


the  carrier  is  not  liable  if  he  has  provided  against  his  liability 
for  the  loss  from  the  particular  cause  in  his  bill  of  lading,  unless 
it  can  be  shown  that  he  has  been  negligent  to  such  a  degree  as  to 
have  brought  about  the  loss  when  it  would  not  otherwise  have 
occurred,  or  has  been  remiss  in  his  duty  in  endeavoring  to  avoid 
it.  Otherwise,  it  is  presumed,  that  the  construction  of  such 
terms,  and  whether  a  particular  loss  falls  within  them,  will  be 
the  same  whether  the  question  be  upon  a  policy  of  insurance  or 
a  bill  of  lading.  What  they  mean  cannot  of  course  be  exactly 
determined,  nor  their  import  precisely  settled.^^  The  most  that 
can  be  said  perhaps  is  that  they  include  only  the  dangers  or  acci- 
dents of  navigation  upon  the  seas  or  rivers,  or  other  inland 
waters  which  are  not  embraced  by  the  well  known  exceptions 
made  by  the  law  to  the  carrier's  liability,  the  acts  of  God  and 
the  public  enemy,  and  are  yet  such  that  they  cannot  be  avoided 
by  any  prudence  or  foresight  or  ordinary  skill  on  his  part,^'^  and 


66.  Story  on  Bail.,  sec.  512. 

67.  In  Garrison  v.  Memphis  Ins. 
Co.,  19  How.  312,  the  language 
used  is:  "These  words  include 
risks  arising  from  natural  acci- 
dents peculiar  to  the  river,  which 
do  not  happen  by  the  intervention 
of  man  nor  are  to  be  prevented 
by  human  prudence;  and  have 
been  extended  to  comprehend 
losses  arising  from  some  irresisti- 
ble force  or  overwhelming  power 
which  no  ordinary  skill  could 
anticipate  or  evade.  They  exoner- 
ate a  carrier  from  a  liability  for  a 
loss  arising  from  an  attack  of 
pirates  or  from  a  collision  of  ships 
when  there  is  no  negligence  or 
fault  on  the  part  of  the  master 
and  crew.  Latterly  the  courts 
have  shown  an  indisposition  to 
extend  the  comprehension  of  these 
words.  The  destruction  of  a  ves- 
sel by  worms  at  sea  is  not  ac- 
counted a  loss  by  the  perils  of  the 
sea;    nor    was     a     damage     from 


bilging  arising  in  consequence  of 
the  insufficiency  of  tackle  for  get- 
ting her  from  the  dock;  nor  was 
damage  occasioned  to  a  vessel  by 
her  props  being  carried  away  by 
the  tide  while  she  was  undergo- 
ing repairs  on  the  beach,  excused, 
as  falling  within  that  exception." 
And  in  the  case  of  McArthur  v. 
Sears,  21  Wend.  190,  where  the 
question  was  whether  the  disaster 
came  within  the  exception  of  the 
act  of  God,  there  being  no  bill  of 
lading,  Cowen,  J.,  after  discussing 
the  question,  goes  on  to  say: 
"There  is  a  considerable  class  of 
cases  arising  upon  exceptions  in 
bills  of  lading  of  the  'perils  of  the 
sea,'  where  in  addition  to  losses 
from  natural  causes,  those  arising 
from  the  acts  of  third  persons  are 
sometimes  allowed  to  come  with- 
in the  terms.  Such  are  losses  by 
robbery  of  pirates.  Pickering  v. 
Barkley,  Style,  132;  2  Rolle's  Abr. 
248;  Buller  r.  Fisher,  Ab.  on  Ship. 


§491.] 


CONTRACTS  LIMITING  LIABILITY. 


529 


that  they  exempt  him  from  the  absolute  liability  of  the  common 
carrier,  but  not  from  the  consequencees  of  a  want  of  that  reason- 
able skill,  diligence  and  care,  the  absence  of  which  constitut.'s 
what  is  known  as  negligence. 

Sec.  491.     (§290.)     Same  subject-Carrier  liable,  notwith- 
standing exception,  for  loss  from  theft,  embezzlement,  robbery, 

pt.  3,  ch.  4,  §  2.  And  the  collision 
of  ships  without  the  fault  of  either 
party.     But  these  words  are  evi- 


dently of  broader  compass  than 
the  words  'act  of  God';  and  al- 
though it  was  supposed  by  a  very 
learned  judge  that  they  were  but 
commensurate  (Gould,  J.,  in  Wil- 
liams V.  Grant,  1  Conn.  487),  and 
therefore  whatever  was  a  peril  of 
the  sea  would  excuse  the  carrier 
acting  under  his  general  liability, 
yet  it  is  evident  from  the  cases  we 
have  considered  that  they  are  not 
always  so.  The  distinction  was 
adverted  to  but  not  much  exam- 
ined by  Story,  J.,  in  The  Schooner 
Reeside,  2  Sumn.  571.  The  case 
of  Aymar  v.  Astor,  6  Cowen,  266, 
was  an  action  on  a  bill  of  lading 
excepting  the  dangers  of  the  seas. 
The  goods  were  damaged  on  the 
voyage  by  rats;  and  it  was  held 
that  the  defendants  having  taken 
every  precaution  to  avoid  their 
depredations,  the  loss  was  by  a 
danger  of  the  sea  within  the 
policy.  This  case,  we  noticed  be- 
fore, has  been  treated  as  tending 
to  upset  the  law  extending  the 
implied  liability  of  common  car- 
riers to  the  water.  The  case  itself 
has  no  such  tendency."  "Cases  as 
to  the  meaning  of  the  words  'perils 
of  the  sea'  often  arise  also  upon 
policies  of  insurance.  For  in- 
stance, it  was  held  that  the  loss 
of  a  ship  by  the  sudden  impress- 
ment of  sailors  sent  on  shore  to 
34 


fasten  it  was  a  loss  within  the 
policy.  Hodgson  v.  Malcolm.  5 
Bos.  &  P.  [m.  Yet  it  seems  clear, 
on  the  cases,  that  such  an  act 
could  not  be  received  to  exempt  a 
common  carrier  either  as  the  act 
of  God  or  of  the  enemies  of  the 
state.  It  may  be  irresistible.  So 
we  have  seen  of  many  acts  merely 
human;  still  they  may  be  col- 
lusively  committed.  The  carrier 
may  collude  with  the  press  gang 
as  well  as  with  robbers  or  illegal 
kidnapers.  The  difficulty  returns 
therefore;  if  we  receive  the  im- 
mediate agency  of  third  persons  in 
any  shape,  we  open  the  very  door 
for  collusion  which  has  denied  an 
excuse  by  reason  of  theft,  robbery 
and  fire.  Marsh  ads.  Blythe,  1 
Nott  &  McCord,  170,  which  held  it 
a  defense  that  the  carrier's  vessel 
was,  without  his  fault,  run  down 
by  another,  is  an  instance  in 
which  the  rule  in  respect  to  the 
special  exception  in  a  bill  of  lad- 
ing has  been  applied  to  the  car- 
rier's general  liability.  There  may 
be  other  cases  of  a  like  character; 
but  it  seems  clearly  to  me,  from 
authorities  I  have  been  able  to 
consult,  that  the  expression  'perils 
or  dangers  of  the  sea,'  or  'dangers 
of  the  river,'  etc.,  will  be  found  to 
allow,  in  several  cases,  human 
agency  and  other  causes  to  excuse 
a  loss  which  cannot  be  allowed  in 
favor  of  common  carriers  without 
giving  up  the  rigorous  obligation 


530  THE  LAW  OF   CARRIERS.  [§'192. 

etc. — Consequently,  notwithstanding  these  exceptions  in  his 
bill  of  lading,  the  carrier  remains  liable  for  embezzlement,  theft, 
robbery,  the  violence  of  mobs  and  depredators,  provided  they  are 
not  pirates,  in  the  same  manner  as  he  would  have  been  without 
them,  losses  from  such  causes  arising  entirely  from  human 
agency,  and  being  such  as  may  be  provided  against.  In  King 
V.  Shepherd,^^  a  box  of  sovereigns  was  shipped  under  a  bill  of 
lading  containing  the  usual  exceptions  against  the  perils  of  the 
seas.  The  vessel  was  wrecked  on  the  voyage  and  the  box  wa.> 
stolen ;  and  it  was  held  that  the  master  and  owners  were  respon- 
sible for  its  value,  theft  and  robbery  being  perils  of  the  seas  only 
when  committed  by  pirates,  but  not  where  committed  by  persons, 
coming  to  the  ship  when  she  was  not  upon  the  high  seas  or  by 
those  on  board.  Nor  are  depredations  upon  a  cargo  by  passen- 
gers and  crew  in  consequence  of  scarcity  of  provisions,  owing  to 
the  length  of  a  voyage,  perils  of  the  sea.  In  the  case  of  The 
Gold  Hunter,69  it  appeared  that  owing  to  the  length  of  the  voy- 
age, the  ship's  provisions  became  so  scarce  that  the  crew  and 
passengers  had  to  be  put  upon  half  rations,  which  caused  the 
passengers  to  become  so  ungovernable  that  they  could  not  be  re- 
strained from  seizing  upon  and  consuming  a  portion  of  the 
freight.  It  was  nevertheless  held  that  the  master  and  owners  of 
the  vessel  were  liable. 

Sec.  492.  (§290a.)  Same  subject — Carrier  liable  notwith- 
standing exemption  if  loss  caused  by  negligence. — And  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  general  rule,  these  exemptions  will  afford  the 
carrier  no  protection  where  the  loss  was  caused  by  the  negli- 
gence of  himself  or  his  servants'''*^  unless  he  has  expressly  con- 
imposed  upon  them  by  the  policy  Stevens  v.  Navigation  Co.,  39  Fed. 
of  the  law."  Rep.   562. 

68.  3  Story,  349.  So   a   vessel    is    liable,   notwith- 

69.  1  Bl.  &  H.  300.  standing     exemption,     where     the 

70.  Thus  a  stipulation  in  a  bill  vessel  is  stranded  because  a  haz- 
of  lading  exempting  the  owner  ardous  passage  was  unnecessarily 
from  liability  for  losses  caused  by  selected  (The  Fred  H.  Rice,  40 
vermin  will  not  excuse  him  for  a  Fed.  Rep.  690),  or  the  master 
loss  from  rats  if  he  negligently  neglects  usual  precautions  (The 
omitted     to     fumigate     his     ship.     Montana,  17  id.  377);  and,  though 


(492.] 


CONTRACTS  LIMITING   LIABILITY. 


531 


tracted  against  liability  for  negligence,  and  by  the  i-iilcs  ul"  law 
of  the  particular  country  such  a  contract  is  not  considered  un- 
reasonable.^^ 


perils  of  sea  are  provided  against, 
if  goods  are  injured  from  water 
admitted  through  mistake  of  offi- 
cer (The  Bergenseren,  36  Fed. 
Rep.  700),  or  other  negligence 
(Norman  v.  Binnington,  25  Q.  B. 
Div.  475) ;  and,  though  sweating 
exempted,  if  caused  by  defective 
storage  (Paturzo  v.  Company,  31 
Fed.  Rep,  611;  The  Keystone,  31 
Fed.  Rep.  412;  WolfE  v.  Vaderland, 
IS  id.  733);  and,  though  leakage 
exempted,  if  caused  by  tampering 
with  cases  (The  Giglio,  31  Fed. 
Rep.  432),  or  bad  stowage  (The 
Colon,  9  Ben.  354). 

So  a  carrier  of  animals  will  be 
liable,  though  loss  from  disease 
excluded,  where  he  has  neglected 
to  clean  his  ship  after  carrying 
sick  animals.  Tattersall  v.  Steam- 
ship Co.,  12  Q.  B.  Div.  297.  But 
where  a  vessel  was  chartered  for 
a  cargo  of  logs,  a  provision  that 
the  cargo  was  to  be  delivered 
alongside  the  vessel  and  there 
held  at  charterers  risk  and  ex- 
pense, was  held  not  to  be  unrea- 
sonable as  exempting  the  vessel 
from  liability  for  the  negligence  of 


the  master  or  crew.  The  Ira  B. 
Ellems,  50  Fed.  934,  2  C.  C.  A. 
H5,  affirming  48  Fed.  591. 

71.  Goods  were  shijjped  under 
bills  of  lading  which  exemjjted 
the  carrier  from  liability  for  "loss 
or  damage  resulting  from  any  of 
the  following  perils  (whether  aris- 
ing from  the  negligence,  default  or 
error  in  judgment  of  the  pilot, 
master,  mariners,  engineers,  or 
others  of  the  crew,  or  otherwise 
howsoever),  namely,  .  .  .  perils 
of  the  seas,  rivers,  or  navigation 
of  whatever  nature  or  kind  so- 
ever." When  the  ship  was  off  the 
port  of  discharge,  the  engineer, 
intending  to  fill  the  ballast  tank 
with  water  for  boiler  use,  opened 
by  mistake  the  wrong  valve  and 
the  goods  were  damaged  by  sea 
water.  It  was  held  that  the  dam- 
age was  caused  by  a  peril  of  the 
sea  within  the  exemption  of  the 
bills  of  lading,  and  that  the  ship- 
owner was  not  liable.  Blackburn 
(;.  Navigation  Co.,  (1902),  1  K.  B. 
290,  71  L.  J.  K.  B.  177,  85  Law  T. 
783,  50  Wkly.  Rep.  272. 


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